Modern War 6 - 2013 Jul-Aug

AirLand Battle | Operation Just Cause: Panama ‘89 | Soccer War 1969 | A-10 Warthog | Focus Uganda | BOMARC
SAMs | Micro Satellites
#6 JUL - AUG 2013
DECISION IRAQ
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MILITARY HISTORY IN THE MAKING
#6 | JUL – AUG 2013
FEATURES DEPARTMENTS
6 38 24
Decision Iraq Operation Just Cause: Design Theory
Ten years after Saddam’s statue The US Invades Panama Decision Iraq
was toppled in Baghdad, what In one sense, this operation was
do we now know that we didn’t little more than a further certification 54
know then? Here’s our analysis. of US predominance in its geo- On the Horizon
by Joseph Miranda strategic backyard. In the deeper
sense, it heralded a new age of 56
22 “jointness” in American military inter- Systems of War
I Remember: Micro-Terrain in Iraq service planning and operations. • USAF A-10 Warthog
“Micro-Terrain” is one of the newest by Peter Martinson by Kelly Bell
buzzwords in the study of military Spotlight On
art and science. Here’s how its • Focus on Uganda
significance recently came to be 48 by Ravi Rikhye
understood by one of our NCOs in Iraq. The Soccer War of 1969 Weapons
by Phil Sharp This was the war pretty much everyone • America’s BOMARC SAMs
missed, because it was fought while by Carl O. Schuster
26 mankind was landing on the moon for • SAGE 1950s Air Defense
AirLand Battle Doctrine the first time. Here’s what happened. by Carl O. Schuster
The US armed forces have been by Vernie Liebl • EXACTO Sniper Rifles
locked in doctrinal debate since the by David R. Higgins
end of the Vietnam War. Despite New Arenas
some agreements and successes, • Future War: Micro-Satellites
that debate goes on even today. & the Militarization of Space
by Mark R. Schwartz by David R. Higgins
4 MODERN WAR 6 | JUL–AUG 2013

38 48
80
Media Review
PUBLISHER READER SUBMISSIONS
GAME EDITION RULES Dr. Christopher Cummins
Decision Iraq We welcome interesting and concise stories about virtually
ASSISTANT PUBLISHER any aspect of modern warfare. Contact Joseph Miranda,
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MODERN WAR 6 | JUL–AUG 2013 5


DECISION IRAQ By Joseph Miranda
W
hen US forces rolled into Baghdad on 9 April 2003, the war in Iraq
appeared to be all but over. That country’s regular armed forces had
largely disintegrated in the face of Coalition military power; even the
reputedly elite Republican Guard proved incapable of offering serious resistance,
and dictator Saddam Hussein fled underground, literally and figuratively. Yet the
capture of Baghdad was only the beginning of a much longer conflict, one that
pitted the US and its allies in the new Iraqi government against a range of irregular
forces, generally called “insurgents.” It would take years of hard fighting before a
strategy was developed that allowed the consolidation of the victory of April 2003.
Insurgency was already a common form of conflict during the Cold War era.
Communist and nationalist forces in the “Third World” nations of Asia, Africa
and Latin America used it to challenge Western powers. Some insurgents won
victories, as did the Vietnamese in Indochina and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. At
other times the insurgents went down to defeat, as in Malaya and El Salvador. At
the same time, insurgent warfare also came to be employed by anti-communist
forces in countries such as Angola during the later part of the Cold War.
Regardless of the continent, insurgencies had several common characteristics.
That was due to the dissemination of doctrinal ideas emerging from the Chinese
Civil War and honed in the many conflicts that raged globally from 1946 to the
fall of the Berlin Wall. Insurgencies tended to be relatively well organized affairs.
A cadre provided leadership that in turn set up “fronts,” organizations within
the populace that conducted guerilla warfare. As those front organizations
expanded, they formed an infrastructure that in effect created a “state within
a state,” competing with the government to mobilize popular support.
Guerrillas would strike at government forces while defending their own base
areas. On the international front, they used “agitprop” (agitation and propaganda)
to further undermine support for the beleaguered regime and rally world
opinion behind their own cause. When the balance of forces was judged to be
U.S. Marines fire on Fallujah.

right, the insurgents would come Cold War forces developed doctrine body of knowledge and experience,
out in the open, ideally backed by a and tactics to defeat insurgencies. then, it’s fair to ask why the Coalition
general uprising, and seize victory. Broadly, successful counterinsurgents had such a difficult time dealing with
That formula proved effective in used a joint political-military the Iraqi insurgency in the mid-2000s.
several places, most notably with the strategy to build popular support
Sandinistas in their insurgency against for the government, identify and Old & New Insurgencies
the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua. In destroy the insurgent underground,
other conflicts it wasn’t necessary to and provide security to the populace. One reason for that came from
win in a general offensive; rather, all Insurgency and counterinsurgency the fact the Iraqi insurgency didn’t
that was needed was to collapse the were thus often in a race to see which follow the classic pattern. That made
morale of the opposing side. That side could “out-infrastructure” the things simultaneously more difficult
happened in the insurgencies against other, as the creation of compet- in some respects and easier in others.
the French in Algeria and against the ing governmental and economic Cold War era insurgencies tended
Portuguese in Angola. In both cases structures is central to victory. to be rigid in their organization. They
European military forces had the Counterinsurgent forces used that were hierarchic, with centralized
upper hand, but the disintegration approach successfully in Malaya and control from cadre and central
of home front morale still led to their other places—arguably even against committees. That worked insofar
withdrawal and insurgent victory. the Viet Cong infrastructure in Vietnam as it gave them superior command
On the other side of the equation, following the Tet offensive. Given that and control, as well as coordination

of the various fronts comprising
their overall force. At the same time,
however, such hierarchy also created
vulnerabilities that counterinsurgent
forces could exploit once they
properly understood the situation.
Destruction of cadre, or even just
the disruption of communication links
among different levels of the insurgent
command structure, could fragment
and destroy that infrastructure.
Similarly, since the guerilla component
of an insurgency depended on the
political infrastructure for recruits,
intelligence, supplies and direction,
the neutralization of that infrastructure
could then also collapse the guerrillas.
As the 20th century closed out,
however, a new form of insurgency
emerged. It was less organized and
less hierarchic, and more in line with
emerging “chaos theory.” If Cold War The end of the Saddam Hussein regime: Baghdad, 9 April 2003.
insurgencies are taken to be a reflec-
tion of the then-dominant systems that “nation” in the early 1990s. Those warlords. Since the resultant warlord
of industrial mass production and groups formed around warlords who forces lacked the infrastructure of Cold
mass media, the new insurgencies mobilized them based on nothing War insurgents, they were difficult to
have arisen around the emerging more than traditional warrior ethos. neutralize by traditional methods.
technologies of networking and At the same time, though, what was Afghanistan was also the scene
trans-national information flows. old actually became new in that such of ongoing insurgent warfare, first
One pre-Iraq example of non-hier- groups didn’t require any hierarchic against the pro-Soviet government
archic insurgency had been provided organization. The organizing principle in Kabul during the 1970s, and then
by the Somali irregulars various United involved was simply the personal-
Nations peacekeeping forces faced in ity and charisma of the individual continued on page 12 »
Reinforcing Marine vehicles and equipment on their way to Iraq in mid-2003 aboard the USS Kearsarge.

Operation Iraqi Freedom Organization
The diagram displays the order of battle for Coalition ground forces in 2003’s
Operation Iraqi Freedom. It shows mainly ground combat units and various
major support and SOF formations. There were also a number of additional
separate infantry battalions, drawn from various divisions and brigades, deployed
to reinforce major units or for security. As noted, several units arrived after
the campaign had begun, such as 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized).
US Central Command is the joint-service headquarters for all American and
Coalition forces operating in the Middle East, including ground, naval, air and

special operations, though some Special Operation Forces (SOF) report directly to
national-level headquarters. Aside from the forces deployed in Iraq, CENTCOM
had additional units throughout the Persian Gulf and Horn of Africa.


» continued from page 9 and accomplish common goals. the Base), began to operate in
Unlike the older insurgent model, they support of Islamist insurgents
against Soviet armed forces following never became a rigid hierarchy. Rather, globally. When Saddam Hussein
Moscow’s invasion in December 1979. networks formed alliances as needed, invaded Kuwait in 1990, Bin Laden
Unlike most other Cold War insurgen- and broke them off when their goals volunteered his organization to fight
cies, the Afghan resistance coalesced were accomplished. That allowed for against the Iraqis, in part to keep
into several independent movements greater flexibility, as well as making the US and its Western allies from
rather than a single front, all of them it more difficult for counterinsurgent intruding into the Middle East.
built on sectarian or regional lines. forces to pin them down and destroy Facilitating all that was the
The insurgents proved effective them. Even if one “node” within a explosion of the Internet. It gave
enough to force a Soviet withdrawal. network were destroyed, it could be insurgents cheap and easy worldwide
Support for that Afghan resistance replaced by others. The shortfall with communications, agitprop via online
also came from non-state sources. One the network strategy came from the media, the ability to transfer funds
such player was Osama bin Laden, fact their lack of centralized control internationally, and a myriad of other
who helped get money and arms to made coordination difficult in regard functions such as the remote training
the insurgents while also setting up to executing major operations. of individuals in terrorist techniques.
networks among them. Networks were Following the war against the Of course, it wasn’t only Bin
organizations that temporarily worked Soviets, Bin Laden’s organization Laden who became involved in
together to provide mutual support (which he named Al Qaeda, or that new kind of unconventional

warfare. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein
anticipated another war with the
Coalition, and his strategy for it would
be different from that of 1990-91.
Operation Iraqi Freedom
The initial US response to the

911 attacks was an invasion of
Afghanistan to overthrow its Taliban
government and destroy its Al Qaeda
allies. Operation Enduring Freedom
proved successful (at least at first),
with warlord forces, supported by
US airpower and special operations
forces (SOF), swiftly taking major
Afghan cities, putting the Taliban to US Marines moving into one of Saddam’s Baghdad palaces in April 2003.
flight, and destroying Al Qaeda bases.
With victory seemingly assured there, move into Iraq. That was in part Another factor was that much of
American attention turned to Iraq. due simply to logistics: a large force the Iraqi military was deployed facing
Gen. Tommy Franks, commander would require massive resupply. At Iran in the east or in the north to
of US Central Command (CENTCOM, the same time, the offensive was to suppress the Kurds. That meant the
the joint-services command respon- be launched primarily from Kuwait, southeastern corridor from the Kuwaiti
sible for operations in the Middle avoiding basing from Saudi Arabia for border to Baghdad was relatively open.
East), had several objectives for his political reasons. That meant a narrow The Coalition also had ascendancy
campaign against Iraq. His top priority front and therefore fewer divisions in several other fields, particularly in
was winning a quick military victory on the ground. The total starting the air. Coalition (mainly US) airpower
against Iraqi conventional forces. conventional strength for the Coalition could muster a fleet of modern planes.
Speed was vital in order to forestall the was therefore only four divisions plus As a result of the ongoing “Revolution
possibility of Saddam launching mis- a few separate brigades. Follow-on in Military Affairs (RMA),” with its sen-
siles or other attacks against pro-US forces, arriving after Baghdad had sor technologies and precision-guided
countries in the region (such as Israel fallen, comprised an additional munitions, those planes could deliver
and Saudi Arabia), and to prevent division plus several more brigade payloads accurately and therefore to
the destruction of the Iraqi oilfields. equivalents. In terms of troop strength, much greater effect than ever before.
Were Hussein to accomplish then, the Iraqis had the numeric edge. A major target was Iraqi command-
either of those things, it would’ve Even so, the Iraqi Army had control and surveillance systems, with
been politically disastrous for the largely disintegrated by the time the the objective of rendering ineffective
US. The former would likely have Coalition divisions rolled across the the Iraqi high command—which was
invited retaliation from Israel that frontier. That was in part due to the already rigidly and overly centralized
could then have drawn in other decade-long Coalition campaign of in the person of Saddam Hussein.
Middle Eastern countries to support sanctions, bombing and sedition. There were also the Coalition
Iraq; the latter would’ve wrecked or While the Iraqi Army still looked strong SOF to consider. They were tasked
delayed postwar reconstruction. on paper, its units were no longer with missions such as seizing critical
One operational element of capable of waging war. Only a few of oilfields and finding and destroying
Franks’s strategy was to use as small the Republican Guard divisions were surface-to-surface missile sites—again,
a ground force as possible for the able to put up sustained resistance. all done with political objectives in

several paramilitary forces, of which
the Fedayeen made the most deter-
mined stand in March and April 2003.
The Fedayeen proved ineffective
in stopping the Coalition drive on
Baghdad. That was to be expected
given the disparity in armament and
training between the irregulars and
the Coalition divisions. Moreover, to
fight the Coalition the Fedayeen had
to come out in the open, a generally
suicidal move for lightly armed troops
when faced with well equipped and
well trained heavy units. Their impact
during the campaign was therefore
minimal, but the implications
Iraqi police belatedly guard a sabotaged and burning oil pipeline near Karbala, 23 February 2004.
were disquieting as the Coalition
mind. Perhaps even more critically, Along the way much of the Iraqi settled in to administer Iraq.
they were also responsible for mobiliz- military simply surrendered or
ing anti-Saddam insurgents who could deserted. Only some delaying actions Boots on the Ground
seize other objectives and further conducted by irregular forces known
subvert the regime’s armed forces. as the Fedayeen Saddam (Saddam’s Baghdad fell to the Coalition
In fact, much of northern Iraq was Commandos) provided an ominous on 9 April, and with that Franks
already held by various armed Kurdish foreshadowing of what was to come. had attained the stated goals of the
groups, and an American airborne The Fedayeen were a quasi-guerrilla campaign. Coalition forces had
landing there was conducted to force made up of regime loyalists as quickly overrun Iraq, and did so while
provide them with even more support. well as volunteers from various Islamic suffering few casualties. Also avoided
In the event, when Franks gave the countries. The dictator understood were major city fights that certainly
go order on 20 March 2003, Coalition his regulars would be unable to would’ve added to the destruction of
forces executed a lightning advance defend the country against the the civilian infrastructure, which had
to Baghdad. There were several sharp Coalition. He surmised, however, that already deteriorated since 1991. All
engagements, most notably at An where regulars couldn’t win perhaps threats from Iraqi missiles, or danger
Nasiriyah, but Coalition armor over- irregulars could. After all, there was to the oilfields, were neutralized.
came all resistance, ultimately using the recent experience of Afghanistan Effectively, the Coalition had
both speed and shock effect to pre- and Somalia to give credence to the won a military victory. As has
empt a planned last-ditch stand by the use of an insurgent strategy against been the case many times in his-
Republican Guard in the Iraqi capital. strong conventional foes. Pre-war, tory, however, military victory doesn’t
therefore, Saddam had organized necessarily translate into political
The aftermath of an all too common car-bomb explosion near the Green Zone in Baghdad, late in 2004.

success. In Iraq, the reasons for order of battle, but not in sufficient Of course, that belief simply didn’t
that failure are now well known. number. There were Iraqis within reflect the situation on the ground
First, the Coalition ground the Coalition force, most notably the in Iraq. For one thing, the Coalition
force simply wasn’t large enough anti-Saddam Badr Brigades, but again, dissolution of the Iraqi armed forces
to occupy the entire country and their numbers weren’t sufficient. threw large numbers of men out of
preserve law and order. As Iraqi Another aspect of the initial work, creating a pool of dissatisfied
government forces disintegrated, Coalition failure may be summed up and unemployed manpower of military
there followed a wave of civil disorder as ideological: the Americans believed age, which is always a formula for
and looting that broadly disrupted the overthrow of Saddam’s regime trouble. Regardless of what individual
Iraqi society. While the Coalition would result in what was more or less Iraqis might’ve thought about Saddam,
objective had been proclaimed as a democracy appearing more or less the Iraqi military had been a source of
“liberating” Iraq, the situation in the spontaneously across more or less the national pride and unity. Its complete
streets was one of disintegration. entire country. While that’s a somewhat removal therefore came as a shock to
It wasn’t simply a matter of the simplified summary of Coalition the populace, while simultaneously
lack of Coalition troops for occupation intent, it nonetheless reflects the dissolving a force that, under newly
duty, but also of the types of units general faith among American leaders, selected leadership, might’ve main-
needed: military police to maintain since the time of Woodrow Wilson, in tained civil order. At the same time, no
law and order and civil affairs units to the inherent power of democracy. matter the Coalition propaganda line
restore services. Such units were in the about “liberating” the country, all the

The start of a US assault on an insurgent stronghold in Najaf, 19 August 2004.
foreign troops appeared to many as opening for them to finally come to

simply a return of Western colonialism. dominance in Iraqi society. The Shi’ite
One immediate source for the Iranians provided them support,
incipient insurgency therefore came including arms and cadre via their Al
from nationalistic Iraqis. Making Qods organization (a branch of their
things worse was the tendency, due to Revolutionary Guard Corps, respon-
cultural differences and a simple lack sible for unconventional warfare and
of good translators, for small incidents supporting insurgents abroad). There
to escalate. Confrontations between were also volunteers infiltrating in
Iraqi civilians and Coalition soldiers from various Islamic countries, termed
began to be increasingly marked by “Foreign Fighters,” who saw Iraq as a
violence. The killing of four private new front in a general war against the
contractors in Fallujah by an Iraqi mob Western “Crusading” powers. Al Qaeda
in March 2004 became the trigger for also made an appearance, becoming
major armed uprising. It resulted in the known as “Al Qaeda in Iraq” or A.Q.I.
Coalition having to launch two major Even further, there were various tribal
operations to secure that city that year. factions with claims to regional power,
Demographics also came into play. as well as plain old criminal elements.
Saddam had relied on his fellow Sunni The fragmented nature of the
Muslims (about 20 percent of the total insurgency set up the aforementioned
population) to support his regime. paradox. On the one hand, it made
With his overthrow those Sunnis were it more difficult for the Coalition to
on the outs and vulnerable to attack restore order since there was no single
by rival Shi’ites and Kurds seeking enemy center of gravity to attack.
revenge. The Kurds, moreover, had Unlike the Cold War era national
earlier achieved quasi-independence liberation insurgencies, there was no
in their northern part of the country, single front that, if destroyed, would
and that rankled Sunni pride—the cause the entire insurgency to collapse.
war had effectively partitioned their On the other hand, the lack of unity
country and the Coalition was seen meant the various factions couldn’t
as being responsible. Much of what leverage their strengths into a single
became known as the insurgency force capable of seizing the country.
was therefore centered in the Sunni- It also meant that situation could
Triangle, with its apexes at the cities of be, and eventually was, exploited by
Baghdad, Ramadi and Fallujah where the Coalition to play off the different
former regime elements (FRE in the factions against one another and
parlance of the day) took up arms. thereby gain a kind of victory.
Even more, the insurgency was Much insurgent effort was simply
never a single phenomenon. Many dissipated in settling old scores among
different players were involved. the various factions, ethnically cleans-
There were, of course, the majority ing neighborhoods, and otherwise
Shi’ites who saw the situation as an attriting opposing factions. That kind


of thing actually worked to accomplish center of the country. The side that The insurgents were never able to
part of the Coalition’s mission. controlled Baghdad thereby also get their military organization to the
Like Cold War insurgencies, there gained a major advantage in control level of, for example, the Viet Minh or
was also a battle for infrastructure. over the rest of the country. That Viet Cong during the Indochina Wars.
The infrastructure in question was was one reason the 2007 “Surge” In those conflicts communist guerillas
often physical: the provision of basic would be centered on that city. routinely formed battalions, and
services summarized by the acronym Nonetheless, there was also hard they were eventually able to get their
SWET—Sewage, Water, Electricity and fighting ahead outside Baghdad. A main force units up to regimental and
Trash removal. Without those services case in point was Fallujah. The US division size. In Iraq, while there were
civil society is difficult to maintain, had to launch two major operations, insurgent units that styled themselves
and that centrality further reflected the one in April and another in November “battalions” and “brigades,” they were
generally urban nature of the conflict. of 2004, to secure control of that city. really just ad hoc groupings lacking
Unlike the Cold War insurgencies Further significance came from the organizational permanence as well as
that had called for peasant-based rural fact the campaign for Fallujah, when the manpower and weaponry needed
forces to surround the cities, in Iraq viewed in relation to the entirety of for sustained operations at those
it was the cities that were the major the conflict, was the single biggest levels. The weakness caused by all that
battlegrounds. Control of Baghdad of the war, including the March- insurgent factionalism was ultimately
was vital, as it was both the national April 2003 drive on Baghdad. crucial in that it meant Coalition
political capital and commercial

forces never had to face the prospect The Numbers Game
of conventional military defeat.
Further along that same line, the Evaluating the numbers in an insurgency can be difficult. For example, while
Iraqi insurgents always lacked the there may be reports of 100,000 insurgents, only a fraction of them may be full-time
outside support and sanctuaries fighters. The majority might be part-time guerrillas, or members of the underground
on the level the Viet Minh and Viet conducting intelligence, logistics and support. Similarly, while a government may
Cong enjoyed owing to the proximity have 100,000 men in its armed forces, many of them would also function only in
of Communist China and bases in support positions. There are also other combatants to consider, such as militia and
Laos and Cambodia. Iran and Syria police, who often have critical but unheralded missions in this form of warfare.
provided some support, but never In the Iraqi insurgency, organization for the insurgents was generally based
at the level of the Indochina Wars. around networks, often using technologies such as the Internet and cell phones
Even more, Coalition forces were to remain in communication. There were specialized cells for command control,
agile enough to keep major insurgent training, reconnaissance, intelligence, logistics and technical functions—the latter
units from being organized. One involving such things as building bombs. The networks could mobilize guerrilla
advantage the Coalition had in combat cells to engage in open fighting, but throughout the war large insurgent units
that regard was in the realm of (battalion and above) weren’t fielded on a permanent basis. While guerrillas could
“netcentric warfare.” The Americans, hold neighborhoods and make operating difficult for government and Coalition forces,
especially, employed networked they lacked the ability to go over to the offensive as conventional formations.
systems of communication, sensors The major Coalition units for counterinsurgency duty in Iraq usually amounted to
and intelligence gathering that gave five or so divisions at any one time, plus a few independent brigades. Bear in mind
them a real-time advantage at the the divisional headquarters would control a range of units, often drawn from various
tactical and operational levels. The other divisions. What maps can’t show is the use of special operation forces, military
insurgents had their own network police, PSYOP, intelligence and other small formations vital in a counterinsurgency.
systems, but the Coalition advantage Coalition troop strength peaked at 176,000. Added to that was 100,000 or so private
there was comparatively great. contractors hired by the Coalition who conducted many logistical and security operations.
Again, comparing the situation in There were also Iraqi government forces. As early as June 2003, the Coalition
Iraq with that of Cold War era insur- began training a new Iraqi Army. Initially there were shortfalls in morale and leader-
gencies is instructive: generally, those ship, but by the end of the decade the Coalition command could turn over most of the
earlier insurgent underground orga- country’s security to it. The Ministry of the Interior had a critical function in establishing
nizations had an immense advantage a new national police force, currently called the “Federal Police.” A dependable
in intelligence gathering, while their constabulary is vital for restoring and maintaining local security, intelligence and
integrated political-military command paramilitary operations, and thus is a major player in any counterinsurgency.
structure enhanced their control of Finally there were the numerous Iraqi militias and tribal fighters who
the tactical battle space. In Iraq the signed up with the government. They conducted operations strictly on
insurgents were fragmented among the local level, which is the most crucial front in an insurgency.
numerous groups and organizations. All that makes for a nebulous situation when counting up who has the

The same decentralization that often numeric edge. Of course, what counts in the end is not so much the numbers
made it difficult to fully neutralize as gaining sufficient popular support to allow for a return to peacetime condi-
them also made it difficult for them tions—whatever they may eventually turn out to be in that part of the world.
to conduct large, unified operations.

All that reflected an even larger tion of population in an urban niques as embedding reporters into
insurgent dilemma: there was never environment makes control easier, military units, which almost always
any unified cause for which to fight. and the Iraqi insurgents also lacked generated more favorable coverage
Even the simple and overarching remote rural areas for sanctuaries. than did reportage from a distance.
goal of removing the Coalition from The insurgents also had a difficult There was also the residual effect of
the country didn’t hold up, since the time outflanking the Coalition on the terrorist attacks of 911, which had
Westerners showed themselves as the international front. Cold War initially been sufficient to mobilize US
being ever more eager to leave. Rather, insurgents, whether communist or public opinion in favor of war in the
the insurgents fought for a variety of nationalist, put considerable effort Middle East (albeit against ill-defined
ethnic, religious and political reasons, into winning “world opinion” (fuzzy targets and for vaguely stated goals).
and often just for revenge or survival. edged as that concept might be) There was also a general lack
There was, again, also the fact and in demoralizing the enemy via of sympathy for the insurgents in
much of the insurgency was fought agitprop in the home country. Western countries: they were easily
in the cities. Not to push the analogy That didn’t work for the Iraqi insur- identified with radical Islam, which
with Cold War insurgencies too far, gents, in large part because the US had is antithetical to democratic ideals
but it needs to be noted it was the gained a certain ascendancy on that as well as lacking the infrastructure
urban guerrillas of the 1960s and front. That is, the Pentagon’s new con- of Western political groups that had
1970s who were most often defeated cept of “full spectrum warfare” mobi- often been sympathetic to insurgents
by government forces. The concentra- lized public opinion via such tech- during the Cold War. Even among the

governments of Muslim countries,
there was little in the way of open
support for the insurgents. Several of
those governments were full US allies,
such as Egypt, Algeria and Turkey.
Finally, the Coalition fought using
largely volunteer armed forces, and
with relatively low friendly casualties,
thereby mitigating adverse public
reaction to excessive bloodshed.
Of course, all that would’ve been
of little value had there not also
eventually been a successful coun-
terinsurgency strategy put in place.
Surge
One of the major turning points

in the counterinsurgency—though
it wasn’t recognized as such at the A city street in Fallujah heavily damaged by the fighting.
time—came in 2005 with the begin-
ning of what came to be known as the over control of the infrastructure secure the city of Basrah in which
“Anbar Awakening,” after the Iraqi to local Iraqis. The main front was Coalition support was limited largely to
province in which the movement Baghdad, picked on the grounds logistics. Among other things, Moqtada
began. There Iraqi tribal leaders victory there couldn’t help but be al-Sadr agreed to a ceasefire and peace
forged an alliance with Coalition decisive across the rest of the country. was thereby restored in that area.
military forces to fight common foes. While the Surge had a slow start, it
In part that was motivated simply eventually succeeded. Among other Endgame
by the presence of AQI. Al Qaeda often things, local security was increasingly
enforced harsh Islamic law to an extent provided by Iraqi police and militia. A status of forces agreement
that ran counter to local Iraqi views, Their presence gave assurance the between Washington and Baghdad
as well as being perceived as yet more new government could protect was signed in December 2008 setting
outside interference in the national the populace and the counterin- a schedule for the withdrawal of
culture. There were also allegations surgent effort was permanent. Coalition forces, though contractors
AQI was responsible for the terrorist There were also other factors at and support personnel are apparently
attacks on the Golden Mosque of work. For example, improving anti- to remain for some indefinite time
Samarra—an important Shi’ite shrine, IED (improvised explosive device) longer. Thus the Iraqi insurgency has,
but one also respected by Sunnis—in technology reduced much of the havoc as of this writing (mid-2013) seem-
2006 and then again in 2007. The US wrought earlier by those insurgent ingly been defeated. While there
military then also began to pay the weapons. Drones, robots and upgraded are still acts of violence in the
tribes to provide local security, and networking tipped the balance in C4I country, the possibility of insurgents
that began to bring with it intelligence (command, control, communications seizing control are remote.
information and local stability. That and computer intelligence) in favor of Certainly the Coalition can claim
approach spread throughout the coun- American forces while further reduc- some form of victory, and that’s
try and provided a formula for victory. ing their casualties. There was also no small accomplishment given
The much debated Surge increased American emphasis on night the chaos into which Iraq plunged
also began in early 2007. It had fighting, supported by enhanced vision following Operation Iraqi Freedom.
been planned in Washington and technology, which provided a further Whether the Iraq experience also
the Pentagon, and involved the tactical edge to the counterinsurgents provides a new and successful doctrine
commitment of five additional since, historically, guerrillas tended to for counterinsurgency in future
brigades to Iraq while also extending have the upper hand during darkness. conflicts remains to be seen. t
the tours of the units already in Another factor reducing the
place. The objective wasn’t to win violence was that in various places SOURCES
through the use of greater force; sectarian forces succeeded in forcing
Hashim, Ahmed. Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in
rather, the Surge heralded a change their opponents completely out of Iraq. Ithaca: Cornell, 2006.
in strategy. The additional troops entire neighborhoods. The Mahdi Keegan, John. The Iraq War. NY: Vintage, 2005.
Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerilla. Oxford Univ.
provided security for the populace Army secured much of Baghdad Press, 2009.
while training Iraqi government units. against the Sunnis and, when the Moyar, Mark. A Question of Command. Yale Univ. Press,
2009.
As executed by Gen. David dust settled, the reason for fighting Pirnie, Bruce & Edward O’Connell. Counterinsurgency in
Petraeus, the Surge also involved there had largely been removed. Iraq (2003-2006). Santa Monica: Rand, 2008.
Ricks, Thomas. The Gamble: General David Petraeus
changes in tactics to reduce collateral Finally, Iraqi government forces and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, NY:
damage by more selectively targeting were making their effect felt. In March Penguin, 2009.
insurgents. It also emphasized turning 2008 they launched an offensive to

I Remember:
Micro-Terrain in Iraq
By Philip Sharp
Our squad returns to Patrol Base Shanghai. The canal is within the foliage off to the left.
H
istory is full of examples One new concept, though, is micro-terrain. Time and again, IED
of how terrain directly “micro-terrain.” That’s terrain that would be planted under our noses
affected the outcomes of can have an impact on operations and no amount of concertina wire or
battles. Such determinative features even though it doesn’t otherwise draw enhanced vision devices gave us an
are often referred to as “key terrain,” attention to itself on the map or in advantage finding them. Insurgents
because they can open the metaphoric combat. It’s the ditch infantry must often also fired on our locations, only
door to success. Having troops on, cross at the last instant before starting to disappear without a trace. Their
or otherwise controlling, key terrain an engagement, high vegetation knowledge of the local micro-terrain
provides an advantage over an that hides movement, or soil that gave them a huge advantage over
opponent. Gaining a tactical terrain won’t hold the weight of vehicles. us, just as much as any key terrain
edge has therefore translated into The muddy field of Agincourt that they chose not to try to hold.
victory in both battles and campaigns. bogged down the charge of the French We also initially failed to grasp the
Key terrain provides observation and chivalry as they attacked the English effects of micro-terrain in regard to
fields of fire and protection while bowmen serves as an example. The how it applied to the main thing for
hindering enemy movement and exploitation of such micro-terrain which the insurgents were fighting:
deployment. The higher ground at is playing an increasingly important control of the populace. Every time
Gettysburg on which the Union line part in today’s military operations. we occupied a house, we made a
rested, the defile at Lake Trasimene Micro-terrain impacts campaigns potential enemy of the residents and
from which Hannibal launched his and battles in unique ways, and often their relatives. When we wired-off an
ambush of the Romans, and the in ways not considered by military area, thereby preventing livestock
crossing points of the Tugela River leaders beforehand. I came to learn from getting to their feeding pasture,
at Colenso where the Boers shot up that while I was operating in an Iraqi or when we inadvertently trampled
a British column are all examples. village named Rushdi Mullah. That crops as we moved, the locals would
Most armies, at least combat-effec- village, located in an area then known further shift their sympathy to the
tive ones, understand and exploit such by us Americans as the “Triangle of insurgency. All that unwittingly pro-
terrain. Even soldiers of the lowest Death,” was often used as a meeting vided the enemy a recruiting ground
rank have always comprehended the place and training area for Al Qaeda. and safe haven right in front of us.
effect terrain has on their operations, if That was until my unit, B Company, We came to learn we could have
nothing more than in the difficulty in 4/31 Infantry set up there in 2006. a positive impact on the populace
marching up a hill or the opportunity The enemy then taught us through better use of the micro-
to take cover when under fire. lessons associated with the use of terrain. One way was to provide

arteries for safe travel. For example, by
the simple expedient of keeping the
roads open for the civilian populace
via the use of checkpoints, we gave
them a reason to support our side.
I witnessed another way the local
micro-terrain affected our relationship
with the people, and it came on us
suddenly and without planning. The
micro-terrain that would play a crucial
role in influencing the population
was a canal: actually little more
than a ditch about two feet deep.
In the summer of 2007 our platoon
was returning to Patrol Base Shanghai,
our company encampment. We were
exhausted from hours on duty, the The hard and bond-building work of clearing the waterway begins as a joint American-Iraqi effort.
constant wearing of body armor, and
the mostly futile chasing after slippery
insurgents. The only thought on our
minds as we were about to enter our
perimeter was: “Let’s finish this patrol!”
At that moment we were
approached by one of the village
elders. He was known and respected
in the area, and we’d come to get
along pretty well with him and his
large family. That time, though, our
conversation wasn’t the dialogue of
pleasantries we usually had during our
meetings. His demeanor was earnest
and troubled. The issue he wanted
to bring before us boiled down to the
simple ditch we’d neglected for so long. The task being completed.
That waterway passed closely
alongside Patrol Base Shanghai parallel the canal. The catch, as far as we By the end of the day, fresh water
to its walls. Our concertina wire were concerned, was our patrol had was again running through the vil-
coursed across parts of it, and the to stay there with them for security lage. Everyone in the area came and
date trees that had been near our as they performed the clean up. That thanked us for the gesture. From that
perimeter had been leveled to create wasn’t anything the already exhausted time on we were heralded as friends,
a field fire (another example of soldiers wanted to hear. Nonetheless, and we were frequently invited to share
how to alienate the locals). It was the new order came down, so we meals with many of the local families.
understood by all that to approach set about making it happen. The micro-terrain of the canal
our perimeter line unannounced What happened next hadn’t ultimately wasn’t the only thing that
would bring death to anyone so been anticipated by anyone, and made an impression in our area of
foolish. No one had openly dared. was totally unexpected in its result. operations, but it certainly had an
In most of Iraq water is moved via The entire area suddenly came undeniably favorable impact on
canals, not pipes. Those canals are alive, with Iraqi men appearing, as our control of it. It’s relatively easy
tended throughout the year by the if out or nowhere, carrying tools to picture seizing the high ground,
local men, and if they’re not constantly and driving tractors. We posted our breaching a defense line, or
kept up they quickly fall into disrepair. SAW machinegunners farther out, establishing a bridgehead as being
Over time our obscure ditch/canal had to provide perimeter security, while decisive to a fight. Understanding
become clogged by trash and debris. American soldiers, Iraqi soldiers and the significance of micro-terrain
Therefore, throughout the area, cholera locals all pitched in to clear out what isn’t as assured when a commander
was starting to break out because the we then suddenly and fully understood evaluates his “battle space.” The effects
locals were having increasing difficulty was a piece of key micro-terrain. on operations, though, are just as
acquiring clean water. The only avail- The event became a public affair, definitive and aren’t to be overlooked
able water for Rushdi Mullah was to be with more people coming in from all by those who become wise to it. You
found in the now near-stagnant ditch. around to observe the festivities. It was can be sure of one thing: in modern
After some time talking with the that important to them. In that way asymmetric warfare, your insurgent
elder and our higher echelons about there was a bond formed between us opponent will certainly be aware of
the situation, it was decided the and the people that we hadn’t even the advantage of micro-terrain. t
villagers would be allowed to clear thought of trying to develop earlier.

Design Theory
Joseph Miranda
Decision Iraq
T
here were four basic systems appeared in S&T no. 21, way back in ground but losing the media battle.
that needed to be in a game on 1970. The game was called Chicago, I rated the units according to
the Iraq counterinsurgency: Chicago, and it covered the riots functional categories. That was to
1) it was going to be won or lost on surrounding the Democratic National keep things simple and stay within
who had the most political points; Convention in 1968. Long story short, the overall spirit of the design. For
2) units would have varying levels of I adapted that system to model Iraq in example, a US armored brigade is
effectiveness, going up for experience the years following 2003 and – voila! – it the same as an infantry brigade but,
and down for cohesion loss; 3) combat worked. Playtesting showed the game given the situation, the real issue is
was to be asymmetric, with casualty imparted all the critical lessons about how well adapted those two different
generation in the opposing force pos- the insurgency and counterinsurgency forces are at dealing with insurgents.
sibly being counter-productive; with a minimal amount of rules. Often it wasn’t the weaponry that
and 4) the map would have to I added a couple sub-systems to the mattered; rather, it was unit leadership
show the distinction between units original design, including the “Chaos” and the abilities of personnel at all
operating in the open as opposed to events and the “Netwar” chits. The levels to adapt to the situation.
dispersing among the populace. former was the easiest way to integrate FOB and Base Zones (BZ) have
Oddly enough, there already was all kinds of things without a lot of several special abilities: they negate
a game that had all those features. It special rules; the latter was to model retreats, which is conventional enough,
netcentric warfare, a new dimension but they optionally also allow you to
of 21st century operations. There were divide attacks against enemy forces.
also various new specialized units, Those abilities represent increased
such as airmobile formations and command control, logistics,
Forward Operating Bases (FOB). local security and networks set
The combat results tables may up among the people.
seem odd at first. For instance, the As for unconventional units
Civic Action Table shows what happens not being affected by the “level”
when you’re engaged in low-level sub-system, that’s a carryover from
operations among the people: PSYOP, Chicago, Chicago, in which police
SWET (sewage, water, electricity, trash tactical platoons were immune. I can
removal), local security, etc. That offer any number of rationalizes for
reduces the overall level of violence, that – such as unconventional units
so the enemy loses strength. The representing an operational capability
thing is, however, as you disperse throughout a region as opposed to
your force among the people to individual units – but in the end it
accomplish those types of missions, was the “COW” (Comes Out in the
they’re losing combat effectiveness. Wash) factor, as they used to call it
So there’s a chance they’ll also go in the old-SPI days. That is, when
down in strength in that regard. played, it generates a realistic feel
Upcoming magazine previews The Guerrilla Table shows the and result. Call it “design for effect.”
Special offers overall effects of low-level combat Counterinsurgent airpower
and terrorism. The attacker generally can be overwhelming in the game.
Special content only available
goes up in strength as experience Frankly, that’s how it was (and
to Briefing Room subscribers is gained, intelligence is gathered is). Airstrikes represent not only
and weapons are captured. The aircraft but general US technological
enemy goes up in strength due to superiority. That’s balanced by the
the fact his people want revenge. points the Insurgent player gets
The Major Offensive Table repre- due to collateral damage. The game
sents larger battles such as Fallujah. shows the asymmetry of present-day
You wreak a lot of havoc on the enemy, unconventional warfare. t
but at the same time results such as
“Overkill” can mean winning on the

DECISION IRAQ
Decision: Iraq, designed by Joseph Miranda, is a game that To purchase the game that covers the battles featured in
covers the fight against the insurgency in Iraq, which began in this issue send your name and address along with:
2003 following the US-led invasion of that country. Historically, the
quick US-Coalition victory over Saddam Hussein’s military forces $30 US Customers
in March of that year quickly degenerated into an insurgency that $36 Canadian Customers
swept the country. The situation was eventually turned around, $38 Overseas Customers
but only after a steep learning curve for the United States and All prices include postage for 1st class or airmail
its partners. The game shows the major factors involved. shipping. CA residents add $1.80 sales tax.
There are two players: the Insurgents (who want to seize control
of Iraq. They represent various Iraqi rebels and Foreign Fighters, the Name
latter including Al Qaeda and Iranian support, among others, and the Address
Counterinsurgents (who want to restore stability to a democratic Iraq,
as well as defeat any Al Qaeda elements which may be operating in the
country.) They represent Multinational (MNF) forces (US and allies) and City/State/Zip
Iraqi Government Forces (which also include friendly Iraqi tribal militias). Country
Both players have pieces that represent conventional and V/MC/DISC# Exp.
unconventional forces. During their respective turns, players
Signature
move their pieces among the spaces on the map, and engage in
various kinds of conflict in order to destroy enemy forces. The Phone # Email
objective for each player is to establish control over Iraq.
One unique feature of the game is that units, as they
engage in combat, may increase or decrease in effectiveness
as they gain experience in fighting or become demoralized.
GO ONLINE: shop.strategyandtacticspress.com
SEND TO: Decision Games

ATTN: MW Game Offer
P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield CA 93390
Detail of the Decision Iraq map

Airland Battle Doctrine
By Mark R. Schwartz
Need for Something New
I
n the late 1970s the US Army and Air Force developed a new doctrine
for conventional war that was centered on the idea of being able
to rapidly defeat massed Soviet ground formations. Among other
things, it shifted away from past reliance on tactical nuclear weaponry
and instead emphasized a new way of fighting conventionally. Both
services moved to the same concepts for different reasons, together
creating what became known as “AirLand Battle Doctrine.” It would
be applied in an adapted form during the First Gulf War in 1991.

Soviet-era Russian artist V.S. Visotsky’s concept of what WW3
would’ve looked like in heavily urbanized terrain.

the rest of the operation would also
fall apart. The dilemma, then, was in
having forces prepared to fight large-
scale mobile battles, actions that went
well beyond simply holding a line.
Until the 1970s the US Army
doctrine for conventional warfare was
called “Active Defense.” It stressed fire-
power over maneuver, and its central
idea was to attrit attacking forces to the
point they halted their advance. Then
reserves would be committed to push
them back. The doctrine was unimagi-
native, but it seemed to be the best
alternative in the face of Soviet and
Warsaw Pact numerical superiority.
The US experience in the Vietnam
War indicated attritional tactics were
unable to gain a decision, at least in
a politically acceptable timeframe
and with politically acceptable losses.
A formation of Soviet tanks moves out. Rather than fighting outnumbered
and winning, the new concept that
Throughout the Cold War, Soviet up in predictable echelons, and its emerged was aimed at controlling
and their Warsaw Pact allied armed technology was inferior. Further, the the larger “battle space” in order to
forces lacked the training and Warsaw Pact command and control reduce the strength and effectiveness
technologically advanced weaponry of (C2) system was overly centralized. of enemy forces prior to the moment
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Plans were made at the upper level, of main contact between opposing
(NATO). Rather, their advantage lay with higher headquarters retaining ground forces. That called for interdict-
in their ability to concentrate large control of all aspects of operational ing the adversary’s flow of men, mate-
numbers of armor, artillery and execution down to the tactical level. riel and supplies using aerial assets,
mechanized infantry divisions for At the same time, Soviet doctrine long-range artillery, and airmobility.
what were expected to be decisive called for units to seize the initiative By immediately taking the fight
battles and exploitation deep into and conduct complex, mobile opera- deep into the enemy’s rear area, NATO
Western Europe. Soviet doctrine tions. Thus those centrally controlled could channel the attackers’ move-
called for “deep operations,” using tactics would likely falter if an oppo- ment, open gaps among their forma-
densely massed armies and air forces. nent could disrupt their execution. tions, and block follow-on echelons
American military planners doubt- For example, Soviet doctrine called from joining the battle. All that would
ed the ability of then current NATO for second and third echelon forces then result in the disruption of their
doctrine to stop such an offensive to move through and exploit break- momentum and combat effectiveness.
without the employment of tactical throughs made by the first echelon. That, in turn, would force a “culminat-
nuclear weapons. That was something Those two echelons weren’t flexible ing battle” in which NATO could
that would devastate Europe, regard- reserves; rather, they were rigidly slated maneuver to decisively counterattack
less of who “won” any such future war. as to when and where to move as part whatever had by then been identi-
Of course, the Soviet system of the larger overall plan. Hence, were fied as the enemy center of gravity,
wasn’t infallible. Its tactics were the initial phase of the offensive to thereby gaining the final decision.
relatively inflexible; its units formed be disrupted, US strategists expected
extended Battlefield
AirLand Battle had four doctrinal

tenets: initiative, depth, agility and syn-
chronization. To execute those tenets,
the corps was to become the primary
C2 headquarters, both utilizing divi-
sions in operational-level engagements
and also conducting the deeper fight,
the latter by synchronizing organic
artillery assets with air power.
Corps were to attack enemy
formations massing for combat up
to 100 miles away. The overall battle
space was partitioned into the Close
9 miles 9 miles 56 miles Battle Area (up to 13 miles beyond

the Forward Line of Own Troops or
FLOT), the Deep Battle Area (which
might extend to 120 or more miles
beyond the FLOT), and the even more
distant Strategic Battle Area, in which
operations were reserved for airpower.
Maneuver-unit commanders
operated within an “area of interest.”
Maneuver brigades at the FLOT
generally influenced the battle to a
depth of nine to 13 miles, while the
divisions did so out to 43 miles. In
comparison, Soviet doctrine placed
follow-on maneuver formations in
reserve at 18 to 30 miles from the above — The TRADOC ensignia.
FLOT. Thus the US would actually be right — Gen. William Dupuy.
fighting far deeper than would the
“deep operations” of the Soviets.
Commanders were to plan to
fight within their areas of interest TrADoc: The uS Army’s Intellectual Side
as determined not only by higher
headquarters’ guidance, but also by Douglas Skinner, a noted military analyst, described doctrine as “a level of
their own appreciation of the enemy’s abstraction and generality higher than strategy. Doctrine is a guide to thought on how
actual and anticipated actions. That to employ strategy and tactics. Commanders formulate their strategy, employ tactics,
area of interest concept was another then appeal to doctrine for how to combine these elements effectively in battle.”
new dimension of AirLand Battle: they In the 1950s and 1960s, US Army and Air Force doctrine for a future war in Europe
were to overlap between adjacent revolved around nuclear weapons. Both services intended to use them liberally against
maneuver units, so more than one attacking Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. Additionally, the army intended to disperse its
could be coordinated to concentrate formations across the battlefield to deny lucrative targets for Soviet nuclear weapons.
attacks against the same enemy force. Neglect of conventional war-fighting doctrine during Vietnam left an intellectual
As a result the battlefield became vacuum as Soviet military power grew and technological innovations made their impact
increasingly non-linear, and the felt. The 1973 Yom Kippur War demonstrated the power of anti-tank guided missiles,
importance assigned to an enemy suggesting massed enemy armor could be stopped. To bridge the doctrinal gap, the army
formation didn’t necessarily match its formed its Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973 under Gen. William Dupuy.
relative distance from the FLOT. All of TRADOC developed doctrine for the army, becoming the intellectual engine for all
that demanded speed and initiative, such developments. TRADOC’s new look at land warfare determined armored warfare
in order to be able to strike enemy was feasible in Europe while conflicts elsewhere would involve mostly light infantry.
units deep in their own rear area as Dupuy counseled NATO weaponry could provide victory in initial European battles,
opportunities presented themselves. but formations would have to be concentrated. TRADOC evolved “Active Defense”
As stated in Field Manual (FM) 100-5, as a first – but transitory – doctrinal effort. The next TRADOC commander, Gen. Don
Operations: “Operations must be rapid, Starry, expanded that thinking in his 1978 Battlefield Development Plan. That advocated

unpredictable, violent, and disorient- attacks against enemy second echelon forces. Better force management techniques
ing to the enemy.” The overarching were also developed, as did viewing the “extended battlefield” as a dimension of time
intent was to avoid engaging head on as well as distance. Under Starry, TRADOC made AirLand Battle ready for war.
the enemy’s main strength by first,
disrupting his fighting capabilities
and then shattering his will to fight.
The USAF Tactical Air Command Before submitting requests for that
Jointness (TAC), alongside the army’s Training kind of help, ground unit commanders
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), had to check if organic artillery could
The new army doctrine was formed the Air-Land Forces do the job. If so, the mission went
aligned with close air support (CAS) Applications Agency (ALFA) and the to those assets. Air support requests
concepts the air force wanted to Joint Studies Group (JSG) in 1977. endorsed by the corps headquarters
apply to its own evolving concept of ALFA tested the new A-10 CAS aircraft went to the theater-level C2 center to
deep battle. The air force had always and attack helicopters, producing be matched with available aircraft.
resisted the reduction of airpower joint tactics to focus air-delivered ALFA and JSG grouped Combat Air
to the mere status of flying artillery, weapons against tactical targets. Support (CAS) and Air Interdiction (AI)
preferring instead to operate against JSG also investigated methods to to form a new mission area, Offensive
strategic and other targets beyond the interdict Warsaw Pact second-echelon Air Support (OAS), applying fixed-wing
battlefield. Nonetheless, a working formations: each headquarters attack to the ground battle. Artillery
partnership with the army came into would have USAF tactical air control would also be used to suppress hostile
place in forging the new doctrine. parties (TACP) to identify targets to air defense systems threatening OAS
be engaged by fixed-wing aircraft. missions, thereby supporting airpower.

cAS vs. AI vs. BAI
Like the US, NATO saw the corps as the spearhead

of deep operations. It developed a new fixed-wing
OAS mission, Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI), to
attack enemy follow-on echelons. The US in turn
accepted BAI as part of its doctrine in 1979, but
the US Air Force said it should be a weapon of the
theater-level air component commander (ACC) rather
than any ground force corps. BAI thus became a focal
point for army vs. air force AirLand Battle debate.
CAS supported close battle and required detailed
integration with small-unit maneuver and fire plans,
and safety measures were needed to protect ground
troops from friendly fire. CAS could attack no deeper
than the fire support coordination line (FSCL), a control
measure giving the ground force commander authority
over air strikes to the range of his organic artillery
(usually out to 12 miles beyond the FLOT). The com-
mander’s TACP proposed likely CAS missions inside
the FSCL, and he approved or denied those proposals.
CAS thus remained a secure part of AirLand Battle,
but the question remained as to how enemy second
echelon forces moving toward friendly troops already
engaged against first echelon units could be struck.
col. John Boyd & the ooDA Loop By mid-1981 air force and army staffs had endorsed
an agreement that set up OAS apportionment and
In his 1976 briefing, Patterns of Conflict, Col. John Boyd – a allocation procedures, and directed that corps
USAF fighter pilot and doctrinal theorist – proposed a new set commanders would select BAI targets. Theater-level
of tactics with no set front line, utilizing hit-and-run attacks C2 allocated sorties to OAS missions with army-level
against Soviet maneuver groups. He advocated a “deep battle” advice on their distribution to corps and divisions.
that would be fought in the Soviet rear area as well as via agile To integrate CAS with his unit’s scheme of
maneuver along the front. Its objective was to derail the Warsaw maneuver and fire, each commander required
Pact command system. Boyd asked the following questions. timely information on the location of enemy and
friendly formations. That level of situational aware-
Why try to reduce your own friction and uncertainty? Why ness remained hard to achieve for brigade and
not magnify the adversary’s friction and uncertainty? division commanders in fluid situations. Generally
only the corps possessed information adequate to
Why try to exhaust the adversary by increasing his efforts? Why decide if a CAS request was better served by organic
not paralyze him by denying opportunities to expend effort? artillery fire or needed higher-level commitment.
According to the 1981 inter-service agreement, BAI
Why strike at one center of gravity where mass would engage enemy concentrations of sufficient size
is concentrated? Why not strike at many smaller and importance to have a potentially decisive effect
centers of gravity that sustain the larger system? on the overall land battle. BAI would therefore target
only battalions or larger formations, especially those
He suggested traditional strategists erred by viewing conflict spearheading an attack and the units following them to
from the top down. He emphasized adaptability by pushing deci- exploit penetrations. In 1981 the USAF high command
sions to lower levels as the battle tempo increased. He advocated declared that agreement to constitute official doctrine.
a coherent command and control (C2) structure by synchronizing all
levels of command. Missions were to be contracts between supe- Further Debate
riors, who dictated what must be accomplished, and subordinates
who served their superiors’ intent with imagination and initiative. The 1982 edition of FM 100-5 officially premiered
Boyd also coined the term “OODA Loop.” That was the AirLand Battle and defined BAI as the “primary means
decision-making process of: Observe, Orient, Decide and Act. The of fighting the deep battle at extended ranges. BAI
idea was to operate inside the adversary’s OODA time-cycle by isolates enemy forces by preventing their reinforce-
performing all of its elements faster, thereby controlling every ment and resupply and by restricting their maneuver.
level of conflict. That idea applied equally to overall ground It also destroys, delays, or disrupts follow-on enemy

force commanders and individual fighter pilots and everyone units before they can enter the close battle.”
in between. Today that concept is advocated by most military The army intended to diminish Warsaw Pact supe-
schools of thought as well as many business strategists. riority along the FLOT by destroying follow-on rein-
forcements. AirLand Battle still omitted guidance on
resolving overlaps or gray areas between CAS and BAI.

For instance, one question was:
should BAI be used at the point
of penetration? The figure above
illustrates that dilemma, with a Soviet
thrust approaching friendly lines and
in CAS range. CAS could attack the
flanks of the thrust, but the enemy
could still shift troops laterally in
their mid- to deep-zones to position
for a breakthrough or exploit one.
One proposal was that targets
beyond the FSCL be made solely
a USAF responsibility, especially if
dispersed across more than a one-
corps area of interest. That then led
to lobbying for centralized control
of massed air assets, to be matched
by decentralized mission executions
by the tactical air control parties.
That, in turn, would effectively have
put BAI into command limbo.
The army then further complicated
matters with its deployment of longer-
range weapons. Corps could augment
division fires with the Multiple Launch
Rocket System (MLRS), which could
hit targets up to 18 miles within the
Deep Battle Zone. The Army Tactical
Missile System (ATACMS) offered a
3 miles
range of up to 186 miles. Likewise,
Apache attack helicopters could 19 miles
range out to 62 miles into that zone.
In 1985 it was suggested the FSCL
be kept close to the FLOT, no more
than 9.3 miles deep. That aligned with
the limits of observed fire (out to about
three miles from friendly positions)
and troop safety needs. The idea was
the more controlled circumstances
inside the FSCL permitted BAI to target
leading elements of the enemy second
echelon. Failure to accept those pro-
cedures would create a “No-Mission” 40 to 70 miles
zone within the FSCL, where neither
CAS nor BAI met the criteria for use.
In 1986 the army revised AirLand rifts that still divided soldiers and placed air assets accordingly. It oper-
Battle to synchronize ground opera- airmen. While the ground force ated on a 72-hour cycle paralleling the
tions with larger theater and campaign commander lamented the effective corps planning cycle of 72 to 96 hours.
objectives, dictating that air-to-ground absence of BAI, the airmen applied There was a continuous evaluating of
operations support campaign objec- CAS across all the deep battle space intelligence against missions proposed
tives rather than be subordinate to nominally given to BAI, irrespective for every 24-hour period, and it was
the needs of individual battles within of FSCL placement. Doctrinal sup- resolved by using the best mix of
it. The proving ground for all that port for division-level deep battle missions. That system, controlled at
theorizing would finally come in 1991. evaporated. Battlefield air interdiction the theater air commander level, mis-
was controlled and executed by the aligned with the 24 to 72 hour planning
War in the Gulf air commander as part of his larger and execution cycle at division-level.
theater-level air interdiction campaign. It thereby effectively legislated BAI
In response to the Iraqi conquest The air force regulated their strikes operations out of the division’s reach.
of Kuwait in 1990, the US committed through their method of planning and Doctrinal expectations for a
sizable land and air forces to fight executing the air war – Air Tasking European conflict evaporated with
in the 1991 operation codenamed Orders (ATO). The ATO scheduled the realities of the war in the Persian
Desert Storm, a.k.a. the First Gulf air missions with inputs from all Gulf. CAS remained available for
War. That fighting exposed doctrinal interested targeting agencies and the close battle, but the absence of

“kill boxes” as a control measure
beyond the FSCL. Kill boxes provided
a free-fire area for AI and other deep
battle systems. Friendly ground units
were to stay clear of the boxes.
The JFC and JFACC leaned toward
satisfying interdiction demands after
filling CAS requests. Headquarters
and airborne command posts directed
uncommitted aircraft to AI targets.
As interdiction targets changed with
battlefield circumstances, army and
air force staffs generated new targets
for the mission stream. Airborne
command posts monitored FSCL
movement and controlled the 30-mile-
square kill boxes with procedural rules
Gen. Sir John Hackett.
and F-16 scouts that patrolled each
box as airborne forward air controllers.
BAI suggested the persistence of The altered doctrine took into
the feared No Mission Zone. Gen. account all enemy units inside the
Norman Schwarzkopf, the Joint FSCL in close proximity to friendly
Force Commander (JFC, responsible forces. The altered definition of the
for the operations of all services) FSCL encouraged army counter-efforts
and Lt. Gen. Charles Horner (Joint to move it deeper – thus providing
The Third World War Force ACC, JFACC) therefore agreed targets for their deep weapons.
to restrict interdiction missions to CAS required terminal control and
In 1978, Gen. Sir John Hackett and areas beyond the FSCL, fearing the integration with maneuver and
several other British officers penned a No Mission Zone held the greatest fire plans, but ad hoc procedures
novel detailing a possible Warsaw Pact potential for friendly fire incidents. instigated during the Desert Storm
blitz into Western Europe titled The Third In the Gulf, USAF planners also maneuver effort allowed CAS to range
World War. Their overriding message maintained interdiction missions up to 40 miles ahead of friendly forces,
was: bolster NATO’s conventional were ultimately more productive than opening a larger set of targets for
defenses to meet the growing Soviet CAS. Along that line, they introduced corps and division commanders.
menace. Among other things, the book
brought out that then-existing US military
doctrine, emphasizing defense, offered
no inspiration for victory. The book
portrayed massed Soviet formations
overwhelming NATO defenders.
The initial onslaught: “The open
ground…was swarming with menacing
black shapes coming fast toward him.
They were tanks, moving in rough line-
abreast about 200 meters apart, less than
1,000 meters off and closing the range
quickly. Another line was following behind
and a third just coming out of the trees.
The world seemed full of Soviet tanks.”
The Soviet doctrine of massed ech-
elons: “Soviet momentum was maintained
by heavy concentrations of armour and
firepower on narrow fronts; flanks were
largely ignored. …Swift exploitation by
troops of the second echelon would then
follow hard on the heels of the first.”
NATO’s previous doctrine often
committed up to 50 percent of a
forward deployed corps to be burned

up in defense, while AirLand Battle
offered a vision of victory through
vigorous mobile counterattacks.

&
The biggest issue thus became the

final determination of targets. Attacks
against Iraqi ground units consumed
89 percent of JFACC-directed mis-
sions. That left army commanders
cold. In particular, they reported
too few sorties were being made
available to VII and XVIII Corps. They
also complained USAF response to
army-designated deep targets took
30 minutes to two hours, which was
much too long given the rapidly
changing situation on the ground.
continued on page 36 »

uS & Soviet units of and preventing duplication of functions at big picture) and tactics (the battlefield itself).
the Later cold War different levels of the division. Facilitating It dealt with fighting and winning campaigns.
all that was the superb American fire control The new doctrine did much to orient army
US Army system, which allowed even the lowest-level planning toward fighting for decisive objectives.
unit to call in masses of artillery and airpower.
Starting in 1963, US Army divisions were The ROAD concept was similar to the Soviet Army
organized under the ROAD (Reorganization army’s “combat command” armored divisions of
Objective Army Division) program. Divisions World War II, though the heavy divisions of the The two main types of Soviet divisions
had a “base,” consisting of an artillery later Cold War years had more organic assets. were tank (armored) and motorized rifle
group, a reconnaissance battalion, various A major upgrade was the addition of an entire (infantry). Tank divisions (TD) were intended
combat support battalions, and a support aviation brigade to the division, expanding the to conduct breakthroughs, while motorized
command (the latter controlling division-level helicopter battalion of the 1960s and 1970s and rifle divisions (MRD) would exploit and
logistical units). Maneuver battalions would including the armored cavalry battalion—since consolidate. Soviet organization emphasized
be assigned based on the type of division, the latter had considerable air-mobility. Another combined arms formations: tank and motorized
of which there were two: light and heavy. upgrade was the inclusion of a communications rifle regiments were miniature divisions,
Light divisions included infantry, airborne electronic warfare intelligence battalion to han- with their own armor, mechanized infantry,
and air assault. Heavy divisions included dle a range of intelligence and EW activities. artillery, etc., units. That put all the assets the
armored and mechanized. In general, there Corps were the next level above divisions. commander needed under one headquarters,
was little difference between the armored and The diagram on p.30 shows a typical corps in but it could make it difficult to concentrate
mechanized divisions, other than in their mixes Europe. The armored cavalry regiment was for specific types of fire at the division level.
of armor and mechanized infantry battalions. reconnaissance, screening and delay actions. TD and MRD organization owed much
Each division had three maneuver The independent armored or mechanized to the Red Army tank and mechanized
brigade headquarters, which controlled the brigades might be units forward-deployed from corps of World War II. For example, the
maneuver battalions. The idea was the division divisions stationed back in the United States, inclusion of an organic mechanized infantry
commander would form task forces based on which would reinforce the theater in the event battalion in the TD armor regiments was
the tactical situation, assigning battalions of war (referred to as “the balloon going up”). to provide close-in support for the tanks.
as needed. Other divisional assets might be One US advantage was in its While the scale of organization seems
assigned to brigades for the accomplishment of lavish logistical support. That made the impressive on paper, Soviet units were smaller
specific missions. For example, a brigade going sustainment of divisions through prolonged than their American counterparts. For example,
into the attack might receive additional armor, periods of combat more efficient. a US mechanized infantry battalion had 875
armored cavalry and attack helicopter units, The development of AirLand Battle doctrine men, while its Soviet equivalent came in at
while a brigade holding the line might be made was accompanied by the army officially 450; similarly, a US armored battalion was
infantry heavy. Otherwise, the brigade HQ had recognizing the operational level of war. The assigned 54 tanks, while a Soviet would have
no organic units, streamlining the organization operational level was between strategy (the 40. Overall strength for a TD was 11,470
men, and for an MRD 12,695. In comparison,
Divisional Weapons & Equipment in the 1980s a US heavy division would have 19,000.
There were two types of motorized
US “Division ‘86 Soviet Tank Soviet Mechanized
rifle regiments, based on the primary type
Armored Division Division 1980s Division 1980s
of infantry fighting vehicle: BMP (boyevaya
mashina pekhoty—armored vehicle infantry)
Men 16,295 11,470 12,695
MBT 348 328 220
IFV/APC 457 250 - 365 324 - 497
Notes
ATGM vehicles 48 9 36 Men: total personnel
ATGM (d) - - 24 MBT: main battle tanks
IFV/APC: total infantry fighting vehicles and
AT guns - - 12 x 100mm/125mm armored personnel carriers, including recon
Medium artillery towed - 36 x 122mm 36 x 122mm vehicles, excluding support vehicles
ATGM vehicles: antitank guided
Medium artillery SP 75 x 155mm 72 x 122mm 72 x 122mm
missiles on IFV/APC
Heavy artillery SP 12 x 203mm 18 x 152mm 18 x 152mm ATGM (d): dismounted ATGM
MLRS 9 x 227mm 18 x 122mm 18 x 122mm AT guns: antitank guns
SP: self-propelled guns/howitzers
Heavy mortars 66 x 107mm 36 x 120mm 54 x 120mm MLRS: Multiple launcher rocket systems
AAA 24 x 20mm 16 x 23mm 16 x 23mm AAA: anti-aircraft artillery (guns)
SSM: surface-to-surface missile launchers
SAM 24 20 20
SAM: surface-to-air missile launchers
SSM - 4 4 (exclusive of manpack weapons)
AH 50 18 (1) 18 (1) AH: Attack helicopters
SH: Scout helicopters
SH 54 - - UH: Utility helicopters
UH 54 - - (1) total multipurpose attack/utility helicopters

Representative Armored Fighting Vehicles
Vehicle Country Main Gun Machineguns Horsepower to Max Road Road Armor
Notes
(caliber) weight (tons) Speed (km/hr) Range (km) (maximum)
APC: Armored
M60 MBT USA 1 x 105mm 1 x 12.7mm, 14.2 48.3 480 156mm Personnel Carrier
2 x 7.62mm IFV: Infantry
M1 MBT USA 1 x 105mm 1 x 12.7mm, 27 72.4 498 ? Fighting Vehicle
2 x 7.62mm MBT: Main Battle Tank
?: classified, or varies
M113 APC USA - 1 x 12.7mm 18.5 60.7 480 44mm
depending on add-ons
M2 IFV USA 1 x 25mm, 1 x 7.62mm 20.4 66 483 ?
2 x TOW
launcher
T-62 MBT USSR 115mm 1 x 12.7mm, 14.5 50 650 242mm
1 x 7.62mm
T-72 MBT USSR 125mm 1 x 12.7mm, 18.9 80 550 ?
1 x 7.62mm
BTR-60 USSR - 1 x 14.5mm, 17.5 80 500 9mm
1 x 7.62mm
BMP-1 IFV USSR 1 x 73mm, 1 x 7.62mm 22.2 65 600 33mm
1 x Sagger
launcher
and BTR (brona transporta—armored for commitment when an attack was otherwise were assigned at all levels for detection and
transporter). BMP were tracked vehicles stalled—with, presumably, the division com- decontamination of the after effects of the use
while BTR were wheeled. The latter were mander himself taking personal command and of all types of weapons of mass destruction.
considered to be useful for rapid movement leading the battalion when all else had failed. Generally, Soviet operations were
and pursuit along the central and western The level above the division was army. highly centralized. Headquarters developed
European highway systems, as well as being There were two types, tank and combined plans lower levels of command were to
more maneuverable in urban fighting. The arms. The organization was variable, and the execute precisely. The intent was to create
tracked vehicles were better in cross-country diagram shows some sample formations. a Chess-like control of the battlefield, but
maneuver and assaults. (Incidentally, while the As can be seen, a Soviet army was about the lack of initiative meant operations could
official nomenclature of the MRD was “motor- the size of a reinforced NATO corps. Also, grind to a halt in the face of unanticipated
ized,” the infantry was entirely mechanized throughout this period the Soviets increased events or enemy counteroffensives.
insofar as they rode in armored carriers.) their level of air-mobility with more helicopter The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan showed
Soviet tactics called for an attack in and helicopter-transportable units. their system’s strengths and weaknesses:
multiple echelons. The first echelon was to Soviet doctrine called for deep operations, the initial seizure of the country in December
make the breakthrough, the second to exploit with maneuver groups detached from forward 1979 went with clocklike precision; however,
it, and the third to mop up bypassed enemy units to range into the enemy rear area. the more versatile Afghan guerillas were
strongpoints. For example, a TD commander They were to be supplemented by airborne able to gain the initiative as the war went on.
might assign two tank regiments to the first and special operations units parachuting How the Soviet system might’ve worked in
echelon, a motorized regiment to the second, or helicoptering into that same area. the event of a conventional war in Europe is

and the remaining tank regiment to the third. The Soviet Army was also prepared to a matter for speculation—and wargaming.
The MRD operated similarly. Some MRD had a fight under conditions of nuclear, chemical
division-level tank battalion that was supposed and biological warfare. Personnel were — Joseph Miranda
to act as the division commander’s final reserve trained for that, and relatively large units

manders to use their assets first and
then appeal to the ACC for assistance.
Thus the inter-service struggle
over doctrine continues. Air support
represents an effective battlefield
capability, but coordinating it with
ground forces continues to prove to
be more difficult than the two services
commands’ have imagined. t
SourceS
Alberts, Donald, Lt. Col. “An Alternative View of Air

Interdiction.” Air University Review, July-August
1981.
Caldwell, Thomas, Col. “Extending the Battlefield, An
Airman’s Point of View.” Air University Review,
March-April 1983.
Canby, Steven. “Tactical Airpower in Armored Warfare:
The Divergence with NATO.” Air University Review,
May-June 1979.
Department of the Army. Field manual 100-5: Operations.
Washington, DC, 1986.
Department of the Army. Field manual 100-2-3: The
Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and Equipment.
Washington, DC, 1984.
Foss, Christopher. Jane’s Tanks and Combat Vehicles
Recognition Guide. NY: Harper Collins, 2000.
Laughbaum, Kent, Lt. Col. “Synchronizing Airpower and
Firepower in the Deep Battle.” Air University Press,
» continued from page 33 for attacking throughout the depth January 1999.
of the battle space. Army focus has McPeak, Merrill, Lt. Gen. “TACAIR Missions and The Fire
Support Coordination Line.” Air University Review,
That doctrinal scrap afforded since turned to its own commanders September-October 1985.
otherwise defeated Iraqi units a managing deep attacks with their Romjue, John. “The Evolution of the AirLand Battle
Concept.” Air University Review, May-June 1984.
temporary sanctuary from air and units’ organic weapons, synchronizing Romjue, John. “From Active Defense to “AirLand Battle.”
surface fires. Even so, it failed to fires in each area and supporting US Army TRADOC, June 1984.
Romjue, John. The Army of Excellence: The Development
change the war’s outcome, with the theater commander’s campaign of the 1980s Army. US Army Training & Doctrine
Kuwait liberated by the Coalition and plan. That’s certainly an attempt to Command, 1995.
Skinner, Douglas W. “AirLand Battle Doctrine.” Center for
the Iraqi armed forces shattered. subordinate the air campaign and the Naval Analysis, October 2003.
JFACC to a merely supporting role. Tsouras, Peter. Changing Orders: The Evolution of the
Last Words The air force has meanwhile purged World’s Armies, 1945 to the Present. NY: Facts on
File, 1994.
BAI from their doctrine and touts its US Army Command & General Staff College. Combat
Studies Institute Report No. 14: Sixty Years of
The army dropped the term ATO as the only management tool Reorganizing for Combat. Fort Leavenworth, 2000.
AirLand Battle from its 1993 FM 100-5, needed for deep battle, with all opera- Winton, Harold. “Partnership and Tension: The Army
and Air Force Between Vietnam and Desert Shield.”
though much of the actual concept tions beyond the range of observed Parameters, Spring 1996.
was actually retained. Doctrine no fires under the control of their JFACC.
longer advocates shaping the battle- Subsequent joint doctrine guidance
field for the close-in fight, but rather has directed land component com-
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House_Ads-Mags-v2.indd 79 7/24/12 3:05 PM

Operation Just Cause:
The US Invades Panama
By Peter Martinson
Background
“
G
eneral Noriega’s reckless
threats and attacks upon
Americans in Panama
created an imminent danger to the the following year. Much of Bush’s terrorism and international traffick-
35,000 American citizens in Panama.” defense policies were therefore the ing of illicit drugs, advancing the
With those words President George same as those that had been spelled cause of democracy, freedom and
H. W. Bush announced the US out in President Reagan’s 1988 human rights, and ensuring access
military intervention in Panama to National Security Strategy, since Bush to foreign markets as well as overseas
the American public in December had served in that administration as energy and mineral resources.
1989. Of course, there was more to vice-president. That strategy identified One developing threat identified
the story than a rescue operation. the need to deter hostile attacks on by American leaders was Panama,
The elder Bush’s administration the US, its citizens and military forces. then under the dictatorship of Gen.
came to the White House in January It also included combating threats to Manuel Antonio Noriega, commander
1989. It wouldn’t publish its own the stability of friendly governments of the Panamanian Defense Forces
National Security Strategy paper until from insurgencies, state-sponsored (PDF). Noriega was actively seeking
assistance from Cuba, Nicaragua and
Libya, all countries then hostile to the
US. He accepted $20 million in 1989
from Libya, reportedly in exchange for
permission to use Panama as a base for
insurgent activities throughout Latin
America. Noriega was also involved in
drug trafficking—in fact, he had been
indicted in February 1988 by Federal
grand juries in Miami and Tampa for
numerous violations of those laws.
He had also annulled Panama’s May
1989 election results, arranging to
have Francisco Rodriguez, one of his
cronies, appointed to the position of
president. From Noriega’s perspective,
those moves were intended to counter-
balance the power of the US in Panama
but, given the exigencies of the Cold
War, in Washington they were inter-
preted as direct adversarial actions.
Of course, what made all of it of
importance to Washington was the fact
the country of Panama encompassed
US mechanized infantry literally advancing through Panama City during the operation’s first day. the strategically vital Panama Canal.

That canal was scheduled for turnover regarded him as a major irritant and an covert action proved unsuccessful.
to Panamanian control in accordance outlaw. He was an outlaw with some With the range of remaining options
with the Torrijos–Carter Treaty of firepower, as he controlled Panama’s limited, military intervention was
1977. That treaty also required the armed forces. If nothing else, the Canal becoming the most viable alternative.
US to end its military presence in Zone was home to 12,000 American Top-level interagency discussions
Panama by 1999. At the same time, military personnel and their families, then resulted in the composition
in 1989 the Soviet Union was still who might be endangered in the of National Security Directive 17
a going concern, and there was event of a confrontation. US national (NSD17). In it Bush directed the
worry Cuba would support communist planners, such as Chairman of the military to undertake actions to
insurgent forces throughout the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. William J. protect US facilities and personnel
region. Consequently, control of the Crowe, Jr., considered several strategies while asserting American treaty rights
canal and its military bases was of for Noriega’s removal. One was an in Panama. Meanwhile the president
vital interest to the US government. offer of cancellation of the Federal also appeared before the press in May
While Noriega had once been drug charges in return for Noriega to announce he was sending a further
viewed as a CIA asset, by the summer stepping down, but that was rebuffed. 1,881 US soldiers to Panama as a
of 1989 the American government Similarly, economic sanctions and CIA precautionary step. He stated that his

interests in Panama were democracy
and the protection of American lives.
Of course, left unspoken was the
fact installing a friendly democratic
government meant Noriega had to go.
One final element to Bush’s
strategy was his replacement of Gen.
Frederick Woerner as Commander of
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).
Woerner’s criticism of US policy in
Panama earlier in the year, coupled
with his insistence a political, rather
than a military, solution to the Noriega
problem was the preferred course
of action, had sealed his fate.
Gen. Maxwell Thurman, who
had a solid reputation for taking on
difficult challenges and getting results,
took Woerner’s place. Thurman’s
selection signaled a shift in focus from
security and diplomacy to combat
readiness and decisive action.
Striking South
Wasting no time, Thurman

immediately participated in a series
of top-level briefings in Washington.
Operational objectives were developed
to bridge the gap between broad US
national interests and tactical military
action. Objectives included protecting
American personnel and facilities,
capturing Noriega and remanding him
to criminal prosecution, supporting
the establishment of a US-recognized
democratic government, and restruc-
turing the PDF so as to ensure its long
term support for that new regime.
With those goals in mind, Thurman
began a major assessment of the
situation in which he determined the
enemy center of gravity was the PDF
leadership. Consequently he pushed
for a wider strategy than simply remov-
ing Noriega: the decisive target was to
become the PDF command structure.
By the summer of 1989 Adm. Crowe
and SOUTHCOM (which oversaw
all operations for Latin America)
had readied a series of contingency
plans collectively known as Prayer
Book. They detailed various options
to employ US forces to unilaterally
defend the canal in time of crisis, carry
out a Noncombatant Evacuation Order
(NEO), and assist the Panamanians in
setting up a new form of government.
The political challenge came from
the fact the canal wasn’t in immediate
danger; an evacuation of civilians was


Panamanian Defense Forces » continued from page 40
The Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) numbered some 12,800 men in 1989. neither necessary nor desired, and
That total included the “National Guard” (actually the regular army), police an offensive military operation was
and various officials. The ground force was organized into two infantry bat- therefore still considered too extreme.
talions, five light infantry companies, one cavalry troop and two “public order” Instead, Secretary of Defense Dick
(police) companies. Heavy equipment and armored vehicles were scarce. Cheney, along with Crowe, recom-
Additionally, there were 18 “Dignity Battalions,” paramilitary units of little combat value. mended to the president he simply
Noriega had organized them as a means to suppress his political opponents, as well as to announce the deployment of more
further supplement the defense of the country against possible outside military intervention. troops to Panama. That was supposed
The air force had 500 men with an assortment of reconnaissance, to send a message to Noriega that
transport and training planes as well as unarmed helicopters. The naval America would stand by its interests.
contingent numbered around 400 sailors with various light craft. In addition, Bush agreed to the
Gen. Thurman, of the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), only expected resistance deployment of special operations
from a handful of PDF units. Those units were: Battalion 2000 (550 troops at Fort forces (SOF), elements of Delta Force
Cimarron); 2nd Infantry Company (200 troops at Torrijos-Tocumen Airport); 1st Infantry and part of SEAL Team 6—those
Company (200 troops at Tinajitas, just north of Panama City); 5th Rifle Company (300 troops two units being national-level assets
at Fort Amador, near the Bridge of Americas southwest of Panama City); 12th Cavalry capable of conducting top-echelon
Squadron (150 men at Panama Viejo, between Panama City and Fort Cimarron); 8th Rifle missions. Their mission would be
Company (175 men at Fort Espinar); 6th and 7th Rifle Companies (400 men at Rio Hato); to rescue a CIA operative being held
and elements of 6th, 7th and 8th Companies (150 men at the Comandancia headquarters). by the PDF and, if the opportunity
The disposition of the PDF left the Panamanians with few of the advantages arose, to attempt an operationally and
normally afforded to the defender. US bases were in proximity to all key objectives politically risky snatch of Noriega.
of the operation, and American commanders were familiar with the ground and the One thing Bush had made clear was
deployment of the other side. Consequently they were able to quickly overwhelm the he wanted Noriega to be taken alive

Panamanians by concentrating efficiently against them. The qualitative difference in and brought back to the US for trial.
the respective forces, coupled with the preponderance of the US military’s combat In August 1989 Gen. Thurman
multipliers, assured a quick and relatively low-cost victory for the Americans. focused on one particular contingency
plan within Prayer Book: Operation
Blue Spoon. It called for US forces
Victorious US infantry displaying the American flag and a trophy Panamanian flag at the end of the fighting.

to neutralize the PDF and restore
order in Panama, and it came closest
to accomplishing his operational
vision. As originally designed, Blue
Spoon’s initial operations were to be
conducted by the 12,000 American
military personnel stationed in
Panama, reinforced by 10,000 more,
primarily from 7th Infantry Division. It
was expected to take 22 days to build
up sufficient forces. Consequently,
full combat force wouldn’t be applied
for more than three weeks after the
start of the operation. The concern
then became that such a gradual
approach would eventually come to
mean prolonged fighting against a
thoroughly forewarned and prepared
PDF, and thus more casualties and
more opportunities for Noriega to
take hostages or escape to the jungles
and lead some kind of guerrilla war.
On 1 October 1989, Gen. Colin
Powell took over as chairman of
the JCS. He continued the planning A US military police unit advances on the Presidential Palace during the first day of the attack.
process and reached a general under-
standing with Thurman and Lt. Gen.
Stiner, commander of XVIII Airborne
Corps. That corps contained many of
the army’s rapid deployment units,
which would provide the nucleus of
JTF SOUTH (Joint Task Force South).
Even so, it soon became apparent
Blue Spoon needed reworking. Powell
was looking for a wider range of
options, including the development
of a capability to respond on short
notice to unforeseen contingencies.
Conventional and special operations
forces needed to be more fully inte-
grated, and possibilities considered for
different levels of resistance by the PDF.
The result of Powell’s guidance was
a revised Blue Spoon that differed from
its predecessor in several major ways.
First the timeframe of the buildup
went from three weeks to a few days. A PDF resistance strongpoint inside Panama City goes up in flames
The 82nd Airborne Division and 75th after the culmination of the attack on it by US forces.
Ranger Regiment would spearhead
a “forced entry” using airborne the PDF while minimizing collateral still needed was the president to
operations. Second, unity of effort damage. That would ensure a viable give his give his final go ahead for
was assured by establishing unity post-operation political situation, with the operation renamed Just Cause.
of command: all units, regardless of the US in control but Panamanians not
their initial location or time of arrival, responding by starting a guerilla war. Just Cause
were under command of Gen. Stiner. In early November 1989, Stiner and
Third, in addition to compressing Brig. Gen. William Hartzog, the “J3” D-Day for Just Cause was 20
the timeline, assaulting forces would (operations officer) of SOUTHCOM, December 1989. H-Hour was originally
attack their targets with maximum briefed Powell on the details of the scheduled for 1:00 a.m. local time,
surprise. Fourth, US forces would revised plan. He approved them, but reports of unusual PDF activity
make a major effort to seize Noriega. and on 7 November the secretary of caused Stiner to advance the start by
The final requirement was that JTFS defense authorized the augmentation 15 minutes for the SOF. Since the
would make its primary objective of the existing forces in Panama.
the disarming and dismantling of The stage was thus set: all that was continued on page 45 »


Joint Task Force South » continued from page 43
Southern Command left little to chance. Units from each of the services participated overarching objective was tactical
in the operation, though the main unit in the Canal Zone was the 193rd Infantry Brigade surprise, those forces would strike
(Reinforced). Those prepositioned US forces in Panama were then reinforced by units several objectives simultaneously.
deployed into the area from the United States, including a brigade of 82nd Airborne Key SOF targets included the
Division, 7th Infantry Division (Light), a battalion from 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Carcel Modele Prison at the central
a battalion-sized “expeditionary” unit from 6th Marine Regiment and the Marine headquarters of the PDF (a.k.a. La
Security Forces Battalion Panama. Special Operations Forces included 75th Ranger Comandancia), where Delta Force
Regiment and the Joint Special Operations Task Force, which was assembled from operators rescued the CIA operative;
a range of units of that general type. There were also numerous combat support and the Punta Paitilla Airport, where
service support units, while overall command was under XVIII Airborne Corps. SEALS destroyed Noriega’s private
Air Force combat assets were provided by the 37th and 366th Tactical Fighter Wings, jet to prevent that possible escape
with several tactical airlift wings in support. F-117A Stealth aircraft saw their first method; and the Pecora River Bridge,
combat deployment. Army aviation support was drawn from the organic battalions to prevent reinforcements from
of 82nd Airborne and 7th Infantry Divisions for lift and close-in air support, while USAF reaching the PDF garrison at Torrijos
and US Army special operations aviation provided additional aerial firepower. International Airport and adjacent

Altogether, US forces eventually totaled 27,000, with nearly 22,000 engaged in Tocumen Military Airport. (Quickly
combat operations as members of conventional Task Forces Atlantic, Pacific, Bayonet, and securing the airports was critical as a
Semper Fi, and special operations Task Forces Green, Black, Blue, White and Red. means to bring in follow-on forces and
supply.) Meanwhile Task Force Red’s
1,300 Rangers jumped in over targets
that stretched from Rio Hato in the
west to Fort Cimarron in the east.
Organized into four task forces
(see sidebar), conventional US ground
forces moved in at the original H-Hour
of 1:00 a.m. Task Force Atlantic, com-
posed of a battalion from 7th Infantry
Division (Light) and another from
82nd Airborne Division, attacked into
the Colon-Gamboa sector extending
southeast from the Atlantic entrance of
the Panama Canal midway to Panama
City. Though that TF encountered
resistance from PDF 8th Rifle Company
at Fort Espinar and a naval infantry
company at Coco Solo Naval Station,
by 10:29 a.m. that morning it reported
all missions accomplished.
TF Semper Fi, a Marine rifle compa-
ny and a Marine light armored vehicle
company, conducted operations in
the western suburbs of Panama City,
capturing PDF stations at Vera Cruz
and Arraijan as well as securing the
area around Howard Air Force Base.
Their primary mission was to occupy
the approaches to the Bridge of the
Americas, a chokepoint along the main
roads for PDF forces moving from the
Rio Hato area with the possible intent
of reinforcing La Comandancia.
Facing what turned out to be one
of the greatest challenges on D-Day,
TF Bayonet moved through sprawling
Panama City to seize Fort Amador and
La Comandancia as well as protect
the US embassy. Supported by four
Sheridans (air-transportable armored
assault vehicles), helicopter gunships
and three infantry battalions (5/87th
US paratroopers entering the Panamanian countryside via air drop on the first day. Infantry, 1/508th Infantry [Airborne] and

Joint Operations & Goldwater-Nichols of Staff that had previously been the hallmark of such operations.
The Joint Staff within the JCS was also made responsible to the
Operation Just Cause demonstrated US forces had made Chairman instead of the several Joint Chiefs of Staff. That meant it
significant progress in joint interoperability since 1983’s Operation was no longer necessary to delay operational planning decisions in
Urgent Fury in Grenada, when inter-service cooperation was order to allow for further coordination among those service heads.
lacking. In particular, communication equipment compatibility Even further, Goldwater-Nichols gave additional authority to
and command lines between the services were inefficient. While the commanders of unified and specified commands. For Panama,
Urgent Fury was a success, opposition had been minimal, and Gen. Thurman was given “full combatant command” over all the
the resultant concern was, when it came to facing larger or service components, allowing him to fully control the organization
better prepared foes, that lack of smooth inter-service oper- and employment of forces. He in turn used that authority to set the
ability (“jointness”) would undermine American operations. makeup of the chain of command below his headquarters, insisting
The single most important consequence of Grenada, in the Gen. Wade Stiner be the Joint Task Force South commander, under
operational sense, was the momentum it generated in aid of the which he then put both Joint Task Force Panama (JTFPM) and
passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which brought the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). Stiner, in turn,
organizational, doctrinal and other changes to the Department subdivided JTFPM and JSOTF into nine separate task forces.
of Defense. Career progression became tied to participation in That decentralization of command below Stiner’s headquarters
joint assignments, so service members were therefore compelled allowed for those individual commanders, dispersed over the
to seek such postings, take part in joint exercises and contribute operational area, to exercise maximum independence and flexibility
to the development of joint doctrine. By the end of the 1980s, within their respective spheres. In fact, after H-Hour, Stiner largely
then, the services had effectively closed the jointness gap. regarded his role as ensuring each of his nine task force commanders
In Panama the Rangers and air force gunships, for had the resources they needed to achieve their objectives, as
example, successfully and effectively worked together while opposed to micro-managing the plan’s detailed execution.
exercising restraint in the use of firepower. Overall, the special Thus a chain of command streamlined at the high level allowed
operations forces of the army, navy and air force were seen to for more decisions to be made at the tactical level. All that in turn
have best coordinated their efforts to achieve objectives. worked to ensure more timely execution and support at all levels. The
Goldwater-Nichols also streamlined the higher-level command and result was an operation planned and executed with precision by nine
control of US forces engaged in joint operations. The Chairman of the separate task forces assigned to converge on their objectives simul-
Joint Chiefs of Staff, not the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff, became taneously in order to overwhelm the Panamanian Defense Forces.
the principal military advisor to the president and his National Security When the shooting started, the PDF proved incapable of
Council. Consequently, during final planning for Just Cause, Secretary fending off the American forces directed against them. US D-Day
of Defense Dick Cheney worked through the chairman, Gen. Colin objectives were reached and then secured by follow-on forces. The

Powell, to create the official guidance from the national command concentration of the best units in the US order of battle, coupled with
authority to Gen. Thurman, the head of Southern Command. That the experience of years of joint operational training, overwhelmed
eliminated the time consuming deliberation within the Joint Chiefs the Panamanians and soon compelled Noriega to give up.
4/6th Infantry [Mechanized]), the TF

secured Fort Amador by mid-morning.
It fought elements of the PDF 6th, 7th
and 8th Rifle Companies reinforced
by two public order companies, for
almost three hours before securing
its objectives. By 6:00 p.m. TF
Bayonet completely controlled La
Comandancia, effectively ending the
PDF command’s ability to exercise
centralized control of its forces.
TF Pacific, formed from three
airborne battalions that had reinforced
the Rangers at Torrijos-Tocumen
Airport earlier in the day, cleared the
airport of the 1st PDF Infantry Company
and then conducted operations in
central Panama. Pacific conducted
what turned out to be the last major
assault on D-Day, securing Panama
Viejo, Tinajitas and Fort Cimarron.
Though the PDF had effectively
been defeated by the end of D-Day,
sporadic fighting continued over the
US Army infantry moving through a residential neighborhood inside Panama City. next few days as US forces cleared

pockets of resistance and engaged members attacking US citizens. That Refugees at Balboa High Stadium.
small groups of armed civilians was an especially sensitive issue in the
belonging to the paramilitary “Dignity wake of the Iranian hostage crisis of
Battalions.” In fact, most PDF units 1979, when the US seemed helpless
fought harder than expected before in the face of a similarly aggressive N O W A V A I L A B L E
surrendering or fleeing. In the end, small power. Added to that was the THE DECISION GAMES
though, the Panamanian forces were nationalist feelings Americans had
in an untenable situation, and on about the Canal Zone, which was seen FOLIO GAME
the 21st the US was in control of the
country. The number of US personnel
by many as US territory unnecessarily
given up by a weak president.
SERIES
killed in action is variously given If nothing else, Just Cause reaf-
below
as 19 to 23, while best estimates of firmed the fact the US could project
Lebanon ‘82:
Panamanian dead hover around 500. power into the Caribbean. When the Operation Peace for Galilee
As for Noriega, he fled to the Papal decision was made to act, sufficient
mission in Panama City where, after a forces were quickly sent to accomplish
siege by US special operations forces, the mission decisively. Consequently,
he surrendered on 3 January 1990. a protracted conflict was avoided and
the US got what it set out to accom-
Aftermath plish: remove Noriega and assert
control over the Panama Canal. t
The Panama crisis was of a type
common for the US throughout SOURCES
the Cold War and after. The US had Cole, Ronald. Operation Just Cause: The Planning and
the military resources to achieve Execution of Joint Military Operations in Panama,
February 1988 - January 1990. Washington: Joint
its objectives, but because of History Office, 1995.
political considerations there were Embrey, James H. Operation Just Cause: Concepts for
Shaping Future Rapid Decisive Operations. Carlisle
mission limitations. Certain trigger Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2002.
mechanisms had to exist before a Flanagan, E. M. Battle for Panama: Inside Operation Just
Cause. Washington: Brassey’s (US), 1993.
military operation could be launched Reagan, Ronald, et. al. National Security Strategy of the
at all, and they weren’t always clearly United States: The White House. Washington: Office
of the President, 1988.
or fully identified ahead of time. Woodward, Bob. The Commanders. New York: Simon &
In the case of Panama, the PDF Schuster, 1991. P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598
History Office, XVIII Airborne Corps & Joint Task Force
itself provided the necessary justifica- South. Panamanian Defense Force Order of Battle:
(661) 587-9633 phone | (661) 587-5031 fax
tion through increased reports of its Operation Just Cause.

The Soccer War
of 1969 By Vernie Liebl
Background
I
n 1969 El Salvador, the smallest
country in Central America, had a
rapidly growing population of around
3.3 million with a density approaching 160
persons per square kilometer. Much of the
land within the tiny country was owned by the
oligarchic “14 Families,” while two-thirds of
the people were peasants desperate to be able
to farm enough acreage to make a living.
Neighboring Honduras was six times larger,
with a population of 2.5 million and a population
density of 22 persons per square kilometer.
Most Hondurans lived in the center and north
of their country, away from the border with
El Salvador. By the end of 1968, the presence
above — Honduran infantry in

defensive laager along the main
axis of the Salvadoran advance.
left — A view of Honduran Corsairs.

of so much relatively empty land
just on the other side of an almost
unguarded border had drawn over
300,000 Salvadorians to take over
Honduran land and farm it. At the
same time, an increasing number of
small village businesses in Honduras
were coming to be Salvadorian owned
and operated, creating unwelcome
competition. That increasing friction
between the two countries resulted in
the Honduran government refusing,
in January 1969, to renew the 1967
Bilateral Treaty on Immigration with
El Salvador, which had been instituted
to regulate the flow of individuals
across their common border.
The increasingly poor Honduran
economic situation led many A pro-war rally in El Salvador’s capital city.
Hondurans to identify the Salvadorians
as the root cause of Honduran
problems. The Honduran government
announced in April 1969 it would begin
expelling those who “had acquired
property under agrarian reforms
without fulfilling the legal requirement
that they be Honduran by birth.”
Simultaneously, Honduran
media began to distribute stories on
the negative impact of Salvadorian
immigrant labor on the Honduran
economy. By the beginning of June,
some 75,000 Salvadorians had either
gone back to El Salvador or had
been rounded up and expelled from
Honduras – often to find that their
home country didn’t want them back.
Despite the growing hostility, the
two countries could still agree on their
national sport—soccer. Their respec-
tive teams met to play a three-game Seven days later the second match carried the defeated Hondurans to the
series to determine which would was held in San Salvador, and that airport while visiting Honduran soccer
advance to the preliminaries of the time it was the Honduran team that fans were hounded by jubilant mobs
World Cup. The first game was played had to endure a sleepless night. All the of Salvadorians. Many were beaten
on 8 June in Tegucigalpa, the capital windows of the hotel they stayed in and abused as they headed home, with
of Honduras. The night before the were smashed, with rotten eggs, dead two killed. Over 150 Honduran cars
match, as the El Salvadorian national rats and filthy rags tossed inside. The were burned, and several hours after
team huddled sleeplessly in their Honduran team had to be escorted the match ended the governments of
hotel, crowds of Hondurans pelted to Flor Blanca Stadium in military the two countries sealed the border.
their windows with stones, beat sheets armored cars, which was the only With the third and deciding game
of tin and barrels with sticks, set off thing that saved them from the mob approaching, the media of both
firecrackers and whistled, screamed that lined the road. The playing field countries became increasingly hys-
and chanted all night long. That effort itself was surrounded by a battalion teric. The issue of illegal Salvadorian
was intended to create an edgy and of heavily armed soldiers. Things immigration became the center piece
exhausted visiting team that would didn’t begin auspiciously, as the of the Honduran press, which claimed
be bound to lose. Not surprisingly, the Honduran flag was burned and, when they were actually stealing land and
next day the visiting El Salvador team the Honduran anthem was played, territory from Honduras. Salvadorian-
did lose to Honduras 1-0. Further, the Salvadorians jeered, and then owned stores, shops and farms were
the Salvadorian team members were cheered as a dirty dishrag was raised attacked in Honduras, leading many
booed, spat on and jeered as they in lieu of the burned Honduran flag. Salvadorians to sell their property at a
made their way to the Tegucigalpa Under such conditions the loss and flee. Rumors and newspaper
airport for the plane ride home. Honduran team unsurprisingly lost, stories became increasingly belliger-
3-0. The same armored cars then ent. Finally, on 26 June, El Salvador

The Armed Forces
The Salvadorian Army initially consisted of three infantry battalions, one mechanized
cavalry squadron (with M3A1 Stuart tanks), and an artillery battalion (nine x 105mm howit-
zers), for a total of roughly 4,500 men. The Salvadorian Air Force consisted primarily of P-51
Mustangs (which proved useful for ground support) and various trainers and cargo craft. Their
use was limited by the fact there were only 34 qualified pilots on hand. (Seven others were
seconded to the national airline; two were on crop-dusting duty, and two were assigned to
pilot the DC-4 El Salvador used to fly fresh lobsters to Miami.) Total air force manpower was
only 1,000, with few mechanics on hand. There were only 14 operational combat aircraft.
Anticipating war, the Salvadorian government began seeking more aircraft (all Mustangs)
in June. The army battalions were officially expanded into regiments, and the Territorial
Service (a National Guard-type reserve), with its 12 company-sized units, was mobilized.
That gave a strength of nearly 20,000 men, though many of them were only partially trained.
The Honduran Army was much smaller, containing fewer than 5,000 men. It consisted of
a large battalion of 1,000 (the Presidential Honor Guard) and two smaller 500-man infantry
battalions (2nd and 3rd). The remainder of the troops were distributed among the six military
districts of the country, organized as one light infantry battalion per district distributed
in company-sized outposts. They were intended as the first line of defense. Not as well
equipped as the Salvadorians (two batteries of World War II-era 75mm howitzers, and no Evacuating civilians from the battle area.
armor at all), the Honduran Army did enjoy a higher level of combat experience and training
due to having been involved in other border disputes with Guatemala and Nicaragua. extra time. El Salvador thus advanced
The Honduran Air Force was much larger than the Salvadorian, and was equipped to the 1970 World Cup (where they
with more aircraft, primarily piston-engine F4U Corsairs, but also some armed T-28 were quickly eliminated). A much

trainers. With a strategy based on the judicious use of air power (US influence), there larger struggle was about to begin.
was also a relatively large pool of trained pilots, so much so that Honduras was able
to sustain two fighter-bomber squadrons compared to the single Salvadorian. War
El Salvador had begun to mobilize

its military on 24 June, and then moved
units to the border in early July. With
a population pushing for war (buoyed
by victory in the soccer series), on 12
July the El Salvadorian government
rejected a call by the Central American
Mediation Commission for a mutual
withdrawal from the border area.
El Salvador was intent on war.
Despite the severance of relations,
there was no Honduran mobilization.
Some small incidents then began to
occur, as when a single Honduran
aircraft flew into El Salvador and
conducted a few strafing runs.
Finally, on 14 July 1969, the
Salvadorian Army invaded Honduras.
The attack was preceded by a surprise
air raid that caused consternation in
Tegucigalpa but little actual damage.
On the ground, Salvadorian troops
moved in two columns to execute their
A Honduran battalion on parade, just prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Plan de Campana. The first column
as some of their air force’s vintage Corsairs fly above them.
was a 7,000 man force moving along
the connecting road (Highway 1)
officially broke all ties with Honduras, On 27 June the third and deciding between El Salvador and Honduras just
stating: “The Government of Honduras game was played, this time in neutral north of the Gulf of Fonseca (aiming
has not taken any effective measures to Mexico City. Honduran fans were kept for the junction of Nacaome). A smaller
punish these crimes, which constitute on one side of the stadium, Salvadorian 5,000 man column attacked toward
genocide, nor has it given assurances fans on the other. Between them were Nueva Ocotepeque along Highway
of indemnification or reparations for stationed 5,000 Mexican police. Neither 4N near the Guatemalan border.
the damages caused to Salvadorians.” team was harassed the night before, Initial Honduran resistance
Honduras severed its relations with and thus a hard-fought game ended was light but increased the
El Salvador the following day. with El Salvador winning 3-2 after deeper Salvadorian forces advanced.

Honduran civilians increas-
ingly asked for weapons to combat
the invaders, as well as spontaneously
joining whatever Honduran units
came near them in the field.
The leaders of El Salvador had
notions of conquering Honduras,
thereby tripling the size of El Salvador
and making it a two-ocean regional
power. The Nueva Ocotepeque route
was the shortest to the Caribbean, so
the grandiloquent order of the day
was: “Push through to the Atlantic!” A Salvadoran P-51.
Despite those sentiments, and
Salvadorian declarations they would
be in Tegucigalpa in three days and on
the Atlantic in five, the advance soon
bogged down. Reaction by Honduran
units, extensive civilian resistance,
rugged terrain, inadequate roads, inex-
perienced troops, lack of maps, and
shortages of ammunition all combined
to slow and then halt the Salvadorians.
The Salvadorian air attacks caused
little damage, as pilot inexperience,
jury-rigging of aircraft to drop ord-
nance (C-47s pushing small bombs out
cargo doors, trainer aircraft dropping
fused artillery and mortar rounds),
and inadequate air facilities limited
Salvadorian operations. Honduran
aircraft then took the initiative from
the Salvadorians, raiding into El
Salvador on the morning of 15 July. Honduran soldiers holding a part from a destroyed Salvadorian aircraft.
Using bombs, rockets and napalm
in strikes against Ilopango airfield and
the oil facilities at La Union, Ajacutla
and Cutuco, they cratered runways
as well as causing extensive damage
to oil farms and Standard Oil refining
facilities. As most of the operational
Salvadorian aircraft were elsewhere
conducting attacks against Honduran
targets, the only resistance was from
anti-aircraft fire. As a result, El Salvador
suffered significant strategic damage
in that first series of Honduran attacks.
During the course of that day
ground combat remained intense, with
slow movement by the Salvadorians
along both axes, but the real
action remained in the air. Several
Salvadorian aircraft were lost or dam-
aged due in combat, while Honduran
aircraft concentrated a second series
of strikes on Salvadorian ground
forces. As the fighting raged, the
Organization of American States (OAS)
met and began to work to impose
a ceasefire on both combatants.
On 16 July, Salvadorian troops
managed to secure Nueva Ocotepeque
and then continued to advance up A Honduran ‘cavalry’ patrol mounted on donkeys.

invasion to a halt. As well, both
sides were beginning to run short of
ammunition and the Salvadorians
were almost out of fuel. Both
countries requested US assistance,
and Washington turned down both.
By the end of 17 July all Salvadorian
movement had stopped and their
logistical situation was perilous. Both
sides agreed to an OAS-brokered
ceasefire on the 18th, which went into
effect on the 20th. The war was over and
no decisive result had been obtained.
Approximately 900 Salvadorians
(200 soldiers) had died, while 2,100
Hondurans (100 soldiers) were killed.
A further 300,000 civilians had fled the
combat zones, primarily Salvadorians
heading back to their own country.
Bigger Picture
A Honduran memorial to the war near the border today.
Though brief, the war led to the
political destabilization of El Salvador
and, as a result, a decade of civil
war and insurgency soon followed.
In 1992 the International Court of
Justice agreed to settle the border
dispute, eventually awarding 375
square kilometers of land to Honduras.
Honduras also agreed to pay damages
to expelled Salvadorians. A border
rectification agreement was signed
in 1998, and relations between the
two countries remain cordial today.
The conflict was inevitably dubbed
the “Soccer War,” owing to the inci-
dents leading up to it. It went largely
unnoticed in the US, despite the fact
we had (and have) considerable politi-
cal and economic interests in Central
America. That was because the war
was so short; the weaponry used in it
was obsolescent; the regions fought
over were comparatively remote, and
the result was a stalemate. Further,
What stole the show: man on the moon.
the US was already absorbed with
events in Vietnam: President Nixon
Santa Rosa de Copan Road toward the battlefield. Salvadorian aircraft had just officially declared the policy
the Atlantic. But the drive was were then increasingly held back to of “Vietnamization,” and the first US
slowing down as the heavily forested protect the capital, and Honduran troops were returning home in early
mountainous terrain assisted the aircraft continued to conduct July. As well, events in the Middle East
outnumbered defenders. In El numerous and effective strikes. were heating up, with Israel and Egypt
Salvador a newspaper carried a On the 17th the elite Guardia de engaged in open conflict along the
banner headline: “Salvadorian Army Honor Batallon of the El Salvadorian Suez Canal in what became known
Advance Unstoppable,” and there was Army was strafed and bombed by as the “War of Attrition” in which,
proud talk El Salvador had “become Honduran aircraft, after having been during the course of July, 20 Egyptian
the Israel of Latin America,” an halted by a ground ambush of its lead MiGs were shot down. Of course, the
analogy with the rapid 1967 Israeli elements. That incident has come main reason for US disinterest was
victory over its Arab neighbors. to be viewed as the turning-point the fact the Apollo 11 space mission
Even so, the tide was turn- toward Honduran victory in the launched on 16 July, entered lunar
ing as the Honduran Air Force war, and is called the Battle of San orbit on the 19th and then landed
established air superiority over Rafael de Mataras. It brought the on the moon the next day. t
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A-10 Warthog:
The USAF Ground Attack Aircraft
By Kelly Bell
Old & Ugly
T
he A-10 is not an attractive aircraft was designed to meet the US The plane can remain airworthy even
aircraft, nor is it the fastest. Air Force’s (USAF) need for a platform after absorbing substantial damage.
Enemy aircraft have little to take out enemy tanks, armored Despite the age of the design,
to fear from it in the air, but if the vehicles, fortified installations and the A-10 has served successfully in
A-10 catches them when they’re other ground targets. It’s the only conflicts down to this time. During
parked the results can be devastating. American warplane today meant both 1991’s Desert Storm and 2003’s
Attacking targets on the ground is the solely to provide close air support. Iraqi Freedom operations, the Warthog
A-10’s mission. Officially termed the The Warthog was constructed was the terror of Iraqi armor. In some
Thunderbolt II (after the World War around its main armament—the planning scenarios, numbers of the
II US Army Air Force P-47 fighter that GAU-8 Avenger 30mm Gatling plane are expected to remain on
also excelled in the ground attack gun—which is to date the heaviest active duty until 2028, which will set a
role), the Fairchild Republic plane is rotary cannon ever mounted on a service record of some five decades.
informally known as the Warthog. flying platform. The plane’s hull is The origin of the A-10 dates back
Developed in the early 1970s, this designed with survivability in mind, to the mid-20th century. During
single-seat, twin-engine, straight-wing and boasts over 1,200 lbs. of armor. the Vietnam War, large numbers

Systems of War
of US aircraft engaged in close

support missions fell to small
arms, ground-to-air missiles and
low-level anti-aircraft fire. The USAF
also received criticism it didn’t take
seriously the close air support mission.
The F-4 Phantom II, F-100 Super
Sabre, and the F-105 Thunderchief
jets had all been designed to fight in
large-scale conventional and nuclear
wars, not to engage small ground
targets in jungles and mountains.
The USAF did deploy the A-1
Skyraider, a robust propeller-driven
aircraft, and it served effectively in
the close air support role, but it
was approaching obsolescence. In
1966 the USAF therefore formed the
Attack Experimental (A-X) Program

The Stuka Connection
A-10 Aircraft designer Pierre Sprey examined many sources to determine

what made a successful ground attack aircraft. One of them was a book
popular during the early Cold War—Stuka Pilot. It was the wartime memoir
of Hans Ulrich Rudel, one of World War II Germany’s most skilled ground
combat support pilots. Stuka Pilot provided an inside look into the human
and material dimensions of ground attack aircraft in operation.
Rudel joined the Luftwaffe in 1936 and was randomly assigned to a
unit of Stukas (Junkers Ju-87 dive bombers). During the war he flew an
incredible 2,530 sorties on the Russian front, destroying 519 enemy tanks,
150 artillery pieces, a Soviet Navy destroyer, two cruisers, one battleship, 70
landing craft, four armored trains, several bridges and over 800 soft-skinned
vehicles. Despite flying an aircraft that hadn’t been designed for aerial
combat, he even managed to shoot down a few Soviet warplanes.
The Stuka (short for Sturzkampfflugzeug or “diving combat aircraft”)

was only lightly armored, but when equipped with weaponry such as
the 37mm Kanonenvogel (bird cannon) wing-mounted gun, which fired
tungsten-core rounds, it became a deadly tank killer.
A-10 Crew Dimensions

(L x W x H
in meters)
Wing
area (m2)
Weight
loaded
(kg)
Max
speed
(kph)
Range (km)
with internal
fuel tank
Ceiling (m) Rate of
climb (m/s)
Guns Other Ordnance
1 16.3 x 17.5 47.0 21,361 706 4150 (com- 13,700 30.0 1x 7,260 kg (combina-
x 4.5 bat radius 30mm tions of bombs,
= 460) rockets and
air-to-air missiles)

Systems of War
» continued from page 57 Comparative Specs
Office to develop a replacement. A-X F-35(L x W x H

in meters)
Crew Dimensions
area
(m2)
Wing
loaded
(kg)
Weight
speed
(kph)
Max Range (km)
with internal (m)
fuel tank
Ceiling
climb
(m/s)
Rate of Guns Other Ordnance
approached aircraft designer Pierre

1 15.7 x 10.7 42.7 24,470 1930 2220 18,288 n/a 1x 8,100 kg
Sprey (see sidebar) to write detailed x 4.3 25mm (combinations
of bombs and
specifications for the project. air-to-air missiles)
Following extensive interviews of
pilots, Sprey determined the machine
he was tasked with creating would
need long loiter time, low-speed
maneuverability, heavy cannon fire-
power, and far-above-average surviv-
ability. The latter was vital because its
role would require it to be constantly
exposed to hostile fire. Among other
things, Sprey studied World War II-era
ground attack aircraft, including the
German Henschel Hs-129 and Soviet
Ilyushin IL-2 Shturmovik (see tables).
Both of those aircraft had fearsome
reputations; both were heavily
armored, and the Hs-129 was armed HS-129 Crew Dimensions (L x W x H
Wing
area
Weight
loaded
Max Range (km) Ceiling Rate
speed with internal (m) of
Guns Other Ordnance
with cannon designed as dedicated in meters) (m2) (kg) (kph) fuel tank climb
(m/s)
tank killers. Also under the microscope 2 11.5 x 15.0 33.7 5,960 380 790 8,000 3.9 3x 2 x 37mm
was the Douglas A-1 Skyraider, which x 3.9 7.92mm antitank guns, or
500 kg bombs
had proven itself in Korea and Vietnam.
All those planes together inspired the
design of what would become the A-10.
The USAF hired Philco-Ford and
General Electric to build the GAU-8
cannon, while Northrop and Fairchild
Republic worked on the plane itself.
On 18 January 1973 the USAF gave the
nod to the prototype, dubbed YA-10A.
In tests the following June the plane
outperformed the A-7D Corsair II,
the primary existing ground attack
plane. Production-model A-10s started
arriving at USAF bases in March 1976. light operations, and in 1999 the plane ailerons, the A-10 has superior
By the time production ceased in 1984, received Global Positioning System maneuverability at low altitude, and
715 had come off the assembly line. (GPS) capability and a new multi- that same feature also allows for
function instrument display. In 2005 short takeoffs and landings, enabling
Upgrades the Warthog fleet received Precision operations from primitive forward
Engagement upgrades for enhanced airfields. A modest cruise speed of
The A-10 has been upgraded fire control and electronic counter- 340 miles per hour, and the resultant
several times. In 1978 it received measures. In July 2010 the Raytheon light fuel demand, permits the plane
the Pave Penny laser receiver pod Corporation began supplying the to stay airborne for extended periods
to provide faster and more accurate planes with a new Helmet-Mounted while operating at altitudes of 1,000
target identification. It got an inertial Integrated Targeting System. Currently feet and less. The Warthog is thus a
navigation system in 1980, followed the cockpits are being upgraded much more stable and accurate gun
by the Low-Altitude Safety and with a newly developed Integrated platform than many faster planes.
Targeting Enhancement computerized Flight and Fire Control Computer. The A-10’s engine exhaust passes
weapons-aiming equipment package, Despite all those enhancements, over the horizontal stabilizer and
an autopilot and a ground-collision it remains the Warthog’s basic design between the tail fins, so the plane
avoidance system. Pilots now have that is still the plane’s main strength. has a low infrared signature, making
onboard night vision goggles for low- With a huge wing area and oversized it a difficult target for heat-seeking

Comparative Specs
A-10s flew a number of missions
Ju-87G Crew Dimensions
(L x W x H
Wing
area
Weight
loaded
Max
speed
Range (km)
with
Ceiling
(m)
Rate
of
Guns Other Ordnance during the 1999 NATO intervention
in meters) (m2) (kg) (kph) internal climb in Serbia. In March of that year
fuel tank (m/s)
A-10s flew escort for helicopters
1 9.8 x 14.2 29.0 5,250 407 690 9,000 8.1 2x 1 x 30mm
x 3.25 13mm, antitank gun, or sent to rescue downed pilots during
2 x 20mm 400 kg bombs
Operation Allied Force and, as the
weeks passed, the Warthogs were
increasingly called on to fly ground
attack, serving in those twin roles until
the end of operation in June 1999.
From March 2002 until March 2003,
A-10s flew missions against Taliban
and Al Qaeda forces before being
redeployed for the new campaign
against Iraq. Sixty Warthogs flew in
the Iraqi Freedom campaign, again
devastating Iraqi formations on the
ground. According to a USAF report
titled Operation Iraqi Freedom: By the
Numbers, released 30 April 2003, the
planes flew at a mission capable rate of
85 percent during the invasion’s initial
Ilyushin-2 Crew Dimensions Wing Weight Max Range (km) Ceiling Rate Guns Other Ordnance
(L x W x H area loaded speed with (m) of stages, and they fired a total of 311,597
Shturmovik in meters) (m2) (kg) (kph) internal climb
fuel tank (m/s) 30mm rounds. They also flew 32
2 11.6 x 38.5 6,160 414 720 5500 10.4 2x 600 kg (bombs, missions to drop propaganda leaflets.
14.6 x 4.2 23mm, rockets)
2x Late in the conflict anti-aircraft
7.62mm,
1x gunners downed an A-10 over Baghdad
12.7mm
International Airport, which proved
to be the only one lost during the
2003 war. In March 2011 the US
sent six Warthogs to participate
in the NATO intervention against
Libyan government forces as part
of Operation Odyssey Dawn.
The USAF recently announced the
A-10’s scheduled replacement with
the Lockheed-Martin F-35 Lightning
II. That’s led to a rising chorus of
missiles. The placement of the engines Combat Record protests, as many have pointed out
behind the wings also provides the Warthog has demonstrated its
them some additional protection. During Desert Storm the Warthogs effectiveness and reliability while
Integrally machined skin panels were credited with destroying more the F-35, a fifth generation fighter-
mean the A-10 has no seal or joint than 900 enemy tanks along with some bomber, has yet to be blooded. t
problems. Since those panels are 2,000 other assorted vehicles and
fabricated using computer-controlled approximately 1,200 artillery pieces. SELECTED SOURCES
machining, their construction is On 6 February 1991 Capt. Robert
Bell, Dana. A-10 Warthog in Detail & Scale. TAB Books,
fast and relatively inexpensive. The Swain gave the A-10 its first air-to-air 1986.
panels are also durable, and even when combat triumph when he shot down Campbell, Douglas. The Warthog and the Close Air
Support Debate. Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press,
they’re damaged they can be easily an Iraqi helicopter. Only four A-10s 2003.
replaced in the field. Many parts, such were lost during the war—all to Jenkins, Dennis R. Fairchild-Republic A/OA-10 Warthog.
North Branch, MN: Specialty Press, 1998.
as the engines, main landing gear and surface-to-air missiles. After 8,100 Just, Gunther. Stuka Pilot Hans Ulrich Rudel. Atglen, PA:
vertical stabilizers, are interchangeable sorties the plane’s mission-capable rate Schiffer, 1986.
Neubeck, Ken. A-10 Warthog Walk Around. Carrollton, TX:
left-to-right and right-to-left, further during the conflict was 95.7 percent, Squadron/Signal, 1995.
simplifying maintenance. Self-sealing prompting the USAF to abandon Wilson, Michael. “Fairchild A-10.” Flight International, 20
March 1976.
fuel tanks protected by fire-retardant plans for replacing the Warthog with a
foam further enhance survivability. close air support version of the F-16.

Focus on Uganda
By Ravi Rikhye
Ed’s Note: This is the first of a new series of articles, each of which will
provide an in-depth look at the military of a selected country.
Assessment
U
gandan (and Burundi) (4,500 of whom have been reflagged as colonial armies under the leadership of
troops have fought well Amisom) have been clearing the south, officers and NCOs from their armies.
in Somalia against al- with a slow advance on Kisamayo, al- Amisom is intended to provide
Shabaab, Islamic insurgents who are a Shabaab’s main southern base. Unlike time and space for Somali govern-
highly motivated, innovative and tough Kenyan forces, other Amisom troops ment forces to stand up. While some
enemy. Because of a shortage of troops, haven’t had the benefit of air cover. Somali battalions are participating
the African Union Mission in Somalia While US/EU have done much to in the fight, inefficiency, corruption,
(Amisom) was restricted for several help Amisom regarding equipment, lack of governmental institutions,
years to a corner of Mogadishu. After transport, firepower, training, sup- and tribal politics are causing delays
reinforcement the mission cleared port and finance, Amisom is still in in the indigenization effort.
al-Shabaab from the capital after hard parlous condition. Nonetheless, the Ugandan troops are also perform-
fighting. Now Amisom is pushing US variant of the old Anglo-French ing well in the secretive and arduous
into central Somalia in conjunction strategy of placing reliance on local mission of tracking down the LRA’s
with Ethiopian forces to expand forces is working so far. The British leader in a quarter-million miles of
Mogadishu’s defensive perimeter and and French, of course, used some jungle. In this case, US leadership,
cut in two al-Shabaab’s overall area of of their regular battalions as a core, surveillance, and logistical support
control. Simultaneously, Kenyan troops and incorporated locals into their are being made freely available.
Oil
Two billion barrels (bbl)

recoverable heavy oil in Lake
Albert region (Ugandan share).
Possible reserves of up to 6 bbl.
Domestic consumption 13,000 bl/
day 2009. Extraction to start in 2013;
planned 200,000 bl/day by 2018.
Plans for oil refinery could be

affected by proposed new refineries in
South Sudan and Tanzania. Product
mainly heavy fuel oil for thermal
power plants in region and a small
quantity of POL for domestic use.
A freshly trained Ugandan infantry unit on parade after graduating.
National Statistics
GDP Defense Classified Operations & Troops
$17-billion 2012 2011-12 (likely weapons) Maintenance $60-million African
Union (AU) grant for
$280-million AMISOM (7,500 troops)
Government $50-million $230-million
expenditure 23 8,100 new recruits
percent of GDP for the fiscal year
$720-million for
new fighter aircraft Military Personnel ~50,000
separately budgeted

Spotlight On
Insurgencies Victoria island, leading to Lord’s Resistance Army

frequent media talk of conflict.
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) Six combat groups ~
~100 each
insurgency continues (northwest: Note: There have been reports
4th and 5th Divisions). LRA effective of a “Wobulenzi Mobile People’s Resistance Army
strength is less than 1,000. US has Brigade,” a rebel unit.
sent 100 Special Forces trainers Based in DRC, purportedly sup-
and facilitators to help eliminate Alliance for ported by Rwanda. Originally raised
LRA leader Joseph Kony. Democratic Forces by the government in 2001;
A low-level insurgency continues turned against the government
in the Karamoja region (northeast, 3rd An Islamic group, now forced subsequently. Strength ~
~1000.
Division) as the government seeks to into the Democratic Republic of
collect illegal weapons, estimated at the Congo (DRC), ~
~800. Al Qaeda Somali Islamic
50-150,000. The region is said to be connection alleged but not proved Fundamentalists
Uganda’s poorest and least developed.
There is a minor border Cells, of approximately 10 to 50 ter-
dispute with Kenya over a Lake rorists, including facilitators. They’ve

conducted attacks in retaliation for
Uganda’s participation in the UN
peacekeeping force in Somalia.
Militias
Private Security Firms

Approximately 25,000
total personnel.
“Arrow Boys”
Originally raised as anti-LRA
militia. Disbanded but several
thousand still retain their arms.
“Amuka Boys”
Also known as “Rhinos” (anti-LRA).
Disbanded 2006, many absorbed
into Army. Some remained
armed and engage in banditry.
Summary of 1st Division RECON40 2 mechanized battalions

Battalions (estimate) 2nd Division Armored Personnel 1 artillery battalion (-)
3rd Division Carriers (APC) 80 6 infantry battalions
28 infantry (7, 9, 11, 4th Division (Mamba; Buffalo)
19, 23, 27, 29, 33, 35, 5th Division ARTY (T) 200; including Uganda has been
43, 45, 47, 49, 63, 71, MRL; HM 60 x 120mm sending reservists to
75, 79, 93, 105, 111) Ruwenzori Mountain Mine Protected Vehicle Somalia. Training for
Brigade (MPV) Casspir Somalia deployments
3 mechanized 105th Brigade is assisted by 10 to 20
1 parachute 301st Brigade Military Schools contract instructors from
1 commando (1) 401st Brigade Armored Warfare School the US L-3 Corporation.
5 tank (3, 17, 69, 73, 77) 403rd Brigade Infantry School Periodically US military
8 artillery 409th Brigade Jinja Military Academy personnel also assist. The
6 engineer 501st Brigade Jinja Eastern District US has supplied unknown
6 signal 503rd Brigade Officer training school types and quantities of
505th Brigade Junior Staff College equipment for the Uganda
Command Troops 507th Alpine Brigade President’s Bodyguard forces in Somali. US and
special forces (SF) brigade 601st Brigade Training Wing EU also assist with military
commando battalion Senior Staff College salaries, which, even at the
parachute battalion Marines Singo Training Centre lowest level, are five times
anti-terror unit 1 company more than average civilian
(“Black Mambas”) Peacekeeping pay ($1,000 per month vs.
Aviation Uganda is the major $200). Casualties are kept
1 armored brigade 3 x AB206 base and main troop secret. Possibly as many as
2 tank battalions 1 Mi-24 contributor to a 5,000- 400 Ugandan soldiers have
1 motorized infantry 2 Mil-17 man force hunting LRA been killed since 2007, with
battalion 2 Y-12 light cargo leader Joseph Kony, a twice as many wounded.

Ugandan national. The high pay provides
1 mechanized brigade Equipment incentive, and there is no
1 artillery brigade Main Battle Tanks Somalia (9,000) shortage of recruits.
1 service brigade (MBT)180 T-55/T-62 HQ Battle Group 9
1 engineer brigade 100 T-72 delivering (Mogadishu)
Light Tanks (LT TK)20 1 tank battalion

Spotlight On
Local Defense Units
Often the term is used inter-
changeably with the ASTU,
below. Some units are battalion
strength, ~
~850 men. In 2010, 2400
men were recruited for LDUs
in the Karamoja region, with
salaries of ~
~$45/month.
Anti-Stock-Theft Units (ASTU)

To stop cattle rustlers from South
Sudan and Kenya). Target strength
7000, a police auxiliary force
under Ministry of the Interior.
Paramilitary
Border Guard ~
~600
Reducing the Army: above — Some of the Ugandan soldiers deployed in Somalia.
Ineffectives & Ghost Soldiers below — A US Army sec ops trainer explaining what’s what to some Ugandan soldiers.
After the army reduced some 18,000

ineffectives, including 3,000 “ghost
soldiers” (on the rolls but not present
for duty), plus sick, overage and AWOL
personnel in the late 2000s, active
battalions were reduced from 59 to 37
by mergers. The objective is to help
modernization and improve effective-
ness. The Ugandan Army reached a
peak of 100,000 men in 1992, before
a reduction of 40,000 was imposed.
The army is again increasing and has
a sanctioned strength of 50,000 which
it should have reached in 2011.
Higher Organization
Joint Anti-Terror Task Force 1 tank battalion
President of Uganda & Commander 1 motorized battalion
in Chief (General) Ad hoc grouping with personnel from: 1 mechanized battalion
Minister of Defense Military Intelligence (including 1 tank company)
Minister of state for Defense Elite Counterterrorism (CT) 1 infantry battalion (or inde-
Permanent Secretary for Defense unit “The Warriors” pendent rifle companies)
Chief of Defense Forces (General) District Security
Deputy Chief/Inspector Organization (Police) Presidential Protection Unit
General (Lt.-General) Internal Security ADC and President’s
Joint Chiefs of Staff (Brigadier) Organization (Police) Bodyguard (Captain)
Commander Land Forces (Lt.-General) Officer of First Lady’s Security
Chief of Staff Land Forces (Brigadier) External Security Detail (Captain)
Organization First Lady’s Security
Caveat on Battalion Numbers Officer (Captain)
Presidential Guard Brigade (4,000)
While many battalion numbers Entebbe (Outside Army HQ) The Special Forces and President’s
are current, some may have Reports of 10,000 strength Guard are now under the joint com-
been merged or deactivated. are exaggerations mand of the president’s son, previously
Special Forces commander. t

America’s BOMARC:
The Longest-Ranged
Surface-to-Air
Missile Ever Built
By Carl O. Schuster
T
hough it was never used in war, the
BOMARC was the longest-ranged and most
powerful surface-to-air missile (SAM) to
see service during the Cold War. It originated as
a 1946 Boeing Corporation program to develop
a high-speed pilotless aircraft (unmanned aerial
vehicle or UAV in today’s parlance). At that time,
however, the Pentagon had little interest in UAV. It
was only increasing tensions with the Soviet Union
that then drove both the army and air force to seek
a long-range air defense weapon to engage enemy
bombers while they were still far from American soil.
Late in 1948 Boeing therefore initiated a revised
proposal for a long-range, high-speed pilotless
interceptor. In June 1949 the air force agreed to fund
development of the XF-99, adding the Michigan
Aeronautical Research Center to the project
shortly thereafter. The new program was designated

Weapons
BOMARC Specifications
Missile IM-99B BOMARC B

Designation
Weight 45’ 11”
Length 16,000 lbs.
Guidance Command guid-

ance with radar
homing to intercept
Maximum 500 miles

Range
Missile Mach 3.0

Speed (2,214 mph)
Ceiling 100,000 feet
Warhead W-40 7-10 KT

fission warhead
Reaction 30 seconds from

Time loading to launch

A typical BOMARC base.
(SAGE) system, an early ground-based no conventional warhead variant.

computer network. SAGE was itself By that time the advent of Soviet
fed radar tracking data from Air ICBMs and the Kremlin’s resultant
Defense Command’s radar network. de-emphasis of its bomber force
BOMARC, an acronym based on the The BOMARC activated its homing rendered the BOMBARC redundant.
combination of the names of the radar on command, typically when it Only two sites were brought up to
two primary contractors. Eight was within 10 miles of its target; then B-model standards, and the air force
years of testing, experimentation it closed in autonomously to intercept. began to phase out the system in
and evolution of the overall concept Conventional BOMARCs used a 1,000 1969, less than 10 years after it had
followed before a design was ready. lb. high explosive warhead, while first entered service. In June 1972 the
The resulting command-guided the nuclear version carried a seven last BOMARC site was closed down at
missile entered production in 1958. to 10 kiloton (KT) bomb intended McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey.
BOMARC came in both nuclear to take out an entire attacking Despite its short operational life,
and conventional warhead versions. aircraft formation in one blast. the BOMARC stands as a marvel
They were deployed to two Canadian The A-model suffered from the of weapons engineering. More
and nine US sites in groups of 28 same maintenance, serviceability and importantly, the lessons learned
missiles each, starting in 1959. The safety problems as the other liquid-fuel from it, and the systems developed
initial production model, the IM-99A rockets of that era. That is, the fuel and for it, provided the foundation on
(or BOMARC A), used a liquid-fuel oxidizers were corrosive and explosive. which America is building its present
booster. Launched vertically, it Fortunately, developments in rocket ballistic missile defense systems. t
ascended to an altitude of 60,000 feet fuels provided a solution. The IM-99B
before transitioning to level flight. It (BOMARC B), using a solid-fuel
used a ramjet for propulsion, giving booster, entered production in 1960. In
it a top speed of Mach 2.8 (2,066 addition to being safer and requiring
mph) and a range of 265 land miles. less maintenance, the B-model had
It received its launch and in-flight a faster cruising speed, more range
guidance via a data link from the Semi- (see table), and could be loaded and
Autonomous Ground Environment fired more quickly; however, it had

Weapons
Semi-Automatic Ground
Environment (SAGE):
Air Defense, 1950s Style
By Carl O. Schuster
T
he development of jet- It was in that environment the US
propelled bombers during Department of Defense initiated a top
the early Cold War alarmed secret program to find a technological
American and Canadian defense solution to the problem. As early as
officials. Envisioning formations 1948 a Massachusetts Institute of
of Soviet aircraft flying across Technology physics professor, Dr.
the Arctic to deliver atomic and George E. Valley, had proposed a
hydrogen bombs, the two countries computer-based automated system
built the Defense Early Warning to more rapidly process informa-
(DEW) Line system of radar stations tion. That system acquired the The NORAD organizational emblem.
across northern Canada, Alaska and cover name “Semi-Automatic
Greenland (eventually backstopped Ground Environment” or SAGE. guide fighters to their targets. Instead
by two additional lines farther Valley proposed computers process of the controllers manually calculating
south – Mid-Canada and Pinetree). all incoming tracking and intercept the incoming bombers’ altitudes,
Early exercises revealed, however, data and present that information to courses and speeds, as well as the
that the accelerating pace of aerial the air intercept operators on their best intercept courses for the fighters,
operations was rendering obsolete radar screens. The goal was to replace those data would all be calculated by
all purely human-based air warning the myriad of radio circuits, manual computers and projected on monitors.
and intercept procedures. Manually plotters and status boards that human Radar search operators still had
detecting bombers and coordinating intercept controllers had to use to to manually enter the intruders’
air defense responses took too long.
Many bombers were expected to get
through without being intercepted,
which was an untenable situation in
the nuclear age. Defense planners were
thus faced with unpalatable alterna-
tives: either concede any truly effective
air defense was impossible or vastly
increase the number of interceptors
and surface-to-air missile bases.
The first alternative was politically
unacceptable, and the latter couldn’t
be made cost-effective. On top of all
that, operations analysis revealed
current interception control proce-
dures couldn’t even reliably prevent
large-scale “blue on blue” accidents
in which friendly interceptors and
missiles engaged each other. That
was due to the airspace simply
being overwhelmed with high speed
intruders, interceptors and missiles,
as well as various countermeasures, above — A typical DEW Line installation in the late 1950s.
all adding confusion to the picture.
right — The DEW Line organizational patch. The (perhaps somewhat
over-thought) Latin motto translates as: “Faith – Contention – Wisdom.”

A Tu-95 “Bear” bomber, another Soviet heavy bomber type from that era (though some are still in
service in the Russian Air Force today and are expected to remain there until 2040).
initial directional data, and then therefore took over the project in 1949, on the operator’s CRT (Cathode Ray
keep updating their positions in calling for a demonstration model Tube) display as symbols: semi-
the system, but that took only a few under the codename Project Charles. circles depicted friendly aircraft,
seconds. Valley’s proposal created a Its success set the stage for SAGE. chevrons enemy planes, and an
significantly more efficient process In the early stages of SAGE, RCA open-bottomed box icons represented
than the almost 20 seconds per target developed the AN/FSQ-7 computer, unidentified or unknown contacts.
required to do so via sound-powered which became the heart of the system, Operators gained contact data
phone reports to “plotters” who posted with IBM beginning production of it in (course, height and speed) by using a
each target’s location on a plexi-glass 1958. Standing over six feet in height, track device to place a cursor over the
map board called a “vertical plot.” and requiring over half an acre of floor contact’s icon and pressing a button.
SAGE’s automatic updates provided space, the AN/FSQ-7 weighed 275 The system also provided informa-
enemy and friendly aircraft locations tons, making it the largest computer tion on the availability of airfields and
to all intercept and search operators ever manufactured. It used over 56,000 surface-to-air-missile sites. Orders
in near real time. Updates came in vacuum tubes and nearly three mega- were sent to those units by simply
seconds rather than minutes, greatly watts of power, but it enjoyed a then- pressing a button, thereby sending
accelerating reaction time and all but fantastic 5MB of memory capacity. a digital command that told the
precluding enemy bombers avoiding Each SAGE site included two AN/ airfield operations center or SAM site
interception by making frequent FSQ-7s for redundancy. They used a control center which target they were
changes in their altitudes and courses. “marginal checking maintenance” to engage while also sending all the
The technology for SAGE had origi- routine that identified components for information needed to intercept it.
nally been developed for the US Navy replacement before they failed, giving The first SAGE site became
as part of an earlier Project Whirlwind, the computers a reliability rating that operational in Syracuse, New York,
which had been abandoned in 1949. varied from 97 to 99 percent. Manned in 1959. Linked together under the
That was due to the sad fact computers by 150 personnel, each SAGE site command of the Joint US-Canadian
of that era had only limited memory was connected to 15 radar stations North American Air Defense
capacity and processing speed while that transmitted their information Command (NORAD), SAGE saw
also consuming large quantities of over telephone lines in the world’s constant improvement throughout
electricity. Weight and power concerns first digitized format. The system’s its service life. At its peak it consisted
therefore precluded the Whirlwind initial data rate was less than 10KB of 22 Sector Direction Centers and
system from being carried on any but per second, but by the mid-1960s three smaller Combat Centers, linking
the largest warships. Those concerns that had been increased to 22KB. over 300 radar sites and airborne
didn’t weigh as heavily on US Air Each operator console came EC-121 Warning Star Airborne Early
Force planners, who could base the with a built-in coffee cup holder and Warning aircraft. A small SAGE Combat
system in ground facilities. The USAF ashtray. Radar tracks were presented Center was also eventually set up in

Weapons
This diagram was meant to explain the whole operation to the uninitiated.
Thailand to support the conventional

air war over North Vietnam.
At a cost of $8 to $12 billion ($60
to $90 billion in today’s dollars),
SAGE filled a vital gap in North
American air defense during the
height of the Cold War. It also provided
the conceptual framework for the
Federal Aviation Administration’s air
traffic management system and the
foundation for modern space battle
management theory. Some computer
historians point out that its pioneering
transmission of digitized information
A SAGE control room while the program (Project Charles) was still under
between computers inspired the
development and hadn’t yet been turned over for military manning.
development of Arpanet, which
went on to become the Internet.
The advent of ballistic missiles,
transistors and newer, faster computer
systems and links rendered SAGE
obsolete by the mid-1970s. The last
SAGE site was closed in 1983. Criticized
for its cost and shortcomings, SAGE
was never tested in a large-scale
aerial atomic war, but that was
actually the point of its existence: to
ensure North America’s air defense
was sufficiently effective to deter
any thought of testing it. t
A SAGE rearview, showing some of the 56,000 vacuum tubes used in each one.

The M107 sniper rifle, representing the current state-of-the art in such weapons.
Extreme Accuracy Tactical Ordnance

(EXACTO) Sniper Rifles
By David R. Higgins
S
niper rifle optics, hardware, The US involvement in combat Enhanced Sniper Systems project.
sight designs and general ergo- operations in Afghanistan and Iraq Included in that program, new preci-
nomics have advanced consid- also demonstrated a great need for sion sniper rifles are to incorporate
erably over the last several decades. longer-ranged sniper weapons. As improved ammunition so as to double
Even so, the physics inescapably a result, the Pentagon looked for a the current range of NATO standard
related to using standard munitions system that would reduce training 7.62mm rounds. The M107 and M110
meant accuracy against man-to-truck- costs and time while improving the weapons are to be reduced in weight
sized targets peaked and then fell off shooter’s confidence in achieving and provided with noise-and-flash
at 875 and 2,200 yards, respectively. a kill, even against moving targets, suppressors and improved optics.
Achieving kills from greater ranges was and then withdrawing following a Fire control solutions are being
feasible, as evidenced by the record completed mission or detection. similarly developed to accurately
shot of 2,709 yards held by British Sniper rifles such as the M107A1, acquire targets and calculate near-
Army Corporal of Horse (Sgt.) Craig the M82A1, the 408/375 Chey Tac, instantaneous ballistic solutions.
Harrison against a Taliban insurgent and the M110 had good ranges, but in Under the direction of the US
in November 2009, though such feats order to improve on their capabilities Defense Advanced Research Projects
aren’t the norm and moving targets the Pentagon implemented a list Agency (DARPA), the One Shot pro-
are even more difficult to hit. of initiatives as part of the Future gram has produced a spotting scope

Weapons
that automatically adjusts the ballistic by the creation and demonstration
aim-point to factor variables such as of a complete prototype system,
cumulative wind effect. That scope including the required optical sight-
was made available for field testing in ing equipment and new .50 caliber
2011. DARPA has been further tasked projectiles. The next phase is system
with developing an Extreme Accuracy integration and live-fire testing.
Tactical Ordnance (EXACTO) weapon, To overcome the effects of wind,
which will encompass advanced air density and target movement, the
technology to create a sniper rifle EXACTO rounds possess aerodynamic
with significantly improved range and stabilization fins. Those fins change the
accuracy over all its contemporaries. bullet’s geometry so as to improve its
The Pentagon has stipulated the lift-to-drag ratio and thus its accuracy
new sniper system is to be no heavier and range. Spin-induced gyroscopic
than the combined 46 lb. weight of the forces can be controlled by an internal
current two-man M107. That includes power-transfer clutch, off-center
a Leupold Mark 4 riflescope and mass and even exploding squibs. You know something has penetrated
spotting scope, a compact tripod, an They allow a round to alter its in-flight well into the mass culture when it
becomes part of the LEGO universe.
eight-round magazine, a FLIR AN/PAS-
13 (V3) Heavy Thermal Weapon Sight,
monocular AN/PSQ-20 Enhanced
Night Vision Goggles, and a sniper
data book. The system is required
to use .50-caliber ammunition with
a 10-year shelf life, be ballistically
compatible with the earlier M82A1
and M107 rifles, offer scopes with
enhanced resolution and clarity,
possess a tamper-proof design to
prevent misuse or enemy exploitation,
and provide a small and stable power
supply to support a 14-hour mission.
DARPA has further called for
the system to be able to effectively
identify a target at maximum range,
have a firing noise signature no
greater than the M107, incorporate a
multiple-round capability, and impart
a projectile energy and momentum
equal to the standard .50 caliber inert
ball M33 at all ranges beyond 300
meters (329 yards). With all that, the
EXACTO system is also to remain part
of the traditional two-man shooter-
observer sniper team and impose as
few doctrinal changes as possible.
In November 2008, Lockheed
Martin Missiles & Fire Control and
Teledyne Scientific & Imaging LLC
began work on the EXACTO program.
The first development phase was a
preliminary design and component
risk reduction and performance
validation study. That involved
testing in a variety of scenarios via
simulations and modeling. Phase II
focused on detailed design followed A view of the new fin-guided ammunition.

A US Army sniper team shown recently at work in Afghanistan.
trajectory, which can also help mask the shooter’s location.

Various other guidance and control technologies are also
being considered, including inertial navigation that relies on
continuous dead reckoning calculations, as well as “beam-
riding” to a radar- or laser-illuminated target. A modified
Electro-Optical Targeting System using a multi-function
targeting sensor in the projectile’s nose is also in the works.
Ballistic software can compensate for drag coefficient,
muzzle velocity dispersion, minute manufacturing variations in
individual rounds, as well as atmospheric conditions including
heat, humidity, barometric pressure and, to a degree, wind fluc-
tuation. Improved optics, such as stadiametric reticules, enable
rapid range estimation by fitting known target sizes within
graduated overlays and using laser rangefinders to replace
the earlier calculation-intensive logarithmic mildots system.
To date the EXACTO program has completed its initial
phase after achieving a successful proof of concept with
simulations of real-time, sensor-based usability and functional-
ity of the system’s components. DARPA has also contracted
with Cubic Corp to provide an optical data-link system to
develop a smaller caliber guided weapon system. Additional
projects are focusing on both laser and radar-guided bullets.
Lockheed Martin is slated to provide new EXACTO sight
modules, while Teledyne is to produce prototype bullets 11
months later. Scheduled to be operational in 2015, EXACTO’s
technologies will also be applicable to larger caliber vehicle,
ship and airborne-mounted weapon systems. t

Weapons

Future War:
A US ASAT ASM-135 Missile.
“stop the arms race in space” passed

by a count of 178 to one. (The US
Micro-Satellites & the voted no and Israel abstained.)

Various missile systems present a
Militarization of Space satellite threat, as they can potentially

be used to detonate a nuclear warhead
in low-earth orbit and thus produce
By David R. Higgins a crippling electromagnetic pulse
(EMP). Even so, the likelihood of
M
ilitary satellite technology furthering its interests in space and it such a scenario, at least within the
has advanced considerably would seek to deny similar capability context of the current global peace
– particularly in terms of to hostile nations. Though the details among the great powers, is remote.
optical and radar-imaging, signals- of how the policy is to be enforced have Other possibilities include lasers
intelligence monitoring and data relay so far been left only vaguely defined, to inflict thermal damage, and
– since the launch of Sputnik in 1957. the document as a whole reflects the radio frequency and particle beam
Governments with such assets have general consensus among top military weapons that can disable electronic
made the maintenance of an orbital officials and analysts calling for an components. Those technologies are
presence a top national priority, along “active military posture” in space. still nascent, at best, and aren’t likely
with the ability to counter adversaries’ America’s closest competitors in to become operational for another
orbital capabilities in the event of war. space development are China and decade. As part of non-nuclear anti-
At present 47 nations own or operate a Russia, though they both presently lag satellite (ASAT) weapon systems,
global total of some 900+ orbital satel- somewhat behind. One angle they’ve then, purpose-built air-launched
lites, military and commercial. The US, begun employing recently has been and ground-launched missiles and
China, France, Germany, Israel, Russia, to try to use diplomacy to gain at least micro-satellites presently offer
the United Kingdom and Spain lead the moral high ground. At the United the best and most cost-effective
in terms of orbital military vehicles. Nations they’ve both claimed the US solution for use against what are
The US makes considerable use is trying to monopolize space and is still generally undefended targets.
of space-based satellite technologies, clearly also weaponizing it. Various One result of this new race for
more so than other nations. That’s General Assembly (and therefore ASAT space dominance has been
for communication, reconnaissance, toothless) resolutions have been the development of micro-satellites.
early warning and GPS coordination, presented in an attempt to curb such Defined as any object orbiting the
among other things. Consequently activity. None of those efforts have earth with a mass between 10 and 500
the protection of those assets is also achieved anything of consequence, kilograms (22 to 1,100 lbs.), micro-
deemed vital to national security. On though they have put in motion a satellites are designed to undertake
18 October 2006, President George W. growing international consensus innocuous jobs deemed less suited
Bush signed an executive order setting against the US in space. The best illus- or too hazardous for larger satellites.
in place a new policy stipulating tration of that came on 5 December Less expensive to build and launch,
America wouldn’t be “restrained” in 2007, when a vote on a resolution to multiple micro-satellites can be lofted

New Arenas
into orbit aboard a small space vehicle
or as part of a large payload rocket.
They are also more maneuverable
than their larger counterparts.
The relative ease with which such
systems can be weaponized, and their
small size, makes them difficult to
detect and therefore ideal to deploy
as stealthy orbiting ASAT systems. By
remaining functionally disguised until
activated, such hunter-killers can then
simply alter their orbit to that of their
prey and, having moved into proximity,
destroy it using a variety of possible
attack capabilities. They include
shrapnel-producing explosives, energy
beam weapons, or intentional (and
mutually destructive) collision.
Over the last several years the
Pentagon’s research and development
branch, the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA),
has produced several micro-satellite An artistic conception of near-future ASAT warfare in space.
technologies that emphasize reducing
weight while improving reliability and
performance. Other aspects of that
effort have been concentrated on the
development of lightweight optical
surveillance and situational awareness
sensors, power sources, chemical and
electric propulsion systems, advanced
lightweight structuring materials,
miniaturized radio components, and
autonomous navigation capability.
Other micro-satellite projects
include those within the Tactical
Satellite Program, run out of
the Pentagon’s Office of Force
Transformation. The TSP is primarily
tasked to develop an operational capa-
bility for delivering satellites into orbit
more quickly than present means.
On the other side of the high
frontier, China’s desire for matching
high-technology weapon systems has An engineering team from MIT displaying some of their next-gneration micro-sat designs
so far exceeded its ability to develop
and field them. Like the Russians, the prior to initiating a jamming or contact satellites against nuclear explosions
Chinese have to rely on ground-based attack. Once perfected, that will give and electromagnetic pulses, and
launch systems to put hunter-killer the Chinese the capability to engage making them more maneuverable in
satellites in orbit, with the result their satellites with small and virtually order to be able to avoid such assaults.
targets can generally be engaged undetectable hunter-killer vehicles Of course, such measures would
only when overhead. Along with that that rely on kinetic-kill capabilities increase satellite costs, so decoys that
conventional ASAT approach, the (Kinetic Energy ASAT or KEASAT). simulate a target satellite’s radar and
Chinese are known to be working on Should micro-satellite ASAT optical signatures offer a potentially
“parasitic” weapons that strike by weapon systems proliferate, counter- cheaper solution, as would jamming
attaching themselves to their victim measures would include hardening systems carried within target satellites.

An interior view of a UK micro-sat.
Until counter-measure technolo-
gies have further matured, monitoring
from earth may remain the most
practical deterrent to the use of hunter-
killer micro-satellites. Such monitoring
can spot orbital deviations of hostile
satellites and also identify ownership
of otherwise anonymous ones.
At present, all the world’s ASAT
and ASAT counter-measures
technologies are only emerging, both
in terms of efficiency and numbers.
The only certain thing is space will
increasingly be a likely battleground
for future military technologies.
Other questions also remain to
be answered about militarized space.
For instance – just as during the Cold
War, when the superpowers were
able to combat each other within the
Third World without going over to a
general state of war through the use of
proxies – if two or more nations’ satel-
lites (and/or other space weaponry)
are combating each other in orbit,
does that mean the conflict will also
automatically be spread down into the
Chinese technicians prepare a micro-sat for launch. atmosphere and ground level? t

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AirLand Battle | Operation Just Cause: Panama ‘89 | Soccer War 1969 | A-10 Warthog | Focus Uganda | BOMARC

SAMs | Micro Satellites

#6 JUL - AUG 2013

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The Folio Game Series provides dozens

P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfi eld, CA 93390-1598

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1) DG COFFEE MUG $10

2) S&T PRESS BOOKS $30-35

3) DG MINI SERIES GAMES $13

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U.S. Marines fire on Fallujah.

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Operation Iraqi Freedom

The initial US response to the

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foreign troops appeared to many as opening for them to finally come to

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One of the major turning points

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Detail of the Decision Iraq map

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Need for Something New

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