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Stormin’ Norman Schwartzkopf | 1972 Easter Offensive in SVN | Russia’s New Military | SEAL Team Six vs. Bin Laden

MODERN WAR ISSUE #1

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STORMIN’ NORMAN SCHWARTZKOPF | 1972 EASTER OFFENSIVE IN SVN | RUSSIA’S NEW MILITARY | SEAL TEAM SIX VS. BIN LADEN
T:10 in
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 Weapons
The RPG-32
Hashim Portable Grenade
Launcher System
The venerable Russian Rocket
Propelled Grenade 7 (RPG-7) has
been nearly ubiquitous on modern
battlefields, but it’s also proven gener-
ally unsuited for defeating modern
armored vehicles equipped with
Active Protection Systems (APS).
In response, the Russian State
Research and Production Enterprise,
Bazalt, helped develop the RPG-32
one-man rocket-launcher system.
56
Operation Carnivore:
The Destruction of
Second Shock Army
By Andrew Hind
40 WORLD at WAR 24 | JUN–JUL 2012
www.WorldatWarmagazine.com
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 1
The RPG-32 is related to the
RPG-29 Vampire, whose rocket is
armed with a tandem warhead that
proved deadly to Israeli Merkava tanks
in Lebanon in 2006. It’s also able to
penetrate the armor of the American
M1 and British Challenger II tanks.
The RPG-32 Hashim improves
on that design. Bazalt financed the
project in mid-2005 to Jordanian
specifications, with local development
MODERN WAR 2 | NOV– DEC 2012
www.ModernWarmagazine.com
“Battle Banner,” by V. Safronov.
WORLD at WAR 24 | JUN–JUL 2012
licensed to the King Abdullah II
Design and Development Bureau. The
Jordan-Russian Electronic Systems
Company (JRESCO), as well as the
governments of Mexico and Argentina,
have also been involved. By 2010 the
program was no longer a joint effort,
though Bazalt continued to provide
hardware and technical assistance
from its factory in Novo Vyatka (Kirov).
The multipurpose grenade
Background
O
n the eve of the German
invasion in 1941, Leningrad
(St. Petersburg) was the
second-largest city in the Soviet Union
with a population of 2.5 million. Its
factories produced 10 percent of the
nation’s entire industrial output, includ-
ing much of its high quality steel and
its most modern tanks. It had obvious
strategic value; so, when Hitler ordered
his generals to make Leningrad one
of the major objectives of Operation
Barbarossa, it wasn’t merely on the
ideological grounds that it had been the
birthplace of the communist regime.
Leningrad was in fact one of the
top three priority objectives specified
in the Barbarossa plan, but Hitler kept
modifying how he wanted to deal with
the city. The original scheme called for
Army Group North (AGN), comprised of
Sixteenth and Eighteenth Armies along
with Fourth Panzer Group, a total of 28
divisions and nearly half a million men,
to capture it by direct assault. Failing
its entire rapid capture, a close-in siege
was to be set up within lines running
entirely within the built-up city center.
Difficult terrain, tenacious
resistance by the Soviets, and the
startling appearance of heavy KV-1
tanks for which the Germans had no
immediate answer, finally stopped
the advance of AGN. Rather than
risk his forces in a potentially bloody
attack into a heavily defended urban
area, Hitler decided to try to take
Leningrad via a more distant siege.
During the autumn of 1941, AGN
was able to effectively isolate the city,
entering the suburbs and reaching Lake
Ladoga in the east to sever all land links
with the rest of the Soviet Union. The
Germans then dug in along that perim-
eter outside the city to starve Leningrad
into submission while pounding it with
artillery and aerial attacks. During the
last four months of 1941, their artillery
fired over 30,000 rounds into Leningrad.
At the same time, mindful of the poten-
tial of Red Army counter-actions, the
besieging Germans set up static defense
lines as well as strongpoint positions on
the Volkhov River, to block such efforts.
The encirclement of Leningrad
trapped some 20 Soviet divisions,
totaling over 300,000 troops. Those
soldiers then had to compete with
3 million trapped civilians for food
and fuel. Resupply via Lake Ladoga,
using barges or – once the surface
froze solid – truck convoys, brought in
41
launcher is made up of a two-piece
modular unit: a short, reusable firing/
sighting launcher and a disposable
container with either a tandem
anti-tank or thermobaric round. The
former has grips, electro-triggering
firing controls and sight-mount, a
detachable, forward-set collimator sight
that allows the user to see a target-fixed
illuminated reticule with both eyes
open, and an optional night sight. The
16 S&T 271 | NOV–DEC 2011
www.StrategyandTacticsmagazine.com
New
Weapons
Arena
RPG-32 Characteristics
105 mm PG-32V tandem HEAT/TBG-32V thermobaric
Weight (unloaded/72 mm/105mm rocket): 3kg/6kg/10kg
Length (72 mm/105 mm): 900mm/1,200mm
Muzzle Velocity: 140 m/s
Penetration (RHA equiv.): 650mm+ after defeating ERA; 1,500mm
(concrete); 2,000mm (brick); 3,700mm (wood/ ground)
Effective Range: 700 meters
launcher’s design enables the user to
quickly prepare the RPG-32 for use in
all combat conditions, and ensures a
high kill probability from any shooting
position. Reusable to some 200 firings,
the Hashim’s unloaded weight was less
than 40 percent of that of the RPG-29.
To fire the weapon, factory-loaded
ammunition containers are attached
to the rear of the launcher. There are
two types of shape-charged 105mm
MODERN WAR 2 | NOV– DEC 2012
The Course of the Fighting
Ed’s Note: the following sidebar is
excerpted and adapted from a piece
that originally ran in issue 68.
Early Going
Initially the Soviets poured through the
German lines on 12 May. The Germans were
able to avoid a route in front of Kharkov
only by forming the same type of all-around
strongpoints (“hedgehogs”) that had broken
the back of the Soviet winter offensive.
Soviet 6th Army tore open the German
front in its sector. The Germans soon had
gaps in their line where there were simply no
units. By 15 May, Krasnograd and Taranovka
had fallen. The next day a Soviet reconnais-
sance element temporarily got within 25
miles of Army Group South headquarters
in Poltava, the scene of the historic defeat
of an earlier would-be conqueror or Russia,
Charles XII of Sweden, in the 17th century.
By rapidly moving 3rd and 23rd Panzer
Divisions into the breach, Gen. Paulus,
commander of German 6th Army, was able
to halt the drive of 28th Army some 12 miles
from Kharkov. Army Group South commander
Marshal Fedor von Bock was in a quandary
as to what to do: Paulus could barely keep his
army afloat, much less launch an immediate
counterattack. The only rescue force available
was 17th Army, the command element that was
to constitute the southern wing of Operation
Fredericus II, the Germans’ own planned and
upcoming attack into the Soviet salient. Even
so, it was apparent that army would have to
be quickly reinforced. Field Marshal Ewald von
Kleist was therefore hurriedly moved forward,
along with elements of his 1st Panzer Army, to
command the southern counterattack force.
The Soviets were playing into the
Germans’ hands in that regard, in that they
were being slow to commit their reserves.
Instead of pushing out those units far and
fast as they opened gaps in the German line,
as the Germans surely would’ve done had
the situation been reversed, they sent them
in piecemeal. One of the axioms for using
a reserve is it must not be committed too
soon or too late; the decisive moment occurs
when the weight of the reserve can alter (or
culminate) the course of a battle. Sent forward
in driblets, the Soviet reserve had little impact.
At the same time, by only probing to the
south, the Soviets failed to disrupt the hurried
German preparations for a counteroffensive.
As it was, by 16 May the Soviet command
was receiving reports of the growing strength
of the enemy force assembling to the south.
They realized too late they were advancing
into what amounted to a trap about to
be sprung. The Germans launched their
counteroffensive from the south on 17 May.
warheads. The PG-32V High-Explosive
Anti-Tank (HEAT) rocket was optimized
for use against Explosive Reactive
Armor (ERA) equipped vehicles. The
TBG-32V anti-structure thermobaric
round incorporates an enhanced frag-
mentation effect that makes it devastat-
ing against lightly armored vehicles,
soft targets and infantry. Thermobaric
munitions rely on a fuel-oxygen
mixture to produce longer duration
57
Counterattack
By the 21st the Germans had reached the
Donets. They also sent 16th Panzer Division
toward Izyum, the main communication center
for the whole Soviet bulge. That division crossed
the river and got inside the suburbs of that town.
The larger German attack was carried out
by 3rd Panzer Corps. That force continued to
drive north, and on 22 May it linked up with 44th
Infantry Division coming down from the north:
all the Soviets to the west were pocketed.
Meanwhile, the leadership of Southwestern
Direction were urging Stalin to call back the
whole attack, reporting to him about the German
force that was cutting into their operation’s
southern flank. Stalin refused to consider any
change in plan and, as a result, the Soviets
were unable to prevent the Germans from
firmly sealing off their rear. Once the cut off was
completed, however, the Southwestern Direction
command, on its own initiative, began to divert A captured Soviet T-34 tank put to use by the Germans.
forces to try to reopen a path into the newly
formed pocket. They deployed units from 37th
and 38th Armies in a line to keep the Germans
from expanding their ring wall to the east,
and their plan was to have those units attack
inward as those in the pocket attacked out.
The situation was fluid, as the Germans had
little time to prepare strong positions within
the lines of their encirclement. The Soviets then
threw everything they had into the rescue and
breakout effort. The mutilation of the German
dead discovered after the battle attested to the
ruthlessness of that attack. The focal point of
the Soviet effort fell on the 101st Jaeger (light
infantry) Division, which was then the only
formation standing between the Reds and a
clean getaway. At that crucial moment, however,
the Soviets had no final reserve left to commit
in order to secure a breakthrough. Everything
was already committed, and none of the units
nearby proved able to disengage and move
rapidly enough to get where they were needed.
The result was a bloodbath, but by the third
day of the Soviet effort the 101st still held, and
the Reds’ attack ran out of steam. The pressure
on German 6th Army was by then also falling
off, and that force was able to add its weight
to the counterattack, which was enough to
keep the remainder of the Soviet forces away
from the breakout attempt. The rest of the
battle was little more than a German mop up
operation as the Soviet pocket was destroyed.
When the fighting was over the Germans
had bagged 22 rifle and seven cavalry divisions.
The Soviets had lost 239,000 men, 1,250 tanks
and 2,026 artillery pieces. Soviet 6th, 9th and 57th
Armies were destroyed, and the commanders
of the first two were killed. As it turned out, it
was the last strategically significant pocket the
Germans would create during the war, though no
one would’ve predicted that at the time. ◆
— Stephen B. Patrick
S&T 271 | NOV–DEC 2011 17
5/11/12 4:19 PM
 MILItARY HIStORY IN tHE MAKING

#1 | SEP–OCT 2012

FEATURES DEPARTMENTS

6 44 20
Red Dragon / Green Crescent: Analysis: Russia’s Ongoing Design Theory
Naval Warfare in the 21st Century. Military Reorganization Red Dragon / Green crescent
the US Navy has enjoyed global the Russian military is presently in the by Joseph Miranda
superiority since 1945. that may last stage of a massive reorganization,
be changing in the Indian and one that’s easily the most radical it’s 50
Western pacific Oceans. Here’s ever undergone. Here’s our analysis. On the Horizon
our analysis of what’s involved. by Bruce Costello
by Joseph Miranda 54
66 Weapons
22 SEAL Team Six: DEVGRU & the • Colt vs. Beretta
“Stormin’” Norman Raid to Kill Osama Bin Laden by Blaine Taylor
Schwarzkopf & Desert Storm Here’s our summary analysis of SEAL • Speed Kills: The US Navy’s 64 -
controversy still swirls about the ultimate team Six and that elite unit’s vital Megajoule Electromagnetic Railgun
outcomes of the First Gulf War and the role in finally getting bin Laden. by David R. Higgins
man who commanded in achieving them. by David R. Higgins • The X95 (Tavor 2) Assault Rifle/SMG
by Blaine Taylor by David R. Higgins
New Arena
30 • Pentagon Wargaming
Vietnam 1972: Conventional or Life on MORS
Offensive in an Unconventional War by Brian R. Train
In 1972 the North Vietnamese abandoned • US Cyber Command & the
all pretence of “people’s war” and New Dimension of War
launched a conventional combined-arms by Joseph Miranda
offensive into the South. It failed.
by John Walker

2 MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012

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 26 70

73 PUBLISHER READER SUBMISSIONS

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 4 MODERN WAR 1 | SEP–OCT
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 Red Dragon
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6 MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012

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 Naval Warfare in the 21st Century
By Joseph Miranda
US Naval Supremacy
T
he US has been militarily involved in the
Middle East for several decades, including
the First and Second Gulf Wars, the Somali
peacekeeping operation and the current fighting in
Afghanistan. Those operations have required America
maintain naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean and
its approaches. Until recently there were no nations
in the region capable of challenging the US Navy at
sea; however, that situation is now changing, as both
India and China are developing their own sea power.
The US has several advantages in global naval warfare.
One of them comes from its Navy’s vast experience
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp– Oct 2012
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 7
since World War II in conducting major operations
from the oceans. The main element of US naval power
projection has been the carrier battle group, recently
redesignated carrier strike groups. They each consist
of an aircraft carrier plus supporting warships and
logistical vessels. Aircraft carriers were a major factor in
concentrating combat power and providing air cover
in the Korean, Vietnam and Gulf Wars. They’ve also
been useful in providing shows of force; for example,
executing the naval quarantine that brought an end to
the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and in establishing a
presence in the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz
during the Reagan era campaign against Iran.
The downside of US naval power is that it has had
7
7
5/11/12 4:19 PM
 A US Navy ship prepares to make a port call at Kuwait City.

little recent experience in combat
operations against major enemy ships.
The last large-scale surface-and-air
battle involving the USN was in 1945
against the Japanese. Since then,
most actions have been against light
enemy forces, such as in the 1964
Gulf of Tonkin incident and the 1980s
strikes against Iranian craft and oil
platforms. That’s not unusual given
the few major naval battles fought
since the conclusion of World War
II. The largest and most protracted
campaign was between British and
Argentinean forces in 1982’s Falklands
War, and that was mainly a matter of
airpower against surface vessels.
USN operations in the Western
Pacific and Indian Oceans require
extensive logistical support due to the
length of the lines of communication
back to America. Even so, the US also
possesses an advantage in that area.
The later years of
World War II saw
the USN operating
independent
of its bases for
protracted periods in the Pacific with
the support of fleet trains: major
formations of oilers, cargo ships,
repair craft and other support vessels.
The USN has continued that practice,
today maintaining large numbers
of such support vessels in the active
inventory and many more in reserve.
In the Indian Ocean and on

Specifications: Penguin Missile

Warhead 120 kg (MK2), 130 kg (MK3)

Launch Platform naval ships, helicopters (MK2),

fixed-wing aircraft (MK3)

Weight 385 kg (MK2), 370 kg (MK3)

Guidance System pulse-laser, passive IR (MK2),

passive IR, radar altimeter (MK3)

Length 3.0 m (MK2), 3.2 m (MK3)

Operational Range 34+ km (MK2), 55+ km (MK3)

8 MODERN WAR 1 | SEp– Oct 2012

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Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
its periphery the US has also established a
considerable infrastructure. For example,
Diego Garcia is the site of a major US base,
and there are more in the Persian Gulf states
and Saudi Arabia. Since the end of the 1970s
the US has had a de facto alliance with
Egypt, which has secured the Suez Canal
route for resupply and reinforcement via
the Mediterranean. (What impact the 2011
uprisings in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle
East may have on that situation is not apparent
at the time of this writing early in 2012).
The base structure was initially built up
during the Cold War to counter the possible
threat of a Soviet advance into the Middle East.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 gave
urgency to the situation, with the US forming
the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in order
to be able to speedily reinforce the region in
the event of further communist advances.
The RDF became the predecessor for today’s
Central Command, the headquarters that
presently controls US operations in the Middle
East. By building an infrastructure of bases,
airfields and depots – the latter containing
pre-positioned heavy equipment – the
introduction of major combat units into
the region in a crisis would be facilitated.
Another advantage the US has is its
Marine Corps (USMC). The Marines have
both the doctrine for and experience with
large amphibious operations and sustaining
expeditionary forces. Marine units are
specifically organized for that kind of
mission. Initial landings can be made by
battalion-sized Marine Expeditionary Units
(MEU), a larger Marine Expeditionary Brigade
(MEB), or even a Marine Expeditionary
Force (MEF), which amounts to a
reinforced division. All of those formations
have air units assigned directly to them,
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 9
US Warship Development
The USN is commissioning a new class of destroyers designated the
DD(X) or DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class, named after Adm. Elmo Zumwalt,
the commander of the successful SEALORDS riverine campaign in
Vietnam who later went on to become chief of naval operations.
The DDG-1000s incorporate new approaches to warship design. One of
the more obvious is the ships’ “tumblehome hull,” which flares out toward the
waterline. The main intent is to enhance stability, but the hull also maximizes
stealthiness by reducing superstructure features. The bridge slopes smoothly
into the hull, and the forest of above-deck radar and antenna masts, standard
for decades on warships, is eliminated; it’s integrated into the superstructure.
Ship systems are increasingly automated, reducing the number
of crew required. Primary weapons are deployed in modular vertical
launch systems (VLS) that can fire surface-to-air (SAM), surface warfare
(SUW), surface-to-surface (SSM) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
missiles. There are also two medium-caliber guns as well as a
helicopter pad. The DG-1000 class is to be operational in 2015.
Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) are now also coming on line. They’re
intended to support operations on and adjoining coastlines. They’re modular
in design, carrying different “system packages” for conducting amphibious
support operations, ASW, mine operations, terrorism counteraction, ISR
and interdicting enemy shipping. The DDG-1000 and LCS exploit advanced
technologies and networked systems. They’re able to integrate them
into larger combined task forces as well as with air and land forces.
There’s been controversy over the LCS on the grounds they’re too special-
ized and would be unable to compete on the high seas against conventional
destroyers and cruisers. While the reduction of the size of their crews gives
more space for modules and sensors, it could also be a liability if a ship
were hit and required a large number of personnel for damage control.
Another issue, which has been part of the naval debate for
decades, is the relatively small number of guns carried: most offensive
systems are missiles, which can be subjected to jamming and other
countermeasures while also requiring sophisticated technical support.

Further, there’s no comparison between tactical missiles and the amount
of firepower that could be generated by the Iowa-class battleships
the USN maintained on the active rolls until the early 1990s.
providing immediately on hand close support and airlift.
Expeditionary units can be based on large amphibious warfare
ships (LHA and LHD classes). Those vessels contain berthing spaces
for landing craft and assault units, as well as decks for helicopters and
close support aircraft. The US has 10 LHA/LHD, all of which have flight
decks. They therefore also need to be considered when evaluating
American naval air power, since they can complement the fleet carriers.
The US has developed a considerable body of doctrine for
expeditionary operations, and that’s reflected in the organization
for them. The US Air Force (USAF) has organized air expeditionary
wings for rapid deployment of airpower abroad, while the USN has its
Expeditionary Combat Command to coordinate its forces. Much of that
doctrine is based on direct experience. The US has engaged in numerous
combat and support missions as well as conducting counterterrorism
missions globally. Practical lessons have been learned and many previous
organizational shortcomings have been identified and resolved.
At the same time, though, experience can be a two-edged sword.
Many recent US combat operations have been against lightly armed
insurgents or forces that had already been hobbled by air attack and/
or economic sanctions. As a result, US units have been reorganized
along lighter lines. For instance, Army divisions are being replaced by
Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). While the BCT concept has demonstrated
effectiveness against insurgents and in mobile situations, their
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 hypersonic speed while being guided
by satellite to their targets. Even if such
attacks failed to hit anything, the threat
alone might cause the withdrawal of
carrier forces from harm’s way at a criti-
cal moment in some larger operation.
The loss of even a single carrier
might have effects that could cascade
both militarily and politically. The US
national command authority might
become hesitant to risk major surface
units, given each carrier represents a
huge capital investment in its construc-
tion and aircraft complement, not to
mention its highly trained crew. While
the destruction of one carrier out of 11
might appear to be only a fraction of
Atlantic Ocean (June 23, 2007) — sailors assigned to the small craft action team (SCAT) man the
total strength, the proportionate com-
.50 caliber machineguns on board guided missile cruiser USS Vicksburg before taking part in bat value of each single ship is actually
a boarding scenario training exercise. Vicksburg is underway in preparation for an upcoming higher owing to the need to return them
deployment. US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Oscar Espinoza. to port for overhauls, training and crew
relief. Since much of the USN’s offen-
effectiveness against major enemy Another issue is the vulnerability of sive ability is tied up in its carrier strike
conventional forces, especially if those US aircraft carriers. There’s a possibility groups, the loss of even a single one
enemy formations are backed by air some combination or concentration could radically alter the global balance
or sea power, remains to be seen. of attack by cruise missiles, aircraft, of naval power. Similarly, the sinking or
The US has fought under conditions submarines, suicide boats and high damaging of amphibious warfare ships
of total air and naval superiority velocity projectiles might breach could also have immense effects, since
for decades. While it’s doubtful the a carrier’s defenses. The infamous they’re the primary means for the US to
Indian or Chinese Air Forces could Millennium Challenge exercise of 2002 insert large ground formations onto a
provide sustained resistance to US demonstrated the feasibility of such littoral and support them with airpower.
airpower, air assets would still have attacks, albeit in a much-disputed One response to that threat has
to be diverted to air superiority wargame. More recently there’s been been to increase the number of escort
and counter-air missions, at least concern over Chinese DF-21 missiles, ships while also enhancing their anti-
during the critical opening stages which are alleged to be capable of pen- ballistic missile defense capabilities.
of any such confrontations. etrating carrier defenses by traveling at Yet there’s a point of diminishing

12 MODERN WAR 1 | SEp– Oct 2012

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 12 5/11/12 4:19 PM

 return, when too much strength is tied a growing threat, especially so in moves into the Indian Ocean are also
up simply protecting carriers and not the chokepoints along the Red Sea/ viewed as a threat in that regard.
enough is left available to conduct Horn of Africa axis and in the straits India is facing several obstacles
offensive operations. To deal with that off Malaya and Indonesia. The Indian along the route to becoming a naval
situation the USN has been developing Navy must therefore be capable power. One is that it needs secure
a new class of littoral combat ships of projecting power at least as far overseas naval bases. The Chinese
(LCS) dedicated to operations in as the Indian Ocean periphery. have taken the lead in that race, having
coastal waters and supporting forces India’s major potential foe is China. established bases in Myanmar and
ashore. Relatively cheap to construct, The two Asian powers fought a brief Pakistan while also maneuvering to get
and requiring minimal numbers of war in 1962 in which the Chinese got the Maldives government to grant bas-
sailors to operate, they’re expected the upper hand. China still maintains ing concessions. A Maldives base would
to be useful in high risk situations. considerable ground combat strength complete the Chinese strategic encir-
Another aspect of US littoral power in Tibet, as well as having a large air clement of India, something the Indian
projection has come in the form of a force at home. At the same time, part government has pledged to counteract.
revival of riverine squadrons (RIVRON) of Indian grand strategy is to keep from The downside for China is their
consisting of small patrol craft. The being encircled; therefore Chinese Indian Ocean bases are at some
USN had experience with them
during the Vietnam War, where they
conducted successful operations in
the Mekong River delta. More recently
the Navy committed a RIVRON to Iraq,
where the boats proved useful on that
country’s extensive river system.
The US has further grand-strategic
advantages owing to its investments
in global intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) and command
control (C2) systems. That includes
a vast network of satellites, sensors,
reconnaissance aircraft, drones
and AWACs. US Special Operations
Forces (SOF) add even more to those
strategic capabilities, being capable of
long-range ISR as well as conducting
raids, terrorism counteraction and
liaison with friendly forces, as well as
the more traditional mission of training
friendly insurgents and security forces.
Part of recent US strategy has been
to provide the ISR, C2, logistical and
SOF support to friendly forces that then
conduct the actual ground combat
missions, sometimes supported by
our air and sea power. That minimizes
US ground force involvement and
the political implications it entails.
The US applied that strategy success-
fully during the initial intervention
in Afghanistan, though “mission
creep” soon took over: by 2011 the US
and its NATO allies had committed
the equivalent of 15 brigades to
ground operations in that country.

India

The Indian government has stated

its intention to make that country a
major naval power. That’s in part a
result of India’s economic expansion, A missile is launched from
which will require secure overseas the USS Hopper during
a 2009 test of the Aegis
sources of commodities, particularly
ballistic missile defense
minerals and petroleum, to be brought system. (U.S. Navy photo)
in via shipping. Piracy has also been

MODERN WAR 1 | SEp– Oct 2012 13

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 13 5/11/12 4:19 PM

 distance from their navy’s homeports,
and they can be lost if a host country’s
political situation changes. In the
event of a shooting war between the
two countries, the Indian armed forces
would have the advantage of shorter
lines of communication in dealing
with those Chinese bases. The Indian
Navy also got some combat experience
in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, when
one of its carriers launched successful
strikes against Pakistani warships
in port and otherwise succeeded
in cutting enemy lines of supply.
It remains doubtful, however, that
India has the wherewithal to engage in
a major war at sea. The country’s home-
based military industries can’t support
their nation’s armed forces on their
own. Major weapons systems must
either be imported from abroad or built
under license. The current Indian goal
is to have 70 percent of it arms provided
by home industries. In a protracted
INDIAN OCEAN (Sept. 4,
2007) - A Sea Harrier takes
off from the flight deck
of Indian Navy aircraft
carrier INS Viraat.
14
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 14
war, India would have difficulties
sustaining its armed forces if its oceanic
lines of supply were threatened.
The Indian Navy is planning for a
two-carrier strike group fleet. Currently
it has one, the Viraat, originally the
Royal Navy’s Hermes. There’s another
carrier slated for deployment in 2012,
the Vikramaditya, a former Soviet Kiev-
class through-deck cruiser that contains
both a flight deck and surface-to-sur-
face missile systems. The Vikramaditya
is being refit, with the removal of the
missile launchers to further facilitate
flight operations. The Indian Navy is
also building two new Vikrant-class
carriers in its own shipyards, which are
expected to be operational in the near
future. The number of aircraft each of
those carriers can launch is limited,
especially when compared to the USN
Nimitz-class. Still, there are plans to
further modernize, including adding
nuclear submarines and stealth frigates.
MODERN
MODERN WAR
WAR 11 || SEp–
SEp–Oct
Oct 2012
2012
The Indian Navy has several large
amphibious warfare ships, which give it
littoral power projection capability. The
Indian Army has some experience in
expeditionary operations, though main-
ly from the era of the British Empire.
The Indian Army initially ran the inva-
sion of Ottoman Mesopotamia in World
War I, and was also heavily involved in
many overseas operations in World War
II. India has also contributed sizable
numbers of troops to more recent
international peacekeeping missions.
The 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai
led to the Indian Navy being assigned a
counterterrorism mission. That might
seem an overreaction, but the alleged
involvement of Pakistan in the attacks
gave them international implications.
Indian armed forces have also been
in a long running standoff with the
Pakistanis in Kashmir. Asymmetric
threats such as terrorism, cyberwar and
insurgency have become increasingly
5/11/12 4:19 PM
 a part of modern warfare, and having modernization. Consequently it has global power. Such operations require
the regular armed forces deal with interest in the Indian Ocean, Persian overseas bases and, as noted, they’ve
them provides more choices in how to Gulf and Red Sea regions. The incidence already been secured in various places
counter them. Given that Pakistan has of piracy there has led the Chinese around the Indian Ocean littoral.
allied itself with China, the expanded to commit a small naval squadron The Chinese armed forces have in
mission matrix for the Indian Navy to secure the shipping lanes in the recent years been undergoing a major
has taken on political importance. western Indian Ocean. Aside from reorganization. The outcome of the
protecting shipping, that force also First Gulf War (1990-91) was taken by
China gives the PLAN an opportunity to their high command as a successful
show the flag as a sign of increasing demonstration of the American-led
China is another emerging naval
power. Its primary strategy has revolved
around domination of the so called USS Cole (AFP Photo/ US Marine Corp/
First and Second Island Chains; the Ho/ Sgt. Don L. Maes/ Getty Images)
former includes the East and South
China Seas, the latter extends along a
north-south line running east of the
Philippines. China is also considering
sending its People’s Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) farther away, as indicated
in a 2008 government paper.
As does India, China relies on
foreign commodities, especially
petroleum, to support its economic

Effects Based Operations & Kinetic Operations their withdrawal for fear of an unconventional attack, could take them out
Two buzz phrases currently circulating through the Pentagon are
“effects based operations” and “kinetic operations.” The latter are
those intended to cause attrition to enemy forces, usually through the
use of weapons systems. Effects based operations are those intended
to have an impact beyond the tactical situation. For example, they
might include attacking enemy C2 capabilities in order to collapse
an opposing air defense network. Those planning effects based
operations concentrate on the end state to be achieved and then
tailor forces to accomplish it. Effects based operations also look
at the impact of military operations on the political situation.
There is some sophistry there. Commanders have understood for
millennia that military operations have secondary effects on national
morale and politics. Indiscriminate firepower can cause collateral damage
among civilians, alienating otherwise friendly groups. Alternatively,
massive displays of firepower can sometimes convince hostile forces to
cease resistance. The RMA has been based in part on the assumption
precision giddied munitions, in combination with advanced sensors, could
target key enemy command control and infrastructure facilities, thereby
causing the collapse of enemy armed forces with a minimum of fighting.
Terrorism has an effect out of proportion to the physical damage
it causes. The Al Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001 were sufficient
to place the US into what has amounted to a permanent state of war
against assorted insurgent forces worldwide, as well as providing
the impetus for major military operations in the Persian Gulf.
On the tactical level, terrorism has had effects against naval forces.
The Al Qaeda attack on the USS Cole in 2000 not only took a USN destroy-
of action during a critical period of an otherwise conventional campaign
The current situation involving piracy on the high seas is another case
in point. The “pirate fleets” have been operating with increasing boldness,
despite their general lack of military capacity in comparison to the navies
of the NATO powers. Much of the dilemma is in the failure of political
will on the part of the countries whose shipping is being attacked. Rather
than launching a comprehensive military campaign against the pirates,
they’ve instead attempted small-scale actions that accomplish little, or
they’ve deferred the issue to politico-legal institutions. There’s potential
there: if the navies of India or China were to take decisive action, they
could thereby establish themselves as power brokers in the region.
In the bigger picture, the development of information warfare
(infowar) has also become a new means to attack enemy forces on a non-
kinetic front. Infowar can include cyberwar, electronic warfare, psychologi-
cal warfare (PSYOP), deception measures and a host of other activities.
Modern combat forces are becoming increasingly dependent on
sophisticated electronic systems. They’re also tied to global networks for
command control, communications, intelligence and targeting systems.
That’s especially true for the distantly deployed warships of major powers.
While those systems give them great combat power, they can be rendered
un-functional by jamming, computer viruses, sabotage and deception mea-
sures. Commanders must therefore be prepared to engage on those fronts.
Infowar has been useful in recent years for facilitating mass-based
rebel activities, as the uprisings across the Middle East in 2011 demon-
strated. Much of that was loosely coordinated via the internet and cell
phones. Such upheavals can change governments in power, and with that
the military situation. A new government may make or break a military


er out of the theater for repair, it also caused a reassessment of overall alliance and withdraw or grant base access. All that indicates a modern
naval security. While it’s doubtful an aircraft carrier could be sunk by military force will have access to a range of options – as well as exposure
terrorists, the diversion of carriers to counterterrorism support missions, or to threats – when it comes time to accomplish national objectives.

MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–

SEp–Oct
Oct 2012
2012 15

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 15 5/11/12 4:20 PM

 “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA).
Briefly, the RMA was put in motion by
combining superior command control,
sensors and precision guided weaponry
to inflict massive losses on less sophis-
ticated foes. Decisive military outcomes
could therefore be achieved at low cost.
The Gulf Wars have also been a demon-
stration of power projection capabilities
in which the US supported in sustained
combat not only its own forces but
also those of its Coalition partners.
For the Chinese armed forces the
RMA means converting from Maoist
doctrines of protracted warfare that
relied almost solely on various kinds of
infantry. Emphasis now is on building
up the Chinese Navy, Air Force and
strategic missile force. The idea is to
create a smaller but better trained
professional force that can deploy
rapidly to fight in distant theaters.
The Chinese government has also
designated the counterterrorism mis-
sion as belonging to its armed forces,
giving them another reason to deploy
Indian Navy Harrier fighters aboard one of their carriers.

16 MODERN WAR 1 | SEp– Oct 2012

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 16 5/11/12 4:20 PM

 Communist Chinese P-6 patrol boats.
Sailors practice readying torpedoes aboard a Taiwanese patrol boat.
abroad. Even with all that taken into
account, however, the Chinese still
have little actual experience in power
projection. Their recent foreign wars
have all involved land campaigns on
their own frontiers (Korea 1950-53,
India 1962, Vietnam 1979).
The Chinese Navy and Air Force
are both larger than their Indian coun-
terpart services, though the Chinese
don’t currently have an operational
aircraft carrier. The PLAN has acquired
several foreign made carriers, appar-
ently for study of their technology
and operational requirements. One
of them, the former Ukrainian carrier
Varyag (Admiral Kuznetsov-class),
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 17
is in the process of conversion to
operational status. The Chinese are also
building carriers of their own design.
The PLAN is also bringing in a
new class of destroyer, the Type 052C.
Those vessels are to be constructed
from entirely Chinese components,
with heavy emphasis on sensors and
electronics. They’re to be dedicated to
fleet air defense, along with some sur-
face and anti-submarine capabilities.
Conclusion
It’s one thing to have ships commis-
sioned, but it’s another thing to deploy
them in a fleet that can conduct combat
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp– Oct 2012
An Indian Navy patrol boat sets out to sea.
at sea and support littoral operations.
The US Navy and the navies of its allies,
such as Britain and France, have that
experience. India has a smaller amount
of experience; the Chinese have little.
The situation “on the ground,” both
military and political, must also be
considered, since it can provide or
deny access to bases. Modern naval
warfare takes on even larger dimen-
sions due to the impact of terrorism
and cyberwar. What all that means is
the outcome of any future naval war
will be determined by many different
factors, and the power that can best
integrate them into an overall national
strategy will have the advantage. t
17
5/11/12 4:20 PM
 | | | | | Naval Orders of Battle 2012 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
The charts show active naval forces. The United States, especially, also maintains large numbers of warships in reserve.

Notes
United People’s India Indonesia Iran CVN: nuclear powered aircraft carrier
States Republic CV: other aircraft carriers
of China CG: guided missile cruisers
CVN 11 - - - - DDG: guided missile destroyers
CV - - 1 - - FF: frigates
CG 22 - - - - LC: smaller landing craft
DDG 56 28 8 - - LCC: amphibious command ship
FF 21 52 11 7 + 23 (*) 4 LCS: littoral combat ships
SSBN 14 3 - - - LHA/LHD: landing ship assault/
SSN 57 7 1 - - landing ship dock (large amphibious
SS - 54 16 2 7 ships with aircraft flight deck)
LCS 2 - - - - Logistics: various tanker, cargo,
Patrol 16 253 28 41 c. 150 transport, repair and other support ships
MW 9 69 10 11 5 LPD/LSD: landing platform dock/landing
LCC 2 - - - - ship dock (other large amphibious ships)
LHA/LHD 10 - - - - MW: mine warfare vessels
LPD/LSD 21 84 10 5 13 Naval Aircraft: fixed winged
LC 270 160 6 54 8 naval combat aircraft
Logistics 110 205 47 27 26 Patrol: patrol and coastal craft
Naval Aircraft 900 290 35 24 19 SSBN: ballistic missile submarines
Marine Bde 9 2 1 3 2 SSN: nuclear powered submarines
equiv. SS: other submarines
Marine Bde Equiv: marine
brigade equivalents
(*) frigates plus corvettes

Comparing Warships

Ship Class CVN Nimitz CG Ticonderoga CG(X) DDG Arleigh DDG Zumwalt LCS
Burke

Country USA USA USA USA USA USA

Displacement: tons c. 9600 23,000 9,000-11,000 14,500 2,176
100,000
Length: meters 333 173 154 183 127
Beam: meters 77 17 18 25 32
Propulsion nuclear Gas turbine Possible Gas turbine Gas turbine Diesel
nuclear
Speed: km/h 56 60 ? 56 56 81
Crew 3200 400 ? 303 - 330 140 75
Aircraft 90 - - - - -
Helicopters - 2 ? 2 1-2 2
Guns - 2 x 127mm, ? 1 x 127mm 2 x 155mm 1 x 57mm,
2 x 25mm, 4x
4 x 12.7mm 12.7mm
VLS - 122 512 96 80 Varies
on mission
SAM 24 (*) - (*) (*) (*)
SSM - 8 - (*) (*) (*)
TT - 6 - 6 - -
ASW - (*) - - - -
CIWS 4 2 ? 2 2 2

18 MODERN WAR 1 | SEp– Oct 2012

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 18 5/11/12 4:20 PM

 Notes
Comparing Warships (Continued) ASW: anti-submarine
warfare weapons
CIWS: close-in weapons
Ship Class CV Viraat CV Vikrant DDG Delhi CV Shi DDG system; rapid firing guns or
Lang (**) Lanzhou missiles used for interception
of incoming enemy missiles
Country India India India China China SAM: surface to air
missile launchers
Displacement: 23,900 40-65,000 5200 33,000 7,000 SSM: surface to surface missile
tons launchers; includes anti-shipping
(SUW) and cruise missiles
Length: meters 227 262 163 300 154 TT: torpedo tubes
VLS: vertical launch system
Beam: meters 49 60 17 73 17 missile tubes (combination
of SAM/SSM/ASW)
Propulsion Steam Gas turbine Gas turbine Steam Gas turbine UAV: Unmanned aerial
turbine turbine vehicles (drones)
(*) weapons included under VLS
Speed: km/h 26 52 52 59 56 (**) specifications are for Admiral
Kuznetsov-class CV, from which
Crew 2100 1400 350 2626 280 the ship is being converted


(***) ASW capable
Aircraft 30 29 - 26 - “?” : information not
available
Helicopters 7 10 2 24 1

Guns 2x 4 x 76mm 1x 8x 1x
40mm 152mm 30mm 100mm

VLS - - 32 - -

SAM 16 ? 8 18 48
below — PACIFIC OCEAN (March
SSM - - 16 12 16 24, 2008) On the flight deck
aboard the Nimitz-class aircraft
carrier USS Ronald Regan
TT - - 5 - 6 (***) (CVN 76) flight deck personnel
prepare fixed-wing aircraft for
ASW - - 2 1 - flight operations. Reagan and
embarked Carrier Air Wing (CVW)
14 are conducting routine carrier
CIWS - ? 2 8 2 operations. U.S. Navy photo by Mass
Communication Specialist 3rd
UAV - - - - - Class Chelsea Kennedy (Released)

MODERN WAR 1 | SEp– Oct 2012 19

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 19 5/11/12 4:20 PM

 Design Theory
Joseph Miranda
Red Dragon, Green Crescent
T
here are several reasons to
design and play a wargame.
One is to learn something
about the potential inherent in a
battle, campaign or war that hasn’t yet
actually taken place. You can see this
in Red Dragon, Green Crescent (RDGC),
the wargame you get with the hobby
edition of Modern War magazine’s issue
number one. (Elsewhere in this issue
there is information on how to order
RDGC if you’ve bought the newsstand
edition of the magazine, which comes
without the game.) RDGC explores the
possibilities involved in a near-future
war between opposing US- and
Chinese-led coalitions that’s fought in
the Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific,
and the South and East Asian littoral.
The game immediately points
up a number of things. One is
the importance of what have at
various times been called “combined
operations,” “joint warfare,” and
most recently “hybrid warfare.” What
all those terms describe is warfare
prosecuted so as to most efficiently
use in combination naval, air and land
forces to gain a battlefield decision.
You can see that by examining the
counter-sheet, which represents the
military forces readily available to
fight such a war. The counters provide
a quantitative analysis of the relative
20
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 20
strengths of each type of unit, measured
in terms of various combat factors.
Thus, a naval surface warfare group is
most useful in fighting enemy naval
units, while perhaps also providing
limited support to ground forces
ashore; meanwhile, an armored brigade
is most useful in fighting other ground
units, and has no ability at all to take
on naval forces at sea. The key to suc-
cessful operations therefore becomes
having the right combinations of units
at the right places at the right times.
The map provides a quick and
efficient reference to strategic locations
across the otherwise vast area it covers,
such as vital ports and sea lanes. That’s
one more good use for wargames: a
ready source of cartographic data.
Even without playing the game, you
can gain a lot of information simply
by looking at the map. In Modern
War magazine, that’s backed up by an
article providing deeper background
to the issue game. The article and
game work together to present you
with a complete experience.
RDGC uses the award winning
system created by developer Ty Bomba
and used previously in designer Bruce
Costello’s Red Dragon Rising (RDR).
That game, the ‘parent’ of RDGC,
simulated a potential future war only in
East Asian waters. Costello’s new design
of RDGC expands the original game
into a two-map presentation while also
adding new units and larger scenarios.
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
The system uses turns composed
of alternating single “operations”
(ops) by each player. Players alternate
launching one kind of mission, which
is then executed by a particular group
of units. What that does is place players
in the combat operations center of
theater-level commanders who must
make major decisions within a limited
time – all the while knowing the enemy
is capable of an equally quick reaction
or move of his own. The clock is also
ticking in the larger sense, because both
sides are limited in the number of oper-
ations they can make within a complete
game. Those features highlight the
swift pace of war fought between
two technologically enabled sides.
The design also includes random
events, which represent many of
the non-material factors of warfare:
political considerations, command
control, fog of war, friction and so forth.
They come in via a “chaos generator”
(meaning you periodically have to pick
chits out of a cup). While that’s a simple
way to model such factors, it conve-
niently provides for an “effects based
simulation” – one that concentrates on
providing an accurate range of results
and outcomes without bogging down in
the real-world minutiae and procedures
necessary to make those things come
about. It also means players have to
think not only in quantitative terms, but
also across the range of larger possibili-
ties inherent in any operation. t
5/11/12 4:20 PM
 Red Dragon Green Crescent To purchase the game that covers the battles featured in
Red Dragon/Green Crescent is a game this issue send your name and address along with:
covering near-future conflicts around Asia’s
periphery from 2013 to 2021. It’s adaptable for $51 US Customers
two player, multi-player and solitaire play. $58 Canadian Customers
$62 Overseas Customers
Most ground units are brigades. Aircraft are mostly All prices include postage for 1st class or airmail
combat-wings. Ship units represent groups of vessels shipping. CA residents add $3.19 sales tax.
such as SAGs, subrons or individual capital ships.
Name
turns represent varied amounts of real time, depend- Address
ing on the operation being conducted. An entire match
encompasses the first month of the war. Scenarios City/State/Zip
include partial and two-map games, some centered Country
on Korea, others on the Indo-pakistan area, and others V/MC # Exp.
covering the entire region from the Red Sea to Alaska.
Signature
Phone # Email
contents Include: two 22 x 34”
maps and 352 counters SEND TO:
Decision Games
ATTN: MW Game Offer
P.O. Box 21598
Bakersfield CA 93390

Detail of the Red Dragon/ Green Crescent map

MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012 21

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 21 5/11/12 4:20 PM

 Just Desserts
R
etired Maj. Gen. Leroy
Suddath, former commander
of US Army Special Operations
Forces, said of his friend, the man
who commanded in America’s first
Gulf War in 1990-91: “Norman would
predict [when still just a student at
West Point] not only that he would
lead a major American army into
combat, but that it would be in a
battle decisive to the nation.”
And indeed Schwarzkopf did just
that as head of Central Command,
winning a stunning campaign
against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
For his service in Vietnam,
Grenada and the Gulf War, H. Norman
Schwarzkopf was in 1994 awarded the
22
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 22
prestigious Distinguished Graduate
Award by the United States Military
Academy’s Association of Graduates.
The citation stated: “As military
commander, staff officer, soldier-
statesman, and peerless combat
leader…Schwarzkopf has rendered
extraordinary service to his country, to
the US Army, and to his fellow soldiers.”
In addition, he was awarded the
Presidential Medal of Freedom, the
Congressional Gold Medal, several
military orders from various Arab states,
an honorary membership in the French
Foreign Legion, and an honorary
knighthood given by Great Britain’s
reigning monarch Queen Elizabeth II.
As commander of both the military
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
buildup codenamed Operation Desert
Shield, and then its offensive successor
Desert Storm, the general with the
legendary temper commanded a
six-week-long aerial bombardment
of both Iraq and Iraqi Army positions
in occupied Kuwait. His follow-on
100-hour ground campaign resulted
in the liberation of that latter country,
and all with minimal friendly casualties.
The quick victory provided a neces-
sary contrast to the protracted, and
ultimately lost, war of attrition in which
America had found itself in Vietnam.
5/11/12 4:20 PM
 Stormin’
Norman Schwarzkopf
& Desert Storm By Blaine Taylor

Youth

H. Norman Schwarzkopf graduated

43rd in a class of 480 at the United States
Military Academy in 1956 at the age
of 21 with a commission as a second
lieutenant of infantry. He was the
son of Gen. H. N. Schwarzkopf of the
class of 1917. Schwarzkopf senior had
been the first New Jersey State Police
Chief, and in that capacity headed the
investigation into the sensational 1932
kidnapping of the baby son of famed
aviator Charles Lindbergh. He also
served as a provost marshal in Germany
after both World Wars, as well as chief
of the Iranian national police force

A Kuwaiti oil field burns at the conclusion of the First Gulf War in 1991.

MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012 23

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 23 5/11/12 4:20 PM

 in the mid-1940s. In 1953 he allegedly
played a key role in the CIA’s overthrow of
Three views of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh,
Schwartzkopf during his which returned to power the Shah of Iran
Vietnam War service. and US ally Mohammed Riza Pahlevi.
The younger Schwartzkopf was born
in Trenton, New Jersey, on 22 August 1934,
and received the unusual split in his name
because his father disliked his own first
name of Herbert. As a 10-year-old cadet
at the Bordentown Military Institute, near
Trenton, Norman didn’t smile for his year-
book picture, explaining to his mother:
“Someday, when I become a general, I
want people to know that I’m serious.”
Norman spent the years 1946-51
abroad with his father: a year in Iran,
another in Switzerland, two in Germany
and six months in Italy. Among other
things, he learned to speak both German
and French. In 1951 he returned to the
US and received a football scholarship
at Valley Forge Military Academy in
Wayne, Pennsylvania. It was on another
such scholarship that he entered West
Point on 1 July 1952. While there,
Cadet Schwarzkopf was on both the
football and wrestling teams, sang
tenor and conducted the choir.

Vietnam & After

Following airborne training at Fort

Benning, Georgia, the new second
lieutenant spent two years with the 101st
Airborne Division at Fort Campbell,
Kentucky. After being stationed in Berlin
for two-years, he returned to Benning
for the officer advanced course. In 1964
he received a master’s degree in guided
missile engineering from the University of
Southern California at Los Angeles, then

24 MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 24 5/11/12 4:21 PM

 Iraqi armored personnel carriers, tanks and trucks destroyed in a Coalition attack along a
road in the Euphrates River Valley during Operation Desert Storm.
returned to West Point to teach for three
years. That stint was interrupted by the
Vietnam War, when he was granted a
requested combat posting for a year in
the summer of 1965 as “task force advi-
sor” to the South Vietnamese airborne.
There Capt. Schwarzkopf helped
defend the Special Forces camp at
Dak To against a Viet Cong assault,
and was promoted to major a month
later. As he told writer C.D.B. Bryan
for his 1976 book Friendly Fire: “I
came home with the greatest feeling
of satisfaction I’ve ever had. I’d slept
in the mud, ate rice and Vietnamese
food with chopsticks for one solid year.
Everywhere the Vietnamese went,
I went. I was one of them…I really
felt that I was helping people.”
During 1966-68, Schwarzkopf
again taught at West Point. He also
married a flight attendant he met at
a football game, Brenda Holsinger,
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 25
with whom he had three children.
Promoted to lieutenant colonel,
Schwarzkopf took courses at the Army
Command and General Staff College
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He
volunteered for a second tour of duty
in Vietnam in December 1969 as a bat-
talion commander in the 198th Infantry
Brigade of the Americal Division. It was
during that tour, on 18 February 1970,
he was involved in the accidental death
by artillery fire of Sgt. Michael Mullen,
and incident featured in the 1976 book
and later television movie Friendly Fire.
The following May, he found
himself in the middle of an enemy
minefield rescuing some of his men
who’d become stranded in it. It was “the
worst thing I’ve ever been though in my
life,” he later recalled. For that action
he was awarded his third Silver Star.
After Vietnam, Schwarzkopf served
in assignments with the 172nd Infantry
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, US Pacific
Command, 8th Mechanized Infantry
Division, and the Pentagon. He was
promoted to major general in 1983 and
given command of 24th Mechanized
Infantry Division. In October of that
year he acted as advisor to the com-
mander of the US intervention on the
island of Grenada. The intervention
was ordered to rescue American
medical students endangered by a
communist uprising. During the final
phase of the operation he was made
coordinator of all ground forces, his
first major combat command.
In 1985 he was named Assistant
Deputy Chief of Staff for Army
Operations at the Pentagon, and
he became a corps commander the
following year. Schwarzkopf was
named head of Central Command
in November 1988, and it was in
that capacity he was positioned for
25
5/11/12 4:21 PM
 the coming campaign in Kuwait.
Desert Shield & Desert Storm
On 2 August 1990, Saddam Hussein
invaded and occupied oil-rich Kuwait,
and it was thought his next target might
be neighboring Saudi Arabia, a US ally
since 1945. President George Bush,
Sr., asserted: “This will not stand,” and
demanded Saddam withdraw or face
hostile action. The United Nations
concurred and issued an ultimatum.
Despite that the Iraqi Army stayed
in place, and the US-led coalition
began a buildup into the next year.
By February 1991, Schwarzkopf’s
28-nation Coalition force numbered
three quarters of a million men,
with 541,000 of them American.
They were backed up by hundreds
of ships, thousands of aircraft and
above — The lieutenant general’s
official Pentagon photo portrait.
F-16A Fighting Falcons and F-15C and F-15E Eagles fly over burning oil fields during Desert Storm. Operation Desert Storm began Jan. 17, 1991.
26
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 26
a huge armored contingent.
After moving his command head-
quarters to the Saudi capital of Riyadh,
the general went over to the offensive.
Operation Desert Shield became Desert
Storm on 16 January 1991, with a
Coalition air and missile bombardment
of Iraq and occupied Kuwait starting 17
hours after the UN deadline expired.
Schwarzkopf’s immediate goals
were: 1) gaining air supremacy by
destroying enemy air defense radar
installations and missiles; 2) severing
Iraqi supply lines; 3) interdicting Iraqi
command, control and communica-
tions; 4) taking off-line all Iraqi nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons
facilities; and 5) totally defeating the
Iraqi Army’s elite Republican Guard.
On 23 February the general
launched the ground assault that routed
the Iraqis in 100 hours. He had tricked
above — An OH-58D Kiowa helicopter departs from a communications
site in the desert during Operation Desert Shield.
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
the enemy into thinking there would
be a large-scale amphibious operation
on the Kuwaiti coast, and they thus
left their western (inland) flank largely
unprotected. Enabled by that strategic
misdirection, Schwartzkopf’s 200,000-
man strike force moved in what he
later told the media was like a “‘Hail
Mary’ [desperation] play in football.”
The move placed Coalition
spearheads within 150 miles of the
Iraqi capital of Baghdad before they
were given a stop order. President Bush,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gen. Colin. Powell, and Schwarzkopf
himself were all later criticized for
stopping short of overthrowing Saddam
Hussein, and the senior Bush lost his
reelection bid in 1992 at least partly as
a result of it. Similarly, Schwartzkopf
also failed to include helicopters in his
ceasefire ban on Iraqi military flights,
5/11/12 4:21 PM
 Desert Storm: A Cold War Payoff

Norman Schwarzkopf had at his disposal for Desert Storm a superlative instrument in US Third Army. That headquarters
had been activated to command US and Coalition ground forces against Iraq, continuing the lineage of the organization Gen.
George S. Patton had commanded during the drive across France and into Germany in the campaigns of 1944-45.
There were several factors contributing to the rapid and relatively bloodless Coalition victory in Desert Storm. One was US
forces had, since the end of the Vietnam counter-insurgency effort, been preparing for exactly the type of war they ended up
fighting in Kuwait. Army doctrine was then built around the “AirLand Battle” concept, which had four basic principles.
Agility. Friendly forces would operate at a faster pace than the enemy, getting inside his action-reaction com-
mand loop, thereby completing each discrete operation before the foe had the opportunity to respond.
Initiative. Maintaining the offensive was critical: the enemy would only be able only to respond
to US maneuvers, and thus the US commander would set the pace of battle.
Depth. The battle would be fought throughout and across the theater of operations. Long-range fire and airpower would attack enemy
command control and lines of communication all across and through it, while mechanized and airmobile spearheads drove deep.
Synchronization. All elements of combat power would work together to attain maximum synergistic effect.
Maintaining friendly command control was therefore vital in order to ensure the necessary coordination of all ele-
ments, while attacks on enemy command control would further degrade the opposition’s ability to respond.
Of course, all that required a highly trained force, and that training had been taking place for years, most notably
under the realistic conditions of the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. The simulated foe there was based
on the Soviet military, but that was close enough because Iraqi military practice was largely just a regionally modi-
fied form of Red Army doctrine. American training therefore matched the tactical situation in the Persian Gulf.
Another element of success came from the fact US units were capable of fighting at night, using then new night vision equipment and navigat-

A US Navy F-14 streaking above Kuwaiti battlefield in1991.

ing via previously unheard of GPS. American tanks could also engage at longer range than their Iraqi counterparts, and with great accuracy. That
generally gave US forces the first kill, important psychologically, and it also resulted in maximized enemy losses with minimal friendly casualties.
Yet another American advantage was attention to logistics. During the Cold War the US had built up massive base
complexes in the Arabian peninsula and along its approaches. Those facilities had originally been meant to support friendly
forces in the event the Soviet Union moved to break through to the Persian Gulf from its foothold in Afghanistan. In 1990-91 those
same bases were also at the right place for the buildup during Desert Shield. Once Desert Storm kicked off, American logistical
capability provided further dividends through its demonstrated ability to rapidly displace forward via ground and air transport.
Similarly, US Air Force operations were based on “systems warfare” concepts developed by Col. John Warden. The objective was to
destroy the overall enemy capacity to fight by attacking key targets, the destruction of which would then cause the collapse of the rest of
his force. Critical targets would be acquired by remote sensor systems and then attacked with precision-guided munitions such as smart
bombs and cruise missiles. Advances in technology facilitated that approach, as the new weaponry got 50 percent and higher hit rates.
Enemy command control systems were high on the target priority list. Because of attacks on his headquarters, communication
facilities and radars, the enemy was denied any ability to coordinate forces or operatively utilize his own available intelligence informa-
tion. That caused a new term to be coined, “C2 warfare,” and the side with superior command control dominated operations.
As with the army, air force and navy fliers trained realistically via their services’ Red Flag and Top Gun programs. American airpower had
three priorities in Desert Storm: the first was to gain air superiority by destroying the Iraqi Air Force and suppressing enemy air defenses; the
second was to destroy enemy command control systems; and the third was to support the ground force via interdiction and close support.


Another mission was strategic: to destroy the Iraqi power grid, thereby shutting down the infrastructure required to support a military effort.
All that paid off in a successful campaign. The air war kicked off on 17 January 1991; Coalition ground
forces crossed the border on 24 February, and by the 28th they’d liberated Kuwait.

— Joseph Miranda

MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012 27

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 27 5/11/12 4:21 PM

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The victorious Coalition commander, along with an aide and his personal security personnel,
are shown as they helicopter in to brief Kuwaiti dignitaries on the details of the ceasefire.
which allowed Saddam the firepower earlier one had solved its problems
he needed to crush the revolt that broke for them. Without doubt, in exhibit-
out against his regime shortly thereaf- ing the confidence he showed all
ter. Nevertheless, a huge victory parade through his mission in Kuwait, and
was held in Washington, and “Stormin’ then delivering (what at least at the
Norman” became a national hero, time appeared to be) a smashing
which he remains today as a retired victory, he did much to restore
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In fairness, given the tangled web of in itself, its ideals and its military. All
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matter what his plan’s details or exactly
when its advance was shut down. At the
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through the interior desert constituted
some kind of brilliantly bold and previ-
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actually it had been run any number
of times by the Allies and Germans in
World War II’s North African theater –
haven’t helped his postwar reputation.
All that latter-day criticism,
however, can also be put off as one
generation wistfully wishing an
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
5/11/12 4:21 PM
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ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 29 5/11/12 4:21 PM


Note: communist units are
in plaintext; South Vietnamese
units are in italics.
Change in Strategy
O
n 30 March 1972, hundreds
of rockets and artillery shells
began raining down on South
Vietnamese bases just south of the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating
the two Vietnams, shattering the quiet
30
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 30
Vietnam 1972:
Conventional Offensive in
an Unconventional War
of the Palm Sunday morning. When the
barrage lifted, three North Vietnamese
Army (NVA) divisions, backed by col-
umns of reinforcing tanks and artillery,
crossed the border and began an offen-
sive into Quang Tri province, the north-
ernmost tip of South Vietnam’s I Corps.
The massive and accurate artillery bar-
rage – a signature tactic of NVA senior
commander Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap since
his days fighting the French – was the
opening salvo of a huge offensive he
US Army ‘Huey’ helicopters on the flight line at Tan My in December 1972.
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
By John Walker
hoped would bring on the final military
reckoning with the South. Ground
captured and held could be used as
bargaining chips in peace negotiations.
The North Vietnamese were
backed by their southern insurgent
allies, the Viet Cong. In the wake of
the I Corps attack, they launched
assaults against South Vietnamese
provincial capitals and other cities
in II and III Corps. Those cities were
both strategically important, and the
5/11/12 4:21 PM
 A well fortified US firebase late in 1972.
control of them established a claim
to political legitimacy. Three NVA
divisions attacked into the Central
Highlands while three more moved
across the Cambodian border against
the two provinces north of Saigon.
By the end of April most of Quang
Tri province was in communist hands;
an entire ARVN division fighting
there had been rendered combat
ineffective. In II and III Corps, where
the offensive began less dramatically
but with equally devastating effect,
district capitals fell in succession.
Kontum and An Loc came under
siege. As US air power pounded
NVA armor and infantry formations
around the clock, long-range com-
munist artillery barrages eventually
reduced both cities to rubble.
The 1972 Easter Offensive turned
into the heaviest, most sustained
fighting in the history of the 26-year-
old Indochinese war, raging for six
months. As with the 1968 Tet Offensive,
Allied commanders in South Vietnam
had expected an attack, but were
again surprised by the scope and
intensity of the onslaught when it
actually came. Abandoning protracted
guerrilla warfare, the North Vietnamese
committed 14 of their 15 main-force
infantry divisions along with 26
separate regiments and 1,200 tanks and
other armored vehicles. The total effort
included more than 120,000 men.
It was also the first time the
communists committed tanks and
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 31
mobile anti-aircraft platforms in large
numbers on the South Vietnamese
battlefield. Among other items the NVA
committed Soviet-supplied 130mm
cannon and T-54 tanks, two of the most
potent weapons in their arsenal, as
well as AT-3 Sagger anti-tank missiles
and SA-7 Strela shoulder-launched
surface-to-air missiles. Those weapons
altered the nature of the fighting in
Indochina. The strategy of “people’s
war” war was entirely discarded.
Debacle at the DMZ
In early 1972 the Army of the
Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN, the South
Vietnamese Army) deployed its newly
activated 3rd Infantry Division, com-
prised mostly of green troops, along the
DMZ in 13 firebases. Those positions
were collectively known as the “ring of
steel.” They had formerly been occu-
pied by the US Marines, and they strad-
dled all the major routes into the South.
Of the division’s three regiments, only
the 2nd, recently transferred from the
crack 1st Infantry Division, had combat
experience. The 56th and 57th Regiments
were made up of locally raised units
that had been upgraded to divisional
status and filled out with conscripts and
returned deserters; they were mostly
officered by castoffs and incompetents.
To make matters worse, the NVA
attack caught the 3rd Division shifting
two of its regiments among the base
positions. Thousands of ARVN soldiers
31
5/11/12 4:21 PM
 32 MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 32 5/11/12 4:21 PM

 Lightly wounded South Vietnamese civilians and troops attempt to push their way aboard a South Vietnamese
evacuation helicopter hovering over a stretch of Highway 13 near An Loc in Vietnam on June 25, 1972.
were caught in the open when rocket
and artillery shells began raining down.
As the surprised and outnumbered
defenders fell back in the face of the
three-division communist onslaught,
two more NVA divisions rolled south
across the DMZ in follow-on attacks.
Meanwhile a sixth division, backed
by an attached armored regiment,
crossed the Laotian border and
attacked from the west in the direction
of Hue. The Nguyen Hue offensive,
as Hanoi termed it, had begun.
Many 3rd Division troops in the
rear area soon panicked and broke.
Especially disastrous was the poor
performance of the artillery batteries
supporting the bases south of the DMZ.
Instead of providing critically needed
fire support and counter-battery fire,
those ARVN gunners simply fled.
Overcast weather also hampered
combat air support. The sole initial
fire support came from a US Navy
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 33
destroyer on station off the coast. With
the ARVN in full retreat, intelligence
on the routes and dispositions of
NVA forces was unavailable. That
forced the US Air Force to try to
maintain continuous air cover over 3rd
Division’s entire area of operations.
ARVN I Corps commander, Lt.
Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam, was a political
general who’d proven incompetent
during operations in Laos the year
before. He was powerless and clueless
in the face of the communist attack. In
just three days the NVA overran all the
DMZ outposts and then turned farther
south toward the provincial capital
of Quang Tri. After a series of small
clashes on the outskirts of that city on
27 April, the communists regrouped to
launch a multi-pronged drive into it.
Taking advantage of the poor
flying weather, the NVA struck
when tactical air support was least
effective. They captured Dong Ha,
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
near Quang Tri, on 29 April, forcing
those defenders to fall back into the
city itself. There the defense stiffened
somewhat, and clearing skies allowed
Allied planes to make concentrated
strikes, some 200 sorties in one day.
Even so, before 29 April ended,
the equivalent of four NVA divisions
began their final advance on Quang
Tri. In the face of massive artillery
barrages and tank-backed infantry
attacks, the South Vietnamese defend-
ers again broke, abandoning huge
quantities of weapons and supplies.
On 1 May 1972, a month into the
offensive, ARVN forces abandoned
Quang Tri city and fled south on
Highway 1 in the direction of Hue,
their columns clogged with panicked
civilians. The NVA continued moving
south as well, getting into position to
threaten Hue from the west and south-
west. Though Allied tactical airpower
continued to strike the advancing
33
5/11/12 4:21 PM
 A South Vietnamese Marine carries the dead body
of a comrade near Quang Tri on 30 April 1972.
III
34
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 34
NVA formations, what remained of
ARVN’s 3rd Division disintegrated
during its renewed retreat south.
Stabilization
Realizing the direness of the
situation, South Vietnamese President
Nguyen Van Thieu relieved Gen.
Lam, replacing him with Lt. Gen.
Ngo Quang Truong, one of the ablest
and most experienced commanders
in the ARVN. Truong arrived in Da
Nang on 3 May, and as one historian
later described it, the effects of the
change in command “were electric.”
The renowned commander’s
presence calmed the situation and
gave renewed hope to the beleaguered
ARVN forces. Tasked with holding Hue
and reestablishing the defense in I
Corps, Truong set to work, appearing on
television with a promise to hold Hue
and turn back the communists. He put
together a handpicked staff and moved
his headquarters into Hue, whose
populace was on the edge of panic in
the face of the continued NVA advance.
To stabilize the situation, Truong
devised a defense in depth to halt the
communist advance, while at the same
time initiating a program to quickly
refit and regroup the ARVN units that
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
had been mauled in the fighting for
Quang Tri and the ensuing retreat.
Farther south the NVA had begun
the second phase of its offensive, this
time against II Corps in the Central
Highlands. Some 50,000 communist
soldiers were committed to that effort.
Arrayed against them were the ARVN
22nd and 23rd Divisions, two armored
cavalry squadrons and 2nd Airborne
Brigade, all under the command of Lt.
Gen. Ngo Dzu. Communist spoiling
attacks farther east in the coastal
lowlands of Binh Dinh Province – long a
communist stronghold – threw him into
a panic. He almost fell for the ploy by
diverting his forces from the highlands.
His senior American adviser, John Paul
Vann, barely convinced him to stand
by to receive the main blow, which he
was convinced would come from Laos.
As Vann predicted, the reinforced
NVA 320th Division soon swept across
the Laotian border and advanced on
the city of Kontum, badly mauling
ARVN 22nd Division in the process.
The communists attacked more than
a dozen ARVN outposts southwest
of Kontum, blocked Routes 14 and
19, and captured the highland city
of Dak To before moving directly
on Kontum and surrounding it.
Fortunately for the South
5/11/12 4:21 PM
 The slogan on this knocked out NVA PT76 tank translates as: ‘Destroyed at An Loc by 7th Regiment / 5th Infantry Division.’

MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012 35

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 35 5/11/12 4:21 PM

 Aerial view of An Loc.
Vietnamese defenders, the attackers
halted their advance for more than a
week to regroup and resupply. Even
so, Dzu was again rattled when an
ARVN column was ambushed and
destroyed during the fighting for
Dak To. Vann took over command,
placing responsibility for the defense
of Kontum on Brig. Gen. Ly Tong Ba,
commander of 23rd Division. Vann
then called in massive B-52 strikes to
attrit NVA strength while he worked
to find additional troops to bring in to
stabilize the situation on the ground.
The NVA nevertheless reached
the outskirts of Kontum on 14 May
and immediately launched their
initial assault. Backed by tanks, two
battalion-sized NVA units simultane-
ously attacked from the north, south
and west. The South Vietnamese, using
handheld anti-tank weapons and
supported by airpower, stubbornly
held their ground. By mid-May the
worst of the fighting in other sectors
36
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 36
had ended, and the mass of American
airpower was free to concentrate
over the Central Highlands.
At Vann’s insistence, President Thieu
officially replaced Dzu with Maj. Gen.
Nguyen Van Toan, whose confident
and assertive nature was the opposite
of his predecessor. The fighting at
Kontum in the following weeks was
characterized by massed NVA assaults
that were savaged by B-52, tactical air,
and helicopter gunship strikes. ARVN
troops then counterattacked over the
remnants of the attacking waves.
On 26 May, four armor-backed com-
munist regiments managed to punch
a hole in the Kontum defense, but US
helicopters firing new, tube-launched,
optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW)
missiles halted them. In three days of
heavy fighting, 23 Soviet-made T-54
tanks were destroyed by TOWs and the
breach was sealed. As elsewhere during
the campaign after the initial com-
munist onrush, the NVA assaults were
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
increasingly hampered by the inexperi-
ence of communist field commanders
who proved unable to effectively
coordinate infantry, tanks and artillery.
Backed by around-the-clock air
strikes, the ARVN managed to hold
Kontum despite suffering severe
losses. By early June the NVA had faded
back to the west. Their attempt to cut
the country in two was a failure. US
intelligence later estimated communist
losses in the Central Highlands totaled
between 20,000 and 40,000 killed
and wounded. Vann, however, wasn’t
able to savor the hard-won victory.
While returning to Kontum from a
briefing in Saigon on 9 June, he was
killed when his helicopter crashed.
Airpower Interlude
On 4 April, US President Richard
Nixon authorized air strikes ranging
from the DMZ north to the 18th parallel,
the first systematic bombing of North
5/11/12 4:21 PM
 MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012 37

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 37 5/11/12 4:21 PM


A captured communist tank displayed in Saigon as a victory trophy in May 1972.
Vietnam since the end of Operation
Rolling Thunder in November 1968. He
then upped the ante, targeting the cities
of Hanoi and Haiphong. Between 1 May
and 30 June, B-52s, fighter-bombers
and other fixed-wing aircraft carried
out 18,000 sorties over the North. On 8
May Nixon ordered the aerial mining
of Haiphong harbor and other North
Vietnamese ports in order to halt the
flow of Chinese and Soviet supplies
Captured communist small arms are made part of that same trophy display.
38
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 38
sustaining the offensive in the South.
Nixon had gambled correctly that
the leaders of the Soviet Union, with
whom he was conducting negotia-
tions for a strategic arms limitation
treaty (SALT 1), wouldn’t jeopardize
improved overall relations with the US
for the sake of their North Vietnamese
ally. The People’s Republic of China
muted its response for the same
reason. Emboldened, Nixon launched
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
Operation Linebacker, a systematic
aerial assault on North Vietnam’s trans-
portation, storage and air defense
systems on 10 May 1972. Those strikes
significantly hampered the North’s abil-
ity to sustain its offensive by severing
supply routes and preventing reinforce-
ments from entering the South. The
aerial counteroffensive was also greatly
facilitated by the large-scale American
use of precision-guided munitions
that gave unprecedented accuracy to
the attacks. North Vietnamese lead-
ers had not only failed to take into
account US technological progress
in weapons development since the
end of Rolling Thunder, they had also
underestimated the resolve of the
American commander-in-chief.
Nixon’s plan also depended on
the strategic mobility of American air
power. As the crisis unfolded, several
hundred US Air Force planes were
rushed to Southeast Asia from bases
around the world, to be joined in-the-
ater by five aircraft carriers. That rapid
redeployment of force over such vast
distances demonstrated a capability
never previously seen and represented
a turning point in military history.
The devastating impact of the
US Strategic Air Command’s B-52
bombers, and the accurate firepower
of US Air Force AC-130 gunships, was
5/11/12 4:21 PM
 US soldiers search through the wreckage of a shot down helicopter near An Loc in May 1972.
indispensable in decimating NVA
formations, as was US naval gunfire
from off the coast. Inside North
Vietnam, laser-guided bombs inflicted
unprecedented damage on key targets.
Sizable numbers of those precision-
guided munitions – “smart bombs”
– were employed for the first time. For
example, they were used to destroy
bridges that had withstood years of
attack by conventional ordnance. The
bombing continued for six months.
Siege at An Loc
The third wave of Nguyen Hue
began on 2 April 1972 when the NVA/
VC 5th Division moved across the
Cambodian border into Tay Ninh
province in III Corps. In two days those
attackers gained control of key areas
within that province, then directed their
attention to their main objectives: the
towns and airfields in Loc Ninh, An
Loc and Quan Loi, along with positions
astride Highway 13, the main route
connecting the region with Saigon.
The city of Loc Ninh, located not
far from the Cambodian border, fell
to the attackers within two days. It
subsequently became the capital
of the “Provisional Revolutionary
Government of South Vietnam,”
a distinction it held until it was
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 39
disbanded by the North Vietnamese
after the war ended on 30 April 1975.
After seizing Loc Ninh the NVA/
VC advanced on the provincial capital
of An Loc, to which most of the ARVN
units in the region had withdrawn.
After capturing the airfield at Quan Loi,
two miles north of the city, the NVA/
VC 9th Division probed An Loc while
their 7th Division blocked Highway
13 to the south, stopping an ARVN
airborne brigade dispatched north
to reinforce the garrison. On 13 April,
with their escape route to the south
cut off, the city’s five ARVN regiments
and 10,000 civilians found themselves
in a siege that would last 95 days.
That same morning NVA gunners hit
An Loc with field artillery, mortars and
rockets. Just after dawn, communist
infantry and armor assaulted from
the northeast, advancing through a
deluge of defensive rockets, bombs
and napalm delivered by Allied aircraft.
When Soviet-made T-54 and PT-76
tanks attacked down the main north-
south road into the city, panic ensued
among some ARVN soldiers who’d nev-
er before encountered enemy armor.
Though several units broke, the situa-
tion stabilized when some of the more
stalwart ARVN infantry began knocking
out attacking tanks with US-made
M-72 light anti-tank weapons (LAWs).
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
Heavy fighting raged for three days
as the NVA and ARVN fought house
to house. With casualties heavy on
both sides, the ARVN’s situation was
tenuous. By the end of the third day
the NVA had forced the defenders into
a redoubt measuring just 1,100x1,650
yards in the southern sector of the city.
As the battle continued, with the
opposing forces separated in many
areas by the width of a single street, the
critical factor holding back the NVA
was air support coordinated by US
advisers embedded with the ARVN in
An Loc. As US attack aircraft, AC-130
gunships and Cobra helicopters came
in close, B-52 strikes also struck the
enemy’s staging areas in the rubber
plantations surrounding the city.
Though the attackers lost momentum
due to the continued pounding from
the air, they succeeded in maintaining
the encirclement of An Loc and kept up
relentlessly shelling the city. The NVA
fired 2,500 artillery rounds and rockets
in the first three days, then continued
the barrage with between 1,200 and
2,000 rounds per day for another week
as they regrouped for another try.
After bringing up additional anti-
aircraft weapons to try to counter US
airpower, the communists launched
their second attack against An Loc. A
massive pre-dawn artillery bombard-
39
5/11/12 4:21 PM
 ARVN soldiers in An Loc celebrating their victory atop a destroyed communist tank.
ment hit both the city and the positions
of 1st Airborne Brigade to the southeast.
Though one airborne battalion was
overrun and two more were driven
back, the new attack on An Loc then
also stalled. Even so, conditions within
the city continued to deteriorate. As
fire from communist tank guns,
rockets, mortars and field artillery
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40
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 40
poured in, the defenders and civilians
were forced to move underground.
Most of the buildings in An Loc
were destroyed, and the streets were
littered with dead. To avoid a cholera
epidemic, ARVN soldiers used bulldoz-
ers to bury the bodies in mass graves,
some holding as many as 500 corpses.
Communist anti-aircraft fire had
MODERN WAR 1 | SEP–OCT 2012
meanwhile become so intense it was
almost impossible to resupply the
defenders by air. Given those grim
conditions, increasing casualties
and incessant artillery barrages,
morale again plummeted among
the defenders even as US advisers
redoubled their efforts to bolster the
confidence of the 4,500-man garrison.
For their third attempt to take
An Loc the communists changed
commanders and, on the morning of
11 May, began an intense new artillery
barrage – 8,300 rounds – against the
defensive perimeter. Seven NVA regi-
ments backed by tanks then attacked
from the north and northwest, forcing
two salients in the ARVN line and
almost cutting in two the overall posi-
tion. Both sides suffered horrendous
losses in the fighting, but though the
ARVN defenders bent they didn’t break.
In the sky above the town, close
air support aircraft, AC-130 gun ships,
Cobra helicopters and B-52s jockeyed
for position in order to unload their
ordnance on the attacking NVA.
5/16/12 2:58 PM

Flown in the face of the most severe
anti-aircraft fire yet encountered in the
war in the South, the air support broke
the back of the NVA attack, allowing
the ARVN to reduce both enemy
salients and re-stabilize their line.
Though the fight for An Loc wasn’t
yet over, by the end of May the tide
had clearly turned in the ARVN’s favor.
Around-the-clock air strikes continued
to inflict a toll on three of the NVA’s
finest divisions, which sustained an
estimated total of over 10,000 casual-
ties. The fighting also reduced the city
to total ruin and cost the ARVN 5,400
casualties, of which 2,300 were dead or
missing. On 11 July the NVA withdrew
from around An Loc and headed back
toward the Cambodian border.
Quang Tri Redux
Back in I Corps, Gen. Truong had
solidified the defense around Hue, and
the regrouped 3rd Division was ready to
return to the fight. The NVA mounted
several drives against Hue in late
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 41
ARVN soldiers rush to board evacuation helicopters during the fighting in Military Region III.
May, the heaviest on the 29th, but they
failed when the outnumbered South
Vietnamese pushed the attackers back
across the Perfume River. Backed by
air support and naval gunfire, Truong
then launched a counteroffensive with
three divisions to retake lost ground.
It was a deliberate and slow process,
but Truong’s forces pushed back what
remained of the NVA’s six attacking
divisions. They retook Quang Tri city
on 16 September and also recaptured
most of the bases along the DMZ.
The situation in I Corps was stabi-
lized. Nonetheless, Truong’s exhausted
and depleted forces were forced to halt
on the southern bank of the Thach
Han River and were unable to push
on to Dong Ha, which remained in
communist hands. With the recapture
of Quang Tri, the ARVN stands at
Kontum and An Loc, and the continu-
ous pounding by American airpower,
the communist offensive ground to a
bloody end in late September 1972.
Both sides claimed victory when
the campaign ended. Considering the
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
casualties they’d suffered, as well as the
loss of almost their entire inventory
of armor, the offensive was a costly
failure for the North Vietnamese. As
in 1968 the communists had tried to
do too much at one time. Instead on
concentrating their forces in just one
or two sectors, their leaders sought
victory everywhere but achieved it
almost nowhere. The minimal gains
they made came at a staggering price.
The North Vietnamese failed to
permanently destroy any major ARVN
units, and didn’t take any provincial
capitals. Nonetheless, they did gain
control of territory they thereafter
never relinquished: along the Laotian
and Cambodian borders as well as
areas in the countryside in the four
northernmost provinces of the South
Vietnam – a total of about 10 percent
of the country. The NVA suffered
about 40,000 killed and another
55,000 wounded as well as the loss
of 250 T-54, PT-76 and T-34s tanks.
41
5/11/12 4:22 PM
 ARVN soldiers advancing north through Quang Tri city as the communist offensive winds down.
Aftermath & Conclusion
Hanoi wasted no time in making
good use of what they’d so expen-
sively gained, immediately extending
their supply lines from Laos and
Cambodia into the South, as well as
rapidly expanding facilities at the
captured river port of Dong Ha. By
1973 over 20 per cent of the materiel
destined for the southern battlefield
flowed across the docks there.
For even the most seasoned field
commanders, the effective coordina-
tion of infantry, armor and artillery is a
challenge; for Hanoi’s combat leaders
in 1972 it had proven an impossibility.
Communist commanders threw away
their local numerical superiority
by making repeated frontal attacks
into heavy defensive fire, which only
resulted in horrendous casualties.
Hanoi’s strategic overreach and its
commanders’ inexperience in conven-
tional warfare wouldn’t have mattered,
however, if not for the dogged and
42
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 42
heroic resistance mounted by the South
Vietnamese, who stood and fought
as never before. When the offensive
finally ended, Quang Tri city lay in
ruins after having been lost and then
retaken. Over 25,000 South Vietnamese
civilians were dead and 75,000 others
had been wounded. An Loc was also
in ruins. The ARVN suffered 43,000
casualties, and almost 1 million South
Vietnamese had become refugees;
600,000 of them left dispossessed and
living in camps under government care.
The last US combat units left the
South in March 1973 in accordance
with the Paris Peace Accords, which
included a ceasefire in place and
prisoner exchanges. The fatal weakness
of the accords, signed in January, came
from the fact the NVA was allowed to
remain in the areas of the South it then
occupied – most of which had been
taken in the Easter Offensive. Those
enclaves amounted to a geo-strategic
death sentence for South Vietnam.
In early 1975, 20 NVA divisions,
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
rumbling south in an offensive that
was almost identical to Nguyen Hue,
rapidly overwhelmed ARVN resistance,
who by then lacked US air support.
They also lacked in-country resupply
capacity, since almost all US military
aid had gone to Israel after the end of
the October War of 1973. Victorious
communist soldiers and tanks entered
Saigon on 30 April 1975. t
SELECTED SOURCES
Anderson, Charles. The Grunts. Presidio Press: Novato,
CA, 1976.
Andrade, Dale. Trial By Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive,
America’s Last Vietnam Battle. Hippocrene Books:
New York, 1995.
Davidson, Philip B. Vietnam at War: The History 1946—
1975. Presidio Press: Novato, CA, 1988
Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. Viking Press: New
York, 1983.
Kelly, Michael. Where We Were in Vietnam. Hellgate Press,
2001.
Palmer, Gen. Bruce. The 25-Year War: America’s Military
Role in Vietnam. Simon & Schuster: New York, 1985.
Stanton, Shelby. Vietnam Order of Battle. Stackpole
Military Classics, 2003.
5/11/12 4:22 PM
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ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 43 5/16/12 2:56 PM

 Analysis:
Russia’s Ongoing
Military Reorganization
By Bruce Costello
T
he main mission of the Russian
armed forces today is to fight
local wars, either on Russian
soil or in the border regions of the
former Soviet Union (the “near abroad”
in Kremlin parlance). Accordingly,
all Russian regular military units are
to be kept fully manned and capable
of rapid reaction within that sphere.
The downsizing of unnecessary
formations and the elimination of
obsolete equipment is considered a
virtue. That’s in contrast with the Cold
War-era Soviet armed forces, which
were geared toward fighting large-scale
wars against major powers along the
rim of Eurasia, a strategy whereby most
units were only maintained at partial
levels to be filled out via mobilization
when the expected big war arrived.
A key architect of the new effort
is Anitoly Serdyukov, defense
minister since May 2008. He had to
44
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 44
overcome intense opposition from
more traditional authorities to get the
green light for his approach. That’s
led to political infighting in which
the high command structure has also
undergone tremendous change. Prior
to 2009, Russia had six military districts,
each with one or more subordinate
army headquarters within it. With the
reorganization there are now only four
“Operational Strategic Directions”
or OSD – Western (headquarters St.
Petersburg), Southern (headquarters
Rostov-on-Don), Northern (head-
quarters Ekaterinburg), and Eastern
(headquarters Khabarovsk).
The new OSD command all army,
air force and navy elements within
their respective geographic areas,
thereby facilitating joint-multi-service
operations. The exception is the
Strategic Rocket Force – the nuclear
war-fighting arm – which remains
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
under direct control of the Kremlin.
A new three-level command chain
has also been created: 1) operational
direction; 2) operational command;
and 3) brigade. Any given operation
can potentially use one or more
brigades along with smaller separate
elements. Under the new scheme,
OSD headquarters will assign an
“operational commander” who is
responsible for the entire campaign
he’s preparing. He would be given
what’s deemed necessary for that
operation in terms of brigades and
all-arms support elements. The former
army, corps and division command
echelons have been dispensed with.
That flattened command structure
was first partially tested in the Georgian
War of 2008. The operations in South
Ossetia were planned at the military
district level and deployed its main
unit from that area-command, notably
5/11/12 4:22 PM
 Russian naval infantry prepare for inspection while aboard ship.

58th Army. Other elements came from in 2007 when a number of divisions The Russians expect those difficulties
nationally maintained independent and regiments were converted into will be resolved by the new structure.
formations, such as airborne and naval separate brigades. It was given greater The reorganization extends far
infantry. The army level of command impetus when continued problems beyond the army into every part of
was essentially bypassed during the were identified within the still- Russia’s armed forces. The intent is to
operational phase of the war. The surviving elements of the old force make everything run more efficiently,
Russians believe that gave them a structure during the Georgian War. increase the overall striking power
much-needed advantage, reducing the The deficiencies highlighted in that of Russian arms, and also provide
time to make decisions and implement war included: 1) poor communication increased strategic mobility. In sum,
actions and enabling them to better among elements not of the same command and control has been
keep pace with the Georgian Army division; 2) undependable tactical com- streamlined in an effort to ensure rapid
on the battlefield. In American terms, munications in combat; and 3) poor response and positive control. t
that meant increased “agility” as the reconnaissance due to lack of assets
“command cycle” was reduced. specifically dedicated to that mission.
The primary operational element
(“unit of maneuver”) is now the
brigade. That’s a radical break with
the recent past, when the division
had fulfilled that roll. Precedent had,
however, already been set in the Afghan
War of the 1980s when Soviet forces
employed combined-arms brigades
with some success. Around the time
of the breakup of the Soviet Union,
there was also some experimentation
underway in regard to organizing
mission-specific multi-brigade “opera-
tional mobile groups,” but the rapidly
shifting circumstances of that time
kept them from being tried in combat.
The current reorganization began A ground crew prepares an updated and heavily up-gunned Hind for testing.

MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012 45

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 45 5/11/12 4:22 PM

 The Navy

The Russian Navy has been less affected than the other services by the reform program.
The main reduction has been in the naval infantry, which has lost all but one brigade (the for-
Russian Ground mer Naval Infantry Division in the Far East). A few independent battalions have also survived.
Force Schematic The Russian Navy has slowly been adding new ships, but it still faces further overall
reduction. One item on the acquisition wish list is 10 new ballistic missile submarines,


by Ty Bomba but whether they can be acquired any time soon appears unlikely. Overseas naval power
projection is a mission largely consigned to the dustbin of history, aside from occasional
“demonstrations” of sending a high value warship or two to some far off port.

46 MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 46 5/11/12 4:22 PM

 A destroyer and helicopter cooperate in an
anti-submarine warfare training exercise.

above — Aerial starboard bow view of a Northern

Fleet Delta III class nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine underway on the surface.

MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012 47

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 47 5/11/12 4:22 PM


The Army
The new reorganization eliminates corps and division headquar-
ters, supplanting them with independent combined-arms brigades.
The most common such formation is the motor(ized) rifle brigade,
which consists of three motorized rifle battalions, usually also
with one or two tank battalions, an artillery “command” (battalion
equivalent) with two self-propelled and three towed howitzer batter-
ies, a rocket battalion with multi-launch rocket systems, an anti-tank
battalion, as well as air defense, reconnaissance, engineer and
support companies. The “motor rifle battalions” are actually equipped
with armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles.
Such brigades can be used for independent operations as well as in
combination with other brigades under an operational command staff.
Russia now fields 35 motor rifle and four tank brigades.
Ninety-five percent of them are reported to have been kept at full
establishment since the main reform program was completed
in 2010. That’s well up from the 13 percent of fully staffed units
maintained under the old system. Numerous smaller support
formations, typically also designated as brigades, fill out logistical
and other support needs. Only one old-style division remains in
the conventional ground force, an artillery unit in the Far East.
Also still in place are four Desant (airborne assault) divisions,
which are being kept as a strategic rapid response force. One
is assigned to each of the four OSD. Those divisions, now using
brigades as their own sub-units, are being beefed up in order to
enhance their capabilities as the “fire brigades” of the Russian state
that can be quickly flown or helicoptered to crisis spots. The seven
spetznaz (special forces) brigades likewise have strategic status, and
are given much higher levels of training than the rest of the army.
While active Russian forces now no longer rely on mobilization
in order to be fleshed out, there are still army headquarters
remaining in the order of battle for use in their respective OSD
to manage reserves. About 30 partially maintained reserve
brigades are also available to be used as training centers and
military schools to reinforce the regulars. Their adequacy of
staffing and modernity of equipment is in question; however,
and they don’t appear to be getting priority in those areas.
48 MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 48
Army recruits line up for their first full-dress inspection.
The overall strength of active Russian forces is to be reduced
to a total of 1 million personnel by the end of 2012. That’s down
from 1.2 million at the start of the reorganization. Numerous
officer positions have been cut, and the number of generals and
marshals is being reduced by 20 percent to less than 1,000.
The training of noncommissioned officers (NCO) is to improve,
due to the fact the experiences of the Cold War showed the lack of
a western-style professional NCO corps was a major deficiency. The
intent is sergeants will henceforth be able to be given responsibility
commensurate with that of their counterparts in Western armies.
The traditional Russian point of view held the former system
had been successful in winning World War II and maintaining
the Soviet Union as a superpower through the Cold War. Further,
those losing their positions aren’t happy with the new scheme for
personal reasons. Those factors are combining to lead to discontent
and dissension in the officer corps and the political sphere.
Internal critics have also pointed out it’s unlikely there will be
sufficient funding to purchase all the called for new weapons and
equipment on which the restructuring ultimately depends to be
effective. Current weapon buys are still mostly of late-Soviet-era
designs, such as Mi-28 helicopters, Su-35 fighters and T-90 tanks.
The present Russian state lacks the ability of the old USSR’s com-
mand economy to direct research and production for all services and
all needs. The Russians are therefore moving to purchase various
foreign-made systems, such as the French Mistral amphibious
assault ship. Of course, such moves are coming under attack
from Russian industrial interests as well as from those who don’t
believe it’s strategically prudent to go abroad to buy weapons.
Minister Serdyukov is therefore taking fire from many interest
groups simultaneously. Nonetheless, the big changes have already

been put into effect and it’s doubtful they will or can be reversed. The
further success of the reorganization therefore likely depends on the
political fate of Serdyukov’s main backer, President Medvedev.
5/11/12 4:22 PM
 The Air Force

The Russian Air Force is undergoing an

even greater reform than that of the Army.
The Soviet-style “air regiment” has been
abandoned, replaced by the “airbase” forma-
tion. Each of them has a command staff, one
to seven aircraft squadrons, a service bat-
talion and communications staff (company).
There are a total of about 50 airbase units.
Air divisions and air armies have
also been abandoned, replaced by
seven aviation commands. They include
a Long Range Aviation Command and a
Transport Aviation Command. Both of them
represent special strategic requirements,
respectively nuclear war-fighting and the
strategic movement of land forces. The
former Air Defense Force has been merged
into the new Air Force, though a separate
Task Force Command remains in charge of
Mig29 the air and space defense of Moscow.
Streamlining the air force has
led to 50,000 officer positions being
eliminated and numerous older aircraft
being removed from inventory. The intent


Nuclear Weapons is to shift funding to newer designs and
systems in order to replace obsolescent
The Russians continue to hold at least 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons. assets as rapidly as possible.
That number is likely to be maintained and is intended to make any power
otherwise intent on the penetration of Russian territory think twice.
Similarly, there are no apparent changes going to be made in the Rs-24-yars-intercontinental-ballistic-missile
structure of the Strategic Rocket Forces. The START-II Treaty should make
it possible to maintain those units with modern equipment, and it will also
lessen the probability of strategic nuclear war by accident or design. In
theory, the larger reorganization will also make available funds to bring
new rocket systems online and build up the strategic bomber force.
Additional money is also being spent to upgrade the Glonass
reconnaissance satellite system. Existing capability proved anemic during
the Georgian War, when it was quickly found there were insufficient
satellites to cover that small area of operations. That necessitated the


use of reconnaissance aircraft to fill the void, and a Tu-22m Backfire was
shot down during such a mission. The current and intense US effort in
ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) isn’t being ignored.

Older (disarmed) missiles on display at a Moscow park.

MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012 49

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 49 5/11/12 4:22 PM

 On the Horizon
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ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 50
Oil War: Iran Strikes
(Modern War No. 2)
T
his near-future what-if game, by Ty Bomba,
is an update of the old-SPI Oil War from
the 1970s. It examines an Iranian strategic
alternative that’s becoming plausible in light of
the drawdown of US strength in the Middle East.
That is, the prospect of opposing sides having
nuclear weapons may work to create a deterrent
umbrella that, at least for some time, could allow
for a conventional war to go on underneath
the threat of “mutually assured destruction.”
Oil War: Iran Strikes (OW) is a low-
intermediate complexity design set in the near
future (2013-2017), when the Iranians may have
developed nuclear capability. The possibility for
a conventional military victory – aimed at estab-
lishing and certifying Tehran as the hegemon of
the Gulf – moves to the fore. OW examines the
possibilities inherent in the opening offensive of
such a war. There are no rules for atomic bombs
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
or other WMD. The situation is on such a hair
trigger in that regard, if one such weapon were
to go off, many more detonations would cer-
tainly follow. The idea is for Iran to gain a victory
without resorting to “game changing” WMD.
Each hex on the map equals 18 miles from
side to opposite side, and it stretches from
Turkey in the north to the UAE in the south, and
from the Iranian border and Persian Gulf on
the east to Baghdad and Riyadh on the west.
Each turn represents three days, with a full
match covering the first month of fighting.
Units of maneuver are corps, divisions,
brigades, and US brigade combat teams
(BCT), each representing from about 5,000
to 15,000 men and/or 50 to 400 armored
fighting vehicles or helicopters. Up-to-date
data have been used to establish each
country’s order or battle, including the
Iranian regular army, Basij martyr force and
Revolutionary Guards, along with the ground
forces of Iraq (loyalist and insurgent, Kurds,
and the “elite” Quick Reaction Force). There
are also the armies of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, Syria and Turkey.
Special rules cover such things as: sudden
death victory, variable phase sequence, US
naval supremacy, Saudi combat characteristics,
multi-national movement and combat restric-
tions, US locking zones of control, US bases,
Kuwaiti border defenses, Iraqi defections,
Al Qods terror attacks, Basij suicide attacks,
Basra’s critical logistical status, artillery, combat
engineers, airpower, UN intervention, unique
US BCT capabilities, the 12th Imam, Iranian
airborne and marines, and much more. t
5/11/12 4:22 PM
 A FAST & EASY PLAYING
SERIES OF CARD GAMES
S P E C I A L S A L E ALL SIX TITLES FOR $99.95 (+ SHIPPING)

WAR ON TERROR
This is the third game in the Lightning series. Fight the war on terror with America’s cutting edge weapon systems! You
have been charged with hunting down terrorists aiding regions around the world and toppling their corrupt governments. To
accomplish this, you have been given command of the latest weapons and best personnel America has to offer. You get to
command elements of the Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines, Special Forces and Propaganda Warfare. War on Terror is an ultra-low
complexity card game for all ages. The focus is on fast card play, strategy, and fun interactive game play for 2–4 players. $ 20.00

FLYING CIRCUS
This game depicts the German blitzkrieg campaign against Poland in September, 1939.
Historically, it was a stunning victory but the blitzkrieg strategy was untested and the potential was
present for Poland to hold on long enough for other countries to intervene against Germany.
In the game, the German side needs to force the Polish surrender quickly. This occurs by capturing the
Polish capital, Warsaw, and other Polish rallying points. The Polish side needs to delay the German advance long
enough to garner international intervention. This occurs when the Polish win three delaying actions. $ 23.00

POLAND
This game depicts the German blitzkrieg campaign against Poland in September, 1939. Historically,
it was a stunning victory but the blitzkrieg strategy was untested and the potential was present for
Poland to hold on long enough for other countries to intervene against Germany. In the game, the German
side needs to force the Polish surrender quickly. This occurs by capturing the Polish capital, Warsaw,
and other Polish rallying points. The Polish side needs to delay the German advance long enough to
garner international intervention. This occurs when the Polish win three delaying actions. $ 23.00

NORTH AFRICA
Covering the great battles of Erwin Rommel from 1941 to 1943, as he fought his way back and forth across
the deserts of North Africa. LNA uses cards to represent the military units, supply convoys and objectives
of the historic campaign. To win, you must consider your units’ combat power and maneuver options as well
as their supply situation. The game features: the Afrika Korps, Tobruk, the Desert Rats, Malta, anti-tank
guns, resupply from Europe, minefields and more. LNA is based around a new combat system that makes
maneuver and planning as important as brute force. That approach is faithful to the historic events, in which
smaller forces were often able to defeat and rout larger ones by using better tactics and planning. In LNA,
battles can be won not only by overwhelming the enemy with firepower, but also by out-thinking and bluffing
him. The dynamic game system puts you in charge of one of the most famous theaters of WWII. $ 20.00

D-DAY
This two-player card game recreates the drama of the day Allied soldiers went ashore in occupied
France, 6 June 1944. Each of the historic landing beaches; Gold, Juno, Sword, Omaha and Utah
— is represented by its own card, as are the defending German divisions and attacking
Allied units. The Allied player must marshal his resources to gain and secure control
of every beach by day’s end: one run-through of the 110-card deck.
The tension in the game increases with each card thrown, like the build up in a close baseball game. At
first it seems the Allies have resources to meet every crisis across the beachheads, but if a key airborne division
gets scattered across the countryside, allowing a counterattacking panzer division to slip through the perimeter,
everything can change instantly. And an Allied unit committed to one beach, where you might find the defense
isn’t as strong as you thought, can’t be called back in time to rush to the true danger zone. Both players must
constantly be thinking ahead, looking for ways to best utilize their cards several throws down the line. $ 20.00

MIDWAY
Two players step into the roles of opposing fleet commanders in this history based recreation of the famous World
War II battle between US and Japanese forces. At stake is control of Midway Atoll in the Central Pacific. The US player
must risk his navy’s three carriers to try to keep it; the Japanese player must risk his four carriers to try to take it.
The atoll and the aircraft carriers are each represented by their own card. Players throw reconnaissance
cards to find and fix the enemy’s location, then play other cards representing attacking squadrons.
Some find their targets, others don’t. Sometimes the enemy shows up over your fleet without warning.
Everything often hinges — literally and figuratively — on the timely throw of one card. $ 20.00

All games include 110 full color playing cards and one sheet of rules.

p.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfi eld, cA 93390-1598 | (661) 587-9633 phone | sales@decisiongames.com | decisiongames.com

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 51 5/11/12 4:22 PM

 Colt vs. Beretta
I
n March 1911, following five
years of competitive testing,
the US armed forces adopted
what would become one of the most
famous sidearms in military history:
the Colt .45 M1911 A1 single-action,
semi-automatic pistol. Incredibly,
it remained the standard sidearm
for several generations of American
soldiers, sailors, Marines, airmen
and Coast Guardsmen, outlasting
four service rifles during that time.
The initial contract with Colt
52
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 52
(Springfield, Massachusetts) was
issued on 5 May 1911 for 31,344 units
priced at a $14.25 apiece. An additional
$1.35 was also allocated to cover the
price of two additional magazines
and spare parts for each pistol. Within
six months another 50,000 of the
popular new firearm were on order.
Reportedly, the first combat use
of the weapon was against charging
Moro warriors in the Philippines, where
the Army was fighting insurgents in
America’s new colonial possession.
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
By Blaine Taylor
The Colt was the onzly handgun
whose round was powerful enough
to always knock them down. The .38
caliber round of the then standard
pistol lacked the stopping power to do
so, as the Moros were alleged to use
drugs to give themselves enhanced
survivability in combat. Moreover,
the Colt’s magazine provided extra
rounds over that of the standard-issue
revolver. The 45s thereafter came to
be used in close-in combat against
Mexican bandits, Nicaraguan rebels,
5/11/12 4:23 PM

1.0
0.5
0.0
0.0 0.5 1.0
Russian Bolsheviks, as well as in two
World Wars, Korea and Vietnam.
Even so, it wasn’t the first auto-
matic handgun the US military had
considered. The first Colt-Browning
automatic pistol prototype had
debuted in 1898, but the Ordnance
Department felt the design needed
more work. Two years later, firearms
designer John M. Browning started
commercial production of the Colt .38
automatic pistol 1900 Model, the first
US automatic to be made commercially.
Both the Army and Navy expressed
interest in the new weapon, but testing
was simultaneously continued with
other makes and models, mainly
because reactions from both soldiers
and sailors to the Model 1900 hadn’t
been good. Meanwhile the Army and
Navy continued issuing the Model
1892 .30 caliber revolver, which
was universally considered to be
underpowered. The German Luger also
failed to measure up to what the US
services wanted and needed: a weapon
with dependable knockdown power.
Colt stayed in the game, developing
its first .45 caliber model in 1902-05.
In 1907 the Ordnance Department
ordered a batch of the Model 1905,
but it wasn’t officially adopted. The
1907 trials featured 20 applicants, of
which half were selected for further
trials: Colt, Luger, Savage, two Knobles,
Bergmann, White & Merrill, Webley-
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 53
1.5
Fosberry and Smith & Wesson.
Five models remained in conten-
tion after the first round of testing: the
Colt, Savage and Luger automatics, as
well as revolvers from Colt and Smith
& Wesson. The next round saw the
Ordnance Department ordering 200
each of the Colt and Savage automatics,
which were all delivered in 1908.
A major factor helping the Colt
bid was the fact that it could be
produced at about a third the cost
of the Savage entry. By 1910 the Colt
entry had the clear lead, the company
having made all the government’s
recommended improvements. It then
formally came into being as the “.45
Colt Automatic Pistol, Model of 1911.”
In that version, and later in the
modified 1911 A1 Model, it was
produced at a record 3 million units.
Teething problems and tooling up
delayed mass production until 1914,
and only 4,214 were purchased in
1916, the last full year before the US
entered the First World War. The British
Royal Navy also ordered 13,500 units
chambered for its .455 cartridge.
The American .45 received its
true baptism of fire in 1916 against
Pancho Villa’s bandits, and by the time
the US declared war on Germany in
April 1917, the military had 119,000
Colts on hand. The trench warfare in
Europe convinced the top brass more
soldiers should be equipped with the
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
Weapons
M1911A1
powerful new sidearm. It was useful
for close quarters trench fighting due
to its stopping power and rapid rate
of fire. Initially only officers, NCOs,
cavalry and field artillerymen were
issued the pistols, but by the time
of the Armistice fully 70 percent of
all American troops carried them. A
postwar survey revealed nearly 170,000
had been reported lost, destroyed or
missing, leading analysts to conclude
many of the men had clandestinely
taken their pistol home with them.
During the interwar years of
1919-39 a mere 17,000 Colts were
bought. Some 7,500 more were
purchased during 1939-40, and
after the US entry into World War II
another 2 million were acquired.
A gray metal finish was adopted
during World War II, and thus the
popular weapon proceeded in usage
until the 1970s, when the NATO high
command began lobbying for an
alliance-wide adoption of a standard
pistol using the same cartridge by all
member countries’ armed forces.
The stage was thus set for the
replacement of the Colt on 14 January
1985 by the 9mm Beretta 92 SB-F. The
Beretta was a more accurate weapon
at long range, and the commonality of
its ammunition type across the alliance
would facilitate easier logistics. Even
so, when the Army made the stunning
announcement that Colt – a powerful
53
5/11/12 4:23 PM

domestic US arms manufacturer for
decades – had been supplanted by a
foreign gun maker, it created a sensa-
tion in the firearms industry. The $57
million Beretta deal, the largest such
one-time sale in the history of firearms
The Strategy & Tactics
of World War II
SUBSCRIBE NOW @
www.WorldatWarmagazine.com
54
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 54
action was one of the biggest reasons
police had been reluctant to stop
using them. Among the features of
the 92F pushed by Beretta in the
competitive testing was its open slide
design, which eliminated jamming and
allowed single bullet loading as well.
Tests were conducted at Aberdeen
Proving Ground, also in Maryland,
and Fort Dix, New Jersey. The pistols
were exposed to adverse conditions,
such as extremes of heat and cold,
and were then screened for durability
to determine if they could meet the
required 5,000-round service life.
Other tests for hit probability and
reliability were conducted at the US
to that time, was announced the day Army Infantry School at Fort Benning,
before the industry’s annual exposi- Georgia. The entire program concluded
tion in Atlanta, the SHOT (Shooting, in September 1984. The 9mm Beretta
Hunting & Outdoor Trade) Show. 92SB-F was the clear winner, one of
Beretta’s parent firm, Fabbrica only two candidates to satisfactorily
d’Armi Pietro Beretta of Gardone, complete the entire evaluation pro-
Italy, is one of the oldest gun makers gram, the other being the entry of
in the world. It was founded in 1526, the Swiss-German firm SIG-Sauer.
and has been run by 17 generations of The consensus was the Beretta
the Beretta family continuously since was a more accurate weapon than
then. Over the centuries Beretta has the Colt, particularly at distance,
established itself as one of Europe’s though the latter remained the better
premier gun makers, usually producing weapon when it came to reliably
handcrafted high-quality products knocking down someone, which was
rather than mass-production weaponry. specifically what it had been designed
In 1915 the Italian Army adopted one to do. The Beretta was also easier
of their pistols as its official sidearm, to disassemble for maintenance.
and after World War II it began The five-year contract awarded
manufacturing weaponry for NATO. by the US government was for the
In 1975 Beretta introduced its 9mm production of a total of 315,930 units
Model 92 auto-loading pistol, which has for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air
since come to be widely regarded as one Force and Coast Guard. It would begin
of the most successful firearm designs with US assembly and testing, but with
of all time. It was quickly adopted by parts made in Italy. The final three
the Brazilian, Italian and French police, years of the contract called for Beretta
and by some 1,600 law enforcement to produce all parts, components,
agencies in North America. It shouldn’t assembly and testing in the US. All raw
really have come as a surprise, then, materials were also to be purchased
that by the 1980s Beretta’s US facility at in the US. In making the change the
Accoceek, Maryland, was competing Army ended 74 years of tradition.
with other gun makers to replace the It remains to be seen if Beretta will
veteran Colt in our armed forces. be able to better the Colt’s 74-year-long
Nationally, police had begun run. The Colts have certainly not disap-
switching from their traditional six- peared from the modern battlefield.
shot revolvers to the newer 15-round They remain prized among many
automatics in order to keep pace with soldiers who still employ them, unof-
opposing criminal elements, who ficially, for their stopping power. t
were using more powerful weapons.
The fact revolvers rarely jammed in
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
5/11/12 4:23 PM
 Weapons

Speed Kills: The US

Navy’s 64-Megajoule
Electromagnetic Railgun
By David R. Higgins

T
he planners of the US Navy’s “Future
Surface Combatant Program” envi-
sion the next generation of warships
as all-electric. That’s in contrast to current
warships that rely on separate systems for
propulsion and electric power. Instead of a
mechanical drive, power on the new ships
will be provided by a single system integrat-
ing a steam-driven turbine and generator.
Output will be allocated to both propulsion
and solid-state power conversion as
needed. Acting as a common electrical
bus, the generator will power an integrated
system of propulsion, weapons, sensors and
support modules that will reduce operating
costs while providing a platform that can
be quickly modified for various missions.
The new ships will also have inwardly
sloping “tumblehome” hulls that become A railgun round leaving the business end of the “barrel.”
narrower above the waterline, allowing
them to pass through – rather than
over – waves, thereby making for an even
more stable platform. The tumblehome
design also reflects a radar cross-section 50
times smaller than that of existing vessels.
The DDG-1000s’ integrated power
systems provide 78 megawatts (equivalent
to 78 megajoules of work per second),
which is sufficient to mount directed
energy weapons. They include active denial
systems (microwave projectors), still-in-
development high-energy free-electron and
chemical lasers, as well as electromagnetic
weapons known as “rail guns.”
The latter’s development began in
2005 when the US Navy’s Office of Naval
Research contracted with the North
American division of British military
contractor BAE Systems to develop a
32-megajoule weapon capable of accurately
firing a hypersonic projectile up to 75 miles
(120 km). The railguns are to provide
high-volume precise fires in all-weathers View of a railgun’s propulsive equipment.
at long ranges. Each rail gun projectile will

MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012 55

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 55 5/11/12 4:23 PM


As titled on that color diagram.
cost an estimated 1,000 to 10,000 USD
to fire, which is considerably cheaper
than a $600,000 sub-sonic Tomahawk
cruise missile. It would also reach its
target more quickly than a missile.
The firing procedure for a railgun
relies on closing an electrical circuit
in which a current flows from a “com-
pulsator” (an enhanced alternator
merging energy conversion with
pulse-shaping) to a pair of conducting
rails acting as launcher for a sabot-
like round. Having stored a charge,
the pulse-power system initiates
a millisecond high-current surge,
A US Defense Department artist’s view of
railgun-firing Zumwalt-class destroyers
in combat sometime after 2020.
56
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 56
equating to roughly 220 megajoules.
The resulting magnetic field rotates
forward along one positively charged
rail, across a sliding armature holding
the projectile, and back down its
negatively charged partner rail. The
resultant “Lorentz Force” pushes the
sabot containing the projectile away
from the breech using a pulse imparting
nearly 50,000 times the force of gravity.
To preserve the gun’s struc-
tural integrity against stress, an
11-yard-long (10 meter) countering
barrel is required. The resultant
overall system has less recoil than
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
a conventional 5-inch naval gun.
To protect the apparatus from
excessive heating and potential melt-
ing, each rail is infused with channels
made of energy dissipating composite
materials. That works to cool the gun
and enable a rate of fire of between
six and 12 rounds per minute.
Relying on kinetic energy
instead of explosive propellants, the
hypersonic projectiles launch with
the equivalent of 15 lbs. of TNT and
are capable of penetrating more than
10 yards of concrete on impact.
The system’s 33 lb., 30-inch cold-
formed kinetic energy rounds incorpo-
rate a lightweight aft skirt to minimize
drag. Composed of heat-resistant mate-
rials such as metal-clad ceramics, the
rounds (a.k.a. “integrated launch pack-
ages”) can be either entirely solid or
carry 10,000 tungsten shrapnel cubes.
The absence of explosives, and each
round’s relatively small size, make rail
guns ideal for precision strikes where
collateral damage is a concern. Crew
safety is also improved by eliminating
the possibility of on-board detonations,
and more rounds can subsequently
be carried, though room is needed
for the system’s large capacitor banks.
The projectile’s high trajectory also
makes it less susceptible to jamming,
interception and wind resistance.
A prototype has already test-fired
a projectile at 32 megajoule muzzle
velocity, and BAE Systems is contracted
to ultimately bring on line a 64 mega-
joule weapon capable of hurling a
GPS-guided round into space at mach
7 (5,709 mph). The maximum range
will be 222 nautical miles (255 statute
miles, 411 km). The round will achieve
a maximum altitude of some 95 miles
and take no more than 15 seconds to
reach its target. The projectile, when
striking at such a high velocity, will
impart so much kinetic energy no
explosive warhead will be needed
(hence the development project’s
Latin motto: “Velocitas Eradico” or
“Speed Kills”). Final field-testing is
to begin in 2018, followed by the 64
megajoule weapon becoming fully
operational in the early 2020s. t
5/11/12 4:23 PM
 Weapons

The X95 (Tavor 2)

Assault Rifle/SMG
By David R. Higgins

F
ollowing the end of the 1982
Lebanon War, the Israel Defense
Force (IDF) determined they
needed a better weapon. It was to be a
small arm that could perform double
duty in close quarters and open envi-
ronments. Israeli Military Industries,
the state-owned company that
originated the infamous UZI subma-
chinegun and later privatized as Israeli Specifications: X95 (Tavor 2)
Weapons Industries, Ltd., responded.
They produced an advanced design
to replace the ageing assault rifles Type 5.56 x 45 mm 9 x 19 mm / with suppressor
presently in service. Touted as the
“ultimate weapon of the 21st century,” Magazine capacity 30 32
the resulting Tavor Assault Rifle (21st
Century Assault Rifle or TAR-21) was Weight (km) 2.98 2.94 / 3.25
first made available for field testing in
1999 with Indian and Georgian special Muzzle Velocity (m/s) 860 400 / 280
forces. The rifle incorporates proven
features and is popular with its users. Length (mm) 580 580 / 650
Additional sharpshooter and grenade
variations are now being produced. Rate of Fore (r/m) 700-1,000 700-1,000 / 750-1,200
Even so, a smaller version of the
weapon was still needed, more specifi-

MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012 57

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 Two Israeli soldiers carrying highly augmented versions of the gun.
cally tailored to the needs of special
operations forces, tank crews and sup-
port personnel. The Tavor development
team therefore created the MTAR-21
(Micro). At only 22.62 inches (580mm)
in length, the Micro is designed to
accommodate the short-range 9x19mm
parabellum round, a standard NATO
pistol and submachinegun cartridge.
The two versions of the Tavor have 70
percent compatibility, and conversion
simply entails changing out an operat-
ing recoil mechanism, magazine-well
adaptor and a floating barrel kit. That
can all be accomplished by a qualified
armorer in under 10 minutes.
Redesignated the X95 or Tavor 2,
the weapon’s body incorporates a com-
posite high-strength polymer with all
its metal parts corrosion resistant. The
magazine, receiver and bullet chamber
are positioned behind the trigger
handle, shifting the center of gravity to
the rear to improve control and make
for an even more compact weapon.
The weapon’s “bull pup” configuration
makes the barrel roughly three-quarters
of its overall length, allowing for highly
accurate fire out to medium ranges.
The X95 possesses an ergonomic
design, with six holding points for
improved stability and accuracy, and
an ambidextrous fire control system
and cocking handle. The weapon can
58
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 58
fire 240 rounds before the heat build
up risks “cooking off” subsequent
ammunition. It has a last round stopper
to indicate an empty magazine, a
selective fire system (semi-automatic,
burst and full auto), and over-the-beach
capability (meaning it can be fired
after having been submerged).
The safety has three mechanical
layers that keep the gun from firing
unintentionally: the bolt needs to
be locked completely; unlocking
can’t occur unless the projectile has
left the barrel and internal pressure
has dropped to a safe level, and
a safety mode selector lever.
The X95 incorporates a tactical
“picatinny rail” that can mount a
variety of attachments. A passive non-
magnifying reflexive (reflector) sight
offers rapid target acquisition, allowing
both eyes to remain open during aim-
ing. Transitioning between a daytime
illuminated aiming point and nighttime
tritium light source is instantaneous.
To provide greater accuracy to the sight
a magnifier can be added. Additional
attachments include a flashlight,
assault grip, bayonet, and silencer.
The X95 can also be integrated
with a sight that measures a target’s
range and displays a corrected aiming
point for proper elevation. That same
device can also be used to control
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
“augmented lethality munitions” such
as grenades fired from the optional
M203 launcher. That sets a time-delay
fuse to either activate detonation just
prior to impact at a pre-determined
height above the target, or post-impact
for penetrations of windows.
The weapon also has surveillance
capabilities. An inert grenade with an
embedded camera and communica-
tions link to a receiving unit can be
launched to provide the user an aerial
image of his target. An integrated video
camera allows the user to aim from
around corners via an eyepiece, as well
transmitting real-time images and data
to team-level and squad-level units and
forward command posts. As a result,
tactical battlefield monitoring and coor-
dination can be considerably enhanced.
Having proven itself during the
Gaza Strip Action of December 2008
to January 2009, the X95 has been
selected as the IDF standard infantry
weapon. Over the last few years it’s
been progressively issued to more and
more Israeli units. The weapon is also
used by foreign special operations
units, including India’s Commando
Battalion for Resolute Action, Thailand’s
Thahan Phran Rangers and Georgia’s
Special Forces Brigade. t
5/11/12 4:23 PM
 New Arena

Pentagon Wargaming
or Life on MORS By Brian R. Train

I
’ve been playing and designing
wargames for over 20 years.
I’ve also been involved with the
professional wargaming community –
people who design and play wargames
not just to experience history but to
attempt to help the US Department
of Defense make better decisions.
The final chapter of wargaming
guru James F. Dunnigan’s classic work
in the genre, The Complete Wargames
Handbook: How to Play, Design and
Find Them, sketched out the experi-
ences of professional wargamers at
that time (1980). He discussed the
trade-off between the accuracy of a
wargame’s predicted results and the
all too limited time and resources
available to produce the wargame
itself. He concluded many professional
wargames get lost in the details of
searching for a solution that deviated
less than one percent from accuracy.
I agree with Dunnigan on that, as
long as the problem the game was
trying to address was of a technical
nature, such as simulating the impact
of individual weapons. That said, my
own interests have tended toward
political-military subjects and the kinds
of conflicts that have been variously
described as “low-intensity conflict,”
“irregular warfare,” and “asymmetrical
warfare.” Designing wargames on those
topics is difficult because they deal
with factors difficult to quantify – yet
a professional wargame must remain
essentially a mathematical model.
A wargame should yield a range of

MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012 59

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 outcomes, not The One True Answer. wargame. Algernon’s creator had used I understand work has continued to
Special attention should be paid to my Algeria game as the basic system, improve the modelling aspects of PSOM
the outlier results in that range. and programmed a Visual BASIC appli- and to make it more of a role-playing
The events of 11 September 2001 cation allowing double-blind play on a exercise – so much so that the Journal
caused a sudden swing in the interests laptop computer with a moderator. The of Defense Modeling and Simulation
of the American military in irregular scenario constructed for the workshop devoted an entire issue to its history
warfare. Certainly more has been writ- was called “Ginger Junction,” a situation and development in April 2011.
ten in English on that topic in the last 10 that took place in a fictional island Since then I’ve also par-
years than in the preceding 30. The 2006 group in the South Pacific, with insur- ticipated in the annual Connections
Department of Defense Quadrennial gents trying to secede from the govern- Interdisciplinary Conference, an event
Defense Review confirmed the shift of ment through a guerrilla movement. intended to bring together the worlds
emphasis in US planning from major There was also a demonstration of military, commercial and academic
conventional operations to irregular, and two-day play of the Peace Support wargaming. The first Connections
asymmetric warfare. It also recognized Operations Model (PSOM). That was conference was in 1993, and was spon-
American military forces weren’t well another computer-assisted wargame sored by the Air Command and Staff
prepared to conduct that kind of con- first developed in 2004 by the British College. Each subsequent conference
flict. The defense analytical community Ministry of Defence, on what is cur- has had a particular theme explored
also realized they would be called on to rently called “stability operations” in by various speakers, panel discussions
provide advice and decision support on the United States. The game focused on and demonstrations of new games.
matters concerning irregular warfare. two levels of play: the high-level game, Some of those themes have involved
So it was in late 2007 I learned where political and strategic decisions exploring qualitative factors, such as
Algeria, a game I’d designed in 1999 are made, and the operational game, wargaming’s potential for organiza-
simulating that country’s 1954-62 where those decisions’ campaign tional and educational transformation,
insurgency against France, was effects are shown at the battle-group and modeling human factors across
being used by the US government and reconstruction-group level. the spectrum of combat operations.
as the basis for building a model of I went away feeling the mechanisms That brings me to what I find
the Iraqi insurgency, in the creation and assumptions of the game were most problematic about Pentagon
of a computer-assisted counter- shut away in black boxes on the other gaming as used to model the security
insurgency wargame, and for exposing side of the computer interface, and situation of the modern world. It seems
trainee military analysts to some of so couldn’t be examined or criticized.
the dynamics of irregular warfare.
I was invited to attend a workshop
called “Improving Cooperation
Among Nations in Irregular Warfare,”
which was held at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey,
California, in December 2007.
The workshop there was put on
by the Military Operations Research
Society (MORS <www.mors.org>). Over
165 attended, including 40 representa-
tives from 21 different countries. The
purpose of the workshop was to learn
about analytical methods and tools
used by allies of the US and to discuss
the use of analytically supported
wargames, with the participation
of some outside experts – in this
case, including designers of com-
mercial wargames such as myself,
Jon Compton and Joseph Miranda.
I gave a presentation on
simulating irregular warfare, and also
participated in presentations by the
Counterinsurgency Working Group
of Algernon, a computer-assisted

60 MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012

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to be moving in two diametrically
opposed directions – both of them
enabled by modern technology.
One direction is exemplified by
the continued development of heavily
iterative, resource-intensive software
simulations described generically as
“agent-based models.” They’re based
on the concept that, by examining the
interactions of low-level autonomous
units (agents) operating in accordance
with algorithms, they will show the
creation and evolution of complex
systems that have predictive value.
In effect, you wind it up, set it down
and watch the model create a story for
you – and the more data, algorithms
and agents you dump into it, the
more accurate and predictive the
resulting story is supposed to be.
While great advances in comput-
ing power have taken place since
Dunnigan wrote The Complete
Wargames Handbook, which now
permit even desktop computers to
create and run powerful agent-based
models, it still remains necessary
to question the accuracy of results
such models produce. Even what
the term “accuracy” would mean in
an irregular warfare setting and how
receptive it is to “black swan events”
(rare and unpredictable outliers
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 61
New Arena
that nonetheless happen and affect
complex systems deeply – see the book
The Black Swan by Nassim Nicholas
Taleb) still need to be examined.
The other direction has also been
enabled by information technology, but
instead of using the calculating power
of computers, they’re used to permit
humans to cooperate and communi-
cate massively in search of a solution to
a problem – what’s being called “crowd
sourcing.” Examples of that kind of
cooperative play with military applica-
tions include the Open Simulation
Platform, an open-source project
developed by the US Institute for Peace,
and MMOWGLI (Massively Multiplayer
Online War Game Leveraging the
Internet), which was developed for the
Office of Naval Research and run as an
experiment during the summer of 2011.
Gen. Martin Dempsey, the current
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
remarked in his Senate confirmation
hearings on his belief in the value
of social networking software and
Massively Multiplayer Online Games
as tools for military professional
development and problem-solving.
The latter is currently the road less
travelled by the Department of Defense,
but I believe it’s the better approach.
When confronted with the difficult
problems posed by irregular warfare,
composed as it is of human motiva-
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
tions and unpredictable actions and
reactions, it’s better to apply multiple
human minds to the problem than to
observe the actions of an almost infinite
number of programmed automatons.
The solutions emerging from the
process shouldn’t all be considered
predictive or even accurate. The
value of the exercise lies in exploring
alternatives and testing decisions.
Peter Perla, author of The Art of
Wargaming and a noted designer of
both commercial and professional
wargames, put it succinctly when he
was quoted in a June 2011 blog posting:
But what games can do for those
who play them (at least when
they are designed by insightful
and knowledgeable and skillful
designers) is give them that dull
grey shadow of what a black future
might look like and feel like. And
getting as much practice as possible
at making decisions in those sorts of
environments can be very helpful to
some of those decision makers (the
best ones, I contend), especially if
knowledgeable, talented, and skilful
mentors and analysts help them
understand and profit from those
experiences. That seems to me to be
the best we can hope for. And I think
that’s a lot when compared to the
sort of nonsense or intentionally self-
deluding results of models and sims
and pseudo-analyses and junk arith-
metic that so many of them get today.
Where does that leave traditional
manual (paper-based) wargaming?
There remain niches in the large and
varied communities of military, intelli-
gence and security professionals where
using manual wargames continues to
make perfect sense. As training tools or
seminar material, they remain relatively
cheap and quick to develop. In many
cases they would be the preferred way
to map out a conceptual exercise, as
they can be changed or amended on the
fly far easier than a computer program.
So many popular computer games have
in fact begun their lives as paper-based
concepts that I seem to have come
full-circle, and will conclude here. t
61
5/11/12 4:24 PM
 US Cyber Command
& the New Dimension of War
I
n May 2010 the Department
of Defense established the US
Cyber Command (CYBERCOM),
headquartered at Fort Meade,
Maryland. CYBERCOM consolidates
various cyberwar forces into a single
organization, including Twenty-Fourth
Air Force, Second Army, Tenth Fleet,
and the US Marine Corps Cyberspace
Command. The mission statement
for the command authorizes both
defensive and offensive missions,
though they’re all to remain within
the military sphere. The importance
of this move is indicated by the fact
the major components of CYBERCOM
are numbered air force-army-navy
headquarters, all top-level commands.
Cyberwar has come a major
component of Pentagon strategy due
to the extent to which networked
computer systems have become central
to the modern world’s functioning.
Computers have many industrial,
62
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 62
By Joseph Miranda
administrative, entertainment and mili-
tary functions. The internet is used to
conduct communications, for financial
transactions, to disseminate media,
to control transnational organizations
and as a form of social interaction.
In many ways, computers and their
networks have become the equivalent
of what the industrial infrastructure
of the 20th century was to the World
Wars. Control of that infrastructure, and
destruction of the enemy’s capabilities
in it, have therefore become a central
feature of warfare. The military today
is dependent on many networked
systems for command control (C2).
One estimate credits the Department
of Defense with having 15,000
networks run by 90,000 people and
involving up to 7 million computers.
Cyberwar has considerable
offensive applications. Saboteurs
can attack via computer viruses,
logic bombs and denial of service.
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
Those tactics can disrupt not only
cybernetic systems, but also physical
infrastructure such as power grids
controlled by computers. There are
also opportunities for espionage via
penetration of enemy systems and
gaining access to confidential informa-
tion. Data can also simply be destroyed.
Economic targets are also on the list,
as financial accounts can be altered
and funds transferred clandestinely.
Cyberwar is a front for psycho-
logical operations (PSYOP), with
internet websites used to disseminate
propaganda and recruit insurgents.
The internet can be used to organize
transnational forces, overcoming
geographic factors of distance. Internet
insurgents can operate clandestinely
from dispersed and remote locations,
minimizing the risks of detection
and destruction by security forces.
There is the swarm attack, in which
numerous internet-based insurgents
5/11/12 4:24 PM
 New Arena

simultaneously concentrate to
assault single online targets.
In recent years there have been
several major cyberwar operations.
Often, their sources haven’t been
known or are only suspected. Hackers
can take control of computers in
other countries and use them to
launch attacks; consequently, the
opportunities for false flag and black
operations have greatly expanded.
Some examples include the following.
The China’s People’s Liberation Army
has dedicated cyberwar units. It’s
alleged they’ve initiated cyberwar
operations against the US.
In April 2007, Estonian government and
financial agencies came under cyber
attack from sources in Russia. The
attacks were supposedly made in
retaliation for the Estonians’ having
moved a Soviet-era war monument.
The 2008 Georgia War saw considerable
cyber attacks against all sides. Some
of those efforts originated from
official sources, others were made
from independent networks.
Iranian computers in its nuclear
facilities were paralyzed by the
Stuxnet virus in September
2010. Given US and Israeli
opposition to the Iranian nuclear
program, suspicion went in
those countries’ directions.
Indian and Pakistani cyberwar
networks have been conducting
exchanges of attacks, some in
retaliation for the Mumbai terrorist
attacks, which were alleged to
have had Pakistani support.
Various nations in recent years have
established military and intelligence
organizations to conduct cyberwar.
information flowing upward from units
in the field. Destroying any one level of
command could therefore disrupt an
entire operation. Net-centric warfare
provides more resiliency, since the
destruction of a single link isn’t fatal;
other links can be quickly activated.
Terminology is developing to
reflect that change. Central points for
processing of information and making
decisions are now called nodes, and
they’re connected by network lines.
In networked units, information
flows not only up and down the
chain of command, but also laterally
among units. Real-time intelligence
can be transmitted from units in
the field to national levels, and
national-level intelligence can be sent
back in return. One downside is that
can lead to over-control by higher
headquarters, micro-management
and information overload. Yet, at
least so far, American forces seem
to be adapting well to the situation,
perhaps in part because the spread of
information technology throughout
our culture has created a new genera-
tion at ease in that environment.
One example comes from
Operation Anaconda, the March
2002 US-Coalition assault on an Al
Qaeda/Taliban stronghold in eastern
Afghanistan. The original plan, which
called for friendly Afghan forces to
attack enemy positions while US
airmobile infantry formed a blocking
force, fell apart owing to friendly fire.
Commanders on the scene quickly
put together a new plan in the midst
of the battle. They used networked
systems to link together aircraft,
headquarters and forward observers on
the ground, exploiting airpower to win
at least a tactical victory. The rapidity
of the switchover in the operational
concept was a testament to the adapt-
ability of both net-centric warfare
and the skill of those utilizing it..
Networks have also changed the
nature of insurgency. For much of the
20th century, insurgent organizations
tended to be rigidly hierarchical,
organized top-down around key cadre,

All that has led to the Department

of Defense developing doctrine for
both cyberwar and net-centric warfare
(a.k.a. netwar). Netwar allows dispersed
forces to attack in synchronization,
and relies on information-sharing via
both horizontal and vertical means.
That implies a change in organi-
zational thinking. Historically, most
military control systems have been
hierarchical, with commands flowing
down from higher headquarters and Air Force personnel updating anti-virus software. (US Air Force Photo).

MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012 63

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 63 5/11/12 4:24 PM

 political and military organizations and
popular fronts. Breaking that infrastruc-
ture was a centerpiece of counterinsur-
gency warfare because, by neutralizing
the organization, the larger insurgency
would collapse for lack of direction
and support. In the era of netwar,
however, organizations have become
more loosely defined. Redundancy
in nodes and network lines makes
for more resilient organizations.
For example, an insurgent node
might make connections with various
financial institutions in order to
transfer funds in support of a terrorist
operation, disestablish those links
when detected, and then open an
entirely new network, this time with
media allies who exploit collateral
damage caused by counterinsurgent
forces. That leads to a shifting set
of alliances that make it difficult to
track down and destroy a network.
The ‘big screen’ crashes during a cyber-war
exercise at an undisclosed US base.
64
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 64
On the downside, networks have
difficulties in coordinating major
operations since they may lack central
direction and the discipline a hierarchic
leadership imparts. Moreover, the
shifting nature of networks means
an organization may not be able to
sustain the initiative over protracted
struggles. A net-based insurgency can
be more survivable than a traditional
infrastructure-based movement, but
it becomes more problematic when it
comes time to launch a large offensive.
While net-centric operations
give conventional militaries great
advantages in command control,
information dissemination, planning
and intelligence operations, there’s also
a downside for them. The technologies
required to run the networks create
vulnerabilities from hackers employing
cyberwar tactics, including electronic
jamming and the physical destruc-
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
tion of equipment. An organization
that becomes overly dependent on
networks may not be able to function
in situations when systems are down.
A case in point in what could
happen was provided by Operation
Millennium Challenge 2002, a US Joint
Forces Command exercise that includ-
ed units in the field and computer
simulations. Millennium Challenge pit-
ted “Blue Forces” (representing the US)
moving into the Middle East, opposed
by “Red,” a hypothetical enemy regional
power. The objective was to test how all
three services – navy, army and air force
– could fight and win a decisive battle
in an Information Age environment.
The operation went in an
unanticipated direction when the Red
commander took unorthodox steps.
Red forces used low technology means
for communications, such as dispatch
riders and minaret broadcasts, which
5/11/12 4:24 PM

A highly stylized view of ‘cyber-warriors.
could not be intercepted or jammed
by Blue’s high-tech gear. Red forces
were thereby able to coordinate mass
attacks involving small boats, aircraft
and cruise missiles that inflicted
simulated havoc on US naval forces
and brought the operation to a halt.
That outcome led to a debate about
who runs the script in wargames,
but also indicated cyberwar will
be effective only insofar as forces
remain tied to electronic networks.
Still, as long as much of the world’s
populace, or at least those involved in
critical sectors of warfare, economics
and opinion making, are plugged into
the global communications system, any
modern force must engage on the level
of cyberwar. Effectively, cyberspace has
become a virtual battleground, but in
a bizarre kind of way: a battleground
that’s been chosen by mutual consent.
The terms “Full Spectrum
Dominance” and “Information Warfare”
(or the less belligerent sounding
“Information Operations”) are now
used to describe not only cyberwar
but also psychological operations,
electronic warfare, cryptology and
assorted politicized military operations
operating together. At literally the
highest level, Information Warfare
overlaps with space operations due
to the importance of satellites in
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 65
New Arena
A more realistic view.
maintaining the global network as
well as in conducting surveillance.
Other applications of network Get your
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is becoming the virtual space of the
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any event, many of today’s military ModernWarmagazine.com
powers are racing to fight on this new
front, and CYBERCOM is slated to
become a major combatant. t
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012 65
5/11/12 4:24 PM
 SEAL A SEAL Team Six member in training.

Team
Six:
DEVGRU &
the Raid to
Kill Osama
Bin Laden
By David R. Higgins

A
s a result of the failure of
Operation Eagle Claw, the
attempt to rescue American
hostages held by Islamic militants at the
US Embassy in Teheran in April 1980,
the US Navy saw the need for a full-time
counter-terrorist unit. The mission
was assigned to that service’s special
operations force, the SEAL (acronym
for SEa, Air and Land, emphasizing
their methods of insertion).
SEAL Team One had already been
conducting counterterrorism training
on the US west coast. Meanwhile its
eastern counterpart, SEAL Team Two,
created a two-platoon group known
as MOB (Mobility) Six, which was
dedicated to fighting terrorists. MOB Six
was to get handpicked candidates and
an accelerated training program. Many
experienced special operators trans-
ferred to the new formation to provide
a cadre. Following a rigorous six-month
training regimen, the unit was made
operational under the designation
SEAL Team Six; the “Six” being an effort
to confuse Soviet intelligence as to
the number of such units in service.
Naval Special Warfare Command
(NSW) was established in 1987. Under
its control the remaining SEAL teams
were organized as Naval Special
Warfare Groups One through Five, with
the last being a reserve formation.
There’s also an NSW Center. Groups One
(Coronado, California, with Teams One,
Three and Five) and Two (Little Creek,
Virginia, with Teams Two and Four),
along with NSW support units, logistics,
and training personnel. Groups Three
and Four include a SEAL Delivery Team
and Special Boat Team, respectively.

66 MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012

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 MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012 67

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 67 5/11/12 4:24 PM

 Another close-up view of SEALs in an exercise.
Each of the teams is assigned a glob-
al operational area and is comprised
of a headquarters element and three
40-man troops. Each troop has its own
headquarters controlling two platoons,
each of two officers and 14 enlisted
men, though occasionally they’re
assigned two additional operators.
A platoon is typically the largest
operational element assigned to a
mission. Special Boat Teams were
created to infiltrate and exfiltrate SEALs
and other Special Operations Forces
(SOF) using a variety of watercraft.
SEAL operations were supposed to
concentrate on maritime missions
involving ships, oil rigs and military
and civilian bases accessible from
the sea or inland waterways – though
they’ve actually ranged as far inland
as the mountains of Afghanistan.
SEAL Team Six became the Naval
Special Warfare Development Group
(DEVGRU) under the control of the
Joint Special Operations Command
(JSOC) in 1987, no longer under NSW.
Its missions are highly classified: appar-
ently it’s received another designation
that hasn’t been revealed to the public.
DEVGRU comprises some 300 person-
68
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 68
nel in three ”assault units” (codenamed
Red, Blue and Gold) and a special boat
team (Gray). Another 300 personnel
provide administration and training.
DEVGRU training begins with
the grueling selection process of
Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL
(BUD/S). All applicants in it originate
from other SEAL teams as well as the
Navy’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD) units, with combat experience
a prerequisite. Those passing the
recruitment and selection process are
selected to attend a half-year Operators
Training Course known as “Green
Team.” Candidates are evaluated with
a variety of mental and physical tests
that produce a high rate of attrition.
Additional training is conducted at
military and civilian facilities through-
out the US and abroad. Exchange
programs and joint training are
undertaken with the most experienced
international teams, such as Germany’s
GSG-9 and Great Britain’s Special Boat
Squadrons. Realism is stressed, and
it involves a range of skills including
stress shooting, combat tactics, under-
water diving techniques, parachuting,
demolitions and survival/evasion/resis-
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
tance/escape (SERE). All that can result
in trainee injuries, but the assumption
is making the training realistic will
pay off later in combat. Candidates
deemed worthy are advanced to one
of the Tactical Development and
Evaluation Squadrons. The others
are returned to their previous units.
The objective is to provide the
highest quality operators, though the
criticism has been made DEVGRU pulls
the best personnel out of the rest of
the SEAL community. Still, DEVGRU
has been tasked with conducting a
range of sensitive missions in which
failure can produce considerable
political fallout. They involve hostage
rescue, capture or killing of “high value
targets” (a euphemism for important
enemy personnel), and covert recon-
naissance of critical targets. DEVGRU
also conducts security assessments
of US military bases and embassies.
Another important mission is proactive
counterterrorist operations, including
preemptive strikes against potential
threats and dealing with situations
involving weapons of mass destruction.
DEVGRU often trains and deploys
alongside the Army’s Combat
5/11/12 4:24 PM
 Operations Group (a.k.a. Delta Force)
and 160th Special Operations Aviation
Regiment (Airborne) as part of a Joint
Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF).
Joint training is intended to overcome
the command-control issues that
led to the failure of Eagle Claw.
DEVGRU at War
In 1983 DEVGRU participated in the
US intervention in Grenada, Operation
Urgent Fury, and during it rescued and
evacuated Commonwealth Gov. Sir Paul
Scoon. Team members also deployed
to the site of the Achille Lauro hijacking
in 1985 in anticipation of a possible
assault on that vessel. SEALs captured
Panamanian president Manuel Noriega
during 1989’s Operation Just Cause.
DEVGRU also operated in Panama in
a failed secret operation to capture
drug lord Pablo Escobar, codenamed
“Pokeweed,” and purportedly recovered
Haitian President Jean Bertrand
Aristide following his ousting in a coup.
The unit also undertook missions in
Somalia (1992-93), Bosnia (1992-95),
Afghanistan and Pakistan, often
under temporary CIA authority.
Neptune Spear
After a nearly decade-long manhunt
for Osama bin Laden, DEVGRU was
tasked with killing or capturing the
Al Qaeda leader. Having located bin
Laden in a compound in the Pakistani
garrison town of Abbottabad, opera-
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 69
tives from the CIA’s Special Activities
Division (SAD) initiated a months-long
surveillance campaign on him.
Additional US agencies pro-
vided support, including the National
Geospatial Intelligence Agency, which
produced detailed images of the facility
using National Reconnaissance Office
spy satellites. Stealthy RQ-170 Sentinel
drones contributed, as their data
enabled facial recognition technology
to identify bin Laden and other resi-
dents of the compound and determine
their routines. Using that information,
a full-scale mock-up of the compound
was constructed in the US and a second
one at Camp Alpha at Bagram Air
Force Base, Afghanistan. It was used
to train under realistic conditions.
Bin Laden’s hideout, located in the
affluent Bilal suburb some 1,000 yards
from the Pakistan Military Academy’s
main gate, seemed either unlikely or
one that Pakistani officials had quietly
permitted. That meant the raid was
going to be politically sensitive.
The initial plan was to use a pair of
B-2 stealth bombers to obliterate the
compound by dropping 2,000 lb. JDAM
smart bombs. That was abandoned
because there would possibly be
no corpse left for identification and
the bombs might cause collateral
damage on nearby civilians.
A new plan was therefore developed,
Operation Neptune Spear, involving
the SEALS. They would be flown in
at night in two MH-60 Blackhawk
helicopters that had been modified
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
to minimize their radar signature and
muffle noise. The first helicopter was
to have 11 SEALs rappel onto the main
house’s roof and then work their way
down. The remaining operators would
then be deposited on the ground
to block any escapes and provide
warning if Pakistani security forces
arrived. The second “chalk” of 12 SEALs
was to rappel into the courtyard,
secure that area and clear the main
house from the ground up. Using
night vision equipment and silenced
weapons to maintain surprise, both
teams were to meet in the middle of
the main house, getting bin Laden
sometime during that process.
If Pakistani forces interfered,
the SEALs were to avoid contact,
remain in the compound and wait for
officials in Washington to negotiate
their extraction. The US president
approved a 30 April 2011 raid on
the 29th, but weather conditions
forced a 24-hour postponement.
Late on 1 May the Blackhawks flew
out of Jalalabad, Afghanistan, sup-
ported by three double-rotor MH-47G
Chinooks, two carrying a dozen SEALs
each as backup, and one as a reserve
for any emergency (another lesson
learned from Eagle Claw). All aircraft
were under the control of the specially
trained 160th SOAR, whose pilots negoti-
ated a low altitude circuitous path
through the mountains. Since the US
had helped the Pakistanis develop their
air defense, SOAR pilots could exploit
gaps in radar coverage via terrain-
69
5/11/12 4:24 PM
 hugging nap-of-the-earth flying.
With cover from fixed-wing
aircraft and drones, the Special
Operations force passed over western
Pakistan’s volatile semi-autonomous
Pashtun tribal area, a Taliban
stronghold. The Chinooks touched
down in the isolated mountainous
area several miles before reaching
Abbottabad while the Blackhawks
flew in and executed the mission.
At 1:10 a.m. local time the
Blackhawks approached the com-
pound; the neighborhood around the
target had been inflicted with a power
blackout 40 minutes earlier. During
the descent one of the helicopters was
reportedly hit by ground fire and began
to lose altitude, though that was later
attributed to a drop in air pressure from
above — SEALs also train to enter missions via underwater swimming. higher than expected temperatures.
Compounding the problem, the
courtyard’s high outer walls blocked the
rotor blade downwash from properly
circulating, which further reduced lift
by creating what’s known as a “vortex
ring state.” Unable to remain aloft, the
pilot attempted a hard landing during
which the tail rotor struck one of the
three-yard-high walls, causing the
helicopter to crash. With surprise lost,
the SEALs disembarked and secured
the compound, then called in the
reserve Chinook. With no room for an
additional helicopter in the courtyard,
the second Blackhawk landed its
team outside the compound. Seven
SEALs then used explosives to gain
access and join the dozen who were
already inside clearing the facility.
The SEALs approached the guest
above — A Seahawk helicopter departs after delivering SEALs during an exercise in Nevada. house where they killed a courier and
his wife before blowing the main build-
ing’s false front door and supporting
brick wall. Receiving no gunfire from
inside, they rushed through the gap
and began clearing the three-story
structure, killing the courier’s brother
and bin Laden’s son. Having correctly
assumed bin Laden occupied the top
floor, three SEALs arrived to see their
target at the end of a hall wearing a
white undershirt and tan shalwar
kameez (a traditional dress worn
indoors by both men and women
in Southwest Asia). One SEAL fired
and missed as his quarry withdrew
back into his bedroom. Believing bin
Laden might be going for a weapon or
suicide vest, the trio quickly followed.
The lead SEAL ushered two of bin
Laden’s daughters out of the way. A
second team member shot his wife
in the leg after she either rushed
above — SEALs search through an Al Qaeda compound in Afghanistan.

70 MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 70 5/11/12 4:24 PM


the Americans or was pushed. On
pushing her aside, he shot bin Laden
in the chest and head. Their leader
subsequently transmitted: “For God
and country: Geronimo, Geronimo,
Geronimo!” to the White House
Situation Room indicating “Mission
Stage G,” the killing of bin Laden (code-
named “Jackpot”) had been achieved.
By 1:25 a.m. the SEALs had
secured the compound and began
photographing the bodies for
identification, while others removed
everything of possible intelligence
value. Apparently none of bin Laden’s
electronics or data storage devices
had been rigged for self-destruction.
Later analysis of the files revealed the
names of many Al Qaeda operatives.
After 23 minutes of taking
photographs and inventorying rooms,
the SEALs secured the remaining
four women and 13 children before
blowing up the crashed Blackhawk. Bin
Laden’s body was then loaded onto the
recently arrived Chinook, along with
the crew of the destroyed helicopter,
captured documents and other seized
material. The surviving Blackhawk
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 71
Navy Seal Team Six pins and patches
was likely refueled on the ground by ed, along with a specialist burial detail
the waiting pair of Chinooks before all – all options having being prepared for
re-crossed the border and headed for depending on the outcome of the raid.
Bagram. By 1:50 a.m. the operation was After confirming the corpse’s identity
completed and the SEALs had departed using DNA taken from his sister, the Al
the area. Scrambled Pakistani aircraft Qaeda leader’s body was buried in the
arrived on scene 35 minutes later. Arabian Sea. That ended one chapter
Bin Laden’s body was later off-load- in the War on Terror, and the success
ed to a V-22 Osprey and flown to the of the SEALs demonstrated how far
aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, where a America’s terrorism counteraction
team of lawyers and interrogators wait- capabilities had come since 1980. t
With Custer
at the
Death by Robert F. Burke
The fascination with Custer’s Last Stand hasn’t diminished in the decades
since 1876. He led his regiment well ahead of the main body, only to run
into an unprecedented gathering of Indians. The first accounts were
pieced together by other soldiers arriving on the scene in the battle’s
aftermath, and by archaeologists in the generations since. To that
information was added the reminiscences of the Indians who fought there.
Interleaving and cross-referencing all those accounts provides a
minute-by-minute story of the fighting, as Custer desperately and
expertly maneuvered his outnumbered troops to face repeated and well-
coordinated assaults by bands of Indian warriors. The resultant narrative is
supported by dozens of detailed maps and orders of battle for both sides.
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MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012 71
5/11/12 4:25 PM
 On the Other Hand

As has been the case with every important military operation in history, the one to kill Bin Laden has already become the
subject of revisionist accounts of the events within and surrounding it. In a book published in November 2011 (Seal Target
Geronimo: The Inside Story of the Mission to Kill Osama Bin Laden) military historian and former SEAL Team Six operative Chuck
Pfarrer offers an assessment that differs from the previously released account. Pfarrer – who wasn’t on the mission, but who has
based his book on personal interviews with several of the SEALs who were there – offers the following divergent account.

There was no helicopter crash upon insertion of the SEALs. That crash occurred shortly after Bin Laden was killed.

The first SEALs in the assault were dropped directly onto the roof. There was no “ground up” battle through the
floors of the compound.

Bin Laden was killed within 90 seconds of the first American footfall onto the roof. The decision to kill him was
taken spontaneously during the mission by the operatives involved; it wasn’t part of any order issued prior to
its start. It was necessary to shoot the terrorist because, as the SEALs entered his room, he dove for an AKSU
assault rifle he apparently always kept at the headboard of his bed.

Pfarrer also concludes the biggest mistake concerning the initial reporting of the mission had to do with that news release’s
timing. That is, the president decided to take political credit for the mission within minutes of his receiving confirmation of
Bin Laden’s death. Had Obama not made that immediate announcement, the CIA and NSA would’ve had hours – perhaps
a day or more – to go through all the hard drives, CDs and video cassettes seized during the raid and then act on that


intelligence. As it was, Al Qaeda operatives around the world knew within minutes that they had to go to ground.

— Ty Bomba

SEALs disembarking from

a transport helicopter.

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 MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012 73

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 73 5/11/12 4:25 PM

 Mega Feedback

(Answer form available at the end of this support for future boxed games. As the boxed game with CIA, KGB, China, DSGE and MI6 fac-
survey for mail in, or use our on-line form at games move up the rankings, they move forward tions. Players use chits to send in agents to steal
modernwarmagazine.com) into design, development, artwork, printing and each other’s secrets and counterspies to prevent
release. You can also see the latest listings in the them from being captured. Players will also
1. Are you: next Dispatch. have to deal with the events of the age that had
a. A subscriber to or regular buyer of profound effects on the global stage. A game of
Strategy & Tactics and/or World at War The current line-up for Modern War is: global supremacy in the age of the spy. Rules for
Game Edition? agents, assassination, counterintelligence, coup
b. A subscriber to or a regular buyer of #2 Oil War d’états, the Korean War, the Berlin Airlift, fund-
Strategy & Tactics and/or World at War ing your agency and more. David March
magazine? #3 Somali Pirates
c. Someone who has read past issues A3. First Cav: Battle of Taegu. The North
of Strategy & Tactics and/or World at #4 Six Day War Korean Army is moving to finish off the Pusan
War but rarely purchased it, or let a Perimeter; three of their best divisions are
subscription run out over one year ago? #5 Drive on P’yongyang making their way to attack the critical city of
d. Someone who has never seen Strategy & Taegu, and only the 1st Cavalry Division and a
Tactics and/or World at War magazines? #6 Decision in Iraq scratch force of Marines stand in their way.
Rules include tanks, airpower, two combat
2. After reviewing this premiere issue of #7 Vietnam Battles: Snoopy’s Nose & Iron tables, artillery, Hill 303 massacre, napalm and
Modern War, what rating would you give it Triangle carpet bombing. David March
overall on a scale of 0 to 10 (10 being the
best you’ve ever seen)? #8 Holy Land A4. The North Ridge Fight. This design
would use an evolution of the system from
3. What did you like best about this issue? #9 The Next War in Lebanon First Blood: Second Marne and Soldiers to
cover the dramatic first day of fighting at the
4. What did you see or read in this issue that We need your help in ranking the current Chosin reservoir late in 1950. During their
needs improvement? candidates for Modern War to determine our counteroffensive’s first 24 hours, the Chicoms
priorities. Remember to rank each set from first – almost broke through on the “North Ridge” area
5. What would like to see more of in future the one you would like to see published soonest of the Marine positions. Had they done so, it’s
issues? or have the most interest in – to eighth. That is, unlikely the US division would’ve gotten away.
mark the game you would most like to see “1,” Special emphasis will be given to the Chicoms’
6. What topics would you like to see for future the second game you would like to see “2,” on use of grenade-tossing sappers and the
articles? down to “8” for the game you would least like to Marines’ good use of airpower. Ty Bomba.
see published in each category (down to “10” for
7. What is the name and location of the store the Cold War category). A5. Dien Bien Phu Solitaire. The decisive
where you buy most of your wargames? (If battle of the First Indochina War, with the player
an on-line store, what is the name of the COLD WAR commanding the French forces defending the
web site?) A1. Andartes: The Greek Civil War, 1947-49. base the fall of which led to the communist
The first test of the Truman Doctrine and one victory in 1954. The system will control Viet
8. What is the name and location of any other of the few times a communist insurgency Minh besiegers. The map will show the network
game store that carries wargames in your was beaten by a Western government. of French strongpoints comprising the base.
area (Or, if your primary store is on-line, Uses the Decision Iraq system to model the The player commits French units, including
what is the name and location of the conflict: some additions to the system include elite paratroopers and the Foreign Legion, to
physical store closest to you.)? government political interference in how the various strongpoints as well as counterattacks.
army is deployed and supplied, refugees and Each strongpoint will have an “assault path,”
Game Proposal Section population resettlement, foreign support, showing the Viet Minh line of advance toward
Please take a few minutes to review the game etc. The Rebel player also has the option of that point. Viet Minh forces are moved randomly
proposals and select the ones you would like switching his forces to conventional warfare if via a table. When they take a critical number of
to see us publish. Go to our Mega-Feedback he’s confident (or desperate) enough to engage casualties, the Viet Minh change from assault
page at http://www.modernwarmagazine.com. the army in set-piece battles. Brian Train. tactics to siege warfare. French units will be at
This feedback is the most important source for the battalion and company level; Viet Minh at
determining what games we will be working on A2. SPIES: Cold War. An updated version of regimental and battalion. Airpower can be called
for future issues. In addition, we’re seeking your the old-SPI Spies game set in the Cold War era in, but is affected by Viet Minh AAA. French
input on additional ideas we’re considering. from 1945 to 1960. Players will take on the rolls leadership and morale is critical, and various
We also have a feature on our other web site of various intelligence agencies and fight it out historic officers and enlisted who rose to the
(decisiongames.com) where you can pledge your across a global world view. A two to five player challenge can enter the game – as well as exit

74 MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 74 5/11/12 4:25 PM

 owing to mental breakdowns. Joseph Miranda
A6. Operation Musketeer. was the planned
Anglo-French campaign to seize the Suez Canal
in 1956. The plan’s first stage—the capture
of Port Said—was executed successfully,
but Musketeer was called off in the face of
international pressure. What if the British
and French had decided to keep fighting? That
could’ve led to some of the biggest tank battles
of the Cold War. The game map will cover the
Suez Canal and adjoining regions, west to
Cairo and east to the Mitla Pass in the Sinai.
The Anglo-French side will have elite airborne
units as well as amphibious forces, armor and
plenty of airpower, as well as control of Israeli
formations. The Egyptian player would have the
historic defense forces, as well as additional
reinforcements from the Arab world and
potential Soviet intervention divisions and air
power. Joseph Miranda
A7. Green Beret. It’s 1964-5 in the Central
Highlands of Vietnam, in the period before
the first US Army and Marine units arrived to
bring the war into a new phase. Montagnard
tribesmen of the Civilian Irregular Defense
Groups, raised, trained and advised by Special
Forces A-teams, try to prevent the Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese from controlling the
population and opening supply routes to the
coast. The game focuses on processes of
progressive recruitment, population control,
evasion and detection. Company to regiment
scale. Brian Train.
A8. East Is Red Redux. This will be a remake
of the S&T game from issue no. 42, pitting the
Soviet Union against Communist China in a
full-scale war during the Cold War. The game
system is simple, using multiple impulses to
show mechanized warfare. Units are corps and
combined arms armies, which can be broken
down into divisions. Both sides will have
specialized units such as Soviet air assault and
Spetsnaz, operational maneuver groups and Red
Guards. Airpower is represented by bases with
associated airstrike markers. And yes, there
will be plenty of nuclear weapons, from SSM
strikes to atomic demolitions. Scenarios will
cover different levels of force mobilization, plus
one based on information later revealed about a
real Soviet plan to take on China. There will also
be optional US intervention. The map will cover
northeastern China, eastern Siberia and northern
Korea. Joseph Miranda
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 75
A9. Carrier Battle Group Solo. A solitaire
game in which the player takes command
of a US Navy carrier battle group during a
hypothetical NATO-Warsaw pact conflict. The
map will cover the North Sea and North Atlantic.
The game will have multiple missions, which
can be played alone or linked into a campaign.
For each mission the player can equip his carrier
with various squadrons, each of which can
conduct different operations (air superiority,
strike, EW, ASW, refueling, etc.). The player can
also select escort craft, including guided missile
cruisers, destroyers and submarines, each of
which has specialized sensors and weapons
systems. Additional air cover can be purchased
in the form of shore-based long-range patrol
aircraft. A mission is executed by moving the
carrier battle group along sea lanes, with enemy
forces being generated randomly. The player
can launch and recover air squadrons, conduct
ASW, fire cruise missiles or close to gunnery
range. That can lead to various types of combat,
false alarms, and the potential for friendly fire
incidents. In the campaign game, successful
missions will lead to the player being assigned
advanced weaponry as well as upgraded crew
capabilities. Joseph Miranda
A10. Lebanese Civil War. During the 1970s
and 80s, Lebanon was the site of a civil war that
involved numerous parties seeking to control
the small nation. Using a variant of the Russian
Civil War system, two to four players will control
factions on the Muslim or non-Muslim side of
the conflict, attempting to accumulate sufficient
control to dominate Lebanon. The map will
depict the entirety of Lebanon, including the
Bekaa valley and Southern Lebanon, but will
also have an inset map where forces can vie
for control of sections of the old city of Beirut.
Forces will include Sunni Muslims, Shi’ite
Muslims, Druze, Maronite Christians, Catholics,
the forces of Israel, US Marines, French forces,
Syrians and Palestinian organizations. Additional
rules will cover foreign intervention (including
Iranian), hostage taking, shelling Israel, and
para-military organizations (the Phalange, PLO,
PFLP, Amal and Hezbollah). Darin Leviloff.
MODERN/RECENT/CURRENT
B1. 10 Day War. This game will cover the
short independence war fought between the
Slovenian Republic and the Yugoslav People’s
Army in 1991. The YPA player must crush the
breakaway country before foreign intervention
can occur. Battalion scale with rules covering
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
special forces, low YPA morale, Armbrust
missiles, airpower, tanks and equipment
breakdown. David March
B2. Rivers of Blood: Rwanda 1994. In 1994
the largest genocide since WW2 occurred in the
tiny Central African country of Rwanda. Between
500,000 and a million people were massacred
in attacks carried out by bands of Hutu. Once
word of the genocide got out, the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF), a Tutsi rebel army that had
previously invaded Rwanda from neighboring
Uganda, launched an attack in an attempt to halt
the killings and overthrow the Hutu government.
RoB:R 1994 would be a solitaire operational-
level game of the RPF response to the genocide.
The map would show the entire country with a
blow-up of the Kigali region in one corner. The
RPF has to move quickly to sweep the Rwandese
army off the map and rescue as many Tutsi
civilians as possible, while random events will
control where and when atrocities happen.
There will be rules for capturing Hutu leaders,
French intervention, various levels of UN
response, and much more. Bart Brodowski
B3. War By Television: What If the Serbs
Had Fought for Kosovo? This game explores
the possibilities inherent in the war that
would’ve resulted had the Serbs decided to fight
against the US and NATO to keep Kosovo at the
end of the last century. The system will provide
an operational treatment, with mostly brigades
as the units of maneuver, an asymmetric turn
sequence, and a map that covers Kosovo and its
immediate environs. Ty Bomba.
B4. Massoud’s War 1996-2000. An area map
game covering the civil war in Afghanistan
between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban.
Will the Taliban be able to defeat and capture
Massoud before the historic timetable, or can he
recapture the capital? Rules will cover foreign
intervention and support, Al-Queada, the IMU,
Iranian border dispute and Ismail Khan. David
March
B5. Enduring Freedom: Campaign for
Afghanistan. This will cover the first six months
of the Global War on Terror in Afghanistan,
which culminated in the overthrow of the
Taliban and the Anaconda battle. One player
commands the US-Coalition side and the other
is the Militant Islamic (Al Qaeda plus Taliban).
The game starts with Militant Islamic forces in
75
5/11/12 4:25 PM
 Mega Feedback
control of most of Afghanistan. The Coalition
stages into the country from bases in adjoining
countries, using a range of forces: airpower,
heavy and light brigades, special operations,
as well as Afghan warlord formations. Militant
Islamic forces will include elite Al Qaeda units
(such as the 055 Brigade), insurgents, and
high value targets (such as Osama bin Laden).
Militant Islamic units are deployed face down,
but the Coalition can reveal them via special
operations and ISR. The Players can expend
Infowar Points to purchase various types of
units and special weapons (the latter including
everything from satellites and killer drones
to suicide bombers). Infowar points can be
gained by eliminating enemy units (especially
high value targets) or, for the militant Islamic
side, inflicting terrorist attacks on Coalition
units. Victory is determined by relative levels of
Infowar Points at the end of the game. Joseph
Miranda
B6. Race for Baghdad. The 2003 US-Coalition
campaign in Iraq using the classic Battle for
Germany system. One player will control US V
Corps while the other commands 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force (including the UK 1st
Armoured Division). Players also control Iraqi
forces facing the opposing player. The map will
show all of Iraq, from Basra to Kurdistan, divided
into two sectors. Baghdad’s hexes will be open
to whichever player can get his units there first.
During deployment, each player picks the Iraqi
units he will control from a pool and deploys
them face down. Iraqis will include a full
spectrum of forces, such as Republican Guard
armor, foreign fighters and potential weapons
of mass destruction sites. That will make each
game different as well as providing fog of war.
Coalition units will be at brigade level, with
special operation forces as teams. The latter
can conduct a range of operations, such as
long-range recon and raising friendly guerillas.
Airpower will be in the form of airstrikes
players can allocate to various missions. Joseph
Miranda
B7. Kandahar. A game on the conflict in this
province of southern Afghanistan, 2009-10.
Players take the role of regional commanders
(Afghan National Security Forces and Taliban)
striving for the resources to allow them to
earn victory points, which are granted in
accordance with objectives set them by the
higher authorities that provide them with those
resources. Players will find themselves in the
76
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 76
position of having, if they wish to continue to
get support, to follow courses of action that
are not the most effective in opposing the
enemy but are more valued by their superiors,
and which change from time to time during the
game. When you run out of support, the game
ends: the war continues, but with a different
regional commander. Constructed with three
levels of difficulty so players can add complexity
as they go, in the form of additional factions
(organized crime, tribal militias, non-government
organizations, NATO forces) and concepts
(training, unit cohesion, economic stability,
infrastructure and aftereffects of violence). Brian
Train.
B8. Target: Iran. What if the US and Coalition
countries, including Israel, launch a proactive
strike against Iran? The map will cover Iran from
the Persian Gulf to the Caspian. Game units will
be brigades for the Coalition and divisions for
the Iranians. Different combat results tables will
show differing tactics (high-tech, fanatic assault,
unconventional warfare). The Iranians will have
counters they deploy face down representing
potential nuclear sites the Coalition must
capture or destroy. Each side will have a track
representing logistical support. Airpower will be
shown as mission packages and include stealth,
electronic warfare and more conventional types.
Plus possible Russian and Chinese interventions,
special operations, militant Islamic fanaticism
and cyberwar. Joseph Miranda
FUTURE
C1. Red Dragon Falling: The Coming Civil
War in China. This low-to-intermediate
complexity, near-future, what-if solitaire
wargame explores the possibilities inherent in
the breakup of Red China. The player commands
regime forces that have to react to randomly
generated threats that would include: rebellions
in Tibet and/or Sinkiang, invasion from Taiwan
and/or Russia, north/south coastal region
secession movements, army mutinies, and
possible expeditionary-style meddling from
Korea, Japan or even the US. This design will
make use of the system recently created by
Joseph Miranda, in which the handling of the
game-controlled side is greatly simplified. That’s
because time, space and unit-of-maneuver
scales are chosen so as to allow those units’
movement and combat to be resolved as
discrete events rather than as multi-step
processes. Ty Bomba
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
C2. The Baltic War. This low-to-intermediate
complexity, near-future, what-if, two-player
wargame explores the possibilities inherent in
the war that would result if a resurgent Russia
decided to try to re-annex the Baltic republics.
Units of maneuver would mostly be brigades.
The forces of Sweden and Finland would also be
included. The system will provide an operational
treatment, an asymmetric turn sequence, and
a map that covers from southern Finland to
Kaliningrad and its immediate environs. Ty
Bomba.
C3. Visegrad 4 2020. A hypothetical conflict
between the nations of the Visegrad group
(Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republics and
Poland) and Russia. Tensions have been rising,
and with the old NATO countries cutting
their budgets due to the continued economic
recession, a resurgent nationalistic Russia
attempts expand westward. The only thing
standing in their way is the Polish-centered
Visegrad group. The game has 176 large
counters (mostly brigades) set on a hex map
of Poland, Lithuania and Beylorussia. Rules
will cover cyberwarfare, Nato airpower, armor,
commandos and two different combat results
tables. David March
C4. Drug War 2020. The violence in Mexico has
spilled over into the US and hundreds of civilians
have been killed in a cross-border shoot out.
The public demands action and the US Federal
government sends in an intervention force. Can
the US defeat the gangland violence? The game
uses 176 large counters on an area map. David
March
C5. East Is Green. Similar to East Is Red Redux
(A8), but set in a near-future war between
mainland China and Russia. The two armies
will be shown in their presently emerging
organization, with corps breaking down into
brigades. Each side can mobilize special task
forces and rapid deployment formations.
Airpower can execute a wide range of missions,
such as attacks on enemy command-control
systems. There will also be an option for
cyberwar and the potential for US and other
Coalition intervention. The map will cover
northeastern China, eastern Siberia and northern
Korea. This will be one of a series covering
near-future operational-level warfare (to include
Great Game 2020, below). Joseph Miranda
5/11/12 4:25 PM
 C6. Great Game 2020. This will cover potential
Russian military operation in Central Asia with
several different scenarios. Several combat
results tables will show the differences in
national military tactics. There is also the
potential for use of tactical nuclear weapons.
The game will include a morale system that will
provide combat bonuses (when high) to national
collapse (when low). The game will provide
orders of battle for Russia, the various Central
Asian states, plus Chinese and US-Coalition
intervention forces. Cyberwar, terrorism and
special operations will be modeled via an
allocation of operational chits. The map will
cover Central Asia from the Caspian to the
Sinkiang and Afghan frontiers. Joseph Miranda
C7. Operation Arctic Circle. This game
assumes the Arctic ice pack breaks up in the
near future, leading to a scramble for resources
to be found on Polar islands and under the
sea. One side will be the Coalition, the other
a resurgent Russia. Units will include various
types of naval task forces (carrier, amphibious,
surface warfare) to which players can assign
assets (air units, expeditionary forces, cruise
missiles, etc.). There will also be land-based
aviation and ground forces, as well as the SOF.
Electronic warfare and satellite ISR will be vital
for acquiring enemy forces, and there will be
plenty of opportunities for surprise attacks. The
map will be a polar projection and include the
littoral of northern Russia, Canada, Alaska and
Greenland. Joseph Miranda
C8. China versus Africa. In recent years
China has been moving into Africa, buying up
resources and in some places taking control
of economic activities. This game posits that
leads to open warfare as African states attempt
to regain control. The Chinese player will
have an order of battle representing overseas
intervention forces, including rapid deployment
units and the growing Chinese Navy. The African
player will have a shifting alliance of forces
based on whatever states want to join in the
fight. There will be several combat results tables
reflecting high-technology, conventional and
guerilla approaches to warfare. Plus possible
US, European Union and Russian intervention,
as well as private military contractors
(mercenaries). The map will cover sub-Saharan
Africa. Joseph Miranda
SPECIAL EDITIONS (all of these
proposals are for double-sized games with two
ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 77
maps, two counter-sheets and up to 32 pages of
rules)
D1. No Substitute for Victory: the map
would cover the entire Korean peninsula plus
eastern Manchuria. The UN player would have
the option to go for total victory and bring
in additional US reinforcements, Nationalist
Chinese divisions and tactical nuclear weapons.
That would be tied into a Political Events
Table that could cause extremes of Communist
reaction, such as a major war breaking out
elsewhere. Units would be divisions with
regimental breakdowns. Air units would be
at group level, and there would be a range
of missions. Headquarters would bring in
the element of leadership, with HQ rated for
operational and tactical modifiers. Joseph
Miranda
D2. NATO 1950. What if Stalin had used the
Korean War to distract American attention to
the Far East and then launched an invasion of
Western Europe? NATO 1950 will explore the
possibilities of such a war, showing varying
orders of battle for that year via a scenario
generation system. The Soviets have strong
ground forces, but have not yet established
the Warsaw Pact and may have to deal with
uprisings in Eastern Europe. NATO is only a year
old and the West German Army hasn’t been
built up, while US divisions are understrength.
The NATO player will have access to US nuclear
weapons and long-range bombers for a tense
contest of atomic firepower versus Soviet mass.
The map will cover Central and Western Europe.
Joseph Miranda
D3. NATO Pentomic. What if World War III
broke out in Europe during the late 1950s? The
Warsaw Pact has superiority on the ground,
but NATO has the advantage on the nuclear
front. Units would be primarily divisions.
There would be special rules for US Pentomic
divisions, which were organized to operate as
battle groups in a nuclear environment. Atomic
weapons would be represented by counters
of varying mega-tonnage. Air units would be
represented by sorties, and include a range of
types including early USAF EW aircraft. Joseph
Miranda
D4. Search & Destroy/Grunt II. An update
of the classic old-SPI game on small unit
operations in Vietnam, expanded to cover other
actions during the Cold War. The game would
MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012
have two maps, one showing a typical jungle
area of operations, and a second showing city
terrain for urban guerrilla warfare. There would
be two counter-sheets with infantry squads,
individual armored fighting vehicles, and
intelligence and special forces teams. Airpower
would be in the form of markers for airstrikes,
helicopter gunships, and Puff the Magic Dragon
gunships. Enemy forces would be guerrilla
cadre, squads, and terrorist teams. There
would also be makers representing civilians,
arms caches, booby traps and intelligence
information. Combat is simple, but the player
will have to deal with intelligence, resupply, and
civilians. Scenarios will be from both Indochina
Wars, the Rhodesian insurgency, the Tupamoros,
the Contra War, and others. Joseph Miranda
D5. October War: Fighting on Two Fronts,
One map would represent the Sinai Front,
the other the Golan Heights. Units would be
brigade-level with battalion breakdowns.
Each side will have special rules to show their
capabilities. The Israelis will be more flexible in
organizing their units, while the Arabs will have
the initial advantage of surprise. Prior to initial
deployment, each side will pick special tactics
chits, giving them unique advantages in each
game (such as Egyptian Suez Canal crossing
ability). The game will include an option for
Battle for Germany-style play, with each player
commanding Arabs on one front and Israeli
forces on the other. Joseph Miranda
D6. Famous Divisions: 3rd Armored, 1988.
The next game in the Famous Divisions series
examines the first tactical encounter of World
War III: The elite Soviet 20th Guards Tank
Division against the US 11th Armored Cavalry
Regiment and 3rd Armored Division in the Fulda
Gap. From the material now available, and the
combat data from the Gulf War, FD3A examines
two of the best opposing forces of the Cold
War would’ve fared against each other. This
would use a variation of the Famous Divisions
rules used for Gross Deutschland (World at War
#20) and Guards Armoured (World at War #34)
featuring helicopter gunships, anti-tank guided
missiles, chemical weapons and more. Eric
Harvey
D7. Red Tide West examines a hypothetical
Warsaw Pact invasion of West Germany in
the 1980s. Players can explore questions such
as: would the Soviets have employed tactical
nukes from the outset? Would NATO have
77
5/11/12 4:25 PM
 Mega Feedback

detonated tactical nukes to stem the Warsaw
Pact’s invasion before being overrun? What if
the Soviets had employed chemical weapons?
Could NATO’s conventional forces have stopped
the numerous Warsaw Pact armies? How would
the Soviet client states have performed? How
thoroughly had either side’s command been
infiltrated by espionage? How successful would
the Spetznaz have been disrupting US airbases?
Could the US Special Forces hidden among
the population of East Berlin have disrupted
the Soviet supply network? Division-level
presentation, from Scandinavia to Italy, including
the entire order of battle of all NATO and WP
participants. Eric Harvey
D8. Tac Commander. Modern tactical Other Questions
operations. Units would be platoons rated E1. Regarding Special Edition frequency, should
for the standard firepower-range-defense- they be every seventh issue like Strategy
movement; but they would also have an & Tactics and World at War, or a different
acquisition factor, representing their ability frequency?
to gain targets and shoot first. Tank, Stryker,
infantry, SOF, guerrilla and many more units will a) Place the topics in their eras and run
be represented, as well as helicopter gunships, them as often as they are selected
UAV and airstrikes. Additionally, each player
would have a pool of Asymmetric Warfare b) Every 7th issue
chits. These would give them special abilities:
for example, insurgents might have IED, while c) Every 15th issue
conventional forces could utilize satellite
intelligence. Scenarios would be drawn from d) Only for very special issues (like
the Gulf Wars, the Russian incursions into the every 50th)
Caucasus, Afghanistan, and various “what if”
situations, such as a future NATO-CIS conflict, or e) Never
a war with mainland China. Joseph Miranda

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ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 78 5/11/12 4:25 PM

 Media Reviews

A Line Through the Desert, by
William Stroock (Booksurge Publishing,
2008). Reviewed by Chris Perello.
This is a novel telling the story of
Jake Bloom, a young American who,
seeking purpose in his life, joins the
army after high school. Assigned to
the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment
in Germany, Jake works his way up
to the command of an M-1 tank.
After Saddam Hussein’s invasion of
Kuwait in 1990, Jake and his crew are
shipped to the Middle East as part
of the Coalition buildup to eject the
Iraqis. Most of the book follows the
adventures of the tank crewmen during
Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
are presented with detail and accuracy
(a former tanker myself, I found no
flaws in Stroock’s descriptions). The
conversations among the soldiers –
what one might call “earthy” – are filled
with the humor and rough camaraderie
of men in harsh circumstances. Though
specific to an M-1 in 1991, many of the
events described would be familiar
to any veteran from any time.
Bookending the story of Jake in
combat are his adventures at home,
before and after his service. There
is an obligatory love sub-plot, but
Stroock also takes time to describe
the difficulty of a combat veteran
readjusting to the civilian world.
This is a fast-paced, well written


The operations of the tank crew- story that will remind veterans of
men, both inside their tank and inter- their experiences and introduce
acting with others in and out of combat, non-veterans to a different world.

The 14-Hour War: Valor on the
Koh Tang and the Recapture of the SS
Mayaguez, by James E. Wise Jr. and
Scott Baron (Naval Institute Press,
2011). Reviewed by Chris Perello.
Depressed and exhausted after the
Vietnam War, the American public at
first scarcely noticed a day-long battle
on a small island off the Cambodian
coast. There, Khmer Rouge fighters had
seized an American merchant ship, the
Mayaguez, and her crew. To recover
both ship and men, a Navy-Marine
task force was brought together for
insertion onto the island. The ship was
recovered quickly by the Marines, while
the crewmen were rescued from the
boat carrying them to the mainland.
Following the rescue the Marines on the
island were reinforced to create a safe
area from which they could be evacu-
ated. Most were gotten away safely,
but three were left behind (and were
later executed by the Khmer Rouge).
Throughout, the command of the
the seizure of the Mayaguez, the
formation of the rescue team and the
actual combat operation. That portion
is supported by eight superb maps
that include substantial text detailing
the operation. The next three chapters
describe the efforts to determine the
fate of the three Marines left behind,
including one chapter that combines
a present-day trip to the island by the
authors along with a considerable
amount of historiographic work.
The third part, consisting of a single
chapter that makes up nearly two-thirds
of the entire book, is a collection of
personal accounts by the men who took
part in the operation. Each reminis-
cence is preceded by a brief biography
(and for some a photo) of the veteran.
The action is told logically and
concisely, with complete maps that
dovetail perfectly with the narrative.
Separating the reminiscences prevents
their interfering with the flow of the
larger story and vice versa, allowing
the reader to experience each without

operation was muddled and distracted
by over-involved senior commanders
all the way up to the White House.
The book consists of three main
parts. The first seven chapters detail

losing the thread of either. Simply
put, this book has no flaws: this is
how history should be written.

MODERN WAR 1 | SEp–Oct 2012 79

ModWar1-Issue-v5F.indd 79 5/11/12 4:25 PM

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Stormin’ Norman Schwartzkopf | 1972 Easter Offensive in SVN | Russia’s New Military | SEAL Team Six vs. Bin Laden

MODERN WAR ISSUE #1

SPECIAL EDITION HISTORICAL GAME
99% of Americans try to avoid getting caught in traffic.
1% of Americans try to avoid getting caught in an ambush.

SEP - OCT 2012

#1 SEP - OCT 2012

STORMIN’ NORMAN SCHWARTZKOPF | 1972 EASTER OFFENSIVE IN SVN | RUSSIA’S NEW MILITARY | SEAL TEAM SIX VS. BIN LADEN
T:10 in
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