Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Armor September October 1996
Armor September October 1996
When we used to talk about efficiencies, we referred ting a critical component for the space shuttle, but they
to those little, cheaply built and cheaply rented, bare- don’t see a lot more ways to create efficiencies.
bones apartments that single soldiers and geographical
That our units are learning conservation is very good,
bachelors could rent right outside the main gate of Fort
for no one likes to see once-used but now contami-
Really Hot. They offered some semblance of civiliza-
nated tubes of grease thrown out, or see scrap metal
tion: a stove top, a closet, and a commode. They were
bins with untagged and perfectly good parts destined
austere places, but a smart guy with some imagination
for a smelter, rather than the turret. No one likes to see
could get by if he cleverly used his limited space.
soldiers who are not training. Waste should make every
Nowadays, efficiencies have come to represent some- one of us mad.
thing a little bit different. They still demand that clever- At some point we will have reached the limit of effi-
ness from the user, but now we are talking about re- ciencies and actually begun cutting into our muscle. I
sources when we hear the word. How can you leverage don’t pretend to know where that point is, for each unit
your allocations of whatever you’ve been given to ac- will be different. I do know that a number of guys feel
complish the mission, or missions? Not enough people? they have streamlined their operations a lot already.
Look for some efficiencies. Not enough equipment? Talk of cutting annual ammo allocations or reducing
Look for efficiencies. Not enough fuel or repair parts to PLLs and ASLs should always send a shudder through
support your OPTEMPO? Look for some efficiencies. the force. We are all concerned about the erosion of
Not enough training opportunities? Simulate. Then look collective skills that can’t be captured in simulations.
for efficiencies. Sure, you can keep the simulation running a little bit
Being the mission-type guys they are, tankers and longer to give the logisticians — that is, all of us — time
cavalrymen will always say, “We’ll do our part.” Their to police up the battlefield. But, a simulation just isn’t
units might go without as many chemical lights as last going to replicate the effort needed to simultaneously
year, or quite as many batteries, or fewer CL III POL recover two or three dozen armored vehicles and surge
package products to try and stretch the unit’s money for the increased casualty flow. Doing it for the first time
and resources to last the year. More than likely though, at a Combat Training Center certainly isn’t our model
they will maintain a readiness level close to where they now, nor what we want, although it may be the direction
are supposed to be. Those new found efficiencies will forced on us by efficiencies.
probably get ’em through enough of the exercises they There is everything right about operating more effi-
had planned to meet the quarterly, semi-annual, and ciently; waste in any form is a bad thing. Soldiers not
annual training objectives. training is bad; money that is thrown away is bad; or-
Later, after the exercises and recovery operations are dering repair parts then not using them is unconscion-
complete, these same guys catch up on their reading able; POL products used once, then contaminated, im-
and see articles about multi-billion dollar acquisition poverish the unit, the Army, and ruin our environment.
programs and wonder what is going on (for some en- As budgets continue shrinking, it behooves us all to be
lightenment, read about the machinations surrounding creative, and to use our collective imaginations to effi-
the F/A-18 and whether to upgrade or buy new). They ciently operate within increasingly tight resource alloca-
look in their motorpools and sure don’t see $3,800 toilet tions. But, if you see muscle getting damaged, speak
seats. They might see a stray, solitary bolt, inexplicably up.
shipped via FEDEX or Express Mail in packaging befit- — TAB
Editor-in-Chief
LTC TERRY A. BLAKELY Features
8 STAWs: New Threat from Above
Managing Editor Smart Top Attack Weapons
JON T. CLEMENS by Lieutenant Colonel James H. Boschma, U.S. Anny (Ret.)
10 Russia's Arena Active Protection System
Commandant by First Lieutenant Adam Geibel
MG LON E. MAGGART 11 Cavalry In Force XXI
by Major General Lon E. Maggart
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi-
monthly by the U.S. Anny Annor Center, 4401
13 Fort Knox Cavalry Branch Will Host Reconnaissance Symposium in October
Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121- 14 The Indian Wars Staff Ride
Disclaimer: The infonnation contained in AR- by Lieutenant Colonel Edwin L Kennedy, Jr.
MOR represents the professional opinions of the 20 Task Force Baum and the Hammelburg Raid
authors and does not necessarily reflect the offi- by Richard Whitaker
cial Anny or TRADOC position, nor does it
31 Leadershlp •••And Command and Control
change or supersede any infonnation presented
by Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson
in other official Anny publications.
33 Honorary Colonels Can Re-energize Your Unit
Official distribution is limited to one copy for
by Captain Dave Clark
each annored brigade headquarters, annored
cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion 34 Operation Just Cause: The Armor-Infantry Team in the Close Fight
headquarters, annored cavalry squadron head- by Major Frank Sherman
quarters, reconnaissance squadron headquar- 36 Balkan Report III: The Six-Bradley Scout Platoon In Bosnia
ters, armored cavalry troop, annor company, by First Lieutenant Frank Lozano
and motorized brigade headquarters of the
United States Anny. In addition, Anny libraries, 37 Kentucky Windage
(Target acquisition and tracking with the M-18 Hellcat)
Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM
Letter from CPT Richard Buchanan (Ret.), 704th TO Battalion
staff agencies with responsibility for annored, di-
rect fire, ground combat systems, organizations, 38 Tank Combat Training: Tactical Table VIII
and the training of personnel for such organiza- by Captain Pat White and Lieutenant Colonel Karl Gunzelman
tions may request two copies by sending a mili- 41 Mobility Analysis for the Digitized Brigade
tary letter to the editor-in--chief. by Captain Robert S. Mikaloff
Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only 45 The Task Force Commander's Role in Fire Support Planning
those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor by Lieutenant Colonel Harry L Leiterman
Center has proponency. That proponency in-
cludes: all annored, direct-fire ground combat Back "Driver, how much fuel do we have?"
systems that do not serve primarily as infantry Cover Here's an easy way to report accurately...
by Staff Sergeant Stephen A. Krivitsky
carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these
systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers;
any miscellaneous items of equipment which ar- Departments
mor and armored cavalry organizations use ex-
2 Contacts
clusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C
3 Letters
officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted sol-
6 Commander's Hatch
diers; and infonnation conceming the training,
7 Driver's Seat
logistics, history, and leadership ot ann or and ar-
52 Books
mored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level
and below, to include Threat units at those lev-
els.
Material may be reprinted, provided credit is
given to ARMOR and to the author, except Second-class official mail postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster. Send address
changes to Editor, ARMOR, ATTN: AUK·TDM, Fort Knox, KY 40121·5210.
where copyright is indicated.
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
USPS 467·970
September-October 1996, Vol. CV No.5
Directory - Points of Contact
DSN - 464-XXXX
Commercial - (502) 624-XXXX U.S. Army Armor Center
Commanding General (ATZK-CG)
MG Lon E. Maggart 2121
ARMOR Editorial Offices E-Mail: MAGGART@KNOX-EMH1.ARMY.MIL
1st Armor Training Brigade (ATSB-BAZ) Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA)
COL Fred A. Treyz III 6843 LTC Randall Williams 1315
E·Mail: TREYZ@KNOX-EMH1.ARMY.MIL E-Mail: WILLlAMR@KNOX·EMH1.ARMY.MIL
ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in edit- gets lost or distorted.) If you have any questions concerning electronic
ing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or art SUbmissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above.
printed out double-spaced in near·letter-quality printer mode. We also
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illustrations or photos submitted. port delivery problems or changes of address to Connie Bright or Dar-
lene Kennedy, P.O. Box 607, Ft. Knox, KY 40121, or call (502) 942-
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lication by, other Army journals. Please submit your article to only one UNIT DISTRIBUTION: Report delivery problems or changes of ad-
Army journal at a time. dress to Mary Hager, DSN 464·2610; commercial: (502) 624,2610. Re-
quests to be added to the free distribution list should be in the form of a
GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We can accept electronic graphics and letter to the Editor-in-Chief.
photo files in most formats except Harvard Graphics. Compressed for-
mats .jpg and .gif take up the least disk space. We prefer PC Paint· ARMOR HOTLINE - DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 24-
brush (.pcx). If you use Powerpoint Cppt), please save each illustration hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine,
as a separate file. Try to avoid the use of color and shading, but if you training, organizations, and equipment of the Armor Force.
must use shading to illustrate your point, send us an un shaded version of
the illustration along with a printout of your shaded version. (We have ISSUES IN ARMOR: Visit the ARMOR Web site at the following ad-
found that when we convert tiles to a format we can use, the shading dress: http://www.entelechy-inc.comldocslknoxdoc/amlOrmaglcover.htm.
Building Victory
From the Ground Up
All great endeavors have one thing in keep the Armor Force leading change used in overwhelming, violent, and de-
common: they were all built from the in the 21st Century. cisive actions on the battlefield.
ground up. Without firmly laid founda- In the past, new ideas often were de- Among its most important missions,
tions, no accomplishment can stand the
test of time. The United States Army is veloped separately from their intended the Armor Center has the requirement
users because the gap in experience to unlock and then organize the genius
no different. It was built from a well- and knowledge between users and de- of our soldiers and junior leaders into
organized plan, led by dedicated lead-
ers of uncommon vision, and its great- signers was so great that it could not be something useful for the entire Army.
easily bridged. But today’s information For example, the Armor Center re-
est strength comes from the ground up technology allows these two to work cently created Integrated Concept
— well-trained and highly-motivated
soldiers. hand-in-hand. On the digitized battle- Teams (ICTs) to chart out the Future
field, the increased access to informa- Combat System (Future Main Battle
Our soldiers are the best in the world tion will not be used to concentrate Tank), future scout cavalry system
because our Army takes care of them control at the highest levels, but to em- (FSCS), and improvements in tank ar-
from the ground up, with tough, realis- power initiative by everyone in the maments and ammunition, as well as
tic training, opportunities for advance- force to achieve decentralized execu- upgrades to the Abrams fleet.
ment, skill and professional develop- tion.
These ICTs pulled together partici-
ment, and quality support for them and Passing information —and the ability pants from many different Army or-
their families. Make no mistake: Op-
eration Desert Storm was not won by to use that information — down to the ganizations and disciplines to ensure
lowest levels, will help us win future that the ideas and expertise of all con-
high technology or smart weapons. It battles. New combat vehicles, new in- cerned with the future of the mounted
was won by tough, smart soldiers, who
knew their equipment and fought with formation transfer structures, new or- force were focused in a manner consis-
ganizations, and new doctrine cannot tent with today’s realities. It also was a
skill and bravery, because they knew be created by bureaucracies isolated way to build the future from the
the Army would take care of them. Our
soldiers are the bone, the muscle, and from the field. Instead, these things ground up.
must be created out of the experiences
the lifeblood of our Army, and our and lessons learned by those who actu- We will use these same techniques
country — and it will never be any when developing new combat organi-
other way. ally use them everyday. That is why zations, new doctrine, new training
the Army has invested in Advanced
Warfighting Experiments and the EX- packages, and new technologies. All of
Building from the ground up also de- FOR. these will ensure that the equipment we
scribes how our Army, and specifically give our soldiers of the future will be
the Armor Force, must adapt to change. As warfare and technology change, the best in the world. Creativity and in-
In the past, the Army was run from the the Army must accommodate these novation are key ingredients to build-
“top down.” changes in creative ways that meet the ing the future. Creativity and innova-
real needs of a changing world. The tion from the entire force — not just
Decisions were made at the top. Armor Force understands this concept from those at the top. It is, therefore,
Equipment was designed at the top. Or- because it was born in response to ad- incumbent on all of us to think about
ganizations were developed at the top. vances in mechanization, firepower, the future and to offer suggestions on
All this has changed now. Our soldiers and communication. As our yellow, how to improve the mounted force.
and civilian employees are the best blue, and red insignia suggests, the Ar-
quality we have ever had. We must use mor Force was created from the combi-
their input — from the ground up — to nation of tanks, infantry, and artillery ON THE WAY!
Since Fiscal Year 1990, we have seen a soldier’s promotion possibilities. sibilities. Accomplish the mission, but
a 32 percent drawdown in the Armor Good soldiers must be given the oppor- not at the expense of a soldier’s career.
enlisted force, from 26,112 to 17,742. tunity to compete for such prestigious The Armor Enlisted Professional De-
As we continue to downsize, the re- awards as the Soldier of the
sponsibility of leaders, to our missions Month/Year, Sergeant Morales and velopment Guide provides the com-
mander with 12 rules for Armor NCO
and our soldiers, will require us to Audie Murphy Clubs, and the Excel- professional development. The first
make sure we properly utilize the sol- lence in Armor program (EIA). En-
diers under our control. courage soldiers to take varied assign- rule is “Work your soldiers in their Pri-
mary MOS.” By keeping this rule in
The first leader involved in this area, ments, such as drill sergeant, recruiter, mind, we will properly utilize assigned
AC/RC duty, and instructor, just to
the unit command sergeant major, must name a few. Commanders must also be soldiers.
actively manage enlisted personnel as- aware of the damage they can cause
signments within his unit. By thor- The guide also tells the soldier what
oughly screening records and being in when they keep soldiers in key, non- he must do to meet minimal standards
leadership positions within their organi- of branch qualification in each grade,
tune with the needs and missions of the zation. and how to become eligible for the
unit, he can place soldiers in the best
positions, both for their careers and the next higher grade. The soldier must
The master gunner position is a good also play a key role in his own career
good of the unit. However, the CSM is example. This is a critical position that development. If he is misassigned, he
not alone in this assignment process.
must be staffed by soldiers who are must inform the chain of command that
Commanders and first sergeants must highly motivated, extremely competent, the present assignment is not advanta-
track their personnel by MOS, assign- and show the potential for advance- geous to his career. If he is in an un-
ing them to the proper paragraph and ment; in short, a soldier who is a cut authorized or invalid position, he must
line number within the unit. All mem- above the rest. But leaving a soldier in take the appropriate steps to be re-
bers of the chain of command must in- that position too long, and not giving leased and reassigned to a unit author-
form their soldiers about staying on a him the chance to be a platoon ser- ized his MOS and grade. The soldier
good career track (See CMF 19 Career geant, will not only stagnate the sol- must pay close attention to Item 35 on
Development Model) and its impact on dier, but also hinder his promotion pos- his DA Form 2-1 and the job title on
the NCOER. Additionally, the
job that he is doing must match
THE CENTER
CMF 19 CAREER DEVELOPMENT MODEL with the paragraph and line
number on the DA Form 2A.
RANK
SKILL LEVEL
PVT PFC SPC/CPL
SKILL LEVEL 10
SGT
SKILL LEVEL 20
SSG
SKILL LEVEL 30
SFC
SKILL LEVEL 40
MSG/1SG
SKILL LEVEL 50
SGM/CSM The bottom line: the soldier
must seek out and excel in hard
INSTITUTIONAL LEADER DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTIONAL OSUT PLDC BNCOC ANCOC RECOMMEND SERGEANTS
jobs to further his career.
TRAINING BATTLE STAFF NCO MAJOR COURSE
AND/OR 1SG COURSE Generally, the Armor commu-
OPERATIONAL LEADER DEVELOPMENT nity is doing a fine job utilizing
DUTY
ASSIGNMENT
RECRUITER/RETENTION/DRILL SERGEANT/INSTRUCTOR
OPS/INTEL SERGEANT
Armor soldiers. As the Army
MOS 19D LOADER/DVR GUNNER TANK COMMANDER
PLATOON SGT FIRST SERGEANT
continues to downsize, it is our
MOS 19K SCOUT/DVR GUNNER/SQUAD LDR SQUAD/SECTION LDR
responsibility as leaders to en-
LEADER SELF-DEVELOPMENT sure our soldiers receive the
PRIOR TO PLDC PRIOR TO BNCOC PRIOR TO ANCOC PRIOR TO USASMA
RECOMMENDED
NCOES RELATED 1. ENGLISH COMP 1. COMMUN SKILLS 1. PRINCIPLES OF MGT 1. RESEARCH TECH (STATS)
training and leadership positions
COURSES 2. BASIC MATH
3. COMPUTER LIT
2. PERSONNEL SUPV
3. BEHAV SCIENCE
2. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV
3. INFO MGT SYSTEMS
2. HUMAN RESOURCE MGT necessary for career advance-
RECOMMENDED
4. STRESS MGT 4. TECHNICAL WRITING
ment. We must continue to chal-
10 10 10 10 12
READING STD
ACHIEVE ARMY WRITING STANDARD
lenge our soldiers, properly util-
ize them within our units, and
SKILL LEVEL 10 SKILL LEVEL 20 SKILL LEVEL 30 SKILL LEVEL 40 SKILL LEVEL 50
New Smart Top Attack Weapons and the STAWs’ down-looking seekers
(STAWs) are rapidly emerging from overcome attempts at camouflage. Be-
the research world and entering the bat- cause of the small, portable nature of
tlefield, exposing our soldiers to a new many STAW systems, they can be em-
threat. We need to develop doctrine, ployed relatively covertly, do not at-
tactics, and a training program to tell tract patrolling aircraft, and cannot be
our soldiers how they can reduce their easily seen by long range electronic
vulnerability to this new family of anti- sensor systems. Thus, STAWs offer
tank weapons. Third World nations a 21st century an-
titank system that is possibly more ef-
The performance of the first-genera- fective than the easily obtained, ex-So-
tion STAWs is so impressive ---- and viet main battle tanks in the antiarmor
the advances in STAW supporting sen- role.
sor and computational technology so
rapid ---- that we must act now to de- Recent advances in the development
velop a doctrine which addresses this of STAWs have resulted in their field-
threat. To delay would virtually ensure ing to (at least) two foreign armies.
that American soldiers will face STAW More than 50 non-U.S. STAW systems Development, and Engineering Center
systems without the training and are known to be under development. (ARDEC), and the Army Materiel
knowledge necessary to operate effec- Additionally, several successful STAW Command, Smart Weapons Manage-
tively in the STAW environment. systems, in manufacture by foreign- ment Office (AMC-SWMO). Two
owned aerospace and defense firms, weapons were purchased: the British-
Emerging STAWs are highly mobile, are ‘‘for sale’’ on the open arms market. manufactured MERLIN millimeter
deployable from a variety of platforms, One Asian country is in the process of wave-guided 81mm mortar, and the
deadly when striking intended targets, producing a low-cost STAW weapon Swedish STRIX 120mm infrared-
and are in the hands of potential enemy specifically developed for world-wide guided mortar. These two weapon sys-
forces today. They are almost always sales. One analyst stated that ‘‘...We tems were matched against M60 target
fired from extremely long ranges, or should expect to see at least 20 STAW tanks to examine their performance
from sites which cannot be targeted systems in the field within the next five against moving and stationary armored
with direct-fire weapons. They search years.’’ So, it is virtually certain that vehicles. A total of nine STAWs were
for armored targets from an optimum U.S. and Allied forces will encounter fired under a variety of environmental
vantage point high above the battle- STAW systems on the battlefield. conditions. Of these, five found their
field, capitalize upon a range of mod- intended targets and either damaged or
ern seeker types (visible, millimeter In the winter of 1993, a STAW For- destroyed them.
wave radar, infrared, acoustic, and la- eign Military Evaluation program was
ser) to find targets, and conduct undertaken by the Foreign Intelligence, While both weapon types managed to
autonomous maneuver to attack the Science and Technology (FSTC) Labo- hit targets, the infrared 120mm mortar
relatively thin top armor surfaces of ratory, the Army Armament Research, was especially effective. Its thermal-en-
our vehicles, thus increasing their ef-
fectiveness.
It is in this environment of a rapidly
emerging threat ---- probably more
deadly than any of the antitank guided
missile systems fielded in the past two
decades ---- that triggers this call for an-
other look at our doctrine, tactics, and
training.
STAWs are attractive to Third World
nations who do not have the financial
resources or political advocacy to pro-
cure advanced armored systems. The
STAW offers an effective defense
against modern armor at a bargain
price. Top attack sidesteps the protec- Typical IR signature of
tion value of the best modern armor, armor as seen from
which is oriented toward defending the the STAW’s vantage.
60-degree frontal arc of the vehicle,
As a result of the Russian Army’s reminiscent of the BDD ‘Horse Shoe’ existing ones scheduled for rebuilds, is
mauling at the hands of the Chechen armor. They provide a 110-degree arc expected to double the tanks’ surviv-
rebels — particularly the disastrous as- of protection, centered on the gun tube ability during assaults and reduce
sault on Grozny on 31 December 1994, (Russian reactive armor kits weigh the losses from 1.5 to 1.7 times.
the Kremlin made a shocking admis- same as an active kit, but only cover a
Arena-fitted tanks are not supposed to
sion of shortcomings at a televised sci- 35-40 degree arc). The system has 22 create electromagnetic interference
entific-technical conference at Kubinka to 26 rounds, depending upon the type
on 20 February 1995. of tank, which are mounted so that they while working with other tanks. The
manufacturers also claim that the sys-
Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ad- provide overlapping ‘fields of fire.’ Un- tem is extremely immune to ECM.
like reactive armor, an expended round
mitted that unnecessary casualties were will not leave a hole in the defensive Support for the system has also been
sustained due to the T-80Y’s vulner- curtain.
abilities: short range, flammable fuel addressed by the manufacturer. Subsys-
and ammunition stowage, thin upper The silos are armored against splin- tems are modular and can be pulled for
fast replacement. Test and control
surface armor. ters and bullets to prevent accidental equipment is mounted on a cross-coun-
detonation of the rounds. The whole 27
Bitten by their own RPGs, the Rus- V system weighs 1,000-1,100 kg and try capable truck, for forward mainte-
sians have developed a defensive coun- nance.
termeasure that solves some of the consumes 1 kW of power.
Like the T-90, this system may not be
technological problems addressed at The description of the system in use fielded in substantial numbers with
Kubinka.
sounds fairly simple. Prior to entering a Russian forces for some time, due to
The Arena Active Protection System, hostile area, the TC turns the system budgetary constraints.
developed at the Kolomna-based Engi- on. Arena automatically tracks incom-
neering Design Bureau, is designed to ing rounds, ignoring incoming rounds
provide protection from antitank gre- until they’re within 50m, then engaging
nades and ATGMs, including those anything approaching at speeds of 70- References:
with top-attack warheads. Arena is 700 m/s. False targets, such as outgo- “ARENA: Active Protection System For
foreseen as useful, both on battlefields ing rounds, near misses, birds, small Tanks,” V. Kashin, Military Parade, May-June
where the latest generation of 3-8 km projectiles (like bullets or splinters) 1996, pp. 32-35.
ATGMs prevail and during peacekeep- would be ignored.
ing operations and LICs, where the When fired, the round detonates the
greatest threats are from light antitank
weapons. warhead at a stand-off distance of a
few meters, so that the double-charge
Arena includes three major subassem- ATGM warheads designed to defeat re-
blies. Inside the turret, and taking up active armor are rendered impotent.
about 30m3, is the target detection and Time to detect and destroy a threat is First Lieutenant Adam Geibel
tracking equipment (computer, TC’s .07 sec, with .2 to .4 sec for the system is a tank platoon leader with
control panel, command signals con- to reset. The danger zone for accompa- 5/117th Cav, 42d ID, NJARNG.
vertor unit). nying infantry is 20-30m. He is also the Assistant Editor
of Journal of Military Ordnance
The radar itself is fitted to a If necessary, the TC can manually
‘Kladivo’-style folding radar mast, override and fire the system. The num- and a journalism graduate stu-
mounted on the centerline at the rear of ber of remaining rounds are displayed dent at Temple University. His
the turret roof. The octagonal radar on the TC’s control panel. The rounds last contribution to ARMOR
panel assembly is fairly large, approxi- are rectangular and reloadable by the was a chronicle of the Che-
mately 1.5m3. crew. chen Revolution (January-Feb-
Launchers, which the makers call ‘si- The Arena system, which can be fit- ruary 1995).
los,’ are mounted around the turret, ted to new production tanks as well as
As the U.S. Army rapidly transforms neity and depth will be based on the the battlespace and facilitate move-
itself into the decisive force of the 21st success of cavalry operations. Cavalry ment of the striking force.
century, the requirement for specially provides a critical maneuver capability
organized, trained, and equipped cav- to larger forces conducting deep and si- • Tactical commanders will require
alry forces must be re-evaluated and multaneous attacks. To rapidly defeat accurate, manned, real-time infor-
stated. While some suggest that cavalry the enemy, commanders will employ mation that can be gained in all
forces are no longer needed in an era cavalry to set favorable conditions for weather, terrain, and varying de-
of electronic sensors and battlefield in- maneuver by gathering information and grees of enemy threat to supple-
formation technologies, our Force XXI shaping the battle space. In this con- ment and verify information gained
developmental efforts to date indicate text, maneuver is used to attack the en- by other sources.
the opposite — a dedicated, specialized emy’s vulnerabilities, such as flanks, • Tactical units will be required to
cavalry force, enabled by new systems, rear, lines of communication, logistics, fight for information and expand
is paramount to fighting and operating and combat support capabilities. Tacti- the battlespace in space, time, and
within this new strategic environment. cal commanders in the future will need purpose without the expenditure of
This article lays the foundation for the an unprecedented, high degree of situ- combat power from the decisive
continued evolution of cavalry as the ational awareness to protect their forces force.
“eyes and ears” of the combined arms and successfully maneuver. This aware-
team. ness is acquired by reducing uncertain-
ties on the battlefield through aggres- Future Battlefield Requirements
sive security and reconnaissance opera-
tions by digitally equipped cavalry Success in Force XXl operations will
A Fundamental Role require unique capabilities which only
units.
cavalry units possess and can employ
As a start point, the role of cavalry for the decisive force commander. With
needs to be restated, given the new op- digital systems, cavalry units will pro-
erational conditions within which we Information Age Warfare: vide information with unprecedented
will fight in the 21st century. We be- Key Assumptions levels of timeliness, accuracy, and re-
lieve that the importance of cavalry op- dundancy. Cavalry’s ability to provide
erations to provide security and con- The Armor Center, in concert with confirmation for other information sen-
duct reconnaissance in Force XXI will our TRADOC partners and the Experi- sors, as well as to provide security for
dramatically increase. Cavalry is mental Force (EXFOR), have per- the decisive force, allows cavalry
uniquely capable of providing the deci- formed extensive work to define future forces to fulfill vital battlefield require-
sive force commander the assured operating conditions and concepts for ments for the commander.
means to gain information, secure the Force XXI and beyond. From this ef-
force, and control battlefield tempo fort, key assumptions relevant to the Provide Time and Space to Regu-
necessary to concentrate overwhelming role of Cavalry in Force XXI have late Tempo. Tactical commanders will
combat power against the enemy at de- emerged that shape our thinking: think and plan in terms of battlespace.
cisive times and places. Cavalry units will operate to continu-
• Reconnaissance and security tasks ally expand the battlespace, which in
As an enabling capability of the require specialized organizations, turn provides more time and space for
Army’s new capstone doctrine on in- equipment, and training. the commander to assess the situation,
formation operations (FM 100-6), cav- determine courses of action, and take
alry forces will be tasked to signifi- • Battlefield information collection action. Security operations will delay
cantly enhance the decisive force com- and force protection are assured ca-
pabilities that tactical commanders enemy movements and deny or deceive
mander’s ability to set conditions for force information to the enemy, ensur-
success. must possess organic to their force.
ing reaction time for any necessary fol-
The ability for the combined arms • Tactical commanders require inde- low-up actions. Further, cavalry pos-
force of Force XXI to achieve simulta- pendent maneuver forces to shape sesses the lethality to destroy enemy
ously. Cavalry can identify the enemy’s broad precepts that guide our future or- ditions desired by the decisive force
capabilities and intentions in real-time ganizational and materiel develop- commander. These characteristics are
by observing enemy reactions to ments. some of the design principles for guid-
friendly contact. Only an armed ma- ing the development of cavalry units
Cavalry or reconnaissance forces
neuver unit can delay a force and make must be organic to all major warfight- for the future.
it show intent. Cavalry will operate to
deceive the enemy as to the decisive ing echelons, from battalion to corps Conclusion
force’s intentions. — and must be organized as combined
arms teams. Cavalry units exponen- While much work remains to be per-
Decisive Operations. Cavalry’s main tially increase the effectiveness of their formed, it is clear that cavalry is an es-
function is to support the maneuver of parent organization. sential warfighting capability for Force
the decisive force. It accomplishes this XXI. New operational conditions
by controlling the tempo of operations Further, they must maneuver faster caused by non-contiguous operations,
— by destroying enemy information or than the decisive force they support. new warfighting doctrine, new techni-
This mobility differential is gained by cal capabilities, and diverse threats in-
security forces and allowing the deci- the synergistic effects of air and ground crease the value of cavalry. The sol-
sive force to attack the enemy unhin-
dered. Cavalry is uniquely capable of cavalry units working together. diers and leaders of cavalry units will
performing real-time battle damage as- operate in the face of the enemy to
Future cavalry units must also have gain information, shape the battlespace,
sessment that allows the decisive force greater operational endurance than the
commander to re-orient combat power secure friendly forces, and set condi-
decisive force. Organized as self-con- tions for decisive maneuver throughout
to finish the fight or exploit battlefield tained units possessing organic combat
opportunities. Cavalry must also locate the depth of the battlefield. Armed with
support and logistics, cavalry units the best equipment in the world,
and maintain contact with the enemy; must be capable of operating for 72 to trained to fight, and led by aggressive,
as the decisive force attacks in depth 96 hours without external support.
simultaneously, enemy forces will relo- competent leaders, cavalry will con-
cate to meet friendly forces. Cavalry Lastly, cavalry units must be capable tinue its long tradition of leading
provides the commander with real-time of performing multiple missions in a si- America’s Army into battle well into
information on changing enemy dispo- multaneous fashion in order to set con- the 21st Century.
sitions. Cavalry can also secure critical
friendly assets, such as logistical units,
command and control nodes, and intel-
ligence facilities. Additionally, cavalry
can operate independently of the deci-
sive force to perform economy-of-force Fort Knox Cavalry Branch Will Host
operations that allow the commander to
allocate more relative combat power at
Reconnaissance Symposium in October
critical and decisive points.
Fort Knox Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development (Cavalry
Sustain and Transition to Future Branch) is hosting a Reconnaissance Symposium from 28-31 October 1996.
Operations. Cavalry provides security The focus of the symposium is on the planning and execution of reconnais-
so the decisive force can transition be- sance operations at the tactical level. The purpose of the symposium is to
tween missions and reorganize for fu- assemble all organizations in one location and discuss issues pertinent to
ture operations unhindered by enemy reconnaissance operations and to provide recommendations in accordance
forces. It can survey and secure lines of to those issues. The tentative schedule is as follows:
communications and sustainment areas Day One - In Processing (Gaffey Hall) and No Host Social (Brick Mess)
while the decisive force conducts re-
supply. During post-conflict operations, Day Two - Large Group Seminar (Gaffey Hall)
cavalry units are ideally suited to per-
form activities such as separating Day Three - Small Group Discussion (Boudinot Hall)
forces and controlling buffer zones im-
Day Four - Small Group Presentations (Gaffey Hall)
mediately upon cessation of hostilities.
All TRADOC installations will be invited to participate as well as repre-
Organizing the Cavalry Force sentatives from active duty and reserve component divisions and regiments.
Fort Knox needs participation from outstanding professionals from the field
For Force XXI and various organizations in order to have a successful and productive sym-
posium.
Clearly, for Cavalry to fulfill the roles
and missions described in this opera- Information regarding the symposium can be obtained on the internet via
tional concept will require change the Cavalry Branch Web site at http://www.awwg.org/~dave/cavdiv.htm. The
through modernization of current or- Fort Knox point of contact is CPT Vic Harris, DSN 464-3154/5576 or com-
ganizations and equipment. To support mercial (502) 624-3154/5576. PROFS: CAVBRANC@knox-emh1.army.mil.
our efforts, we have established some
HAMMELBURG RAID
Several years ago, I read with great and proceeded to call the authors and was too late to plan one. It seemed
enthusiasm RAID, a book by Richard some of the key participants regarding ironic since the original mission was
Baron, Abraham Baum, and Richard a 50th reunion in Hammelburg, Ger- planned in less than 24 hours! Baron
Goldhurst. It is a true story about a many. In a later telephone call, MAJ was awarded the Bronze Star for his
WWII U.S. Army raid 40-plus miles Abe Baum, the leader of the raid, was efforts during the escape.
behind German lines, covering the dis- delighted to hear that he had not been
tance from Aschaffenburg to Hammel- forgotten and wished he had been noti- T/SGT Charles O. Graham, who led
the antitank platoon, also did not wish
burg. This raid was conceived and or- fied earlier so he could have planned to to participate, even if there was a reun-
dered by GEN George S. Patton Jr., attend. There were no funds provided
then commanding the U.S. 3rd Army. by the military for this purpose. ion. He was awarded five Silver Stars
and two Bronze Stars during his Army
Although the reason for this raid was MAJ Baum sent me a list of 29 offi- career. LT Nutto, who commanded a
concealed from the task force and its cers and men who received the Silver platoon of tanks, also elected not to
commander until H-hour, it was an at- Star for this action, and I would guess participate.
tempt to liberate some 1,200 U.S. that there were five times as many
Army POWs, one of whom was LTC Bronze Stars awarded, in addition to By March 26, 1945, units of Patton’s
John Waters, General Patton’s son-in- probably 150-200 Purple Hearts to 3rd Army, in particular the 4th Ar-
law. those wounded and killed in action. mored Division, arrived near Schwein-
When the raid failed, speculation Baum got three. heim after four days of hard fighting
inside Nazi Germany. They paused in
about LTC Waters’ relationship to the Baum also was personally awarded the hills overlooking the German-held
army commander entered into criti- the Distinguished Service Cross by towns of Aschaffenberg and Schwein-
cisms that the operation was ill-timed, GEN Patton himself. His certification
poorly planned, undermanned, and reads: “For the brilliant leadership he heim. This was to be the opening scene
of Patton’s biggest military blunder.
doomed to failure from the beginning. displayed while in command of Task
Force Baum. The mission of this task
It was not until the operation by force had led them far behind enemy Patton ordered the raid after having
“Task Force Baum” had begun, that been ordered to the north by GEN
CPT Abraham Baum, leading the raid, lines with only a small force. The dar- Omar Bradley. He knew that his son-
ing of this movement threw the enemy
learned from MAJ Stiller, GEN Pat- into a panic, believing that all this terri- in-law, LTC John Waters, was being
ton’s aide, that LTC Waters was be- held approximately 70 kilometers to
lieved to be in the camp and that he tory was being overrun by our troops. the east, in Oflag XIIIB, a prisoner of
Communications were disrupted and
was GEN Patton’s son-in-law. At this large enemy forces were needlessly war camp for officers overlooking the
point, CPT Baum wondered if his mis- old Frankish town of Hammelburg.
sion had any chance of success. shifted from more important strong- LTC Waters had been captured by ele-
points, facilitating a later drive by an-
The task force included 300 men and other combat command of this division ments of GEN Erwin Rommel’s Afrika
Korps during the battle for the Kasser-
53 vehicles, including tanks, tank de- through Hanau and to Hernfeld.” ine Pass two years earlier. Military in-
stroyers, and halftracks. telligence had been tracking his intern-
I spoke with the book’s co-author,
I thought that it would be good to MAJ Richard Baron, via telephone, ment and had informed Patton that he
commemorate the 50th anniversary of and he informed me that as far as he was in the Hammelburg lager, a few
this famous 4th Armored Division raid, knew there would be no reunion, as it miles east of Frankfurt.
“It’s against anyone’s nature to rush fort. These were: priority of fires, nuclear age a leader should not, indeed
headlong into gunfire. But, for the com- placement of the reserve, and the pres- could not, be heroic — especially at
mander, it’s pride that pushes him. And ence of the commander. The advance the national level. This was unquestion-
for his men, it’s the sight of the com- of technology has made this practice ably true when the threat of mutually
mander in front of them. At such mo- less and less likely, the higher in the assured destruction hung over the
ments you cannot hesitate.” chain of command an officer goes. planet. But the extension of this con-
Conceivably, we will end up like the clusion into the tactical and operational
(CPT Francois Lecointre, French platoon leader in the movie Aliens, realm is incorrect. Keegan also points
Army in NYT Times Fax, p. 2, June 6,
1995) where the lieutenant stayed in the land- out the imperatives of command that
ing craft to be in a position to over- defined leadership in the past: kinship
The history of the profession of arms watch his platoon’s monitors. with common soldiers, sanction of re-
is filled with the exploits of leaders wards and punishments according to
Rapidly advancing command and
who led from the front. Young Lieuten- control technology is forcing com- common values, leadership by exam-
ant Rommel led the bulk of the Würt- ple, prescription of risk-taking to sub-
temburg Mountain Battalion in the sei- manders at nearly every level to remain ordinates, and direct action in putting
in the command post to be near the
zure of Mount Matajur during the Ital- monitors that give them the situational these principles into effect (p. 343ff,
ian campaigns of World War I. He The Mask of Command). These impera-
wrote of these feats of arms in Infantry awareness to “see” the entire battle and tives still have a place in the military
remain in contact with higher head-
Attacks. He inspired his soldiers by quarters. Indeed, we have found a Na- art, and we cannot let technology
placing himself at the decisive point of eliminate these imperatives of com-
action and led from the front. poleonic “hill” from which to see the mand.
entire field. Yet this capability removes
Guderian, when serving as a corps a key morale factor from the fight, the Keegan also briefly touched on the
commander in the Battle for France in
1940, led his corps from the front. presence of the commander. velocity of events, both in their report-
ing and response. We have seen many
When Guderian’s lead infantry regi- examples of this in the past five years,
ments were crossing the Meuse under
French fire, he was at this decisive The recent experience of 3d Squad- from Kuwait to Haiti. The need for in-
ron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment in formation is such that, for example,
point to better direct the actions of all Haiti is a prime example. During its everywhere the XVIII Airborne Corps
other arms and fires in support of the main headquarters goes, CNN follows,
crossing effort. Lieutenant Colonel deployment, the squadron was outfitted
Creighton Abrams led his battalion with cameras that mounted on the bar- both within the headquarters as a
rels of the scouts’ rifles. These cameras means of receiving information, and
from the front throughout World War connected to the squadron tactical op- outside as reporters. The world of op-
II. General Patton led from the front as
a brigade commander in World War I erations center through the radio, erations other than war (OOTW) places
thence to the Pentagon. The Army Staff the rings of strategic, operational, and
and as an army commander in World can now watch squad fights from the tactical arenas within each other, as op-
War II. He directed efforts on the
beachhead at Gela, Sicily, during Op- ultimate in foxholes. This experiment posed to the traditional concept of
in technology raises the specter of merely overlapping. The pace of events
eration Husky, and was present when Moltke the Elder, sitting in his railroad demands that a leader remain abreast of
the Hermann Goering division counter-
attacked the beachhead. car, sending telegraph messages to his events on the world stage.
far-flung armies during the battle of
The trait these great leaders shared Koeniggratz. Moltke never saw the bat- There are times when the proper
place for the commander IS in the
was leading from the front, as a visible tlefield, rather remaining aloof from the headquarters. Here, he can detach him-
example to the soldiers they led into fight and sending and receiving reports.
battle. What is wrong with this picture? self from the mundane and think. There
are also times, even in the world of op-
The Armor School, during the Armor John Keegan wrote of “post-heroic” erations other than war, when the place
Officer Basic Course (in 1977), taught leadership in his work, The Mask of for the commander is at the decisive
three means of reinforcing the main ef- Command. His conclusion: that in the point or the point of danger. The com-
mander and his staff must retain the higher headquarters and on specific sions based upon the best information
bond with the soldiers who daily take platforms such as the USS Mount Whit- available. Call it coup d’oeil, finger-
the risk of executing the orders of the ney. While this appears to be a reason- spitzengefuehl, or situational aware-
higher commander. Kinship is still a able compromise, it does remove an ness, but the commander requires tech-
valid imperative. As Keegan wrote, option from the commander’s range of nology that gives him the freedom to
“Those who impose risk must be seen decisions. The commander CANNOT go to the decisive point and retain the
to share it...” (p. 329, The Mask of decide that he will accompany the in- advantages of the technological “Napo-
Command). Our technology for com- itial assault, even if that is the right de- leonic hill.”
mand and control increasingly puts the cision. This concentration of technol- The changing world is unpredictable.
means of control in the headquarters. ogy makes the apparent risk of the
commander at the decisive point The changes in vital national interests,
Consider the following hypothetical greater; he may not be in communica- as well as the increasing frequency of
scenario: An Army corps is selected as OOTW-type operations, will increase
the nucleus for a JTF, which will plan tion with the command and control the demands on our entire force. The
means necessary to direct a far-flung
and lead a forcible entry of an island task force. This is a mistake. nature of the combined arms team will
nation. When the corps commander change, although the concept remains
takes the first briefing on the operation, We must give the commander the the same: the effects of all arms under
his planners recommend that he com- freedom to go to the point of action, the command of one commander, sup-
mand from the USS Mount Whitney, while retaining contact with the means ported by one staff.
where he’ll be able to control the entire of control and the situational awareness
The constant in this changing world,
JTF fight, while maintaining contact afforded by the electronic “high even in the era of “post-heroic” war-
with the regional commander-in-chief ground.” Doctrine remains the engine
(CINC). Stating that a visit to the front of change. FM 100-5, Operations, re- fare, is the commander. As General
Patton said, “Staff systems and me-
is worth one thousand reports, the tains the essence of military leadership chanical communications are valuable,
corps commander states he will take a by stressing the art of command and
small assault headquarters in with the the science of control. Commanders but above and beyond them must be
the commander; not as a disembodied
later assault echelons of the forcible command, staffs control. The thrust of brain linked to his men by lines of wire
entry. When this intention becomes our drive for technology, especially in
known, the CINC worries that he will the area of information management, and waves of ether, but as a living
not be able to talk to the corps/JTF must afford us this means. Technology presence, an all-pervading, visible per-
sonality. The unleavened bread of
commander while in transit. As the must allow the JTF commander the ca- knowledge will sustain life, but it is
planning proceeds, it becomes apparent pability to lead at the decisive point —
that the commander of the JTF needs whether the mission is a parachute as- dull fare unless seasoned by the yeast
of personality” (p. 56, Leadership,
to be in a position to respond to the sault, amphibious raid, or maritime in- Cavalry & Armor Heritage series).
CINC and national leaders, the media, terdiction operation — while simulta-
and the requirements of the battlefield, neously controlling the entire JTF fight.
simultaneously and in real time. The The emerging new world order (or
USS Mount Whitney provides such a
medium, allowing the commander ac- disorder, as it appears) brings with it
new missions for the armed forces. The Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C.M.
cess to the electronic high ground and
the ability to visit the front.
missions themselves are strange, and Benson is the executive officer
some are even distasteful. The require- of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regi-
The command ship provides security ments range from winning a “Desert ment. He has served in armor
and no drain on shore facilities, which Storm” type war to UN operations in battalions and cavalry squad-
are at a premium during the initial Haiti and Macedonia. The definition of rons in the U.S. and Europe. He
phases of the operation. The availabil- the vital national interest of the United
ity of a U.S. Navy helicopter allows the States will undoubtedly change as the also served on the staff of XVIII
CJTF to quickly speed to the decisive new powers within the world jockey Airborne Corps. Most recently
point when necessary. Indeed, the heli- for position. We may even face the de- he served as the Chief of Staff,
copter in this operation becomes the mise of the influence of the nation- U.S. Forces Haiti. He has been
commander’s “horse” carrying him to state, as Martin van Creveld spoke of published in Military Review,
and from the place on the field requir- in The Transformation of War. Never- ARMOR, Infantry, and Special
ing his presence. The technology to en- theless, the requirements of the com- Operations magazines.
sure instant voice and video communi- mander will remain the same: lead by
cation contact is currently available at example, share danger, and take deci-
Based on my experiences in Panama eight surviving the drop. As the Sheri- This barrier was well made, with cars
as the commander of Company C, 3rd dans were readied for combat and wired together and what appeared to be
Battalion (Airborne), 73rd Armored crewed, they formed the nucleus of the propane tanks inside. Quickly analyz-
Regiment, I would like to highlight the brigade’s firepower. Initial missions ing the situation, we decided against
versatility of the M551A1 Sheridan were to deter counterattack and support the normal obstacle drill and opted to
light tank. Its 152mm main gun, and its the infantry’s simultaneous assault on clear the roadblock with a 152mm heat
.50 caliber and coax machine guns, four D-day objectives. round instead. The TC identified the
coupled with the modified M60A3 tank middle red car, and the gunner engaged
thermal sight (TTS) — arguably the Striking the D-day Targets the target. We had to wait a few min-
best tank-mounted thermal sight in the Forcing Roadblocks utes for the fire to subside, and smoke
force — produce an awesome amount to clear, then a Sheridan moved for-
of firepower, while its armor affords Our first encounter with the Panama- ward, pushing its way through the
the crew a moderate level of protec- nian Defense Force (PDF) occurred as wreckage. There was no enemy re-
tion. Because of the vehicle’s compact the infantrymen of 1st Battalion, 504 sponse to our obstacle reduction, even
design, light weight, parachute deploy- Parachute Infantry Regiment, were es- though we were exposed for over five
ability, and modest support require- tablishing a supply route from Tocu- minutes. Maybe they had heard about
ments, Sheridans deploy and maneuver men International Airport to their initial their buddies guarding the other road-
where other heavier vehicles would objective of Tinajitas. The convoy had block?
bog down or be restricted. In short, the only moved a few kilometers when it
Sheridan remains the only armored, di- stopped to clear a roadblock located on
rect-fire weapon that can accompany a bridge. As the Sheridans moved to Urban Fighting at the Comandancia
the Airborne Infantry, beginning on the the edge of the highway to support the
drop zone at P-hour. infantry, SSG Troxell, the lead tank At about the same time, fighting in
and around La Comandancia was heat-
commander, called me on the radio and ing up. The remaining PDF defenders
stated, “This is a hell of a place for an
Strategic Forcible Entry obstacle, buildings all around and no were going to stay and fight, so U.S.
forces were preparing to go in after
On two separate occasions during the cover. It looks like swamps on both them. The 3rd Platoon leader, LT
sides of the road.” As the infantry dis-
Panama operation, the Sheridan dem- mounted and began to execute their ob- Kozar, knew from the radio traffic that
onstrated its ability to strategically de- fighting on the south wall of the Co-
ploy. The first involved secretly air- stacle drill, they began receiving auto- mandancia was intense. He was not
matic weapons fire from the buildings
landing one platoon of four Sheridans, no more than 50 meters away. The lead surprised to be ordered to move there
two pallets of ammunition, two with a tank section and assist in the
HMMWVs, a trailer, and 25 personnel tank commander opened up with .50 evacuation of wounded personnel.
caliber fire as the wing tank com-
on a single C5 Galaxy transport into mander screamed to his gunner to iden- What did surprise him when he turned
Howard AFB, Panama. Once on the tify the threat. A moment later, SFC the corner was to see a burning M113
ground, four HETs quickly moved to and PDF soldiers using the Comandan-
the rear of the aircraft, and the Sheri- Freeman, 1st Platoon sergeant, yelled, cia’s 10-foot-high wall as cover, shoot-
“I got ’em, concrete building, second
dans were off-loaded, covered, and floor, fourth window from the right.” ing in all directions. LT Kozar ordered
moving out the front gate, on their way his gunner to, “take the wall out,” and
to their hide position — all before day- He fired a 152mm heat round at the with one round make a hole large
target, ripping through the room, col-
light. The second and larger deploy- lapsing the right side of the building. enough to drive his tank into the build-
ment of ten Sheridans attached to 1st ing’s courtyard. As the Sheridan
Brigade, 82d Airborne Division con- The enemy fire stopped and the infan- climbed what was left of the wall and
try finished clearing the roadblock.
ducted history’s first combat heavy began to enter, a bus attempting to
drop of armored vehicles from six C- Later that day, along the same route, block its advance was halted by the
141 aircraft, into enemy territory, with we encountered another roadblock. 152mm battlecarry HEAT round. With
enemy fire subdued, LT Kozar backed The rules of engagement specified Uniquely Suited to
his tank out, and the wounded were that we identify a PDF soldier with a Armor-Infantry Close Battles
evacuated without incident. weapon or a combatant about to com-
mit a hostile act before we could en- While the M551A1 General Sheridan
gage; hence, most of our engagements has served the Army longer than any
APERS Engagements were directed at stationary targets at a mount since the horse, it remains a le-
range of 50-400 meters. Only once did thal and versatile weapon system. De-
The next day, LT Jennings, 2d Pla-
toon leader, and his wingman moved we engage a moving target which oc- spite its age, Sheridan OR rates remain
curred immediately after shooting two in the high 90s. Its unique ability to be
slowly through the jungle and over a delivered by parachute during the cru-
light bridge guided by an infantry
squad from 4th Battalion, 325 Airborne cial airborne assault phase of a forced
“During this assault, enemy entry operation provides planners enor-
Infantry Regiment. The battalion was personnel were identified mov- mous flexibility — and the commander
preparing to assault the PDF’s Ranger, ing along this road, and the
Airborne, and Air Assault training base. on the ground an enormous advantage.
Sheridan responded by firing a In contingency operations where
LT Jennings was tasked to support by flechette round. METT-T often will not require a sys-
fire.
No enemy personnel at- tem capable of defeating massed for-
When the order was given to assault, tempted to counterattack down mations of state-of-the-art main battle
the infantry commander used the Sheri- that route.” tanks, where airframes are always
dan’s rear deck telephone to lift and scarce, and where the in-country road
shift the tank’s fire, helping to prevent net frequently limits the utility of our
fratricide. The wingman overwatched a rounds into a building and the infantry near 70-ton MBT, the M551A1 Sheri-
road that was obscured by dense forest, moved forward to sort out the EPWs. dans of the Army’s parachute tank bat-
which the AC-130 (SPECTRE) could The tanks were in the process of repo- talion continue to offer the commander
not cover. During this assault, enemy sitioning when, from around the build- the decisive edge.
personnel were identified moving along ing, came a yellow Toyota Corolla car-
this road, and the Sheridan responded rying PDF members attempting to es-
by firing a flechette round. cape. SGT Pennington, the tank’s gun-
ner, identified, fired, and hit the car be- Major Frank Sherman is the
No enemy personnel attempted to fore it could enter the highway...at a operations officer of 3/73 Armor,
counterattack down that route. range of 100 meters. Fort Bragg, N.C.
The Six-Bradley
Scout Platoon
In Bosnia
by First Lieutenant Frank Lozano
This article is the third to appear in the last three issues Bradleys at a Bosnia checkpoint.
discussing mobility in Bosnia. - Ed.
The three-Bradley scout section lodgment area security, and checkpoint scout platoon more able to conduct
moves through the narrow back roads operations. these missions, unlike the tank platoon,
connecting the many Bosnian villages which is unable to provide both suffi-
that line the Zone of Separation (ZOS). Mounted Patrols cient dismounted security and the abil-
It is mid-afternoon, and the mounted ity to fight their vehicles at the same
patrol is about to link up with the Ser- The peacekeepers conduct daily day time. Also, one cannot overlook the sur-
bian engineers who will provide secu- and night patrols in and around the vivability advantage, both for the crew
rity and ensure the destruction of the ZOS. The M3A2 is well suited for this and the vehicle. The amount of armor
Serb bunkers along the confrontation mission for a number of different rea- protection provided by the M3A2 pro-
line. The morning had been spent with sons, but one of the most important is vides enhanced crew protection, and
elements of the Bosnian Army as they its maneuverability. The narrow roads acts as a visible deterrent, especially to
removed mines and marked minefields. of Bosnia act as very restrictive terrain. those who are quicker to throw rocks at
The section would return to “Ft. The width of the M3A2 CFV (3.61 HMMWVs than Bradleys when denied
Apache” (Lodgment Area Walker) meters) allows it to move through the candy or an MRE.
around 1700, with enough time to grab country much more easily than an
A good example of the CFV’s dura-
chow, ensure the other section’s readi- M1A1 (3.65 meters width). When com- bility was shown when the platoon
ness for its night patrol, and prepare for pared to the M113 series, the CFV’s
the nightly mission brief. ability to pivot steer makes it more ag- leader’s Bradley in 3/B/1-1 Cavalry ran
over an AP mine. The mine, which
The evening would be spent execut- ile in areas where it is important to stay would have ruined the mobility of a
on the cleared route. Another formida-
ing the necessary troop leading proce- ble obstacle is the country’s great num- HMMWV, inflicted no damage to the
dures and pre-combat inspections, en- Bradley.
suring their readiness for the next day’s ber of reckless drivers. The M3A2 is
narrow enough to allow traffic to move
mission. Once that was complete, then in both directions and safely pass. This Lodgment Area Security
would come the showers, a little AFN,
maybe a movie, exercise, and the other aids the M3A2 in performing its neigh- The size of the unit, in both soldiers
borhood patrols while displaying a
amenities provided by the 1st Armored large, visible deterrent. and vehicles, allows the six-Bradley
Division. scout platoon to execute a number of
The M3A2, more so than a different missions at once. For exam-
HMMWV or an M113, is a very im- ple, the platoon is able to run an effi-
Scout Platoon posing fighting machine. In an environ- cient guard roster while conducting in-
ment where only force is respected, the tensive vehicle maintenance. The pla-
The many differing missions of Op- M3A2 easily fits the role. One of the toon is also able to make good use of
eration Joint Endeavor make a six-
Bradley scout platoon a valuable asset. factors that makes the CFV such an in- the time back at the lodgment area by
timidating vehicle is visibility of its maximizing personnel recovery while
There has been much discussion on three turret-mounted weapons systems. conducting concurrent training.
which vehicle is the best for use in a
peacekeeping environment. [See AR- The easily seen 25mm, TOW launcher, The lodgment areas in theater are
and coax provide a much more visible
MOR, July/August 96 for one such dis- deterrent than the single crew-served small and restrictive in regard to motor
cusion. - Ed.] In making this decision, pool space. This requires a vehicle that
we must take into account the task or- weapons mounted on both the not only can move quickly, but one
HMMWV and M113.
ganization of the vehicles. This issue narrow enough to maneuver through
can be examined by focusing on the The size of the unit also makes the the lodgment areas. This gives the
three main missions that ground forces scout platoon a valuable asset. Since commander the flexibility to either
execute in the other than war environ- physical work is often done with the move one or all of his Bradleys to
ment in which we are currently de- factional elements, dismounted security cover any disturbance. The biggest ad-
ployed. They are mounted patrols, is vital. This characteristic makes the vantage of having an M3A2 comes in
the form of available weapons systems. set up in open areas, with good obser- The M-18 “Hellcat” Tank Destroyer.
Since most lodgment areas are in built- vation and fields of fire, the platoon’s
up areas, there are a number of differ-
ent threats. The M240 coax machine
ability to defend itself is important. The
optics of the M3A2 allow for continual
Kentucky Windage
gun is excellent for taking care of any observation of the surrounding domi- Dear Sirs:
close dismounted or POV-mounted nating terrain and built-up areas. Al- Reading in the May-June issue about
threat, while the 25mm HE or AP deals though HMMWVs and M113-series the increased “lethality and fightability” of
with any medium range threat. The vehicles can be outfitted with good op- the enhanced M1A2, with its extensive
25mm chain gun is an outstanding tical systems, they are not standard on use of digital electronics for target acqui-
sition and target tracking, made me won-
weapon for built-up areas. It is both ac- these vehicles. der if any younger readers knew how tar-
curate and destructive. The ability to There are many characteristics of the get acquisition and target tracking was
minimize collateral damage is a key done fifty-odd years ago. I would like to
factor in peacekeeping operations. The M3A2 CFV that make it well-suited quote a paragraph from the combat his-
for peacekeeping operations. There is tory of the 704th Tank Destroyer Battal-
TOW, able to make the long range kill, no vehicle that is completely suited for ion, Fourth Armored Division, of General
is great for covering the many roads Patton’s Third Army.
that are near the lodgment areas. Used all aspects of peacekeeping, and it
does, of course, take the proper integra- The time was September, 1944, the
properly, the M3A2 becomes an effec- tion of all available assets to success- weapon was the 76mm, high-velocity an-
tively lethal weapon for lodgment area titank rifle that armed the M-18 “Hellcat.”
security. fully accomplish the many missions of The gunner was SSG Phillip Hosey. I
Operation Joint Endeavor. I do not quote from Phil Hosey.
doubt that even though the M3A2 “Near Nancy, France, between
Checkpoint Operations alone is an intimidating factor in the Luneville and Arracourt, we faced a
ZOS, the local factions as well as the group of German tanks that had taken a
position one mile away, across a shallow
Here again, the number of people and lurking troublemakers are also well open valley. Our M-18s were in defilade,
vehicles available in the six-Bradley aware of the M1A1 QRF platoon posi- facing out over a small hill. Infantry led
platoon aid in the efficient manning of tioned a few miles down the road. the way across the valley with three M-4s
checkpoints. There are enough people They are also aware of the artillery bat- intermingled. The Krauts let them get
halfway across, then opened up with anti-
to conduct vehicle and weapons main- tery prepositioned a few more miles tank fire from woods on the right. They
tenance, concurrent training, and away. It is my opinion that the M3A2’s immediately KO’d two M-4s and drove
checkpoint improvement, as well as al- ability to integrate maneuverability and the infantry to the ground. Two Panthers,
lowing for a quick reaction force. The survivability, its visible array of lethal a Mark IV, and an assault gun came out
of the woods and moved across our line
preferred approach is to occupy a weapons, and its superior optics make of fire at the distance of about a mile. In
checkpoint with an entire platoon, but it a superb vehicle for peacekeeping his position in our open turret, the tank
that is not always possible. With the operations. When the Bradley is organ- commander, SSG Hicklin, watched their
six-Bradley scout platoon, the com- ized into a six-vehicle scout platoon progression through his glasses and
called out the range: “Two thousand
mander has the flexibility to man two configuration, it becomes a very valu- yards, moving at about ten mph.” Our ri-
checkpoints at the same time. able asset to the commander who must fle, with AP, had a muzzle velocity of
execute a variety of peacekeeping mis- 2,700 fps, so it would take two seconds
The M3A2 proves its worth during to arrive on target. The Krauts were mov-
checkpoint operations by superbly ful- sions. It has proven its worth traveling ing at fifteen feet per second, which let
thousands of patrol miles over the nar- them travel thirty feet in two seconds.
filling all of the necessary require- row roads of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Their lead tank was twenty feet long
ments. The restrictive terrain, coupled (from the book), so we led him a good
with the small areas of land that are will continue to do so for the duration
of our mission. length for a center shot. We laid on and
cleared of mines, creates cramped fired. Voila, a hit! It struck two feet in front
checkpoints with little room to maneu- of his rear drive idler. We then picked the
last tank and scored — he began to
ver vehicles. The CFV is narrow and burn. The two intervening tanks were de-
quick enough to react to any distur- stroyed by two fast AP shots. So we got
bance. Since most checkpoints are set First Lieutenant Frank Lozano two Panthers, a Mark 4, and an assault
up in the center of the ZOS, it is im- gun. Our 76mm rifle packed a good
was commissioned in Armor in punch, even at two thousand yards. We
portant that they portray a formidable, felt that we had the best self-propelled
as well as intimidating, presence. The 1993 as a Distinguished Mili-
antitank gun in the ETO.”
M3A2 is again preferable in this role to tary Graduate from Texas A&M
In spite of his Purple Hearts and contin-
either the HMMWV or M113. As University. A graduate of AOBC ued combat-related disabilities, Phil Hosey
noted previously, the weapons systems and SPLC, he has served as a has provided many important first-hand
and armor protection play a large factor tank platoon leader and scout accounts of his experiences for our com-
bat history of the 704th Tank Destroyer
as a visible deterrent. platoon leader. He is currently Battalion.
Along with these characteristics, an- executive officer of Troop A, 1-
other important factor is the optics of 1 Cavalry, at Lodgment Area CPT Richard R. Buchanan, MC (Ret.)
Bn. Surgeon, 704th Tank Destroyer Bn.
the M3A2. On a checkpoint where 24- Walker, Sebrenik, Bosnia-Her- Secretary/Historian, 704 TD Bn Assn.
hour observation is key, good optics are zegovina. Wilmington, Ohio
vital. Since checkpoints are generally
Standing around the “deadpool” ment no longer allow gunnery to be a man concept facilitates control... tank 2
waiting for the platoon observer/con- crew-focused event, and as a platoon- orients on the platoon leader’s tank,
troller to start his after-action review, focused event, the focus must be on the while tank 3 orients on the platoon ser-
the commander of A-11 looks around at platoon leader. Current tank and tacti- geant’s (PSG) tank. The PSG orients on
the blinking yellow lights. He finds it cal tables fail to provide a realistic the platoon leader’s tank.” Again, the
hard to believe that the entire platoon challenge to Force XXI tankers. The platoon leader is the focus.
was destroyed by one T-80 tank. After training of the tank platoon via qualifi-
all, his platoon averaged 921 on Tank cation of Tank Table XII, and achieving Situational awareness is another criti-
cal factor in understanding and master-
Table VIII. His was the low score, and the optimum training experience of- ing control. Situational awareness is
he still ended with 897 points. At the fered at the CTCs, should become the
time, he was a little disappointed that focal point in development of a Tacti- described as “the ability to maintain a
he didn’t get a distinguished score, but cal Tank Table VIII which fully inte- constant clear mental picture of the tac-
tical situation... For platoon leaders and
a superior score is pretty good, isn’t it? grates the platoon leader, thus optimiz- PSGs... the key to making sound, quick
After all, the crew qualification table is ing the training of the platoon. As TT
challenging, if not stressful and, ac- VIII currently stands, the platoon tactical decisions. It allows them to
form logical conclusions and to make
cording to FM 17-12-1-2, the table leader participates only as a tank com- decisions that anticipate future events
should be realistic within the safety and mander. The platoon leader is not in-
resource constraints of live fire tank volved in tactical decisions, or much in and information.” FM 17-15, Chapter
2, section II. Developing situational
ranges. the development of his crews. Consider awareness as a skill is difficult, but
the two primary training events in the
After thinking some more, maybe he development of a tank platoon leader: paramount to success as a combat
should have ‘performed reconnaissance leader.
by fire’ on the woodline. Maybe that semi-annual gunnery and a CTC rota-
tion. How does TT VIII help in prepar- Seeing the battlefield, based on re-
would have drawn the T-80 out. And, ing the platoon leader for TT XII? ports from the platoon, is critical to
what about “Actions on Contact”? Af-
ter initial contact, the platoon didn’t re- More importantly, how, in the overall success and the development of platoon
readiness and training of a platoon, leaders. Too often, platoons and pla-
spond. Nobody returned fire, and he does TT VIII prepare a platoon leader toon leaders who are successful in gun-
didn’t receive a contact report in time for combat? Truthfully, TT VIII doesn’t;
to develop the situation. At least this nery fail to achieve similar results dur-
was just a training experience, one he in essence, the Armor Corps is missing ing CTC rotations. Primarily, this is a
an excellent opportunity to train the direct reflection of the platoon leader’s
wouldn’t forget, and one he was sure platoon leader, who is quite often one ability to react and act in unfamiliar
the platoon observer/controller wouldn’t
let him forget. of the youngest, most inexperienced situations. All gunnery tables are rote.
members of the platoon. Yet the pla- Learn the fire commands, G2 the
The training program hadn’t been a toon leader is responsible for the safety, course, and you’re guaranteed some
complete waste of time. At least gun- welfare, and training of the platoon. level of success. The problem is that
nery went well. the OPFOR doesn’t react the same
Gunnery tables should support ma- way; it doesn’t deploy on a given piece
Comparing tank gunnery scores with neuver through more tactically sound
results at the Combat Training Centers, execution with direct involvement of of terrain the same every time. Is it re-
alistic to expect the platoon leader to
a clear-cut problem surfaces; platoon the platoon leader, especially given the generalize those skills from TTVII to
leaders need a combined leader and conditions our gunnery manuals depict,
tactical training program. The Armor “the tank platoon is the smallest ma- the fluid battlefield? So, why are we
training precision gunnery to an ex-
force does not offer platoon leaders an neuver element within a tank company pected, unrealistic opposing force?
adequate chance to transition from pre- and the tank platoon is organized to
cision gunnery to combat training. fight as a unified element....” The train- Train proficiency in battlefield aware-
ing of the platoon, and thus the platoon ness, and success in gunnery and CTC
Moreover, our tank combat training rotations should increase. Only then
program does not accurately depict leader, clearly becomes the purpose of will a platoon be able to accomplish
what platoon leaders might encounter revising current tank gunnery tables.
at a CTC or in combat. If the platoon what FM 17-15 says it can, “At the
Chapter 2, FM 17-15, further states most fundamental level, battle space is
fails, the company fails, and so, “the command and control of combat the three dimensional area in which the
shouldn’t we at least consider changing
a training program developed some 30- elements are the biggest challenges platoon can acquire enemy forces and
faced by combat leaders on the modern influence them with effective fires.”
odd years ago? battlefield... command has two vital
The reason to change is to focus tank components: decision-making and lead- The first major maneuver training ex-
platoon proficiency on warfighting ership.” Control at platoon level is de- perience for a platoon leader is a CTC
skills and platoon leader proficiency in fined further by the wingman concept. rotation. The learning curve is often too
fighting a platoon. Changes in environ- “Under battlefield conditions, the wing- steep, and doesn’t afford the platoon an
Today’s emphasis on achieving un- quantity of terrain information and made features, such as vegetation, soil
precedented levels of situational aware- speed its production. By reducing time composition, roads, drainage, and ur-
ness by digitization of the battlefield used to classify terrain (severely re- ban areas. DTED provides elevation
and visualization skills of battle com- stricted, restricted, or unrestricted), data. Both are good tools to aid a com-
mand requires a greater knowledge of more time is available to analyze the mander in terrain visualization and pro-
terrain than in the past. New and so- significance of terrain relative to en- vide some baseline information needed
phisticated weapons, sensors, and com- emy and friendly force tactical situ- to perform mobility analysis. However,
mand and control methods demand de- ations. these applications cannot integrate this
tailed information for employment. The Currently, an automated terrain analy- information into mobility predictions.
ability to gather and understand infor- To adequately meet the needs of the
mation about the terrain is critical to sis capability is available to command- commander, the brigade requires a mo-
our success. ers at division level. This resides at the bility prediction tool, like Risk Based
Division Topographic Engineer Detach-
ST 71-3, Tactics Techniques and Pro- ment. The Topographic Engineer De- Mobility Modeling, that can merge all
variables that affect mobility.
cedures for the Digitized Brigade out- tachment supports the entire division,
lines the importance of more precise and has adequate conventional systems The Risk Based Mobility Model is a
terrain products to a digitized force, to aid in terrain visualization. There are UNIX-based system potentially com-
given the nature of its operations: “The several factors that limit the adequacy patible with the ASAS, being fielded
brigade must integrate its combat of this support to meet future needs. to divisions, and ASAS WARLORD,
power at the right time and place to projected to be fielded at the brigade
Operations other than war, force pro-
achieve the effects required to accom- tection operations, and other diverse re- level. It complements the capabilities
plish the mission and protect the of DFAD and DTED. With DFAD and
force.” Listed as a capability critical to quirements generated by the end of the DTED, the S2 has information on the
cold war increased the burden on divi-
the integration of the force is a “move- sion topographic teams. With this in- characteristics of the area. Risk Based
ment rate program” able to predict Mobility merges the type of informa-
rates of movement of subordinate units creased workload, the Division Topo- tion found on DFAD and DTED with
graphic Detachment cannot adequately
along independent approaches. answer the brigade commander’s re- information on soil composition, pre-
cipitation, etc., into predictions useful
During the 1995 Armor Conference, quirements in a timely fashion while for intelligence, tactical maneuver, fire
the Army Corps of Engineers Water- still responding to the needs of the di- planning, and battlefield logistics.
vision commander.
ways Experiment Station displayed The capabilities of Risk Based Mobil-
automated mobility prediction software The Topographic Engineer Detach-
that can provide this information; it is ment supports the entire division. At ity Modeling include standard IPB
products, such as identification of unre-
called Risk Based Mobility Modeling. brigade or task force level, getting stricted, restricted, or severely restricted
The focus of this model is on ground topographic support involves making a
mobility. It examines how various fac- request through intelligence channels to terrain. These are principal considera-
tions for Phase II of the IPB process,
tors, such as soil composition, slope, the G2. Once a request is in the queue, “Describe the Battlefield’s Effects,”
and precipitation, relate to terrain data the G2 sets the detachment’s priorities.
for any given area. Risk Based Mobil- The increased operational tempo of and a major element in the develop-
ment of the Modified Combined Obsta-
ity Modeling can provide mobility esti- digitized forces requires that terrain cle Overlay (MCOO). Risk Based Mo-
mates with a level of accuracy, detail, analysis be responsive and timely. If
and precision impossible to achieve your request is not high on the priority bility Modeling can further define traf-
ficability based on the type of vehicle,
through manual terrain analysis. The list, the support you get will be late in (i.e., areas where tracked vehicles can
program can be applied to movement coming, probably too late for your pur-
of enemy forces or planning the move- pose. Once again, the S2 will be left in move).
ment of friendly forces. the corner drawing lines on a map and Risk Based Mobility can take this a
At brigade and task force levels, the making a guess on terrain. A solution is step further. Mobility analysis can be
giving the brigade S2 an automated ter- tailored to specific characteristics of
formal process of terrain analysis tradi- rain analysis capability that addresses enemy and friendly vehicles and for-
tionally belongs to the S2. It is a famil-
iar sight to see S2s bent over a map, one of his, and his commander’s, prin- mations (see Figure 1). In addition to
cipal concerns — mobility. identification of unrestricted, restricted,
circling terrain features and making an or severely restricted terrain, Risk
educated guess about the trafficability The All Source Analysis System
of terrain. Through a map analysis, the (ASAS) WARLORD, projected to be Based Mobility Modeling can render a
prediction of the speed at which spe-
S2 seeks to define if the terrain is traf- fielded to brigades, has limited terrain cific vehicles can traverse an area. Fig-
ficable at all, where vehicles are likely analysis capabilities. The map and ter-
to be able to go, and how long it will rain tools currently resident on ASAS ure 2 illustrates cross country speed for
an M1A1.
take to move through certain areas. An WARLORD are Digital Feature Analy-
automated mobility prediction capabil- sis Data (DFAD) and Digital Terrain Other mobility studies analyze terrain
ity, such as Risk Based Mobility Mod- Elevation Data (DTED). DFAD pro- based on homogeneous soil composi-
eling, will increase the quality and vides information on natural and man- tion. The Risk Based Model compen-
These illustrations are intended to give readers a Even in the black and white versions here, the ca-
feel for the screen formats of the mapping system. pability of the system to quickly reveal go and no-
Many of the fine details visible in the actual color go areas can be appreciated. In the lower left illus-
versions are not apparent in these black-and-white tration, the heavier lines show the optimum routes
renderings. selected by the system.
Figure 2 Figure 3
DAG
To illustrate the utility of a mobility
prediction tool at brigade, consider the
following scenario. (Borrowed from
Virtual Kyrgyzstan III, a JANUS exer-
cise held at Ft. Knox to validate the
concepts of ST 71-3, Tactics, Tech-
PD
niques, and Procedures for The Digit-
ized Brigade.) The brigade was to at- PD 3
tack an enemy mechanized division.
The enemy division defended with two 1 PD TF 2-33
understrength brigades forward and a 2
tank brigade situated to their rear (see TF 1-41
TF 1-70
Figure 4). The enemy tank brigade had
dual missions of division reserve and Figure 5
One of the trends reinforced with the force commander’s inability to under- maneuver. The scheme of fires is the
transition to brigade operations at the stand his role in fire support planning detailed sequencing of fire support
National Training Center is the inabil- as well as the role of the task force as events that must occur in order to
ity to synchronize indirect fires and an executor of the brigade scheme of achieve the endstate articulated in the
maneuver to achieve the effects desired fires during brigade operations. concept of fires.
from combined arms operations. The The brigade concept usually assigns
task force commander is not getting This article attempts to explain what
timely, accurate indirect fires. There the task force should expect from bri- fire support tasks to subordinates. As
part of the concept, it is brigade’s re-
have been a number of reasons identi- gade as the ‘provider’ of indirect fires sponsibility to provide indirect fires to
fied, some of which are related to the and clarify the role of the task force
training level of the field artillery bat- and task force commander in fire sup- the task force close/direct firefight.
talion staffs and firing units. However, port planning. Although some of what These fires are for a specific period of
time and a specific purpose. The bri-
it has become more and more evident is contained in this article introduces gade must clearly specify when fires
that part of the problem is the task new terminology and may be consid-
ered ‘emerging’ tactics, techniques and will transition to the task force and
when the task force will lose them. Re-
procedures, there is a basis for this finements to the brigade scheme of
methodology in FM 6-71, Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures for Fire fires from subordinate units must also
be integrated. Finally, the brigade inte-
Support for Combined Arms Com-
“Army forces prefer to fight manders. These observations are also
grates the movement of artillery units
as a combined arms team... based on lessons learned during the with the scheme of maneuver.
producing effects that are first six brigade-level rotations at the
greater than the sum of the National Training Center. This article Brigade Role in
individual parts. The com- also offers a step-by-step approach to Fire Support Planning
bined arms team strives to task force fire support planning.
conduct fully integrated op- • Synchronize the brigade concept of
erations in the dimensions of Brigade’s Role: The brigade plays a fires with brigade maneuver
vital role in task force fire support
time, space, purpose and re-
planning and execution. With the ex- • Develop brigade scheme of fires
sources.... The goal is to con- and assign tasks to subordinates
ception of the task force mortars, the
fuse, demoralize and destroy
the enemy with the coordi-
brigade is the ‘provider’ of indirect • Provide indirect fires for task force
fires. Therefore, before we can accu- close/direct firefight (specified pe-
nated impact of combat rately clarify the task force role in exe- riod of time and purpose - clearly
power.... The sudden and dev- cuting the brigade scheme of fires, it is defining when fires transition to the
astating impact of combined necessary to quickly review brigade’s TF close/direct firefight and when
arms paralyzes the enemy’s role. The brigade develops a synchro- the task force will lose fires)
response, leaving him ripe for nized brigade scheme of maneuver and
brigade concept of fires, translating that • Integrate refinements from subordi-
defeat.... The application of nates
combined arms in this man- concept into a scheme of fires.
ner is complex and demand- There is no clear doctrinal definition • Integrate movement of artillery
ing. It requires detailed plan- for either concept of fires or scheme of units with scheme of maneuver
ning and violent execution by fires. For the purpose of this article,
highly trained soldiers and concept of fires, expressed in terms of The Task Force Role: The task force
units who have been thor- task, purpose, method, and endstate, is is the ‘executor’ of their portion of the
oughly trained.” the allocation of fire support assets to brigade scheme of fires. With the ex-
achieve a specific effect on an enemy ception of the task force mortars, the
FM 100-5 formation with a visualized purpose brigade commander ‘owns’ the indirect
and endstate to support the scheme of fire assets. The artillery is normally in
Conclusion
This paper is not designed to solve all
the challenges of getting timely and ac-
curate indirect fires at the task force
level. Hopefully, it has addressed some
HPTs are only high in payoff relative tions the FISTs, the task force or com- of the issues that are encountered at the
to the time they are identified during pany/team commander. The com- National Training Center and high-
the fight. HVTs/HPTs must not under- pany/team commander needs them to lighted the emerging observations from
mine the sequenced critical fire support assist in his fire support planning and brigade operations. The step-by-step
tasks. to trigger targets assigned to him from approach to fire support planning is
Priority of Fires: (The organization the task force scheme of fires. The task one way to approach the challenge of
force commander wants to position getting the effects of combined arms
and employment of fire support means them to ensure they are in the proper
according to the importance of the sup- operations. Whatever method used, the
ported unit’s mission.) Worthy of dis- positions to call the targets he wants. key is synchronization with maneuver,
Observations at the National Training commander involvement in planning
cussion is its relationship with the com- Center offer this — the amount of
mander’s sequenced fire support tasks. and refinement, and well rehearsed
certainty or uncertainty will dictate plans understood by every observer,
If indirect fires are properly synchro-
nized with maneuver, and the com- the level of control of the FISTs. In a leader, and firing unit.
movement to contact, the task force is
mander has sequenced those critical more likely to leave control of the
fire support tasks to support maneuver,
then it seems priority should go to fir- FIST with the company/team because
the situation is unclear.
ing those targets regardless of who has
priority of fires. One could argue that, Lieutenant Colonel (P) Harry
if the commander has developed a In the defense, where the targets are L. Leiferman is a 1974 gradu-
scheme of fires properly, then the right fully synchronized with the task force ate of Gonzaga University. His
observer will have priority when the scheme, the task force is more likely to
commander wants to fire the critical dictate where the observers are posi- troop experience includes two
task. The key has to be every observer tioned. In a deliberate attack, the task company commands, battalion
and leader understanding the concept force may take the observer away from S3 in 9ID, battalion XO in 1AD,
of fires — the sequenced critical fire the breach force company/team to pro- and commander, 2d Battalion,
support tasks — and sticking to that vide redundancy at the point of pene- 5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Divi-
concept. It is especially important for tration but leave the FISTs with the rest sion. He has served on the DA
the various artillery FDC and fire con- of the teams. staff and on the staff of Armed
trol officers to understand this and not Forces Central Europe. His
Close Air Support: Simply stated,
deviate from what the commander CAS is another means of indirect fire most recent assignment was
wants. However, priority of fires re-
mains a valid concept that should allow support available to the brigade and Senior Mechanized Infantry
task force. The commander, first under- Task Force Trainer (Scorpion
anyone to receive fires as long as no standing the capabilities and limitations
critical fire support task is being fired. 07) at the National Training
of close air support, must synchronize Center. He is currently attend-
Observer Planning: The issue at the it with the fire plan to support the
task force level is who owns and posi- scheme of maneuver. The capabilities ing the Naval War College.
ever slowly it may move, than well into the have done more to correct the greatest Author's Queries
21 st century. weakness of the Sherman - the low muz-
zle velocity of its main gun - but the Army For a study of women's experiences dur-
did not realize the changing nature of tank ing the Vietnam War, I would appreciate
CPT MICHAEL l. PRYOR combat until the huge losses in Normandy
Co C, 1-156 Armor hearing from the mothers, wives, and girl-
forced the Army's leadership to face the friends of men who fought in the Vietnam
louisiana ARNG stark reality of modem armored wariare ..." conflict. Please include memories about the
and other comments about the M4's defi- period your loved ones served overseas,
ciencies. including (but not restricted to) strategies
PIRs Are Not Focused Enough Not entirely so, MAJ Mansoor! I refer you for coping, networks of support, and atti-
to my letter to ARMOR in the March-April tudes of the population at large. Please
For Scouts' Reconnaissance also include a brief description of your
1974 issue, pages 3 and 51. I'll quote only
a portion of that letter on the matter of the background, including age, race, ethnicity,
Dear Sir: controversy surrounding the 75mm gun on and the area of the military with which your
the Sherman: "It was the Ordnance Depart- loved one served. Send responses to:
After reading the article, "Training the ment's position that this gun was inade-
Task Force Scout Platoon," by lTC lynch quate, but this viewpoint was overruled by VIRGINIA LAFFEY
and CPT Cichocki in the July-August issue the Army Ground Forces. After the combat P.O. Box 2052
of ARMOR, I need to clarify a fine point on experiences in North Africa highlighted the Jamaica Plain, MA 02130
tasking R&S assets. In the article, the discontent with the Sherman, it was the
authors use Priority Intelligence Require- Ordnance Department, ironically, that ac-
ments (PIR) to task the scout platoon, stat- crued the 'blame.' At the time when Gen- * * *
ing these "provide focus for the actual con- eral Patton was supposedly incognito in I am researching the U.S. Armed Forces
duct of reconnaissance." This is not entirely England, just prior to the Normandy inva- stationed in and around Stroud, Glouces-
true. sion, he and my father (then Colonel tershire, England, prior to the Normandy
George G. Eddy) got embroiled in a very landings, June 1944. I would like to obtain
According to FM 34-2-1, Reconnaissance loud and public argument about the source
and Surveillance and Intelligence Support enough information on the units camped
of the tank's deficiencies. The dispute was around Stroud, who were here for training
to Counterreconnaissance, PIRs provide broken up in a large officer's mess in lon-
the initial focus for R&S. In essence, they and practice before going into battle, for a
don by Major General E.S. Hughes, later publication in memory of the men and also
get you started. The real focus comes from Chief of Ordnance when General Eisen-
translating those PIRs into indicators of a for a part of Stroud's history.
hower was Chief of Staff, who pulled Gen-
particular enemy activity. The S2 takes the eral Patton away, reminding him of General I need additional information on the fol-
indicators and develops Specific Informa- lowing unit that was camped on Minchin-
Eisenhower's concern about any publicity
tion Requirements (SIR). SIRs are nothing hampton Common on a hill above Stroud. I
of Patton's whereabouts."
more than indicators put in the form of a think it to be a tank destroyer force, for the
question. It is from these SIRs that the It should be remembered that the using shoulder flash (patch) was a Tiger with a
Specific Orders or Requests (SOR) that service determines what it wants in outlin- tank in its jaws; a Collar Dog that I have
tasks the scouts are issued. ing key specifications, not Ordnance. Cer- here belongs to the Quartermaster Corps.
The key to successful R&S planning and tainly Ordnance is expected to point out This was given to a boy at that time by one
tasking is to give the scouts a mission they consequences and alternatives. This was of the men. Also, they were Black Ameri-
can accomplish. Even the most focused done with the Sherman, and the using cans. lastly, I have one name and possible
PIR is often too large a requirement for service got what it requested. address: Andrew (Andy) Dodson, North
scouts. By breaking PIRs down into spe- While I hope I've got your attention, may I June Street, Philadelphia, Pa.
cific pieces of information, you give scouts use this opportunity to recommend to your I would like to hear from some of the
requirements they can satisfy. Through all readers the article, "Planning For Kwa- guys who were here for their memories,
of this, the S2 and the rest of the staff jalein" by my father, BG George G. Eddy, in and any photographs, including themselves
need to understand the logical ties be- the July 1996 issue of ARMY. After he re- in uniform, that I may purchase.
tween the SORs that the scouts are collect- tired in the 1960s, I prevailed upon him to
ing against and the PIRs that the specific describe some of his most significant WWII
requirements are focused on. PAUL F. ASTON
experiences in a number of tapes. Years 15 Hillclose
later, I transcribed and edited some of the Lightpill
events he related, and this article was the Stroud
ROBERT S. MIKAlOFF result. During WWII, he was the Director of
CPT, MI Gloucestershire
the Ordnance Research Center at Aber- Gl5 3PG England
USAARMC Threat Manager deen Proving Ground, Maryland, and be-
came intimately familiar with a great variety
of weapons, armaments and ammunition, * * *
and especially terminal ballistics. As a re-
Army's Users, Not Ordnance, sult of General Marshall's first-hand knowl- For a book on the Maginot Line, I would
Delayed Sherman Upgunning edge of my father's competence, he sent like to hear from anyone with personal
him on several special missions overseas reminiscences or family papers, military or
to demonstrate new weapons and equip- civilian, from the period August 1939
Dear Sir: ment, as well as to review upcoming inva- through July 1940.
sion plans for the proper deSignation and
With some interest, I read MAJ Man- employment of Ordnance materiel. John J. Gallagher
soor's book review about the M4 Sherman c/o Sarpedon Publishers
tank (May-June 1996), especially where he 166 Fifth Avenue
wrote: "... The Ordnance Department could COL (Ret.) GEORGE G. EDDY, PH.D. New York, NY 10010
PIN: 074832-000