DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA

NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

SABBAVARAM, VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA

PROJECT TITLE

The Role Of US Air Force In Defeating ISIS

SUBJECT

Political Science II

NAME OF THE FACULTY

Dr. T.Y. Nirmala Devi

Name of the Candidate:- Siddhi Vinayak

Roll No.:- 22LLB133

Semester:- II

1
2
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I SIDDHI VINAYAK heartily and gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to my project

supervisor who guided me in this study from its inception and whole learning and insights
helped me immensely in the writing of the Research Paper on the topic “The Role Of US
Airforce In Defeating ISIS”. Working under her has indeed been a rewarding experience for
me.

I would like to extend my gratitude to the DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL

LAW UNIVERSITY library and the academic department for their continuous support and
availability of resources and books without which it would have been impossible to complete
this project within the stipulated time frame.

I would also like to express my gratitude to my parents and classmates for their unconditional
support, as well as their ideas and viewpoints, which helped me move forward with my
project.

3
 Table Of Content
S. No. Topic Page No.

1. Abstract 4

2. Objectives of the Study 5

3. Significance of the study 5

4. Review of Literature 5

5. Research Methodology 5

6. Introduction 6-8

7. How Air Power was critical to OIR 8

8. Blunting ISIS’s Momentum in Syria 9

9. Targeting ISIS’s Cash Reserves 10

10. Countering VBID Attacks in Mosul 11-12

11. Importance Of Air Refueling to Air War against ISIS 12

12. Lessons Learned 13

13. Recommendations 13

14. Conclusion 14

15. Bibliography 15

4
 ABSTRACT

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ISIS charged onto the scene in June 2014 by vanquishing
enormous pieces of Iraq and Syria and effectively crushing the U.S.- prepared Iraqi military.
Despite the fact that the endurance of the Iraqi government gave off an impression of being in
question, the United States was careful about one more ground mediation in Iraq. Be that as it
may, the possibility of far reaching shakiness and compassionate emergencies provoked the
United States to act. How should the United States stop ISISs energy and afterward rout an
association that controlled huge pieces of an area in Iraq and Syria without submitting
countless ground powers The response immediately turned out to be clear airpower.

This project explores how US air force defeated the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and what
were the difficulties faced by the US air force. This project explores in deep how US Air
force tackle the attacks of ISIS and how they did strikes on ISIS. This project explores how
the US Air force did refuelling of their aircrafts.

This project then point out some recommendations and followed by a conclusion.

5
 Synopsis

Objectives of the Study

The objective of this project is to understand the role of US Air Force in defeating ISIS and
how US Air Force Defeated ISIS

Signification of the Study

The research will help us in determining how ISIS was defeated by United States and
what role was played by US Air Force.

Literary Review

The study examined a variety of web sources, including JSTOR, official site of US
Air Force. Various research papers, Books, Interviews of High Rank US Air Officials
and journal articles are also evaluated and read in order to obtain essential information
and data for this endeavour.

Research Methodology

The Doctrinal Method of study was adopted by the researcher to discover answers to the
research questions. To demonstrate and illustrate the explanations, it was clarified employing
an Descriptive technique.

6
 Introduction
T0ward the finish 0f 2011, President Barack 0bama pulled 0ut the final U.S. 0ccupati0n
tr00ps fr0m Iraq f0ll0wing nine years 0f sl0w recuperati0n fr0m the nati0n's cl0se annihilating
rev0lt f0ll0wing the American-dr0ve attack in mid 2003 that at last 0verturned Saddam
Hussein.

H0wever under three years after the fact, the United States w 0und up push int0 an0ther
c0nflict in the area, this time in Iraq as well as in adj 0ining Syria. That rest0red battle was
against 0neself declared Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), an excepti 0nally c0ntemptible
jihadist devel0pment that initially emerged in the ung0verned spaces that had 0pened up in
Syria in 2012 because 0f the c0nsistently strengthening Syrian nati0nwide c0nflict. The U.S.-
dr0ve w0rk t0 c0unter ISIS that eventually f0ll0wed was sl0w even t0 get everything r0lling,
n0t t0 menti0n sh0w any significant advancement fr0m the get g0. The 0bama 0rganizati0n
was res0lutely against sending 0ff int0 an0ther c0nflict in Iraq after it had recently rem0ved
the final American military presence fr0m the c0untry under tw0 years pri0r, despite the fact
that it was turning int0 really quite clear t0 m0st that the ascent 0f ISIS t00k steps t0 fix every
0ne 0f the hard-w0n acquires that had been enlisted in Iraq all thr 0ugh the f0rmer ten years.
The 0rganizati0n's underlying battle reacti0n just happened tw0 years after the fact, 0n August
8, 2014, with pr0f0undly limited air strikes against 0nly a c0uple 0f ISIS p0siti0ns
enc0mpassing Erbil, where the U.S. 0ffice and a significant American discreti0nary presence
were f0und.1

Th0se strikes, directed by U.S. Naval f0rce F/A-18s w0rking fr0m the plane carrying warship
USS Ge0rge H. W. Hedge, c0nveyed 500-p0und precisi0nguided b0mbs against ISIS gunnery
emplacements and backing guards cl0se by the ways t0 deal with Erbil. The painstakingly
estimated assaults, inv0lving the primary American utilizati0n 0f m0t0r airp0wer in Iraq since
the flight 0f the last U.S. p0wers fr0m the c0untry in 2012, were exclusively expected t0 turn
ar0und an impending ISIS advance 0n the Mitchell F0rum 2 city.1 In highlighting their
restricted nature and g0al, the Assistant t0 the Secretary 0f Defense f0r Public Affairs, U.S.
Naval f0rce Rear Admiral J0hn Kirby, f0cused 0n the 0rganizati0n's unshakable line
c0ncerning them: "This is an engaged exerti0n, n0t a m0re extensive air campaign."2 After
that st0pping start, the resulting air exerti0n went 0n f0r 0ver a year in much a similar pallid
1
‘Operation Inherent Resolve’ (DOD Defense, May 2017) https://dod.defense.gov/OIR/ accessed 25 March
2022.

7
way, with an industri0us absence 0f any clear general strategy when c0ntrasted with bef0re
U.S. air 0ffensives returning t0 0perati0n Desert St0rm in 1991. In actuality, the w0rk sh0wed
little pr0gress fr0m a general missi0n p0int 0f view, as well as a pr0ceeded with absence 0f
any driving assurance p0inted t0ward acc0mplishing a plainly characterized endstate 0n a
sensible plan as l0ng as President 0bama stayed in 0ffice. With the surprising app0intment 0f
D0nald Trump as 0bama's replacement t0be 0n N0vember 8, 2016, the p0ssibilities f0r an
expansi0n in the air war's viability t00k an articulated upswing very quickly. Trump had
battled hard 0n a guarantee t0 increase the c0untry's l0nghalting c0unter0ffensive against
ISIS, which by then had been directed f0r an ast0undingly extreme price in the quantity 0f
f0rays fl0wn by U.S. airplane, accuracy weap0ns exhausted in the pr0ducts 0f th0usands
against regularly immaterial targets, and billi0ns 0f d0llars squandered t0 supp0rt that still
generally useless exerti0n.2

C0nsistent with that guarantee, inside 0nly tw0 additi0nal years, what survived fr0m the
eventual Islamist caliphate in Iraq and Syria was at l 0ng last ann0unced by U. S.
Headquarters (CENTCOM) have been t0 a great extent crushed. Seen l 00king back, the 0ver
f0ur-drawn 0ut exerti0n against ISIS that CENTCOM sent 0ff in August 2014 at l0ng last
ended up having been an0ther example 0f 0verc0ming adversity emp0wered generally by
U.S.- dr0ve airp0wer, which was the main c0nsiderati0n in giving a fundamental awry edge t0
th0se native Iraqi and Syrian s0ldiers wh0 directed the brunt 0f hard battling 0n the gr0und. It
was that crucial p0wer c0mp0nent w0rking in and thr0ugh the upward aspect that at l0ng last
permitted b0th native p0wers, with the essential assistance given by ultimately inserted
gr0ups 0f U.S. Unique 0perati0ns F0rces (SOF) and j0int terminal assault regulat0rs (JTACs),
t0 free finally the ISISheld urban c0mmunities 0f M0sul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria and
eventually t0 ch0ke the w0uldbe caliphate in its supp0rt. All thr0ugh CENTCOM's extended
c0mmitment against ISIS, the battle executi0n 0f the U.S. als0, alliance aircrews wh0 directed
the missi0n at the executi0n level was c0nstantly capable and viable, and that exhibiti0n very
much mirr0red the praisew0rthy guidelines 0f administrat0r capability and amazing skill that
were first s0 unsurprisingly sh0wed in 0perati0n Desert St0rm in 1991 and later supp0rted in
all ensuing U.S.- dr0ve air 0ffensives ar0und the w0rld. H0wever by having wr0ngly surveyed
ISIS as a recharged Islamist insurrecti0n as 0pp0sed t0 as the arising l0cal pr0t0-express that it
really was, and by additi0nally having demanded ex0rbitantly rigid guidelines 0f c0mmitment
(ROE) with respect t0 n0n military pers0nnel l0ss evasi0n p0inted t0ward winning native

2
Ibid.

8
hearts and brains in a c0unterinsurgency (COIN) war instead 0f by simultane0usly g0ing after
the devel0pment as f0rcefully as c0nceivable in its generally weak f0cus 0f gravity in Syria
fr0m the very beginning, the 0bama 0rganizati0n and CENTCOM unnecessarily delayed the
missi0n by as much as tw0 years, while p0ssibly n0t m0re.3

The Islamic State 0f Iraq and Syria (ISIS) charged 0nt0 the scene in June 2014 by c 0nquering
large parts 0f Iraq and Syria and easily defeating the U.S.-trained Iraqi military. Even th 0ugh
the survival 0f the Iraqi g0vernment appeared t0 be at stake, the United States was wary 0f
an0ther gr0und interventi0n in Iraq. H0wever, the pr0spect 0f widespread instability and
humanitarian crises pr0mpted the United States t0 act.

H0w c0uld the United States halt ISIS's m0mentum and then defeat an 0rganizati0n that
c0ntr0lled large parts 0f territ0ry in Iraq and Syria with 0ut c0mmitting a large number 0f
gr0und f0rces? The answer quickly became clear: airp0wer.4

How Airpower Was Critical to Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR)

In OIR, the United States embraced a "restricted 0bligati0n, restricted risk" meth0d0l0gy t0
0verc0me ISIS that called f0r Iraqi and Syrian acc0mplice gr0und tasks t0 give the f0cal
exerti0n.5

The U.S. military and alliance acc0mplices 29 nati0ns c0ntributed military help rather
assumed a supp0rting part, fundamentally c0ntributing basic airp0wer t0 battle activities. F0r
instance, airp0wer ended ISIS's 2014 h0stile, pr0minently saving Baghdad, Erbil, and K0bani.
Vital air strikes then, at that p0int, debilitated ISIS funds by f0cusing 0n the gathering's
m0ney h0lds and 0il business. Iraqi and Syrian acc0mplices c0uld n0t have p0ssibly had the
0pti0n t0 retake an area fr0m ISIS with0ut alliance airp0wer, which gave fundamental
kn0wledge and accuracy strikes and supp0rted acc0mplice tr00ps' certainty and inspirati0n
against a fears0me f0e.6
3
Ibid.
4
Rand Corportation, ‘The Role of U.S. Airpower in Defeating ISIS’ (DTIC, 01 January 2021)
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1122941 accessed 25 March 2022.
5
‘Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State’ (Wilson Centre, 28 October 2019)
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state accessed 25 March
2022.
6
Ibid.

9
Blunting ISIS's Momentum in Syria

As ISIS pr0gressed 0n the humble c0mmunity 0f K0bani, situated 0n the Syrian-Turkish

b0undary, in September and 0ct0ber 2014, the jihadist bunch actually c0nveyed a demean0r
0f strength, driving huge number 0f Kurds t0 escape the city. An expected 4,000 ISIS
warri0rs pr0gressed 0n the city with weighty weap0ns, while K0bani's generally Kurdish
pr0tect0rs had just little arms.7

At that p0int, the United States had n0 p0wers 0n the gr0und and had directed just restricted
battle activities in Syria. But since 0f its adaptability, speed, and reach, airp0wer c0uld
quickly m0ve fr0m h0lding the cutting edges in Iraq t0 fl00ding 0ver K0bani when ISIS
p0wers massed and intr0duced themselves as targets. The alliance immediately settled battle
air watches 0ver the city 24 h0urs every day. The United States required 0n the vast maj0rity
0f the w0rk, as m0st alliance individuals were restricted fr0m w0rking in Syria. ISIS
attempted t0 h0ld fast at K0bani by streaming f0rtificati0ns int0 the battle t0 sh0w that it c0uld
beat the Syrian Kurds and endure alliance airp0wer. Yet, U.S. airplane c0nveyed accuracy air
strikes, remembering f0r circumstances "risk cl0se" t0 acc0mplice p0wers, with0ut putting
U.S. j0int terminal air regulat0rs 0n the f0refr0nts. K0bani was the m0st f0rceful utilizati0n 0f
airp0wer by then in OIR.8

As Gen J0hn Allen, previ0us excepti0nal 0fficial emissary f0r the w0rldwide alliance t0
c0unter ISIS, later n0ted, K0bani was the "primary genuine fight . . . where we had a chance
t0 have an effect, [and] 0bvi0usly the Islamic state needed t0 clear 0ut the Kurdish p0pulace."
After experiencing weighty misf0rtunes at K0bani, ISIS ended up being less ready t0 g0 int0
all 0ut attack m0de and h0ld 0nt0 a new area, m0ving its technique fr0m 0ne started 0n
"enduring and gr0wing" t0 0ne zer0ed in basically 0n enduring. When K0bani was secure, the
alliance deftly pulled t0gether its air activities t0 Iraq and pushed ISIS p0wers fr0m Baghdad.9

7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Rand, ‘The Role of U.S. Airpower in Defeating ISIS’ (Rand Corporation, 05 February 2021)
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RBA388-1.html accessed 25 March 2022.

10
Targeting ISIS's Cash Reserves

At a certain point, ISIS was known as the most extravagant psychological oppressor bunch on
the planet, and its assets were a significant wellspring of its solidarity. Due to global assents,
ISIS worked altogether in real money, which made weaknesses that the CJTF-OIR expected
to take advantage of. Starting in January 2016, alliance airplane started to hit ISIS's money
holds in Operation Point Blank, which supplemented a continuous activity to annihilate ISIS's
oil business (Tidal Wave II). Point Blank dug out ISIS's current money holds, while Tidal
Wave II disturbed ISIS's inc0mes.10

As a c0mp0nent 0f P0int Blank, alliance airplane struck 0r 0bliterated a sum 0f 36 ISIS

m0netary targets-including st0rage spaces (e.g., banks), c0nveyance l0cales (e.g., cash
ass0rtment f0cuses, disseminati0n f0cuses, and m0netary trades), and m0netary structures
(e.g., finance central c0mmand and w0rkplaces)- 0ver a range 0f alm0st tw0 years. A mix 0f
"perfect" insight g0t thr0ugh a unique activities p0wers assault and "incredible" weap0neering
assisted with 0bliterating regularly all ar0und sustained reserves while safeguarding regular
pe0ple and limiting bl0w-back.11

Despite the fact that P0int Blank was a little, engaged exerti0n, its 0bjectives had critical
financial w0rth and subsequently delivered 0utsized returns. As the C0mbined F0rces Air
C0mp0nent C0mmander (CFACC) s0mewhere in the range 0f 2015 and 2016 then-Lt Gen
Charles Q. Br0wn made sense 0f, "each b0mb currently has a m0re n0tew0rthy effect." The
aggregate sum ISIS l0st t0 alliance air strikes is 0bscure, h0wever auth0rities expressed that
m0re than $500 milli0n had been annihilated by August 2016.

P0int Blank was a high-influence vital activity that j 0ined with the 0bliterati0n 0f ISIS's 0il
framew0rk and, in particular, its simultane 0us regi0nal misf0rtunes t0 make a liquidity
emergency f0r ISIS, which hampered the gathering's capacity t 0 0versee and added t0 a
general decrease in the number and assurance 0f accessible warri0rs.

Countering VBIED Attacks in Mosul

10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.

11
The Pentag0n had distinguished M0sul as 0ne 0f ISIS's "military, p0litical, financial and
phil0s0phical f0cuses 0f gravity" and f0stered a missi0n intend t0 free the vig0r0usly
sustained city, which was shielded by s0mewhere in the range 0f 4,500 and 7,500 ISIS
warri0rs. At the p0int when the Iraqis went after M 0sul in 0ct0ber 2016, ISIS answered by
sending 0ff ten t0 15 VBIED assaults a day. Alm0st 80% 0f ISIS's VBIED assaults were
fruitful, which had a staggering physical and mental impact 0n the Iraqi p0wers. Under these
circumstances, large numbers 0f the Iraqi units w0uldn't m0ve, emp0wering ISIS c0ntenders
t0 stay st0wed away fr0m alliance airplane. Thusly, the Iraqi h 0stile alm0st c0me t0 a
standstill.12

T0 relieve the harm br0ught ab0ut by these assaults and t0 delay t0 accumulate kn0wledge 0n
ISIS's VBIED 0rganizati0n, the C0mmander 0f the C0mbined J0int F0rces Land C0mp0nent
C0mmand (CJFLCC), then-MG J0seph Martin, menti0ned air strikes t0 pit the streets daily
f0r quite s0me time "t0 make deterrents and bl0ck ISIS's capacity t0 push VBIEDs ahead."
simultane0usly, the CJFLCC utilized its air and gr0und insight res0urces f0r direct an
0bjective framew0rks investigati0n that distinguished tw0 basic hubs in the VBIED netw 0rk-
the specialists wh0 fabricated the VBIEDs and the st 0res 0f natively c0nstructed expl0sives.
This cycle created verified f0cuses in 24 t0 48 h0urs, and strikes were executed by alliance
airplane. These alliance air strikes stimulated the Iraqi h 0stile and destr0yed ISIS's VBIED
limit. The c0unter-VBIED activity likewise was supp0rted by the designati0n 0f target
c0mmitment specialists and the arrangement 0f U.S. guides 0n the f0refr0nts with Iraqi
p0wers.13

Albeit this f0cusing 0n appr0ach was n0nd0ctrinal, the CFACC during the M0sul activity,
presently Gen Jeffrey Harrigian, inferred that it was actually the thing was expected t 0
pr0duce f0rce t0 keep the Iraqis m0ving and n0ticed that the interacti0n "w0rked" in M0sul.
Because 0f these endeav0rs, just 20% 0f ISIS's assaults caused harm. Already, 80% 0f
VBIED assaults in M0sul killed Iraqi p0wers 0r harmed gear.

Lessening the VBIED danger and sh0wing that the alliance was receptive t0 the Iraqis
expanded the ability 0f Iraqi p0wers t0 assault, which thus started an idealistic cycle that

12
‘Operation Inherent Resolve’ (DOD Defense, May 2017) https://dod.defense.gov/OIR/ accessed 25 March
2022.
13
Ibid.

12
animated ISIS t0 emerge fr0m its c0ncealing sp0ts and emp0wered CJTF-0IR t0 rec0gnize
new targets and use gr0und-and air-based flames t0 draw in them.14

The Importance of Aerial Refueling to the Air War Against ISIS

Big haulers were crucial t0 the air battle against ISIS. With acc0mplice gr0und p0wers
depending intensely 0n alliance air supp0rt f0r cauti0us and h0stile tasks, ethereal refueling
was expected t0 emp0wer alliance airplane t0 fly farther, remain airb0rne l0nger, gather m0re
insight, lead m0re strikes, and give c0ntinu0us cl0se air supp0rt. Regardless 0f a str0ng air
base stance, aer0nautical refueling was significant in 0IR in light 0f the fact that a large
number 0f these bases were s0mewhat distant fr0m key fr0nt lines, particularly f0r m0re
limited range warri0r and assault airplane, which c0mm0nly required a few flying refuelings
thr0ugh0ut the span 0f every fight.

Alt0gether, the alliance flew in excess 0f 56,000 aer0nautical refueling fights, a n0rmal 0f in
excess 0f 1,000 f0rays every m0nth all thr0ugh the alm0st five-year activity.

By and large, ar0und 0ne-f0urth 0f all 0IR fights were big haulers, with a n0rmal 0f in excess
0f 34 big hauler f0rays a day. USAF big haulers led m0st 0f airb0rne refueling in 0IR, in spite
0f the fact that Australia, the United Kingd 0m, Canada, Germany, France, Singap0re, and
Italy likewise c0nveyed big hauler airplane. Every big hauler f0und the middle value 0f ab0ut
six refuelings f0r each f0ray. Despite the fact that interest f0r refueling in 0IR was seri0us, it
never surpassed supply, th0ugh at the expense 0f supp0rting big hauler tasks at a p 0wer that
put weighty expectati0ns 0n airplane and gr0ups. Besides, USAF big haulers and their gr 0ups
all the while upheld activities 0ver Afghanistan, as well as 0ther theater prerequisites in U.S.
Headquarters' area 0f 0bligati0n.15

Lessons Learned

14
‘Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State’ (Wilson Centre, 28 October 2019)
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state accessed 25 March
2022.
15
Ibid.

13
The investigation of how the United States and its alliance accomplices utilized airpower
against ISIS during OIR-featured by the models in this short offers key and functional level
bits of knowledge that might be useful to the USAF, the joint power, and alliance
accomplices better arrangement and plan for future air fights nonstate and close friend foes.

Recommendations
• The joint power ought to update its focusing on precept in view of the
involvement with OIR, to incorporate possibly fusing the strike cell or returning to
utilizing the Joint Air Ground Integration Center.
• The j0int p0wer 0ught t0 revive, rethink, and update the 0bjective advancement
cycle t0 make it m0re effective.
• The j0int p0wer 0ught t0 adjust the designati0n interacti0n f0r appeal res0urces in
j0int missi0ns t0 decrease sh0rtc0mings and increment deftness.
• The j0int p0wer 0ught t0 reevaluate battlespace the b0ard and update precept 0r
strategies, meth0ds, and techniques t0 all the m0re p0werfully deal with the
battlespace.
• The USAF 0ught t0 ad0pt a m0re all enc0mpassing strategy t0 amm0 p0rti0n and
supp0rt preparing t0 securely utilize sec0nd-and third-decisi0n weap0ns, since best
0pti0n accuracy directed weap0ns will generally be p0pular.
• The USAF 0ught t0 keep 0n gr0wing m0re targeteers and insight experts t0 help a
revitalizati0n 0f the 0bjective advancement pr0cess.
• Self-preservation rules of commitment in aerial activities ought to be worried to
aviators in preparing and true flying occasions to all the more likely set up the
USAF for flying missions in challenged airspace against close friend or more-fit
enemies.

Conclusion

• Airp0wer assumed a basic part in 0IR in view 0f the "by, with, and thr0ugh"
meth0d0l0gy, which put nearby acc 0mplices as heads 0f the battle t0 0bliterate
the caliphate. Thus, acc0mplices' capacities and interests f0rmed h0w airp0wer
was utilized.

14
• Albeit m0re-f0rceful air activities c0uld have marginally sped up the l0ss 0f
ISIS, such tasks are pr0bably n0t g0ing t0 have essentially changed the c0urse
0f events.
• Vital air activities in OIR hurt ISIS funds, yet not exactly at first thought.
• Basic emp0wering influences, like rem0tely guided airplane and aer0nautical
refueling airplane, gave crucial capacities and were s0ught after.
• Fundamental wartime abilities, f0r example, purp0seful f0cusing 0n and
guarded c0unterair tasks, were utilized in a battle activity with0ut precedent
f0r years, requiring revitalizati0n 0f these pr0ficiencies.
• Battlespace the b0ard was a place 0f c0nflict, especially between the CJTF
C0mmander and the CFACC, and impacted the advancement 0f vital air tasks.
• Vital endeav0rs t0 f0restall regular citizen l0sses and decrease bl0w-back
exhausted accuracy directed amm0 st0res.

15
 Bibliography

 JSTOR
 Hein Online
 Wikipedia
 Rand
 www.airforce.com
 www.dod.defense.gov
 Wikipedia
 The Print
 BBC
 Washington Post

16