Electrical Power and Energy Systems 120 (2020) 106008

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Electrical Power and Energy Systems

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijepes

IEC 61850 based substation automation system: A survey T

a b,⁎ c b
Mohd. Asim Aftab , S.M. Suhail Hussain , Ikbal Ali , Taha Selim Ustun
a
Electrical and Instrumentation Engineering Department, Thapar Institute of Engineering and Technology, Patiala 147001, Punjab, India
b
Fukushima Renewable Energy Institute, AIST (FREA), National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), Koriyama 963-0298, Japan
c
Department of Electrical Engineering, Jamia Millia Islamia (A Central University), Jamia Nagar, New Delhi 110025, India

A R T I C LE I N FO A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Power systems are undergoing an evolution similar to what telecommunications sector went through several
Substation Automation System (SAS) decades ago. Analog and hard-wired systems are replaced with automated digital ones. Infrastructure designs are
Substation Communication Network (SCN) not static anymore and are geared towards accepting new deployments as easily as possible. Limited data ex-
IEC 61850 changes of the past are giving way to detailed data collection, reporting and analysis. When equipped with smart
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs)
algorithms and techniques such as machine learning, these significantly enhance the capabilities of smart grids.
Sampled Values (SVs)
Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event
Substations are core component of smart grid, where communication system is integrated. However, achieving a
(GOOSE) standard substation communication system that can operate with the principles of plug-and-play (PnP) is not a
trivial task. Considering the cyber-physical nature of power system equipment, integration requires more dili-
gence for safe operation. Furthermore, there are many different types of substation equipment which are
manufactured by, again, countless many vendors. Achieving a common language and interoperability between
them is a difficult task. IEC 61850 standard has been taking strides towards that goal. Its object-oriented
structure makes its versatile while well-defined modeling blocks ensures compatibility. Recent work has focused
on IEC 61850 based modeling of substation equipment, developing message exchange formats for substation
functionalities as well as investigating the performance of different communication technologies when they are
used to implement IEC 61850 based models. This paper reviews these efforts, their benefits to substation op-
eration and possible future work, including cybersecurity considerations.

1. Introduction independent standard and is interoperable, uses non-proprietary soft-

Substation plays a vital role in electricity transfer. It converts the
voltage level from high to low level and vice versa using power trans-
formers and performs switching and protection operations.
With the emergence of global energy market, there is a growing
competitive environment among different energy suppliers. Due to in-
troduction of new players, more formally known as power players, and
increasing market pressure, the motive of energy supplier is more to-
wards customer satisfaction. Customer satisfaction is pivoted on
transfer of right information to right entity. Thus, there are enormous
information exchanges in the energy market. The challenge faced by
utilities is managing the information and delivering the right informa-
tion to the users who can analyze and use the information for specific
applications. Thus, there is a pressing need to develop a standardized
architecture to harness the information exchanges.
This standardized architecture must be supplier independent and
can interoperate with other applications. This paved the way for open
system, which is a computer system that embodies supplier
ware and supports easy future upgrades [1]. The advantages of open
systems include longer system life, easy upgradeability and supplier
independency. In order to sustain the open system, several standardi-
zation agencies came forward for developing a standard communica-
tion protocol which maps all features of open system and is industry
adaptable. By a standard communication protocol, utilities may install
devices from different manufacturers which can readily co-operate in
the utility’s environment. After deliberate research and numerous
meetings, the standardization agency IEC TC 57 came forward and
proposed IEC 61850 standard for substation automation.
The concept of IEC 61850 standard was applied to the substation,
where enormous amount of data is exchanged among various
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). These IEDs form the backbone of
substation automation system. The substation communication was now
governed with IEC 61850 which has functional use which was lacking
in previous master slave standards such as Distributed Network
Protocol (DNP), IEC 60870 etc. The IEC 61850 leverage several benefits
from previous standards in terms of data speed, eXtensible Markup

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: suhail.hussain@aist.go.jp (S.M.S. Hussain).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2020.106008
Received 7 February 2020; Accepted 11 March 2020
0142-0615/ © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
M.A. Aftab, et al. Electrical Power and Energy Systems 120 (2020) 106008

Language (XML) schema for configurations, peer to peer links and
availability of communication conformance tests [2]. With the use of
IEC 61850 for substation automation system, the performance testing
and functional testing of the IEDs is also changed. Authors in [3] per-
formed functional testing of IEC 61850 based systems. The principles of
different IEC 61850 communication-based functions are discussed
along with various factors which affect the system performance. A
comparison between functional testing of conventional and IEC 61850
devices along with the testing methods have been presented in their
work.
Due to emergence of IEC 61850 as the leading protocol for substa-
tion automation systems (SAS), several studies were reported on the
applicability and enhancement of usage of the standard for substation
functionalities. In [2], the evolutions required during designing, con-
figuring and testing an IEC 61850 based SAS has been presented. The
transition from the physical architecture of a substation to a logical
architecture based on IEC 61850 has also been addressed in [2]. The
roadmap of IEC 61850, as a de facto standard for SAS, including the
system configuration and interoperable design has also been presented.
The SAS based on IEC 61850 was divided into three levels by author in
[4]. The first level was the core function of a substation i.e. the op-
eration of power system, the second being reliability and third being
visibility. It also showed how the IEC 61850 protocol is to be employed
for system design.
The first real time implementation of an IEC 61850 based SAS was
at the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) substation [5]. The re-
searchers at TVA believed that the IEC 61850 based communication can
streamline the substation application environment for advanced cap-
abilities and can also result in resource savings in terms of construction,
operation, maintenance and data management. Further in this direc-
tion, to develop industry ready engineers and practitioners, a substation
automation laboratory was developed at Jamia Millia Islamia Uni-
versity, New Delhi [6].
IEC 61850 has gained popularity and has become a defacto standard
for substation automation world over. Utilities world over upgraded or
automated the substation according to IEC 61850 [7–12]. This paper
presents a holistic review of different advancements in SAS through IEC
61850 standard.
2. IEC 61850 background
The first edition of IEC 61850 standard series had 10 main parts.
The Table 1 gives the brief description of different parts of IEC 61850
standard. The first four parts contain information about the standards
concepts and ideology.
The main strength of IEC 61850 standard is the common data model
it uses for devices as well as its unique message protocols for
communicating power system information in a predefined fashion.
The IEC 61850 standard advocates use of object-oriented approach
for modeling of engineering tasks in a SAS. The advantage of having an
abstract interface provides flexibility to the design engineer in adopting
any underlying technology and protocol for a particular process in a
substation. Abstract interface means that the standard is intended to
provide guidelines for describing services rather than information on
how these services are to be built. Also, the IEC 61850 standard defines
a set of generic services for client/server interactions and transmission
requirements for all sets of measurements in a substation in terms of
latency, reliability and security. IEC 61850 defines all known functions
in a substation and splits them into sub-functions known as Logical
Nodes (LNs). Logical nodes are virtual representation of physical de-
vices and exchanges information as per the standard. The term in-
formation modeling is way of exchanging standardized information and
is realized by defining logical nodes. A group of logical nodes combine
to form a Logical Device (LD). The implementation details and appli-
cation view of the IEC 61850 standard is discussed by authors in [13].
2.1. Object oriented modeling of IEC 61850
The IEC 61850 standard adopts object-oriented methodology and
technique for modeling the data and data sets in a SAS. Authors in [18]
provided a holistic overview of the IEC 61850 standard and the process
of standardizing the substation data using object-oriented approach.
IEC 61850 standard supports all functions of the substation and its
engineering by employing a object-oriented data models which are used
to describe the processes to be implemented and controlled in a sub-
station. An outline and application view of IEC 61850, describing the
information model, logical nodes and data objects that are used to re-
present a physical device in IEC 61850 standard is discussed in detail in
[18].
Further in this direction, the impact of edition 2 of the IEC 61850
standard on the object modeling of IEDs has been covered by author in
[19]. As per Edition 2 of IEC 61850 standard, complex devices can be
modeled as servers containing multiple logical nodes to realize various
substation functions such as protection, measurement etc. The func-
tional hierarchy in the nested model is an important parameter to im-
prove the overall efficiency of the device. The changes in the multi-
functional distribution IEDs due to adoption of Edition 2 of IEC 61850
has been discussed in their work.
2.2. Information modeling
Information modeling is a well-established and effective method for
managing information exchanges. Its main purpose is to provide stan-
dardized syntax, semantics and hierarchical structures for the data that

Table 1
Description of IEC 61850 standard Parts for SAS.
Parts Description

IEC 61850-1 Introduction and overview

IEC 61850-2 Glossary
IEC 61850-3 General requirements
IEC 61850-4 Specifies the system and project management for power utility automation systems with communication between IEDs.
IEC 61850-5 [14] Specifies information on communication requirements of substation automation functions.
IEC 61850-6 specifies a description language for the configuration of IEDs in SAS called System Configuration description Language (SCL)
IEC 61850-7-1 give an overview of Abstract Communication Service Interface (ACSI), different Logical Nodes (LNs), Data Objects (DOs), Common Data Classes (CDCs) and
IEC 61850-7-2 how to achieve interoperability using these building blocks.
IEC 61850-7-3
IEC 61850-7-4 [15]
IEC 61850-8-1 [16] parts specify the protocol structure and mapping of different ACSI services to MMS, XML messages transported over XMPP and ISO/IEC 8802–3 (Ethernet).
IEC 61850-8-2
IEC 61850-9-2 [17]
IEC 61850-9-3 Specifies a precision time protocol (PTP) profile of IEEE 1588–2008 in compliance with IEC 61850.
IEC 61850-10 Specifies standard techniques for testing of conformance of client, server and sampled value devices and engineering tools.

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M.A. Aftab, et al.
is exchanged among different devices and systems. To achieve inter-
operability, all Data Objects (DOs) in the data model need a strong
definition with regard to syntax and semantics. In IEC 61850, the group
of DOs that serve specific functions are defined as LNs. Composition of
relevant LNs for providing information needed for a particular device is
defined as LD. An IED may contain a number of LDs and even one LD
device may be part of different IEDs.
A LN consists of a set of DOs, and these DOs can be of any one of
following type: Transient (T), Mandatory (M), Optional (O) and
Conditional (C). The status of DO with (T) or (M) or (O) or (C) desig-
nation specifies whether the DO in the LN is momentary or mandatory
or optional or conditional respectively. Interoperability becomes much
easier to achieve, when more DOs are defined as mandatory. IEC 61850
standard defines a large number of LNs corresponding to different
components of power utility systems. Furthermore, IEC 61850 standard
defines the DOs with full semantics which further make the interoper-
ability with the LNs even more convenient.
To avoid exclusive extensions that are developed by separate enti-
ties in an incompatible way, IEC 61850 specifies normative naming
rules for LN classes and data object names. The LNs have 4 letter names
where the first letter corresponds to the group that LN belongs to.
Different groups of LNs are defined in IEC 61850-7-4 standard. For
example, the LN MMXU belongs to the measurement group. The data
model of the MMXU LN is shown in Fig. 1. The MMXU data model is
composed of the instance of the data object phase voltage (PhV) in-
stantiated from the Common Data Class (CDC) WYE, which is composed
of phase A voltage (phsA) instantiated from CDC CMV, which is also
composed of complex value cVal (of type Vector), which is, further,
composed of voltage mag (of type AnalogueValue), which is, finally,
composed of floating-point value f (of type FLOAT32).
Initially IEC 61850 standard was developed for substation auto-
mation and it contained the information models (i.e. logical nodes de-
fined) for different components of substations. Later, with publication
of new parts of IEC 61850 such as IEC 61850-7-420 for DERs [20], IEC
Fig. 1. Data model of MMXU LN [15].
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Electrical Power and Energy Systems 120 (2020) 106008
61850-90-5 for PMU [21], IEC 61850-90-8 for electric vehicles [22],
IEC 61850-90-7 for power converters [23], IEC 61850-90-1 for inter-
substation communication [24], IEC 61850 was extended to entire
power utility automation systems. Further, based on these standards the
information models for different components such as smart meters [25],
DERs [26–28], EV and charging stations [29–31], PMU [32,33], fault
current limiters [34] etc., were developed and reported in literature.
The information models contain the data objects and attributes that
are required by a particular component. In order to exchange this in-
formation for realizing different functions and services, this information
model has to be mapped to different protocols. The next section details
about different functions, messages and protocols defined in IEC 61850
for exchanging this information that is modeled in a standardized
fashion.
3. IEC 61850 substation automation systems functions and
requirements
The functions of a SAS are the tasks which are performed inside a
substation. These are functions to control, monitor and protect the
equipment of the substation and its feeders [14]. In addition, there exist
functions, which are needed to maintain the SAS, i.e. for system con-
figuration, communication management or software management.
These functions of a SAS are logically divided into three levels such as
process, bay and station levels as shown in Fig. 2. The process level
functions are all functions interfacing to the process. The sensors or
actuators are interfaced to the SAS functions through the process level.
The bay level functions are functions which uses data of one bay and act
mainly on primary equipment of one bay. The protection and control
functions of bay which require data or information from other bays are
known as inter bay protection and control functions. The bay level
communicates with the process level as shown in Fig. 2.
The station level functions are divided into two categories, process
related station level function and interface related process level
M.A. Aftab, et al.
Fig. 2. Functional levels of a SAS [14].
functions. The process related station level functions are functions
which uses the data of more than one bay or of the complete substation
and acting on the primary equipment of more than one bay or of the
complete substation. The interface related station level functions re-
present interfacing of the substation to local station operator (such as
Human Machine Interface (HMI)) or to a remote control center or to
remote engineering for monitoring and maintenance purposes.
The devices of a SAS are implemented physically on the process, bay
and station levels. The process and bay level functions are usually
performed inside a same device. This does not change the logical in-
terpretation but only changes the physical operation. The process level
devices include I/O devices, sensors and actuators connected by a
process bus. The station level devices include IEDs which are used for
monitoring, control and protection functions. The station level devices
are station level computers, operator’s workplace, remote commu-
nication interface. To fulfill the requirements of a SAS, the functions are
decomposed in form of LNs which may reside logically in a physical
device. The discussion on LNs has been presented in next subsection.
For proper running of functions in a SAS, it is essential and crucial to
meet the performance requirements of the supporting communication
interface. This includes the total latency, i.e. the total transfer time
between two functions in a SAS. The total transfer time is defined as the
sum of communication processing delay at sending and receiving end
and the propagation delay as shown in Fig. 3.
The transfer time is applicable for the complete transmission chain
as indicated in Fig. 3. In physical device 1, a function f1 sends data to
another function f2, located in physical device 2. The transfer time is
sum of processing times at communication processors and the network
transfer time, including queueing and processing time at routers and
other devices in the network. The testing and verification of transfer
times for the communication network is performed before deployment
to ensure reliable operation.
The data between different functions of a physical device is trans-
ferred in form of messages.
3.1. Message types and structures
According to IEC 61850, the different messages are classified into
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Electrical Power and Energy Systems 120 (2020) 106008
seven types which are further subdivided in to two independent groups
of performance classes.
3.1.1. Type 1 - Fast messages
This category of messages contains a single point status data or
command such as “trip”, “close”, “start”, “stop” or “block”. The mes-
sages carrying the “trip” command is further named as Type 1A, while
other fast messages are named as Type 1B. The Type 1A message have
stringent timing requirements and are most important than other fast
type of messages.
Whenever a fault occurs it is detected by protection devices which
respond to it by generating burst of Type 1A Generic Object-Oriented
Substation Event (GOOSE) messages. During fault conditions, the per-
iodic heartbeat nature of GOOSE message is changed to burst mode. In
burst mode, the transmission interval of GOOSE messages increases
sequentially. As an event occurs (such as a fault) the retransmission
time of GOOSE message is changed from To to T1, T2, T3, ……Tn such
that T1 < T2 < T3 < …. < Tn. The sequential increase in re-
transmission time ends until Tn reaches to To. After some period of time,
the retransmission time changes back to normal periodic nature as
shown in Fig. 4. The gradual increase in retransmission time in bursts is
adopted in order to increase reliability of the network, since the Type
1A GOOSE message conveys critical commands.
3.1.2. Type 2- Medium speed messages
This category of messages contains transmission of normal state
information which contains the important message but the time for
transmission in noncritical. These messages include a time tag field
from the sender, and the receiver is expected to react normally after an
inherent time delay computed from the time tag. The medium speed
message category contains client–server type of messages which are
either periodic Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) messages
or event triggered MMS messages.
3.1.3. Type 3- Low speed messages and Type 7- Command messages
This category includes messages which are used for slow auto-
control functions, event record transmission, reading/changing set
point values etc. Generally, slow speed functions such as transmitting
M.A. Aftab, et al.
Fig. 3. Transfer time in a SAS.
non-electrical parameters like pressure, temperature are Type 3 mes-
sages. Also, the Type 7 messages used to send control commands to
provide access control are same as Type 3 messages with an additional
feature of password protection.
3.1.4. Type 4-Raw data messages
This category of messages includes cyclic/periodic sampling mes-
sages from the instrument transformers. They contain continuous syn-
chronized data streams generated in a SAS. The Sample Value (SV)
message generated from the Merging Unit (MU) IED which is trans-
mitted to Protection and Control (P&C) IED is a typical example of
cyclic raw data message.
3.1.5. Type 5- File transfer messages
This category of message contains bulk of data consisting of re-
corded files, information files, setting files which are transmitted as and
when required by a receiver in a randomly selected time. The data is
split into smaller blocks to allow other network activities to occur in
between and to ease continuous traffic in the network. A typical File
Transfer Protocol (FTP) message in a SAS belongs to Type 5 message
class.
3.1.6. Type 6- Time synchronization messages
This category of message contains the synchronization messages for
the internal clocks of IEDs in an SAS. These messages are periodic in
nature and their periodicity is determined based on the accuracy for the
application. However, time synchronization message accuracy must be
an order above the accuracy required by the functional requirements of
the application. Table 2 summarizes the different message types and the
Fig. 4. GOOSE message retransmission in IEC 61850.
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Electrical Power and Energy Systems 120 (2020) 106008
required transmission times.
Messages of type 1 and type 1A are GOOSE, which are mapped
directly to ethernet layer to reduce the protocol stack size as these
messages are time critical. The transmission of raw data or type 4
messages (SVs) are also mapped directly onto ethernet layer with
broadcast/multicast addressing. The GOOSE and SV messages are
normally sent to many IEDs at the same time. Hence, these messages
generally are either broadcast or multicast. To broadcast the GOOSE or
SV messages, the destination Media Access Control (MAC) address is
specified as “FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF”. For multicast of these messages the
range of MAC address is given in Table 3.
Messages of Type 2, 3, and 5 corresponds to Abstract
Communication Service Interface (ACSI) services which require client
server communication. These type of ACSI services are mapped to MMS
protocols with Transport Control Protocol and Internet Protocol (TCP/
IP) stack are used. The time synchronization or type 6 messages use
IEEE 1588 Precision Time Protocol (PTP) over UDP/IP transport layer.
Fig. 5 shows the communication stack mapping of different messages.
The ethernet frame format/communication stack of GOOSE and SV
is as shown in Fig. 6. The frame format/communication stack of Man-
ufacturing Message Specification (MMS) is as shown in Fig. 7. The MMS
protocol is defined to be used on top of TCP/IP stack. Different types of
MMS PDUs and its corresponding tags are shown in Table 4.
3.2. System configuration language (SCL) for substation automation system
In Substation Communication Network (SCN), for seamless com-
munication, IEDs need to possess some information on specifications of
the substation such as the single line diagram, switchyard
M.A. Aftab, et al. Electrical Power and Energy Systems 120 (2020) 106008

Table 2
Different Message Types and their Transmission TImes.
Message type Description Transmission times (ms)

Performance class 1 (P1) Performance class 2/3 (P2/3)

Type 1A “Trip” ‘Trip’ which is the most important fast message with demanding requirements < 10 <3
Type 1B “others” Other time critical fast messages such as Trip, Close, Start, Stop, etc. < 100 < 20
Type 2 Messages containing normal ‘state’ information, where transmission time is less critical < 100
Type 3 The messages comprising auto-control functions, transmission of event records, general < 500
presentation of system data which are time-tagged
Type 4 raw data messages < 10 < 3
Type 5 file transfer messages, where large files of data of recording, information or settings are > =1000
transferred
Type 6 The messages used to synchronize the internal clocks of IEDs in system –
Type 7 The messages of high degree of security used for transfer of control orders command messages –
with access control.

Table 3 file is the configuration file generated by a system (substation) level

Multicast Address Range for GOOSE and SV Messages.
Message type Address Range
GOOSE 01:0C:CD:01:00:00 to 01:0C:CD:01:01:FF
SV 01:0C:CD:04:00:00 to 01:0C:CD:04:01:FF
configuration, communication system description and capabilities of
other IEDs [35]. This information is normally communicated through a
configuration process involving configuration files. IEC 61850–6 spe-
cifies the System Configuration description Language (SCL) and dif-
ferent types of SCL files required for configuration in SAS.
IEC 61850-6 defines six types of SCL configuration files namely, IED
Capability Description (ICD), Instantiated IED Description (IID), System
Specification Description (SSD), System Configuration Description
(SCD), Configured IED Description (CID) and System Exchange
Description (SED) file. The ICD file contains a template of functional-
ities and engineering capabilities of an IED in form of LNs and corre-
sponding data types. IID file contains instantiated data objects obtained
from the data template due to any modifications in earlier instance of
the file. The SSD file contains the description of substation structure
such as single line diagram, functions and corresponding LNs. The SCD
configurator after processing all the ICD files from each IED and SSD
files. CID file is subset of SCD file configured for a specific IED. It
contains the configuration functionality related to the specific IED. SED
files are used for configuring information exchange between IEDs be-
longing to different projects (such as different substations). The SED file
contains the capability description information of an IED required for
configuring information exchange with other IED from a different
project.
Each IED is equipped with its ICD file which is supplied by the
manufacturer [36]. Initially, at the beginning of engineering process all
the IEDs send their respective ICD files to IED configurator. The IED
configurator sends all the ICD files to the system configurator which
combines all the ICD files and SSD file of the substation and generates a
SCD file. The SCD file is sent back to the IED configurators. Based on the
SCD file, IED configurator generates a CID file specific to each IED. The
typical SCL configuration process in substation is illustrated in Fig. 8.
4. Performance evaluation of IEC 61850 substation automation
system communication networks
Performance evaluation of SCN is carried out by assessing the per-
formance metrics such as latency, throughput, jitter, packet loss etc.

Fig. 5. ISO/OSI 7-layer communication stack of IEC 61850.

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M.A. Aftab, et al. Electrical Power and Energy Systems 120 (2020) 106008

Fig. 6. Payload fields of GOOSE and SV.

This performance evaluation is carried out using simulation tools, Table 4

analytical analysis and experimental analysis. Different techniques and Different types of MMS PDU with Tags.
tools have been used in literature for evaluating performance of SCN. Type of MMS PDU Tag (hex) Type of MMS PDU Tag (hex)
Authors in [37] describes a generic network simulator which can be
used for testing performance of IEC 61850 based SCN. The proposed Confirmed-Request PDU A0 Cancel-Error PDU A7
tool can be used for configuration and dynamic testing of IEC 61850 Confirmed-Response PDU A1 Initiate-Request PDU A8
Confirmed-Error PDU A2 Initiate-Response PDU A9
based networks. This section reviews various performance evaluation
Unconfirmed-PDU A3 Initiate-Error PDU AA
techniques for SCN. Reject PDU A4 Conclude-Request PDU AB
Cancel-Request PDU A5 Conclude-Response PDU AC
Cancel-Response PDU A6 Conclude-Error PDU AD
4.1. Process bus - experimental

With the adoption of IEC 61850 standard for SAS, the typical
hardwired copper cables in the substation and control centers were

Fig. 7. MMS Message frame format.

7
M.A. Aftab, et al.
Fig. 8. SCL file configuration for typical SCN [38].
replaced with the process bus technology. This transition results into
elimination of potentially hazardous copper cables with cost savings
and creation of spacious substations. The process bus technology is
based upon transfer of current and voltage signals in the substation
using IEC 61850-9-2 SVs [17]. This is realized using a device known as
merging unit which samples the signals from CT/PT and transmits it in
the form of SVs. In the process bus technology, the trip signals are
transmitted through high speed peer to peer communication of IEC
61850-8-1 GOOSE messages over the Ethernet [16]. This transition
gave an impetus to research and design in process bus technology for
monitoring, protection and control applications.
To adopt the process bus technology in substation, the performance
of the ethernet switches in the process bus network with respect to the
sampled value transmission is analyzed in [39]. The measurements of
sampled values from a replicated merging unit in their test setup con-
firmed that multiple sampled values transmissions can occur at same
rate in same time. From their work, it was concluded that the process
bus network is reliable and can be used in future deployments in IEC
61850 based substations.
In [40], a multivendor process bus technology design for protection
application for use in mesh transmission networks is presented. Also,
performance evaluation for multivendor devices (merging units) was
carried out in the laboratory as shown in Fig. 9. The motive of their
Fig. 9. Interoperability testing of MUs [40].
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Electrical Power and Energy Systems 120 (2020) 106008
work was to create a roadmap for future deployment of different
merging units for protection and control applications. Also, interoper-
ability testing for different vendor merging units was carried out and it
was found that instantaneous interoperability for certain applications
does not work in certain vendor combinations.
In another work [41], directional comparison-based protection
using process bus technique has been carried out. Superimposed Di-
rectional Comparison-Based Protection (DCBP) scheme in time domain
mode has been used. Due to communication delays in IEC 61850 which
adds up in relay operating time, time domain-based scheme has been
used due to fast operation. PSCAD simulation as well as hardware
testing of the scheme has been carried out in their work. From the
performance evaluation results, it is found that the DCBP scheme is
insensitive to CT saturation and does not lose dependability and se-
curity due to packet loss and latency in data transmission. On similar
lines, authors in [42] carried out performance evaluation for SV loss
and delays in process bus communication network for digital protection
using a MU developed in laboratory as shown in Fig. 10. The impact of
SV loss on bus bar protection was analyzed and it was found that
protection IED may malfunction due to SV loss/delay in certain fault
conditions. Also, from their work, it was concluded that corrective
measures for SV loss/delay could certainly improve performance of
process bus communication network for digital protection schemes.
M.A. Aftab, et al. Electrical Power and Energy Systems 120 (2020) 106008

The authors in [45] proposed a performance evaluation setup using

RTDS GTNET cards with SV protocol support and Ethernet switches.
Their setup was developed to measure network latency. The novelty in
the proposed test setup was that the network latency could be measured
by a single set of capture of data packet rather than capturing of source
and destination data packets capture. In other work a prototype of a MU
IED was developed for situational awareness and asset management
[46]. In order to detect the impending faults, this smart MU can detect
partial discharge which happens in transient stage before occurrence of
faults. The proposed prototype was developed in the laboratory and
experimental validation results were presented in [46].

4.2. Time sync 1588

A unique time reference across all SAS is very important to manage

complex tasks and actions (e.g. alarms) in a substation. A time syn-
chronization algorithm is used to synchronize clocks all over the sub-
Fig. 10. Functional block diagram of MU developed in laboratory in [42]. station network. These time synchronization algorithms allow to
achieve a time synchronization accuracy varying from order of micro-
seconds to milliseconds.
For an in depth understanding of protection performance with
Before the introduction of IEC 61850, Simple Network Time
process bus technology, a Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) was used
Protocol (SNTP) was employed for synchronizing components for SAS.
to test the performance of process bus-based transformer differential
For high timing accuracy, IRIG-B is used for SAS, but it requires dedi-
protection in [43] as shown in Fig. 11. It was found that the network
cated network for providing time synchronization. However, the IEC
latency is an important performance metric for process bus networks.
61850 standard compliant devices recommend the use of IEEE 1588 as
Their research will provide future insights into process bus adoption for
the time synchronization protocol [47]. Although IEEE 1588 does not
meeting stringent performance requirements of various process bus-
provide timing accuracy as compared to IRIG-B, but it reduces the
based protection techniques.
complexity of timing infrastructure [48]. The IEEE 1588 also known as
The performance requirement of various protocols used in the
Precision Time Protocol (PTP) is a protocol used for time distribution
process bus are classified based on application in [44]. A quantitative
over local area networks particularly based on Ethernet. Moreover,
investigation of the interaction between various protocols employed in
many IEC 61850 compliant devices are based on SNTP for time syn-
process bus communication network is described by the authors. It was
chronization. Thus, it is necessary to develop time synchronization
concluded through their research that in high network load conditions,
gateways for SNTP to PTP transition for easy adoption of devices for
the fast trip signals being transmitted through GOOSE protocol do not
IEEE 1588 timing protocol.
interact with the continuous samples transmitted through SV protocol.
Authors in [49] proposed three implementations for the SNTP to
This forms a basis of replacing hard wired cabling with the Ethernet
PTP timing gateways for the mixed use of old and new timing protocol
based process bus network into a reality.
based devices in an IEC 61850 based SAS. The proposed gateways have

Fig. 11. Testbed for Transformer Differential Protection [43].

9
M.A. Aftab, et al.
been experimentally evaluated by means of real prototypes using FPGA
based motherboards. From the experimental results it was concluded
that timing gateways prototype was able to perform well on the net-
work performance metrics such as jitter. In other work [50], hardware
evaluation of PTP devices was carried out by analyzing the jitter in
various grandmaster/slave combinations. Grandmaster, slave,
boundary clocks are the commercially available PTP devices. The per-
formance test is carried out by comparing jitter of various slave devices
with the master. The results show that all tested grandmaster and slave
clocks were interoperable, however, a tenfold difference in jitter be-
tween the grandmaster and slave exists between the best and the worst
combinations. The series of tests carried out in their work can be used
by system designers to evaluate timing components and can be used for
systematic testing.
In another work, performance of time synchronization network with
1588 and for SAS has been reported [51]. With the adoption of 1588 for
timing synchronization by various utilities, there is a need of reliability
assessment for confidence of utility before its final roll out. This was
performed by the authors in their work by assessing the performance of
a timing-based system based on mixture of receivers and PTP devices. It
was found that high quality systems with appropriate installations and
engineering is required to meet the stringent accuracy requirement.
The security and availability of PTP based time synchronization is
tested by authors in [52]. To assess its security, detection and preven-
tion attacks related to PTP, delay were simulated and tested on PTP
time synchronization. A PTP master slave model has been constructed
and attacks were simulated and experimentally tested using a prob-
abilistic model checker, PRISM. It is used for quantitative and quali-
tative verification for security assessment of protocols. It was concluded
that the PTP time synchronization method is secure and robust towards
PTP delay attacks.
The revision in IEEE 1588, in 2008 created PTPv2 which provides
greater accuracy for network based timing synchronization with timing
error less than ± 100 ns is utilized for process bus synchronization in
[53]. The experimental setup for time synchronization testing is shown
in Fig. 12. Steady state and dynamic performance tests were performed
on commercially available PTPv2 clocks for time synchronization for
MUs. It was concluded that the PTPv2 timing synchronization is within
the tolerable error for sampled value communication.
4.3. Simulation studies
The performance evaluation of process bus network in terms of
process bus sampling rate, Bit Error Rate (BER) and background traffic
on process bus has been performed by authors in [54]. The performance
evaluation was done using OPNET (now Riverbed Modeler) as the
Fig. 12. Testbed for PTPv2 experimental validation [53].
10
Electrical Power and Energy Systems 120 (2020) 106008
network simulator tool. Also, in their work, algorithm for estimation of
sampled value loss based on adaptative filtering using phasor least
square error approach has been proposed. The sampled value loss es-
timation algorithm has been formulated in MATLAB and tested on a test
system in PSCAD. It is observed that the maximum estimation error for
the algorithm ranges about 8.5%. However, the major limitation in the
SV loss estimation approach is that it could only be used for one SV loss
in an SV sample.
Another challenge in the process bus communication network is the
synchronization loss due to which the MUs are unable to generate SV
with same sample count in the same second when sampled at the same
instant. The authors in [55] proposed a solution based on propagation
delay compensation for SV synchronization in a switched network of a
smart substation. The proposed method does not rely on external re-
ference clock, so the reliability of the SV synchronization method is
improved.
4.4. Architectures with simulation analysis
4.4.1. Typical architecture
Various types of IEDs in a SAS and their modeling with a network
simulator (OPNET) has been presented in [56]. There are three main
types of IEDs in a SAS viz. MU IED, P&C IED and Breaker IED. The MU
IED is responsible for processing data from the field CT and PT and
transmitting them digitally on the process bus. The P&C IED combines
the protection and control functionalities in a bay of a substation. The
breaker IED controls the operation of circuit breaker along with its
condition monitoring. The modeled IEDs has been employed for con-
struction of a SCN for its performance evaluation. The performance of
raw data messages with and without priority tagging for Local Area
Network (LAN) with different link speeds has been presented. Ex-
haustive performance evaluation results for various types of SAS ar-
chitectures presented in their work allows automation engineers to
adopt the best topology as per the requirement.
For accurate performance evaluation of SAS, complete functional
requirements of protection and control in a substation must be con-
sidered. In this regard, authors in [57] considered a large substation
with 14 bays and 159 IEDs. The network performance by analytical and
simulation means in terms of end to end delay, traffic delay and
probabilistic delay analysis has been carried out in their work. It is
concluded from the results that for finding maximum network delay,
analytical method is much faster than the simulation method. Also, the
maximum traffic on the link is due to the SV traffic which is periodic in
nature.
M.A. Aftab, et al.
Fig. 13. Proposed Cobweb architecture for SAS [59].
Fig. 14. Laboratory setup for SCN developed in [65].
4.4.2. Deterministic architecture
A switched ethernet based reliable, fast and deterministic SCN has
been proposed in [58]. The performance of proposed SCN has been
validated through simulations to study its data transmission speed,
determinism and reliability. The proposed architecture has no gateways
for inter IED communication which saves time in data transmission,
enhanced reliability due to redundant path and no single point of
failure. However, to provide redundancy, number of switches are in-
creased which leads to increase in overall cost. Reliability and de-
terminacy in an SCN have been achieved by proposing cobweb archi-
tecture in [59]. Cobweb architecture shown in Fig. 13, by its very
nature has spoke links and ring links which provides reliability and
determinism. The proposed single and dual cobweb architecture for
SCN has been evaluated using OPNET modeler. From the obtained re-
sults it is found that cobweb architecture has high reliability and de-
terminism to be adapted for a suitable architecture for smart substation
in future. Also, the proposed cobweb architecture is economical as
compared to traditional architectures.
IEC 62439-3 standard defines two protocols, Parallel Redundancy
Protocol (PRP) and High availability seamless redundancy (HSR) pro-
tocol, for increasing network reliability and to assure no packet loss.
Several studies have advocated use of PRP and HSR protocol for SAS.
Authors in [60] have presented in-depth analysis of PRP and HSR for
power utility automation. To fulfill the requirements of IEC 61850
based SCN for adapting PRP and HSR, a frame discarding mechanism
based on memory segmentation is proposed. In order to assess the
11
Electrical Power and Energy Systems 120 (2020) 106008
interoperable performance and network redundancy of MU in an IEC
61850 based SCN, an experimental scheme has been presented in [61].
The proposed scheme is tested on a real time digital simulator. Their
results provide confidence to utilities for adapting IEC 61850 based
interoperable devices. A novel redundant, deterministic and resilient
SCN architecture utilizing PRP has been proposed in [62]. Their ar-
chitecture has been compared with existing architectures to prove its
effectiveness.
The HSR protocol has two major drawbacks when applied to SCN.
Firstly, due to duplication of packet it increases network traffic which
greatly effects the performance of SCN. Secondly, latency is introduced
due to each hop in single topology in an HSR network. To overcome
these detrimental effects of HSR when applied to SCN, authors in [63]
proposed Reducing Multicast Traffic (RMT) algorithm and validated its
effectiveness through simulations by reducing 60–87% of traffic as
compared to standard HSR protocol. In other work [64], authors pro-
posed Quick Removing (QR) approach for improving latency and re-
ducing network traffic in HSR protocol based SCN. The proposed ap-
proach is demonstrated theoretically and validated through OPNET and
NS2 simulations. With the application of proposed enhancement, HSR
network can provide increased performance and reduction in network
latency.
4.4.3. Analytical modeling of traffic
For realistic performance evaluation results, analytical modeling-
based performance evaluation has been presented in several studies. In
M.A. Aftab, et al.
[65], analytical modeling of source and destination traffic has been
done using network calculus approach. A laboratory setup for an SCN
has been designed using station PCs, ethernet switches and network
analyzer as shown in Fig. 14. The performance of the SCN has been
analyzed for various scenarios such as heavy traffic, minimum load and
typical event scenarios. The traffic load and network delay proposed by
the analytical method is found to be very close as computed by the
network analyzer during the laboratory investigation. Thus, the pro-
posed methodology has been validated and is found to be very reliable
for designing SCN traffic flows. In another work [66], for carrying out
quantitative analysis, traffic flow in an SCN is classified as cyclic, sto-
chastic and burst data. The performance of an SCN based on the traffic
data modeling has been carried out in OPNET modeler. The concept of
Virtual LAN (VLAN) and the impact of faults on the VLAN network is
also presented. The presented data flow models in their work will act as
the building blocks for system engineers to evaluate the performance of
SCN before its actual deployment.
Improving this performance evaluation further, authors in [67],
proposed bounded model for the modeling of communication delay.
Instead of stochastic or average modeling, bounded model is found to
provide more realistic results. System Integrity Protection Scheme
(SIPS) has been evaluated to determine its latency and the prediction of
latency for SIPS is performed through the bounded model. The pro-
posed approach is found to provide relay bounds for SIPS scheme and
works in providing planning, designing and assessment of SIPS net-
works.
Effect of noise on Wireless LAN (WLAN) based IEC 61850 substation
is carried out in [68]. Authors have developed a laboratory prototype
for testing effect of noise on IEC 61850 messages traversing in a sub-
station through IEDs. The prototype has been validated by im-
plementing in a real substation in London and Canada. Their work helps
to prove the effectiveness of WLAN in IEC 61850 based smart substa-
tions.
Reliability evaluation of IEC 61850 based SCN components has been
carried out in [69]. The reliability analysis has been carried out for a
modern protection system in IEC 61850 based substation. Reliability
analysis of cyber-physical components has been done by introducing
the concept of cyber-physical interface matrix.
Table 5 summarizes the different works reported in literature re-
garding performance evaluation in SAS.
5. Application fields
5.1. Software defined networks
A Software Defined Network (SDN) separates the control and the
data plane into two different entities running in a same network. The
separation of data plane and control plane helps in management of the
network and flexibility in the implementation of solutions that lead to
operational and capital cost reduction. A review of SDN for its appli-
cation to power utility automation has been presented by authors in
[71]. In another work [72], concept of SDN has been applied for
prioritization of time critical GOOSE messages in an Active Distribution
System Substation. The proposed prioritization algorithm has been
validated by running an SDN in a virtual environment. The results in-
dicate that among different messages in a substation, the GOOSE
message is prioritized by using SDN concept and reaches destination
with less latency as compared to without prioritization scheme.
5.2. IEC 61850 based adaptive protection
A high speed distance relaying scheme by taking into consideration
both magnitude and angle of voltage and current phasors is developed
in [70]. The authors in their work have implemented their proposed
high-speed distance relaying scheme on a FPGA board. To validate the
performance of their proposed relaying scheme, the proposed relay was
12
Electrical Power and Energy Systems 120 (2020) 106008
tested using RTDS. The voltage and current phasors from GTNET-SV
enabled card of RTDS is sent to the FPGA based relay which then issues
a command to the GTNET GOOSE enabled card for circuit breaking. The
proposed relay was found to make early trip decisions even with fault
located at remote ends and with large CCVT transient errors.
In [73], Fault Location, Isolation and System Restoration (FLISR) for
Distributed Automation System (DAS) using IEC 61850 information
modeling, as shown in Fig. 15, has been proposed. A DAS consist of
more entities than a SAS and the concept of interoperability and in-
formation exchange to address the more complex architecture of DAS is
required to be addressed by IEC 61850 standard. Since, IEC 61850 does
not include information models for FLISR, new logical nodes such as
Feeder fault location function (FLOC), Fault isolation function (FISO)
and Non-fault area power restoration function (FRES) are proposed.
The proposed logical nodes have been validated by model checking and
implementation in an IED using intelligent distribution simulation
system. The results conform to the validation of proposed logical nodes
development. Further, extending the IEC 61850 beyond substation,
many adaptive protection schemes for distribution system and micro-
grid protection are reported in literature [74–77].
In [78], authors have developed an IEC 61850 communication
based line differential protection scheme and its performance is vali-
dated in a Software-In-The-Loop (SITL) setup by a network simulator
tool. The communication based differential protection scheme is rea-
lized by transferring the SV signal to the distant substation for im-
plementing the protection algorithm. For this the LAN based SV mes-
sage protocol stack is added with TCP/IP functionality in the network
simulator tool and sent to the distant substation. The results have been
presented for different networks such as ATM, SONET and Fiber Optic.
It is concluded from the research that IEC 61850 communication-based
protection meets the stringent timing requirements of power system
protection schemes.
In a similar work, authors have proposed IEC 61850 based ac-
celerated distance protection scheme for inter-substation communica-
tion [79]. The experimental validation and performance evaluation of
GOOSE based accelerated distance protection scheme has been done by
transporting the LAN based GOOSE message through tunneling. Also,
the authors have developed a SITL setup to study the performance of
their scheme under different Wide Area Network (WAN) scenarios as
shown in Fig. 16. It is concluded from their work, that there is a sig-
nificant time saving by using the accelerated GOOSE based distance
protection scheme from the conventional schemes.
5.3. HMI
The IEC 61850 standard provides flexibility and interoperability in
automating any type of industry such as mining, semiconductor, oil and
gas etc. To harness the benefits of IEC 61850, providing greater trans-
parency in the substation, faster commissioning of a system, structured
tag names are maintained in the automaton controller. Authors in [80]
provided solutions for development of nameplates/faceplates for an IEC
61850 based substation. Their work provides reduction in start-up time,
easy configurable SCADA reporting and interfacing of electrical dis-
tribution system with traditional process control applications. Also, in
their work, the process owners can work on a single and standard in-
terface which adheres to IEC 61850 and provides vendor interoper-
ability.
5.4. Cybersecurity considerations in substation automation system
Due to standardized message structure and interoperability, IEC
61850 based SAS are prone to cyber-attacks. There have been several
attempts to present cybersecurity attacks in SAS. Authors in [81] dis-
cussed three types of attacks on GOOSE messages known as GOOSE
poisoning. These attacks are high-status number attack, high rate
flooding attack and semantic attack. In high-status number attack the
M.A. Aftab, et al. Electrical Power and Energy Systems 120 (2020) 106008

Table 5
Performance Evaluation of SAS.
Reference Year Focus of work Simulation Analytical Experimental SAS Architecture Implementation

[56] 2007 Generic IED modeling technique √ × × Waterfall model OPNET

[58] 2010 Reliable, Fast and Deterministic SCN √ × × Proposed redundant OPNET
architecture
[42] 2011 Process bus network evaluation for digital × × √ 230kv power system PSCAD
protection system MATLAB
[41] 2011 IEC 61850 based directional comparison scheme √ × √ 6 feeder power system PSCAD
MATLAB
[54] 2011 Process bus network evaluation √ × × 345/230kv transmission OPNET, PSCAD, MATLAB
substation
[45] 2012 Process bus network evaluation × × √ — RTDS
[39] 2013 Process bus network evaluation × × √ 275kv transmission substation RTDS
[44] 2013 Protocols used in process bus network × × √ Network of 5 ethernet switches DAG card
Ethernet tap
[43] 2014 Process bus network evaluation for transformer × × √ — RTDS
differential protection
[40] 2014 Process bus-based protection scheme testing × × √ Meshed substation Omicron,
Multivendor IEDs
[37] 2014 IEC 61850 for SAS √ × × —— IEC 61850 Network
Simulator
[59] 2014 Reliable and Deterministic Cobweb architecture √ √ × Cobweb architecture of D2-1 OPNET
evaluation substation
[65] 2015 Analytical Modeling of traffic flows in an SCN × √ × 220kv substation Network Analyzer
[63] 2016 Reducing Multicast traffic (RMT) in HSR network √ √ × HSR network OMNeT++ v4.2.2
[67] 2016 Bounded model for SIPS (System Integrity √ √ × IEC 61850 T2-2 OPNET
Protection System IEEE 14 bus system
[60] 2016 PRP and HSR network √ × √ — Finite State Machine
Redbox
[64] 2016 Latency and traffic reduction using PRP √ √ × — OPNET
NS2
[61] 2016 Interoperability assessment of multivendor process × × √ 400kv substation RTDS
bus
[55] 2017 Performance evaluation and compensation of × √ √ — Spirent Test Centre
Sampled Value Ethernet Switch
[66] 2017 Mathematical Modeling of traffic in a substation √ × × Ring and Star networks OPNET
[57] 2018 Characterization of network delays in IEC 61850 √ √ × Double busbar substation Riverbed Modeler
based SCN
[46] 2018 Merging Unit for Fault detection in Transformer × × √ — Real Time Automation
Controller
[70] 2018 Digital distance relaying using FPGA and IEC × √ √ IEEE 12 bus system RTDS
61850 FPGA

Fig. 15. Breaker level Fault location isolation and restoration system design proposed in [73].

attacker multicasts a single spoofed GOOSE message with high status flooding attack also known as status number flooding attack, the at-
number. When the spoofed GOOSE message reaches the GOOSE sub- tacker multicasts a range of spoofed GOOSE messages with increasing
scribers, it discards the other legitimate GOOSE messages with status status numbers. This causes the GOOSE subscriber to expect a very
number equal to or less than that of spoofed messages. In high rate high-status number for the next GOOSE message. In sematic attack, the

13
M.A. Aftab, et al.
Fig. 16. Accelerated GOOSE based distance protection scheme proposed in [79].
attacker firstly observes the network traffic and determines the rate of
status change. Then, the attacker multicasts spoofed GOOSE messages
with a different rate. When these GOOSE messages reach GOOSE sub-
scribers, the subscriber is unable to process the legitimate GOOSE
messages. Similar type of replay and tampering attacks on GOOSE
messages have also been discussed in [82,83]. The GOOSE message
inherently do not have confidentiality and authenticity due to which
these spoofing attacks are possible.
Authors in [84] presented a scheme to audit the security of IEC
61850 based substation. It was concluded from their research that in-
trusion detection for IEC 61850 networks must be employed as a viable
security countermeasure. Node authentication of all the entities in the
network solves the problem of network intrusions. Authors in [85]
discussed cyber intrusion attacks on GOOSE and SV messages. With
intrusion, the GOOSE messages can be modified which leads to false
tripping of circuit breakers in substations. Intruded SV messages can
lead to sending of fabricated values to control centers which conse-
quently result in false conclusions and operational decisions. Authors in
[86] presents integrated Anomaly Detection System (ADS) to prevent
intruders gaining access to SAS. Similarly, in [87] an intrusion detec-
tion system is developed by using data collected from simulated attacks
on IEDs and packet sniffing attacks using forged address resolution
protocol (ARP) packets. However, still these detection systems do not
fulfill the authenticity and message integrity security requirements and
hence are prone to intrusion attacks. Authors in [88] presented Man In
The Middle (MITM) attack on IEC 61850 MMS messages by ARP
spoofing. Based upon the MITM attack, the attacker may further launch
series of new attacks such as eavesdropping, masquerade, false data
injection, replay and DoS. Malicious fault injection attack and hardware
Trojan attack were implemented on embedded systems in [89]. This
study was done to know the impact of these attacks on substation se-
curity and, eventually, power grid integrity and availability. Their re-
search concluded that efficient countermeasures to prevent these at-
tacks must be designed and developed to safeguard the SAS.
Review of cyberattacks and their challenges in IEC 61850 based
SASs are discussed in [90–92]. To address these cybersecurity chal-
lenges IEC 62,351 standard series is developed which provides guide-
lines for securing IEC 61850 messages.
For GOOSE and SV messages, IEC 62351 identifies that integrity and
authentication are major security requirements. However, it does not
14
Electrical Power and Energy Systems 120 (2020) 106008
consider confidentiality as major security requirement for GOOSE and
SV message in SAS. The IEC 62351-6 [93] standard proposes use of RSA
based digital signatures for securing GOOSE and SV messages in SAS.
However, studies reported in [94,95] have concluded that RSA based
digital signatures result in higher processing times and thus, cannot
applied for time critical GOOSE and SV messages. Alternatively, HMAC
based security schemes were proposed for securing GOOSE and SV
messages [96,97]. For MMS messages, the IEC 62351-4 recommends
transport layer security (TLS), as per RFC 5246, having cipher suite
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA [98]. In [99] authors present a
comprehensive review of IEC 62351 security mechanism for securing
IEC 61850 messages.
6. Conclusion and future work
With the emergence of IEC 61850 as the leading standard for sub-
station automation, in recent years many efforts were focused on IEC
61850 based substation automation. This paper presents a holistic re-
view of IEC 61850 based SASs.
With the increasing impetus towards renewable energy integration
in power sector, the common services and interfaces for DER, EV in-
tegration must be made available. In this regard, new extensions of IEC
61850 are published and updated covering entire power utility auto-
mation. Although, standardized DER functions have been dealt in IEC
61850-7-420, 90-7 and 90-5 standards, still services and interfaces for
DER, EVs leading to a secure adaptation of the functional structure
which can provide a more efficient energy system must be investigated
and developed.
Future work can be focused on developing the IEC 61850 in-
formation models and functions for new equipment such as smart in-
verters, Distributed Energy Resource - Management Systems (DERMS),
Virtual Synchronous Generators (VSGs), etc. Also, cybersecurity is a
must as the research shows. Its implementation is required for security
while it should be ensured that timing requirements are satisfied for
proper operation.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to
M.A. Aftab, et al.
influence the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgement
This work was supported in part by AIST Research and Innovation
Fund 2019.
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