WEST END’S LATEST RELEASES! ie independence on carer: Pe ahr Ra ee tee ka ne mma are Ws kS Peace en eau rT ad ris State fe residents add appli ZipCode Fu ith st Front stood again on the brink of disaster. Only a tiny pat force lay between the Red Speatheads and the heart of Centra irae ae ao) eee erty Pee eter CeCe Re ra ia Yom Kippur 1973: In just 48 short hours, the Israelis’ confidence in Cae a ae meee ie) Creer et eRe ul ete tear re ery ana Cone ue ec err nr en ac ena eee Rae UL ae ee ae Care eat ered Bu en ndStrategy Ta In This Issue THE SOVIET NAVY... . From Coast Defense to Blue-Water Fleets Dr. John E. Jessup Soviet naval analyst John Jessup examines the growth of Russian naval power, from its earliest beginings under Peter the Great, to today’s worldwide Soviet ftilas THE ROAD TO ANTIETAM.................. The Battle of South Mountain Richard Berg ‘The desperate Confederate defense of South Mountain's passes helped delay McClellan's Union Army long enough for Lee to ‘regroup at Antietam. THE BATTLE OVER BRITAIN UPDATE........... p.48 David C. Isby Lessons in air combat leamed over Britain in 1940 remain relevant to modern ar forces. MAAR erie co o5 cine s,s Jd Raia, ste DES A 1983 Variation James Meldrum New aircraft, weapons, and scenarios are included for SPI™s popular AIR WAR” Game THREE-DIMENSIONAL CONFLICT IN THE PERSIAN GULF... . Game Profile Nicky Palmer English gaming expert Nicky Palmer looks at Vietory Games contemporary Persian Gulf strategic warfare game. WELLINGTON’S VICTOR’ AVARIANT INTERPRETATION................ p. 56 David J. Ritchie Misinterpretations of the Battle of Waterloo, as well as adcitional variants for SPT's WELLINGTON'S VICTORY™ Game, are featured. EXPANDED RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE. . Magazine Game Variants James Meldrum ‘S&T contributor Jim Meldrum offers additional variant rules and a campaign scenario for S&T’s RDF™ Game. FOR YOUR INFORMATION A. A. Nofi Iroquois combat uniforms, Hannibals elephants, ghost armies of World War Il, the First Soldier of France, politics of Panzers, and the Iran-Iraq war are featured in ths issue OUTGOING MAIL... . BEMRERS irises ined + Wo. wae ics MAGAZINE oft toe DEbe. ++ +p. 62 ‘leranaia, Va. curing the American Contrast with a modem Soviet kre guigedmssile culser, a3 portrayed by Parkinson. STRATEGY & TACTICS is a egstere raceme owned by TSR, In. (TM) ndeates other fradomars owned by TSF ne unless speciied Dragon Publishing Plo: Bor 110 take Geneva, Wt 59147 (a4) 240.8088 STRATEGY RTACTICS4 Stnrgeen tn Go US. her gee |S aes S40 sare ma Cou 5360 alta 83410 ah eran ment pect meyer sce mast econ allan. Pome ct mate ou 2 ‘agp Peg, PO. Bon HD Lake Gone, WI FALL 1080 OUTGOING MAIL D ESIGNING NOTES Readers of S&7™ Magazine will note some of the design changes we've implemented in the last three issues. Besides such obvious permutations as stretching the magazine tile across the cover for more balance, we've modified the department headings and typestyle for a more informational effec. While we may be doing some fine-tuning in design further on, the new look for the magazine is now in place. We plan to use ar. work for the front cover on a regular basis highlighting the issue's main article. ‘And with issue nr. 94, we should have all of our expanded editorial features in place We're seeking to give more space to those readers interested in the gaming aspects of Our historical boardgames with the MOVES” Gaming. Section, One feature reinstated in this issue is our ‘ew Letters colutnn. Back in the early days of SAT, letters were regularly published as a form’of feedback and input from readers, which is. why we're re-establishing. this feature. Letters should be about 200 to words in length, as space is a primary factor. Weld like to hear from our readers on the and articles in each issue, several other features we've instituted recently are the Modern Notes segment of FYI, and the Bibliographical Notes with most major articles. Modern Notes will focus on ‘current topics of interest, such as the Iran- Iraq War covered in this issue. Although we will not be able to offer as much information in depth as the old “For Your Eyes Only"™ col- umn did, we plan to publish original writing on modern subjects. Readers may have noticed ‘our small Bibliographical Notes at the end of Some major articles in the last few issues. We plan to offer these notes with every major ar ticle in the future, both for authenticity and for readers interested in following up with their own reading on the topic. General infor- ‘mation on major sources that authors used for their articles will be given, but as we are not an academic magazine, ‘etailed footnotes listing every reference wil not be used eral items which we stil need help fom our readers with are the Modern Notes and Footnotes segments of FYI, and the Feedback segment of the MOVES Section in SAT nr. 94. We've had a heavy response to ‘our call for writers in the first Special Edition, ‘with medium-length articles for the Data Files segment of FYI coming in at a steady rate. We still need short items of 20 to 500 words in length on any military anecdotal or informa: tional material for Footnotes, and the same sort of modem items for. Modern Notes. Readers. wishing 10 contribute such short items may send them into Dragon Publishing, where they'll be forwarded to AL Nofi. We wll bye rerating the last half of our Games Rating Chart in S&T ne. 91's Feedback when the issue is published this fall, for which we will need ur readers’ assistance in completing Dr. John E, Jessup leads off this issue With his history of the Russian and Soviet Navy. Having dane considerable research in the area, Dr. Jessup is well qualified to ex amine the Soviet Navy's antevedents and its modem influence in the work’s strategie balance. Richard Berg offers his analysis of the opening moves of Lee's Maryland Cam: paign, the battle at South Mountain and Jackson's siege of Harper's Ferry. Davi Rit chie re-examines the Battle of Waterloo and offers variants. 10. the soon-to-be-released WELLINGTONS VICTORY™ Game, while contribator James Meldrum offers. variants for the modernera AIR WAR™ and RDF™ Games. Additional features include Con tributing Editor David Isby’s analysis of the lessons ofthe Battle of Britain as they apply to the modem era, and English gaming exper. Nicky Palmer's profile on Vietory Games’ Gulf Strite™ Game. ‘This issues Outgoing Mail will elose with a note from our Art Dicector, Kristine Bar tyzel, who has helped changed S&T's look in the past few issues. Kristine comes to us from the Chicago area, where she earned = Graphics/Photography B.F.A. and was the an director fora fthography fim and a na tional consumer video magne. Her ideas and her work have already added some ex- cellent graphic elements to S&Ts pages. — Charles Ramsay A Word From The Designer Concerning. the recent format changes in SET, our goal is to create visual continuity Within the magazine, thereby strengthening its identity and direction. We have a publica- tion that offers a rather sophisticated level of information in the historical gaming. genre We are naw presenting that information in format that we feel enhances editorial content and further stimulates reader interest. We have graphically organized. the regularly appearing columns through the use of stan- dardized headlines, subheads, white space, and border rues. ‘The feature articles. wil contain more graphic support in terms of i lustrations, maps and tables. Uhimately we hope allthis makes the magazine more en- joyable and informative, so that you look fr ward to each sueceeding issue. — Kristine BartyzelDISPATCHES: Sp. Ed. Nr. 1 Kudos ‘Compliments on the S&T™ Special Edition Nr. 1, A great advance is forsaking the use of that damnable, nearly unreadable sans-serif type Simulations, Inc. loved to use for text Charts, photos and maps are also well used in the new format John Prades’ lead article and Richard am gatherum of games were also appreciate your offering 3 I" and errata for the DESERT FOX™ T started board wargaming in 1962 and began ordering from Simulations in 1969; Tin flad to see a venerable traiton preserved in your hands, (Clark. tevin Cape Elaabeth, ME “First Issue” Issue ar. 92 appears to be your “rst” issue Gssue nr. 91 and Special Edition nr. 1 have yet to show up atthe local hobby shops) and appears to bold up the past quality with only ‘one glaring (and major) problem, the rule hook! The Table of Contents listed Part 1 Part 2, etc. Fortunately there was enough room to write inthe headings. The inclusion fof photos, quotes, and large, empty. white areas seems to be there to pat the rules out toa pre-determined length. Rules should oc- ‘cupy the smallest area possible in a clear concise form. Film reviews in S&T and ARES — drop them! Films are adequately covered inthe local and rational press and on ‘TV. By the time your reviews run, the film has come and gone. In closing, Td like to say that I intend to purchase S47 and ARES on an issue-by Issue basis for at least the next year before eciding on a subscription, That should give you ample time to work out_ your format which is basically good, but needs fine tuning. Dale Dy Geay Calgary, Abert Bibliographies Wanted As a six-year subscriber to STRATEGY & TACTICS, may I take this opportunity to welcome TSR to the leadership of a fine magazine and to make the following sugges tion [As a stuxent of history as a hobby and in college, it bothers me no end to read “historical” articles in ST" that contain no bibliography. To the historian, an attra and interesting article without a bibliography is lke being served escargot. It may look and smell wonderful, but tastes horrible, What n attempting to say is that without bibliography and footnoting, iis impossible to reach a decision about the article's validity More than once, obscure, juicy tidbits from | S&T articles that would make a research paper really bardhitting have to be omitted because the only source that can be quoted is some wargame desig Dave Isby’s “Battle Over Britain” article has the best bibliography Tve ever seen in an ‘SBT (and one of the only), but it falls far short | of what The Chicago Manual of Ste calls for. | ‘Now is the time to make modifications in the ‘magazine (and indeed this is what is happen- | ing, tothe benefit of S@7) and inclusions such | as bibliographical data can only further benefit | the magazine by enhancing its scholarly credibility and its usefulness to its readers. an Bartlet | Madison, WL Sp. Nr. 1 Feedback Tjuat received SAT Special Eaton Nr. 1 and | T wanted to give you a little feedback on your | publication, First, Iwas aifetime subserber to SET under Simulations and although Iwas The average fourteenth century Pope spent about 60% of his not inconsiderable >The 12,000 British troops defending Boston against the American colonists during the winter of 1775-1776 consumed an of cially attested 468,750 gallons of porter and 95,000 gallons of rum. > During the Second Workd War the United States shipped twelve tons of arms, equip- ment, and supporting materiel for every soldier sent overseas; the U.S. then followed that up with an additional ton of ratios, medicines, clothing, ammunition, and miscel laneous supplies each month that the soldier was abroad, At The Hague in 1899, forty-four nations solemnly agreed by treaty to refrain from conducting aerial bombardments of cities. >The noted German military. theoretician Dietrich Heinrich von Bulow (1757-1806) believed thatthe optimal uniform for the com bat soldier was that used by the Iroquois In dans, a loineloth. > Kaiser Wilhelm I's fondness for uniforms was such that whenever he went to see Wagner's opera, The Flying Dutchman, he always wore his uniform as a Grand Admiral of the German Imperial Navy >The last pitched battle at which royalty commanded on both sides was at the Slivnt- 2a, 17-19 November 1885, when the Serbians under King Milan were soundly beaten by the Bulgarians under Prince Alexander Bat- tenberg. P Herbert Hoover's presidency (1929- 1933) has the distinction of being the only one in American history during which no major combat ship was added to the U.S. Navy. > The daily ration in the Swedish Army dur- ing the reign of Charles Il (1697-1718) was neatly two pounds of meat, two pounds of ‘bread, small amounts of peas, butter, and salt, and two and a half quarts of beer. When Satanta, a Kiowa chief of con: siderable talents, discovered that he had rusiled some distinctly inferior horseflesh from a U.S. Army remount station at Fort Lamed, Kansas, he dispatched a note to the post quartermaster expressing the hope that the Army would acquire better stock before his next visit. 6 PALL toe FOOTNOTES Hannibal And His Elephants ‘PERHAPS THE BEST-REMEMBERED ASPECT OF Hannibal's invasion of Italy during the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.) is the 37 elephants Which he took over the Alps. Elephants, of course, had been used in warfare long before Hannibal. Alexander the Great made them a standard part of eastern Mediterranean ar- mies after encountering them in India at the Battle of Hydaspes in 226 B.C. ‘The common military elephant was the Indian species, which stands about nine feet ‘or so at the ‘shoulder. The taller tropical African variety was unsuited for miltary ser- vice, having a bad temperament. Hannibal used some of the Indian species, but also used a different sort of African elephant. At that time there lived in North Attica a third species, the Mauretanian, which was somewhat smaller than either of his cousins, ‘This variety of elephant became extinct, as it was used to stock the arenas of the Roman ‘Empire in later years. The existence of this third species has been established only in re cent years, thereby clearing up some confus- ing passages in the ancient literature which quite clezrly state that the Afican elephant ‘was smaller than the Indian elephant, which is perfectly true in reference to the North African beast. Needless to say, whether the lephant bearing down on you isa twelve-foot African one, a nine-foot Indian one, oF merely sn eight-foot Mauretanian one, the impres- sion remains fairly terrifying. Which is precisely the point. Elephants were most effective against poory-trained troops, particularly when they ‘were unfamiliar with such beasts. They were particularly useful against cavalry, for horses had to be acclimated to the presence of elephants. Against well-trained and well disciplined troops, however, elephants were considerably less effective, even ifthe men had never seen an elephant before. And they could become a serious lability, for elephants were prone to panic, resulting in a stampede ‘over one's own personnel. For such even tualities, the driver was usually supplied with along spike and mallet, so that he could kil the rampaging beast with a sharp blow into the brain. Roman discipline being what it was, elephants didnot generally impress the Roman commanders, The Carthaginians had acquired some elephants from the Egyptians, who were nor- ‘mally their enemies. As the Carthaginians were concerned about rising Roman power in the Mediterranean, they dispatched an ex: pedition under Hannibal to Italy with some ln- dian elephants, but these do not appear to have been more effective than the Maureta- nan types, Hanmiba’s long march to tay from Spain was necessitated by Roman command of the seas. His army, about 50,000 men and 37 elephants strong, marched northward from Spain along the’ coast road to avoid. the Pyrenees. ‘They passed through southern Gaul with little difficulty, aside from some skirmishing with local tnbes. The Rhone River proved to be the frst major obstacle To cross the river, earth-covered piers were built out from each bank and large sturdy rafts were then constructed, also covered with ‘earth. The elephants were then led onto the pier and coaxed aboard the rafts, which were then poled towards the opposite pier. Some of the beasts panicked and fell off rafts during the crossing, but all managed to get across the Rhone safely. ‘The Alps proved to be a more serious obstacle, for their ruggedness and for opposi- tion from hostile local tribes, Surprisingly, all the elephants seem to have survived the ar- duous crossing, though many were weak and il as a result, At the Battle ofthe Trebbia in December, they performed some useful ser- vices by routing Rome's Gallic auiliaies, but they did not overly impress the Romans, who hhad encountered them before. Hannibal army then weat into winter quarters. During the winter of 218-217 B.C. Han- nibal’s army suffered greatly from weather ‘and from hunger. All but one of the beasts died, an Indian’ beast apparently named Surus; Hannibal rode her at Lake Trasimenus that April. She served with such courage that Cato the Elder termed her the best elephant of the war. This was the last occasion where elephants made a contsibution to the Car- thaginian war effort. During the long years when Hanniba’s army was campaigning in Ttaly, elephant reinforcements were sent from time to time, but they proved indecisive in action. In the end, indeed, elephants coo- tributed to Hannibal's defeat. At the Battle of the Metaurus in 207 B.C., Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal was totaly defeated, partially because his elephants ran rampant throughhis own ines. This disaster effectively isolated Hannibal in Italy, thus permitting a Roman army to invade Aftica and threaten Carthage itself. And in Africa, atthe Battle of Zama in 202 B.C., Hannibal's own elephants panicked and stampeded through his army, ‘hich greatly contributed to his defeat and to the end of the war. Signiieantly, the Romans made litle effort to adopt the elephant as a ‘weapon themselves. Sears The Ghost Army DURING THE SECOND WoRLD WAR ONE of the most, distinguished American Geld armies was the Fourteenth Army, which at fone point comprised some twenty divisions, including such noted outfits as the 6th and Sth Airborne Divisions and the 25th Armored Division. It is quite possible, however, that these outfits, alongwith such equally il- lustrious ones as the 14th Infantry Division, the 135th Airborne, the 22nd Infantry, or the XXQXT Corps, may not be too familiar to the readers. Thig would not be at all surprising, as none of these units ever existed except on paper. Allthese units, and many others, were part of the Allied effort to deceive the Ger- ‘mans as tothe true strengths of their armies, Altogether, the U.S. activated one army group (the “First United States Army Group"), one army, three corps, one armored division, five aitbome divisions, and fourteen infantry divisions during the wat for the direct purpose of deceiving the enemy; one further airborne and nine infantry divisions were of Scilly activated but subsequently not raised, a fact not passed on to Wehrmacht in: telligence. A total of thity nonexistent divi sions were officially a part of the U.S. Army, 4 paper augmentation of more than 30%. Strength of the Ghost Armies Type American British Total Army Group 1 Diet al Armies Se ah Corps 3 7 8 AB Divs 8 een Arm Divs 1 aes Inf Divs 23 7 40 Arm Bdes 0 Femi Inf Bdes 0 a 8 ‘The creation ofa “ghost” unit was dificult and complex. Indeed, it was almost impossi- bie, due toa peculiarity of U.S. Army regula- tions, which required the activation of new divisions to be on American soil. This had to bbe changed before any fictitious units could be created. US ghost units were not crested un- til 1943, by which time the British had been doing it for years. US units were sometimes assigned numbers which fitted logically into the existing order of battle. Thus the “46th Infantry Division” folwed neatly upon the existing 45th Infantry, while the “22nd Infan- tuy Division” did appear to logically precede the 23rd, or “Americal” Infantry Division (the ‘only real division to be activated outside U.S. territory during the war). Other ghost outits were given designations similar to those of ‘existing formations, resulting in a “6th Air- ‘borne Division” with areal 6th Infantry, and a “17th Infantry Division” alongside a real 17th Airborne. It was all designed to be as confus- ing as possible. Of course, to be confused, the Germans ‘had to find out about these units. A variety of techniques were used to assist the enemy in learning about the “addtional” formations. Double agents proved very useful in passing along falsified order of battle information to the Germans. Even real enemy agents could be tricked into serving the Allied cause in this way. At one point a certain popular magazine, Which shall remain nameless, was assisted in running a lavish, fll-color spread of current U.S. military insignia, “including army shoulder patches. Inserted among authentic “ patches were the insignia of various “ghost” formations. The magazine issue was officially recalled before it was distributed. A few copies were “inadvertently” distributed, and are worth a tidy sum today. One such copy fended up in the files of German intelligence, ‘where it was perused with great interest Reinforcing the deception, an enterprising capitalist actually manufactured samples ofall insignia, including ghost units, in hopes of get- ting the contract. Other tricks included using newspaper society columns to print phony ‘marriage notices of officers allegedly assigned to ghost outfits. Some ghost formations actually had per: sonnel assigned. George S. Patton himself commanded the U.S. First Army Group for some time in 1944. This unit was “concen- trated” in eastern Britain, a pact of the cover plan for D-Day, as it was well sited for an in- ‘vasion of the Pas de Calais. Some of Patton's assigned divisions were real outits randomly assigned to the area, but most were fakes. By the eve of the Normandy invasion, most real ‘units were moved out, “new” fake units hav- Jing been created in’ their pice. Britain's Guards Armored Division remained with him right through D-Day on the theory that the Germans would expect this unit to be in the spearhead of the invasion, which is precisely what happened, Patton's units each had a few hundred men assigned. Some were signal corps personnel, assigned to simulate a divi- sions worth of radio traffic by sending all sorts of messages back and forth. Some messages were double deceptions, for they were not only designed to convince the Ger- ‘mans of the existence ofa particular division, but also to reinforce thei impression that the invasion would come at the Pas de Calas other messages merely dealt. with the trivaliies of military lfe. Engineers made up the balance of Patton's troops, since they ‘maintained the elaborate dummy installations necessary to convince aerial reconnaissance ofthe presence of large formations. These in- stallations included inflatable tanks, guns, and trucks; Potemkin-style barracks ‘and other buildings; and various specialized pieces of equipment, which were to simulate the noise and dust generated by real units in camp and in training. The British used several techniques which the Americans id not use. They would ‘occasionally “create” a new division by the simple expedient of redesignating an existing one, which was then kept as a dummy head- (quarters, as was done when their 77th Divi- sion became the 45th. They would also designate training and holding formations as divisions, as with the latter two units. In ad- tion, the British would sometimes designate a territorial command with few or no combat ‘oops as a division, as was done on Cyprus, thus; creating the “7th Infantry Division”; it ‘was given three notional brigades, two of which had the same numbers as outfit on dis- tant colonial postings. Finally, units were shuffled between the British and Indian Armies, thereby thoroughly confusing efforts to trace the assignments of particular outfits then and even today. How successful were these efforts at deceiving the Germans? Apparently, quite successful. On a worldwide basis the Ger- ‘mans were tricked into believing that the Alles had nearly 60 divisions more than was STRATEGY ATACTICS 7“At the outbreak of war in 1914, Australia vowed to fight ‘to the last man and the last shilling.’ ” in fact the case, overestimating American strength by 20% and British strength by a remarkable 70%, representing something lke ‘a million additional combat troops. Before D-Day, the Germans overestimated. the buildup of Allied divisions in Britain by more than 40%, believing that there were some 85, 0:90 infanry and armored divisions as well as 7 airborne divisions, when the actual figures ‘were 35 and 3. It was an effort well worth the expense Historical Note: Although none of the host outfits ever existed except notionaly, some of them do have interesting stories at tached. The U.S. 15th Airborne Division, as well as the Gist, 62nd, 68th, 72nd, 7rd, TAth, 105th, and 107th Infantry Divisions, were all orginally intended to be real units; they were ofcally activated in January 1943, but were never raised. American Sgures could be increased by one cavalry division, the 2nd, which was inactivated in Morocco in 1943, but which remained in the German records until the end of the war. Seven American ghost units (two airborne, one armored, and four infantry) were supplied with dummy equipment while under assign- ‘ment to the U.S. First Army Group. British ‘ghost units inciuded the “Polish 7th” and the “Greek 1st” Infantry Divisions, as well as a “15th Motorized Division.” British infantry ivision figures should be raised to 18, since the Germans somehow retained the 18th In- fantry Division in their records as an active ‘outfit in the Far East long after it had been captured by the Japanese at Singapore in ear- ly 1942, Dummy equipment was supplied to nine British ghost infantry divisions, one air- borne division, one armored division, and one armored brigade. On D-Day, the U.S. First ‘Army Group had under its command the following ghost units: two American airborne divisions, one armored division, and four in fantry divisions; one British airborne division, ‘one armored division, and two infantry divi sions; plus two-and-a-half real divisions, as well as the entire United States Ninth Army. Politics of the Panzei Distribution of Mobile Division Wehrmacht, 1933-1945 THE POLITICS OF THE THIRD REICH included the possibility of armed struggle for the suecession, should anything happen to Hitler. As a result, private political armies sprung up, notably’ the Waffen-SS and the Luftwaffe ground forces. While these never amounted to more than 10% of total German ground divisions, they did amount to an in- creasingly large proportion of Germany's available mobile combat divisions: panzers, panzergrenadiers, motorized, and parachute tits. These were the hardest-hitting outfits available; in any political puisch, they would Politics of the Panzers: than any qualitative considerations. hhave been the “praetorian guard” for any potential Fubrer. Thus, before 1938 virtually hone of the available ground forces were in private armies, but by 1943 the total had risen to 12.6% of divisions available, and fully 82.6% of the mobile divisions, Thereafter the Palitcization of the mobile force increased markedly. By the end of 1944, after the ‘Army's abortive 20 July plot against Hitler, the private armies amounted to only 12.4% of total divisions, but fully 45.1% of the mobile divisions. Ultimately, these _politically- oriented “elite” units were a drain on German military effectiveness. ‘They were usually overly large, and almost always overequip- ped. The units frequently performed in an elite fashion due to these quantitative, rather Distribution of Mobile Divisions in the German Armed Forces, 1938 - 1945 Totst Year Divisions anny Net Mob 199528 1 38 1 1000 199640 3 78 3 1000 19371 8 195 8 1000 193851 13 255 13 1000 199918518 S 1980 © 23595149 OS wos 281 4157 37 892 123278140 488.1 94783183 97608 9a 019 88185 368 B10 1985 375 81k a2 80D 8 FALL 1089 Mobile Division Distribution WAFFENSS —LUFTWAFFE Ratio fh Ae opm - - 10 ~ = 10 7 = 10. = = 10 2 fe 7 3 - 1081 fees gat econ zt 1895842 13-20 «10 189 4 21 13) 8B 184 The Australian Arm: From Colonial Times to the Present AUSTRALIA'S MILITARY HISTORY BEGAN withthe British Marines, who came with the first fleet to man the’ penal colonies on Australia's eastern coast. By the 1850s, the Australia colonies began to win self- government, resulting in the withdrawal of the last British regiment from the continent by 1870. To fil the gap in defense forces, separate local forces were raised by each col- ony. The need for 2 uniform defense force was one of the factors that prompted the federation of the separate colonies into the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901. ‘Australian forces had been sent overseas even before federation, In the 1860s more than 2,500 men had been recruited from Australian colonies to fightin the Maori wars in New Zealand. New South Wales sent 750 men to the Sudan after the fall of Khartoum in 1885, but they saw litle action before being quickly withdrawn. In 1899, all the colonies sent volunteers to South AMfica to fight in the Boer War, where the 16,000 volunteers saw some action against the Boer trekkers. Six Australians were decorated with the Victoria Cross. ‘On 1 March 1901, the federal govern- ment took control of all former colonial forces, merging them into one national ser- vice. Compulsory training was passed into law in 1909 and the Royal Miltary College was established in 1911 at_ Duntroon ‘Australia had strong ties with Great Britain ‘and at the outbreak of war with Germany in 1914, vowed to support the mother country ‘to the last man and the last shiling.” A 20,000-man volunteer expeditionary force was quickly raised; on 1 November 1914, the first ships left for Egypt, accompanied by ‘New Zealand troops. ‘After training in Egypt, the Australian and New Zealand (ANZAC) troops. became part of the Allied attempt to force the Dar- danelles in 1915. The invasion was partly to ‘threaten Constantinople, but was also an at- {tempt to open up a supply line to keep Czarist Russia in the war. On 25 April 1915, ANZAC and French colonial troops landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula in the Dardanelles to liminate Turkish forts guarding the strategic nurows. The Allied forces were unable to dislodge the Turks after eight months of bit- ter fighting, and were evacuated by the end of the year. Nine Australians were awarded the Victoria ‘Cross, including. seven of ‘whom received it for the attack on Lone Pine in August 1915. In 1916, Australian infantry divisions moved to France and saw heavy fighting in battles for Pozieres, Mouquet Farm, andAUSTRALIAN ARMY FROM THE MAORI WARS TO VIETNAM wan SERVED DEATHS OVERSEAS SATTLE OTHER ‘Maori War (18808) 2,600 4 na Sudan (1885) m= 1 Boer (1899-1902 16,463 274 tk World War One 981,761 58,999 4,860 World War Two! geet 18.991 1,873. Korean War 1065727716 Malayan Emergency 7,000 6 2 Confronta: tion 3,500 6 9 Vietnam 40,207 41480. Bapaume. In 1917, they fought at Builecour, Messines, and at Passchendaele, suffering heavy casuals. After recuperating, the Australian divisions were rushed back into line to help stop the German offensives of March and Apel 1918, halting them twice at Villers and at Bretonneux. The Australians frst went onthe attack at Hamel (withthe US 33rd Division) on 4 July, at Amiens on. 8 ‘August, and then at Peronne and Mont St Quentin atthe end of August. The Hinden- burg Line was broken in mid-September; the ‘Australians fought their lst action on 5 Oc- tober, having remained an all-volunteer force throughout the war and having earned an ad. ditional 83 Victoria Crosses. In the Sinai and in Palestine (1917-1918), Ausralan mounted division fought at Gava‘and at Beersheba in 1917. At the end of September 1918, with the “Turkish lines broken, the mounted divisions thrust through Pestine and captured Damascus, before Turkey signed an armistice ‘on 31 October 1918 In 1999, Australia again raised an expedi- tionary force, which was sent immediately to the Middle East. Three Australan divisions ‘aw action in the Western Desert, Greece ete, and Syria during 1941. The 6th and 7h Divisions were dapatched to Australia after Pearl Harbor, but the Sth Division, having held Tobrak in 1941 during an eight-month siege, was kept fr the battles around El Ala mein in late 1942, before returning home. In the Japanese offensives into southeastern Asian early 1942, the Japanese southern ad ance was finally halted on. New Guinea, Within 40° miles of Port Moresby, when Australian troops pushed them back across the Owen Stanley Range. Advancing along the Kokoda Trail the Australians took Gona ano belped the US 32nd Division take Bura in January 1943. Australians figured in other WOUNDED & INJURED TOTAL. TOTAL BATTLE OTHER TOTAL 4 2 ee 1 3 one ssi 588 588m SOB 1,828 58,059 ‘New Guinea campaigns, fighting on the Huon Peninsula in 1943 and at Madang and Hansa Bay in 1944. During 1945, two divisions were involved in mopping up in New Guinea, while another two were clearing out the Japanese ‘on Bougainville and two more were landing on Borneo. Seventeen Army personnel won the ‘Victoria Cross in the Westem Desert and in the Pacific. Postwar military commitments resulted in the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regi- ‘ment being sent to Korea in September 1950, later joined by the regiments other two bat- talons. All battalions saw heavy fighting dur- ing the Chinese breakthrough at Kapyong in ‘Apel 1951. Meanwhile, British and Malayan ‘troops were fighting a bitter campaign against Malayan communist guerrlas. From 1955 to 1960, Australian batalions helped clear hard- core ‘guerrila areas in the Malayan jungles. During the Malaysian-Indonesian confronta- tion of the early 1960s, Australian troops hhelped defend northern Borneo when Indone- sian guerrlas began raiding Sabah and Sarawak. The confrontation ended in 1966, ‘but a battalion remained in Malaysia for some years. In July 1962, an Australian training team was sent to Vietnam, followed by the {st Battalion, R.A.R, in 1965. Eventually three Australian batialions were committed to the Asian conflict, operating in Phuoc Tuy province with both military operations and civic action programs. The Australian Army Training Team alone won four Victoria Crosses, Australian units began to phase out of the conflict in 1970, ending their commit- ment by the end of 1972. ‘The Australian Army was reorganized in 1973 into three functional commands: Field Force, Training, and Logistics. = Anthony Staunton DATA FILES The First Soldier of France ‘THE REIGN OF LOUIS XIV SAW THE TREMEN- ddous expansion of French power in Europe. France gained large tracts of land in Spain and Austria in the Netherlands, Alsace, Franche-Comte, and Italy, this being ac- complished by’ force of arms. In. these endeavors, the Sun King was assisted by Some of the greatest military minds France has. produced. Conde, Luxembourg and Vauban rank high on the list. But even these ‘great soldiers: must take second place to the First Soldier of France, Henri de la. Tour D’Auvergne, known to\ history simply as Turenne, the first Marshal-General of France, “Turenne was bom on 11. September 1611, at Sedan. As a boy be showed an in- clination for soldering, so after his father, the Lord of Sedan, died in 1625, Turenne was sent to Holland to earn the art of war under his uncle, Maurice of Nassau, the greatest captain of the age. Turenne served as a private soldier in Maurice's Dutch army, fighting aganist the Spanish inthe epic Eighty Years’ War (1566-1648). When Maurice died in 1627, his brother Frederick Henry made Turenne 2 captain; the new officer distin ‘guished himself at the siege of Bois-le-Duc. In order to have his family retain some autonomy over Sedan as it came under French control, Turenne joined the French Army in 1629, He was immediately confirmed in the command of an infantry regiment at nineteen, already a seasoned campaigner. For the next eighteen years, he was involved in the convulsion known as the Thirty Years’ War. Turenne first served under Schomberg and later with Frederick Henry against the Spanish until 1634. After being sent to Lor- rain, he served under La Force, and led the storming party that captured the fortress of La Motte, This exploit earned him a promo- tion to Brigadier General, a rare event for a ‘member of the Protestant faith serving inthe army of Roman Catholic France. After the Franco-Swedish allimce of 1635, Turenne served in the French Army of the Rhine, under Cardinal de La Valette. When the inva- sion of the Palatinate ended in failure forthe French, Turenne commanded the advance sard during the retreat. ‘After a brief sojoum in Flanders, ‘Turenne went to the Franco-Swedish Army of Alsace, commanded by the brillant Ber- nard of Saxe-Weimar. In 1638 the army in- vaded southern Germany. The object of the campaign was the strategically important for- tress of Breisach. The campaign was brought off briliantly, with Weimar conducting the STRATEGY TACTICS 9“Louis XIV made Turenne Marshal-General, to give him authority over all other marshals.” siege, while Turenne commanded the cover- ing force. During this campaign he was wounded for the first time. The following year, he went to Italy to give French aid to Savoy against Spain. He remained in Ttaly ‘until 1641, being wounded 2 second time while there. The next year saw a personal tragedy for Turenne. Because of his brother's treasonous intrigues against the French King Louis XIII, and his minister, Cardinal Richelieu, Turenne’s family lost ail infuence over Sedan. This was offset the following year. After being recalled to Italy after ‘another short stay, Turenne went to Paris and received his Marshal's baton from the ew minister, Cardinal Mazarin, on 16 November 1643, and. immediately found himself with a new assignment. He was 32 years old, ‘Turenne's task was to rebuild the French Army ofthe Rhine, which had been shattered by Imperial and Bavarian forces at Dutlingen earlier in the year. He was joined by Conde, who had wrecked the Spanish Army in a brilliant victory at Rocroi, It fell to the two premier soldiers of France, Conde, with Turenne under him, to rebuild the Army of the Rhine and retrieve the situation, Taking the offensive, the two generals began the ‘campaign of 1644 by driving back the Imperial Army, under Bavarian General Mercy, through the Black Forest to the important fortress of Philipsburg, which fell on 9 September. The country between the Rhine and the Moselle was occupied. The French strategic position restored, Conde headed back to France, leaving Turenne to guard the region with 10,000 men. ‘The 1645 campaign began well for ‘Turemne, as he surprised Mercy by crossing the Neckar River and invading Franconia. But ‘Turenne was not the only one who could play trick upon the enemy; ater a clever ruse, Mercy launched a surprise attack upon the French Army at Marienthal, and beat ‘Turenne badly. Extricating only a few thou- sand men from the disaster, the defeated Marshal fll back to Philipsburg, where he ‘was reinforced to 14,000 men and was able to check the enemy's progress. In July Conde arrived, bringing 7,000 more men. With this powerful army, Conde and Turenne decided to recapture the initiative before the end of the campaigning season. After driving the Im- perial and Bavarian forces back, the French attacked and defeated them at’ Nordlingen, Conde, with Turenne under his orders, won @ great victory by decisively beating Mercy, who was killed in the battle. As Conde fel il, Turenne could not exploit the victory to the fullest due to a lack of supplies. Logisticaly strapped, he fel back on Philipsburg, hotly pursued by the new Imperial commander, Ar- 10 FALL 1983 chduke Leopold. After checking Leopold in front of the fortress, Turenne stole away, crossed the Rhine, and took Treves, restor- ing the deposed Elector, who was a French ally ‘The Swedish alliance promised to bear fruit for the 1646 campaign, as a Swedish army under General Wrangel and French army under Turenne were to operate in a coordinated campaign into Hesse. Although heavily outnimbered, both commanders decided to take the offensive. The Franco- Swedish forces crossed the Main River at Frankfurt and headed for the Danube. Wrangel captured Rain and laid siege to ‘Augsburg, while Turenne covered the opera- tion. Archduke Leopold tried to raise the siege, but Turenne, with briliant maneuver- ing, captured Landsburg, Leopold’ supply base, thus gaining a bridge over the Lech River and a clear path to Munich. Shaken, Bavaria signed a peace treaty with France on 1d March 1647. Turenne wanted to carry the upcoming campaign into Austria, to bring the war to a successful conclusion, but was dissuaded by Mazarin, who feared that this would disrupt peace ‘negotiations between Paris and Vienna. A last-ditch Imperial offen- sive was repulsed by Turenne in May, thus Jending weight to the French position at the talks. The Peace of Westphalia the following year ended the Thirty Years’ War. This did ‘not _mean peace for France, however, as Spain was. not a signatory of the treaty, France stil had to conduct an interminable series of campaigns against the stil for- midable Spanish power, An internal series of power struggles, known as the Fronde, fur~ ther disturbed the French peace. Cardinal Richelieu died in 1642, with King Louis XII following him a year later. The new heir to the throne, Louis XIV, was a boy of five; the government was in the hands of the Queen Mother, Anne of Austria, and Richeliew’s scheming successor, Cardinal ‘Mazarin. When high taxes and financial scan- dals. caused a revolt in Paris, the French Parlement took over, as the royal family led to St. Germain. Conde, seeking to put down the revolt, besieged Paris with 8,000 men, while Turenne, a8 a supporter of Parlement, tried to draw the Army to the side of the rebels, Mutinies broke out among the troops; Turenne had to flee to Holland to await events. At this point, however, events took a confusing turn, Parlement, in order to pre- vent the nobles from taking power and return- ing France to a state of feudal anarchy, made peace with the royal family. The nobles revolted, but were quickly quashed, Conde himself being dragged ignominiously off to prison in Paris. Offended at this outrage, ‘Turenne concluded an agreement with Spain to attack France and free the imprisoned nobles. He undertook an offensive, at the head ofa Spanish army, towards Pars in 1651, but was soundly defeated at Rethel by Mar- shal du Plessis Praslin. Having made peace with the royal family, Parlement now ine trigued, with the court's support, against the ‘capable, hateful Mazarin, who fled into Ger- many. All imprisoned nobles were freed and Turenne returned to France. For services rendered during the Thirty Years’ War, his family was given new lands in compensation for the loss of Sedan. Taking advantage of the peaceful interlude, Turenne married Charlotte de Caumont, the granddaughter of his old commander, La Force. Unfortunately,” this peaceful interlude was short-lived. Negotiations to end the war ‘with Spain filed, and soon France was once ‘again in the throes of revolt. In early 1652, Conde was denied the post of governor ofthe province of Guyenne, He revolted, taking ‘many French nobles with him, and he con- cluded a pact with Spain. Archduke Charles of Lorraine also joined the fledgling coalition Louis XIV, now considered an adult at age 14, recalled the indispensable Mazarin from exile jn Germany, which caused Parlement to revolt, Meanwhile, Conde was busy raising the south in revolt, entering Bordeaux in September 1652. With Spanish aid, he raised an army and marched to the Loire, eventually entering Paris with 30,000 men. ‘To oppose Conde, Turenne and Marshal Hocquincourt had only 12,000 men. Turenne saved the royal cause by defeating Conde at Gien and by driving him back into Paris. After checking the Archduke of Lorraine's invasion, Turenne then drove Conde back into Luxembourg. Louis entered Paris triumphantly in October 1652, thus paving the way for eventual ab- solutist Bourbon power. Conde and the Spanish invaded Picardy and Champagne in 1653 from the Netherlands, but were checked by Turenne, ‘who launched an offensive of his own, taking Rethel and Mouzon in the process. Next year Turenne laid siege to Stenay. Rather than march directly to the aid of the city, the Spanish instead besieged Arras. Turenne took Stenay and then attacked the Spanish at Arras, infieting 7,000 casualties and driving them back to Cambrai. The victorious Mar- shal finshed the season by taking Quesnoy, Binch, and Maubeuge. ‘The 1655 campaign was relatively quiet, with only three towns Landrecies, Conde, and St. Ghislain) passing from Spanish into French hands, In 1656, Turenne and Marshal La Ferte besieged Val- Gennes, being routed when Conde and the Spanish’ Army came to the aid of the city. With La Ferte captured and the campaign afailure, Turenne retreated to Quesnoy; he recaptured some lost ground by taking La Cappelle later in the year. With both sides nearing exhaustion, the decisive campaign of the war seemed to be at hand. Spain took the offensive in 1657 at St Ghislain. Turenne tried to counter by laying siege to Cambrai, but was forced by Conde to raise the siege, Turenne began to receive English reinforcements, as a result of the Anglo-French alliance of March 1657, and ‘once again took the offensive, capturing St Venant. With the French teasury empty and the soldiers unpaid, Turenne helped hold his army together by using his own gold and silver plate to pay the soldiers. With the army intact, Turenne beyan the decisive campaign of 1658 by taking Mardyck and by besieging Dunkirk. A Spanish relief force under Don Juan and Conde was attacked on 14 June 1658 by Turenne at the Battle of the Dunes. After four-hour battle, Turenne routed. the Spanish, inflicting Some 4,000 casualties Dunkirk fell 11 days later; Turenne followed up this victory by taking Ypres, Menin, and Dudenarde. Exhausted, Spain sued for pea ‘The Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659 ended. the war. By the terms of the treaty, France ‘gained the rich province of Artois. To ensure Peace, Louis married the Infanta Maria ‘Theresa of Spain. In addition, Conde was restored to all his positions and titles in France and was made governor of Burgundy. On 4 April 1660, Louis XIV made Turenne Marshal-General, to give. him authority over all other marshals, except for Louis himself and for Conde, who was a Prince of the Blood, ‘This episode changed all too quickly in 1667, as France renewed war with Spain asa result of the death of Philip IV of Spain in 1665. According to the laws of inheritance in the Spanish Netherlands provinces. of Flanders, Brabant, and Franche-Comte, a father's possessions devolved upon the eldest child upon his death. As Louis’ wife was the eldest child of Philip 1V, the Sun King claimed that these provinces devolved upon her, ig noring the fact that she had renounced any claim to the Spanish throne, With negotiations failing, Louis decided to enforce his claims by force of arms, in what became known as the War of Devolution, Louis secured Austria's neutrality and then invaded Flanders with 35,000 men in 1667. Although the King was nominally in command, the real leadership was exercised bby Turenne. Accompanying them was a ‘Beyear-old engineer, Sebastien le Pre better known as Vauban, Ina lightning ca ppaign, Louis captured most of Flanders, Dutch attempt to form an anti-French coal tion was quelled by French diplomacy. Mean while, Conde subdued the Franche-Comte with ‘the rarest of seventeenth century nilitary operations, a winter campaign. in a mere three weeks. The Peace of Aixd Chapelle ended the war in 1668, the gains in Flanders being retained. Louis now resolved to crush the Dutch Republic for its in- terfevence in the late war. The King and his ‘war minister, Louvois, frst secured English support and then raised what for those days was a huge army of 130,000 men, This was divided into three commands under the King (ceally Turenne), Conde, and Marshal Lux- cemburg. Three French Marshals, Bellefonds, DHumieres, and Crequi, were reduced by Louis to liewtenant-generals for their refusal to obey Turenne’s orders. Opposing them was the Dutch Army under 22-year-old Prince William of Orange, later King Wiliam 11 of England, ‘The opening moves of the French Army in 1672 against the Dutch went well. After clearing the lower Rhine, French units penetrated deeply into Holland, even taking Unrecht. But with decisive victory almost within their grasp, the French committed two itreparable blunders. The first was with prisoners; some 30,000 Dutch soldiers had been captured early inthe campaign and were ransomed back by Louis for two crowns per hhead. For 2 miserable 60,000 crowns, the Dutch bought an army. The second blunder was with fortresses, Turenne and Conde urged open campaigning in the fields, to win battles and to gain maneuvering. room. Louvois demanded that all captured for- tresses be garrisoned, which became a com- siderable drain on French manpower and slowed the advance to a crawl, To add to the French mistakes, the Dutch broke their dykes, completely flooding the countryside, and alo enlisted Austrian aid. The promising French start for a quick ‘campaign now threatened to become a major war. The campaign of 1673 was the most frustrating Turenne ever fought, He was sent tothe Rhine to fight against the Austrians, led by their best commander, General Montecuc coli. Hamstrung by Louvois’ picayune policies, beset by shortages of troops, sup- plies, and everything except enemies, ‘Turenne coyld do nothing, Montecueco crossed the Rhine, drove back the French, and took Bonn on'12 November. The year was a complete fiasco for the French. As a result, the next campaign opened with Turenne in a defensive role, While the King attacked Franche-Comte, Conde would bold Flanders and Turenne would guard the Rhine at Alsace. Upon learning that the Austrian Army under Bournonville would join with the Duke of Lorraine's army, the Marshal- General decided to prevent the junction with ‘bold offensive, After crossing the Rhine on 11 June, he quickly gathered a small force ad set off in pursuit ofthe Lorrainers Following Conde's vietory at Seneffe in Flanders, Turenne was reinforced to some 20,000 men. He was faced by some 40,000 Lorrainers and Austrians. With the odds heavily ayainst him, he stil managed a stalemate on his front for four months. Upon learning that the Alles were expecting fur. ther reinforcements from the Elector of Brandenburg, Turenne decided to repeat the strategy of Sinzheim. After a cheeky flank march, he surprised the Imperial Army under Bournonville at Enzheim, and drove them back after a bloody fight. Although reinforced by Brandenburg, the Allies decided that the ‘campaigning season was over and sent their ‘troops into winter quarters, Turenne now executed us master- stroke. Seeing that he would be heavily out- numbered in the spring and would be forced buck into France, he decided to drive the Allies out of upper Alsace with a winter cam- paign. Leaving Hagenau on 4 December, he marched upon the enemy encampments by ‘way of Epinal and Belfort, using the Vosges Mountains to sereen his movements. His sud. den appearance at Belfort threw the Allies into complete confusion. Bournonvile, hastily assembling his army, attempted to take up & position near Turkheim. Turenne attacked on 5 January 1675 and completely shattered the ‘enemy, who fled across the Rhine. For the ‘campaign of 1675, Turenne had an army of 25,000 men. Matched against him was bis op- onent of 1673, Montecuccol. Unfortunately for Turenne, the campaign did not last long. On 27 July’ 1675, while making a recon- naissance near Sasbach, Turenne was kiled by a cannon shot. {All France mourned his death. Louis said hhe would rather have lost two battles, or 20,000 soldiers, than to lose Turenne. STRATEGY@TACTICS 1Although he had wanted a simple funeral, Louis decided otherwise. He had the Srst Marshal-General buried with all appropriate honors at St. Denis, in the same chapel with the Bourbons. Turenne’s heart was removed and sent to the monastary at Cluny, where it was preserved as a relic for 150. years. ‘Turenne'’s popularity as a French hero has lasted ever since. The best example of this occurred during the French Revolution. In 1793, a raging mob broke into the chapel of St. Denis and desecrated all the royal graves, leaving untouched only the grave of Marshal- General Turenne, the First Soldier of France. = RL. DiNardo MODERN NOTES The Iran-Iraq War ‘THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, WHICH IS ‘ow in its third year, is st once the largest, bioodiest, and. most important conventional War in the world today, with tremendous im- plications for the stability of not merely the Persian Gulf region, but also for the entire world. The ostensible cause of the war is a Aispute over control ofthe Shattal-Arab, the ‘estuary of the combined Tigrs-Euphrates Rivers, which came into Iranian hands under ‘an agreement dating to 1975. There is also a shadowy Iragi claim on Khuzistan, the most southwesterly of Iran's provinces. This dispute is complicated by historical, ethnic, and religious antagonisms going back cen- tuties. The immediate cause of the war ap- pears to have been the Ayatolah Khomein's Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, which resulted in the apparent disintegration ofthe Tranian armed forces, as well as in the dissolu- tion of previously close Iranian-American ties (US military aid to Iran from 1972 to 1979 ran to about $13 billion). ‘This appearance of military weakness and international isolation presented Iragi President Sadem Hussein with an opportunity to secure the coveted waterway and oil-rich province; to curb Iran's Islamic fervor from spreading to Iraq; and to provide an external focus for growing internal dissatisfaction with his regime. Accordingly, ater a series of “border incidents” in 1979 and 1980, Iraq denounced its 1975 agreement with Iran as having been concluded under duress, and invaded the bordering country on 22 September 1980. Iraq attacked along a 300-mile front stret- ching inland from the headwaters of the Per~ sian Gulf, Initial Iranian resistance was weak and Iraq secured important gains all along the front, taking the important ety of Khorram- shahr and isolating the vital oil center of ‘Abadan. However, Iranian resistance stiffen- 12 FALL 1983 ‘ed rapidly. Tens of thousands of fanatical nilitiamen were thrown into the fight and large numbers of imprisoned, cashiered, or exiled officers were returned to duty’ or volunteered for service Gncluding Prince ‘Reza, the late Shah's son, though he was turned down). Fierce resistance soon stemm- ced the Iragi advance; the front stagnated, with the Iragis holding a strip along the fron- tier averaging about 40 miles wide. Both sides dug in, and positional warfare began. ‘Neary a year later, Iran launched a series of counter-offensives which succeeded in clear- ing Tragi forces from most of Iran by May 41982. Iran then sought to carry the war into Iraq. In July of last year a massive offensive was launched, though for only small gains a8 Iragi troops resisted fiercely, Iranian offen- sives of November 1982 and February 1983 also proved proftless, Since February there thas been considerable activity, inchding massive artilery duels, but no large-scale of- fensives. The conflict appears to be degenerating into a war of attrition roughly ‘The tran-iraq War at a Glance* Sreeeaeeemten ell se vranian Seay Religious strongman Diciaforhip Gitatarenp Population 23,000,000 1,600,000 GNP ‘$112 Billion $39 Billion ‘not reflect lovses lar percepia saan boast Sard dng war, Muitary Budge(1980) $4 Bilton $8 Billion ee erate eo i area. Muitary Manpower** 450000 atin ones (% of popultion 33 Soon near ‘The Ground Forces inaiduon tan Slows ene ‘Active Manpower 275000 aoog00—~—an —~«Cad Ne tle Tanks ino 200 5) Romeo eee Other aFV ao e200 21 dann wh ation 1285 00 toa ‘aaa th fniTank ? ? ma Santawtrars anivaierat 1200 1200 151 lehman eter ae The Air Forces a ae whet sone ‘Active Manpower 95,000 37,000 1A vec Fighters foos250) 300 Bomber ° 1 at and pra Mise ale 119 118 1 persnel No gree Armed Helicopters 178 P) 201 Reva be sora Other Helicopters 486 % on a eee ars pate Theliarat lated undor the arms ‘ative Manpower 10600 7500 Tai leone ene a one so 2 tingents with their 3 ° = are eel Pagan : 1 a1 Seow Nate ‘Submarines: 1 - Le thnalatpoy a Patol Voss @ 2 Ze teal Landing Vessels 10 3 1 ceeenigta tag Minewarfare Vessels 9 5 1.81 nee Hovereratt 17000 rom Jorcan. Talbert A Noft“A war fought with 1980s equipment, 1917 tactics, and 14th century mentalities.” ‘long the line of the old frontier, with Iran holding some hundred or so square miles of tragi soil, Casuaities have been estimated as approximately 100,000 dead, 200,000 wound: ‘ed, and 50,000 captured on both sides. The war will go on for some time, Neither side appears. interested in a negotiated settlement and both appear con dent that a military victory is. possible. Ukimately, Iran is potentially far stronger than Iraq, but its internal problems are much greater. Moveover, Iran's expulsion of American personnel in 1979-1980 has meant much of its military equipment is unfit for combat, including some 250 fighter aircraft — ‘many of these Grumman F-148 — since the Americans did most of the maintenance. In addition, Iran is far less able to replace equip- ‘ment Jost in combat, having become increas- ingly isolated in the world community. As the war is costing both powers a blion dollars o more per month, mutual exhaustion is likely to be the only outcome; that conclusion could take years to realize. ‘Meanwhile, the danger of the war spreading into neighboring regions. remains be one of those nights. Included in the basic set Book 1 The complete rules including character generation for infintey, paratroopers, and rangers. Book 2. Play aid includes; 30+ pages of encounter tables, and 200+ NPC's Book 3. Three full length ‘missions and four short 4 incidents, Charts and Dice. Retail : $2 Damn, it’s going to BEHIND ENEMY LINES™ FASA P.O. Box 6930 Chicago IL 60680 ‘eat, for most ofthe Arab states ofthe Gulf, ‘concerned over latent Iranian claims on their territory, are supporting Iraq. They have been joined by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Moroc- 0, and Jordan (which has also sent troops). Iran, meanwhile, has few friends and has recently so alienated the Soviets that they too have ceased supplying equipment, a practice they began soon after Khomeini seized power in 1979, This leaves only Syria (which has its ‘own reasons to disike Iraq), North Korea, and Libya openly in support of Iran. Covertly Iran is believed to be receiving ad from Israel and possibly from the United States. The pre~ Sent state of the worlds oil supplies has minimized the global impact of the conflict, and neither side has made any effort to in- terfere with the other's ol trade. There does exist the remote possibilty of a Soviet American clash in the region, but this is related less to war than to Soviet intentions concerning Iran. Of course, should Iran seek to spread the conflict to the ol states on the southem coast of the Gulf, US intervention might be necessary, which in turn, could prompt a confrontation with the Soviet Union. is FASA’s new World War II role~playing game. Missions can range from historical actions to events that could only happen in the movies, Neither side in the coniict has demon: strated particular skills in arms. Despite the fact that both possess some of the finest mechanized equipment in the world (raq's ‘material is largely Soviet in origin, while Iran's is American), they have made little use of maneuver, although the Iraqi counter- offensive which halted Iran's February ‘83 rive appears to have been a mobile blow Iran's increasingly eritical equipment shortage has resulted in the use of il-equipped, hal ‘rained militia as infantry. While such troops were useful in stemming the intial Iragioffen- sive and inthe protracted defense of Abadan, they have been frequently committed in fron- tal assaults having litle effect, except in great slaughter, Meanwhile both sides have taken to launching airstrikes on each other's cities, usually for terroristic rather than for military reasons, though so far both have refrained from deliberate efforts to ruin each other's ex tensive oil installations. The situation is, as ‘one analyst put it, "A war fought with 1980s ‘equipment, 1917 tacties, and fourteenth cen: tury mentalities, = Albert A, Nob steaTeGyaTacrics 13THE SOVIET NAVY: From Coast Defense to Blue-Water FleetsSe eg eae ere es reas Seer reat er ert er reer fr vere by Dr. John E. Jessup Atter Oleg’s novel “naval” rad, there is little of interest recorded about Russian ac tivities at sea until the first quarter of the eighteenth century, when Peter the Great set ‘ul to establish the foundation upon which the history of his nation’s maritime traditions ‘would be built. Of all Peter's endeavors, none interested him more than the sea and ship bulking. In 1683, Peter boarded the 12-gun yacht Sinato’ Petr Saint Peter) at Archangel land put to sea to escort a convoy of Dutch and English merchantmen on the passage through the White Sea. Peter, his crew, and his one small craft constituted the entire Russian Navy at that moment, but it was a beginning. Intent upon having a Navy, the Tsar returned to Archangel the following summer with more than twenty barges of sunpowder, other weaponry, many casks of beer, and his rinking companions, some of whom he pro moted to admiral, A new ship, the Seyato! Pavel (Saint Paul), was launched and Russia had a two-ship navy. Peter's experiment in naval affairs almost ended in disaste however, when the Siyaioi Petr nearly foundered in a heavy gale, His deliverance from the sea in 1694 held with it the prophesy 4 great part of his briliance would be in his Navy. More than anyone who had gone before him, Peter manifested Russia's urge to cconteol the sea, a desire that was effectively blocked by the nature of Russia's geography and by the hostility of Russia's neighbors, The powerful Swedes controlled. the Batic, while the Tatars impeded Russian ac cess to the Blick Sea; in the far north, the White Sea passage to the Arctic Ocean was blocked by ice for many months of the year Of these “enemies,” Peter chose to attack the least formidable — the Tatars the first to feel the Russian bear's claws, However, in deciding to attack the Tatar for tress at Azov, Peter led his nation into its second war with the Ottoman Turks. In 1695-1696, the Russians built a fleet at Voronezh, sailed it down the Don River inthe pring of 1696, and then attacked and. cap tured the great fortress at Azov in a combined ‘Although it was not the ter had sought, ar the importance at strategic victory tha id confirm to the T Soon after, Russia entered into the Nor then War (1700-1721) against Sweden. This struggle culminated in the Treaty of Nystadt (30 August 1721) which, among other things, gave Russia access to the Baltic and established it as a major European power. Early in that war (1703), Peter took steps to establish a new town at the mouth of the Neva River, which he called St. Petersburg (Petrograd), after his patron saint In addition he fortiied an island, later to be called Kronstadt, that guarded the new town. T island would become the major naval base of Russia. Peter was able to secure these gains during’ the war by building a fleet and ‘defeating the Swedes at Hango (or Gangut) in PETER THE GREAT 1714, thereby seizing control of the Gulf of Finland and ending Swedish domination inthe Baltic, This was confirmed several years lt at Nystadt. The Russian bear had indeed learned haw to swim, Peter’s Successors PETER THE GREAT DIED IN JANUARY 1725; with him passed! Russia's interest in naval af airs. Little was done to retain a fleet and the t Peter had lavished so much of his personal energies upon were allowed to fall and disrepair. Russia was suc cessful, however, in naval engage against the Swedes at Helsingfors in. 1741, and at Aland in 1743; but this attested n to Sweden's weakness than to any Russian strength, And when Russia entered. the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) as Sweden ally and as Englands and Prussia’s enemy, it iad only 20. ships-f-the-lin -ombat. wing been found unseaworthy and Russo. Swedish-Danish squadrons that commanded the Baltic did so because of British preoc ions elsewhere in the great struggle for against France. But the effect of those ‘ence played an important role ships available. for an equal number in the lind war, as combined Russian and Austrian armies were able to maneuver without fear of surprise of English landings along the Baltic coast. England's eventual sucess in the war can be credited in part t the death of the Russian Empress Blizabeth (ued 1741-1762) and to th nephew, Peter Ill, to the theone was pro-Prussian and in Russia out of the war. After six months on the is short reign, took throne, Peter III was overthrown in a palace revolt and was replaced by Sophia of Anhalt. Zerbst, who took the name of Catherine I sreateovaTactics 1ing the briliance of Peter I's rule, including a refurbishing of the Navy. As in the time of Peter's rule, Catherine depended _upon foreign leadership for her Deets. Russia's old ‘enemy and new friend, England, supplied a ‘number of naval officers to the Tsarina. Others also came to serve in the Navy, pro. Dably the most famous of whom was Jobn Paul Jones, the American naval hero, appointed as 4 reat admiral by Catherine. Jones was osten- sibly to command naval forces in the Black Sea, but soon found himself the target of court intrigue; he resigned two years after his appointment, Before that, however, Jones was able to add to a growing list of Russian naval vie- tories. The victories had already begun in 1770 when a Russian squadron, sent into the Mediterranean to help incite revolt against the Ottomans, frst captured Navarino (April 1770) and then defeated the Turkish feet at Chesme (6 July 1770), near the island of Chios. Although Admiral Aleksei Orlov was in command, it was the actions of his assistant, the Scottish Admiral Samuel Greig, that were largely responsible for the suecess. John Paul Jones’ contribution came in 1787 when the Turks declared war on Catherine series of provocations. On 17 and 27 June 1788, Jones fought two battles at Liman near the mouth of the Dnieper River inthe Black ‘Sea and defeated the Turkish Black Sea Fleet ‘under Hassan-el-Ghasi. Inthe second engagement, the Turks lost 15 ships to Russia's loss of one frigate. Only 18 Russians were killed as compared to more than 3,000 ‘Turks lost in that battle, Jones’ resignation in 1790 was the result of jealousy over his suc- cesses. It serves to point up the discord- ancies in Russian Imperial politics and poticy- ‘making that plagued the Navy and which eventually helped bring an end to the Empire itself. 16 ALL 1088 Ithas been clearly demonstrated in many historical studies that the rise of Russian naval power was directly connected with the revolution in commerce that attended the last part of the eighteenth century. Although this ‘was not as apparent or as impressive as might be discovered elsewhere with other nations, the Russian growth was nonetheless quite visible, Russia did, after all, have the necessary natural resources to build naval vessels, even though such necessities as oak timbers had become scarce and far removed from the shipbuilding facilities. Many ships were built in Russia in this period with inferior ‘materials, especially from “green” wood, which greatly shortened a ship's service life. But Russia's greatest shortage was in trained ‘manpower, not in ships. Vessels, even war- ships, could often be purchased abroad. The real problem was in the recruitment of skilled olicers and trained crews, a shortage which lasted wel into the nineteenth century The Napoleonic Era ‘THE DEATH OF CATHERINE THE GREAT IN 1796 marked another turning point for the Russian Navy. Her son Paul I, who would rule ina state of schizophrenia from 1796 to 1801, ordered two squadrons into western waters, ‘one from the Baltic into the Atlantic and the second, with Turkish permission, through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean. ‘The Baltic Squadron joined with a British naval force, captured a number of Dutch warships and Landed an Anglo-Russian force in northern Holland. Napoleon's violent reaction to the landing, plus the inactivity of the forces ashore, eventually led to. the fleet’s withdrawal to English territory. For the Rus sian Navy, the lessons learned during this period were quite simple; their ships were too cumbersome and their crews wete 100i et to keep up with the British. This fact, perhaps, played a role in Paul's decision to withdraw from the war as England’ partner. In 1807, when Alexander I (1801-1825) was on the’ throne, the winds of war had shifted again; now Russia was France's ally against England. When a British let sailed into the Baltic in the speing of 1808 with the ship-of-the-ine Victory carrying the pennant ‘of Admiral Sir James Seumarez, the Russian Fleet was held in check. In May'the Russians ‘dd manage to land 2 small force of about 1,600 men for a short time at Gotland, Other Russian moves during the spring and early summer also failed; when the British and ‘Swedish squadrons finally met the Russian Fleet in August 1808, the Russians. were forced to flee, only to be overtaken by the faster British ships. One Russian vessel, the Vsevelod, was run aground and destroyed before the remainder of the Fleet could sail under the protection of the guns of the Kronstadt fortress In the Mediterranean, a Russo-Turkish ‘squadron of about 23 ships sortied in October 1798 to eject the French from the Ionian Islands. The combined force was under the command of Vice Admiral Ushakov and by March 1799, had captured all the important French bases, including Corfu, Two months later, another combined squadron under Rear Admiral Putoshkin established a blockade of the important Italian port of Ancona. At the same time, Ushakov used his ships to blockade the ports along the hee ofthe Italian peninsula. While these operations were im- portant, Russia's real contribution to this ‘campaign was a force that landed near Foggia, marched across the Italian peninsula, linked up with Italian partisans and British marines, and helped in the capture of Naples. When war flared up again over France's refusal to relinquish Malta to the Knights of St. John (the stands return to them had beenpromised by Paul 1), Russia reinforced its light squadron inthe Mediterranean from the Baltic Fleet with a large force under Admiral Senyavin. At that point, the Russian flotila based at Corfu numbered about 25 ships, in cluding nine ships-ofthe-line. Senyavin then carried out a number of successful opera: tions, occasionally disobeving the T: forders while doing so. Subsequent even bore out Senyavin's wisdom and Russia soon controlled the Adriatic. Senyavin was about to ‘extend his area of operations to screen the Tonian Islands, when word arrived that Russia and Turkey were once more at war 6 November 1806). On 30 June 1807, Senyavin engaged and defeated a slightly larger Turkish fleet at Lemnos. The battle atually extended over a period of several days, with ‘mote than half the Turkish warships sunk Russia then found itselfn the unusual position ‘of having its victorious fleet blockaded in the ‘Aegean Sea by the English who, having leam- ced ofthe Peace of Tusit (7 July 1807), decided for obvious reasons nat to allow the Russians to sail back to the Baltic. This situation lasted until 1812 with the French invasion of Russia. Tn the meantime, however, Senyavin was held in disgrace for his failure to obey the ‘Tsar's orders. It was not until after his death in 1831, when a new Tsar (Nicholas I 1824-1885) sat on the throne, that Senyavin received the honors he properly deserved. When Napoleon did invade Russia in 1812, English concern quickly shifted to the Tkelfhood that the Russian ships in home ports would be seized by the French. The British moved to evacuate the Russian Fleet out of the Baltic to British ports. Napoleon's retreat from Moscow removed that danger however, and only a part of Russia's Baltic Squadron deployed to England, where it serv- ed until Bonaparte’s fall in 1814. By 1818, when the Russian Fleet was called upon again to fight, it was found to be in state of total disrepair. Under the terms of the Holy Aliance, Spain asked for assistance from Russia; but the Russian squadron of cght ships that was dispatched had to return home when six of them proved to be unseaworthy. Russia again sent ships to join Alied formations in 1827 when, along with the British and French, the Tsar moved to in- tervene into the Greek War of Independence (1821-1832). At Navarino (20 October 1827), the Allied force destroyed a heavily” ‘outnumbered Turko-Exyptian fleet while both forces rode at anchor. ‘The outcome probably decided Greece's claim to independence, but the question of whether it was a true naval victory is stil debated. Russian warships con- tinued operations in support ofthe Greeks un- til 1831, but litle of interest occurred. In 1833, however, the ever-changing, political alignments in Europe found Russia in an allance with its erstwhile enemy, Turkey. ‘When the Egyptian Pasha, Mehmet Al, rose against the Sublime Porte, the Ottoman tan asked Russias help in saving Constan- tinople. The Tsar dispatched naval forces and Janded 12,000 Russian troops near the en angered city; Mehmet Ali found himself ‘obliged to withdraw. This aid led to the sign ing of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (8 July 1833), that gave Russia some control over the Straits, The Russo-Turkish peace would last another twenty years, until war once again erupted. The Crimean War ‘Tuls CONFLICT BEGAN BECAUSE OF SEVERAL disputes: jurisdiction in holy places; unreasonable Russian demands; and an equal ly unreasonable Turkish obstinacy. Turkey declared war on Russia on 4 October 1853. Two months later, on 30 November 1853, a Russian squadron composed of six ships-o- “At Navarino the Allied force destroyed a Turko-Egyptian fleet. The out- come probably decided Greece's claim to in- dependence.” thetine, three frigates, and a number of smaller craft under Admiral Pavel Nakhimov attacked and destroyed a Turkish Meet a chored at Sinope, on the southern coast of the Black Sea. This brought an almost immediate reaction fom the British and French, who saw that any quick Russian vietory over the Turks would lose them their share of the almost moribund Ottoman carcass. On 4 January 1854, British and French naval units entered the Black Sea to protect Turkst shipping and the Turkish coastline, to ensure that the “Eastern question” would not be set- tled in Russia's favor. Another Anglo-French squadron sailed into the Baltic; all sides were ‘now in position to begin waging the Crimean War, one of the most incomprehensible con- fits in history ‘As soon as the Anglo-French fleets ar- ‘ved with their superior guns on the two sides of Russia, the Russians wisely scurried for cover in the fortified harbors. The Aled feet in the Baltic spent its time shooting up Russian coastal towns, accomplishing litle ‘more than a tactical annoyance. Strategically, however, the presence of this Anglo-French force, with its capabiity of landing large bodies of troops almost anywhere along the Baltic coast, required the Tsar to hold in that ‘region almost 200,000 troops who could have been put to better use in the Crimea. On the Black Sea, the story was much the same, with Alied bombardments of a number of Russian coastal cities, including Odessa (22 Apeil 1854). More seriously, the Allies blockaded the Danube River, depriving the Russians of one of their important com- ‘munications routes to their forces operating in the Balkans. A greater problem was in the lack of Russian naval activity against even the large, uncoordinated movements ofthe Aled landing force from the Bulgarian coast to the Vicinity of Sevastopol. Instead of putting to STRATEGY TACTICS 17sea 1o Fight, the guns and mien were removed from the Russi sips, which were. then scultled to black the entrance to Sevastopl harbor. hough this incient was ertiized, it may’ have been the only feasible thing to do. “The defeat suflered by Russia in the Cr mean War was underscored by its poor sbow ing a sea, whch pointed out the need fora thorough overhaul ofthe naval establishment ‘This revamping was begun as soon #8 Alex ander Il (1855-1881) ascended to the throne dn appointed his younger brother, the Grand Duke Konstantin, as the Minister of Marine Notonly would Konstantin evamp the fleets but he would ako enunciate 2 new naval pay that would have far-reaching effects, In 1856, Rusia had a total of 96 steam. screw ships, of which 50 were warships ony 15 of those were ft for deep-water opera. tions, The rest of Russia's ships were sal- powered. By 1863, through Konstanin's forts, 190 adational steam driven ships were stile tothe Imperial naval inventory. Many sang ships remained al ofthe steamers stil Carried ailiary sas, even inthis new age of steam, a8 sais gave the steamers a grealy- increased cruising range. Konstantin also fathered together the est officers in the Feussian Navy to study bow best to employ the Flet, should war loom once again om the horizon. Out of theve efforts came the convic- tion that the Russian Fleet was simply too weak to take on the Brish and French Frets, Possibly one, the officers decided, but never both, With England and France warm ales, a new course of action had to be found ~ ‘commerce riding. By 1859, the notion of raiding had been accepted as the framework for using the Navy asa deterrent force. The Russian Navy in America WueN THE PoLES HOSE UP IN 1863 70 protest the injustices they had sufered under the tyrannical Tsarist rule, the Navy's plan wos put tothe test, Both Briain and France, desirous of sting the po in their own favor, issued demands about Poland that took the form of ultmatums threatening tiltary in tervention, With that incentive, the Tsar ap- proved the deployment of oth the Bali and Pacific Squadrons to American ports for the diration ofthe emergency. This was done to obviate the chance that these ships could be bottled up in their home ports (as had happen- ein the Crimean War) and to put them ina postion to attack Brish and French commer Sal sipping, should war beat ‘The two squadrons arrived almost simultaneously at New York and San Fran isco in September-October 1863. The Rus Sians created great excitement among the “American populace, wearied bythe American Civil War that was rang and bythe fact that no other major power ad shown any Irie Ship toward the ‘Union cause,” The news spread rapidly that an allance had been con- thided between the United States and Im- Derial Russia; no amount of disavowals would fend the rumors. Russia's deterrence ploy ‘worked so well that i was not unl 1395 tbat 18 FALL the full truth of this strategy became known in the United States, or for that matter, in Russia. Throughout most of that period Russia and America were the closest of friends. All did not go well forthe ships involved in the Russian Fleet visits of 1863, The largest warship in the world, the Generalnyy Admiral, was away from her home port and didnot ‘accompany the deployment, while ‘most of the ships stationed inthe Balti could not be made ready for sea. The one-ship Mediterranean flotilla did deploy from Cadiz without diffeulty, but the remainder that of the Baltic did so with leaking fitting sails, and numerous other tmalfunctions, not the least of which was an almost immediate outbreak of scurvy among the unseasoned crews, The Pacific Squadron performed somewhat better, but the first Russian ship that entered San Francisco harbor rau aground and sank and the crew had to be rescued. The presence of the Russian war ships on the West Coast heartened the Americans, who feared a visit from Con: federate raiders at any moment, even though the fear was unfounded. Admiral Popov, the flotilla commander, did indeed instruct his ships to fight ifthe Confederates: appeared and vas chastised for his brashness by his government. This was one of the clearest in dications that there was no such treaty, but few wanted to believe the truth, soit was ig nore From the standpoint ofthe Russian Fleet of the 1870s, the great wooden ships of the past were now totaly useless; new ironclads had to be built to take their place. Fist, Russia built a number of batteries that were Similar to. the older ships-of-the-line in weapons placement, with guns positioned to fire through ports on both sides of the hull Later, turret ships were built with fewer heavier guns that could be trained on either hheara, Two ships built during this period re- mained in commission until wel into the twer- lieth century, Another type of Russian war ship that was developed during these years ‘was the Popovka-cass floating ports. These ships were completely circular in construction and were almost totally unseaworthy, even though they were nearly invulnerable to a direct hit. When the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 broke out, the two Poporkas were the only Russian warships of importance on the Black Sea, Once again Russian ingenuity showed itself, however, and a numberof fast ‘merchantmen were converted into mother- ships for groups of steam-driven torpedo boats. On the Danube River, torpedo boats of this type proved highly effective against the ‘much more powerful Turkish river fois, As an insufficient mmber of launches were available to the Russians, they com= ‘mandeered Rumanian vessels, put Russian officers in charge ofthe crews and went offto battle. Subsequent accounts ofthe successes they achieved have failed to credit the Ruma- nians with any part ofthe victory. In other ac tions on the Blick Sea, the Russians alsows- ce torpedo boats. and employed the “ish torpedo.” a type similar to the present-day ‘weapon in sinking a Turkish warship. ‘Although the Russians. decisively defeated. Turkey in the wat, the Great Powers assured themselves tha the Tsat would not gain from his victories, The resul- tant Treaty of Bertin (1878) denied Russia smack of its ast rewacds and was the result of Englands threat of warts wishes were not granted. This threat was manifested inthe wer of the Briish Fleet, which the Rus Sans. could not bope to overcome, As a rest, Russia established 21-year pln, than 1882, co bud anew, powertl feet, to be the match of any inthe word, This pan ewisioned the construction ‘of twenty bat- tleships and abou twenty-four cruisers, pis 4 number of fighter, upto-date vessel pecially, Rusia planned that ts eet, along with those of i alles, could probably gain mastery of the seas, This notion Was translated into realty as the frst power alignments ‘of the twentieth century paced France at Russ side against the growing threat of Imperial Germany. “Among the more important aspects ofthe ee? plan was the introduction of the sib- tmarine into the Russian Fee. Ths steam driven boat was not «(rue submersible, asi ‘could not move wile submerged it dd have {Wo torpedo tubes, however, and carried four torpedves, The craft was bul for Russia by the Engish, based upon Swedish specica- tions. The sub sank ons way to Russia just after it was completed and was never really tested, From this beginning, a. sizable Undersea force came into being that as flteay operational when wat broke in 1908 between Japan and Russi, The Russo- Japanese War “TW FACTORS THAT LED To JAPAN'S ATTACK ‘on the Russian squadron at Port Artin February 1904 are wel-recorded elsewhere Suffice o say tha, when Russia seized Port. Arthur from the Chinese in 1898, it also in ‘agurated a new balding program to reinforce its let with eight balleships, seventeen raisers, and more than fly destroyers and torpedo boats. These vessels were the prin {Spal strength of the Russian Navy against Japan inthe Pacific. “The war began on the night of # February 1904, when the Japanese ciied outa sur prise naval attack by sending ten destroyers ‘against the Russian First Pace Squadron an- chored at Port Arthur in Manchuria. ‘Three Russian ships were darsaged in the fst a tack, wich was followed by a heavy bon Barden and blockade of the harbor by the forces under Admiral Hehachiro Togo. The next day, another Japanese task force attack fed Inchon harbor in Korea, destroyed two Russian cruisers, and landed troops in the port city- War was offcialy declared on 10, Febuary. During the following months, Rus- sian warships sorted out of Port Arthur, vith litle suecess. Finally, on 13 Ape the Rus-sian squadron flagship Petropaclonsk sank with all hands after striking amine) thereafter, all Russian ships remained in por Te might be noted that a Russian admiral was put in overall charge of the Eastern war and Promptly set about, through sheer in ‘competence, tolose any advantage that might have acerued to a more stable commander. In ‘August, on direct orders from the Tsar, the Port Arthur Squadron attempted to break out and make a run for Vladivostok. The Russian sroup had six battleships, five cruisers, and assorted smaller components. Togo overtook the Russians, sank a number of their ships, and compelled the remainder to retum to Port Arthur. Four days later, on 14 August, the Vladivostok Squadron was attacked in the Korea Strats. One ship, the cruiser Rurtk, was sunk and the remainder scattered, To right these wrongs, the Tsar ordered the Baltic Fleet to sal for the Orient. The leet was put under the command of Vice Ad-~ nial Z.P. Rozhestvensky, a court favorite. ‘The Fleet itself was in poor condition, with ‘numerous mechanical problems. and’ with inadequately-rained and. pooty-led crews, ‘The logistics of the planned trip alone would have made the most seasoned mariners quake. Among other factors, the Fleet would have to replenish its coal supplies underway something that had never been attempted helore. To provide meat, live cattle would be tethered on deck, As a final problem, the RUSSIAN CAPITAL SHIPS IN SERVICE 1905 No. CLASS. TYPE POWER BUILT REMARKS. 1 Knyaz Pozharski Control baltery Steamsall_ 1870. Out of service 1907. 1 Mino Tureamord Steamanl $878. Sunk io Wold War 1 charoauka (Coast lense! Steamisall 1968. Out of service 1907. 2 Admiral Lezarer Coast delensel Stearsall 1868-70 Out of service 1907. 2 Admiral Chichagow Coas! delensel Steamisall 1870 Out of service 1907 1 Petr vei Turret Steam 1876. Out of service 1922. 5 Etaterina Bemette Steam 1880-4 One takan to Bizerta 1920; ‘emainger out of service ‘oor 2 Imperator Alexander li Barbettoturot Steam 1891 Out of service 191825, 4) Drienadsat Apostolov —Garbette Steam 1892. Out of service 1911, 1 Navarin ‘Turet Steam 1896 Sunk 28 May 1905 at Teushima, 1 Ta Syyattete ‘Tonet Steam 1898, Out of service 1922. 1 Sessol veike ‘Tunot Steam 1896. Scultled Tsushima 28 May 1805, (2) Admiral Ustakor Coast detense Steam 189590 Tivge sunk at Tsushima 28 May ‘Batioship 1008; somminger oot of sonic Yoa0'38 One unidentiien. 3. Petropavovsk Battleship Steam 1600 cera 3. Age anuory 688 Pottare ‘era 1 Rostisiev atteohin Stam 1698 Sank n 100 Poresviet Battleship Steam 1901.02 Osuabia sunk Tsushima 26 May ‘Gost Pereswet sunk 8 January 1817; Pobiege scrapped 1922. 1 Pantetinen Battleship Steam 1903 Serappod in 1922. + Retvsan Battleship Steam 1901 Sunk n target practice 1824 1 Tsessarevitch Battleship Steam 1908. Scrapped in 1922. 1) Boresino Battleship Steam 190305 Thvee sunk Teushima 28 M: 1808, one Sunk 7 Octover ne scrapped 1922; one Siicontfos “Historians call it the greatest battle of annihilation since Trafalgar.” Russians believed that they would be subject to attack by the Japanese as soon as they left their Baltic ports Finally, on 15 October 1904, the great expedition got underway, with their destroyer Seren chasing off any ship that cut across the force's path. This fear ofan attack by Japanese torpedo boats in the North Sea Jed to the Dogger Bank Incident (20-21 Oc- tober), in which the Russians opened fire ona soup of English fishing smacks out of Hull and Grimsby, damaged one trawler, and killed several fishermen, Great Britain reacted im- mediately and war was a distinct possibilty ‘Thereafter, the Roval Navy shadowed the Russians southward until they cleared the Bay of Biscay, At the entrance to the Mediterranean, five warships sailed for the Suez Canal, while the remainder continued south around the Cape of Good Hope. ‘The two groups met at Madagascar, crossed the Indian Ocean, and headed up the Pacific for Vladivostok. ‘The twenty-five ship otlla, known as the Second Pacific Squadron, ‘entered the Tsushima Strats (Korea Straits) ‘on 27 May 1905 and there met with Admiral Togo's fleet of four battleships, eight ‘cruisers, twenty-one destroyers, and sixty torpedo boat Tn the action that followed, through the remainder of the day and into the next, the Japanese lost only three torpedo boats and about 1,000 men, The Russian losses includ- fed all but one cruiser and five destroyers, some of which were interned by the Americans after they limped into Manila. ‘More than 10,000 Russian sailors were lost Historians accurately claim this aetion to be the greatest naval battle of annihilation since Trafalgar. Within one month of this terrible Joss at Tsushima and as a part of the general unrest in Russia, a mutiny broke out aboard the Kniaz Potemkin Tavricheski. ‘The Potemkin Incident, as it became known, took place on the Black Sea. It has several versions, none of which are probably very accurate. The primary reason was, without doubt, the poor treatment ofthe ship's company by indifferent ollicers mote interested in discipline than in the welfare of their men. This episode was followed by another several months later, when sailors at the Kronstadt naval base in the Baltic mutinied after the arrest ofa group of soldiers ofthe garrison, who had attempted to present a petition of their grievances to their commander (26 October 1905). Both i uprising and the Potemkin Incident were short-lived, but they signalled what lay ahead, Unfortunately for the Tsar, he and his ad visors failed to recognize the warning. Russia did not directly participate in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the Navy had lle to do except continue ‘its. tortuous recovery from 1905. The Russian Navy now had to contend with the “democracy” of the Duma (Parliament), in addition tothe capriciousness of the Throne. Russia was nearly bankrupt and the resources necessary for an ambitious naval construction program were extremely hard to come by. Stil, in 1909, four keels were laid down for the 23,370-ton Gangut-class battleships that took the worst of Italian and Russian designs and combined them into totally unsatisfactory ships. These were followed by four 32,500-ton Borodino-class dreadnought. in 1912 that were cumbersome, but years ahead of anything else alloat. New-design cruisers and destroyers also enteted the Russian naval inventory as Europe girded for the coming war that appeared to be inevitable. Russia also worked as diligently as it could in learning the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War. One of the most important lessons was the value of 2 good mine-warfare doctrine, from which ‘grew the development of the world’ first rminelaying submarine and an improved type of naval mine. STRATEGY A TACTICS 19World War I and the Revolution WHEN WAR CAME TO RUSSIA IN r014, THE Borodino-class hulls were incomplete and they, along with most of the current ship con- struction, were lirgely unfinished when the ‘Revolution took place in 1917. Allin all, about 98 surface ships and submarines were stil under construction when the Monarchy fel Russia went into war with an obsolescent [Navy and faced a German Navy said to be se cond only to the British Fleet. Even more damaging was the fact that each Fleet was placed under the command of the regional ar my commander. In the Balti, for example the Fleet was under the Northern Army. This could not help but further deteriorate the already badly-eroded saval morale. ‘The war in the Baltic was typical of the overall course of Russian naval history. The most significant occurrence was the inadver tent capture of a German light cruiser that ran aground in a fog on 26 August 1914, Even ‘more important than the eruser’s surrender was the capture of German codebooks, which fell into Russian and subsequently British hands, Duting the remainder of 1914, naval activities in the Baltic were confined to some mining of German harbors and some sub: marine activity “The situation on the Black Sea was dif: ferent. With Russia now an ally of England (Turkey's former protector), the “Young “Turk” government sought and accomplished an alliance with Germany. Turkey did not center the war immediately, however, and the Black Sea remained peaceful until ‘October 1914, when German ‘and ‘Turkish warships ‘operating from Turkish bases attacked Rus- san coastal cities, including Sevastopol, Novorossisk, and Odessa. These attacks, on 29-30 October 1914, as much as any other Single cause, sealed Imperial Russia's doom, ‘The de facto declaration of war by Turkey against Russia prevented any Aled hope that ‘Turkish neutrality could be maintained. Only through that neutrality and the concomitant authority for Alied ships to pass through the Dardanelles, could the Allies have hoped to supply the’ war materiel Russia needed. Other, more ineffective routes included Mur ‘mansk, which at this time had no direct com- munications with the interior, and the 6,000 mile-long Trans-Siberian Railway to Viadivostok on the Pacific Coast One naval operation of importance was the Russian success in cutting the maritime ‘supplied coal route from Anatolia to Constan- tinople. This endeavor included the use of seaplane tenders, that allowed Russian Seaplanes the range to bomb Turkish targets in Anatolia, There was some skirmishing be tween major surface combatants, but no substantial results were achieved. In the wat years that followed, the pattern of naval war- fare on the two seas remained much the ssame. Russia was able to add some new sur face ships and on the Black Sea, to continue attacks along the Turkish coast. In the Baltic the Russians, with British submarine 20 FALL 1980 RUTTER BOLSHEVIK TAKEOVER. TWPE Dreadnought Vola & CLASS PLAN BUILT YEAR, REMARKS 1914.16 Vola (ex-Aerander Tred taken by Bish; Demonativa (exmp, Nichole) not ished: limp Marie blew up at Sevastopo\ Octobar 1316, savaged 1919, mo. Esaterna estroyed at Novorssiak, 18 June 19 1812. femal (1918), ox Borodino;Kinburn (0918) exnavern 1900 Pevopaviovsk sunk by British motor torpedo Batleships (Usually only 1313 ‘one oF two ‘er elass) assistance, were able to gain the advantage over their German opponents. The Germans were, of course, putting their naval resources into the fights in the North Sea area and in the Aantic Ocean, Not many heavy German ships could be spared to parry the Rus and, after Jutland, none could be spared at all. The causes of the revolution that took place in Russia in March 1917 are manifold and cover the entire gamut of social, military political, and economic factors. More than thing else, however, the almost total lack appreciation and understanding of the pro blems at hand by the Monarehy and the venality of the Russian court brought down the already empty shell that was Imperial Russia, When the ‘Tsar did abdicate, the Crown was replaced by a provisional govern- ‘ment that spent more time in squabbling than it did in facing the issues that needed to be settled if Russin was to survive at all, Not only were the Germans banging on the very gates of St. Petersburg, but even more in- Sidious forces were at work within, forces whose principal concern was the total, i revocable seizure of power. From the begin hing of the troubles, sailors took an active role in the revolt. Rioters at Kronstadt, for i- stance, seized the cruiser Aurora, king its ceptain in the process. Eventually, mutinies broke out in all Fleet facilites and aboard ‘many of the ships. As time went on, these rmutinies spread and became more deadly, as officers were killed on sight. Among those killed at Helsingfors were the Fleet com- rmander and most of bis stall All over the Baltic Fleet, sailors’ soviets Clterally: councils) sprang up and took i upon. themselves. to. rule on all orders issued. Names of ships were changed to eradicate all vestiges of the old regime. These activities ‘eventually spread to the Biack Sea Fleet as well, With the entire nation in chaos and with the Fleets in general mutiny, it is not dificult ‘in around in 1919; Congut, Seas fot in semiee a 1918. ae 1887- Ande’ Pervosanny pit by British MTB August {sea oun Zotoust Beret 20 Sabode, Fostaiay Sno, and 71 Swett al Aisabied on 25 Aon 1818, Georg! Povedoneivev dated, and : aan and Tebesma a Poti soNice to see how the Germans were able to unleash 4 number of massive amphibious blows in areas of the Baltic, where they had not been able to sail before, These attacks were part of ‘ concerted German effort to drive Russia out ofthe war, o that miltary resources could be shifted against the Alles in France before the ‘Americans could arrive there in force. Yet with all the confusion, many Russian ships were manned by Russian sailors: who fought and died trying to defend their nation, while the Bolsheviks used ruses to extend the chaos. When the Bolsheviks finally struck, in November 1917, they did so withthe support of large segments of the subverted Navy. A truce was agreed upon with the Germans (November 1917) that eventually led to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (3 March 1918). The ‘act gave the new Bolshevik state the peace it desired to gain political control, but effective- ly isolated it diplomatically Yor the next Gecade, Meanwhile, the Imperial Russian wy ceased to exist and the Soviet Worker: Peasant Red Fleet was bor, The Early Bolshevik Period ALruoucn THE Navy HAD. FIGURED prominently in the Bolshevik seizure of power, there was Jess than unanimity among the rank and file as to what to do. In the Blace Sea numbers of ships were scuttled by their Crews, who vowed not to allow them to fallin to German ~ or Bolshevik — hands. Other ships were moved to Sevastopol, beyond the Soviets reach at that time. Inthe Baltic, a greater Bolshevik fervor evidenced itself among the sailors; it was these Navy men who dispersed the Con- stituent Assembly that Lenin had categorical: Iy damned as a product of reactionism. Similarly, the Baltic Fleet was able to Feassemble at Kronstadt through the ellorts ‘of those officers who had survived Hels-ingfors and through the co-operation of the salors' soviet, Organizationally, the Navy had endured the transfer of power in much the same fashion as the Army had. Soon after the takeover, a Central Committee of the All: Russian Naval Forces (Tsentrolot) was ‘established. It served for a time as a focal point for naval activity, utilizing, as the new Red Army had done, the availble expertise ‘ofa carefully selected and supervised group of fexmperial_ naval officers. In November 1917, an. AIFRussian Congress of Fleet Sailors had elected a Commissar of Naval Af- fairs, who was to serve ina ruling triumvirate that’ also inchided the Director of the Supreme Staff, Naval Forces and the Com- mander, Naval Forces. This commissariat ‘operated within the general precincts of the uufied defense ministry, but also had con- siderable autonomy. In the Baltic, naval warfare began again after November 1918, this time against Russias former alles. The British, intent upon protecting their interests and those of the newly-formed republics of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, moved a number of ships to the naval base at Tallin, Estonia, ‘which both the Germans and the Bolsheviks had tried to occupy. On 5 December, the British cruiser Cassandra struck a Russian ‘mine and sank while attacking Bolshevik pos tions near Narva, on the Estonian-Russian border. This victory was short-lived however, as two Russian destroyers, sent 10 attack the British, surrendered instead. The unfortunate crews of these two ships wer subsequently exchanged for British crewmen in Bolshevik captivity. The two ships became the first vessels of the new Estonian Navy In May 1919, Brith motor torpedo boats opened a campaign against the Russians by sinking the cruiser Oleg. Three months later, on 18 August, a squadron of eight torpedo boats entered Kronstadt harbor The Gangut-class battleship Marat under cover of a British air attack and sank three ships, including the 17,680-ton dread: ought Andrei Peroosanni and the cruiser Bogaiyr. These ships were later raised, after ‘many years. Other ships were lost on both sides, including the British V-class destroyer Vittoria on 1 September 1919, sunk by a Soviet submarine. Soon after, the British bbeyan their withdrawal from the Baltic, under pressure from a Laborite government fed up With fighting and pot unfriendly toward the Bolsheviks. Stl in the Black Sea the British ‘worked to undo the Bolsheviks, even though this was never stated openly. To prevent ‘numbers of submarines at Odessa from falling into the hands of the advancing Bolsheviks, the British convinced the White Russians t0 scuttle them. Some ships were confiscated by the British and French, with even the Halians and Greeks receiving destroyers. By late summer 1920, the White forces were all but defeated by ‘the Reds inside Russia: in December the British evacuated more than 130,000 men, women, and children. AIL that was left of the Imperial Black Sea Fleet was sent into internment at Bizerta, Tunisia, where they remained unt 1924, ‘ying the Cross of Saint Andrew. Finally, the last vestige of the Tsar's Navy was gone. The Soviet Bear Learns to Swim WHEN THE ALLIED INTERVENTION AND THE Revolution wound down, the Soviets had a chance to assess their position concerning the Red Fleet. What they saw must have made them ill. The Black Sea Pleet was gone. In the Baltic, most forward Russian bases had heen lost fo the new Baltic republics through the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. What remained of the Baltic Fleet was in sad disrepair. Even more serious was the Soviet leadership's perception of their sailors’ morale. To Lenin and his advisors, the Batic Fleet sailors were taking the notion of demonstrative democracy too much to heart by demanding such things sections, which the Bolsheviks could ud would not grant. This friction be: tween expectations and. political realities resulted in unrest, which spread outside the Kronstadt naval base into St, Petersburg itselt, Finally, Lenin ordered loyal Bolshevik soldiers, led by a 27-year-old general, Mikhail 'N, Tukhachevski, to besiege the “disloyal” Bolshevik sailors at Kronstadt (1-19 March 1921), When the siege ended, several thou sand sailors were executed or were exiled. For all intents, the original Batic Red Fleet had ceased to exist When the Tenth Party Congress reconvened following the Kronstadt mutiny Gt had adjourned so its members coukd par ticipate in the attack on the base), it ordered a series of reforms to improve party discipline Within the naval establishment, ‘The most notable of these measures was one that re- ‘quired all orders issued by naval officers to be ccountersigned by a political commis. This problem resolved, the second one was that there simply was no Red Fleet. There were few ships worth mentioning and no faclties with which to build new ones, It was decidedtherefore, that the one dreadnought that was slil operational, along with cight destroyers ‘and numerous small craft, would have to suf- fice for a Fleet, even it if could not sail far from home. By 1924, this number was in- creased to three battleships, two cruisers, and a small number of lesser combatants. BY 1928, fleet construction was largely Gnished and the Soviet inventory stood at three bat- tleships, five cruisers, twenty-four destroyers, and eighteen submarines. ‘The most critical problem the Soviets faced was in the determination of a naval policy. Two schools of thought existed: one, composed of the older, ex-Tsarst officers ‘ow in Communist uniform, stated that the Navy should be offensively-oriented and should depend upon its heavy battleships and cruisers to carry any fight to the enemy; the other, called the “Young School," argued for a ddefensively-oriented Fleet that was com: posed largely of submarines and small attack ‘raft to protect the bomeland against foreign attack. When the first. Five-Year Plan (1928-1932) was. announced, Russia's new leader, Josef Stalin, conficmed his support of the light-ship school of development; since he ‘was now the undisputed ruler of the Soviet Union; few, if any, argued. With that pro- nouncement, the doctrine of a Russian sea ing Fleet was shelved, atleast temporarily, By the time the second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937) was inaugurated, a number of new shipyards had been constructed, some of Which undertook the building of new sub- ‘marines based on old German and British designs. A number of new surface classes were also laid down, which included an 8,100-ton Kirov-lass heavy cruiser and several Leningrad-class leader destroyers, While these classes were built along Italian and French lines, respectively, the Germans also. provided | much-needed technical assistance that the Soviets simply did not have then. The building of these newer, heavier ships, along with the upgrading and refurbishing of the three surviving battleships of the preceding decade, appeared to mark ‘Stalin's departure from the policy of a defen: sive Navy. But there is considerable evidence that his intent was to use the large ships as floating fortresses. Stil, the thied Five-Year Pian (1938-1942) aiso included funds for more large ships; there was even discussion of some aircraft carrier construction. ‘The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) un- doubtedly played an important role in reshap- ing Soviet naval policy, as much as any other event, When Fascist Italian submarines began king ships in the war zone around Spain, among them a Soviet freighter carrying sup- plies to the Spanish Republicans, the Soviets could only remain idle, as they could do nothing else. They did not have the type of warships to show Soviet_muscle in_the Mediterranean on a consistent basis, Even though the Soviets had about 115 submarines then, they did not possess the necessary logistics capability to resupply them in distant waters. Also, there was no policy for dealing with violations of Soviet interests in foreign 22 FALL ms “Three different naval com- manders-in- chief served in one 18-month period, two being shot as a result. The Navy lost over half of its officers.” ‘waters, [Fnothing els, the Spanish Civil War, with the victory of the Spanish Nationalists backed by Germany and Italy, must have ad- ced impetus to the already apparent shift toward an ocean-going Navy In any “‘ypieal” society, 9 shift in em. phasis is usually accompanied by a series of factions to improve and upgrade the new direction. This certainly would seem to factor in establishing an ocean-going Navy; one of the first changes would be an upgrading ofthe officer corps to match. the new naval role Whether the Soviet Union could be con sidered a typical society is debatable; that Stalin was hardly a typical leader, however, is shown by the fact that at the same time the redirection in naval policy began, the Soviet dictator launched bis purges. By 1938, almost all ofthe senior naval officers had been exited or executed. Three different naval commanders-in-chief served in one 18-month period, two of them being shot as a result. ‘The Navy, ike the Army, lost more than one half ofits officer corps. Finally, in 1999, Stalin settled upon Admiral N.G. Kuzetsov to run the Navy. He was 38 years old, with some combat experience from a short stint in the Spanish Republican Navy This was a time of great ambivalence For, while the Soviet Union was reviling the Munich Agreements as a Western plot aimed directly at itself, Stain also moved to deal with the West, especially the United States, fon matters such as acquiring the necessary materials to build battleships, even aircraft cartiers. These attempts proved uniruitful, however, and Stain turned to Italy and Ger ‘many, among others, for assistance in building an ocean-going Navy. Though the Germans did give some assistance during the period ofthe Russo-German rapprochement of 1939-1941, it was not what Stalin had hoped for. Instead of giving the Soviets the com- pleted 19,000-ton heavy cruiser Pring Eugen, Hitler transferred to them the unfinished sister ship Leow, which sil lacked its main cight-inch gun batteries. The sale took place in 1940, the ship renamed as the Tallinn. It was still unfinished when the German attack ‘came in June 1941; it served during the war as a floating battery at Leningrad and was scrapped afterwards. Much the same fate met most of the other 1939-1940 hull-starts, Inall, anew series of cruisers, the 15,500-ton, CChapaee class, was besun and two 35,000-(0n, Italian designed, Vitro Veneto-cass bat- teships were laid down, One of these, the Sovietskaya. Ukraina, was captured by. the Germans at Nikolaev, on the Black Sea, in 1941, The other ship of this class never reached completion. Two 30,000-ton battle cruisers under construction when war began also were never competed. The Great Patriotic War ‘THE Sovier RED FLEET WAS TOTALLY unprepared for the onset of war. Russia did possess the worlds largest submarine fet, with about 218 boats in commission, But otherwise, the USSR could only muster the three modernized, pre-World War 1 bat- Ueships, nine cruisers (only two of which ‘were new), and about sixty destroyers. Inthe Baltic were two of the batleships, the Marat and the Okbabrshaya Revolutsia; two new heavy cruisers, the Maksim Gory and the Kirov; about twenty destroyers and sinty-five submarines. This considerable force did nothing when the war began. It finally acted when the Baltic port of Talinn had to be evacuated of ships and personnel. The Kirov was at Tallinn, along with a dozen destroyers. While Riga, Libau (Lepaya), and Tallinn all held up Hitler's Barbarossa timetable for several weeks, by late August these ports had to be evacuated, ‘The remnants of the army divisions that had defended Tallinn were loaded on board the ships and sailed on 28 August for the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland, German minefields were particularly heavy and took their toll, as did German shore batteries, sinking some fity ships and craft. The convoy still made it to Kronstadt, towing in the damaged cruiser Kirov. The Soviet Red Fleet had acquitted itself well and saved many lives, but at terrible cost. By the end of September the Oktabrskaya Revolutsiva, the Kiroo, and the Maksim Gorky had all ben damaged; the Maral was sunk in shallow water, though its turrets were stil in use, The entire Batic Fleet was effectively bottled up inthe Kronstadt-Leningrad area by German mine fields and a naval fore which included the bat- Ueship Tupitz, the pocket battleship Admiral ‘Scheer, four light cruisers, a number of de- stroyers, and several Finish torpedo boats. ‘This was an extremely critical time for the Soviet Union; there was deep concern in