The Organization for National Security

Author(s): Gus C. Lee

Source: Public Administration Review , Winter, 1949, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Winter, 1949), pp.
36-44
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/972661

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The Organization for National Security
By GUS C. LEE
Organizational Analyst
Office of the Secretary of Defense

I I I I

CRITICS of the National Security Act of and (3) the lack of coordination among the
1947 have generally failed to observe a
services, particularly in fields other than strat-
sense of proportion. Attention has been
egy, where, generally speaking, answers wer
focused on the misnamed "70-group" found Air to the great problems of coordination.
Force question, the continuing questions re- These three problems of warfare are more
garding roles and missions of the three serv-
acute in the present stage of rapid technologi-
ices, and the apparent duplications between cal change than at the outbreak of World War
the military departments in facilities and II.
serv-
Although the precise characteristics of such
ices. This focus has obscured some of the great
new weapons as the atomic bomb, the long
gains made in hammering out an organization range plane, and the guided missile are un
for national security which in the long viewknown, their total effect is generally accepted
may well prove the most significant activity-that
of if war comes it will come more rapidly
the Office of the Secretary of Defense in anditsbe more devastating than ever before.
Allies are not available who are capable of
initial year. The task of changing the organi-
zation skeleton provided by the act into a
containing an enemy for the two-year period
team of men associated in the common pur- required in previous wars to bring the weight
of our factories
poses of developing a strong coordinated to bear in the conflict. The
traditional unpreparedness of this country
policy for national security has been carried
might be fatal. The necessity is clear for close
out quietly while the inter-service differences
made the headlines. It is the purpose of this
ties between foreign policy, intelligence and
awareness of an enemy's intentions, and what
article to review the organization for national
security as it now exists. Hanson Baldwin has called mobilization
The organization established by the "readiness."
Na- A return to the pinch-pen
military
tional Security Act can best be understood by establishment of the 1930's seems
a review of the problems which the act at- in view of present policy. The current $
likely
tempts to answer. The act may be viewed billion
as budget for the military establishm
a response to the weaknesses recognized mayin be a bench mark for the years ahead. I
essential, therefore, that the three military d
the country's efforts in World War II. Among
the problems of waging modern war that partments
were be so coordinated that funds
manpower will not be wasted in unnecessa
only partially solved in World War II three
stand out: (i) the lack of correlationduplications
be- in facilities and overhead. T
tween foreign policy and military strength,organizational
or forms of the National Secur
Act
unpreparedness; (2) the gap between military must prove sufficiently flexible, yet suff
ciently strong, to provide and execute t
risks and industrial mobilization, or the failure
to recognize the importance of logistics inpolicies
war; required in this period of gr
changes in the technics of warfare. Our
tional life may well depend upon a solut
NOTE: Opinions expressed in this article are those of
to
the author and not necessarily those of the Office, the three problems listed above which
Secretary of Defense. superior to the solutions of our adversaries

36

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 ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 37

The National Security Council this

andrelationship
the should be symbolic of the
Central Intelligence Agency role of intelligence in the formulation of
policy.
THE gap between foreign policy and The Central Intelligence Agency is the
military
residuary
I policy under the National Security Act maylegatee of the wartime functions of
the Office
be bridged by the National Security Council.of Strategic Services and the Central
Pearl Harbor dramatized the existence of this Intelligence Group, which had been estab-
gap better than any other event of the last war.lished by Executive order. Fore-knowledge of
an enemy's intentions is obtained less by cloak
In the age of the atomic bomb a surprise attack
on industrial centers of population and the and dagger work than through the painstaking
seat of government could be decisive. analysis of freely available information about
The objective of the National Security the activities in the laboratories and factories
of foreign nations. Naval, Air, and Army at-
Council is to relate military, foreign, and do-
taches continue to collect data for their de-
mestic policies by providing a forum to policy-
makers. It is the council's duty "to assess and
partments and the reports coming in are chan-
appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks neled up to Central Intelligence. The De-
of the United States in relation to our actual partment of State also furnishes data. Central
Intelligence, however, is intended as more
and potential military power .. ." The mem-
bership of the National Security Council, con-
than a clearing house or coordinating body.
sisting of the President, the Secretary of State, It has its own staff of civilian and military
the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the scientists, economic analysts, and statisti-
Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the chairman cians who collect, analyze, and disseminate in-
of the National Security Resources Board is of
formation. Representatives of the military de-
the top level that befits the status of the coun- partments serve on Central Intelligence
cil as an advisory agency to the President. The
Agency committees and reading panels. As an
President is the chairman of the council. The agency of the National Security Council, Cen-
council formalizes a continuing relationship tral Intelligence Agency is not subordinate to
between those responsible for foreign and the military establishment. Its director may be
military policies, and this is of utmost impor-
a military man or a civilian; the incumbent is
tance when war if it comes may be expected a military man as was his predecessor. The
to occur with little warning. The State De- vital importance to our defense of an effective
partment initiates the preparation of most intelligence
of system has been repeatedly em-
the papers considered by the council. phasized. It is imperative that the Central In-
The National Security Council is a policy-
telligence Agency function effectively.
making and coordinating group, not an execu-
tive or operating body. It has an executive
secretary who works in close liaison with one The National Security Resources Board
of the special assistants to the Secretary of WHE
De- second link in the chain of national se-
fense. It is generally supposed that far-reach-curity is the National Security Resources
ing subjects-such as the return of Trieste to Board, a civilian agency within the framework
Italy and the undertaking of the air lift for of the President's immediate office, which is
the relief of Berlin-are on the National Secu- intended to close the gap between foreign and
rity Council agenda. One publicized meeting of military policies and domestic policies in the
the council was on the occasion of General economic resources area and in mobilization
Clay's report from Berlin in July 1948; other- planning. The board is responsible for the co-
wise, little public information is available. ordination of domestic and economic policies
That General Clay reported to the National and programs and is the planning agency cut
Security Council instead of the Cabinet is sug-to fit the cloth of total war. Its mission is "to ad-
gestive of the important role this agency may vise the President concerning the coordination
occupy. of military, industrial, and civilian mobiliza-
The Central Intelligence Agency is respon- tion" and to evaluate "the relationship be-
sive to National Security Council guidance and tween potential supplies of, and potential re-

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38 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

quirements for, manpower, resources, the Munitions

and pro- Board. Examples of board
ductive facilities in time of war." studies to date are the stockpiling program;
One of the weaknesses of Hitler's war effort strategic relocation of industries and economic
was its failure to support the civilian home activities; capacities and requirements of elec-
front properly. To feed and clothe the soldier tric power systems; heavy power equipment
at the cost of weakening the civilian base is to production; and power problems in the alumi-
fail in understanding total war. The framers num industry. The board is preparing draft
of the National Security Act conceived the Na- emergency legislation for economic mobiliza-
tional Security Resources Board as the agency tion. As a result of its studies, the Board recom-
whose planning efforts would pull in the di- mends policies and programs to the President
rection of a balanced war effort. This is not a for preparedness for war and mobilization in
duty which exists just if "M" Day comes. We event of war. At present, the board is an ad-
have learned that nations may become en- visory planning agency rather than a directive
gaged in undeclared wars, and preparedness agency.
during a "cold" war may be just as vital as The staff of the National Security Resources
mobilization duties. Board consists of about 350 people. The chair-
The National Security Resources Board, un-man has reporting to him a general counsel, a
der a civilian chairman, is composed of the secretariat, and a public information officer.
heads of such departments and agencies as theThe vice chairman, who is the executive officer
President may direct. At present the Secretaries of the organization, also reports to the chair-
of Defense, State, Treasury, Interior, Agricul-man. The vice chairman has one staff arm for
ture, Commerce, and Labor are members of planning internal working programs, a direc-
the board. The board's programs are related totor of plans and programs, and another staff
those of the Munitions Board, the Joint Chiefsarm, a director of mobilization, organization,
of Staff, and the Research and Development and procedure, for the development of organi-
Board through the Office of the Secretary of zation and procedures concerning relation-
Defense. The chairman of the National Se- ships within the staff, the planning relation-
curity Resources Board is also a member of theships with other agencies, and the wartime re-
National Security Council. Like the Nationallationships within a possible economic com-
Security Council, the board is advisory to themand and between that economic command
President. and other government agencies. Four mobiliza-
The Resources Board has coming into it in- tion planning working groups report to the
formation on foreign policies, as well as in- vice chairman: production, transportation and
telligence data from the National Security storage, the utilization of human resources, and
Council and the requirements for executing the economic management including foreign eco-
related strategic plans from the National Mili- nomic warfare. These groups could become a
tary Establishment. Foreign policies and do- nucleus of a possible war production board in
mestic, social, and economic policies may thus
event of an emergency. The National Security
be expected to influence one another and ci- Resources Board inherited the responsibilities
vilian and military requirements may be bal-
of the emergency war agencies to the extent
anced with the capacity of the economy to that these have not been vested in the regular
furnish the manpower, materials, transporta-
tion, and power to meet them. The board re- departments. In conjunction with the regular
ceives advice, studies, and reports on resources departments of the government, the board is
and civilian requirements from the depart- expected to keep plans in skeleton form for
ments and agencies of the government, private those central organizations which would need
agencies and research committees, and its ad- to be rapidly expanded in event of mobiliza-
visory committees and consultants, as well as tion. In its planning the board obtains the aid
representatives of agriculture, industry, and and assistance of industry, labor, agriculture,
labor. It learns of military requirements from and the general public.

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 ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 39

with the Secretary of Defense and the Secre-

Agency Interrelationships
taries
THE National Security Council, theof the three departments in the War
Central
Intelligence Agency, and the Council,
National and the
Se-four Secretaries meet on
policy
curity Resources Board are outside the matters
Mili-other than strategy in the
"Committee
tary Establishment and are advisory to theofPres-
Four." The Munitions Board,
ident; the War Council, the Jointthe Joint Chiefs of of
Chiefs Staff, and the Research and
Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research Development Board all advised the Secretary
and Development Board are within the Military of Defense in the formulation of the supple-
Establishment. The coordinate departments of mental appropriation for the budget of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force are the "operat- Military Establishment for the fiscal year 1949
ing" organizations of the Military Establish- and are now advising him in connection with
ment. Military thinking thus may be expected the preparation of an integrated military
to have a strong but not an exclusive influence budget for the fiscal year 1950. The relation-
on national policy. The Secretary of Defense ship between the National Security Resources
has stated that policy-making is not the busi- Board and the Munitions Board in industrial
ness of the military; rather, it is the military's mobilization planning and the relationship of
business "to see to it that our military poten- the Munitions Board and the Joint Chiefs of
tial conforms to the requirements of our na- Staff on military requirements may succeed in
tional policy." At the level of the Secretary of tying civilian efforts to the strategic concept
Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff roughly cor- and the military conduct of a war. This was
responds to the National Security Council; the not accomplished during World War II. The
Munitions Board and Research and Develop- fabric of interrelationships in planning and
ment Board within their respective fields are policy-making, therefore, is of great impor-
roughly similar to the National Security Re- tance.
sources Board. In broad terms, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is the policy agency in strategy, The War Council
the Munitions Board in supply, and the Re-
HE War Council has been meeting regularly
search and Development Board in research.
since the Secretary of Defense took his oath
Through the Joint Chiefs military strategy is
of office. It is composed of the Secretary of
responsive to military risks; through the Muni- Defense, the civilian secretaries of the three
tions Board and Research and Development
departments, and their chiefs of staff. Many of
Board logistics planning is kept in balance
the major problems considered by the Secre-
with strategic planning and coordination may
tary of Defense have found their way to War
be brought about in materiel matters. The
Council agenda. One of the special assistants
War Council is the over-all agency, roughly to the Secretary of Defense prepares the
comparable to a board of directors for the
agenda for a meeting and it is circulated to
military establishment. In addition to their
members in advance in order to permit ap-
responsibility to serve as the staff of the Secre-
propriate briefing. Frequently the service sec-
tary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Munitions Board, and the Research and De-
retaries suggest topics that should be included.
Subjects have ranged from questions of dress
velopment Board are responsible for policy
coordination and policy review between thefor the services to discussions of the military
aspects of foreign policy. The intent has been
departments.
to make this agency a forum for frank expres-
Threads of relationship are being spun out sions of the opinions of the closest advisers of
between personnel of these agencies both
the Secretary of Defense with the "power of
within and outside the Military Establishment. decision" remaining with the Secretary. It is
The Munitions Board and the National Se-
quite possible that the War Council may be-
curity Resources Board clear the establish-come an effective "board of directors" in the
ment of industry advisory committees with main stream of policy formulation of the Mili-
one another. The service Chiefs of Staff meet tary Establishment.

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40 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

The Munitions Board of Staff, and the departments in the require-

THE Office of the Secretary of Defense mentshas procedure.
The Munitions Board contributes to coor-
endeavored to strengthen the organization
dination between the departments through in-
of the Munitions Board, visualizing it as one
dustrial mobilization planning, procedural
of the Secretary's most important staff arms.
The Munitions Board has responsibility planning
for and standardization, and the elimi-
nation of unnecessary duplications in the use
the coordination of procurement, production,
and distribution and the military aspects ofof facilities and services. Interservice competi-
industrial mobilization. The services made tion for plant facilities is being avoided and
accurate knowledge of the productive ability
improvements in coordination in these fields
of the United States is being obtained by
during the war, but they were severely criti-
means of the coordinated facilities allocation
cized when failure to coordinate was observed.
The board consists of the under secretary program
or of the Munitions Board. With the
consent of plant management concerned,
assistant secretary of each department with
manufacturing capacity for production of
departmental responsibility for procurement
specified items is being planned so as to make
matters. Its chairman and deputy chairman
maximum use of productive capacity. Some
are civilians. It is important to have representa-
20,000 to 25,000 plants are intended to be in-
tives of the point of view of industry in these
cluded in this program. An example of co-
positions. Although the director of the Muni-ordination through procedural standardiza-
tions Board staff and the heads of divisions are
tion is the publication recently of uniform
officers from the services, the board is staffed
armed service procurement regulations. This
primarily with civilian specialists. At present
type of work is monitored by the board's pro-
curement division. The division has work un-
the staff consists of approximately 275 civilians
and 75 military officers. der way leading to the publication and use of
A major board function is the formulation, uniform supply catalogue procedures for the
review, and coordination of requirements three and departments. The studies under way for
this function is divided among the material, elimination of duplications of facilities and
manpower and utilities, facilities, and military services are varied and diverse. Among the
requirements divisions. The military require- many subjects being studied are duplications
ments division formulates uniform methodsinof the use of laundries, use of space in the San
presenting requirements. When the opera- Francisco area, post exchanges and ship stores,
tional and logistical plans of the three depart- housing facilities, procurement field offices,
ments come back to the Munitions Board, postal systems, and motion picture facilities.
pursuant to the strategic concept of the Joint The board plans the stockpiling of critical
Chiefs of Staff, the manpower and utilities materials. It also plans and administers the
division, materials division, and facilities di- maintenance of a reserve of industrial plants
vision translate these plans into the ships, built for World War II. It assigns armed serv-
guns, planes, shoes, or rounds of ammunition ice procurement responsibility. These ex-
needed. They estimate whether the nation has amples are suggestive of the broad range of
the means in raw materials, power, labor, and Munitions Board activities.
plants to meet the military requirements The method of operation of the Munitions
within the framework of total civilian-military Board is broadly similar to that of the Joint
requirements conceived by the National Se- Chiefs of Staff and the Research and Develop-
curity Resources Board. If the logistical and ment Board. It illustrates the strength and the
strategic pieces of the picture do not fit, the problems connected with the present organiza-
Joint Chiefs of Staff may be asked for revision
tion for national security. It is in large part
of the strategic plans. This is the barest outline through their committee structure that these
of the procedure; it suggests, however, the re- agencies carry out their missions. The Muni-
lationship among the Munitions Board, Na- tions Board exercises leadership and direction,
tional Security Resources Board, Joint Chiefs but achievements depend in large part upon

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 ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 4'

its annual
mutual cooperation by the services. The report
divi- the board is to submit its
sions of the Munitions Board recommendations
request the for what would be con-
establishment of committees and sidered
developanmis-
ideal research program for the
sions and membership in cooperation Military
withEstablishment.
the The Secretary of De-
services. The tasks and objectivesfense calls upon the Research and Develop-
of commit-
tees are assigned in directives issued ment Board for budget advice in a number of
by division
directors. The membership of situations. a committee It advises the Secretary of Defense
elects its chairman and he may appoint in settingsub-
an over-all figure for research and
committees at his discretion. Committees are development which is a limiting factor on the
research and development programs of the
generally under the staff supervision of one of
the divisions of the Munitions Board, which services. Within this over-all limitation the
appoints a liaison representative who facili- services submit estimates for specific projects
tates committee work. Committee work in the which the committees of the Research and De-
eighty-odd Munitions Board committees is velopment Board analyze and upon which the
thus a joint responsibility of the departments board bases its recommendations for shifts of
and the board. emphasis. In case of revisions of figures down-
The strength of this setup lies in the fact ward by the Bureau of the Budget or by the
Congress, the Research and Development
that the services participate in the formulation
of policy and this participation provides the Board makes recommendations for the absorp-
Munitions Board a measure of control in its tion of the cuts. The board's work, therefore,
execution. The problem is, of course, that thegoes beyond coordination to an evaluation of
service representatives assigned to the Muni-the research and development program of the
tions Board must be more than departmentalMilitary Establishment to achieve balance. In
protagonists; otherwise, effective balance and making such broad recommendations the
coordination in the use of resources for pre-board must resolve differences of opinion of
paredness and mobilization will be difficult its various committees and relate its work to
that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the field of
to obtain. The problem of obtaining loyalty
war planning. In view of the accelerated devel-
to the objectives of unification over and above
representation of the point of view of a par-opment of new weapons and uncertainties as
ticular service is common in more or less de- to the time when each will be fully developed,
gree to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Re- this is one of the most delicate missions of the
search and Development Board, as well as to Military Establishment.
The Research and Development Board op-
the Munitions Board. It is, in fact, one of the
major organization problems arising out oferates primarily through working committees.
the National Security Act. At the present time there are working commit-
tees on such subjects as aeronautics, electron-
ics, geophysical sciences, guided missiles, ord-
nance, medical sciences, human resources, and
The Research and Development Board
petroleum. These working committees are usu-
THE Research and Development Board has ally headed by a scientist from industry or one
the mission of achieving coordination of the universities and include representatives
among the services in its functional field. It is from the services. The committees derive their
composed of two representatives of each serv- authority from charters issued by the Research
ice under a civilian chairman and is responsi- and Development Board. There are approxi-
ble to the Secretary of Defense. The board is mately 250 civilian and military personnel
primarily a review rather than an operating working in the office of the deputy executive
agency; that is, it does not award contracts, secretary, the programs division, and the plan-
construct research and development facilities, ning division of the Research and Develop-
or operate laboratories. The board examines ment Board. Most of their work is concerned
the research plans of the services with particu-with facilitating the projects of the various
lar emphasis on gaps and overlaps. Throughcommittees.

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42 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

The Joint Chiefs of Staff ence, these institutional arrangements can

THE Joint Chiefs of Staff preserves and achieve coordination in military matters.
It is true that the operating procedures fol-
strengthens the organization arrangement
which was noteworthy during the war lowed
in by the Joint Chiefs and Joint Staff are
not conducive to speed of decision because the
achieving coordination in military planning
information
and operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff required for decisions is found to
agency is composed of the Chief of Staff to the
a considerable extent only within the depart-
ments. The Joint Staff has been referred to as
President, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the
a "giant paper mill." In a sense, however, the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief
requirement of unanimity brings more delib-
of Naval Operations. They act as military ad- eration to decisions, and the element of delib-
visers to the President as Commander in Chief
eration and considered judgment may be re-
and to the Secretary of Defense. The Joint
garded as one of the strengths in the Joint
Staff is a "working" group limited by the Na- Chief's setup. Decisions in cases of differences
tional Security Act to one hundred officers are primarily the responsibility of the Secre-
who perform duties directed by the Joint tary of Defense. It is significant that commit-
Chiefs of Staff. The functions and activities of
tee representatives usually have department
the Joint Chiefs of Staff relate to strategy, in-duties; also, the officers on the Joint Staff re-
telligence, logistics, communications, troop turn to their respective services after their
training and education, meteorology, and mili- tours of duty. Here, again, the problem of
tary transportation. They include such prob- representation of the nation's interest as well
lems as the composition, organization, and size as the service point of view is at the heart of
of the forces to be mobilized, the strategic policy formulation, but time will produce of-
plans for the employment of military forces, ficers who are informed about services other
and the logistics plans for their support. Un- than their own and who think in terms of in-
der the National Security Act the agency has terest larger than those of their own service.
responsibility for "review of the major mate- The Joint Chiefs of Staff agency is on the
riel and personnel requirements of the mili-policy-planning level but the Joint Chiefs ex-
tary forces, in accordance with strategic and ercise control in theaters of operations through
logistic plans. .. ." The act also requires the
designation of commanders in theaters in
Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide United States
which they have established unified com-
representation on the Military Staff Commit-mands. The commanders of these unified com-
tee of the United Nations. mands have jurisdiction over naval, air, and
The Joint Chiefs of Staff has continuing
ground forces; they report to the Joint Chiefs
committees and groups on strategic plans, lo-
of Staff. During the war, the agency extended
gistics plans, and intelligence. The agency
its scope from long-range planning of strictly
works through subcommittees of these groups military matters to current requirements of a
and makes extensive use of staff papers. Typi- logistical nature. In general, however, its stud-
cally a committee, group, or subcommittee ies is were limited to specific problems, and over-
composed of three service representatives and all coordination on a comprehensive basis was
the exception rather than the rule. An over-all
a deputy director of the Joint Staff from a Joint
Staff group with jurisdiction corresponding logistics
to plan was developed for the Pacific
that of the committee. Papers are usually area but this comprehensive approach was not
worked up by the subcommittees of Joint Stafftaken for other theaters. As it is now consti-
tuted in legislation, the Chiefs of Staff and the
groups, reviewed by Joint Staff committees, and
placed on the agenda for Joint Chiefs con- Joint Staff are responsible for achieving co-
ordination on a continuing, rather than on a
sideration. The work may consist of questions
spotty, basis.
raised by the Joint Chiefs and referred to the
committees or matter originated by the com-A chief concern of the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense has been to draft "terms of
mittees and submitted to the Joint Chiefs for
reference" which would build a system of work-
approval. The power of decision is in the
ing relations between top-level statutory
Joint Chiefs. On the basis of wartime experi-

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 ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 43

boards. In the Munitions Board directive is- the Presidency, they are related largely through
sued June 9, 1948, the Secretary of Defense di-
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. When he
rected the Joint Chiefs of Staff to keep thebecame Secretary, Mr. Forrestal announced his
board currently informed on major materielintention of using the Joint Chiefs, the Muni-
and personnel requirements. The Munitions
tions Board, and the Research and Develop-
Board was directed to make feasibility studiesment Board as his primary staff, keeping the
of industrial mobilization plans against the
staff of his immediate office small so as to avoid
background of the strategic concept of the a layer of organizations between him and the
Joint Chiefs. In the Research and Develop- departments and statutory agencies. One of
ment Board directive issued December 18,
the Secretary's three special assistants is con-
1947, the Secretary of Defense directed cerned
the with buckling together through secre-
Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide the Research
tariat functions the organizations that are links
and Development Board with general guid- in the chain; another special assistant is con-
ance on strategic concepts. The Joint Chiefs
cerned primarily with matters of business man-
were required to estimate the technical per-
agement; a third devotes his attention to legal
formance and military efficiency of major matters. Small staff groups were established in
weapons systems under envisaged combat con- an office of budget policy, an office of organiza-
ditions and apprise the board of their strategic
tional policy, an office of general counsel, and
value. The board, in turn, is to advise the
an office of accounting policy. After six
Joint Chiefs of Staff on the effects of scientific
months of experience, the office of organiza-
advances and their interrelationships withtional policy was dropped and offices of prog-
strategy. The board also is to make recom-
ress reports, civil defense planning, and public
mendations to the departments on the priority information were added. A personnel policy
of research projects on the basis of the relative
board is being established to coordinate mili-
importance of weapon systems as determined tary and civilian personnel administration of
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. the departments.
The hope of great gains in military effi- The problem of the authority of this imme-
ciency lies in strengthening the interrelation- diate staff of the Secretary of Defense with re-
ships of the agencies charged with broad func- spect to the statutory boards and the de-
tional responsibilities for strategy, procure-partments is as yet unsolved. The Secretary's
ment, production, distribution, and researchimmediate staff should be an embodiment of
and development at the policy-planning level.
his program. In the event that the purposes
These agencies can secure a coordinated, in-
and programs of the three great departments
tegrated program among the departments of
with their own Secretaries and identities pull
Army, Navy, and Air Force at the highest level.
away from the over-all policies of the Military
Whether the over-all direction of the Secretary Establishment, a strong staff in the office of
of Defense through the "committee administra-
the Secretary would be able to exert a pull in
tion" of these agencies can overcome depart-the direction of the over-all policies. In time
mental differences in procedures and loyalties their influence over the departments and stat-
and eliminate duplications and work at cross-
utory agencies, particularly the Munitions
purposes is an open question. In forging these
Board and the Research and Development
organizations great gains toward this goal
Board, might furnish the direction required to
have been made.
tie together this confederation of agencies and
departments. It is mostly through this staff
that civilian influence may be brought to bear
The Office of the Secretary of Defense
on military policy.
HE National Security Council, the Central The present organization for national se-
Intelligence Agency, the National Security curity is capable of providing a policy appro-
Resources Board, the War Council, the Joint priate to the role of the United States in world
Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the
affairs. The top organization of the military
Research and Development Board are the establishment provides the means for balanc-
links in the national security chain. Short of ing various interests and bringing to bear a

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44 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

ardize
variety of judgments and points procedures,
of view on thefully utilize facilities and
great decisions which must manpower,
be made. and To use "empire building."
eliminate
Mr. Forrestal's words in a different context, The myth of the unlimited resources of the
this organization can provide the "capacity to United States is fairly well exploded and noth-
make war." In an uncertain period of history ing in the organization philosophy of the Na-
where the risks are great and the margin fortional Security Act requires waste of resources,
error small, the top structure is conducive to although the questions of duplications are not,
flexibility. It makes more possible than here- contrary to popular opinion, simple and clear
tofore the development of a civilian-military cut in specific instances.
team in the conduct of affairs. On the other It would be a mistake to let the difficulties

hand, it sacrifices speed (which sometimes of the first year of "unification" cause prema-
means arbitrariness) of decision and makes ture
for change in the basic organization for na-
some duplication. In retaining departmentaltional security. An under secretary of defense
and a statutory agency to coordinate civilian
identity and assigning missions to each depart-
ment the National Security Act places em- and military personnel policies between the
departments might well be authorized. Perhaps
phasis on the goals of balance and flexibility
in organization. In the light of the many the
un- Secretary of Defense should have a part in
known elements of warfare, these are wise the appointment and removal of top depart-
goals. From them it follows that the Jointmental officials. On the whole, however, the
Chiefs of Staff setup may be more desirable present structure fits the facts of the situation.
than the single Chief of Staff advocated byOrganizational forms are no substitute for men
many; the direction of the Secretary of Defense of character and competence in positions of
working with the departmental Secretaries may responsibility and the job of building a team
be more desirable than the subordination of at the top is only beginning. In the words of
departmental under secretaries to him. the Secretary of Defense: "We are engaged in
In his policies and programs the Secretary great transitional process, namely to weld
a
of Defense must compensate for the organiza- these components of sea, air and land power
tional goals sacrificed. The advantages of co- into an efficient unity the expenditures of which
ordination and teamwork must be formulated will be within the limits of our national econ-
omy to support. I would be less than candid
and accepted as overriding purposes offsetting
with you if I did not say there is still a long way
the time required to reach decisions through the
network of boards and committees. Through to go in achieving the perfection implied in
phrase, but it can and will be done because it
his budget staff and otherwise, the Secretary
must be done."
must execute an aggressive program to stand-

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