Konstan. Shame in Ancient Greece

Shame in Ancient Greece
Author(s): DAVID KONSTAN

Source: Social Research , winter 2003, Vol. 70, No. 4, Shame (winter 2003), pp. 1031-1060
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40971960
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1032 SOCIAL RESEARCH
Lewis, in a highly influential study (1

tance of shame in adult life. By chara
rience of the utter worthlessness of t
to guilt that is limited to a negative f
(40), Lewis, too, contributed to the g
something we would be better off witho
of hand and become transformed int
guilt complex, a psychic condition tha
in Western culture by the Christian e
addition, permissive attitudes toward
in the essential goodness of human n
agement of guilt as a pernicious form
retains a certain dignity as a sentimen
infantile and other-directed.7 Thus S
remarks, "While guilt may have a very
ing and maintaining social relationsh
ties, shame has a much more dubio
Bauman writes:
Just half a century ago, Karl Jaspers could still neatly sepa-
rate "moral guilt" (the remorse we feel when we do harm to
other human beings, whether by what we have done or by
what we have failed to) from "metaphysical guilt" (the guilt
we feel when harm is done to a human being, although this
harm is in no way related to our action). This distinction
has lost its meaning with globalization. John Donne's
phrase, "Do not ask for whom the bell tolls: it tolls for thee,"
represents as never before the solidarity of our destiny,
although it is still far from being balanced by the solidarity
of our sentiments and actions (2001: II).8
Like many other cultures, Greece and Rome did not have dis-
tinct terms for what we call shame and guilt, and they seem to
have made do with one concept where we recognize two. This
view, however, presupposes a natural correspondence among psy-
chological ideas across linguistic and social boundaries. Thus, the

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SHAME IN ANCIENT GREECE 1033
Greek term we customarily translate as "sham

match, more or less, the English concept, unl
absence of a word for guilt, Greek shame had
extension so as to include some (or all) of the
guilt. Alternatively - and this is the more com
the ancient Greeks simply failed to achieve
which is in turn a sign of the poverty of their
and their incomplete psychological developme
In fact, the ancient Greek emotional lexic
neatly onto modern English concepts. We may
with an analogy drawn from the perception
beings everywhere are capable of sight, althou
be partially or wholly blind. If our vision is not d
more or less the same range of colors. But d
More precisely, does what is called blue in con
correspond precisely to some color label in ev
language? I believe that I have been witness
value of "blue" in my own lifetime. When I
taught that the rainbow has seven colors, one
name "indigo." Today, few people think of "ind
basic color terms in English. Indigo lay betwe
occupying a portion of the spectrum that has
been invaded by its neighbors. Blue, then,
wider spectral range today than it did when i
comfortably alongside it, in the way that ancie
occupied a portion of the psychological spectr
by guilt.9
In the case of terms as close as indigo and blue, we can read-
ily accept the possibility of cultural variation. But sometimes the
differences between languages are more extreme. The Latin
word flavus denotes a tawny or golden yellow, like that of wheat
in the field. And yet the word is etymologically related to the
English term "blue."10 What has blue to do with yellow? Accord-
ing to Robert MacLaury (1999: 20), the association between
blue and yellow reflects a categorization of color by way of lumi-

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nosity rather than simple spectral p

are languages today in which blue, gr
gle category. The Welsh glas, for
"blue," "pale," "grey," "green," and "
glaukos in ancient Greek is render
"blue-green," "pale blue," and "gr
1940, s.v.).12 "For physiological re
"green and blue appear more simil
and yet "culture sometimes override
seem to be out there in the world, "
a name" (MacLaury, 1999: 24, refer
Berlin and Kay, 1969). How much
intangible items as emotions should
ture? And, just as shifts in color ter
than a single dimension, emotions to
on a single axis or continuum, yield
seem odd or unnatural.
With this as preamble, let us return to ancient Greek shame.

Here, I must beg the reader's indulgence in advance, for the dis-
cussion that follows will attend closely to the meanings and con-
notations of Greek terms. The payoff will be a richer sense of the
significance of shame both in ancient Greek society and in our
own. As it happens, there are in fact two Greek words that are
typically rendered as "shame" in English: aidôs, which has
received some scholarly attention recently (notably Cairns,
1993), and aiskhunê (sometimes transliterated as aischyne). These
terms are by no means entirely synonymous, and it is a weakness
in Bernard Williams' fine book on shame in Greek antiquity
(1993) that he lumps aidôs and aiskhunê together, although he
provides an excellent defense of shame as a moral sentiment and
challenges the "progressivist" hypothesis of a great conceptual

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shift from ancient to modern ethical thought,

on guilt (7). Thus, in an endnote Williams o
"There are two Greek roots bearing the sense
. and aiskhun-. ... I have not been generally
rate uses of the two kinds of word. Not much turns on the dis-
tinction, for my purposes, and, in particular, many of the

variations are diachronic," with aiskhunê taking the place of aidôs
as the latter became increasingly obsolete over the sixth to fourth
centuries B.C.14 Williams cites the brief lexicographical analysis
by George Shipp (1972: 191), who notes that the two roots are in
fact differentiated in Herodotus, where terms based on aid- carry
the sense "respect the power of," while the aiskh- words mean "be
ashamed." Herodotus, however, wrote in the Ionic dialect. In the
Attic dialect, which was the predominant vehicle of literature in
the classical period, Shipp maintains that " aiskhunomai [the ver-
bal form] took over both senses." This evolutionary story cannot
be right. As Cairns points out (1993: 138), in Homer aiskhunomai
already serves as an equivalent to aideomai, the verbal form of
aidôs (cf. Odyssey, 7.305-06, 21.323-29). What is more, Shipp's
claim ignores the fact that aidôs, which, along with its associated
verbal form aideomai, continues to occur in the classical period
(especially in poetry), also acquired two senses.15
Douglas Cairns, who has written the definitive study of aidôs,
offers as a preliminary definition of the term (1993: 2): "let aidôs
be an inhibitory emotion based on sensitivity to and protective-
ness of one's self-image"; Cairns suggests that the verbal form
aideomai roughly means "I am abashed." The standard Greek-
English lexicon (Liddell, Scott, Jones, 1940) defines aidôs as "rev-
erence," "awe," "respect," and a "sense of honor"; the term does
not normally designate the feeling of shame for acts committed.
In Homer, where aidôs and its relatives occur frequently, " aidôs is
always prospective and inhibitory" (Cairns, 1993: 13); "it does
not approximate to our notion of the retrospective 'bad' or
guilty conscience" (145). More crisply, Cairns affirms that "aidôs
is not shame" (14). 16

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Aiskhunê, on the contrary, is defin

(1940, s.v.) as "shame," "dishonour," a
and "honour"; in this latter sense, we
The vast new Diccionario griega-español
may denote "disfigurement or ugline
induced by public disapprobation, cit
244: "shameful things [aiskhra] en
(2.37) contrasts offenses against the la
ment, with those against unwritten
aiskhunê. But aiskhunê is also "a restr
restrictiva), and in this connotation i
[vergüenza, honor] in the sense of res
at all cost, principledness [pundonor]
ism." Thus, Thucydides (1.84.3) is cite
partakes most of modesty, courage [eu
fying incidentally to a still lively a
between the two terms in the classical
Although some scholars hold that th
ference" in Aristotle's use of the terms aidôs and aiskhunê in his
ethical writings (Grimaldi, 1988: 105), 19 a close analysis reveals
that he in fact respects their distinct ranges of meaning, normally
limiting aidôs to the prospective or inhibitory sense. While this is
not the place for a thorough survey of Aristotle's usage, we may
take as an illustration an important passage in the Nicomachean
Ethics (1128b32-33), often supposed to show the interchangeabil-
ity of the two: "if shamelessness [anaiskhuntia] is a bad thing and
also not feeling aidôs [to me aideisthai] at doing shameful things,
then it is not any more honorable for someone who does such
things to feel aiskhunê [aiskhunesthaí]" that is, after the deeds
have been done. In this passage, aidôs is clearly understood to
inhibit bad behavior, while aiskhunê reflects back on it with regret.
But if aidôs, complex though it may be in its own right, is nev-
ertheless a reasonably coherent concept,20 what shall we say of
aiskhunê, which seems to have both a prospective and a retro-

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spective dimension, signifying equally "shame"

shame"?21 The two meanings are ostensibly quite
should they cohabit in a single concept? To be s
overlap in English: "Have you no shame?" mean
sense of shame?" (so too in the negative compound
But Greek evidently had available a vocabulary by
tinguish the two senses. Indeed, the two concepts
be psychologically discrete, "shame" being an em
"sense of shame" is more like an ethical trait.
Greek philosophers and rhetoricians also seem regularly to

have classified aiskhunê as an emotion or pathos, whereas the sta-
tus of aidôs was more ambiguous. It is aiskhunê, not aidôs, that
Aristotle chooses to analyzes in the Rhetoric, his most extensive
and penetrating discussion of the emotions. True, Aristotle at
times lists aidôs among the pathê (plural of pathos), and Douglas
Cairns states categorically (1993: 5): "that aidôs is an emotion is,
I take it, uncontroversial; Aristotle regards it as more like a
pathos, an affect, than anything else." But the question is not
quite so straightforward. For while pathos often approximates
the English "emotion," it can have a much wider extension.
What is more, precisely in those passages where Aristotle identi-
fies aidôs as a pathos, it is clear that he is using pathos in the broad
sense to include a variety of psychological states. Thus, in the
Eudemian Ethics (1220b37-21al2) we find included under the
pathê, along with aidôs, such items as courage, moderation, just-
ness, and liberality, which Aristotle normally treats as virtues (cf.
also Eudemian Ethics, 1233bl6-34bl4; 1233b26-35). Indeed,
already in antiquity the scholar Alexander of Aprhodisias (or
someone writing in his name), commenting on Aristotle's dis-
cussion, wondered whether aidôs could properly be classified as
a pathos.22
The Stoics, in turn, cite the unusual form aidêmosunêas a form of
sôphrosunê, "modesty" or "self-control" - usually one of the four car-
dinal virtues - and define it as "a careful knowledge of appropriate

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blame."23 Typically, the Stoics contrast

ing the former as a healthy sentimen
the sage, whereas aïkshunê was classi
tions to which that everyone except t
9 = Diogenes Laertius, 7.115). Thus, ha
turns up in the same category as aidôs,
the wise man's equivalent of the fear
people are exposed.24 Aiskhunê, in tur
grace."25 It is true that Aristotle at o
Ethics (1128bl2-13) says of aidôs:. "it is
bos] of disgrace [adoxia]"- or at least,
fear [paraplesion] - and as a species of
terms, to be an emotion.26 If so, how
future rather than to past or present e
of fear in the Rhetoric stipulates (2.5
kind of pain or disturbance deriving
a future evil that is destructive or pain
aidôs is quite distinct from aiskhunê.^
casting about here for an adequate d
logical status of aidôs, and brings in f
in part because it is prospective.
The Christian bishop Nemesius of Em
century A.D., locates aidôs under t
emotion or pathos - rather than caut
of the expectation of blame," though
that "this is the finest emotion [pathos
take in regard to orthodox Stoic doct
ever, is the distinction that Nemesiu
aiskhunê. Nemesius defines the latter as "a fear in the case of a
shameful thing that has been done," and remarks that it is not
unpromising in respect to salvation. He then adds that " aidôs dif-
fers from aiskhunê in this, that a person who feels aiskhunê is
shamed [kataduetai] for things he has done, whereas a person
who feels aidôs fears that he will land in some kind of disgrace; the

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ancients [i.e., Greeks of the classical era] often

but in this they misuse the terms." Nemesius is
I have discovered, to distinguish explicitly the
shame - the feeling of being ashamed and a se
well as the first to differentiate between aidôs and aiskhunê on the
basis of this distinction.
Nemesius is certainly wrong about the semantics of aidôs and

aiskhunê in classical Greek: we have seen that both meanings of
shame coexist in the term aiskhunê (see below). But the distinc-
tion that Nemesius draws between two concepts of shame, one
retrospective and oriented toward the past, the other prospective
and oriented toward the future, has had a considerable influence
on later thought. Kurt Riezler (1943: 462-63), for example, notes
that French, Greek and German all have two words for shame,
and explains: "Pudeur means a kind of shame that tends to keep
you from an act, whereas you may feel honte after an act." While
he acknowledges that the "Greek distinction between aidos and
aischyne does not correspond to the French," he nevertheless cites
the definition provided by the great Renaissance humanist in his
Thesaurus of the Greek language: "Aidôs is shame that derives
from reverence, whereas aiskhunê is shame that derives from
immorality."29 More recently, Melvin Lansky (1996: 769) notes
that the English "shame" can refer to a desire to "disappear from
view" or to "comportment that would avoid the emotion (the
obverse of shamelessness)," and adds: "Many languages have sep-
arate words for the emotion," citing French honte "for the emo-
tion itself; pudeur, for the defense" (769). 30 Thomas Scheff (1997:
209), in turn, differentiates the Greek terms aiskhuynê and aidôs
under the rubrics "disgrace" and "modesty" and compares them
with the Latin foedus versus pudor, French honte versus pudeur, Ger-
man Schande versus Scham, and Italian vergogna versus pudore,
while noting that this distinction is absent in English.31 None of
these contrasts captures the value of the Greek concept of
aiskhunê, to which I now turn.

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The fullest and clearest analysis of shame, as of a variety of

other emotions, bequeathed to us by the ancient Greeks comes
from Aristotle. As indicated earlier, Aristotle, like a number of
his successors, discusses the emotions above all in his treatise on
rhetoric, since exciting or assuaging the passions was primarily
associated with the art of persuasion. Aristotle's definition of
aiskhunê in this work runs as follows (1383bl2-14): "Let aiskhunê,
then, be a pain or disturbance concerning those ills, either pre-
sent, past, or future, that are perceived to lead to disgrace, while
shamelessness is a disregard or impassivity concerning these
same things."
Aristotle's inclusion of future ills, along with past or present ills,
in the definition of aiskhunê as a cause of shame may seem sur-
prising, since if we feel shame at something still to come it might
be supposed that we would avoid the situation or behavior that
will induce the emotion. But Aristotle's definition makes it clear
that he draws no distinction between prospective or restrictive

shame on the one hand, and retrospective or remorseful shame
on the other. A key element in the definition is the term "per-
ceived" or "imagined" (the Greek word, phainomena, may also
mean "are seen"). We remember past events, sense present ones,
and anticipate future events, and things good or ill may "appear"
to us in all three modes. If the ills we perceive or imagine are of
the kind that bring about a loss of reputation or disgrace (adoxia),
we respond with the emotion of shame.32 Of course, such phe-
nomena, if they are memories, can no longer be altered or
avoided, save insofar as one can perhaps change the opinions that
others hold of them and thus limit the damage to one's status or
repute. By contrast, one will ordinarily try to prevent foreseen
events of this type from being realized. But envisioning an antici-
pated ill evokes the emotion of shame just as much as recollecting
a past one does, and the very same sentiment that galls us in the

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case of things that have been done moves us als

we can, in the future.
It seems to me that Aristotle has, in a stroke, resolved the
problem of two kinds of shame - retrospective and inhibitory -
or recast the question in such a way that the distinction between
them is otiose. It is not that aiskhunê includes both kinds of
shame, one properly denoted by aiskhunê and the other by aid

as Nemesius proposed. Whatever the case with the French hon
and pudeur, the German Scham and Schande, or the Span
pudor and vergüenza, classical Greek did not divide the concep
tual sphere of shame between two distinct terms. Nor is
aiskhunê, as Aristotle defines it, a complex idea, as the Englis
"shame" is said to be, embracing within itself the two distinc
notions of the experience of shame and a sense of shame. T
emotion, as Aristotle understands it, is uniform; what varies is
simply the timing of the perceived ills. The lexicographers ar
thus wrong to split aiskhunê into subdefinitions, for there
nothing to disambiguate.
The opposite of shame, in turn, is simply "shamelessnes
(anaiskhuntia) , a failure of sensitivity to the relevant kinds of ills
whether past, present, or future. Whereas "shamelessness" in En
lish is ordinarily taken to be the antonym of a sense of shame
opposed to the feeling of being ashamed, for Aristotle, aga
there is no need to differentiate the two connotations. His inter-
pretation of aiskhunê as a unitary sentiment allows him to treat

shamelessness as an insensibility to all evils, regardless of tense,
that tend to a loss of reputation or disgrace. A person who is not
ashamed at having committed such an act will not refrain from
committing it in the future.
Shamelessness, as Aristotle defines it, does not seem to be a
distinct emotion that is shame's opposite, but rather a lack of
feeling or insensibility (apatheia) with respect to the kinds of ills
that arouse shame. Generally, in the Rhetoric, Aristotle tends to
pair contrasting emotions, such as love and hatred, fear and

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confidence, or pity and indignatio

defined as pain at the undeserved mi
indignation is pain at another's und
easy to construct an emotion that is
totle conceives it: for example, one m
concerning those goods that are perc
utation or approval." Such a sentim
something like "pride." Many modern
ple shame and pride as opposites.
(1992: 86) writes: "Shame, of cours
pride."33 Classical Greek, however, se
term corresponding to a positive sens
ative sentiment of arrogance is well a
form of hubris) ,34 It is beyond the sco
the reasons Aristotle and his contem
identified pride as a positive concept;
that in the competitive world of Gree
were more likely to be struggling to
the critical gaze of their fellow citi
their admiration. Jon Elster (1999: 75
implied by Aristotle's account of the
one "in which everybody knows that
judged, nobody hides that they a
nobody hides that they seek to be jud
judgment was unlikely to be granted f
Returning to Aristotle's definition of a
note that shame is not conceived as
repute or disgrace (adoxia) as such, bu
lead to such a state. It is true that, a litt
lates the definition in an abbreviated form: "since aiskhunê is a
perception [or impression: phantasia] of disgrace, and this on its
own account and not for what results from it. ..." But the word-
ing of the initial and fuller description is, I think, significant.
Shame arises not at the contemplation of loss of honor in the
abstract, but from specific acts or events that bring about dis-

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grace. Aristotle immediately offers examples of t

has in mind: "If shame is as we have defined it, t
we feel shame for those kinds of ills that seem
for ourselves or those we care about. Such are all those actions
that arise out of vice, for example throwing away one's shield or
fleeing; for they come from cowardice. Also confiscating a
deposit, or wronging someone; for they come from unjustness.
And sleeping with the wrong people, or those who are related to
the wrong people, or at the wrong time; for they come from sen
suality." Other examples of vices are wrongful gain, illiberality or
servility, effeminacy, small-mindedness, meekness, and conceited
ness, each manifested in visible outward behavior, such as making
a profit off the poor, lack of generosity, flattery, lack of endurance
and blowing one's own horn. All these actions are evidence o
personal defects, and it is these in turn that, when recognized,
lead to a loss of esteem and status. There are thus three elements
that together prompt the emotion of shame: a particular act

(throwing away one's shield in battle); the fault of character that
is revealed by the act (cowardice); and the disgrace or loss of
esteem before the community at large.
With this schema, Aristotle seems to bridge the difference that
modern investigators suppose exists between shame and guilt,
according to which guilt is elicited by a specific act of wrongdo-
ing, while "we feel shame about the very essence of our selves"
(Morrison, 1996: 12). Shame, for Aristotle (and I would say for
Greeks in the classical period generally)35 results from imagining
particular acts or events, whether committed or intended - for
example, doing someone an injustice or failing to help another
when it is in one's power to do so. It is possible to make amends
for such offenses, whether by apologizing or by some other form
of compensation. They are limited acts, and do not necessarily
entail an annihilation of one's sense of self. At this level, Aristo-
tle's discussion encompasses the modern idea of guilt. Shame-
inducing behavior, however, in addition to being unjust or

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inappropriate, also testifies to a char

and in this respect it is damaging, l
self-esteem, or at least to one's self-r
But to what degree? It is only a part
exposed - for example, avarice or b
not destroy a person's standing com
between shame and honor in fact allo
nomenological effects of shame. The
be experienced as an assault on one's
tle, for whom shame was a fact of ev
such drastic consequences.
To the causes of shame indicated, Ar
of not sharing in those advantages th
enjoy, whether fellow citizens, age-m
ple, the same level of education or c
could be the result of a personal faili
other reasons for it. It is doubtle
appear boorish in cultivated company
fault. Here, then, Aristotle recogn
from circumstances beyond one's con
guilt, which is commonly taken to p
bility.37 Nico Frijda (1993: 367) rep
current theories, his research indica
perhaps pertains to the way we expe
sarily a component of the anteceden
feel guilty for hitting or narrowly m
front of one's car without believi
"Norm violation does not seem pro
guilt emotions that emerged after se
ject is not responsible; for instanc
towards whom they felt they should
ing."38 The borderline between mod
fuzzier than one might imagine, and

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with Aristotle, to see both culpable and morall

iors as eliciting a single emotion.
Aristotle adds, however, that all such defects are the more
shameful "if they are perceived to occur on one's own account;
for it is all the more a consequence of vice, if one is oneself
responsible for what has happened, is happening, or is going to
happen." In his discussion of shame, then, Aristotle is not indif-
ferent to the question of accountability. Rather, it figures as an
exacerbating condition in relation to those kinds of ills that do
not derive from vice or ethical deficiency. It would appear, then,
that responsibility plays a primary role in Aristotle's concept of
shame. While Aristotle acknowledges that certain behaviors,
though strictly speaking beyond one's control, may elicit shame if
the deficiencies they expose are closely related to character (and
hence are easily imagined to be moral shortcomings), he is not
concerned with trivial accidents that indicate nothing about the
ethical self (we may recall that the Greek word for character is
ethos, whence the term "ethical").39
Bernard Williams (1993: 78) writes that "The basic experience
connected with shame is that of being seen, inappropriately, by
the wrong people, in the wrong condition. It is straightforwardly
connected with nakedness."40 Now, Aristotle indeed observes
that one feels shame more intensely when the acts that evoke it
are "in the eyes [namely, of others] and in public; whence the
proverb that 'aidos is in the eyes.'"41 But rather than being fun-
damental to shame, exposure is treated as an aggravating factor,
like responsibility in the case of deficiencies relative to one's
peers. I doubt that nakedness and sexuality in general played so
central a role in Greek shame as modern critics sometimes sup-
pose; after all, Greek males in the classical period exercised
naked in public. As we have seen, Aristotle mentions sexual mis-
conduct among the acts that can lead to shame, but his concern
is with the character flaw to which such behavior testifies, not
with sex as such.42

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For Aristotle, shame has to do above

or adoxia, and since, Aristotle argues
utation [doxa] except via those who h
azontes] , it follows that we feel sham
we take seriously." Examples are tho
admire us, those with whom we com
people, along with righteous folk no
give. The opinions of others are clea
they must be opinions of those we h
again indicates the fundamentally et
Aristotle understands it. Aristotle
shame also before those likely to div
not proclaiming it is the same as not
Aristotle's shame seems to part comp
ized sense of guilt. Whatever we may f
have inflicted a secret injury on anot
in the fullest sense when the evidence of our vicious character has
reached the ears of those whose opinions we value. But this is not
to say that we may not disapprove of our private vices. Such a con-
demnation of our own behavior, however, would take the form of
a moral judgment rather than an emotion, like the response of
those before whom we feel shame. If Aristotle had considered the
judged rather than the judging self, the emotion he would have
ascribed to it would, I expect, be shame.43
Aristotle's analysis of aiskhunê, which plausibly represents, I
believe, the quality of the emotion among Greeks of his time,
sheds a different light on problems attaching to the modern idea
of shame, such as the tension between its inhibitory and its a pos-
teriori manifestations, the relation between judgments concerning
specific actions and those concerning the self as a whole, and the
role of responsibility versus events beyond our control. The Greek
concept no doubt is consistent with a society that placed a high
value on public honor and reputation;44 it may also be that differ-
ent values and practices in child-rearing favored a more positive

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role for shame, in contrast with modern accounts

its devastating effects on the self. The very idea of a
differed in antiquity from the way it is conceived
today.45 Without entering into these complex ques
like to conclude by examining the role of aiskhunê in
that is particularly indicative, I think, of the differen
ancient and modern shame are conceived.
After the death of Achilles at Troy, his arms were awarded as a

special prize to Odysseus. Ajax, enraged at what he considered an
insult to his own valor, undertook to kill the Greek leaders he
held responsible, including Odysseus himself along with
Agamemnon, the chief commander of the Greek expedition, and
his brother Menelaus. The goddess Athena, however, muddled
the wits of Ajax, so that he mistakenly took captive, tortured, and
finally slaughtered a herd of sheep rather than his enemies.
Sophocles' tragedy, Ajax, dramatizes the aftermath of these
events, in which Ajax comes to his senses, realizes his blunder, and
then, deceiving his comrades about his intentions, seeks out an
isolated place and slays himself. The play concludes with a debate
between Odysseus, Agamemnon, Menelaus, and Teucer, Ajax's
half-brother, over whether to permit the burial of Ajax's body
after his attempt at vengeance.
In an illuminating study, Melvin Lansky (1996: 761) argues that
Ajax's shame "leads to narcissistic rage" (from the abstract), and
remarks that "classicist critics, for the most part, have failed to dis-
tinguish an adherence to the heroic code from pathological
shame and vengefulness" (765). 46 In the text, however, neither
Ajax nor anyone else indicates shame as the reason for his suicide,
although the chorus of Ajax's companions connect the rumor
concerning his actions with their own aishkunê (173-175). How

201.212.128.168 on Sat, 27 Aug 2022 18:29:42 UTC
then are we to decide Ajax's motive?

404) : "Where can one flee? Where ca
son why he wishes to hide is that "t
sword in hand" (408-409); not sham
Again, he dreads to face his fathe
spoils in his campaigns (462-463); bu
must return naked, without the armor
he most deserved (464). The closest
gesting shame as a motive is in the
[or shameful: aiskhron] for a man to
inalterably embroiled in evils."47
There is, however, another possible
and that is anger - the same anger t
murder the Greek generals (cf. vers
777, Agamemnon speaking) . Aristot
accompanied by pain, for a perceiv
perceived slight" (2.2, 1378a31-32). A
for what he perceived as a derisive i
temporary spell of insanity. Nothing
regrets the attempt, or that he sees it
character. Thus there is no basis for
acknowledges derives exclusively fro
to Odysseus.48 He is distressed becau
and despite his enduring anger he n
to avenge himself. Aristotle does not
in such frustrated rage; perhaps he
it is not shame or aiskhunê.
Richard Shweder and Jonathan Haidt (2000: 406) observe that

"the contemporary Hindu conception of lajja (or lajya) ... is
often translated by bilingual informants and dictionaries as
'shame,' 'embarrassment,' 'shyness,' or 'modesty'; yet ... every
one of these translations is problematic or fatally flawed." They go
on to remark on "how hazardous it can be to assume that one can
render the emotional meanings of others with terms from our

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received English lexicon for mental states" (4

fectly just, and yet a careful examination of t
terms in other languages can also enrich an
emotional vocabulary.
Shame was a vigorous emotional category
Greeks. Although it has tended to be suppresse
American society, or else treated as a morally
(we are ashamed of shame), writers in classica
fundamental to ethical behavior. And yet, we m
recognizing the Greek concept as "shame,"
nology and modes of expression may well have
own. What Ajax feels in the play is shame for us,
for him, just as we may perceive the color blue in
ing where a native of the culture would have id
complex of hues, defined not just by a shift in
by visual elements that have ceased to enter in
of basic color terms in modern English.50 An
gain in visual sensitivity by learning to appreh
color system, so too, by attending to the mean
the ancient terms, we may expand our awarene
tions function, even in our own social world.
sion of Greek terms for shame has made a small contribution in
that direction.
Notes
*Cf. Tangney and Dealing (2002: 11): "In everyday conversations,

people typically avoid the term 'shame'"; Barton (2001: 235): "At the
time I am writing, the idea is popular in the United States that no one
should ever be shamed. We forget that teasing and mild shaming are
among the most important socializing mechanisms of society - provided
that trust is there and that the teaser is prepared to exchange roles with the teased^
Correspondingly, the study of shame has been largely neglected; cf.
Gilbert and Andrews (1998: v): "Shame has been recognized since
antiquity. A strong theme of shame exists in the early stories of Adam
and Eve. However, it has only been in the last 20 years or so that shame

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has been subject to systematic research

good survey of recent theories, see Gilb
2Cf. Wurmser (1981: 17), although Wu
"be ashamed in front of oneself and feel g
Creighton (1990: 296): "Shame, with its c
is not a very effective sanction in America
encouraged to become independent." F
shame requires an audience, see Taylor
18); and Morrison (1996: 16): "To feel sha
the presence of an actual shamer or even a
these internalized figures who have bec
Tangney and Dealing (2002: 14) report t
"'solitary' shame was about as prevalent a
3) discusses the phenomenology of the
shame.
3Cf. Pattison (2000: 43-44); for criticism of the idea of a shame cul-
ture, see Lloyd-Jones (1987: 2); Creighton (1990); Cairns (1993: 27-47)
(who affirms that criticism has left the antithesis "in tatters" [42]); and
Wissmann (1997: 17).
4Creighton (1990: 286): "Shame feelings precede the development of
the superego, although they may later be integrated into the superego
formation. Guilt develops later during the Oedipal phase and requires
the presence of a superego"; Scheff (1997: 210).
5Nathanson (1992: 19): "Whereas shame is about the quality of our
person or self, guilt is the painful emotion triggered when we become
aware that we have acted in a way to bring harm to another person or to
violate some important code. Guilt is about action and laws. Whenever
we feel guilty, we can pay for the damage inflicted"; Williams (1993: 89-
90); M. Lewis (1992: 10); Morrison (1996: 12): "We feel guilt about our
wrongdoing; we feel shame about the very essence of our selves"; Den-
ham (1998: 40-41): in shame, "the offensive behavior is seen as a reflec-
tion of an equally offensive self ... ; guilt motivates corrective action
rather than motivating avoidance"; M. Lewis (2000: 629): "The emo-
tional state of guilt or regret is produced when individuals evaluate their
behavior as failure but focus on the specific features or actions of the self
that led to the failure. ... In fact, the emotion of guilt always has associ-
ated with it a corrective action that the individual can take (but does not
necessarily take) to repair the failure. ... As such, the emotion is less
intense and more capable of dissipation. . . . The emotion of guilt lacks
the negative intensity of shame"; Ben-Ze'ev (2000: 498); Tangney and

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Dearing (2002: 24): "Shame involves fairly global ne

the self (i.e., 'Who I am'). Guilt involves a more ar
tion of a specific behavior (i.e., 'What I did')," alth
that the two terms are often used "inconsistently
(11). But contrast Solomon (1993: 259, 301): "What
[from shame] ... is its ability to encompass the se
whole person"; shame "is more specific than guilt .
self-demeaning"; Cairns (1993: 23-24): "I doubt v
shame must involve the . . . complete denigration o
if a distinction between self-evaluations which focus on what we are and
those which focus on what we do is tenable in the abstract, this distinc-
tion will not furnish an absolute criterion for the separation of shame
and guilt in ordinary usage" (25).
6Plutarch {On Extreme Bashfulness, 528D) discusses an exaggerated shy-
ness or sensitivity to shame (dusôpia), but this is a disposition (in Aristo-
tle's terms, a hexis) rather than a generalized emotional state; Plutarch
refers, however, to the intense shame itself as a harmful pathos (529E);
cf. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, 1108a33-34.
7Cf. Ohly (1992).
8Barkan (2000: xxviii) remarks on what he sees as a new sensitivity on
the part of entire nations to guilt: "One new measure of this public
morality is the growing political willingness, and at times eagerness, to
admit one's historical guilt."
interestingly, English seems to owe the importance of indigo as a
basic color to Isaac Newton, although Newton himself vacillated over
whether the spectrum should be divided into six or seven zones; in the
end, he opted for seven because of the mystical value of that numeral;
see Gage (1995).
10MacLaury (1999: 20); cf. Partridge (1959): s.v. "blue"; for Latin "fl"
= English "bl"; cf. "in-flate" / "blow," "flower" / "blossom," "flagrant"
(= "burning") / "black" from fire's effect on wood.
nEvans and Thomas (1989, s.v.) . I am grateful to Hugh Mason for this
information.
12Irwin (1974: 5-7) notes that the difficulty in interpreting Greek

color terms according to spectral values led some scholars, including
Goethe and William Gladstone, to conclude that they were color blind.
In the late 1920s, the German semanticist Jost Trier (1931, ch. 1)
observed that, in the time of Goethe, the German word Braun signified
not only what we call "brown" in English (which is more or less what Ger-
mans mean by Braun today), but also tones in the region of violet or pur-

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pie, which, unlike modern brown, are gr

of the rainbow.
13MacLaury (1999: 21); cf. Lyons (1999: 39, 41); Lyons (1995: 197-98);
also Pastoureau (2001: 13-48) on the absence of a coherent category of
"blue" in classical antiquity.
14The noun aiskhunê first occurs in the sixth-century poet Theognis
(verse 1272), in the sense of being a "disgrace," and becomes common
toward the middle of the fifth century B.C.
15Shipp endorses Dodds' hypothesis of a development from shame
culture to guilt culture in Greece, which he sees reflected in the shift
from aidôs to aiskhunê. I ignore here the different nuances of the noun
aidôs and the verb aideomai, although as Cairns (1993: 2) observes, they
"do have different senses." In Euripides' Hippolytus, verse 244, Phaedra
exclaims: "I feel aidôs [verbal form aidoumetha] at what has been said,"
which indicates that the verb can assume the sense of remorseful shame;
for a similar use of the noun, cf. Euripides Hecuba, 968-72, where it is
equivalent to aiskhunê. See also Gauthier and Jolif (1970: 320), who
affirm that aidôs in the classical period "n'est plus seulement l'ap-
préhension d'un déshonneur futur, mais aussi la honte d'un déshon-
neur présent ... et le regret d'une faute passée"
lbHooker (1987) argues that aidôs and related terms only acquired
sense of "shame" in post-Homeric literature.
17Cf. Miller (2000: 70): "Shame bears a close connection with coura-
geous motivation; it might in fact be its chief motivator"; also Wissman
(1997: 13-18).
18In Euripides' Ion, 934, cited by Shipp, Creousa exclaims: "I feel
aiskhunê [verbal form, aiskhunomai] before you, aged sir"; cf. also verses
341, 367, 395, 1074.
19Gauthier and Jolif (1970: 321) specify that Aristotle does not distin-
guish aidôs from aiskhunê in the Rhetoric.
20Cairns (1993: 13) distinguishes two senses of aidôs, namely "I feel
shame before . . ." and "I respect," but he adds that the two are related:
"to feel inhibitory shame ... is to picture oneself as losing honour, while
to show respect is to recognize the honour of another. The combination
of the two in one concept, however, is unfamiliar," though it is also,
Cairns affirms, quite logical. For the rich metaphorical texture sur-
rounding the idea of aidôs, which includes the image of a protecting
mantle, see Ferrari (2002: 74-81).
21The verbal form aiskhunomai, like that of aidôs, is used in the sense
of "feel shame before . . . "; cf. Aeschines (fourth century B.C.) Against

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Timarchus, 24, also 180: "one of the old men befo

shame [aiskhunontai] and whom they fear stepped
uses the negative expressions anaides, anaideia
1.189), but not aidôs, which was, as I have said, obso
^Questiones naturales et morales Book 1, problem
Commentarla in Aristotelem Graeca, suppl. 2.2, ed. I. B
generally supposed to be wrongly attributed to A
I cannot enter into this question exhaustively here
observing that Aristotle tends to treat aidôs in the
emotional temperament or dunamis, and speaks in
aidêmôn or "a man given to feeling aidôs."
^Stoicorum veterum fragmenta (= SVF), 3.264.9-1
2.60.9. The sense of aidôs as "chastity" comes particu
sôphrosunê in erotic contexts.
24Cf. SVF, 432 = Andronicus, On Emotions, 6, p.
439.1-3 = Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, 449A; SVF, 440 =
ions of Hippocrates and Plato, 4.4 [140] p. 354 M. 21;
25The definition is Zeno's, recorded in Diogenes
Definitions, 416A9 (ascribed to Plato but almost cer
of his Academy) .
26In common parlance, both aidôs and aiskhunê
with fear; cf., for example, Xenophon, Memorabilia
2'There are various other indications in this pass
considers aidôs to be different from aiskhunê, as A
disias too observed (in the text cited earlier) - for
particularly appropriate to young people.
¿*SVF, 3.416.17-22 = Nemesius, De natura hominis,
*^"Aidos est pudor profectus ex verecundia. Aischyne
tus ex turpitudine." Riezler adds: "The origin of Ais
Aidos, awe," and affirms that the former pertains
while the latter responds to a sense of how things n
30So too Cope (1877: 71-72), commenting on Arist
tinguishes between "aidôs, verecundia, a subjective feel
precedes and prevents a shameful act" and "aiskhun
aspect which reflects upon the consequences of th
it brings with it" (as summarized in Grimaldi, 1988
31Cf. Scheff (1995: 1053): "When we compare the
languages, the definition of shame in English is n
Scheff adds (1053-54) that the French honte is equi
shame, pudeur to a "sense of shame."

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32For the close connection between ais

see, for example, Demosthenes, Oration
33Cf. Scheff (1997: 206): "We propose t
relate of a secure social bond; and shame, the emotional correlate of a
threatened bond"; also Lewis (2000); Ben Ze'ev (2000: 491, 512);
Manstead and Fischer (2001: 231). Contrast Seidler (2000: 103): "The
postulation of shame and pride as polar opposites is frankly unconvinc-
ing. Only if we decide to limit 'shame' to the affective expression of the
impairment of self-esteem can we conceivably regard 'pride' as the
opposite pole, and even then it would appear more appropriate to
regard the capacity for realistic self-evaluation to be the more convinc-
ing alternative."
34Scheff (1997: 208) notes that in the Hebrew Bible, "Virtually every
reference places pride in a disparaging light," and speaks of the need for
a notion of "justified pride." Cf. Lewis (1992: 78): "Hubris can be
defined as an exaggerated pride or self-confidence. ... It is an example
of pridefulness, something dislikeable and to be avoided. . . . The emo-
tion I label pride is the consequence of a specific action."
35This point requires documentation through an examination of
texts, but such an investigation exceeds the bounds of this paper.
36Those of an inferior social class will not necessarily feel shame at
shortcomings relative to their superiors: the humble farmer to whom
Electra has been wedded in Euripides' Electra (357-432) does not hesi-
tate to invite two well-born guests into his modest home, although Elec-
tra herself is mortified at the idea.
37Izard (1977: 423-24): "Guilt results from wrong-doing"; Lewis (1971:

81): "Guilt ... is evoked by ... the acceptance or acknowledgment of
moral transgression" (both cited in Frijda, 1993: 364).
38Cf. Gilbert (1998: 11).
39If Aristotle had the word, he might perhaps recognize such events
as productive of embarrassment. But cf. the Hippocratic treatise, On the
Sacred Disease, 15, where it is observed that people on the point of an
epileptic attack hide "because of shame at the condition and not out of
fear of a demon, as most people suppose. . . . But children allow them-
selves to fall anywhere at first, and later run to their mothers or other
people whom they know, out of terror and fear of the condition; for they
do not yet know what it is to be ashamed [to gar aiskhunesthai oupô
gignoskousin]" Plutarch, however, writing in the first century A.D.,
argues that Homer "scorns those who cast shame [aiskhunomenôn] upon
lameness or blindness, since he does not consider blameworthy [psekton]

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what is not shameful [or ugly: aiskhron] nor sham

through ourselves but by chance [tukhe]" (On How
Listen to Poetry, 35C).
40"The most primitive experiences of shame are c
and being seen, but it has been interestingly sugg
rooted in hearing" (Williams, 1993: 89).
41There is some debate about the original meanin
Grimaldi (1988: 117) argues that it refers to the loo
son (cf. Ferrari, 2002: 54-56 on the visibility of m
Kennedy (1991: 146 n. 57) defends the possibility
Aristotle evidently takes it, to the disapproving look o
42Let me note here that the shame and honor com
so-called Mediterranean anthropology (see, e.g.,
particularly evident in the Greek world of this peri
that we may feel shame over the deeds of ancestor
does not single out sexual misconduct of female r
such shame. See Herman (1995).
43The idea of a divided self was perfectly familiar
contemporaries; see Aristotle's discussion of self-l
Ethics, 9.4, and cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 2.
44Corbeill (2002) argues that the Roman public s
tive duty to maintain a "desirable fear of shame" (
vice of this moral goal made vigorous use of vitup
insult.
45See especially Foucault (1985), and the essays in

and Platter (1998).
46On shame as the motive for Ajax's suicide, cf.
Of course, if shame is understood to affect the essenc
induce a desire for concealment, it is natural to tak
self-destructive violence.
47Aiskhunê occurs elsewhere in the play in contexts unrelated to Ajax's

sentiments. In the debate over the burial, Menelaus insists that fear
(deos, phobos) and shame (aidôs and aiskhune) are necessary to the well-
being of a city, since they prevent the kind of outrage that Ajax sought
to commit (1073-86). Later, Teucros declares he feels no shame before
Agamemnon and Menelaus for their ostensibly nobler birth (1304-05).
The first is an instance of prospective, the latter of retrospective shame.
48Unless perhaps he perceives his madness as contributing to a loss of
standing; but this motive is not emphasized in the drama.

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49Shweder and Haidt explain that "to b

session of the virtue of behaving in a civ
that the social order and its norms are u
a cultural world based on an ethics of co
that are not fully felt by those whose m
autonomy. Lajja is a clear example" (409
50This does not mean, of course, that
Ajax' s behavior as shame in the modern
shame" in his behavior. I am grateful to
this and other aspects of the present pap
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der griechischen Tragödie. Stuttgart: M u
und Forschung, 1997. Drama Beiheft 7
Wurmser, Léon. The Mask of Shame. Baltim
Press, 1981.

201.212.128.168 on Sat, 27 Aug 2022 18:29:42 UTC

Konstan. Shame in Ancient Greece

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Konstan. Shame in Ancient Greece

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Shame in Ancient Greece

Author(s): DAVID KONSTAN

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40971960

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Lewis, in a highly influential study (1

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Greek term we customarily translate as "sham

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nosity rather than simple spectral p

With this as preamble, let us return to ancient Greek shame.

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shift from ancient to modern ethical thought,

tinction, for my purposes, and, in particular, many of the

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Aiskhunê, on the contrary, is defin

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spective dimension, signifying equally "shame"

Greek philosophers and rhetoricians also seem regularly to

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blame."23 Typically, the Stoics contrast

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ancients [i.e., Greeks of the classical era] often

Nemesius is certainly wrong about the semantics of aidôs and

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The fullest and clearest analysis of shame, as of a variety of

that he draws no distinction between prospective or restrictive

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case of things that have been done moves us als

shame, one properly denoted by aiskhunê and the other by aid

pretation of aiskhunê as a unitary sentiment allows him to treat

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confidence, or pity and indignatio

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grace. Aristotle immediately offers examples of t

that together prompt the emotion of shame: a particular act

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inappropriate, also testifies to a char

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with Aristotle, to see both culpable and morall

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For Aristotle, shame has to do above

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role for shame, in contrast with modern accounts

After the death of Achilles at Troy, his arms were awarded as a

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then are we to decide Ajax's motive?

Richard Shweder and Jonathan Haidt (2000: 406) observe that

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received English lexicon for mental states" (4

*Cf. Tangney and Dealing (2002: 11): "In everyday conversations,

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has been subject to systematic research

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Dearing (2002: 24): "Shame involves fairly global ne

12Irwin (1974: 5-7) notes that the difficulty in interpreting Greek

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pie, which, unlike modern brown, are gr

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Timarchus, 24, also 180: "one of the old men befo

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32For the close connection between ais

37Izard (1977: 423-24): "Guilt results from wrong-doing"; Lewis (1971:

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