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V BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

2023
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF WASAN

UNDER ART 139-A OF THE CONSTITUTION OF WASAN, 1950
WRIT PETITION NO ___ OF 2023

Shiksha Bachao Andolan_______________________________________________________Petitioner
Versus
E-Learner__________________________________________________________________Respondent
WRIT PETITION NO. ___ OF 2023

E-Learner ____________________________________________________________________Petitioner
Versus
The Union of Wasan___________________________________________________________Respondent
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. ___ OF 2023

E-Learner____________________________________________________________________Petitoner
Versus
Jagdeep___________________________________________________________________Respondent
Abstract
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document.
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WRITTEN SUBMISSION FOR THE RESPONDENTS
Aksh Tiwari
[Email address]
MEMORANDUM for RESPONDENTS
TABLE OF CONTENT
_____________________________________________________________________________________
LIST of ABBREVIATIONS _______________________________________________3
INDEX of AUTHORITIES _______________________________________________4
STATEMENT of JURISDICTION _________________________________________7
SUMMARY of FACTS ___________________________________________________8
STATEMENT of ISSUES_________________________________________________10
SUMMARY of ARGUMENTS_____________________________________________11
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED______________________________________________12
1. E-LEARNERS CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR

VIOLATING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION OF WASAN BECAUSE OF MASS DATA LEAK _______12
1.1 E-learner is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the constitution
of Wasan. __________________________________________________________12
1.1.1. Invoking Art 32 mandates adverse party to be State within the
meaning of Art 12.
1.1.2. Meaning of “Other Authorities” under Art 12
1.1.3. E-Learner is a private corporation with no State control
1.2. Mere disposal of public function does not render a corporation State. _________14
2. THE OFFICIALS OF E-LEARNER ARE NOT LIABLE FOR ACTING
DEFICIENTLY AND COMMITTING ACTS THAT LEAD TO
VITIATING TRUE CONSENT OF ITS CLIENTS ______________________15
2.1 Whether or not the agreement was called Loan Agreement does not change
its fundamental nature _____________________________________________15
2.2 The contract cannot be held void merely because the customers did not read
the contract _____________________________________________________16
1
2.2.1 The consent of the customers cannot be said to be driven by fraud or

misrepresentation.
2.2.2 Refund policy is generally mentioned in the terms of the contract
2.3 The Contract was a Standard Form Contract and could not be negotiated nor
discussed with each customer. _________________________________________18
2.3.1 A Standard Form Contract is non-negotiable for the reason of its
own nature
2.3.2 The customers were never coerced to avail the money lending facility
3. E-LEARNER’S RIGHT’S UNDER CONSTITUTION OF WASAN
HAVE NOT BEEN VIOLATED BECAUSE OF THE STEPS TAKEN
BY THE GOVERNMENT OF WASAN ______________________________19
3.1 The termination of Contract with the Company not a violation of

fundamental right. _________________________________________________19
3.1.1 The reasons for entering into contract with E-Learner
3.1.2 The grounds for termination of the contract with E-Learner
3.1.3 Termination of Contract does not lead to infringement of
fundamental rights.
3.2 Community interest prevails over private interest when Fundamental rights
conflict. ___________________________________________________________22
3.2.1 E-learner’s right to trade is in conflict with right to privacy of
general community .
3.2.2 Public Morality and interest are supreme.
3.2.3 E-Learner’s claims are fundamentally flawed.
4. MR. JAGDEEP IS NOT LIABLE FOR CRIMINAL DEFAMATION
__________________24
FOR RELEASING THE VIDEO ON SOCIAL MEDIA
4.1 The imputations bear truthfulness and attributes of public benefit ______________24
4.1.1. E-Learner’s claims for defamation are baseless.
4.1.2. Mr. Jagdeep is covered under the first exception to Sec. 499 of WPC
4.2 Exception 9 to Sec. 499 WPC is attracted for qualified privilege to journalists _____26
4.2.1 The ninth exception to criminal defamation
4.2.2 The qualified privilege to press
4.2.3 The burden of proof is limited to preponderance of possibility
PRAYER___________________________________________________________30
2
ABBREVIATIONS
___________________________________________________________________________
S. No. Abbreviations Expanded Form
1 AIR All India Reporter
2 Art Article
3 CEO Chief Executive Officer
4 CRM Consumer Relationship Management
5 Ed-Tech Education Technology
6 Ibid. Just Above
7 M.P. Madhya Pradesh
8 M/s Messers
9 Mad. Madras
10 Ors Others
11 R/w Read with
12 SCC Supreme Court Cases
13 Sec. Section
14 SUPRA Abovementioned
15 U.P. Uttar Pradesh
16 USA United State of America
16 v. Versus
17 WPC Wasan Penal Code
3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
___________________________________________________________________________
Case List Page (s)

Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & ors., 1981 A.I.R. 487 (India). 13
Alma Lovell v. City of Griffin 303 US 444 (1938) (USA). 28
B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P., AIR 1999 SC 1867 (India). 21
Banabehari Tripathy v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies, 67 (1989) C.L.T 5 (India). 15
Banchhanidhi Rath v. State of Orissa, (1972) 4 S.C.C 781 (India). 21
Binny Ltd. & Anr vs v. Sadasivan & Ors., (2005) 6 S.C.C 657 (India). 14
Chamanlal v. State of Punjab, A.I.R 1970 SC 1372 (India). 26, 27, 29
Chander Mohan Khanna v. NCERT, 1992 A.I.R 76 (India). 15
Chidambaram Pillai And Ors. vs Muthammal And Ors., (1993) 1 M.L.J 535 (India). 16, 18
Chokkammal v. K. Balraj, (2009) 74 A.I.C 666 (Mad) (India). 17
Emperor v. Abdul, (1907) I.L.R 31 (Bom) 293. (India). 27
Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R 1958 SC 578 (India). 28
Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Agrawal Steel, (2010) 1 SCC 83, 84 (India). 18
Guruvinder Singh v. U.P and Anr., 2021 (4) Crimes (HC) 374 (India). 20,21
Har Shankar v. Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner, 1975 A.I.R 1121 (India). 22
Harbhajan Singh v/s State of Punjab, 1965 S.C.R (3) 235 (India). 27
Indian Medicines Pharmaceuticals Corpn. Ltd. v. Kerela Ayurvedic Co. Op. Society Ltd., 21
2023 SCC OnLine SC 5 (India).
Jatya Pal Singh v. Union of India & Ors., 2013 (6) S.C.C 452 (India). 15
Jeffrey J. Diermeier and another v. State of West Bengal and another, (2010) 6 S.C.C 243. 25,27
(India).
Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P 2023 SCC OnLine SC 6 (India). 20
Lekhraj Satramdas Lalvani v. N.M Shah, Deputy Custodian-cum-managing Officer, Bombay, 21
(1977) 3 S.C.C 457 (India).
LIC v. Consumer Education and Research Centre, A.I.R 1995 SC 1811 (India). 21
Mahadev v. Border Security Force (2022) 8 S.C.C 502 (India). 29
Mr X v. Hospital Z, (1998) 8 S.C.C 296 (India). 22,23
Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Prabodh Kumar Tewari, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1089 (India). 29
4
R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 6 S.C.C 632 (India). 28

R.D Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, A.I.R 1979 SC 1628 (India). 13
Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, (1977) 3 S.C.C 457 (India). 23
Ram Jawaya Kapoor v State of Punjab, A.I.R 1955 SC 549 (India). 21
Sakal Papers (P) ltd. v. Union of India A.I.R 1962 SC 305 (India). 28
Security Printing & Minting Corporation of India Ltd. v. Gandhi Industrial Corporation, 17
(2007) 13 S.C.C 236 (India).
Sewakram Sobhani v. R.K. Karanjia, (1981) 3 S.C.C 208 (India). 25,27
Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru S.M.V.S.J.M.S. Trust v. V.R. Rudani, 1989 A.I.R 1607 (India). 12
Smith v. Hughes, 1871 LR QB 597 (England). 18
Sukra Mahto vs Basdeo Kumar Mahto &. Anr, 1971 (1) S.C.C 885 (India). 27
Sullivan v. New York Times, 376 US 254 (U.S.A.). 28
T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnatka, 1994 (2) S.C.C 734 (India). 15
Thompson v. L.M. & S Railway Company, (1930) 1 KB 41 (England). 17,18
Verappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., A.I.R 1952 SC 192 (India). 19
Vishan Swarup v. Nardeo Shastri, A.I.R 1965 All 439 (India). 26
Vivek Ganka v. Patel, (2000) 9 S.C.C 87 (India). 28
Zee Telefilms Ltd v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649 at 681 (India). 13
• Books and Treatises

• Avatar Singh, Law of Contract and Specific Relied Act (Eastern Book Company
2019)
• Batuk Lal, The Law of Evidence (Central Law Agency 2021)
• D.D. Basu, Law of the Press (LexisNexis 2010)
• Dr. S.K. Kapoor, Contract I with Specific Relief Act (Central Law Agency 2019)
• JN Pandey, Law of Torts, with Consumer Protection Act and Motor Vehicles Act
(Central Law Publication 2018)
• KD Guar, Textbook on Indian Penal Code (LexisNexis 2021)
• MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (LexisNexis 2018)
• PM Bakshi, Law of Defamation, Some Aspects Prepared, (N.M. Tripathi, Bombay,
1986)
• S.R. Myneni, The Law of Evidence, (Asia Law House, 2018)
5
• VN Shukla, Constitution of India (Eastern Book Company 2021)

• Academic Papers and Publications
1. Monika Djerf-Pierre, Mia Lindgren and Mikayla Alexis Budinski, The Role of
Journalism on YouTube: Audience Engagement with 'Superbug' Reporting Media and
Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439) 2019, Volume 7, Issue 1, Pages 235–247
2. M P Singh Fundamental Rights, State Action and Cricket in India, Asia Pacific Law
Review, Volume 13 (2005) Issue 2
• Statutes Used
1. Constitution of Wasan, 1950.
2. Information and Technology Act, 2000.
3. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
4. The Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and
sensitive personal data or information) Rules, 2011
5. The Wasan Contract Act, 1872.
6. The Wasan Evidence Act, 1872.
7. The Wasan Penal Code, 1860
• Dynamic Links
1. https://www.scconline.com/
2. https://www.jstor.org/
3. https://www.barandbench.com/
4. https://www.livelaw.in/
• Definitions:
1. PETITIONER - For Part I: Shikha Bachao Andolan
For Part II: E-Learner
For Part III: E-Learner
2. RESPONDENT - For Part I: E-Learner
For Part II: Government of Wasan
For Part III: Mr. Jagdeep
6
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
___________________________________________________________________________
The Supreme Court has clubbed the following matters pending in various Courts in Wasan to
be heard simultaneously in exercise of the power conferred under Art 139-A of the
Constitution:
Writ Petition No. ___ of 2023 (Under Art 32 of the Constitution)
Shiksha Bachao Andolan versus E-Learner
Writ Petition No. ___ of 2023 (Under Art 226 of the Constitution)
E-Learner versus Union of Wasan
Criminal Appeal No. ___ of 2023 (Under Sec 278 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.)
E-Learner versus Jagdeep.
• Article 139-A of the Constitution of Wasan—
“Where cases involving the same or substantially the same questions of law are pending before the
Supreme Court and one or more High Courts or before two or more High Courts and the Supreme
Court is satisfied on its own motion or on an application made by the Attorney-General of India or by
a party to any such case that such questions are substantial questions of general importance, the
Supreme Court may withdraw the case or cases pending before the High Court or the High Courts and
dispose of all the cases itself….”
The Respondent humbly submits to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
7
STATEMENT OF FACTS
_______________________________________________________________________
Wasan is a country with federal system of government and has over 250 million children in the age
group of 6-14 years. The Constitution, laws, rules and regulations of Wasan are pari-materia with
their Indian counterparts.
E-Learner is a virtual education platform (Ed-Tech Company). It provides

services privately, through its mobile application and website, as well as
through tie-ups with various schools. E-Learner engaged in a contract with the
E-Learner’s Legacy government of Wasan to encourage digital pedagogy in Government aided
schools in furtherance of the National Education Policy, 2021.
The company eventually backed about 40 million enrollments, to become the

biggest Ed-Tech Company in the world. Mr. Nandan, the CEO of the Company
was also felicitated by Education Minister of Wasan for his contribution for a
national cause during periling Covid times.
Mr. Jagdeep is a Youtuber, a noted freelance journalist and security researcher.

He uploaded a video on YouTube, claiming that Botguard, the Consumer
Mr. Jagdeep’s Relationship Management (CRM) agency of E-Learner, has caused a major data
YouTube Video leak of its customers and teachers alike, by hosting their data on an unprotected
server.
Claims were also made on the use of AI by E-Learner’s app, to guess the users’
socio-economic status to device market strategies. This sparked a controversy
and E-Learner thereby initiated a criminal defamation suit against Mr. Jagdeep.
Consequently, the Government terminated its contract with E-Learner to

Subsequent prevent further harm to privacy of citizens. E-Learner filed a writ petition
Developments against the Government of Wasan in the High Court of Sanal (Capital of Wasan)
for unreasonable termination of contract and cognate matters.
8
Many consumers resorted to social media to reveal that apparently, E-Learner

Customer Grievances
dealt immorally with its money lending facility to the parents. As per them,
‘loans’ were termed as ‘outstanding payments’ to not intimidate them to fall into
a debt trap. It is claimed that it vitiated true customer consent. The survey
conducted by a celebrated fact checker, AltWatch, confirmed these claims.
Writ Petition in the Shiksha Bachao Andolan is a registered NGO led by Ms. Karuna Roy. It filed a
Supreme Court petition against E-Learner in the Supreme Court of Wasan, concerning
fundamental rights of health and privacy.
The Supreme Court merged the criminal case, the Writ Petition in the High
Court of Sanal, and the present writ petition to be heard together.
9
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
___________________________________________________________________________
I WHETHER E-LEARNER CAN BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE VIOLATION OF

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF WASAN BECAUSE OF MASS
DATA LEAK?
II WHETHER OFFICIALS OF E-LEARNER ARE LIABLE FOR ACTING DEFICIENTLY AND

COMMITTING ACTS THAT LEAD TO VITIATING TRUE CONSENT OF ITS CLIENTS?
III WHETHER E-LEARNER’S RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF WASAN HAVE

BEEN VIOLATED BECAUSE OF STEPS TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF WASAN?
IV WHETHER MR. JAGDEEP IS LIABLE FOR CRIMINAL DEFAMATION FOR RELEASING

THE VIDEO ON SOCIAL MEDIA?
10
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
________________________________________________________________________________
Part I
1. E-Learner cannot be held responsible for the violation of fundamental rights under the
constitution of Wasan because of the mass data leak.
E-Learner is not a State instrumentality, so no fundamental right can be claimed against it within Writ
Jurisdiction under Art 32 of the Constitution. It has been well established by judicial precedents that
fundamental rights can be claimed only against State and its instrumentality. Tests laid down to
determine instrumentality of State are not straight-jacket formulas. Mere disposal of public function
cannot render E-Learner as State or its instrumentality.
2. Officials of E-Learner are not liable for acting deficiently and committing acts that lead to
vitiating true consent of its clients.
E-Learner has provided sufficient opportunity to its clients to read the contract and enter into the
agreement only after satisfaction with the terms. The contract was a standard form contract, since the
company deals with a huge number of clients. The argument that the parents did not read the contract
does not make E-Learner legally liable against their claims.
Part II
3. E-Learner’s rights under the Constitution of Wasan have not been violated because of steps
taken by the Government of Wasan.
The actions of the Government are justified to the extent that the protection of fundamental rights of
the society is supreme. When there is a conflict between fundamental rights of the citizens and that
of a single person or corporation, the public right prevails, and the private individual right has to give
way to the rights of the society.
Part III
4. Mr. Jagdeep is not liable for criminal defamation for releasing the video on social media.
Mr. Jagdeep is squarely covered under the first and ninth exception to Sec. 499 of Wasan Penal Code,
1860. The imputations were true and made in good faith. There was no malice in making the
publication on YouTube and the video was released in good faith. Mr. Jagdeep being a journalist
possesses a qualified privilege, as explained in the Sullivan case.
11
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
_______________________________________________________________________________
[PART I]
1. E-LEARNER CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE VIOLATION OF

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF WASAN BECAUSE OF
MASS DATA LEAK.
1. The penultimate requirement for claiming fundamental rights under writ jurisdiction is the
respondent being a State or Instrumentality of State under Art 12. E-Learner is not a State or its
instrumentality since it is a private corporation [1.1]. Also, mere disposal of public function is not a
rigid rule to make a non-State performer an instrumentality of State [1.2].
1.1. E-learner is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the constitution of Wasan.
1.1.1 Invoking Art 32 mandates adverse party to be State within the meaning of Art 12.
2. It is humbly submitted that that the petitioners have approached this Hon’ble Court under Article 321
of the Constitution of Wasan (the Constitution, from hereinafter), which is a fundamental right in
itself, empowering citizens to approach the Supreme Court against violation of fundamental rights
guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.
3. The language of the Article does not expressly lay down against whom the writ shall lie. However,
judicial precedents have made the position clear. The Supreme Court in Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru
S.M.V.S.J.M.S. Trust v. V.R. Rudani2, while discussing the language of Art 226 of the Constitution,
touched upon the distinction of Art 32 and Art 226 to hold that Article 12 is relevant only for the
purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Art. 32.
4. In words relevant for the issue in hand, it can well be construed that for invoking Art 32, the
respondent must necessarily be a State within the meaning of Art 12. The majority in Zee Telefilms
1
32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.
(3) ***
(4) ***
2
1989 AIR 1607, 1989 SCR (2) 697
12
Ltd v Union of India3 (Zee telefilms case) went on to observe that, “the pre-requisite for invoking the
enforcement of a fundamental right under Article 32 is that the violator of that right should be a State
first”.
5. The court in the abovementioned case mandated that unless the Petitioner shows that The Board of
Cricket Control of Wasan is a State within the meaning of Art 12, the writ petition could not be
maintained, even if the claims of the petitioner in regard to fundamental rights are otherwise
legitimate.
1.1.2. Meaning of “Other Authorities” under Art 12
6. It is humbly submitted that the Constitution defines State against which public law remedy can be
sought for violation of fundamental right. Art. 12 reads as:
“…the State includes the Government and Parliament of Wasan and the Government and the
Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of Wasan or
under the control of the Government of Wasan”
7. The construction of the term “other authorities” has had barrels of ink spent, to be finally embedded
in a liberal yet effective test for determination.
8. The Supreme Court in its landmark judgment in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & ors.4
reiterated the six-pronged test laid down in R.D Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India5, to
determine whether an authority is a State within the meaning of Art 12 of the Constitution. A
corporation or body is said to be an Authority or State under Art 12 when one or more of the tests laid
down therein are satisfied; E-Learner satisfying none.
1.1.3. E-Learner is a private corporation with no State control
9. It is humbly submitted that E learner (“The Company”) is a private Ed-tech (Education Technology)
company, known for providing educational services in the country of Wasan. The Company was
incorporated in 2014, and has continuously strived to establish itself as a leading name in the sector.
The Company majorly aims to impart technological knowledge and skills to children of the age group
6 to 14.
10. The company was valued at $1.2 billion preceding the Covid-19 Pandemic, and spiked to $18 billion
by March 2021, decently surpassing even the annual education budget of the Government of Wasan,
and consequently becoming the biggest Ed Tech company in the world.
3
(2005) 4 SCC 649 at 681
4
1981 AIR 487, 1981 SCR (2) 79
5
AIR 1979 SC 1628
13
11. The Company, thus, harnesses profits for the services rendered to those willing to avail them,
implying that the Company is a profit-oriented entity with the aim of providing quality education to
young children in the area of technology, as well as other areas alike, but only to those who wish to
avail the services rendered, on a contractual basis.
12. It was after the rise of the Covid-19 Pandemic, that the National Education Policy, 2021 (NEP)
encouraged schools to be techno-savvy, and adopt digital pedagogy in various aspects of schooling.
It is noteworthy that the Government had not mandated but encouraged educational institutions to
utilize technological media for imparting education. The company still remained private in its affairs
and rendered services to private customers as well as to schools securing a tie-up, on a contractual
basis.
13. The respondent thus submits that as per the description of the company in the foregoing paragraphs,
it is apparent that the company is free from any form of state control. The company is a private
autonomous company. Its shares are listed on the stock market and traded nationally as well as
internationally, ruling out the prospect of Government owning entire share capital.
14. As to the financial status of the company, it is a well-established fact that the company’s entire
valuation is greater than the annual financial budget allotted for education by the Government of
Wasan. Thus, the company enjoys a self-conferred monopoly.
1.2. Mere disposal of public function does not render a corporation State.
15. It is humbly submitted that disposal of public function by a corporation remains a ‘relevant factor’ to
confer the status of State or Authority under Art 12 to a corporation6. In the Zee Telefilms case, even
though some of the functions of BCCI were public function, it was still not held to be a State . The
writ petition under Art 32 was also dismissed owing to the same.
16. The Petitioner’s contention regarding E-Learner’s function being analogous to public function holds
little importance since the meaning of public function is not water-tight. The Supreme Court in Binny
Ltd. & Anr vs V. Sadasivan & Ors7 reiterated the meaning of public functions as:
“… A body is performing a "public function" when it seeks to achieve some collective
benefit for the public or a section of the public and is accepted by the public or that section
of the public as having authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when
they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest…”.
6
Ibid.
7
(2005) 6 SCC 657
14
17. The Supreme Court in Banabehari Tripathy v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies8 went on to observe
that there is no straight jacket formula to determine nature of a body as State, while in Chander Mohan
Khanna v. NCERT9 the Apex Court held that mere nexus with the Government does not confer the
status of agency of government on a private body.
18. The Supreme Court in Jatya Pal Singh & Others v. Union of India & Ors.10 clearly laid down that for
a corporation to be amenable to writ jurisdiction must have pervasive State control. If the control is
mere regulatory in nature, the corporation is not a State or other authority within the meaning of Art
12.
19. E-Learner is rendering educational services in commercial nature, i.e. service of the nature of quid
pro quo. Imparting education has already been held to be commercial activity in T.M.A. Pai
Foundation v. State of Karnataka11. This commercial activity is no more public function than
companies like Amazon and Flipkart are disposing for providing various amnesties to people.
20. If this contention is accepted, any activity touching large section of society would be deemed a public
function to characterize a body as State, thereby enlarging the scope of the already wide Art 12.12
Therefore, no fundamental rights can be claimed form E-Learner
2. THE OFFICIALS OF E-LEARNER ARE NOT LIABLE FOR ACTING DEFICIENTLY AND
COMMITTING ACTS THAT LEAD TO VITIATING TRUE CONSENT OF ITS CLIENTS.
21. It is humbly submitted that the claims furnished by the Petitioners as to the fraudulent tendencies of
the Company concerning lending of money to customers is built on a hollow foundation. The
nomenclature of the sums is immaterial [2.1]. The fact that the parents did not read the document
does not vitiate the contract [2.2] and the allegation that the company did not discuss the terms directly
with the customers has no substance owing to the nature of the contract [2.3].
2.1. Whether or not the sums were called ‘outstanding payments’ do not change the
fundamental nature of the agreement.
22. It is humbly submitted that the contentions of the petitioners in the present issue concern the money
lending facility provided by E-Learner for the convenience of the customers. The facility constitutes
8
67 (1989) CLT 5
9
1992 AIR 76, 1991 SCR Supl. (1) 165
10
2013 0 AIR(SC)(Civ) 1535
11
(1994) 2 SCC 734
12
Supra note 10
15
arranging a credit amount to be provided to the parents as a relief to pay the fees for our services at
once.
23. The facility of ‘outstanding payment’ in laymen friendly words can be described as lending of
monetary sums by the company to avail educational services, for the customers to pay at a later stage.
This lending was facilitated by the signing of a contract with due consent of the customers.
24. It is pertinent to note that the present issue is a matter of discussion owing to the mere reason that the
agreement was not called a ‘loan agreement’. It is contended that whether the agreement is called a
‘loan agreement’, ‘agreement of arrears’, ‘overdue agreement’ or by any cognate name does not
essentially change the nature of the agreement.
25. When signing the agreement, if the parents knew that a third party company is lending them money
for the time being, it is but natural that the parents have to pay the sum back. This fact is not changed
even if the sums are called outstanding payments.
26. The substance of the deal goes into the contract which clearly lays down the terms and conditions
patently, and the parents are furnished proper opportunity to scrutinize and understand the nuances of
the document.
2.2. The contract cannot be held void merely because the customers did not read the contract
2.2.1. The consent of the customers cannot be said to be driven by fraud or misrepresentation.
27. In the present case, the consent to enter into the money lending agreement with E-Learner was given
by the customers through the mobile application and the web page of the company. The agreement
is only secured only after the customer gives consent thereto, and not before.
28. The company provides terms and conditions of the services through a legal document attached to the
page where the agreement button is placed through a hyperlink. The customers are always advised to
read the terms before giving their consent for the same.
29. It is pertinent to note that the document containing the terms and conditions is a legal document.
However, a legal document cannot completely be layman friendly. It is not an altogether novel fact
that that legal documents must cover a large domain of nuances to avoid any ambiguities. This may
result in its being less-laymen-friendly.
30. The company, however, gives sufficient opportunity to its customers to peruse the document,
understand the terms, and only then agree. The contract of services is entered into only after the user
clicks ‘I agree to the terms and conditions.’
16
31. Thus, the customers have every means to ascertain what they are agreeing to and the consequence
thereof. If a person enters a contract without reading the terms, it is him who must bear the
consequences13.
32. The Madras High Court has expounded upon the matter in the following words:
“…the persons of full age and understanding who subscribe their signatures to a document,
cannot be heard to say that they had affixed the signatures on blank papers or that they
signed without appraising themselves about the recitals. If they had been so imprudent to
affix the signatures in such a fashion, they have to take the consequence for such
imprudence.14”
33. The fact that the parents were surprised to find the document a “loan agreement” is sufficient to show
their negligence, and it would be imprudent, and more importantly, unjust to make E-Learner suffer
for their indifference.
2.2.2. Refund policy is generally mentioned in the terms of the contract
34. It is submitted that, as also addressed in the foregoing contentions, the petitioners claim that the
contract entered into by the parents with the Company was a lengthy document which they found
hard to read and the same is apparently unjust to them.
35. This, however, is not a justified argument for the obvious reason that the company has to tender a
huge number of customers, and the legal document containing terms and conditions is duly supplied
to each and every customer homogenously.
36. The duty of the Company is fulfilled after such document is tendered to the interested parties. It is
then the duty of the customers to read the document and accordingly decide whether or not to avail
the services of the Company. The Company can only provide customer care services, which are
limited to removal of doubts.
37. The consent given for contract is not extinguished merely because the person giving the consent did
not read the document. This rule of prudence has been affirmed by scores of common law decisions
as well as by various courts in Wasan.
38. Reliance is placed on Thompson v. L.M. & S Railway Company15, when the plaintiff suffered injury
owing to the negligence of the defendant, and the contract contained a declaration to the effect that
the defendant would not be liable for any damages, it was held that the fact that the Plaintiff could
not read English was immaterial. Subsequently, the defendant was not liable for damages.
13
Chidambaram Pillai And Ors. v. Muthammal and Ors. (1993) 1 MLJ 535
14
Chokkammal v. K. Balraj, (2009) 74 AIC 666 (Mad)
15
(1930) 1 KB 41 (England)
17
39. The application of the above case is apparent here, in the sense that the refund policy is expressly
elaborated in the contract of service, and ignorance to read the contract by the customers cannot later
entitle them to contend upon the same.
40. A contract is not voidable merely on the ground that one of the parties to the contract was under a
mistaken belief as to the subject matter16. This principle finds place in Sec. 22 of the Wasan Contract
Act, 1872 (analogous to Indian Contract Act, 1872). A unilateral mistake is no excuse to annul a
contract17
2.3. The Contract was a Standard Form Contract and could not be negotiated or discussed
with each customer.
2.3.1. A Standard Form Contract is non-negotiable for the reason of its own nature
42. It is submitted that E-Learner has been named the biggest Ed-Tech company in the world. More than
40 million (4 crore) customers are actively availing the services of E Learner, and the number were
continuously increasing thorough the years, save after the release of the video by Mr. Jagdeep.
43. This results in the impracticality to discuss the terms of the contract directly with the customers. The
contract drafted for the service is of the nature of a Standard Form Contract, i.e., a contract with same
terms for all customers. It is upon the customers to accept or reject availing the services based on
their contentment with the contract.
44. It is established law that in cases of Standard Form Contracts, the duty of the consumer to read the
document and then decide whether or not to enter into the contract. Once signed, the contract becomes
binding upon him whether or not he read the document18.
45. Reliance is placed on Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Agrawal Steel19, where the Supreme Court laid down
that there is a presumption that a signature is affixed to a document only after understanding the
nuances thereof20. It is no defense to state that the person did not read the document21.
46. The complaint of the parents as to one-to-one discussion of the terms of the contract is, thus, not
possible. And the impossibility is such that the company cannot provide such service even if it wants
to. The company does have a consumer relationship management agency, but the function of the
agency is limited to the removal of grievances only.
47. A general rule cannot be secured for one-to-one contract discussion and negotiation. It is impractical
and counter-productive for execution of affairs of the Company.
16
Security Printing & Minting Corporation of India Ltd. V. Gandhi Industrial Corporation, (2007) 13 SCC 236.
17
Smith v. Hughes, (1871) LR QB 597.
18
Thompson v. LM & SR Co., (1930) IKB 41, CA
19
(2010) 1 SCC 83, 84.
20
Ibid
21
Chidambaram Pillai And Ors. vs Muthammal and Ors. (1993) 1 MLJ 535
18
2.3.2. The customers were never coerced to avail the money lending facility
48. It is highly imperative to state that the liability against this argument cannot be put on the Company
for two reasons. Firstly, as stated in the foregoing arguments, it is not the company which must suffer
for the idiosyncrasies of diverse kinds of customers who did not read the agreement. Secondly, to
contend that they were defrauded or made to fall in the ‘trap’ of the company would imply that the
company has coerced them to avail such services, which, as stated above, is not the case.
49. Company has not coerced the parents to take up the sums facilitated thereby. The company,
undoubtedly, encouraged the parents to avail such services. But promotion of a convenience facility
does not amount to coercion.
50. It is the customer himself who must decide whether to avail such facility or not. By no means, the
consent of the customers is vitiated and consumer rights violated. It is but a natural fact that a
company tendering to millions of customers cannot satisfy each and every of them.
Therefore, the claims made by the petitioner cannot be held to be justified and are thus liable to be
dismissed.
[PART II]
3. E-LEARNER’S RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF WASAN HAVE NOT BEEN

VIOLATED BECAUSE OF THE STEPS TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF WASAN.
52. It is humbly submitted that the petition filed by E-Learner in the High Court of Sanal are unjustified
and are, in fact, vexatious. The claims of the Company are based on vague grounds, certainly liable
to be dismissed. The alleged fundamental-right-violating actions of the Government of Wasan include
the Public Notice released after the viral YouTube video, and the subsequent termination of Contract
with the Company [3.1]. When two fundamental rights are in conflict, the right which serves public
benefit must prevail. [3.2].
3.1. The termination of Contract with the Company not a violation of fundamental right.
3.1.1. The reasons for entering into contract with E-Learner

53. It is humbly submitted that the present issue is nothing but a mountain out of a mole hill. A claim
essentially liable to be filed in a civil court has been deliberately dragged to the High Court of Sanal
as a writ petition. No question of fundamental right is arising as far as the termination of contract by
19
the government with the company is concerned. And a writ is only allowed if no alternate remedy is
available22
54. It is submitted that the contract being referred to above refers to the arrangement made between the
Government and E-Learner, concerning the supply software specially developed for the smooth
digital operation of the educational institutions. This was a necessary step as the looming Covid 19
pandemic had already taken a huge toll on the academic progress of the children.
55. It is the duty of the Government to ensure that school children are given proper infrastructure to be
able to receive quality education, as is their right as well. Thus, in furtherance of this duty, the
Government felt compelled to institute the adoption of digital pedagogy in Government schools, in
concurrence with the National Education Policy (NEP), 2021.
56. The intention to engage with E-Learner had two factors in contemplation:
a) First, the company was the finest of its kind in the world. The Company’s valuation surpassed the
Government’s annual budget by hundreds of millions, thereby making it fit candidate for providing
services at such a large scale. This would also ensure accountability and quality of the services, as
well as safe implementation of the directives of NEP.
b) Second, it was already very popular among students as well as teachers. The company recorded
over 40 million enrollments through its app and website. These figures were a relevant factor, since
the implementation of digital pedagogy in government schools requires a user-friendly application,
and E-Learner being a widely used platform supports the requirement.
3.1.2. The grounds for termination of the contract with E-Learner

57. As already stated, the Government’s rationale behind the contractual arrangement with E-Learner
derived meaning from two core factors, of which the first bears an even greater significance. Since,
in the case of providing services, the Government would be the “customer” for the Company, it is
natural that various degrees of information would be shared to the company.
58. The events which led to the termination emanated from the release of the video by Mr. Jagdeep, who
claimed that the company was negligent as to the privacy of its customers, that under the watch of
the company, sensitive customer data was jeopardized.
59. The data so leaked included sensitive personal details like phone numbers and addresses of students
and teachers alike. The duty to protect the privacy of those employed as well as nurtured directly
under Government’s functions rests with the Government only23.
22
Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 192
23
Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 6; Guruvinder Singh v. State of UP and Anr.,
2021 4 Crimes (HC) 374.
20
60. An inaction by the Government in the circumstances of the present case would have caused a pubic
unrest, since the matter had already attracted much heat on print and digital media. Had the
Government continued the contractual relationship with E-Learner (accused of leaking data of
millions of its customers), it would be classified as Government’s ignorance to an important national
issue; to its citizens’ privacy
61. The Government’s actions were not based only upon the YouTube video, directly at least. The video
being the ground for termination is but a tip of an iceberg. As a responsible Government, it is our duty
to abstain from actions potentially leading to consequences prejudicial to public security and
integrity24
62. The Government, thus, relied not the video per se but its implications upon general public. The
termination of contract was not based on the YouTube video but the Governmental duty to prevent
the infringement of the public’s right to privacy as enshrined in Art 21 of the Constitution of Wasan25.
3.1.3. Termination of Contract does not lead to infringement of fundamental rights.

63. It is humbly submitted that the Government has constitutional power to enter into contracts with
private individuals or corporations etc. under Art 298 of the Constitution of Wasan. The provision
confers the constitutional power upon the Union to contract for any purpose it may deem necessary.
A question of Fundamental or any other Constitutional rights may arise if the Government acts
prejudicial to public policy, like unreasonable classification to include only certain classes of people
to avail policies generally made for public welfare26.
64. The Apex Court has already established in Ram Jawaya Kapoor v State of Punjab27 that power of
Government to enter into contract is expressly vested in the Government under Art 298 of the
Constitution. Similarly, the Court in B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P.28 held that the scope of business,
trade or contracts for any purpose in Art 298 is much wider than in Art 301 or 303, such that even
though a particular Governmental activity may not have a claim under Art 301 or 303, it may be well
within the scope of Art 298.
65. It is imperative to state that E-Learner’s claims for violation of fundamental or constitutional rights
cannot stand on the anvil of Art 226, invoking writ jurisdiction of the High Court of Sanal. The
Supreme Court has time and again condemned invoking writ petition for pure and simple contractual
matters.
24
Indian Medicines Pharmaceuticals Corpn. Ltd. v. Kerala Ayurvedic Coop. Society Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine SC
5
25
Guruvinder Singh v. State of U.P. and Anr., 2021 4 Crimes (HC) 374
26
LIC v. Consumer Education and Research Centre, AIR 1995 SC 1811
27
AIR 1955 SC 549
28
AIR 1999 SC 1867
21
66. In Lekhraj Satramdas Lalvani v. N.M Shah, Deputy Custodian-cum-managing Officer, Bombay29, the
Court held that ‘any duty or obligation falling upon a [public servant] out of a contract entered into
by him as such public servant cannot be enforced by the machinery of a writ under Art 226 of the
Constitution.
67. Reliance is also placed in Banchhanidhi Rath v. State of Orissa 30, wherein the Court held that if a
right is claimed in terms of a contract, such a right cannot be enforced in a writ petition. The Court
had maintained the same in Har Shankar v. Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner31, that a writ
petition is not an appropriate remedy for impeaching contractual obligations.
3.2. Community interest prevails over private interest when Fundamental rights conflict.
3.2.1. E-learner’s right to trade is in conflict with right to privacy of general community
68. In the light of the foregoing arguments, the Government’s rationale to terminate the contract was
justified with the release of the public statement on the matter. The company had explicitly admitted
in the statement that a data leak had indeed occurred. It stated that the data was shifted to a protected
server within 24 hours, indicating that the data was already jeopardized32.
69. The grounds upon which the Government terminated the contract are justified, more than ever, after
the release of this public notice. The right to privacy of a large portion of the community was
jeopardized by the actions of E-Learner. This includes all the users who were engaged with E-Learner
in any manner, through Private schools, Government schools, or through individual services, who
were the victim of this data leak.
70. Quantitatively, over 40 million (4 crore) children were engaged with E-Learner as of March 2021.
The company saw exponential growth therefrom, with huge publicity owing to the Biggest
Contributor to Education award to Mr. Nandan, the CEO of E-Learner. This would undoubtably have
attracted a greater number of students by the time the controversy ensued in January 2022 (roughly
an year thereafter).
71. The claims of the company regarding the violation of fundamental rights due to the termination of
contract are in conflict with the general community’s right to privacy. In other words, the rights of the
Company are nothing but a liability to the people.
3.2.2. Public morality and interest are supreme
29
(1977) 3 SCC 457
30
(1972) 4 SCC 781
31
1975 AIR 1121
32
Factsheet, paragraph 9, line 4
22
72. It is humbly submitted that there is no hierarchy of rights given in the constitution and all the rights
stand on the same priority to the other. However, the present case poses a peculiar circumstance where
fundamental rights are claimed by both the parties, and both the claims appear justified in their
respective perspectives.
73. A similar question arose in the case of Mr X v. Hospital Z33. Here, a conflict arose between the ‘right
to privacy’ of one party and the ‘right to live a healthy life’ of the other. The petitioner husband sued
a hospital for making the information of his suffering from AIDS public, claiming a breach of right
to privacy. The hospital on the other hand maintained that such declaration was necessary to ensure
right to health of the general public, AIDS being a deadly venereal disease.
74. Thus, the question was a dispute in the nature of a paradox. To protect the right of one would mean
to violate the same right of the other. The views of the court in this regard were as follows:
“Where there is a clash of two Fundamental Rights … the right which would advance the public
morality or public interest, would alone be enforced through the process of court, for the reason that
moral considerations cannot be kept at bay and the Judges are not expected to sit as mute structures
of clay in the hall known as the courtroom, but have to be sensitive…34.”
75. The principle laid down in the case has direct application on the issue in hand. In the present case as
well, the right of the company to trade freely under art 19(1)(g) [as well as fundamental rights, as the
petitioner claims] are a direct encroachment to the right to privacy of the citizens of Wasan.
76. Thus, in the light of the present law, it is justified to curtail a certain fundamental right of a certain
individual if doing so would advance public morality or public interest. The termination of contract
with E-Learner is a step by the Government to protect the same.
3.2.3. E-Learner’s claims are fundamentally flawed.
77. There is a fundamental flaw in the arguments of the Company in stating the violation of their
constitutional rights. If the company alleges violation of fundamental right to free trade, the claim is
defeated on the ground of non-enforceability of such right in the present case.
78. As held in the case of Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, 35 after the State has entered into field
of ordinary contract, the relations are no longer governed by constitutional provisions but by the
legally valid contract which determines the rights and duties of the parties inter se.
79. The Government has acted in pure executive capacity as a party to a contract and not as a State,
against which claims of fundamental rights could be formed. The only rights which may be claimed
33
(1998) 8 SCC 296
34
Ibid.
35
(1977) 3 SCC 457
23
by the Company from the Government are reliefs given under the Contract Act of 1872 or the Specific
Relief Act of 1963. And these claims essentially lie in an ordinary civil court of original jurisdiction.
80. Secondly, the public notice by the Ministry of Education, cautioning general public to be vigilant
while using Ed Tech platforms, might be included by the Company in the list of actions of government
curtailing fundamental right of the company in their perspective. It must be stated that the notice
comprised of the following words: ‘Citizens should exercise extreme caution while signing up for
courses on Ed-Tech platforms.’
81. It is important to point out that the public notice was a mere advisory. The word ‘should’ must not be
confused with ‘shall’. The people were still free to avail the services of the company and the public
notice, in no way, mandated the people to abstain from using the Company’s services. It must also be
stated that the notice was never meant to target E-Learner only.
82. The notice cautioned citizens to use services of ED-Tech platforms carefully and vigilantly in general.
The company cannot base any claims of violation of constitutional rights by deliberately inventing
grounds bearing no real normative force.
Thus, the Government was justified in termination of the contract, and no Constitutional rights of
the Petitioner have been prejudiced.
[PART III]
4. MR. JAGDEEP IS NOT LIABLE FOR CRIMINAL DEFAMATION FOR RELEASING THE
VIDEO ON SOCIAL MEDIA.
83. It is humbly submitted that the alleged defamation suit by the Company has no locus standi for the
reason that the video was a true analysis of factual reality, released for public good and in good faith.
The company cannot thus allege defamation for the imputations bear truthfulness and good faith [4.1].
Also, the video must be construed within the freedom of press [4.2].
4.1. The imputations bear truthfulness and attributes of public benefit.
4.1.1. E-Learner’s claims for defamation are baseless.
84. It is submitted that Mr. Jagdeep, a security researcher and a freelance journalist, is an active social
influencer on YouTube, where he is an icon of spreading public awareness on a wide range of social
issues.
24
85. The antecedents of Mr. Jagdeep’s previous works are available on his YouTube channel, where one
can find numerous awareness videos, concerning social issues like dowry, corruption and scams. The
channel had over 1 Lakh subscribers, indicating his popularity among viewers.
86. It was for this social awareness that Mr. Jagdeep commented on the functioning of E-Learner and
sought to reveal the hidden side of the Company to the general public. The claims cannot be held to
be defamatory since there was no direct motive for any mal- intent on part of Mr. Jagdeep to defame
the company.
87. It was but a part of his job to make people aware of all the aspects of engaging with an ed-tech
company, as every facet of the working of such companies must transparently visible to the general
public.
88. And for this reason, the claims of E-Learner should fail since the case of Mr. Jagdeep is covered under
first36 and the ninth exception 937 to the offence of criminal defamation under Section 49938 of the
Wasan Penal Code (WPC, from hereinafter), 1860, as alleged by the Company.
4.1.2. Mr. Jagdeep is covered under the first exception to Sec. 499 of WPC
89. It is submitted that, for some reason, E-Learner is confident that the actions of Mr. Jagdeep fall within
the definition of defamation under Sec. 499 of the WPC. As per the company, the video was ‘an attack
on their freedom to lawful business’. However, it was rather a judicious exercise of the freedom of
speech without any malice on part of Mr. Jagdeep.
90. However, Sec 499 is not sans exceptions, and of the nine exceptions appended thereto, Mr. Jagdeep
is squarely covered under the first exception. The first exception reads as:
‘Imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or published. —It is not
defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any person, if it be for the public
good that the imputation should be made or published. Whether or not it is for the public
good is a question of fact.39
91. The sine qua non for the first exception to be invoked are (i) truth of the matter, and (ii) the imputation
be made in public good, the conditions to be satisfied cumulatively40.
36
Imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or published. —It is not defamation to impute
anything which is true concerning any person, if it be for the public good that the imputation should be made or
published. Whether or not it is for the public good is a question of fact.
37
Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other’s interests. —It is not defamation
to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the
protection of the inter-ests of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good
38
Defamation. —Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible
representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or
having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases
hereinafter expected, to defame that person.
39
The Wasan Penal Code, Sec. 499, First Exception.
40
Jeffrey J. Diermeier and another v. State of West Bengal and another, (2010) 6 SCC 243
25
92. In the present case, the conditions are indeed satisfied. The claims were centered on a data leak made
by Botguard, the Consumer Relationship Manager (CRM) of the company, since sensitive user data
was found by Mr. Jagdeep on an unprotected data server41. The required good faith was also present.42
93. The fact that the data was actually found on the server rebuts the claim of the Company that Mr.
Jagdeep is spreading misinformation. The occurrence of the data leak was even admitted by the
Company in their public statement released by the company after the situation tightened.
94. The statements are thus ex facie true, as can be construed from the foregoing. It is also submitted that
the claims were made pursuant to public awareness in the exercise of reasonable freedom of speech
by a journalist.
95. It must be observed that though a journalist possesses no higher right than an ordinary citizen has in
respect of the freedom of speech, but by virtue of the special character of his profession, the journalist
owes a duty to the public, the most important of which is the dissemination of news and views fully
and truly expressed on matters affecting the public good43.
96. It was for Mr. Jagdeep’s video that the matter could see the light of the day, and E-Learner could shift
the data to a protected server. E-Learner claims to have resolved the ‘glitch’ in a matter of 24 hours,
but it is indiscernible as to how long the data was already exposed if it were not for Mr. Jagdeep’s
revelation.
97. The video was not only intended for public good; it even served a pubic good by uncovering a
potential privacy breach that could have severely affected the digital section of the education
consumers.
98. As was observed by the Supreme Court in Vishan Swarup v. Nardeo Shastri44 this species of opinion
of a journalist is recognized as a fair comment, and ‘to pass the test of fair comment, the publication
must be free from malice and must be made bona fide in public interest45’.
99. And since truth, public good, good faith are questions of fact46, the factual circumstances above make
it apparent that the imputations were certainly true and made in good faith for the wellbeing of the
society. Thus, the benefits of the first exception should be available to Mr. Jagdeep.
4.2. Exception 9 to Sec. 499 WPC is attracted for qualified privilege to journalists
4.2.1. The ninth exception to criminal defamation
41
Factsheet, paragraph 6
42
Sewakram Sobhani v. R.K. Karanjia, (1981) 3 SCC 208
43
KD Guar, Textbook on Indian Penal Code, 7th edn 2020, p 1310
44
AIR 1965 All 439
45
Ibid.
46
Chamanlal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 1372
26
100. In addition to the first exception, which necessitates truth and public good, Mr. Jagdeep’s case also
falls squarely within the four corners of the Ninth exception appended to Sec. 499 of WPC as well.
The provision reads as:
Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other’s interests. —It is not
defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made
in good faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it, or of any other person, or for
the public good47.
101. The ingredients of the Ninth Exception are: firstly, the imputation must be made in good faith;
secondly, the imputation must be for protection of the interest of the person making it or of any other
person or for the public good48. When both requirements of good faith and public good are fulfilled,
aid of exception 9 of Sec. 499 can be invoked49.
102. The existence of good faith is quintessential to attract the ninth exception50. The General Clauses
Act defines ‘good faith’ in terms of ‘honesty’. It states that “a thing shall be deemed to be done in
'good faith' where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not.”
103. The Wasan Penal Code provides a negative definition of good faith as- “Nothing is said to be done
or believed in ‘good faith’ which is done or believed without due care and attention.”
104. A cumulative construction of this term would suggest that to be within the bounds of good faith,
one must act honestly, and with due care and attention. The facts already stated clearly suggest that
the video was released not in furtherance of a mal-intent but an honest belief in one’s own research
and for public good.
105. ‘Due care and attention’ were present on the part of Mr. Jagdeep since the video was released only
after the data was found on the server, the claims are not mere conjectures. To quote the Supreme
Court’s views in Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab51, one of the condition precedents for the case
to be in favor of the accused is the existence of cogent circumstances confirming inquiry on the part
of the accused before making the allegations.
106. Mr. Jagdeep had a reason to believe that his claims were true, this reason to believe being another
sine qua non thereof52. The plea of Mr. Jagdeep would certainly have failed had he acted recklessly
47
Section 499, Wasan Penal Code, ninth exception
48
Sukra Mahto vs Basdeo Kumar Mahto &. Anr, 1971 (1) SCC 885
49
Harbhajan Singh v/s State of Punjab 1965 SCR (3) 235
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
52
Sewakram v. Karanjjiya, AIR 1981 SC 1514.
27
and rashly without any attempt to verify the truth53 and if the allegations were not for the public
good54.
107. Also, such imputations would only constitute defamation if there is a specific intent with the maker
to cause harm to the reputation of the other55.
108. In the present case, sufficient material is on record to show that the accused took sue care and
attention before publication of the matter online, in furtherance of a bona fide cause of public good.
4.2.2. The qualified privilege to press
109. A free, regularly published press is essential for a healthy democracy 56. It is for the press that the
right to information can flow smoothly, and the general public has knowledge of matters that hitherto
they could not access57.
110. The term ‘Freedom of Press’ is not limited to newspaper and television media. As per the American
Supreme Court in Alma Lovell v. City of Griffin58:
“The freedom of press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals, but it includes also
pamphlets and circulars and every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information
and opinion.”
111. Lately, YouTube has become a prominent stage to share information and any person working as a
freelance journalist over such platform stands on the same footing as that of a journalist on the
television59.
112. Mr. Jagdeep has a qualified privilege to make statements which might otherwise seem The Supreme
Court of India in the landmark case of R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu 60 relied on the American
case of Sullivan v. New York Times61 to recognize the qualified privilege given to press.
113. It was established that for freedom of press to survive, journalists have to be given ‘breathing space
to freely share their views on public matter. Mere inaccuracies cannot hold a journalist liable for
defamation. This was the case where the rule of actual malice was laid down.
114. The Court held that if the writer either knew that he was making false claims, or published them
with “reckless regard” of the veracity thereof, he would be liable for defamation.
53
Chamanlal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 1372.
54
Emperor v. Abdul, 1907 31 (Bom) 293.
55
Jeffrey J. Diermeier and another v. State of West Bengal and another, (2010) 6 SCC 243.
56
Sakal Papers (P) ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1962 SC 305
57
Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578
58
303 US 444 (1938)
59
Monika Djerf-Pierre , Mia Lindgren and Mikayla Alexis Budinski, The Role of Journalism on YouTube:
Audience Engagement with 'Superbug' Reporting Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439) 2019,
Volume 7, Issue 1, Pages 235–247
60
(1994) 6 SCC 632
61
376 US 254
28
4.2.3. The burden of proof is limited to preponderance of possibility

115. The principles of natural justice provide that ‘Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat’, that the
burden to prove a criminal lies on the person who affirms it, and not on one who denies it. It
manifests the doctrine of ‘innocent until proven guilty’.
116. It is upon the prosecution to substantiate his beyond reasonable doubt, the accused has to prove
mere preponderance of possibility to substantiate a plea under any of the exception to Sec. 49962.
117. The arguments laid down in the foregoing sub-issues form sufficient matter to establish a
preponderance of possibility that Mr. Jagdeep is covered under the said exceptions. Reliance is
placed on Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Prabodh Kumar Tewari,63, where the court stated that ‘if
the accused is able to raise a probable defense which creates doubts about the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail.’
118. The accused was acquitted on preponderance of possibility of innocence in Mahadev v. Border
Security Force64, indicating that the burden on accused is same as that in a civil case, and
establishment of preponderance of possibility is sufficient to discharge the same65.
119. Therefore, the Respondent believes that the foregoing arguments are sufficient to create the required
preponderance of possibility, and is thus sufficient to render Mr. Jagdeep innocent.
Thus, the allegations for defamation are liable to be set aside and Mr. Jagdeep is innocent.
62
Vivek Ganka v. Patel (2000) 9 SCC 87
63
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1089
64
(2022) 8 SCC 502
65
Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 1372 (para 15)
29
PRAYER
_______________________________________________________________________________
WHEREFORE IN THE LIGHT OF ISSUES RAISED, ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AND
AUTHORITIES CITED, THE COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS MOST
HUMBLY PRAY BEFORE THIS HON’BLE COURT TO BE PLEASED TO ADJUDGE AND
DECLARE THAT:
1. E-Learner cannot be held liable for violation of Fundamental Rights of the

citizens.
2. The Money Lending Contact is valid.
3. E-Leaner’s constitutional rights have not been infringed.
4. Penal charges of defamation on Mr. Jagdeep are dropped.
Or pass any order or relief in favor of the Respondents which this Hon’ble Court
may pass in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience.
And for this act of kindness, the Respondents shall forever be duty bound.
Date: ***
Place: Wasan
30

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V BENNETT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF WASAN

WRIT PETITION NO ___ OF 2023

WRIT PETITION NO. ___ OF 2023

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. ___ OF 2023

LIST of ABBREVIATIONS _______________________________________________3

INDEX of AUTHORITIES _______________________________________________4

STATEMENT of JURISDICTION _________________________________________7

SUMMARY of FACTS ___________________________________________________8

1. E-LEARNERS CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR

2.2.1 The consent of the customers cannot be said to be driven by fraud or

3.1 The termination of Contract with the Company not a violation of

S. No. Abbreviations Expanded Form

1 AIR All India Reporter

3 CEO Chief Executive Officer

4 CRM Consumer Relationship Management

5 Ed-Tech Education Technology

6 Ibid. Just Above

7 M.P. Madhya Pradesh

11 R/w Read with

12 SCC Supreme Court Cases

15 U.P. Uttar Pradesh

16 USA United State of America

17 WPC Wasan Penal Code

Case List Page (s)

R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 6 S.C.C 632 (India). 28

• Books and Treatises

• VN Shukla, Constitution of India (Eastern Book Company 2021)

For Part II: E-Learner

For Part III: E-Learner

2. RESPONDENT - For Part I: E-Learner

For Part II: Government of Wasan

For Part III: Mr. Jagdeep

Writ Petition No. ___ of 2023 (Under Art 32 of the Constitution)

Shiksha Bachao Andolan versus E-Learner

E-Learner versus Union of Wasan

E-Learner versus Jagdeep.

• Article 139-A of the Constitution of Wasan—

The Respondent humbly submits to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

E-Learner is a virtual education platform (Ed-Tech Company). It provides

The company eventually backed about 40 million enrollments, to become the

Mr. Jagdeep is a Youtuber, a noted freelance journalist and security researcher.

Consequently, the Government terminated its contract with E-Learner to

Many consumers resorted to social media to reveal that apparently, E-Learner

I WHETHER E-LEARNER CAN BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE VIOLATION OF

II WHETHER OFFICIALS OF E-LEARNER ARE LIABLE FOR ACTING DEFICIENTLY AND

III WHETHER E-LEARNER’S RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF WASAN HAVE

IV WHETHER MR. JAGDEEP IS LIABLE FOR CRIMINAL DEFAMATION FOR RELEASING

1. E-LEARNER CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE VIOLATION OF

1.1.3. E-Learner is a private corporation with no State control

Therefore, no fundamental rights can be claimed form E-Learner

3. E-LEARNER’S RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF WASAN HAVE NOT BEEN

3.1.1. The reasons for entering into contract with E-Learner

3.1.2. The grounds for termination of the contract with E-Learner

3.1.3. Termination of Contract does not lead to infringement of fundamental rights.

3.2.2. Public morality and interest are supreme

4.2.3. The burden of proof is limited to preponderance of possibility

1. E-Learner cannot be held liable for violation of Fundamental Rights of the

2. The Money Lending Contact is valid.

3. E-Leaner’s constitutional rights have not been infringed.

4. Penal charges of defamation on Mr. Jagdeep are dropped.

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