The Use of Complex Electronics in the

Ropeway Industry
Based on the Example of a Revolutionary
Fail-Safe Rope Position Detection Switch

by

Elmar Fuchs 1

Complex electronics are being used in ropeway engineering increasingly to perform

control, monitoring and safety functions. Particularly in cases where safety functions
are involved, there are several factors which must be taken into account.
Disregarding these factors may have fatal consequences.

The establishment of directives and regulations which are binding on all

manufacturers in the ropeway industry is essential if the possible risks are to be
reduced.

Regulations of this type have already be incorporated in various national and

international codes - provisions are also included in the new European standards
(CEN) which are currently being drawn up.

In accordance with these regulations, every function of a ropeway must be subjected

to a safety analysis. This gives the safety category which determines which criteria
are to be considered during the planning and design stages.

Functions are assigned to the individual safety categories with the aid of a risk
assessment chart.

1
Head of the Electrical Department
Konrad Doppelmayr & Sohn
Maschinenfabrik
Gesellschaft m.b.H. & Co.KG.
Rickenbacherstr. 8 - 10
Postfach 20
A-6961 Wolfurt / Austria

Tel. (+43) 5574/604-400

Fax (+43) 5574/75590
e-mail: elmar.fuchs@doppelmayr.com

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Selection of Category

1 2 3 4
S 1
N 0 0 0
P 1 A N 0 0
S 2 P 2
A A N 0
P 1 A A N 0
P 2

S 3
A A A N

W
Occurrence probability

S Severity of injury

S1 No injury
S2 Slight injury
S3 Serious irreversible injury to one or more persons, or death of one person

P Possibility of the person(s) being able to avoid the hazard

P1 Possible under specific conditions

P2 Hardly possible

W Occurrence probability

N Normal level of risk category

A Additional measures required

O Oversized category

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I would now like to explain the application of this regulation on the basis of a concrete
example:

The rope position detector on a ropeway

As deropement on a tower can lead to the serious injury or death of one or more
passengers,

S3 must be selected on the risk assessment chart.

It is hardly possible for the passenger to avoid the accident therefore

P2 must be assumed.

Based on known deropement statistics, a lower value cannot be assumed for

the occurrence probability W.

The risk analysis for this safety device thus gives us the safety category 4

W
Selection of Category Occurrence probability

1 2 3 4
S1
N 0 0 0
P1 A N 0 0
S2 P2
A A N 0
S3
P1 A A N 0
P2
A A A N

The individual safety categories have to satisfy the following requirements:

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Category Requirements

1 Using well-tried components according to the industrial

Well-tried standard.

2 Using well-tried and proven safety components and safety

Checked principles.

3 A single fault shall not lead to the loss of the safety

Redundancy function(s); safety functions are to be checked at suitable
intervals.
"First fault theory"

4 A single fault shall not lead to the loss of the safety

Self-monitored function(s).
An accumulation of faults shall not lead to the loss of the
safety function(s). The faults will be detected in time to
prevent the loss of the safety functions(s).
"Second fault theory"

Thinking whitch led to the development of a Rope Position Detector

to satisfy Safety Category 4.

With the safety devices commonly used today for monitoring the position of the rope
(break fork switches, etc.) it is not possible to detect the occurrence of deropement
until it has already happened. For this reason, there has long been a call for an early
warning system for detecting an imminent deropement, i.e. as soon as the rope starts
to deviate from its normal position on the sheave. This would then make it possible to
initiate the remedial action of slowing down the rope speed and, particularly in the
case of high-speed installations, of breaking down the build-up of kinetic energy, thus
reducing the risk of deropement actually occurring. Various ideas have been
developed and in some cases patented. The fact remains, however, that none of
these devices proved to be inherently safe, or not, at least, in the case of an
electronic switch. Industry was not able to provide us with the right tools for the job.
This meant that such devices could at best be used as basic monitoring systems, i.e.
with limited safety functions. These limitations meant that in critical situations you
would not have known whether you could rely on the system or not. This was also
the reason why no-one in Europe ever asked for this type of rope position monitoring
system.

When the US ropeway code first included a requirement for monitoring systems of
this kind on installations with rope speeds > 3m/s some 6 years ago, we pointed out
the problem of fail-safety. We nevertheless had to concede that a ropeway with a
conventional deropement detector plus an additional monitoring system was safer
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than one without. The system that we then went on to develop for the US market has
since become standard equipment on detachable chair lifts in the USA.

The experience gained with this system was so positive that in recent years this
system has also been adopted on several lifts in Europe.

A special test system made it possible to perform regular function checks on the
switch. However, this test was limited to the switching stage and did not include the
actual sensor components.

&

& SIGNAL

TEST

It was this fact that motivated us to intensify our efforts to come up with a genuine
rope position detection system which would satisfy category 4 and would thus
constitute a fully acceptable replacement for the deropement detection system with
break fork switches generally used.

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Roughly 4 years ago we started to draw up the design specifications for a system of
this kind. From a ropeway engineering point of view, the new system would have to
satisfy the following requirements:

Code IEC 61508 (functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic

safety related systems)
rope has left line groove +/- 4 mm (AOC)
operating voltage 24 V/DC (+15 / -25 %)
temperature -33° - +55°C
UV-resistance
rel. humidity 15 - 100 %
abs. humidity 0,03 - 36 g/m³
,etc.

Sheave Type Nom. Sheave Ø Side Plate Rope Ø AOC Signal Initiated
Clearance
type 401 400 75 36 - 44 >4mm towards side plate
type 403 400 100 38 - 58 >4mm towards side plate
type 501 500 100 44 - 58 >4mm towards side plate

With this new system we are now in a position to detect a lost or a blocked sheave
and a worn liner.

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-7-
The sensors are fittet to the ropeway towers to be monitored on the first evener
frame on the entry side, and in the case of sheave assemlies >4 sheaves, below
the haul rope on both entry and exit sides.

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The complete system consists of a safety category 4 tested, fail-safe programmable
logic controller (referred to as a “PSC” = Programmable Safety Controller), a signal
converter, cabling and up to 200 switches.

Control cabinet Line

Programmable
safety controller

LOG SRA LOG SRA LOG SRA

AOCIN AOC AOCIN AOC AOCIN AOC

SIN SOUT SIN SOUT SIN SOUT

E_Stop

AOCIN

LOG
SIN
RPD1 RPD2 RPD3

Signal RPD4
converter
SRA
SOUT
AOC

RPD-n RPD6 RPD5

Slow
SOUT SIN SOUT SIN SOUT SIN

AOC AOCIN AOC AOCIN AOC AOCIN

SRA LOG SRA LOG SRA LOG

PSC
3032
Serial-
interface

+24V
Power supply

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In addition to the fail-safe control channels (AOC, SRA), the RPD sensor (Rope
Position Detector) also comprises a non-fail-safe, non-reactive monitoring channel
(SIN, SOUT) which is connected via a serial interface. This makes it possible to
address and diagnose errors on individual sensors.

50ms
425/450ms

SRA LOG SRA LOG

AOC AOCIN AOC AOCIN

150ms
SIN SOUT SIN SOUT

50ms
425/450ms PSC
LOG SRA LOG SRA

AOCIN AOC AOCIN AOC

150ms
SOUT SIN SOUT SIN

E r r o r t o l e r a n c e t i me : S RA 5 0 0 ms = si n/ s out = no t f ai l - saf e !
A OC 5s

The sensors (max. 200) of several ropeway towers can be cascaded using a 5-wire
cable. The fail-safe programmable logic controller (PSC) generates two clocked
signals with a defined pulse-pause ratio (LOG, AOCIN), which are sent on the 1st
sensor (RPD). Provided that the RPD sensor is intact and the rope is in its proper
position, these signals will be reproduced at the outputs of the sensor (SRA, AOC)
and transmitted to the next sensor. If the sensor chain is intact, the signals will arrive
back at the inputs to the PSC. The application software stored in the PSC checks the
incoming SRA and AOC signals for the right shape. If a critical situation is detected
by the sensor or a system error identified in the sensor, the output signal is
transmitted without dynamic characteristics. The PSC will then evaluate the signal as
an invalid operating status and consequently slow down (AOC) or shut down (SRA)
the lift.

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The maximum reaction time (SRA signal) to external criteria (deropement) is
dependent on the number of cascaded sensors, and for the permitted maximum of
200 cascaded sensors is typ. 60 ms and max. 420 ms.

REACTION TIME SRA

DELAY TIME
REACTION TIME
typ. 0,2ms
ΔT ≤ 20ms
max. 2,0ms

The maximum reaction time (AOC signal) to external criteria (rope leaves liner
groove) is dependent on the number of cascaded sensors, and for the permitted
maximum of 200 cascaded sensors is typ. 140 ms and max. 420 ms.

REACTION TIME AOC

DELAY TIME
REACTION TIME
typ. 0,2ms
ΔT ≤ 100ms
max. 2,0ms

The True RPD Sensor

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The true RPD sensor has already been SC 4-certified (TÜV Germany). To date, one
ropeway in Germany has been fitted with this system on a trial basis. We are
currently working on the approval of the complete system including the software for
the fail-safe PSC and expect this to be granted shortly. The first installations with this
revolutionary new rope position detection system are expected to go into operation in
1999.

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