Medieval Academy of America

The Terms "Prima Intentio" and "Secunda Intentio" in Arabic Logic

Author(s): Kwame Gyekye
Source: Speculum, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Jan., 1971), pp. 32-38
Published by: Medieval Academy of America
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2855087
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 THE TERMS "PRIMA INTENTIO" AND "SECUNDA
INTENTIO" IN ARABIC LOGIC*
BY KWAME GYEKYE
THE more passages one examines in the translations from Arabic to Latin and
from Arabic to English and other modern languages, the more mistakes one
comes across in the translation of the Arabic expression 'ald al-qasd al-awwal
(or, 'ald al-qasd al-thdni). The mistakes stem from the failure to distinguish
between two senses of the expression, one an adverb, and the other a famous
philosophic concept. Failing to distinguish between the two senses, the trans-
lators translated the phrase literally, often with unsatisfactory results. In this
paper, I shall indicate a Greek word which was rendered by the Arabic 'ald
al-qasd al-awwal. I shall refer to some English translations from the Arabic
and show how wrong they are. I shall suggest that in Arabic philosophy itself
al-Farabi, rather than Avicenna, may have been the origin of the philosophic
concepts of "first and second intentions." I shall point out that although these
concepts may have been introduced into Latin scholasticism by Raymond Lull,
he could not have derived them from the Logic of al-Ghazsli, as has been alleged.
I
The expression 'ald al-qasd al-awwal occurs in the mediaeval Arabic transla-
tion of Porphyry's Eisagogel where it is used to literally translate Porphyry's
rponyovueivos,2translated by Boethius with the word 'principaliter.' The Arabic
'ald al-qasd al-awwal literally means "according to first intention" (prima
intentione) and in some passages, to be mentioned below, it was so translated.
The Greek 7rpoyrozjiaL means "to go first and lead the way, to precede," of which
in Arabic the Greek prefix "pro"= awwal, and the verb 'yotpiat== qasada;= Latin:
intendere.It must be noted that in another passage3 the Greek word was rendered
by the Arabic word awwalan which is obviously used as a synonym of 'ald
al-qasd al-awwal.
Avicenna also in his Eisagoge4 says: "Accidents exist primarily ('ald al-qasd
al-awwal) in individuals, while genera and species do not." In two other places5
the phrases do occur with the meaning of "primarily."
In a passage in al-Farabi6 the phrase occurs as qasdan awwalan. Although this
form of the phrase is different, the meaning is the same as 'ald al-qasd al-awwal,
* I would like to record my gratitude to Dr A. I. Sabra of the Warburg Institute, University of
London, who read this paper and whose suggestions helped me eliminate some errors.
1 The Arabic translation of Porphyry's Eisagoge was edited by al-Ahwani (Cairo, 1952).
2 Porphyry's Eisagoge, ed., A. Busse (Berlin, 1887), p. 17, line 9.
3 al-Ahwani, op. cit., p. 83; Porphyry's Eisagoge, p. 13. 20.
4 Al-Madkbal, op. cit., p. 102, 1. 17. Latin, ibid., p. 126=principaliter.

Al-ildhiydt ed. S. Dunya et. al. (Cairo, 1960), p. 126 line 16. Latin, p. 473=principaliter; and
al-Jadal, ed. A. F. El-Ehwany (Cairo, 1965), p. 78, lines 14, 15.
6 Al-Farabi: Risalat ft 'L'aql. M. Bouyges, op. cit., p. 29=F. Dieterici, Philos. Abhandlungen,
(Leiden, 1890), p. 48.
 The Terms "Prima Intentio" and "Secunda Intentio" 33

i.e., "primarily." The Latin translation7 of this passage renders it as "princi-

paliter." Dieterici, however, in his German translation (p. 76) renders the phrase
by "als erstes Ziel" ("as first intention") - which is the literal translation of
the Arabic. In a passage in his commentary on the De Interpretatione8al-Farabi
says: "The intended term is that predicated of the subject primarily (qasdan
awwalan). The existential word (i.e., 'is') is predicated only of the subject, not
of the predicate-term, and that is in order that it may connect the predicate-
term to the subject-term. Thus, it (i.e., the existential word) is not a predicate
per se (bi-dhdtihi) and primarily ('ald al-qasd al-awwal); it is only predicated
for the sake of something else." Here, al-Farabi denies that "is" is a predicate
primarily, or strictly speaking, and that it is the predicate-term which is pri-
marily a predicate. Thus in "Man is just," it is "just" which is primarily a predi-
cate. (In modern logic it is "is just" which is the predicate). The phrases 'ald
al-qasd al-awwal (=awwalan) and 'ald al-qasd al-thdnd (=thdniyan) occur also
on pp. 206-207, ibid. What all this is meant to show is this, that if we were always
to translate the phrases 'ald al-qasd al-awwal and al-thdni as "according to first
and second intention," we would hardly bring out the meanings of the passages
in which they occur.
Yet this is what was done in the two existing Latin translations of Averroes'
Tahdfut al Tahdfut (which contains al-Ghazali's Tahdfut al-Faldsifah). In the
several passages in these two works where the two phrases occur they were
translated by "prima or secunda intentione." Some, at least, should surely have
been translated by "primo" or "principaliter." Kamali and Van Den Bergh in
their translations of these two works of al-Ghazali and Averroes have done what
the Latin translators did. For instance, one passage in Van Den Bergh's transla-
tion reads: "This movement, however, does not occur, according to the phil-
osophers, in first intention ('ald al-qasd al-awwal) for the sake of this sublunary
world; that is, the heavenly body is not in first intention (bi-'l-qasd al-awwal)
created for the sake of this sublunary world. . . and if this movement occurred
in first intention ('ala al-qasd al-awwal) for the sake of the sublunary world. .. "9
In this passage "primarily," to me, makes better sense and brings out the
meaning more clearly than "in first intention." For what does "in first intention"
mean? Kamali translates a passage in al-Ghazali as: "He does not know the
Other by first intentions (bi-'l-qasd al-awwal). But He knows Himself as the
Principle of the Universe. From this knowledge follows-by second intention-
(bi-'l-qasd al-thdnz) the knowledge of the Universe."'0 This passage means that
while God does not know the universe primarily (i.e., directly - the Greek
7rpooyovuEvws means also "directly," Liddell and Scott), he knows it in a secondary

7 "De Intellectu." Le texte midieval du De Intellectu p. 123 (see Footnote 18 below for full ref.).
8 W. Kutsch and S. Marrow: al-Farabi's Commentaryon Aristotle's De Interpretatione, (Beyrouth,
Catholique,1960), p. 105.
9 S. Van den Bergh, Translation of Averroes'Tahafut al-Tahafut (Luzac, 1954), p. 295; Arabic,
Bouyges' edition, p. 484, lines 12ff.
10S. A. Kamali, A translationof al-Ghazal's Tahafut al-Falasifah (Pakistan Philosophical Congress,
1963), p. 116; Arabic, Bouyges' edition, p. 174, lines 5-6.
34 The Terms "Prima Intentio" and "Secunda Intentio"

way (i.e., indirectly). Thus, in all these cases we should be guided by the sense
of the passages themselves rather than by the dictionary meanings of al-qasd,
"intentio."'l While literalness in translations is generally commendable, it must
not be pursued relentlessly and at the expense of clarity and intelligibility.
II
Now, one might argue that since "prima intentione" translates the Arabic
'ald al-qasd al-awwal which in turn translates the Greek IrporyovMifvws
(primarily,
principally, directly), it could be used but that it should be understood to mean
"primarily." Such an argument would be specious for two reasons. First, it
should not be taken for granted that the one who translates the Arabic phrase
with "prima intentio" necessarily understands it to mean "primarily": Notice
the consistently literal, but senseless, translations of the phrase by Van den
Bergh and Kamali, for instance. Second, and the more important reason, "prima
intentio" came to be used to denote a new concept in scholastic logic, a concept
which has been fathered upon Avicenna. These two reasons point to the crucial
problem that requires some solution: the problem is how to distinguish, in the
Latin or in any other translation, between "intentio" in the sense of "primarily,"
and "intentio" in the scholastic or Avicenna sense. What did the scholastics
mean by "prima" and "secunda intentio"?
For this, let us take two quotations from the texts of two of the schoolmen.
First, William of Ockham:
For the present it is enough to say that an intention is something in the soul which is a sign
naturally signifying something for which it can stand or which can be part of a mental
proposition. Such a sign is twofold. One which is a sign of something which is not such a
sign... and that is called a "first intention" such as is that intention of the soul which is
predicable of all men, and similarly the intention predicable of all whitenesses and black-
nesses, and so on. . . But a second intention is that which is a sign of such first intentions,
such as are the intentions "genus," "species" and such like.

Second, Albert of Saxony:

"Term of first intention" is the name given to that mental term which is significative of
things not from the point of view of their being signs. Thus this mental term "man," or
this mental term" quality", or this mental term "voice." Hence this mental term "man"
signifies Socrates or Plato, and not insofar as Socrates or Plato are signs for other things...
But a mental term which is naturally significative of things insofar as they are signs is
called a "term of second intention," and if they ceased to be signs it would not signify
them. Of this kind are the mental terms "genus," "species," "noun," "verb," "case of a
noun," etc.12

We learn, here, that terms of "first intention" are the individual things existing
in nature, while terms of "second intention" are the universal concepts which
exist as a result of the operations of discursive thought. We learn, further, that
1 Dr A. I. Sabra of the Warburg Institute, University of London, mentions, in a correspondence,
that, al-ma'dni al-mubsarain Alhazen's Opticswas translated by "intentiones visibiles," whereas here
ma'nd means thing or object; but it was translated by "intentio" - and many times!
2 These two quotations are found in I. M. Bochenski, A History of Formal Logic (Notre Dame,
Indiana, 1961), pp. 155-156. (Dots are not mine.)
 The Terms "Prima Intentio" and "Secunda Intentio" 35

the "intention" whether "first" or "second", is a psychological or mental

phenomenon. Thus, one of the significations of "intentio," according to St.
Thomas,13is "ratio." Another signification given by Duns Scotus is "conceptus,"
and Swiezawski says that when Scotus speaks of "intentio" qua "ratio formalis"
and "conceptus," he thinks of both the first and second intentions.14
Thus, "prima intentio" denotes something entirely different from its adverbial
use as Irporyov,evos(principaliter). So, what should guide us in distinguishing
between "intentio" in the two senses is not its literal or dictionary meaning
but the sense of the passage. For instance, in a passage where al-Farabi dis-
cusses the existence of universals we have the following:
Askedabout how, and in what way, universalthings exist, al-Farabisaid: "That which
actually exists becauseof anotherthing, and whose existence,therefore,is accordingto
(or, as) secondintentionand accidental.The existenceof things universal,i.e., universals,
is derivedfrom the existenceof individuals.Their existence,then, is accidental.By the
word"accidental"I do not meanthat universalsthemselvesareaccidents,forthe universals
of essencesare not accidents.I mean, rather,that it is the actual existenceof universals
whichis accidentalsimpliciter."'5
In this passage I think it makes sense to render 'al al-qasd al thdni by "secunda
intentione."
III
Al Farabi in his commentary on the De Interpretatione speaks of what he
calls ma'qul, a word which is used in the Arabic translation of this work of
Aristotle to translate voyb,aa concept or thought. He says that "the logician
investigates concepts (or, intelligibles, al-ma'qildt) in two ways: in terms of their
relation (i) to the things that exist outside the soul, and (ii) to words. The logician
investigates also the words themselves in terms of their relation to the concepts
(al-ma'qildt).16 He continues to say (L. 13) that "Aristotle says that words sig-
nify concepts which are in the soul," and (on p. 25, lines 1-2) he says that "com-
mentators maintain that the concepts in the soul indicate things that are outside
the soul .... Aristotle did not here mention (L. 4) the relation of concepts to
things that exist outside the soul." If I understand al-Farabi correctly, what he
is saying is that, just as "intentio," as understood by the Latin scholars, is a
psychological phenomenon, so also is ma'qul something in the soul denoting both
what is outside it, i.e., a natural existent - "prima intentio," and what is inside
the soul, i.e., a "secunda intentio." If this interpretation is correct, then it would
make al-Farabi's ma'qul have the same sense as "intentio" and "conceptus."
And if this is so, it would mean that conceptually, though not linguistically,
al-Farabi's ma'qul is identifiable with Avicenna's ma'na in the sense of concept
(see below). That ma'qul can be a synonym of ma'nd (= notio; Begriff) was recog-
1 H. D. Simonin, "La notion d' "Intentio" dans l'ouvre de Saint Thomas d'Aquin,' Rev. de sciences
philos. et theol. xix (1930), p: 451.
14 St.
Swiezawski, "Les intentiones premieres et les intentions secondes chez Jean Duns Scot,"
Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Age, ix (1934), pp. 207, 212.
16F. Dieterici, op. cit., p. 87.
16 Kutsch and
Marrow, op. cit., p. 24, lines 5, 6.
36 The Terms "Prima Intentio" and "Secunda Intentio"
nized also by Pollak.l? Incidentally, in al-Farabi's De Intellectu there are places
where ma'na has been translated by "intentio."18
Avicenna's ma'nd was rendered by the Latin "intentio." (Etymologically
"conceptus," rather than "intentio," would be a better translation for ma'nd
which means meaning or concept; but it was "intentio" that was used.) Hence,
it is Avicenna to whom the notion of "prima et secunda intentio" is often traced.19
Long before the schoolmen, Avicenna had written that the subject-matter of
logic consists of the second intentions. In his "Metaphysics" he had written:
"The subject-matter of logic - as you know - consists in the second intelligible
intentions (or concepts, al-ma'qladt) which are dependent upon the first intel-
ligible intentions (al-ma'quldt) with regard to the manner by which to arrive
from the known to the unknown."20The Latin translation of this passage was
as follows: "Subiectum vero logicae, sicut scisti, sunt intentiones intellectae
secundo, quae apponuntur intentionibus primo intellectis, secundum quod per
eas pervenitur de cognito ad incognitum."21
Now, could al-Farabi have been the source of this distinction between "prima"
and "secunda intentio?" We may note that Avicenna's use of ma'qul in reference
to both "prima" and the "secunda intentio" resembles al-Farabi's mentioned
earlier (p. 35). Al-Farabi also, in a passage where he discusses the copula
(rdbit)says that the copula (i.e., the verb "to be") is among the "second concepts"
(or intelligibles: al-ma'qulat al-thawdan).22In his "Enumeration of the Sciences"
al-Farabi says: "As for the subject-matters (al-maua1u'dt)of logic--namely,
those concerning which the (logical) laws are given - they are the concepts
(or the intelligibles: al-ma'quldt), inasmuch as they are signified by words, and
words inasmuch as they signify concepts."23Although al-Farabi here makes no
distinct mention of "second" concepts (or intentions) as such, they are, of course,
implied. Also, in his book on "The Intellect" al-Farabi speaks of the "first con-
cept" (or intelligible: al-ma'qul al-awwal) and the "second concept" (or intel-
ligible: al-ma'qul al-thdni), and says that "when it (i.e., the potential intellect:
intellectusin potentia) has acquired for itself the second concept, it becomes actual
intellect (intellectus in effectu) by means of the first concept and the second
concept."24In al-Farabi, the intelligible exists in potentiality in sensible thing,
17
I. Pollak, Die Hermeneutik des Aristotles in der Arabischen Uebersetzungdes Isak B. Honain,
(Leipzig, 1913,) p. 47; see under 'aql.
18
Dieterici, op. cit., p. 48, lines 17, 18, pl 44, lines 6, 7. Latin, ed., E. Gilson, Le Texte medievaldu
De Intellectu d'Alfdrdbi (Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age, 1929), pp.
115-126, p. 118. line 126, p. 119, lines 127, 128, and 141-143.
19E.g., by William and Martha Kneale, The Developmentof Logic, (Oxford, 1962), pp. 229-230;
T. J. de Boer, The History of Philosophy in Islam, tr. by E. R. Jones, (London, 1965), p. 185; David
Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought, (Baltimore, 1962), p. 197.
20
Avicenna, al-ildhiyydt, op. cit., p. 10.
21 C. Prantl, Geschichteder
Logik im Abendland,II, p. 328 (footnote); quoted also by Kneale, op. cit.
p. 230.
22 Kutsch and Marrow, op. cit., p. 45, last line; also p. 46, line 2.
23Al-Farabi, Ihsa al'ulum, ed. Osman Amine (Cairo, 1949), p. 59, lines 9-11.
24 Al-Farabi: De Intellectu; Dieterici op. cit., p. 44, lines 16-17=Bouyges, Risalah fi'l-'aql, (Bey-
routh, 1938), p. 18, lines 8-9.
 The Terms "Prima Intentio" and "Secunda Intentio" 37

i.e., in "first intentions," and when it is abstracted from them it then exists
in the mind in actuality. Thus, he says: "Before becoming actual, the intelligi-
bles (al-ma'qildt) which are potential are forms in matter outside the soul."25
It is on the basis of al-Farabi's theory of "abstraction" as explained in his
De Intellectu that Dr Ibrahim Madkour - he is the only one I know -has
found in al-Farabi the origin of the doctrine of the "two intentions."26I myself
think that there is much in al-Farabi's writings, both of philosophy and termi-
nology, to justify the view of his having anticipated Avicenna.
IV
In scholasticism itself it is said that it was Raymond Lull (1235-1315) who
introduced the terms "prima and secunda intentio," having derived them from
the logic of al-Ghazali.2 (To Lull, just as to al-Farabi and Avicenna, the "second
intentions" are the subject-matter of logic.)28We know that al-Ghazali's Tahdfut
al-Faldsifah was translated (in 1328) into Latin as part of Averroes' Tahdfut
al Tahdfut, and therefore we cannot give credence to the view that it was never
translated.29Al-Ghazdli's Maqdsid al-Faldsifah was translated into Latin during
the second quarter (1125-1150) of the 12th century.30 And we are told that
"Lorsque les scholastiques ou leurs editeurs citent la Logique d'Algazel, ou la
Metaphysique d'Algazel, ou la Science Naturelle d'Algazel, c'est toujours au
Maqaid qu'il faut songer d'abord, si l'on veut identifier la citation."3' It is said
that it was from the logical part of the Maqdsid of al-Ghazali that Lull derived
the "intentions."32The Latin translation of the sections that deal with physics
and metaphysics has been published by Muckle,33and the logical part by Lohr.34
We know, so far, that the two Arabic words qasd and ma'nd were both rendered
by the Latin "intentio." Qasd, used on page 9,35has nothing to do with either
of the two senses of "intentio" we are now concerned with. Ma'nd, used a few
times,36has, like qa.d, nothing to do with the two senses either. It just means
"meaning." For instance, al-Ghazali says (pp. 70-71) that essence has two
2 Ibid.; Dieterici, p. 43, lines 19-20=Bouyges, p. 16, lines 4-5.
26 I. Madkour, La Place d'alFarabi dans l'ecole philosophiquemusulmane (Paris, 1934), p. 140.
27 Frances A.
Yates, "The Art of Ramon Lull," Journal of the Warburg and CourtauldInstitutes,
xvII, (1954), p. 160; Armand Llinares, Raymond Lulle, Philosophe de l'Action, Paris, 1963), p. 194;
Erhard W. Platzeck, Raimund Lull, sein Leben- sein Werke, die Grundlagenseines Denkens, (Berlin,
1962), i, 102-104.
28 Yates,
op. cit., p.A56 (footnote 3); "Logicus tractat de secundariis intentionibus."
29 This view is
expressed by D. Salman: "Algazel et les Latins," Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale el
Litterairedu Moyen Age (1936), p. 105 (repeated'on p. 108).
30 D. Salman, op. cit., p. 105.
31M. Bouyges, "Notes sur les philosophes Arabes connus des Latins au Moyen Age", Universite
Saint Joseph, Beyrouth, Mlange de I Faculte Oriental (1921), p. 399.
32A. Llinares, op. cit., p. 193, (footnote).
33Rev. J. T. Muckle, Algazel's Metaphysics, A Medieval Translation, (Toronto, 1933).
34Charles H. Lohr, "Logica Algazelis, Introduction and Critical Text," Traditio, xxI (1965), pp.
223 ff.
5 Al-Ghazali, Maqasid al-Faldsifah, Cairo Edition.
m Ibid., e.g., pp. 25, 64, 70, 71.
38 The Terms "Prima Intentio" and "Secunda Intentio"

meanings, and then goes on to say "the first meaning" is so-and-so, and the
"second meaning" is so-and-so. But the Latin translation (Lhor, op. cit.) has
"intentio." (In some other places the Latin translation has "modus." After
comparing the metaphysical part in the Latin translation with the Arabic this
is what I found: that three different Latin words were used to translate ma'nd.
They are "intentio"37 (written intencio), "sensus," and "aliquod."38We must
note here that al-Ghazali's ma'nd, where it was rendered by "intentio," was
wrongly translated: his "intentio" had nothing to do with al-Farabi's ma'qil.
Consequently, I do not see how Lull ought to have derived his "intentions"
from al-Ghazali's Maqasid. I notice that al-Farabi's Izd was known to Lull.39
The result of our investigation may be summed up as follows: The Arabic
expression ('ald) al-qasd al-awwal has two different meanings. It means (i)
"primarily" (or, "principally"); (ii) it means "prima intentio" in respect of a
"concept." It was often rendered literally in the Latin translations with un-
satisfactory results. In translating it more attention must be paid to the sense
of the passage in which it occurs rather than to its dictionary meaning. Avicenna
is often credited with having originated it, but the idea already occurs in al-
Farabi. When all is said, however, so far as the original philosophic or logical
idea is concerned, the idea is certainly traceable to Aristotle's doctrine of the pri-
mary and secondary substances. It is remarkable that in some places where al-
Farabi uses the expression 'aid al-qa.d al-awwal (or thdnl), he adds to it the
expression bi-dhdtihi, i.e., per se, essentially, or bi-'l-araf, i.e. accidentally,
Karta crjVef.Ko6S.40 These expressions must be references, on the one hand, to the
self-existing primary substance, and on the other, to the secondary substances
plus the other nine accidental categories, of the Categories of Aristotle.
UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

87Arabic: pp. 107, 11 (occurs twice), 114, 128=Muckle's ed. of Latin tr.
op. cit., pp. 27, 29-80, 32,
43.
38 On
aliquod see my footnote 11 above.
39 Osman Amine, op. cit., p. 21.
40
E.g., Kutsch and Marrow, op. cit., pp. 105 (already referred to in footnote 8 above), 206, 207.
See also the reference of footnote 15 above.