Cognition 179 (2018) 202–212

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Cognition
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/cognit

Original Articles

A new approach to differentiate states of mind wandering: Effects of T

working memory capacity
⁎
Matthew J. Voss, Meera Zukosky , Ranxiao Frances Wang
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, United States

A R T I C LE I N FO A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Although widely studied, the process of how mind wandering occurs and is subsequently sustained still remains
Mind wandering unclear. Moreover, the traditional concept of mind wandering tendency/frequency based on the self- or probe-
Meditation caught methods alone is incoherent and problematic. We developed a new approach to characterize the mind
Working memory wandering process by combining the self-caught and probe-caught methods to estimate the time of focus and
Memory and attention
time of mind wandering separately, and examined their relationship to working memory capacity. Participants
performed an OSPAN task and subsequently a basic Mindfulness Meditation Task (focus on breath). During the
meditation task, participants indicated when they became aware that they were mind wandering (self-caught
method), or were asked if they were mind wandering when probed (probe-caught method). Results showed that
time of focus but not time of mind wandering increased with greater working memory capacity. This suggests
that individuals with higher working memory capacity were able to focus on the current task longer, but had
little effect on the ability to monitor and terminate mind wandering once it occurred. The theoretical and
methodological implications of this new approach are discussed.

1. Introduction
While performing a task, internal thoughts often grab our attention,
preventing us from focusing on the current task at hand. These in-
ternally driven thoughts are termed mind wandering, and encompass
thoughts that are unrelated to the current task at hand (Christoff,
Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews- Hanna, 2016; Randall, Oswald, &
Beier, 2014; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, 2015). Although the specific
terms used and the exact definition of mind wandering varies across the
literature, it is agreed upon that mind wandering can be described as a
shift of attention away from the primary task at hand to internal
thoughts (Christoff et al., 2016; Randall et al., 2014; Smallwood &
Schooler, 2006, 2015).
Various factors have been found to affect mind wandering. Task
difficulty, clinical symptomology of ADHD and Dysphoria, as well as an
individual’s mood have all been shown to affect the tendency to mind
wander (Feng, D’Mello, & Graesser, 2013; Phillips, Mills, D’Mello, &
Risko, 2016; Poerio, Totterdell, & Miles, 2013; Seli, Smallwood,
Cheyne, & Smilek, 2015; Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudbery, & Obonsawin,
2007). For example, in regards to task demands, Smallwood, Ruby, and
Singer (2013) examined task unrelated thoughts in relationship to task
demands and found that task unrelated thoughts under a non-de-
manding condition of a simple choice reaction time task were
associated with reduced delay discounting, but were not in a more at-
tention demanding working memory task. Although these findings have
given us insights into the nature of mind wandering, the current
methodology of measuring the tendency to mind wander is ambiguous.
Here we explain the problems that arise with the current mind wan-
dering methodology, and develop a novel, more informative way to
examine mind wandering.
Research on mind wandering has employed various methods to
estimate people’s tendency to mind wander. One of the main ways to
measure mind wandering is with thought sampling, i.e., asking parti-
cipants directly through self report whether their mind was focused on
the task at hand, or whether they were mind wandering (Bastian &
Sackur, 2013; Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009;
Hasenkamp, Wilson-Mendenhall, Duncan, & Barsalou, 2012; Seli,
Carriere, Levene, & Smilek, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, 2015).
For example, participants may be interrupted while performing a task
to check for mind wandering (dichotomous probe-caught methods,
more fine-tuned probe-caught methods such as utilizing likert scales or
confidence ratings, and self-caught methods) (Christoff et al., 2009;
Hasenkamp et al., 2012; Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012; Seli,
Jonker, Cheyne, Cortes, & Smilek, 2015; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006;
McVay, Kane, and Kwapil, 2009, etc.). Post-hoc self reports, where
individuals are not interrupted during the task, have also been utilized

⁎
Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 603 E. Daniel St., Champaign, IL 61820, United States.
E-mail address: zukosky1@illinois.edu (M. Zukosky).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.05.013
Received 17 May 2017; Received in revised form 18 May 2018; Accepted 18 May 2018
Available online 29 June 2018
0010-0277/ © 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V.
M.J. Voss et al.
to estimate the occurrence of mind wandering (Helton & Warm, 2008;
Smallwood et al., 2012; Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 2009).
Among them, the self-caught and dichotomous probe-caught methods
administered during a task are two of the most common thought sam-
pling methods used to measure mind wandering, and are the primary
focus of the present study.
In the self-caught method, participants are asked to report whenever
they realize they are mind wandering (Braboszcz & Delorme, 2010;
Bastian & Sackur, 2013; Hasenkamp et al., 2012; Smallwood &
Schooler, 2006, 2015). For example, participants are asked to perform a
task and to report, usually with a button press, whenever they notice
that their focus is off the current task. Here the number of times an
individual catches her/himself mind wandering can be measured, as
well as the duration of time between reports. The frequency an in-
dividual catches her/himself mind wandering or the duration of time
between reports 1is interpreted as an indication of the likelihood or
tendency for an individual to mind wander. That is, a longer duration
between reports, or consequently a lower number of mind wandering
instances reported (lower frequency of self-caught reports of mind
wandering), is usually interpreted as a lower tendency or likelihood to
mind wander. In contrast, a higher number of mind wandering in-
stances reported (higher frequency of self-caught reports of mind
wandering), or a shorter duration between reports, is usually inter-
preted as a higher tendency or likelihood to mind wander (Braboszcz &
Delorme, 2010; Bastian & Sackur, 2013; Hasenkamp et al., 2012;
Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, 2015).
In the probe-caught method, participants are interrupted (usually
with a tone or a screen display) at different time intervals while per-
forming a task (Bastian & Sackur, 2013; Christoff et al., 2009; Seli et al.,
2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). At the time of the probe, parti-
cipants are asked to report whether their focus was on the task at hand,
or if they were mind wandering. The proportion of time an individual
was mind wandering can be calculated by dividing the probes labeled
as being in the mind wandering state by the total number of probes
given. The probe-caught method thus can provide a measure of the
overall proportion of time an individual was in a mind wandering state
based on the mind wandering probe rate (Bastian & Sackur, 2013; Seli
et al., 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). With the probe-caught
method, the proportion or percentage of time reported to be in a mind
wandering state is usually interpreted as an indication of the likelihood
or tendency for an individual to mind wander. That is, a higher pro-
portion or percentage of probes caught in the mind wandering state is
thought to indicate a higher tendency or likelihood to mind wander. In
contrast, a lower proportion or percentage of mind wandering probes is
thought to indicate a lower tendency or likelihood to mind wander.
Although intuitively sound, a closer examination of the self- and
probe-caught method reveals issues with the traditional interpretations
of mind wandering, and suggests that the concept of mind wandering
frequency/tendency itself is incoherent. As discussed by Smallwood
(2013), the inability to covertly detect the onset of mind wandering
poses difficulties in studying mind wandering. For example, as illu-
strated in Fig. 1a, a focus-mind wandering episode can be defined as the
time when an individual starts focusing (or refocusing) on a task, to
when an individual realizes s/he is mind wandering and terminates the
mind wandering. A focus-mind wandering episode therefore consists of
a period when an individual is focused on the current task s/he is
performing, and a period when s/he is actually mind wandering. This
time course within a focus-mind wandering episode illuminates po-
tential problems with the current use of the self- and probe-caught
methods to measure the tendency of mind wandering.
For example, the self-caught method provides a measure of the
frequency of self-caught reports or the duration of time from one self
1
Frequency of reports and the duration between reports are inversely related; there-
fore they are essentially the same measurement in different forms.
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Cognition 179 (2018) 202–212
report to another self report of an individual catching him/herself mind
wandering. From the self-caught method alone, one can get a mea-
surement of the entire focus-mind wandering episode duration (denoted
as Tself), as illustrated in Fig. 1a. However, this measurement includes
both the duration of time when an individual is focusing on the current
task at hand, which can be defined as the duration from the start of the
task to the moment one begins mind wandering (Tfocus), and the
duration of time an individual is actually mind wandering, which can
be defined as the duration from the start of mind wandering to the
moment that one catches him/herself and terminates the mind wan-
dering process (TMW). Since it is unknown when the time of focus stops
and when the time of mind wandering begins with this method, one
cannot distinguish the focus state duration (Tfocus) from the mind
wandering state duration (TMW) using the self-caught method alone. As
a result, people with the same self-caught mind wandering duration (or
same self reported mind wandering frequency) can have drastically
different durations that they actually spend mind wandering. For ex-
ample, as illustrated in Fig. 1b, one participant could have a short
duration of being in the focus state and a longer duration of being in the
mind wandering state, while another participant might have a long
duration of focusing on the task at hand and a short duration of being in
the mind wandering state, even though both participants catch them-
selves mind wandering at the same frequency (and thus have the same
focus-mind wandering episode duration). This difference is indis-
tinguishable using only the self-caught method, and thus the actual
duration of time an individual spent in the mind wandering state re-
mains unclear. Thus, the self-caught frequency of mind wandering is
not a satisfactory measure of how much people mind wander.
The probe-caught method measures the relative proportion of time
people are in a focus state and a mind wandering state. That is, if the
probes are sampled randomly or uniformly across the focus-mind
wandering episode, then the chance a probe happens to land at a time
while the participant is mind wandering is determined by the overall
proportion of time s/he spends in mind wandering (p(MW)). If an in-
dividual spends 60% of the time in an actual mind wandering state,
then the chance a random probe occurs at a time s/he is mind wan-
dering would be 0.6. Although this method can estimate the proportion
of time an individual is in a focus state and a mind wandering state, it
cannot determine the duration an individual spends in a focus state and
in a mind wandering state in individual episodes. As illustrated in
Fig. 1c, individuals with the same probe-caught mind wandering rate
can have drastically different durations of focus and mind wandering in
individual episodes, which reflects their different ability to maintain
attention on the current task and their ability to detect mind wandering.
Participant 1 (P1) is able to focus on the current task for 10 s before
mind wandering is initiated, and remains in a mind wandering state for
30 s before catching mind wandering and returning to the task, while
P2 is able to stay on focus for 5 s before entering a mind wandering state
which lasts for 15 s. If we randomly probe these two participants, they
will both be caught mind wandering 75% of the time, however both the
duration of focus (Tfocus) and the duration of mind wandering (TMW) are
longer for P1 compared to P2. Thus, the probe-caught rate of mind
wandering is also not a satisfactory measure of the underlying me-
chanism of mind wandering.
These methodological limitations can lead to confusion and mis-
interpretations in evaluating people’s tendencies to mind wander. For
example, Fig. 1d shows two individuals and their mind wandering time
course. The first participant (P1) has an average of 15 s in the focus
state, and 5 s in the mind wandering state, while the second participant
(P2) has 10 s in the focus state, and 30 s in the mind wandering state.
Therefore P1 has an overall focus-mind wandering episode duration of
20 s (or will self-catch her/himself mind wandering 3 times per
minute), while P2 has an overall focus-mind wandering episode dura-
tion of 40 s (or self-caught mind wandering rate of 1.5 times per
minute). Thus, according to the self-caught method, P1 would be con-
ventionally interpreted as having a higher tendency to mind wander
M.J. Voss et al.
compared to P2, as P1′s self-reported mind wandering frequency is
higher than P2′s.
In contrast, using only the probe-caught method, one would reach
the opposite conclusion. When probed randomly, P1 would be caught in
the focus state 75% of the time and in the mind wandering state 25% of
the time, while P2 would be caught in the focus state 25% of the time
and in a mind wandering state 75% of the time. According to the probe-
caught method, P1 would be traditionally interpreted as having a lower
tendency to mind wander compared to P2, as P1 is in a focus state
proportionally more and a mind wandering state proportionally less
than P2. Therefore for the same participants, the self-caught method
and probe-caught method give exactly the opposite conclusion on who
mind wanders more. This contradiction of the interpretations of more
vs less tendency to mind wander based on the two methods suggests an
intrinsic ambiguity of the traditional concept of mind wandering ten-
dency itself.
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Cognition 179 (2018) 202–212
Fig. 1. A theoretical analysis of the traditional
interpretations of mind wandering tendency
based on the self- and probe-caught methods.
(a) The different states of a focus-mind wan-
dering episode. (b) Problems of the self-caught
method as a measure of mind wandering ten-
dency. Participant 1 (P1) and participant 2
(P2), both have focus-mind wandering epi-
sodes of the same duration, but the duration in
the mind wandering state of P1 is longer and
the duration in the focus state is shorter, than
for P2. These two scenarios cannot be dis-
tinguished using only the self-caught method.
(c) Problems of the probe-caught method as a
measure of mind wandering tendency. The
ratio between the duration in a focus state and
the duration in a mind wandering state is the
same for both participants, but the actual
durations of being in the focus state and mind
wandering state in a given episode are dif-
ferent. These two scenarios cannot be dis-
tinguished using only the probe-caught
method alone. (d) Conflicts between the self-
caught method and the probe-caught method.
Here the probe-caught and the self-caught
method used alone lead to contradictory in-
terpretations when evaluating an individual’s
tendency to mind wander.
The present study took a new approach to characterize the mind
wandering process by estimating the time course of the two main states
of the focus-mind wandering episode separately, following the princi-
ples of the Process-Occurrence Framework by Smallwood (2013). This
theory emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between processes
that lead to the occurrence of an experience from those supporting the
continuation of the experience once it is initiated. According to this
framework, the first state Tfocus can be taken as a measure of one’s
ability to maintain attention on the current task and resist the occur-
rence/initiation of mind wandering, while the second state TMW can be
taken as a measure of processes that keep people in the mind wandering
state after it occurs. We used this new approach to examine one of the
main factors that has been shown to affect mind wandering, namely
working memory capacity.
The effect of working memory capacity on mind wandering has
been an important issue on theories of mind wandering. There is debate
M.J. Voss et al.
in the literature on whether mind wandering consumes executive con-
trol resources or whether mind wandering rather results from a failure
of executive control (Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012; McVay &
Kane, 2010; Randall et al., 2014; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, 2015).
The Resource Hypothesis states that mind wandering instances take up
executive control resources (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). In this view,
both the current task at hand and mind wandering instances are com-
peting for the same executive control resources. Here the same execu-
tive control resources intended to keep an individual focused on the
current task at hand, are diverted from the current task and used to
entertain internal mind wandering instances (Smallwood & Schooler,
2006). Thus, the resource hypothesis emphasizes that maintaining a
mind wandering instance requires executive resources. As such, when
more executive control resources are available, more mind wandering
should be present (Antrobus, 1968; Levinson et al., 2012; Rummel &
Boywitt, 2014; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Teasdale et al., 1995;
Thomson, Besner, & Smilek, 2013).
In contrast to the Resource Hypothesis, McVay and Kane (2010)
proposed the Executive Control Hypothesis, stating that instead of
consuming the executive control resources needed to focus on the
current task at hand, mind wandering is actually a result of a failure in
our executive control (McVay & Kane, 2010). Thus mind wandering is a
result from a failure in executive control to block thoughts about cur-
rent concerns (the default mode) during task performance (McVay &
Kane, 2010). As such, individuals with lower executive control re-
sources will be worse at blocking out this default mode, which will lead
to more mind wandering during task performance (Buckner, Andrews-
Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Christoff et al., 2016; Christoff et al., 2009;
Hasenkamp et al., 2012; Mason et al., 2007; McVay & Kane, 2009,
2010, 2012).
In summary, these two theories predict different behaviors in the
relationship between executive control, as measured by working
memory capacity, and mind wandering. If mind wandering instances do
in fact consume executive control resources (Resource Hypothesis),
individuals who have higher working memory capacity should have
more available executive control resources to divert to mind wandering.
Thus it is thought that individuals with higher working memory capa-
city should report being in a mind wandering state more compared to
individuals who have lower working memory capacity (Levinson et al.,
2012; Rummel & Boywitt, 2014; Teasdale et al., 1995; Thomson et al.,
2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). If, on the other hand, mind
wandering instances are a result of a failure in executive control (Ex-
ecutive Control Hypothesis), individuals who have higher working
memory capacity should have better executive control capacities to
block out mind wandering instances. Thus it is thought that individuals
should report being in a mind wandering state less compared to in-
dividuals who have lower working memory capacity (McVay & Kane,
2010, 2012).
The Process-Occurrence Framework by Smallwood (2013), on the
other hand, sought to reconcile this debate between the Executive
Control Hypothesis and the Resource Hypothesis. The Process Occur-
rence Framework stresses the importance of separating different ele-
ments of mind wandering, such as mind wandering’s initiation and the
maintenance of mind wandering (Smallwood, 2013). For example, as
Smallwood (2013) explains, executive control could influence mind
wandering directly (inhibiting mind wandering from being initiated) or
indirectly (maintenance and continuation of mind wandering). The
Executive Control Hypothesis and the Resource Hypothesis thus are not
in direct conflict, as these different hypotheses can illuminate the role
of executive control in different aspects of mind wandering.
However, the lack of empirical methods to indicate when mind
wandering begins, makes it difficult to separate the initiation of mind
wandering (for example when a mind wandering state begins) and the
maintenance of mind wandering once it has been initiated (for example
maintaining mind wandering until it is recognized and terminated)
(Smallwood, 2013). As a result, most previous work did not distinguish
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Cognition 179 (2018) 202–212
between different states of mind wandering and the corresponding
underlying processes, both at the theoretical and at the experimental
level. The failure to separately measure how working memory capacity
affects different states of mind wandering can cause confusion in the
interpretation of the data. The goal of this study was to develop a new
approach to estimating time of focus (Tfocus) and time of mind wan-
dering (TMW) within a self-caught focus-mind wandering episode se-
parately in relationship to working memory capacity, to examine the
role of executive control on the ability to focus on the task at hand, and
that on the ability to maintain and/or detect mind wandering sepa-
rately.
Experiment 1 is a pilot study following the traditional methods to
estimate some basic parameters and provide an initial measurement of
the relationship between working memory capacity and the raw self-
caught or probe-caught mind wandering rate in a mindfulness of breath
meditation task with our experimental setup and procedure. This served
as the basis for Experiment 2, where the two methods were combined
within the same participants to estimate the two states of the focus-
mind wandering episode.
2. Experiment 1a
Experiment 1 was conducted to estimate the temporal parameters of
self-caught mind wandering and examine the relationship between
working memory capacity and mind wandering using the self-caught
method alone within a non-demanding task, i.e., a Mindfulness Breath
Meditation Task.
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Participants
Twenty undergraduate students aged 18–22 from the University of
Illinois participated in experiment 1a. All participants had less than a
total of 10 h of meditation practice experience during their lives and
were novice meditators, to avoid practice effects of meditation, as it has
been shown that meditation practice can improve focused attention and
reduce mind wandering (Braboszcz, Hahusseau, & Delorme, 2010;
Brewer et al., 2011; Hasenkamp et al., 2012; Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, &
Davidson, 2008).
2.1.2. Working memory task
Individual’s working memory score was measured using the
Automated OSPAN task. This OSPAN task is a measure of working
memory capacity (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). During
this OSPAN task, participants first mentally solved a basic math pro-
blem (eg. (2 ∗ 4) + 2 = ?). Once participants finished solving the math
problem, a number would be presented on the screen. The participant
would then respond with a mouse click, whether the number presented
on the screen was true or false to the solution the participant mentally
calculated. After they made their selection, participants would see a
letter of the alphabet flash on the screen. After 3–7 trials, participants
were prompted to report what letters they saw in the order they saw
them. The entire OSPAN task took approximately 20 min where parti-
cipants saw a total of 75 math problems and letters. The absolute
OSPAN score is calculated as the total number of letters correctly re-
called (for more information on the OSPAN task please see Unsworth
et al., 2005). The OSPAN test used for the current study was created by
Millisecond Software from the following website (1http://www.
millisecond.com/download/library/OSPAN/).
2.1.3. Mindfulness breath meditation task
The main task for the current study was a Mindfulness Breath
Meditation Task. During the Mindfulness Breath Meditation Task, par-
ticipants were instructed to breathe normally and to focus on their
breath (participants were instructed to focus on the sensation of their in
breath and out breath from their nostrils). The Mindfulness Breath
M.J. Voss et al.
Meditation Task has been chosen as the task for this current study as it
is thought to be a task with a high propensity for mind wandering and
thus ideal to study the natural fluctuation between states of focus and
states of mind wandering (Braboszcz & Delorme, 2010; Hasenkamp
et al., 2012; Levinson et al., 2012).
2.2. Procedure
Participants were first given the OSPAN working memory test on a
computer. After completion of the OSPAN working memory test, par-
ticipants were instructed on how to practice mindfulness meditation.
Participants sat in a fully lit room to avoid drowsiness, but were in-
structed to at least partially close their eyes to avoid distractions.
Participants were told to focus only on the sensation of breath and not
to count breaths in their head. During this task, participants were in-
structed to press a spacebar when they noticed their focus was not on
their breath and their attention was instead focused on other thoughts
(any thought that is not focused on the breath, for example a past event,
a future plan, etc.). Anytime participants noticed a task- unrelated
thought, they were instructed to recognize the task unrelated-thought,
push it out of their mind, and continue to focus on their breath.
Once participants felt comfortable in doing this, they were in-
structed to press the space bar on the computer when they recognized a
thought, then return to their breath. The computer ran a program on E-
prime Psychology Software 2.0, which tracked and recorded every
button press during the meditation session. The participants completed
two 10-minute meditation sessions with a 5 min break in between
where they were allowed to use the restroom and have a drink of water.
The total experiment took no longer than 50 min.
2.3. Results and discussion
The OSPAN working memory scores ranged from 23 to 69
(M = 48.85, SD = 13.50). The self-caught mind wandering time (Tself)
was calculated as the mean interval between the start of a meditation
session to the first key press indicating the end of one focus-mind
wandering episode, or between one key press and the next (i.e., from
the end of the previous mind wandering event after which participants
returned to meditation, until they caught themselves mind wandering
Fig. 2. Results of Experiments 1a and 1b. (a) The scatter plot of Tself as a function of the OSPAN scores in Experiment 1a showing the linear regression line. (b) The
scatter plot of p(MW) as a function of the OSPAN scores in Experiment 1b showing the linear regression line.
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Cognition 179 (2018) 202–212
again). The Tself ranged from 13.33 s to 132.54 s (M = 58.12 s,
SD = 34.56 s). Fig. 2a shows the linear regression on the mean Tself as a
function of the participants’ OSPAN score. The results did not show a
significant correlation between working memory capacity score and the
average focus-mind wandering episode duration (r = −.15, t
(18) = −0.66, p = .52), suggesting that the mean focus-mind wan-
dering episode duration (Tfocus + TMW) was not affected by the OSPAN
score.
These results replicated those of previous studies that show that self-
caught task unrelated thoughts did not correlate with working memory
capacity in a breath counting task (Levinson et al., 2012). As stated in
the introduction, due to the self-caught method’s inclusion of different
components within a focus-mind wandering episode (Tself and TMW), it
is unclear what these results alone mean in relationship to working
memory and mind wandering. To develop a new measurement to assess
different states of the focus-mind wandering episode, the probe method
is also needed. As such, Experiment 1b was conducted to measure the
basic parameters of probe-caught mind wandering and to examine the
relationship between working memory capacity and mind wandering
using a modified probe-caught method.
3. Experiment 1b
This experiment followed the traditional probe-caught method to
examine whether working memory capacity affects the rate of mind
wandering reports, with a methodological modification on the dis-
tribution of probes that addressed an important issue in the traditional
methods.
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants
Thirty-four undergraduate students aged 18–22 from the University
of Illinois participated in Experiment 1b. Similar to Experiment 1a, in
Experiment 1b all participants had less than a total of 10 h of medita-
tion practice experience during their lives and were novice meditators.
M.J. Voss et al.
3.2. Procedure
The design and procedure was the same as Experiment 1a except the
following. After completion of the OSPAN working memory test and the
instruction on how to practice mindfulness meditation, a series of two
meditation sessions were performed with a break in between. During
each session, participants were instructed to practice the mindfulness
breath meditation, but this time when they heard a tone they were to
respond with where their focus was at the time of the tone. If their focus
was solely on the sensation of their breath, they were instructed to
respond with a V on the keyboard for yes they were focused on their
breath. If they found themselves mind wandering at the time of the
tone, they were instructed to respond with an N on the keyboard for no
they were not focused on their breath and were having other thoughts.
Once the participants began their mindfulness meditation, a com-
puter program was run using E-prime Psychology Software 2.0. This
program was set to run three consecutive cycles of 8 different trials each
(with no division or gap between cycles). Each trial was set to play a
tone at one of these time intervals from the previous response: 5 s, 10 s,
15 s, 20 s, 25 s, 30 s, 35 s, and 40 s. All 8 trials were randomized within
each of the three cycles. Once the participants heard the tone, they had
ten seconds to respond if their focus was on or off their breath. If the
participants did not respond, the program would move to the next trial
and the trial was marked as a “miss.” Once the participants responded,
the next time interval would begin until the participants were given all
three cycles of eight trials each for a total of 24 probes during the entire
meditation session. Once the session was over, the participant was
given a five minute break. Upon conclusion of the break, the second
session of mindfulness breath meditation began. Each session lasted
around 10.5 min.
A key modification of the current procedure from previous studies is
the timing of the probe. Based on the theoretical discussion in the
Introduction, the probes need to be distributed randomly or uniformly
across the focus-mind wandering episode for a probe-caught measure to
accurately reflect the true proportion of time one is in a focus state
versus in a mind wandering state. That is, if more probes are distributed
in the earlier portion of the focus-mind wandering episode, then the
probe-caught mind wandering rate can potentially be under-estimated.
In contrast, if more probes are distributed in the later portion of the
focus-mind wandering episode, then the measured proportion of mind
wandering responses would be an over-estimation of the time people
spend mind wandering. Since the all-trial mean Tself measured in
Experiment 1a was about 40 s, the probes in Experiment 1b were set to
the eight different time intervals evenly distributed across an average
focus-mind wandering episode to provide a uniform sample of the mind
wandering event and minimize any potential bias created by probing
shorter or longer intervals.
3.3. Results and discussion
Five participants failed to respond within the 10-second response
period in some of the trials and were not included in the data analysis.2
For the remaining 29 participants, the OSPAN working memory scores
ranged from 4 to 75 (M = 51.10, SD = 18.28).
Fig. 2b showed the linear regression on the proportion of mind
wandering responses (p(MW)) as a function of participants’ OSPAN
scores to determine if there was any relation between their working
memory capacity and the proportion of times they were mind wan-
dering. The p(MW) ranged from 0 to .77 (M = .39, SD = .18). The
OSPAN working memory score was able to predict p(MW), (r = −.41, t
(27) = −2.37, p = .03). These data showed that as the participants'
working memory capacity increased, the proportion of times they
2
The results remained the same when these participants were included in the data
(r = −.38, t(32) = −2.35, p = .02).
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Cognition 179 (2018) 202–212
reported they were mind wandering decreased.
Experiments 1a and 1b measured some basic parameters of the self-
and probe-caught mind wandering using our modified procedure, and
provided an initial test of the effect of working memory capacity on the
two traditional measures of mind wandering tendency (Tself and p
(MW)). However, to better characterize the mind wandering process,
we need to estimate the two main states of mind wandering (Tfocus and
TMW) separately. Experiment 2 developed a new method to calculate
the mean duration in the mind wandering state and duration in the
focus state for each participant by combining the self-caught and probe-
caught method within the same participant.
4. Experiment 2
In this experiment, each participant performed both the self-caught
and the probe-caught mind wandering sessions. The duration of focus
(Tfocus) and duration of mind wandering (TMW) were calculated for each
participant, and the relationship between their OSPAN scores and these
two duration estimates were tested separately to examine whether
working memory capacity affects the two aspects of mind wandering,
i.e., people’s ability to remain on task and resist the occurrence of mind
wandering (indicated by Tfocus), and the continuation/detection of
mind wandering once it occurs (indicated by TMW).
4.1. Methods
The methods were the same as in Experiments 1a and 1b except the
following. 111 participants participated in the current study.
Participants ranged in age from 18 years of age to 22 years of age and
were recruited from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Like Experiment 1, only participants who have had less than a total of
10 h of meditation experience were included in the data analysis, to
avoid practice effects of meditation, as it has been shown that medi-
tation practice can improve focused attention and reduce mind wan-
dering (Braboszcz et al., 2010; Brewer et al., 2011; Hasenkamp et al.,
2012; Lutz et al., 2008).
Each participant completed the OSPAN task and four Mindfulness
Breath Mediation Sessions in the following order.
1. Self-caught session 1: The participant performed the Mindfulness
Breath Meditation Task and focus-mind wandering episodes were
measured using the self-caught method. This session allowed us to
calculate the average focus-mind wandering episode duration.
2. Probe-caught session 1: The participant performed the Mindfulness
Breath Meditation Task and mind wandering instances were mea-
sured using the probe-caught method, where the probe intervals
were based on the average focus-mind wandering episode duration
calculated from the first self-caught session (further explained
below).
3. Probe-caught session 2: If participants’ self-caught average time was
less than 80 s, participants performed a second probe-caught ses-
sion. This session was exactly the same as probe-caught session 1. If
participants’ self-caught average time was longer than 80 s, parti-
cipants only performed one probe-caught session, due to experi-
mental time limitations (further explained below).
4. Self-caught session 2: The participant performed the Mindfulness
Breath Meditation Task and mind wandering episodes were mea-
sured using the self-caught method. This session allowed us to cal-
culate the average focus-mind wandering episode duration, and was
exactly the same as the self-caught session 1. The session was con-
ducted to ensure that the timing measure between a participant’s
first self-caught session and the last self-caught session remained
consistent over time (further explained below).
Overall, the entire experiment lasted approximately 2 h, where
participants were allowed to take a break in between sessions.
M.J. Voss et al.
The self-caught session was the same as Experiment 1a except that it
lasted 20 min (similar to Hasenkamp et al., 2012). The probe-caught
session was the same as Experiment 1b, except that the timing of the
probes were based on the average self-caught time duration of the
participant’s own individual focus-mind wandering episode, calculated
from the first self-caught session. Upon hearing a probe, participants
were asked to press the keyboard button “m” if their focus was on their
breath, and press a keyboard button “z” if their focus was off their
breath. These button presses were counterbalanced between partici-
pants to account for possible response biases, where half of the parti-
cipants were instructed to press “m” if their focus was on their breath
and “z” if there focus was off their breath, and half of the participants
were instructed to press “m” if their focus was off their breath, and “z”
if their focus was on their breath. Focus off their breath was defined as
any thought that is not on the breath or breath sensation, such as future
events, past events, personal events, and events that are happening
around the world. The probe-caught session contained 4 cycles (each
cycle containing 8 probes), and was run using a program created in C+
+. This session time varied depending on the average timing from the
self-caught session.
The placement timing of the probes for the probe-caught session
was based on the average duration of the self-caught session. After the
20 min self-caught session, the average duration of a focus-mind wan-
dering episode was calculated by finding the average duration in sec-
onds between button presses during the self-caught session (measuring
the start of focusing on breath, to when a participant realized their
mind had wandered). We then used this average to calculate the pre-
sentation timing of the probes for the following probe-caught sessions.
To determine when to present the probes for each participant, we di-
vided the mean duration from the self-caught session by 8, and added
three seconds to each time to ensure a minimal time that would be
meaningful to probe and allow time for participants to enter the med-
itation state. For example, if a participant has an average of 40 s for the
self-caught session, the 8 probe delays for a cycle would be 8 s, 13 s,
18 s, 23 s, 28 s, 33 s, 38 s, and 43 s. These delays were measured from
participants’ response to the previous probe, e.g., an 8 s probe would be
presented 8 s after the participant responded to the previous probe. The
order of the probes was randomized for each cycle.
4.2. Results and discussion
Overall forty-seven participants were excluded from data analysis.
Twelve participants (10.8%) were excluded from data analysis because
they had meditated for more than 10 h, eight participants (7.2%) were
excluded from data analysis because the OSPAN score was not properly
collected, twenty-two participants (19.8%) were excluded because of
incomplete/inaccurate data3 (none or less than 32 data points for the
probe session, only one self-caught session, etc.), and five participants
(4.5%) were excluded because there was a large discrepancy between
their self-caught 1 and self-caught 2 data (more than one minute).4
Overall, data from sixty-four participants were analyzed for the current
study.
4.2.1. Calculating time of focus and time of mind wandering
The duration for the time of focusing on a task (Tfocus) and the time
of mind wandering (TMW) were calculated by combining both the self-
caught sessions and the probe caught sessions using the following for-
mulas:
3
The regression results remained the same when these participants were included (for
Tself and OSPAN: r = .17, t(80) = 1.52, p = .13; for p(MW) and OSPAN: r = −.20, t
(80) = −1.85, p = .07; for Tfocus and OSPAN: r = .25, t(80) = 2.27, p = .03; for TMW and
OSPAN: r = .07, t(80) = .66, p = .51).
4
Discrepancies larger than 1 min were more than 2 standard deviations from the mean
and were in the long tail of the distribution.
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Cognition 179 (2018) 202–212
Tfocus = Tself ∗ (1−p (MW)) (1)
TMW = Tself ∗p (MW) (2)
Tself is the average time of a focus-mind wandering episode calculated
from the first and second self-caught sessions and ranged from 10.27 s
to 124.90 s (M = 43.08 s, SD = 27.36 s). p(MW) is the proportion of
time a participant said that s/he was mind wandering based on the
probe caught session alone, and ranged from .23 to .83 (M = .47,
SD = .13). Both Tfocus and TMW were calculated separately for each
participant individually.
The logic for Eqs. (1) and (2) is straightforward. As illustrated above
in Fig. 1a, Tself is a measure of the average duration of an individual’s
focus-mind wandering episodes in seconds (when they start focusing on
the task to when they catch themselves mind wandering), which is the
sum of the time of focus and the time of mind wandering. That is,
Tself = Tfocus + TMW (3)
Moreover, when sampled randomly or uniformly, the chance a
probe falls in the period of focus state (p(focus)) relative to the chance
of the probe falling in the period of mind wandering (p(MW) = 1 − p
(focus)) is determined by the relative duration of time of focus and time
of mind wandering in a focus-mind wandering episode. That is,
p (focus): p (MW) = Tfocus: TMW (4)
Solving Eqs. (3) and (4), we will get Eqs. (1) and (2).
To test whether a participant’s first self-caught session and the last
self-caught session were generally consistent over time, the first self-
caught session and the last self-caught session for each participant were
compared. Of the 98 participants who had data from the first self-
caught session (ranging from 6.53 s to 353.94 s (M = 50.12 s,
SD = 45.50 s)) and the second self-caught session (ranging from 6.91 s
to 304.46 s (M = 55.27 s, SD = 51.20 s)), there was a strong significant
correlation between the average duration of the self-caught session one
and the self-caught session two, r(96) = .78, p < .001.
Because there were a relatively large number of participants ex-
cluded from analysis, mostly due to incomplete data, the average
OSPAN score of included participants was compared with the average
OSPAN score of excluded participants to determine whether we have
differentially excluded certain participants. A two-sample t-test showed
that there was not a significant difference in OSPAN scores for included
participants (M = 49.66, SD = 14.20) and OSPAN scores for excluded
participants (M = 49.33, SD = 15.16), t(1 0 1) = .11, p = .91,
d = 0.02, 95% CI [−5.55, 6.19].
4.2.2. Linear regression analysis
As illustrated in Fig. 3a, there was not a significant relationship
between the average duration of self-caught focus-mind wandering
episodes calculated from reports using only the self-caught sessions
(Tself) and OSPAN score, r = .16, t(62) = 1.26, p = 0.21 with an R2 of
.03, F(1, 62) = 1.60. This result replicated that of Experiment 1a. As
illustrated in Fig. 3b, there was a marginally significant relationship
between proportion of mind wandering probes and OSPAN score,
r = −.24, t(62) = −1.96, p = .054 with an R2 of .06, F(1, 62) = 3.86.
This result was similar to that of Experiment 1b.
Of most importance to the current study, to analyze the relationship
between working memory capacity and different states within a focus-
mind wandering episode, two linear regressions were performed sepa-
rately: time of focus (Tfocus) as a function of OSPAN score, and time of
mind wandering (TMW) as a function of OSPAN score. As illustrated in
Fig. 3c ((Tfocus) as a function of OSPAN score), there was a significant
positive relationship between mean time within the focus state (fo-
cusing on their breath) and OSPAN score, r = .27, t(62) = 2.20, p = .03
with an R2 of .07, F(1, 62) = 4.83. As OSPAN scores increased, so did
the time within the focus state.
As illustrated in Fig. 3d (time in a mind wandering state (TMW) as a
function of OSPAN score), there was not a significant relationship
M.J. Voss et al. Cognition 179 (2018) 202–212

Fig. 3. Results of Experiment 2. (a) The scatter plot along with the linear regression line of duration of a full focus-mind wandering episode (including both Tfocus and
TMW), calculated from the self-caught sessions alone (Tself), as a function of OSPAN score. (b) Scatter plot along with the linear regression line of the proportion of
time in the mind wandering state (mind wandering proportion or p(MW)) overall, calculated from the probe-caught session alone, as a function of OSPAN score. (c)
The scatter plot along with the linear regression line, of the mean time in the focus state (Tfocus) during a focus-mind wandering episode, calculated from both the self-
caught and probe-caught sessions, as a function of OSPAN score. (d) The scatter plot along with the linear regression line, of the mean time in the mind wandering
state (TMW) during a focus-mind wandering episode, calculated from both the self-caught and probe-caught sessions, as a function of OSPAN score.

between time of mind wandering and OSPAN score, r = .01, t
(62) = 0.05, p = .96 with an R2 of .00, F(1, 62) = 0.003.
Overall, the results of mean time of focus (Tfocus) and mean time of
mind wandering (TMW) were of most importance for the second ex-
periment. Results showed that Tfocus increased with greater working
memory capacity, suggesting that individuals with higher working
memory capacity were able to focus on the current task longer. Results
did not show a significant relationship between TMW and working
memory capacity, suggesting that the ability to sustain the mind wan-
dering state and/or detect the mind wandering state was not affected by
working memory capacity.
5. General discussion
The aim of the current experiments was to develop a more in-
formative method to measure mind wandering, by calculating the mean
time focused on the current task at hand (measuring the ability to stay
on task and resist mind wandering (Tfocus)) and mean time in a mind
wandering state (measuring processes for the continuation of mind
wandering and/or ability to catch mind wandering (TMW)), and how
these new measures relate to executive control as measured by working
memory capacity.
Two traditional measures of mind wandering tendency (mean
duration/frequency of self-caught mind wandering and the proportion
of mind wandering responses when probed) were estimated as a func-
tion of working memory capacity (OSPAN score). In both experiments,
there was no significant correlation between working memory capacity
and the mean duration of the self-caught focus-mind wandering epi-
sode. This result replicated that of previous research (Levinson et al.,
2012). However, there was a negative correlation between working
memory capacity and proportion of mind wandering responses in a
probe-caught method (significant for Experiment 1b, marginally sig-
nificant for Experiment 2). This finding was in contradiction to that of
Levinson et al., 2012, but broadly consistent with other work in the
literature (McVay & Kane, 2009; Randall et al., 2014).
More importantly, Experiment 2 was conducted to estimate the
mean time of focus (Tfocus) and mean time of mind wandering (TMW)
separately using the raw self-caught duration and the proportion of
mind wandering measured in the same participants. The results showed
a significant positive relationship between working memory capacity
and time of focus (Tfocus). These results suggest that individuals with
higher working memory capacities were better able to block out mind

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M.J. Voss et al.
wandering to focus on the current task at hand longer. Moreover,
working memory capacity did not have a significant effect on the time
of mind wandering (TMW) in a focus-mind wandering episode, sug-
gesting that once mind wandering occurs, it will last a comparable
amount of time regardless of the working memory capacity.
5.1. Implications on the methodology of mind wandering research
These findings have important implications both on theories of
mind wandering and on the methodologies used to study mind wan-
dering. There are three main implications regarding measurements of
mind wandering. First, a careful examination of the time course of a
focus-mind wandering episode revealed that the traditional concept of
“tendency to mind wander” is not self-coherent. That is, measurements
of how often people mind wander based on the self-caught method and
the probe-caught method can be intrinsically contradictory and do not
have a consistent interpretation. Therefore despite the intuitive appeal,
researchers studying mind wandering should restrain from character-
izing mind wandering by the vague notion of “how often people mind
wander”. Instead, characteristics of mind wandering may be better
described by measuring the durations of its sub-components separately,
such as Tfocus and TMW.
Second, we developed a new method to estimate the duration of the
two states of a focus-mind wandering episode, which was a key dis-
tinction proposed in the Process-Occurrence Framework (Smallwood,
2013). However, there has been no empirical method to measure them
separately to date. Our method relies on the combination of the tradi-
tional self-caught and the probe-caught methods, where the self-caught
method provides a measure of the length of the entire episode, while
the probe-caught method provides a measure of the relative proportion
of each of the components. The duration of each component can thus be
calculated, providing the first empirical methodology to examine the
time course of the sub-components of the focus-mind wandering epi-
sode separately.
Third, we developed a new probe sampling scheme in the timing of
probe placement. The probe placement in our probe caught session was
distributed uniformly within one focus-mind wandering episode cycle.
This method of probe distribution was adopted because it was a ne-
cessary requirement for our experimental logic, i.e., for Equation #4 to
hold. This new method corrected a common error in the probe place-
ments in previous research using the probe-caught method. The most
common probing scheme used in the literature was to distribute the
probes uniformly across an experimental session. For example, the
participants may be probed every certain number of trials, or every
certain amount of time during an experiment. Although this method
appears intuitive and reasonable, it is actually not appropriate and most
likely biased in general. For example, if during an experimental session,
a probe is presented every ∼3 min, this is not a uniform distribution of
probes across the focus-mind wandering episode, but a fixed delay
probe. Because the task (and the focus-mind wandering episode) re-
starts after each probe, probing the participants every 3 min means the
probe always occurs 3 min after the start of each episode. If a partici-
pant tends to remain on task for ∼2 min, followed by ∼3 min of mind
wandering before she catches herself, then the probe will almost always
catch her during the mind wandering state, and overestimate the true
proportion of time she’s in a mind wandering state. Similarly, if a
participant tends to have ∼4 min of task focus followed by ∼1 min of
mind wandering, then the probe is most likely going to catch him
during the focus state and again mis-represent the likelihood he’s in a
mind wandering state.
As a result, probes evenly distributed across an experimental session
generally will not provide an appropriate assessment of the proportion
of time a given participant is in the mind wandering state, and conse-
quently could affect the estimation of its relation to other factors. For
example, the apparent contradictory findings on the relationship be-
tween WMC and mind wandering in previous research (e.g., Levinson
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Cognition 179 (2018) 202–212
et al., 2012; Randall et al., 2014; Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013;
Smallwood et al., 2013) could be partly due to issues related to the
inappropriate probe sampling method, in addition to other moderating
factors such as task demand. Allowing some variations of the delay to
make “random” or “unpredictable” probes (e.g., instead of probing
exactly every 3 min, one may probe every 2–4 min) may alleviate the
issue to some degree, however it’s still an inappropriate sample unless
the variation window matches the focus-mind wandering episode
duration, which becomes equivalent to our method. Increasing the in-
terval between two probes may also alleviate the issue. Due to varia-
tions in Tself, when two consecutive probes are separated by more
episodes in between, they become more independent of each other and
the sampling may approximate a random sample. However, length-
ening the interval between probes may substantially increase the ex-
perimental time/cost, and the traditional method is still theoretically
inappropriate.
Thus, although our sampling method is still not ideal (see more
discussion on the limitations below), it’s theoretically more justified
and improved than the typical method used in previous research, and
should be adopted in mind wandering research using on-line probe-
caught methods instead of the traditional one.
Although the current study divided a focus-mind wandering episode
into only two main states, the same approach can be used to study mind
wandering events in a more fine grain scale by using more fine-tuned
questions in the probe tests. For example, instead of asking participants
to make a two-alternative forced choice between “on-task” vs “mind
wandering,” one can include intermediate states such as partially on-
task/partially mind wandering (Mrazek et al., 2012). Using the finer
scale probes, one may divide the states of a focus-mind wandering
episode into more detailed sub-components, such as including a sub-
state of gradually entering the focus state at the beginning, a sub-state
of already being aware of mind wandering but having not terminated
the task-unrelated thoughts yet, and so on. Our method can in principle
be adopted to estimate the durations of these finer grain sub-
components of the focus-mind wandering episode separately. In addi-
tion, our method may also be used to examine the effects of other
factors, such as to differentiate spontaneous mind wandering vs. in-
tentional mind wandering (Seli, Smallwood et al., 2015; Seli, Risko, &
Smilek, 2016; etc.), since the time course of the focus-mind wandering
episode is likely to be different for spontaneous and intentional mind
wandering.
5.2. Implications on theories of mind wandering
The potentially different effects of working memory capacity on
Tfocus versus TMW in a focus-mind wandering episode suggest that the-
ories of mind wandering need to address these different states sepa-
rately. As outlined in the Introduction, there is debate as to whether
mind wandering instances consume executive control resources
(Resource Hypothesis), or if mind wandering is a result of a failure in
executive control to block out mind wandering instances (Executive
Control Hypothesis). Each theory predicts different patterns of how
mind wandering should behave in relationship to executive control, as
measured by working memory capacity. For example, the Resource
Hypothesis predicts that individuals with higher working memory ca-
pacity should report being in a mind wandering state more compared to
individuals who have lower working memory capacity (Levinson et al.,
2012; Rummel & Boywitt, 2014; Teasdale et al., 1995; Thomson et al.,
2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), while the Executive Control Hy-
pothesis predicts that individuals with higher working memory capacity
should report being in a mind wandering state less compared to in-
dividuals who have lower working memory capacity (McVay & Kane,
2010, 2012).
Both theories rely heavily on the idea of how much mind wandering
one should have. However, neither theory in its current form is based
on a clear definition of what “more” mind wandering means. Our
M.J. Voss et al.
analyses of the focus-mind wandering time course suggest that the
concept of how much one mind wanders is intrinsically ambiguous. In
fact, the intuitive idea of the “tendency to mind wander” can have at
least three totally different meanings. First, the tendency to mind
wander can be defined as the likelihood that mind wandering will occur
after one has started focusing on a task for a certain amount of time.
The mean duration one can stay on the current task before switching to
mind wandering (i.e., Tfocus) provides an index for this likelihood. That
is, the shorter the Tfocus, the higher one’s tendency/likelihood to mind
wander. Second, the tendency to mind wander can be defined as the
likelihood one will stay in a mind wandering state once it occurs. The
mean duration of mind wandering in each episode (i.e., TMW) measures
this type of tendency. That means the longer the TMW, the higher one’s
tendency to mind wander. Third, the tendency to mind wander can also
be defined as the total amount of time one ends up spending in mind
wandering. The proportion of mind wandering in a probe-caught
method provides a measure of this tendency.
Among these three different definitions of mind wandering ten-
dency, the proportion of mind wandering is the only type that has been
empirically examined in the literature. However, the theoretical
meaning of this type of tendency is the most vague and most difficult to
interpret. As discussed in the Introduction, the proportion of time one
spends on mind wandering is determined jointly by two independent
quantities Tfocus and TMW, and does not have a clear correspondence to
the underlying mechanism or processes. Therefore this measure is
theoretically vague unless such a correspondence can be established.
Because these theories of mind wandering and existing experimental
work are all based on the ambiguous concept of “mind wandering
tendency,” the experimental findings are difficult to interpret with re-
gards to whether they support or reject these theories. As such, these
theories themselves are difficult to test empirically until the conceptual
vagueness of the above mentioned theories are clarified.
The Process-Occurrence Framework, on the other hand, provides a
theoretical account for the two states of the focus-mind wandering
episode separately. According to the Process-Occurrence Framework
(Smallwood, 2013), executive control could influence mind wandering
directly by increasing focus on the task and thus inhibiting the initiation
of mind wandering from occurring. Smallwood (2013) argued that at-
tentional control would help participants stay on task, so that “under
tasks demanding continual external focus attentional control can limit
the occurrence of self-generated thought by ensuring the continuity of a
task-relevant train of thought” (p. 529). Our finding that time of focus
(Tfocus) positively correlates with working memory capacity is con-
sistent with this prediction.
Although working memory capacity affects one’s ability to maintain
task focus, it does not show a reciprocal relationship to the duration of
the mind-wandering state. There are at least two possible explanations
for the independence of TMW from the working memory capacity, de-
pending on what determines the termination of the mind wandering
state. If the termination of a mind wandering state is due to the failure
to sustain the internal thought processes (e.g., due to lack of resources),
then these results suggest that processes that sustain one on the current
task are different from those that buffer the internal train of thought.
Alternatively, it is also possible that the termination of a mind wan-
dering state is primarily due to a separate, self-monitoring system that
determines one’s meta-awareness of the mind wandering event. Thus, a
mind wandering event may be terminated even if there are sufficient
resources to maintain its continuation. Under this scenario, our findings
would suggest that the self-monitoring/meta-awareness system is not
dependent on working memory capacity. Which of these hypotheses is
true awaits future research. Regardless of the cause of the termination
of a mind wandering event, our findings provide empirical evidence
that theories of mind-wandering need to account for multiple compo-
nent processes, as emphasized in the Process-Occurrence Framework
(Smallwood, 2013).
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Cognition 179 (2018) 202–212
5.3. Limitations and future directions
Despite the improvements in our methodology, there are still some
limitations in the method we adopted in this study. The current study
probed individuals in a uniform manner based on a fixed number de-
rived from the average of the first self-caught session. However, the
actual duration of the focus-mind wandering episode varied from one
episode to the next, therefore the uniform probe distribution is only an
approximation and may not fully reflect the true proportion of Tfocus
and TMW in the focus-mind wandering episode. Ideally, the probe dis-
tribution should match the individual episode durations. However, due
to the unpredictability of the individual episode durations, it’s not
possible to match all of them in practice. Whatever size of the window
within which we choose to distribute the probes, we can only correctly
estimate the proportion of mind wandering for focus-mind wandering
episodes of that specific length, and estimation of all other events will
have some errors. For example, if we distribute probes within a range
longer than the mean episode duration, we can match focus-mind
wandering episodes that happen to be at that particular length, how-
ever as a result it will not properly estimate those episodes equal to or
shorter than the average duration. Therefore as a compromise we tai-
lored the probe sampling distribution to the mean episode duration to
maximize the number of episodes we can match properly. Whether
there are alternative ways to determine the probe distribution to further
improve the sampling accuracy remains a challenge for future research,
for example, by varying the sampling window location (e.g., instead of
sampling from a fixed range within [3 s, Tself + 3 s], one may sample
from [x, Tself + x] with varying x), or by varying the sampling window
size according to the variance of Tself, instead of using a fixed value of
mean Tself. Whether these alternative methods improve the overall ac-
curacy of the estimation awaits further investigation.
Another consequence of our method is that by uniformly dis-
tributing the probes within a focus-mind wandering cycle, some of the
probe delays were quite short. The frequent probe presentation could
potentially interfere with typical task focus, especially for individuals
who have a short focus-mind wandering episode. One way to amelio-
rate this limitation in future research is to move the time window for
the uniform distribution of the probes past the average focus-mind
wandering episode to increase the delay between each probing, espe-
cially for people with short Tself. In addition, the probe presentation was
based on the average duration of the self-caught mind wandering
measure for each individual. This means that each individual was
probed at different times depending on their self-caught mind wan-
dering measure. Whether the different sampling times can change in-
dividuals’ behavior is a topic for future research.
It is also important to stress that the relationship between working
memory capacity and the durations of the two states of a focus-mind
wandering episode found here is specific to the mindfulness of breath
task implemented. It has been well established that people’s mind
wandering can be affected by various factors, including the demand of
the current task (Levinson et al., 2012; Randall et al., 2014; Smallwood
& Andrews-Hanna, 2013; Smallwood et al., 2013). Because the main
task for the current study was a mindfulness breath meditation task,
which is a low demanding task, the relationships found here may only
apply to low demanding tasks such as mindfulness meditation, and may
not generalize to other tasks, specifically higher demand tasks that re-
quire more cognitive control, or tasks where motivation to perform the
task is higher. In those cases the relationship might even show the re-
serve pattern. For example, the moderating effect of task demand has
been proposed to account for different results in the effects of working
memory capacity on mind wandering in previous research. It was
suggested that in lower demanding tasks, individuals who have higher
working memory capacity might mind wander because of an excess of
executive resources, but in tasks that require more attentional demands
to perform, mind wandering can be a result of a failure of executive
control, showing different patterns of results in regards to task difficulty
M.J. Voss et al.
(Levinson et al., 2012; Randall et al., 2014; Smallwood & Andrews-
Hanna, 2013; Smallwood et al., 2013). Further research should address
the differences between these two states of mind wandering in relation
to task difficulty.
Our method relies on an implicit assumption that the only way to
return to focus is through the self-awareness mechanism (self mon-
itoring/meta-awareness system), where the participants realize that
they are mind wandering, then voluntarily terminate the mind wan-
dering process and return to the basic task, unless they are interrupted
by an external probe. This is an assumption implied (but not required)
in previous theories of mind wandering (e.g., Schooler et al., 2011;
Smallwood, 2013). If individuals can return to focus without self
awareness, and have multiple switches between the focus and mind
wandering states during a single self-caught focus-mind wandering
episode, then the current method may not measure these switches, and
the estimations we obtained (Tfocus and TMW) do not indicate the mean
duration of each individual focus (or mind wandering) state, but in-
stead indicate the total duration of the multiple focus (or mind wan-
dering) states within a self-caught focus-mind wandering episode.
Whether there can be multiple switches without self-awareness be-
tween focus and mind wandering states within a single self-caught
focus-mind wandering episode awaits future research.
In summary, the current study developed a new methodology to
estimate the timing of different states within a focus-mind wandering
episode and measured how they are affected by working memory ca-
pacity. The results showed that in a low demanding task, people with
higher working memory capacity tend to remain on the current task
longer. However, once mind wandering occurred, it lasted for a com-
parable duration regardless of the working memory capacity. These
findings suggest that existing theories of mind wandering and experi-
mental work based on a vague, ambiguous concept of mind wandering
tendency need revision to address different states and processes in-
volved in mind wandering.
Acknowledgement
We would like to especially thank Mike Kane, Paul Seli, Jonathan
Smallwood, Dan Simons, and David Irwin for discussion of the findings,
and Sophia Dumlao, Dashiell Koester, Jackin Feng Sheh, Heidi Soon,
and Faith Tan with help with data collection. This project was funded in
part by the National Science Foundation grant #1519407. Comments
should be sent to Meera Zukosky (email: zukosky1@illinois.edu).
Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the
online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.05.013.
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