Boeing 737 Oe Report Revision 2 English

RDIMS #17171568
Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA)

OPERATIONAL EVALUATION REPORT
Revision: 2
Date: 2021-10-04
THE BOEING COMPANY
BOEING 737
Type Certificate Data Sheet TCDS Identifier/Master
Marketing Name Pilot Type Rating
(TCDS)* Series
B-737-100
Boeing 737 B73A (TCCA)
A16WE (FAA) B-737-200
(B-737) B-737 (FAA)
B-737-200C
B-737-300
A-146 Boeing 737 Classic (CL) B73B (TCCA)
B-737-400
A16WE (FAA) (B-737CL) B-737 (FAA)
B-737-500
B-737-600 Boeing 737 Next Generation (NG)
A-146 B-737-700 (B-737NG) B73C (TCCA)
A16WE (FAA) B-737-800 Boeing 737-800SFP B-737 (FAA)
B-737-800SFP (B-737-800SFP)
Boeing Business Jet
B-737-700
A16WE (FAA) (BBJ 1 / BBJ) B-737 (FAA)
B-737-800
(BBJ 2)
Boeing 737-800BCF
A16WE (FAA) B-737-800BCF (B-737-800BCF) B-737 (FAA)
Boeing 737 Next Generation (NG)

B-737-700C
(B-737NG)
A16WE (FAA) B-737-900 B-737 (FAA)
Boeing Business Jet 3
B-737-900ER
(BBJ 3)
A-146 B-737-8 Boeing 737 MAX 8 B73C (TCCA)
A16WE (FAA) (B-737 MAX 8) B-737 (FAA)
A16WE (FAA) B-737-8 Boeing Business Jet MAX 8 B-737 (FAA)

(BBJ MAX 8)
A16WE (FAA) B-737-8200 Boeing 737-8200 B-737 (FAA)

(B-737-8200)
A16WE (FAA) B-737-9 Boeing 737 MAX 9 B-737 (FAA)

(B-737 MAX 9)
Boeing 737 Operational Evaluation Report, Revision 2 RDIMS #17171568
APPROVED: Original signed by F. Meunier______ DATE: _________

Approved by: Félix Meunier, Director Standards
Transport Canada, Civil Aviation, Standards Branch (AART)
MANAGEMENT CO-ORDINATION SHEET
Office of Primary Interest (OPI):
Roman Marushko
Program Manager, Flight Technical and Operator Certification (FTOC);
Chairman B73C, TCCA Operational Evaluation Board
Transport Canada Civil Aviation
Commercial Flight Standards (AARTF)
330 Sparks Street, Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N8
Tel: (613) 698-5433
e-mail: roman.marushko@tc.gc.ca
Original approved by Roman Marushko Date: __________
Deborah Martin
Chief, Commercial Flight Standards
Transport Canada, Civil Aviation
Standards Branch
Commercial Flight Standards Division (AARTF)
Original approved by Deborah Martin Date: __________
Page 2 of 174
Table of contents
1. Record of revisions ................................................................................................... 4

2. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 5
3. Highlights of change ................................................................................................. 7
4. General ..................................................................................................................... 8
5. Acronyms................................................................................................................ 13
6. Definitions ............................................................................................................... 17
7. Pilot type rating ....................................................................................................... 19
8. Related aircraft ....................................................................................................... 20
9. Pilot training ............................................................................................................ 22
10. Pilot checking ......................................................................................................... 32
11. Pilot currency .......................................................................................................... 34
12. Operational suitability ............................................................................................. 35
13. Miscellaneous ......................................................................................................... 36
14. References ............................................................................................................. 38
Appendix 1 – Differences Legend ................................................................................. 39
Appendix 2 – Master Differences Requirements (MDR) Table...................................... 41
Appendix 3 – Difference Tables .................................................................................... 43
Appendix 4 – Transition Line Indoctrination (TLI) .......................................................... 81
Appendix 5 – Head Up Display (HUD) qualification program ........................................ 83
Appendix 6 – Alternate go-around flaps training ......................................................... 101
Appendix 7 – B-737 MAX special training for flight crews ........................................... 103
Appendix 8 – Supplemental training guidance to TCCA OE report for B-737 ............. 107
Page 3 of 174
1. Record of revisions
Revision Sections(s) Date

Number
Initial Issue ALL 2017/11/30
1 ALL except Appendix 1 2020/12/17
2 Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14 and 2021/10/04

Appendix 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8
Page 4 of 174
2. Introduction
2.1 General
The Transport Canada Flight Technical and Operator Certification (FTOC) section of the
Civil Aviation Standards Branch is responsible for the TCCA Operational Evaluation
(OE) program. FTOC’s objectives during the operational evaluation of a new or
modified aircraft are to determine:
1. The acceptability of a manufacturers training program for use by Canadian
operators;
2. Pilot qualification and type rating requirements including training, checking, and
currency requirements, and;
3. The operational suitability of an aircraft type.
This report lists those determinations for use by:
1. TCCA Inspectors who approve training programs;
2. TCCA inspectors; Approved Check Pilots (ACPs) who conduct Pilot Proficiency
Checks (PPCs) and Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) Evaluators who
conduct Line Operational Evaluations (LOEs); and
3. Aircraft operators and training providers, to assist them in developing their flight-
crew member training, checking and currency programs.
Determinations made in this report are based on the evaluations of specific B-737
series made in accordance with current regulations, standards and guidance.
Modifications and upgrades made to the series described herein, or introduction of new
related aircraft, may require amendment of the findings in this report.
NOTE
This report does not grant TCCA training program Approval. It is incumbent upon the
air operators to ensure their B-737 training program is approved by the Minister in
accordance with the Commercial Air Service Standards and with the material
indicated in this report.
2.2 Regulatory Requirements / Language

This OE report uses mandatory terms such as “must”, “shall” and “is/are required” in
order to convey the intent of the Regulatory requirements and other guidance
documents. The term “should” is to be understood to mean that the proposed method of
compliance must be used, unless an alternate means of compliance has been
determined and approved.
Page 5 of 174
NOTE
The terms “Pilot” and “Flight Crew” may be used interchangeably within this report,
and should be used specifically when dictated by the context of their use.
Page 6 of 174
3. Highlights of change
This Operational Evaluation Board (OEB) Report Revision 2 adds the Boeing 737-8200,
re-instates differences tables for the Boeing 737-800SFP from a previous FAA FSB
revision and adds the new Appendix 8. This OE Report revision updates content,
incorporates minor editorial updates and more closely harmonizes with the FAA Flight
Standardization Board Report (FSBR) Revision 18.
The following are highlights of changes in the report:
 Cover page – Table updated;
 Table of Contents updated
 Section 1 – Record of Revisions updated;
 Section 2 – Editorial updates;
 Section 3 – Highlights of Change updated;
 Section 5 – Acronyms added and removed;
 Section 8 – Table 1 and content updated;
 Section 14 – References updated;
 Appendix 1 – Editorial updates;
 Appendix 2 – Master Differences Requirements (MDR) Table updated;
 Appendix 3 – Difference Tables (DTs) updated and added;
 Appendix 4 – Supervised Line Flying (SLF) terminology replaced by Transition
Line Indoctrination (TLI);
 Appendix 8 – New Appendix titled Supplemental training guidance to TCCA OE
report for B-737
Page 7 of 174
4. General
4.1 Scope of Report

This OE report applies to all series of the Boeing 737 (B-737). The contents of this
report are harmonized with the FAA, EASA, and ANAC (Brazil) to the maximum extent
possible.
NOTE
This report refers to B-737 aircraft by their TCDS/ Master Series identifier (e.g. B-
737-800 or B-737-8), by their marketing names (e.g. B-737, B-737CL, B-737NG or B-
737 MAX) or by their Pilot Type Rating designators (B73A, B73B or B73C) as
necessary for convenience and clarity.
4.2 Guidance Material

The TCCA OE evaluations were conducted in accordance with FAA Advisory Circular
(AC) 120-53B, Guidance for Conducting and Use of Flight Standardization Board (FSB)
Evaluations, and the JAA/FAA/TCCA Common Procedures Document (CPD) for
Operational Evaluation Boards.
4.3 OE Report Effectiveness

Provisions of this report are effective until amended, superseded, or withdrawn by
subsequent OE findings.
TCCA reserves the responsibility and authority to re-evaluate and modify sections of
this report based on new or revised advisory material, amended Canadian Aviation
Regulations (CARs), aircraft operating experience, or the evaluation of new or modified
aircraft under the provisions of the CPD or FAA AC 120-53B.
4.4 Application of OE Report

All relevant parts of this report are applicable on the effective date of this report.
4.5 Alternate Means of Compliance

The OEB Chairman, the Program Manager of FTOC and/or the Program Manager
Airline Standards should be consulted when alternate means of compliance, other than
those specified in this report, are proposed. An applicant will be required to submit a
proposed alternate means that provides an equivalent level of safety to the provisions of
the CARs and this OE report. Analysis, demonstrations, proof of concept testing,
differences documentation, and/or other substantiation may be required.
Page 8 of 174
In the event that alternate compliance is sought, training program credits, simulator
approvals, and device approvals may be significantly limited and reporting requirements
may be increased to ensure equivalent levels of training, checking, and currency are
maintained. TCCA will generally not consider relief through alternate compliance
means unless sufficient lead-time has been planned by an operator to allow for any
necessary testing and evaluation.
4.6 AQP/OEB Report relationship

Where an air operator has an approved AQP, differences between this report and an
operator’s proposed training, checking, and currency requirements under an AQP
should be substantiated and documented as part of the operator’s AQP approval
process. Program approvals under AQP need to ensure the provisions and
requirements of this report have been addressed, and where necessary, coordination
with the OEB has been completed.
4.7 Boeing 737 MAX Initial Type Training, STAR and PEC course evaluations
TCCA conducted a joint operational evaluation with the FAA (lead authority) and EASA
of three separate B-737-8 type training courses in March and April of 2017 in Miami, FL
and Seattle, WA using a T5 evaluation process.
The three courses included an initial type training course, an FAA Shortened Transition
and Rating (STAR) course and an EASA Previous Experience Credit (PEC) course.
The initial type training course had a 26 day footprint, while the STAR/PEC courses had
an 18 day footprint. The reduced footprint of the STAR and PEC courses was achieved
by giving credit to pilots qualified on other Boeing types for commonality in flight deck
layout, operational philosophy, and similar handling characteristics. Pilots from all three
authorities with B-757 and B-787 experience evaluated the STAR and PEC courses.
The three courses were found to be acceptable by TCCA for use as the basis of an air
operator’s or private operator’s training program.
4.8 Differences between Boeing 737 MAX and Boeing 737NG

In August 2016, TCCA participated jointly with the FAA (lead authority) and EASA to
evaluate differences from the Boeing 737NG (B-737-800) to the Boeing 737 MAX (B-
737-8) using a T2/T3 evaluation process.
NOTE
The B-737-800 (Serial Number YT951) used to compare differences with the B-737-8
incorporated the Short Field Performance (SFP) enhancements of the B-737-
800SFP.
Page 9 of 174
Master Training and Checking Differences of B/B respectively were established in the
transition from the Boeing 737NG to the Boeing 737 MAX. The same B73C Pilot Type
Rating as the Boeing 737NG was assigned to the B-737-8.
In September 2017, TCCA, the FAA and EASA jointly evaluated differences from the B-
737 MAX (B737-8) to the B-737NG (B-737-800) using a T2/T3 evaluation process.
Master Level B/B differences were established in the transition from the B-737 MAX to
the B-737NG.
4.9 Differences between B-737-8 and B-737-9

In September 2017, TCCA, the FAA and EASA jointly evaluated differences from the B-
737-8 to the B-737-9 using a T1 evaluation process. Master Level A/A differences were
established between the B-737-8 and B-737-9. The B-737-9 is incorporated into the B-
737 MAX family aircraft into the Appendix 2 MDR Table.
NOTE
The B-737-9 has not been type certified in Canada and is therefore not included on
the TCCA Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) A-146, nor assigned a TCCA Pilot
Type Rating designator.
4.10 Boeing 737-800 Boeing Converted Freighter (BCF)

TCCA has validated by analysis the differences established by the FAA FSB between
the B-737-800 and B-737-800 Boeing Converted Freighter (BCF). The FAA analysis
identified that the B-737-800BCF is functionally equivalent to the B-737-800. The B-737-
800BCF is incorporated into the B-737NG family aircraft into the Appendix 2 MDR
Table. The B-737-800BCF, as well as the associated AFM change, was found to be
operationally suitable by the FAA.
NOTE
The B-737-800BCF has not been type certified in Canada and is therefore not
included on the TCCA TCDS A-146, nor assigned a TCCA Pilot Type Rating
designator.
4.11 Rockwell Collins right seat Head Up Display (HUD) installation

In April 2018, the FAA FSB conducted flight evaluations of the Rockwell Collins right
seat Head-Up Display (HUD) installation. The FSB found the right seat HUD and the
use of dual HUD operations to be operationally suitable. This Operational Evaluation
Board Report has been revised to add the optional equipment training requirements
where necessary.
Page 10 of 174
4.12 Boeing 737-8 Boeing Business Jet (BBJ) MAX 8

TCCA has validated by analysis the FAA FSB determination established in April 2018
that the BBJ MAX 8 is functionally equivalent to the BBJ 2 (Boeing 737-800 BBJ)
aircraft. The BBJ MAX 8 is incorporated into the B-737 MAX family aircraft into
Appendix 2, MDR Table. The BBJ MAX 8, as well as the associated AFM change, was
found to be operationally suitable, by the FAA.
NOTE
The Boeing Business Jet series (BBJ1/BBJ, BBJ2, BBJ3 or BBJ MAX 8) have not
been type certified in Canada and are therefore not on the TCCA TCDS A-146, nor
assigned a TCCA Pilot Type Rating designator.
4.13 Revised Flight Control Computer (FCC) software evaluation

In March 2019, the FAA FSB with TCCA and EASA conducted a T2 handling quality
evaluation of revised Flight Control Computer (FCC P11.1) software between the B-
737-800 and the B-737-8. This operational evaluation determined that the handling
qualities between the B-737-800 and the B-737-8 validated the original T2 evaluation
results conducted in August 2016. Subsequently in March 2019, the FAA FSB
conducted an additional T1 functional equivalence evaluation with the new FCC
software version P12.1. This evaluation determined functional equivalence between
software versions FCC P11.1 and P12.1 with regards to airplane handling qualities and
pilot training.
4.14 Joint Operational Evaluation Board (JOEB) Evaluation of Boeing 737 MAX
design changes
In September 2020, TCCA, EASA and ANAC conducted a Joint Operational Evaluation
Board (JOEB) under the leadership of the FAA FSB to evaluate the updated 737-8 FCC
software version P12.1.2, revised Non-Normal Checklists (NNCs), and all proposed pilot
training in support of B-737-8 and B-737-9 design changes. The JOEB determined the
updated software version FCC P12.1.2 was operationally suitable. In addition, the JOEB
determined that the Boeing training evaluated, was acceptable for use by Canadian
Operators. Specific training requirements are listed in Appendix 7 of this OEB Report.
4.15 Boeing 737-8200

TCCA has validated by analysis the FAA FSB determination established in January
2021 that the B-737-8200 is functionally equivalent to the B-737 MAX 8 aircraft. The B-
737-8200, as well as the associated AFM change, was found to be operationally
suitable, by the FAA. Master Level A/A differences were established between the B-
Page 11 of 174
737-8 and the B-737-8200. The B-737-8200 is incorporated into the B-737 MAX family
aircraft into the Appendix 2 MDR Table.
NOTE
The Boeing 737-8200 has not been type certified in Canada and is therefore not on
the TCCA TCDS A-146, nor assigned a TCCA Pilot Type Rating designator.
4.16 Appendix 8 - Purpose

The title of the Appendix 8 is Supplemental training guidance to TCCA OE report for B-
737.
The purpose of Appendix 8 is to provide guidance on new training incorporated into
Section 9 and Appendix 7 of this OE report.
Page 12 of 174
5. Acronyms
AC Advisory Circular
ACP Approved Check Pilot
ACFT Aircraft
ADV Advanced
AFCS Automatic Flight Control System
AFDS Autopilot Flight Director System
AFM Airplane Flight Manual
AGL Above Ground Level
ANAC Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (Brazil)
ANCDU Alternate Navigation Control Display Unit
ANS Alternate Navigation System
AOA Angle of Attack
AOC Air Operator Certificate
AP Autopilot
APU Auxiliary Power Unit
AQP Advanced Qualification Program
AT Auto Throttles
ATC Air Traffic Control
AV Audiovisual Presentation
AWM Airworthiness Manual
BBJ Boeing Business Jet
BCF Boeing Converted Freighter
CAR Canadian Aviation Regulation
CASS Commercial Air Service Standard
CAT Category
CBT Computer-Based Training
CDS Common Display System
CDU Control Display Unit
CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain
COM Company Operations Manual
CPD Common Procedures Document
CPT Cockpit Procedures Trainer
CRM Crew Resource Management
DA Decision Altitude
DH Decision Height
DR Difference Requirements
DU Display Unit
Page 13 of 174
EASA European Union Aviation Safety Agency

EDFCS Enhanced Digital Flight Control System
EDS Emergency Descent Speedbrakes
EEC Electronic Engine Control
EFIS Electronic Flight Instrument System
EFVS Enhanced Flight Vision System
EGPWS Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System
EGT Exhaust Gas Temperature
ER Extended Range
ETOPS Extended Range Twin-Engine Operations
EVS Enhanced Vision System
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAF Final Approach Fix
FANS Future Air Navigation System
FAR Federal Aviation Regulation
FCC Flight Control Computer
FCOM Fight Crew Operations Manual
FCTM Flight Crew Training Manual
FD Flight Director
FFS Full Flight Simulator
FLT CHAR Flight Characteristics
FMA Flight Mode Annunciator
FMC Flight Management Computer
FMS Flight Management System
FPV Flight Path Vector
FSB Flight Standardization Board (FAA)
FSBR Flight Standardization Board Report
FSTD Flight Simulation Training Device
FTD Flight Training Device
FTOC Flight Technical and Operator Certification (TCCA)
GLS Global Positioning System Landing System
GS Glideslope
HAT Height Above Threshold
HGS Head-Up Guidance System
HO Handout
HUD Head-Up Display
ICBI Interactive Computer-Based Instruction
ILS Instrument Landing System
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions
IOE Initial Operating Experience
Page 14 of 174
IR Infrared
IS&S Innovative Solutions and Support
ISFD Integrated Standby Flight Display
JOEB Joint Operational Evaluation Board
LAM Landing Attitude Modifier
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
LOC Localizer
LOE Line Operational Evaluation
LOFT Line-Oriented Flight Training
LOS Line-Operational Simulation
LPV Lateral Approach Procedures with Vertical Guidance
MCAS Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System
MCDU Multi-purpose Control and Display Unit
MDA Minimum Descent Altitude
MDR Master Differences Requirements
MDS MAX Display System
MEL Minimum Equipment List
MFD Multifunction Display
MFF Mixed Fleet Flying
MLW Maximum Landing Weight
MTOW Maximum Takeoff Weight
MTW Maximum Taxi Weight
MZFW Maximum Zero Fuel Weight
N1 Rotational Speed of the Low-Pressure Compressor in a Dual-Spool Gas
Turbine Engine
NAV Navigation
ND Navigation Display
NG Next Generation
NM Nautical Mile
NNC Non-Normal Checklist
NPA Non-Precision Approach
NUCC Non-Uniformity Correction Calibration
OE Operational Evaluation
OEB Operational Evaluation Board
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
PEC Previous Experience Credit
PF Pilot Flying
PFD Primary Flight Display
PIC Pilot In Command
PM Pilot Monitoring
Page 15 of 174
PMS Performance Management System

POI Principal Operations Inspector
PPC Pilot Proficiency Check
PROC CHNG Procedural Changes
PSEU Proximity Switch Electronic Unit
PTT Part Task Trainer
QRH Quick Reference Handbook
RC Rockwell Collins
RCAS Roll Command Alerting System
RNP Required Navigation Performance
RNP AR Required Navigation Performance Authorization Required
RSAT Runway Situational Awareness Tools
RVR Runway Visual Range
SA Special Authorization/Specific Approval
SELCAL Selective Calling
SFP Short Field Performance
SIC Second In Command
SMGCS Surface Movement Guidance and Control System
SMYD Stall Management & Yaw Damper
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
STAR Shortened Transition and Rating
STC Supplemental Type Certificate
STS Speed Trim System
SU Stand-Up Instruction
TASE Training Area of Special Emphasis
TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System
TCBI Tutorial Computer-Based Instruction
TCCA Transport Canada Civil Aviation
TO/GA Takeoff/Go-Around
TCDS Type Certificate Data Sheet
TLI Transition Line Indoctrination
TTL Technical Team Leader
UPRT Upset Prevention and Recovery Training
UTC Universal Coordinated Time
V1 Takeoff Decision Speed
VOR Very High Frequency Omni-Directional Range
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions
VREF Reference Landing Speed
WAAS Wide Area Augmentation System
VSD Vertical Situation Display
Page 16 of 174
6. Definitions
These definitions are for the purposes of this report only.
6.1 Base Aircraft – An aircraft identified for use as a reference to compare differences
with another aircraft.
6.2 Current – A crewmember meets all requirements to operate the aircraft under the
applicable CAR or CASS.
6.3 Differences Tables – Describe the differences between a pair of related aircraft,
and the minimum levels operators must use to conduct differences training and
checking of flight crew members. Difference levels range from A to E.
6.4 Master Differences Requirements (MDR) – Specifies the highest training and
checking difference levels between a pair of related aircraft derived from the
Differences Tables.
6.5 Mixed Fleet Flying (MFF) program– A program permitting the operation of a
base aeroplane and one or more variant of the same, common or different type by
one or more flight crew member, between training or checking events in
accordance with an approved process based on the recommendations of an OE
report that is acceptable to the Minister.
6.6 Operational Evaluation – A TCCA evaluation of the pilot qualifications
requirements of an aircraft type (pilot type rating, minimum flight crew member
training, checking and currency requirements, and unique or special pilot
qualification requirements (e.g., specific flight characteristics, no-flap landing)),
operational suitability of an aircraft type and the Original Equipment Manufacturer
(OEM) training program.
6.7 Operational Suitability – A determination during an operational evaluation that an
aircraft or system may be used in the Canadian airspace system and meets the
applicable operational regulations (e.g., CAR subparts 604, 605, 701,702,703,704
and 705 as applicable).
6.8 Qualified – A flight crew member holds the appropriate licenses and ratings as
required by the applicable operating regulations.
6.9 Related Aircraft – Any two or more aircraft of the same make with either the same
or different type certificates that have been demonstrated and determined by
TCCA to have commonality.
6.10 Seat Dependent Tasks – Maneuvers or procedures using controls that are
accessible or operable from only one flight crew member seat.
Page 17 of 174
6.11 Specific Flight Characteristics – A maneuver or procedure with unique handling

or performance characteristics that TCCA has determined must be checked.
6.12 Training Areas of Special Emphasis (TASE) – A training requirement unique to
the aircraft, based on a system, procedure, or maneuver, which requires additional
highlighting during training. It may also require additional training time, specialized
training devices or training equipment.
Page 18 of 174
7. Pilot type rating

7.1 The pilot type rating designator for the B-737-100/-200/-200C (Boeing 737) is
B73A.
7.2 The pilot type rating designator for the B-737-300/-400/-500 (Boeing 737CL) is
B73B.
7.3 The pilot type rating designator for the B-737-600/-700/-800/-8 (Boeing 737NG and
Boeing 737 MAX) is B73C.
Page 19 of 174
8. Related aircraft
Type Certificate Data Sheet TCDS Identifier/Master
Marketing Name Pilot Type Rating
(TCDS)* Series
B-737-100 Boeing 737 B73A (TCCA)

A16WE (FAA) (1) B-737-200 (B-737) B-737 (FAA) (3)
B-737-200C (1)
B-737-300
A-146 Boeing 737 Classic (CL) B73B (TCCA)
B-737-400
A16WE (FAA) (B-737CL) B-737 (FAA)
B-737-500
B-737-600 Boeing 737 Next Generation (NG)

A-146 B-737-700 (B-737NG) B73C (TCCA)
A16WE (FAA) B-737-800 Boeing 737-800SFP B-737 (FAA)
B-737-800SFP (4) (B-737-800SFP)
Boeing Business Jet

A16WE (FAA) B-737-700 (BBJ 1 / BBJ) (2) (5) B-737 (FAA)
B-737-800 (BBJ 2) (2) (5)
Boeing 737-800BCF
A16WE (FAA) B-737-800BCF (2) B-737 (FAA)
(B-737-800BCF)
Boeing 737 Next Generation (NG)
B-737-700C (2) (B-737NG)
A16WE (FAA) 2 B-737-900 (2) B-737 (FAA)
Boeing Business Jet 3
B-737-900ER (2)
(BBJ 3) (2) (5)
A-146 B-737-8 Boeing 737 MAX 8 B73C (TCCA)

A16WE (FAA) (B-737 MAX 8) B-737 (FAA)
A16WE (FAA) B-737-8 Boeing Business Jet MAX 8 BB-737 (FAA)

BBJ MAX 8 (2) (5)
A16WE (FAA) B-737-8200 (2) Boeing 737-8200 B-737 (FAA)
(B-737-8200)
A16WE (FAA) B-737-9 (2) Boeing 737 MAX 9 B-737 (FAA)
(B-737 MAX 9)
Table 1
B-737 TCDS/Master Series, Marketing Name and Pilot Type Rating names
Page 20 of 174
NOTES
(1) The B-737-100/-200/-200C series aircraft are not included on TCDS A-146.
These aircraft were accepted by TCCA prior to 1970, under the terms of the
Canada/U.S. Bilateral Airworthiness Agreement.
(2) The B-737-700C/-900/-900 Extended Range (ER) series, the Boeing Business
Jet Aircraft (BBJ1, BBJ2, BBJ 3 and BBJ MAX 8, and the B-737-8200/-9) have
not been type certified in Canada and are therefore not included on TCDS A-146,
nor assigned a TCCA Pilot Type Rating designator.
(3) The FAA has assigned the B-737 Pilot Type rating to all series of the Boeing 737,
but have grouped the series by marketing names (Boeing 737, Boeing 737CL,
Boeing 737NG and Boeing 737 MAX), which correspond to the TCCA pilot type
ratings (B73A, B73B and B73C).
(4) The B-737-800SFP is a Short Field Performance enhancement to the B-737-800.
The B-737-800SFP has differences in auto-slats, flap load relief, flap/slat
sequencing and spoiler deflection compared to the “standard” B-737-800. This
enhancement is basic to the B-737 MAX.
(5) The BBJ 1 is a B-737-700 series with Primary Flight Display (PFD)/Navigation
Display (ND) and HUD. The BBJ 2 is a B-737-800 series with PFD/ND and
HUD. The BBJ 3 is a B-737-900ER series with PFD/ND and HUD. The BBJ
MAX 8 is a B-737-8 series with HUD.
8.1 Related Aircraft on same TCDS

The B-737-300/-400/-500 (B73B) and B737-600/-700/-800/-800SFP/-8 (B73C) are
related aircraft on TCCA TCDS A-146.
8.2 Related Aircraft on different TCDS

The B-737-100/-200/-200C (B73A) and B737-700C/-800BCF/-8200/-900/-900ER/-9 (B-
737 (FAA Type Rating)) are related aircraft on FAA TCDS A16WE.
Page 21 of 174
9. Pilot training
9.1 Previous experience

The provisions of this section apply to all B-737 training programs for pilots who have
experience in CAR 705 airline, CAR 604 private operator or equivalent operations in
multi-engine transport turbojet aeroplanes. Pilots receiving B-737 training should have
experience in high altitude operations, highly integrated avionics systems with electronic
flight displays, AFCS, AT, and FMS. Pilots without this experience may require
additional training.
The STAR course requires that pilots have prerequisite experience on transport
category aeroplanes equipped with EFIS, FMS and Autoflight systems. The basic
EASA PEC course requirements are a current EASA type rating on B-737-300-900, B-
747-400, B-757/767, B-777 or B-787 and 500 hours experience on type.
9.2 Training Areas of Special Emphasis (TASE)

NOTE
References to “pilots” in this section include both Pilot In Command (PIC) and
Second In Command (SIC) unless otherwise specified.
Pilots must receive special emphasis training in the following areas:
9.2.1 TASE - Ground Training
Pilots must receive special emphasis on the following areas during ground training:
9.2.1.1 Multiple Flight Deck Alerts during Non-Normal Conditions
Applicable to all series of the B-737:
Training is required for instances where a single malfunction results in multiple flight
deck alerts and must include flight crew alert prioritization and analysis of the need to
conduct additional Non-Normal Checklists (NNC). This training must be included in
initial, upgrade, transition, and recurrent training.
9.2.1.2 Automatic landings
When an operator is authorized for autoland operations, ground training is required
during a preflight briefing prior to flight training. This item must be included in initial,
upgrade, transition, differences, and recurrent training.
The B-737NG and B-737 MAX autoland systems are identical and do not require
differences training unless transitioning between the Fail Passive system and the Fail
Operational system.
9.2.1.3 Enhanced Digital Flight Control System (EDFCS)
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When an EDFCS that supports Fail Operational autoland operations with a Fail Passive
Rollout system is used, ground training is required during a preflight briefing prior to
flight training. This item must be included in initial, upgrade, transition, differences, and
recurrent training.
Operational system.
9.2.1.4 B-737 MAX Flight Control System
The Elevator Jam Landing Assist system and the Landing Attitude Modifier (LAM)
ground training must address the system functions and associated flight spoiler
deployments. These items must be included in initial, transition, differences, and
recurrent training.
9.2.1.5 B-737 MAX Flight Control Computer (FCC)
MCAS ground training must address the latest FCC system description, functionality,
and associated failure conditions to include flight crew alerting. This training must be
included in initial, transition, differences, and recurrent training.
9.2.1.6 HUD
Training must address appropriate ground training elements for both HUD and non-
HUD operations as specified in Appendix 5, Head-Up Guidance (HUD) qualification
program. This item must be included in initial, upgrade, transition, differences, and
recurrent training.
9.2.1.7 B-737 MAX gear handle
Gear handle operation to address normal and non-normal procedures. This item must
be included in initial, transition, differences, and recurrent training.
9.2.2 TASE - Flight Training
Pilots must receive special emphasis on the following areas during flight training:
9.2.2.1 Automatic landings
When an operator is authorized for autoland operations, flight training must occur with
the appropriate Autopilot (AP) autoland systems (e.g., Fail Operational vs. Fail Passive).
This training can occur in either a full flight simulator (FFS) or aeroplane. Flight training
must ensure appropriate AFM limitations are addressed and complied with. This item
must be included in initial, upgrade, transition, differences, and recurrent training.
Page 23 of 174
Operational system.
9.2.2.2 EDFCS
When an EDFCS that supports Fail Operational autoland operations with a Fail Passive
Rollout system is used, flight training can occur in either an FFS or airplane and should
address dual channel AP approaches. This item must be included in initial, upgrade,
transition, differences, and recurrent training.
Operational system.
9.2.2.3 HUD
When HUD is installed and an operator is authorized HUD operations, training must
address appropriate flight training elements for both HUD and non-HUD operations as
specified in Appendix 5, Head-Up Guidance (HUD) qualification program. This item
must be included in initial, upgrade, transition, differences, and recurrent training.
9.2.2.4 Stabilizer trim
9.2.2.4.1 Training must emphasize the following during manual and electric
trim operations:
a) Manufacturer recommended procedures for the proper use of main

electric stabilizer trim during normal and non-normal conditions, and
manual stabilizer trim during non-normal conditions;
b) The different manual trim techniques recommended by the
manufacturer;
c) The effects of airspeed and aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer and
the resulting trim forces in both the nose-up and nose-down
directions during operations at low and high airspeeds and/or mach
number; and
d) Use of manual stabilizer trim during approach, go-around, and level
off.
9.2.2.4.2 This item must be included in initial or transition training and must be
accomplished at least once every 36 months during recurrent
training.
Page 24 of 174
9.2.2.5 Runaway stabilizer

Training must emphasize runaway stabilizer recognition and timely pilot actions required
by the Runaway Stabilizer NNC:
i. Demonstrate control column functionality and its effect on a runaway
stabilizer condition;
ii. Emphasize the need to reduce control column forces with main
electric stabilizer trim prior to selecting STAB TRIM cutout.
This item must be included in initial or transition training and must be accomplished at
least once every 36 months during recurrent training.
NOTE
Runaway Stabilizer flight simulator training must be conducted using the ATA 27
malfunction titled Stabilizer Runaway (also known as the Dual Wire short
malfunction). Use of the ATA 27 malfunction, Stabilizer Runaway – Trim Switch (also
known as the Electric Trim Switch Malfunction) is not permitted for use in Runaway
Stabilizer flight training. Operators should ensure that the appropriate Runaway
Stabilizer malfunction is incorporated into their FFS, prior to Runaway Stabilizer
training. The TCCA National Simulator Evaluation Program (NSEP) should be
consulted on the incorporation of malfunctions into the FFS and the subsequent
qualification of the FFS for training.
9.2.2.6 Multiple Flight Deck Alerts during Non-Normal Conditions
Flight crew training must include scenario-based training for initial, upgrade, transition,
and recurrent flight crew training where a single malfunction results in multiple flight
deck alerts that require timely pilot actions to include:
• Recognition and interpretation of the non-normal condition.
• Prioritization of the required pilot actions
9.2.2.7 Unreliable airspeed
This training applies to pilots flying the B-737NG, B-737 MAX, or conducting B-
737NG/B-737 MAX Mixed Fleet Flying (MFF).
Training must include erroneous high angle of attack (AOA) malfunctions. This training
must also include a demonstration of Flight Director (FD) behavior (biasing out of view)
during a go-around or missed approach.
Page 25 of 174
Training must include the discretionary deactivation of nuisance stick shaker in

accordance with Airspeed Unreliable NNC.
This item must be included in initial, transition, and differences training and must be
accomplished at least once every 36 months during recurrent training. Either pilot may
serve as pilot flying (PF) for this training task.
Recurrent training may be accomplished in either a B-737NG or B-737 MAX FFS.
9.2.3 Tail strike avoidance
Each operator’s training program should address tail strike potential during takeoff and
landing. The B-737-400/-800/-900/-900ER/-8 and -9 series aircraft are slightly more
susceptible to tail strike due to their increased fuselage lengths.
9.2.4 Two position Tail skid
The B-737-900ER, B-737-800 SFP, B-737-8, and B-737-9 have a dual tail skid
configuration to protect the aft fuselage during landings (the dual tail skid is optional for
the B-737-800SFP, and -8). Approach speeds may be reduced with the protection
provided by the two-position tail skid. The resultant approach speeds and body
attitudes of the B-737-800SFP, -8, and -9 with the two position tail skid are similar to
that of the 737-700.
9.2.5 Landing de-rotation
The B-737-800SFP has been found to have greater than normal landing de-rotation
rates (i.e. higher than normal nose gear sink rate). In the interest of commonality with
all series of the B-737s, pilots should be trained to fly the nose wheel smoothly onto the
runway without delay on landing, and avoid attempting to hold the nose-wheels off of
the runway.
9.3 Specific flight characteristics

There are no specific flight characteristics.
9.4 Seat dependent tasks

Pilots must receive initial, transition, upgrade, and recurrent training in these seat
dependent tasks:
a) HUD (left seat (right seat, when installed)); initial, transition, upgrade, and
recurrent training.
b) Nosewheel steering (left seat, right seat, when installed); initial, transition,
upgrade, and recurrent training.
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c) Manual Landing Gear Extension (right seat); initial, transition and recurrent
training.
9.5 Training requirements not applicable to the B-737 series

9.5.1 Tuck and Mach buffet training
The B-737, B-737CL, B-737NG, and B-737 MAX do not exhibit any Mach Tuck
tendency and therefore no training is required for this flight maneuver. Demonstration of
the aircraft’s overspeed protection capabilities is an acceptable substitute.
9.5.2 Fuel Jettisoning
The B-737, B-737CL, B-737NG, and B-737 MAX do not have fuel jettisoning capability.
9.6 Flight Simulation Training Devices (FSTD)

An approved Level C of D B-737 FFS equipped with day and night visual scenes that is
representative of an operator’s specific B-737 configuration is required for flight training.
The flight training for the B-737 MAX required in Appendix 7 of this report must be
conducted in a in a suitably qualified B-737 MAX Level C or D FFS, that meets Upset
Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT) requirements. The FFS must have installed
a Binary Simulation Load revision 3.23.4_3 or higher and FCC software version P12.1.2
must be assured to be active. For B-737 MAX pilots conducting B-737NG/B-737 MAX
MFF, some flight training exercises may be conducted in a suitably qualified B-737NG
Level C or D FFS only where indicated in the Appendix 7.
Stabilizer Trim and Runaway Stabilizer training for all B-737s requires a FFS that has
the required flight deck effects for this training. The manual stabilizer trim system must
be representative of proper control forces and travel system operation.
NOTE
The FFS requirements for Enhanced Flight Vision System (EFVS) training is provided in
Annex 1 of Appendix 5 of this report.
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9.7 Training equipment

There are no specific systems or procedures that are unique to the B-737 series that
require specific training equipment.
9.8 Differences Training between Related Aircraft

Pilots must receive differences training between the B-737 and B-737CL, B-737CL
Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) and B-737CL non-EFIS, B-737CL and B-
737NG, certain variations of B-737NG, B-737NG and B-737 MAX, and variations of B-
737 MAX.
NOTE
Pilots transitioning from one B-737 Pilot Type Rating to another (e.g. B73B to B73C)
or conducting Mixed Fleet Flying (MFF) with different B-737 Pilot Type Ratings (e.g.
B73B and B73C) require exemptions to specific provisions of CAR 705.106, CASS
725.106 and CAR 705.113. Appendices 2, 3 and 4 provide the training, checking
and Transition credits between various B-737 series.
9.8.1 B-737NG to B-737 MAX Ground Training
Ground training is required for differences between the B-737NG and B-737 MAX. See
Appendices 2, 3, and 7.
9.8.2 B-737NG to B-737 MAX Flight Training
Flight training is required for differences between the B-737NG and B-737 MAX. See
Appendices 2, 3, 4 and 7.
9.8.3 B-737CL (EFIS/Non-EFIS) aircraft to/from B-737NG (PFD/ND) aircraft
differences
Applicable from the B-737CL (Electronic Flight Instrument Systems (EFIS) and non-
EFIS) aircraft to B-737NG (PFD/ND) aircraft only:
PFD/ND differences require a minimum of 12 hours in an interactive CBT, 6
programmed hours in a level 6 FTD, and supervised line flying as described in Appendix
4. Pilots must be trained in accordance with the difference levels specified in Appendix
2. The ND is an expansion of the MAP mode and the CBT needs to only demonstrate
the differences in display selections and capabilities (e.g. Center Map). The following
elements should be included in the training curriculum:
a) FMA Differences
b) AFDS Status Annunciator
c) Vertical Speed Display
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d) Airspeed Bugs and Flap Maneuvering Speeds

e) Compass Rose
f) Pitch Limit Indicator
g) Airspeed Trend Vector
h) Minimum and Maximum Speeds
i) Landing Altitude Reference Bar
j) Altimeter Setting
k) LOC And GS Deviation
l) Selected Altitude Indication (Bug)
m) Ground Speed Display
n) Radio Altitude Display
o) TCAS Resolution Advisories
p) Time Critical Warnings
q) Approach Reference Area
r) Marker Beacon Indication
s) System Failures and Flags
t) No “Compact Display” (DU Switching only)
9.8.4 Blended, Split-scimitar and the MAX Advanced Technology winglet
Operators engaged in Mixed Fleet Flying (MFF) (i.e. MFF 737CL and/or 737NG and/or
737 MAX) with and without winglets must address differences at the A/A level including:
a) Physical/dimensional differences, with emphasis on lower strake ground
clearance considerations during ground operations
b) Takeoff crosswind guidelines
c) Landing crosswind guidelines
d) Ground contact angles for normal landings
9.8.5 Roll Command Alerting System (RCAS)
RCAS is optional equipment on the B-737NG and standard on the B-737 MAX. Level B
training is sufficient for initial, transition, and upgrade training in that series aircraft.
Page 29 of 174
9.8.6 Runway Situational Awareness Tools (RSAT) system

RSAT consists of On-Ground Overrun Warning, In-Air Overrun Warning, and a
Speedbrake Warning. RSAT is optional equipment on the B-737NG and B-737 MAX.
The FAA FSB found Level B training to be sufficient for differences.
9.8.7 Rockwell Collins Head-Up Guidance System (HGS) HGS-4000 and HGS-
6000
The HGS-4000 and HGS-6000 is optional equipment on the B-737NG and B-737 MAX.
The FAA FSB found for pilots already qualified on one system that Level A differences
training is sufficient to qualify on the other Rockwell Collins HGS.
9.8.8 Integrated Standby Flying Display (ISFD)
Training for ISFD may be satisfied with Level B differences training for all B-737 aircraft.
No flight training required.
9.8.9 Display Installation
Applies to Universal avionics flat panel display/FMS installations (Supplemental Type
Certificate (STC) No. ST03355AT/ST03356AT) into B-737-300 series or Innovative
Solutions & Support (IS&S) flat panel display installation (No. ST03125NY) into the B-
737-400 series. The FAA FSB found Level D differences training to be sufficient.
9.8.10 FMS for B-737-200 series
Applies to Universal avionics FMS installations (STC No. ST03362AT) into the B-737-
200 series. The FAA FSB found Level C differences training to be sufficient.
9.8.11 Future Air Navigation System (FANS)
Differences training for FANS 1 and/or FANS 2 may be satisfied with Level C training in
accordance with FAA AC 90-117, Data Link Communications (as amended) for all 737
aircraft. Flight crew who have completed FANS 1 training may qualify on FANS 2 with
Level A training.
9.8.12 Alternate Navigation System (ANS)
The ANS consists of use of the ISFD and Alternate Navigation Control Display Unit
(ANCDU) as a means to provide alternate navigation guidance in the event of an all
Flight Management Computer (FMC) fail situation. It is standard equipment on the 737
MAX BBJ. The FAAFSB has determined Level A training to be sufficient for differences.
9.8.13 FMS
Pilots qualified on the B-737 MAX with FMC U13 may qualify on a B-737 MAX with FMC
U14 with Level A training.
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9.9 B-737 MAX special training for flight crews

Completion of the ground and flight training specified in Appendix 7 is required before
flying the B-737 MAX.
9.10 Landing from a No flap or Non standard flap approach

The probability of flap extension failure on the B-737 is extremely remote due to system
design, therefore a demonstration of a no-flap approach and landing is not required
during training.
A partial flap approach and landing, with the leading edge devices in either the extend
or full extend position, and trailing edge flaps less than 15, is required during initial flight
training.
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10. Pilot checking
10.1
Reserved
10.2 Specific flight characteristics

There are no specific flight characteristics.
10.3 Seat dependent tasks

During initial, transition, and upgrade checking, pilots must be checked in these seat
dependent tasks:
a) HUD (left seat; right seat when installed).
b) Nosewheel steering (left seat; right seat when installed)
10.4 Other checking items

10.4.1 Precision approach using HUD and EFVS.
When HUD and/or EFVS use is approved, checking must include suitable
demonstration of HUD and/or EFVS use for modes and phases of flight authorized;
10.4.2 HUD vs. FD and Raw Data.
When HUD and/or EFVS is installed, PPC maneuvers, Line Oriented Flight Training
(LOFT), Line Oriented Simulation (LOS) or other demonstrations may be completed
using HUD at the check pilot’s/inspector’s discretion. However, periodic assessment of
non-HUD skills should be demonstrated, and at any time a check pilot/inspector may at
their discretion request that authorized maneuvers be performed without use of HUD
(e.g. if manual CAT I FD operations are authorized, the pilot being checked may be
requested to perform the maneuver without HUD).
10.5 FSTD
An approved Level C of D B-737 FFS equipped with day and night visual scenes that is
representative of an operator’s specific B-737 configuration is required for checking.
The FFS requirements for Enhanced Flight Vision System (EFVS) checking is provided
in Annex 1 of Appendix 5 of this report.
10.6 Equipment
There are no specific systems or procedures that are unique to the B-737 series aircraft
that require specific equipment.
Page 32 of 174
10.7 Differences Checking between Related Aircraft

10.7.1 Alternating PPC for B73A, B73B and B73C
For mixed-fleet-flying between different pilot type ratings, PPCs should alternate each
six months for PICs, and annually for other flight crew members.
When such alternating checks are accomplished, the differences assessment of other
series applicable to that pilot type rating being checked (e.g. either B-737-100/-200
(B73A), B-737-300/-400/-500 (B73B) and/or B-737-600/-700/-800 and/or B-737-8
(B73C)) may be satisfied by ground training, written questionnaire, oral review, or other
method approved by the Principal Operations Inspector (POI) or Technical Team
Leader (TTL). However, such simplified programs may not be approved if they result in
progressive loss of knowledge or skills related to particular differences over successive
recurrent periods.
NOTE
725.106 and CAR 705.113. Appendices 2, 3 and 4 provide the training, checking
and transition credits between the B-737 series aircraft.
10.7.2 FMS demonstration of competency/checks
Checking for differences related to a series having FMS must include a demonstration
of competency covering both an oral/written exam and demonstration of proficiency with
both normal and non-normal procedures. FMS proficiency should be demonstrated with
“hands-on” operation, and address each applicable FMS mode or function. Specific
items and flight phases to be checked may include initialization, takeoff, departure,
cruise, arrival, precision and Non-Precision Approach (NPA), missed approach, holding,
diversion to an alternate or route re-clearance, and pertinent non-normal scenarios.
Scenarios used should include routes, airports, ATC situations, and other factors, which
are representative of, or present equivalent complexity to those anticipated for that
operator. FMS competency may be demonstrated in conjunction with other checking.
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11. Pilot currency

There are no additional currency requirements for the B-737, B-737CL, B-737NG and
B-737 MAX other than those already specified in CAR 705 and CAR 604.
11.1 Differences Currency between Related Aircraft

Not Applicable
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12. Operational suitability

The B-737, B-737CL, B-737NG and B-737 MAX are operationally suitable for
operations under CAR 705 and CAR 604.
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13. Miscellaneous
13.1 ETOPS
The B-737-600/-700/-800 and B-737-8 meet TCCA certification criteria for 180-minute
ETOPS operations. TCCA operational approval is required to conduct ETOPS.
13.2 FAA approvals for ETOPS

 The B-737-200 and B-737CL aircraft are approved for 120-minute ETOPS.
 The B-737NG aircraft are approved for 180-minute ETOPS (see note below).
 The B-737 MAX aircraft are approved for 180-minute ETOPS.
NOTE: The B-737-800BCF is not approved for ETOPS.
13.3 Forward Observer Seat

The B-737, B-737CL, B-737NG and B-737 MAX forward center observer seat has been
evaluated by the FAA and determined to meet the requirements of FAR 121.581(a),
FAR 125.317(b), FAR 135.75(b) and Advisory Circular (AC) 120-83. TCCA has
accepted the findings of the FAA in the absence of any TCCA regulatory criteria
regarding a forward observer seat.
13.4 Landing Minima categories

Approach Category for B-737 series aircraft is as follows:
Aircraft Category
B-737 C
B737CL C
B-737-600/700 C
B-737-800/900/900ER C or D
B-737 MAX C or D
NOTE
Due to the numerous maximum landing weight options among the B-737NG and the
B-737 MAX, determining an aircraft approach category may be done using the
certificated maximum flap setting of 40º and the particular airplane’s AFM maximum
certificated landing weight.
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13.5 Normal landing flaps

The B-737, B-737CL, B-737NG and B-737 MAX series normal “final landing flap setting”
is Flaps 15º, 30º, and 40º. Flaps 15º is primarily used for non-normal situations (e.g.
engine out approach) or atypical operations (e.g. high altitude airport operations).
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14. References
1. FAA Flight Standardization Board (FSB) Report for the Boeing 737 Revision 18
dated 03/03/2021 (March 03, 2021) or later revision (http://fsims.faa.gov/).
2. FAA Advisory Circular AC120-53B, Change 1, Guidance for Conduction and Use of
Flight Standardization Board Evaluations, dated 10/24/16 (October 24, 2016) or
later revision (http://fsims.faa.gov/).
3. FAA Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) A16WE Revision 68 dated 07/19/2021
(July 19, 2021) or later revision (http://fsims.faa.gov/).
4. JOEB OPS/FCL Common Procedures For Conducting Operational Evaluation

Boards, dated June 10, 2004
5. Transport Canada Advisory Circular, AC 700-035, Special Authorization for Take-off

Operations below RVR 600 down to and including RVR 300, at Issue 01, dated
2016-02-12 or later Issue
6. Transport Canada Policy Letter, PL 173. Flight crew Member Qualification Credits
for Transition Programs and Mixed Fleet Flying Programs, dated July 25, 2007
7. Transport Canada Publication (TP) 6327, Safety Criteria for Approval of Extended
Range Twin-Engine Operations (ETOPS) dated June 2007
8. TCCA Type Certificate Data Sheet A-146, Issue No. 197, dated June 30, 2021 or
later issue.
9. Interim Order (IO) Respecting Certain Training Requirements (B-737-8 and Other),
No. 3 dated February 26, 2021, or later revision.
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Appendix 1 – Differences Legend
Training Differences Legend
Differences Type Training Method Examples Conditions

Level
A Self- • Operating manual revision (HO) • Crew has already demonstrated understanding on base aircraft (e.g.
instruction • Flight crew operating bulletin (HO) updated version of engine).
• Minor or no procedural changes required.
• No safety impact if information is not reviewed or is forgotten (e.g. different
engine vibration damping mount).
• Once called to attention of crew, the difference is self-evident.
B Aided • Audiovisual presentation (AV) • Systems are functionally similar.
instruction • Tutorial computer-based • Crew understanding required.
instruction (TCBI) • Issues need emphasis.
• Stand-up instruction (SU) • Standard methods of presentation required.
C Systems • Interactive (full-task) computer- • Training can only be accomplished through systems training devices.
Devices based instruction (ICBI) • Training objectives focus on mastering individual systems, procedures or
• Cockpit procedures trainers (CPT) tasks versus highly integrated flight operations or “real-time” operations.
• Part task trainers (PTT) • Training devices are required to assure attainment or retention of crew
• Level 4 or 5 flight training device skills to accomplish more complex tasks usually related to aircraft systems.
(FTD 4-5)
D Maneuvers • Level 6 or 7 flight training device • Training can only be accomplished in flight maneuver devices in a real-time
Devices (FTD 6-7) environment.
• Level A or B full flight simulator • Training requires mastery of interrelated skills versus individual skills.
(FFS A-B) • Motion, visual, control loading and specific environmental conditions may
be required.
E Level C/D • Level C or D full flight simulator • Motion, visual, control loading, audio and specific environmental conditions
FFS or (FFS C-D) are required.
Aircraft • Aircraft (ACFT) • Significant full task differences that require a high fidelity environment.
• Usually correlates with significant differences in handling qualities.
Page 39 of 174
Checking Differences Legend
Differences Checking Method Examples Conditions

Level
A None None
B • Oral or written exam • Individual systems or related groups of systems.
• Tutorial computer-based instruction (TCBI) self-test
C • Interactive (full-task) computer-based instruction (ICBI) • Checking can only be accomplished using systems devices.
• Cockpit procedures trainers (CPT) • Checking objectives focus on mastering individual systems,
• Part task trainers (PTT) procedures or tasks.
• Level 4 or 5 flight training device (FTD 4-5)
D • Level 6 or 7 flight training device (FTD 6-7) • Checking can only be accomplished in flight maneuver
• Level A or B full flight simulator (FFS A-B) devices in a real-time environment.
• Checking requires mastery of interrelated skills versus
individual skills.
• Motion, visual, control loading and specific environmental
conditions may be required.
E • Level C or D full flight simulator (FFS C-D) • Significant full task differences that require a high fidelity
• Aircraft (ACFT) environment.
Page 40 of 174
Appendix 2 – Master Differences Requirements (MDR) Table

These are the minimum levels of training and checking required, derived from the highest level in the Differences Tables
in Appendix 3. Differences levels are arranged as training/checking.
Pilot Type From B73A B73B B73B B73C (4) B73C (5)
Rating Base Aircraft
→
To Related Marketing B-737 B-737CL B-737CL B-737NG B-737 MAX

Aircraft ↓ Name (NON-EFIS) (EFIS)
B73A B-737 A/A C*/C* C*/C* D/D NOT

NAV - B/B EVALUATED
PMS - C/B
AFCS-C/B
(1) ADV-B/A
B73B B-737CL C*/C A/A C/B (3) C/B NOT

(NON-EFIS) (2) LIMITED EVALUATED
FMS - C/B
B73B B-737CL C*/C* C/B A/A (3) C/B NOT

(EFIS) (2) LIMITED PFD/ND - D/C EVALUATED
FMS - C/B
B73C B-737NG D/D (3)C/B (3) C/B A/A B/B

PFD/ND – D/C PFD/ND – D/C (3) EFIS to
PFD/ND- C/B
PFD/ND to
EFIS – D/C
EDFCS – C/C
B73C B-737 MAX NOT NOT NOT (D*) B/B A/A

EVALUATED EVALUATED EVALUATED
Page 41 of 174
FOOT NOTES TO MDR TABLE:
C* - Level C training or checking, which requires use of a Level 5 FSTD or higher.
D* - Prior to operating the 737 MAX aircraft with FCC software version P12.1.2 or newer, each pilot must complete the
required training outlined in Appendix 7. Appendix 7 serves as special training for ground and flight training
requirements for 737 MAX pilot qualification. The asterisk MDR annotation, “(D*) B/B” is intentionally used in the table
to call attention. Level C or D full flight simulator (FFS C-D) is required for the D* training.
(1) All Model 737-200 series airplanes having serial numbers 20492 and subsequent are the -200 advanced (737-200
ADV) series airplane and require Level B differences training when transitioning from the 737-100/-200. All earlier
airplanes can be kit-modified to the advanced configuration.
(2) Limited FMS pertains to B-737CL aeroplanes which retain partial FMS functions.
(3) C level training requirement may be satisfied by interactive CBT.
(4) The B-737-700C/-800BCF/-900/-900ER/-BBJ1/-BBJ2/-BBJ3 are not type certified in Canada and are not included in
the B73C pilot type rating designator. Refer to Note 2 in Section 8.0, following Table 1.
(5) The B-737-8200/-9/BBJ MAX 8 are not type certified in Canada and are not included in the B73C pilot type rating
designator. Refer to Note 2 in Section 8.0, following Table 1.
Page 42 of 174
Appendix 3 – Difference Tables
This Design Differences table, from the Boeing 737-800 to the Boeing 737-8, was proposed by The Boeing Company and
validated by TCCA. It lists the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and
checking of flight crew members.
FROM BASE DESIGN REMARKS FLT PROC TRAINING CHECKING

AIRCAFT: B-737-800 CHAR CHNG
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT: B-737-8
Nose Landing Gear Lengthened 8 inches.

CONFIGURATION No No A A
Dual Tail Anti-Collision/Position Lights
No No
PANEL LAYOUT New MAX DISPLAY SYSTEM (MDS) B B
New 2 Position Landing Gear Control

PANEL LAYOUT No Yes B B
Lever
LIMITATIONS Size/type/system limitations No No A A
LIMITATIONS Ground wind operating envelope No No A A
Page 43 of 174

TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT: B-737-8
Increased to:
 Max Taxi Weight (MTW)

- 181,700 lb.
 Max Takeoff Weight (MTOW)
WEIGHTS - 181,200 lb. No No A A
 Max Landing Weight (MLW)
- 152,800 lb.
 Max Zero Fuel Weight (MZFW)
- 145,400 lb.
ATA 21 PACKS:
AIR CONDITIONING Electronic Pack Flow Control System No No B B
ATA 21 PACKS:
AIR CONDITIONING Revised PACK light logic No Yes A A
EQUIPMENT COOLING:
ATA 21
EQUIP SMOKE light and Detection No Yes B B
AIR CONDITIONING
System
FCC
ATA 22
Added MCAS No No B B
AUTOFLIGHT
(See Appendix 7)
Page 44 of 174

TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT: B-737-8
FCC
ATA 22
AFDS functionality logic No No B B
AUTOFLIGHT
(See Appendix 7)
FCC
ATA 22
Revised STAB OUT OF TRIM light logic No Yes B B
AUTOFLIGHT
(See Appendix 7)
FCC
ATA 22
Revised SPEED TRIM FAIL light logic No Yes B B
AUTOFLIGHT
(See Appendix 7)
ATA 24 Relocated 4 circuit breakers from aisle

No No A A
ELECTRICAL POWER stand to P-6
ATA 27 FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS

FLIGHT CONTROLS Fly by Wire Spoiler System No No B B

FLIGHT CONTROLS Maneuver Load Alleviation No No B B

FLIGHT CONTROLS LAM No No B B
Page 45 of 174

TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT: B-737-8

FLIGHT CONTROLS Elevator Jam Landing Assist No No B B
ATA 27 FLAPS/SLATS
FLIGHT CONTROLS Position indicator relocated to MDS No No B B
ATA 27 SPEEDBRAKES/SPOILERS
No No B B
FLIGHT CONTROLS Emergency Descent Speedbrakes (EDS)
No B B
FLIGHT CONTROLS SPEEDBRAKE EXTENDED light logic No
FLIGHT CONTROLS SPOILERS light added No Yes B B
FLIGHT CONTROLS ASSIST ON light added No Yes B B
STABILIZER TRIM:
ATA 27
Stab Trim cutout switches panel
FLIGHT CONTROLS No No B B
nomenclature
Page 46 of 174

TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT: B-737-8
CONTROLS AND INDICATORS:

ATA 28
Additional System Alerts (see ATA 34 No Yes B B
FUEL
Navigation)
ATA 28 CONTROLS AND INDICATORS:
FUEL Revised fuel FILTER BYPASS light logic

No Yes B B

ATA 29
System indications relocated to MDS
HYDRAULIC POWER No No A A
Systems Page
ATA 30
ENGINE ANTI-ICE
ICE AND RAIN No Yes B B
ADDITIONAL ENG ANTI-ICE alert
PROTECTION
ENGINE ANTI-ICE
ATA 30
REVISED COWL VALVE No Yes B
ICE AND RAIN
NOMENCLATURE AND COLOR B
PROTECTION
(AMBER)
ATA 30
WING ANTI-ICE
L / R VALVE ALERTS COLOR (AMBER)
PROTECTION
Page 47 of 174

TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT: B-737-8
Incorporation Of MAX DISPLAY SYSTEM

ATA 31 (MDS)
INDICATING/RECORDING
SYSTEMS 4 Large Liquid Crystal Display (LCD)
Units No No B B
ATA 31 LIGHTING CONTROLS

INDICATING/RECORDING Updated and Relocated Engine Display
SYSTEMS Control Panel No Yes B B
LIGHTING CONTROLS
ATA 31
INDICATING/RECORDING Revised Display Brightness, Display
SYSTEMS Select Switch Panels, Master Dim and No No B B
Test
ATA 31 ENGINE DISPLAY CONTROL PANEL

SYSTEMS Added Engine Transfer Switch
No No B B
ATA ENGINE DISPLAY CONTROL PANEL

31INDICATING/RECORDIN Added Multifunction Display (MFD) Info
G SYSTEMS Switch No Yes B B
ATA ENGINE DISPLAY CONTROL PANEL

31INDICATING/RECORDIN
G SYSTEMS Revised N1 and Speed Set Selectors
No No B B
Page 48 of 174

TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT: B-737-8
ATA PFD
31INDICATING/RECORDIN Expanded Sky Ground and Compass
G SYSTEMS Display No No B B
ATA EFIS CONTROL PANEL

31INDICATING/RECORDIN Dedicated Vertical Situation Display
G SYSTEMS No No B B
(VSD) switch
ATA EFIS CONTROL PANEL

31INDICATING/RECORDIN ND/Weather (WXR) Range Selector- No No B
G SYSTEMS B
revised functionality
ATA 31 STANDBY FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

INDICATING/RECORDING No No B B
SYSTEMS ISFD basic
ATA 31 AUX DISPLAY

SYSTEMS Added Information Displayed
AUX DISPLAY
ATA Added Flight number, Transponder,
31INDICATING/RECORDIN Selective Calling (SELCAL), Coordinated B
G SYSTEMS No No B
Universal Time (UTC), Date and Elapsed
time
Page 49 of 174

TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT: B-737-8
ATA AUX DISPLAY

31INDICATING/RECORDIN Added Clock start/stop switches relocated
G SYSTEMS No No B B
to glareshield
ATA
MAINT LIGHT (replaces Proximity Switch
31INDICATING/RECORDIN
Electronic Unit PSEU light) No Yes B B
G SYSTEMS
ATA 32 NOSEWHEEL STEERING No No B B
LANDING GEAR, BRAKES Switch relocated
ATA 32 Brake accumulator pressure indicator No No B B

LANDING GEAR, BRAKES relocated
ATA 32
Autobrake switch relocated No No B B
LANDING GEAR, BRAKES
ATA 32 Landing Gear Warning Cutout switch No No B B

LANDING GEAR, BRAKES relocated
ATA 32 No No B B
Revised landing gear lock override switch
LANDING GEAR, BRAKES
ATA 34 FMS
No No B B
NAVIGATION FMC SOFTWARE U13 basic
Page 50 of 174

TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT: B-737-8
ATA 34 FMS
No No B B
NAVIGATION Variable Takeoff Rating function
ATA 34 FMS
No No B B
NAVIGATION Fuel Alerting and Fuel Management
Control Display Unit (CDU) Pages New or

ATA 34
Revised:
NAVIGATION No No B B
Perf Init page 1/2
ATA 34 CDU Pages New or Revised:

NAVIGATION N1 Limit No No B B
ATA 34 CDU Pages New or Revised:

NAVIGATION Fuel Progress page 5/5 No Yes B B
ATA 34 FMC and Engine Display Alert Messages:

No Yes B B
NAVIGATION USING RSV FUEL

No Yes B B
NAVIGATION FUEL DISAGREE
Page 51 of 174

TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT: B-737-8

No Yes B B
NAVIGATION INSUFFICIENT FUEL
ATA 34
FUEL FLOW (engine display only)
NAVIGATION No Yes B B
ATA 36
BLEED AIR CONTROL PANEL
PNEUMATIC No No A A
Removed RAM DOOR FULL OPEN lights
ATA 36 BLEED AIR CONTROL PANEL

PNEUMATIC Revised BLEED TRIP OFF nomenclature No A A
Yes
to BLEED
ATA 36
PNEUMATIC No
Revised BLEED light logic Yes B B
SYSTEM OPERATION
ATA 49
Removed Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)
APU No No A A
MAINT light
Page 52 of 174

TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT: B-737-8
SYSTEM OPERATION
ATA 49
Removed APU Exhaust Gas Temperature
APU No No A A
EGT gauge
ATA 49 SYSTEM OPERATION

APU Added retractable door No No B B

APU Added DOOR light No Yes B B
ATA 72, 73,77,78,80 ENGINES:

POWER PLANT New LEAP-1B engines No Yes B B
ATA 72, 73,77,78,80 Electronic Engine Control (EEC) SYSTEM
POWER PLANT Removal of Overboost rating No No B B
ATA 72, 73,77,78,80 EEC SYSTEM

POWER PLANT Addition of Icing Idle speed No No B B
ATA 72, 73,77,78,80 INDICATORS
POWER PLANT Revised Display Format No No B B
ATA 72, 73,77,78,80 INDICATORS

No No A A
POWER PLANT Compact engine display removed
Page 53 of 174

TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT: B-737-8
INDICATORS
ATA 72, 73,77,78,80
Added THRUST alert No B B
POWER PLANT No
INDICATORS
ATA 72, 73,77,78,80
Added MOTORING indication for bowed No No B B
POWER PLANT
rotor logic
THRUST REVERSER SYSTEM

ATA 72, 73,77,78,80
Added REVERSER COMMAND and No Yes B B
POWER PLANT
REVERSER AIR/GND alerts

ATA 72, 73,77,78,80
Replaced REVERSER alert with No Yes B B
POWER PLANT
REVERSER LIMITED
Page 54 of 174
This Maneuver Differences table, from the Boeing 737-800 to the Boeing 737-8, was proposed by The Boeing Company
and validated by TCCA. It lists the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and
FROM BASE MANEUVER REMARKS FLT PROC TRAINING CHECKING

AIRCAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-800
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT: B-737-8
Optional installation of two-position

PREFLIGHT INSPECTION No Yes A A
tailskid
After take-off checklist – Landing gear

CLIMB No Yes B B
handle
Checklist changes due to annunciation

NON-NORMAL and system changes listed in DESIGN No Yes A A
difference tables. (See Appendix 7)
CROSS-FCC TRIM
MONITOR
See Appendix 7 No No D* A
DEMONSTRATION OF
MCAS ACTIVATION See Appendix 7 No No D* A
ERRONEOUS HIGH AOA

DURING TAKEOFF See Appendix 7 No No D* A
Note: Refer to Appendix 7 for additional training requirements
Page 55 of 174
D* - Prior to operating the 737 MAX aircraft with FCC software version P12.1.2 or newer, each pilot must complete the
required training outlined in Appendix 7
This Design Differences Table, from the Boeing 737-800/-900 to the Boeing 737-800SFP, was proposed by Boeing and
FROM BASE
AIRCRAFT:
737-800/-900
FLT PROC
DESIGN REMARKS TRAINING CHECKING
CHAR CHNG
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
737-800SFP
CONFIGURATION Added two-position tail skid (option No Yes A A
requires APU drain mast re-position).
CONFIGURATION Changed and relocated aft pressure No No A A

bulkhead.
Changes related to limitations differences

LIMITATIONS for improved performance as defined in No No A A
the AFM and FCOM
Changes related to design differences for

PERFORMANCE improved performance as defined in the No No A A
AFM and FCOM.
WEIGHT Increased operating weights No No A A
ATA 27
Added sealed leading edge slats No No A A
FLIGHT CONTROLS
Page 56 of 174
FROM BASE
AIRCRAFT:
737-800/-900
FLT PROC
DESIGN REMARKS TRAINING CHECKING
CHAR CHNG
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
737-800SFP
ATA 27
Increased on-ground spoiler deflections No No A A
FLIGHT CONTROLS
ATA 27
Changed speed brake handle detent No No A A
FLIGHT CONTROLS
ATA 27
Changed SMYD software for improved No No A A
FLIGHT CONTROLS performance
ATA 31
Revised CDS for improved performance No No A A

SYSTEMS
ATA 34
Revised FMC for improved performance No No A A
NAVIGATION
ATA 73
Revised EEC software for performance No No A A
ENGINE FUEL AND credit
CONTROL
Page 57 of 174
This Maneuver Differences Table, from the Boeing 737-800/-900 to the Boeing 737-800SFP, was proposed by Boeing
FROM BASE
AIRCRAFT:
737-800/-900
FLT PROC
MANEUVER REMARKS TRAINING CHECKING
CHAR CHNG
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT: 737-
800SFP
PREFLIGHT INSPECTION Added check for two-position tailskid No Yes A A
(optional).
Procedural changes due to system

SUPPLEMENTAL No No A A
changes listed in the DESIGN differences
PROCEDURES
tables.
Page 58 of 174
This Design Differences table, from the Boeing 737-800 to the Boeing 737-800BCF, was proposed by The Boeing
Company and validated by TCCA. It lists the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences
training and checking of flight crew members.

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-800
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-800BCF
GENERAL Added Main Deck Cargo capability No No A A
Added Main Deck Cargo door control

panel
CONFIGURATION No Yes A A
Added Rigid Cargo Barrier and
Supernumerary area
ATA 21
Removed Recirculation Fans No Yes A A
AIR CONDITIONING
Added Main Deck smoke detectors

ATA 26
No Yes A A
FIRE PROTECTION Added Main Deck indications and controls
to Cargo Fire Control Panel
Page 59 of 174

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-800
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-800BCF
ATA 29 Added Main Deck Cargo Door to System

No No A A
HYDRAULIC POWER A
ATA 33 Added Main Deck Cargo Door not secure

No Yes A A
LIGHTS to takeoff configuration warning
ATA 35
Added Supernumerary Masks No No A A
OXYGEN
Added Main Deck Cargo Door flight deck

indication
Flight Deck door removed

ATA 52
No No A A
DOORS All overwing Type III emergency exits
deactivated
Both flight deck No. 2 windows can be

opened from outside the aircraft
Page 60 of 174

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-800
Nose Landing Gear 8 inches shorter

CONFIGURATION No No A A
Single Tail Anti-Collision/Position Light
PANEL LAYOUT Changed to Common Display System (CDS) No No B B
PANEL LAYOUT Three Position Landing Gear Control Lever No Yes B B
LIMITATIONS Size/type/system limitations No No A A
LIMITATIONS Ground wind operating envelope removed No No A A
Page 61 of 174

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-800
Decreased to:
 MTW
- 174,700 lb.
 MTOW
WEIGHTS No No A A
- 174,200 lb.
 MLW
- 144,000 lb.
 MZFW
- 136,000 lb.
PACKS:
ATA 21
No No B B
AIR CONDITIONING Simplified Electronic Pack Flow Control
System
PACKS:
ATA 21
No Yes A A
AIR CONDITIONING
Revised PACK light logic
EQUIPMENT COOLING:
ATA 21
No Yes B B
AIR CONDITIONING EQUIP SMOKE light and Detection System
removed
Page 62 of 174

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-800
FCC
ATA 22
Removed Maneuvering Characteristics No No A A
AUTOFLIGHT
Augmentation System (MCAS)
FCC
ATA 22
Changed Autopilot Flight Director System No No A A
AUTOFLIGHT
(AFDS) functionality logic
ATA 22 FCC
No Yes A A
AUTOFLIGHT Revised STAB OUT OF TRIM light logic
ATA 22 FCC
No Yes A A
AUTOFLIGHT Revised SPEED TRIM FAIL light logic
ATA 24 Relocated four circuit breakers from P-6 to

No No A A
ELECTRICAL POWER aisle stand
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS

ATA 27
Yes No B B
FLIGHT CONTROLS
Mechanical Spoiler System

ATA 27
Yes No B B
FLIGHT CONTROLS
Maneuver Load Alleviation removed
Page 63 of 174

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-800

ATA 27
Yes No B B
FLIGHT CONTROLS
LAM removed

ATA 27
Yes No B B
FLIGHT CONTROLS Elevator Jam Landing Assist System
removed
FLAPS/SLATS
ATA 27
No No B B
FLIGHT CONTROLS
Fixed position mechanical indicator
SPEEDBRAKES/SPOILERS
ATA 27
Yes No B B
FLIGHT CONTROLS
EDS removed
ATA 27
No Yes B B
FLIGHT CONTROLS
SPEEDBRAKE EXTENDED light logic
ATA 27
No Yes B B
FLIGHT CONTROLS
SPOILERS light removed
Page 64 of 174

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-800
ATA 27
No Yes B B
FLIGHT CONTROLS
ASSIST ON light removed
STABILIZER TRIM:
ATA 27
No No B B
FLIGHT CONTROLS Stab Trim cutout switches panel
nomenclature

ATA 28
No Yes B B
FUEL Fewer System Alerts (see ATA 34
Navigation)

ATA 28
No Yes B B
FUEL
Revised fuel FILTER BYPASS light logic

ATA 29
No No A A
HYDRAULIC POWER System indications relocated to Lower
Display Unit (DU)
ATA 30 ENGINE ANTI-ICE

PROTECTION ENG ANTI-ICE alert removed
Page 65 of 174

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-800
ENGINE ANTI-ICE
ATA 30
REVISED COWL VALVE NOMENCLATURE
PROTECTION
AND COLOR (BLUE)
ATA 30 WING ANTI-ICE

PROTECTION L/R VALVE ALERTS COLOR (BLUE)
ATA 31 CDS
SYSTEMS Six DUs
LIGHTING CONTROLS
ATA 31
INDICATING/RECORDING No Yes B B
Updated and Relocated Engine Display
SYSTEMS
Control Panel
LIGHTING CONTROLS
ATA 31
Revised Display Brightness, Display Select
SYSTEMS
Switch Panels, Master Dim, and Test

INDICATING/RECORDING No No A A
SYSTEMS Engine Transfer Switch removed
Page 66 of 174

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-800

INDICATING/RECORDING No Yes B B
SYSTEMS MFD Info Switch removed

SYSTEMS Revised N1 and Speed Set Selectors
ATA 31 PFD
SYSTEMS Sky Ground and Compass Display changes
ATA 31 EFIS CONTROL PANEL

SYSTEMS Dedicated VSD switch removed
EFIS CONTROL PANEL

ATA 31
ND/WXR Range Selector - revised
SYSTEMS
functionality
ATA 31 STANDBY FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS

SYSTEMS Three Standby Flight Instruments basic
Page 67 of 174

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-800
ATA 31 AUX DISPLAY – Removed

INDICATING/RECORDING No No A A
SYSTEMS Information Displayed
ATA 31 AUX DISPLAY- Removed

INDICATING/RECORDING Flight number, Transponder, Selective No No A A
SYSTEMS Calling (SELCAL), Coordinated Universal
Time (UTC), Date and Elapsed time
ATA AUX DISPLAY - Removed

31INDICATING/RECORDIN No No A A
Clock start/stop switches relocated from
G SYSTEMS
glareshield
ATA 31
INDICATING/RECORDING PSEU light (replaces MAINT light) No Yes B B
SYSTEMS
NOSEWHEEL STEERING
ATA 32
No No B B
LANDING GEAR
Switch relocated
ATA 32 Brake accumulator pressure indicator

No No B B
LANDING GEAR relocated
Page 68 of 174

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-800
ATA 32
Autobrake switch relocated No No B B
LANDING GEAR
ATA 32 Landing Gear Warning Cutout switch

No No B B
LANDING GEAR relocated
ATA 32
Revised landing gear lock override switch No No B B
LANDING GEAR
FMS
ATA 34
No No B B
NAVIGATION
FMC SOFTWARE U13 not basic
FMS
ATA 34
No No B B
NAVIGATION
Variable Takeoff Rating function
FMS
ATA 34
No No B B
NAVIGATION
Fuel Alerting and Fuel Management
Page 69 of 174

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-800
ATA 34 CDU Pages Removed or Revised: Perf Init

No No B B
NAVIGATION page 1/2
ATA 34
CDU Pages Removed or Revised: N1 Limit No No B B
NAVIGATION
ATA 34 CDU Pages Removed or Revised: Fuel

No Yes B B
NAVIGATION Progress page 5/5
FMC and Engine Display Alert Messages

ATA 34 Removed:
No Yes B B
NAVIGATION
USING RSV FUEL

ATA 34 Removed:
No Yes B B
NAVIGATION
FUEL DISAGREE

ATA 34 Removed:
No Yes B B
NAVIGATION
INSUFFICIENT FUEL
Page 70 of 174

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-800
ATA 34 Removed FUEL FLOW message (engine

No Yes B B
NAVIGATION display only)

ATA 36
No No A A
PNEUMATIC
Added RAM DOOR FULL OPEN lights

ATA 36
No Yes A A
PNEUMATIC Changed BLEED light to BLEED TRIP OFF
light

ATA 36
No Yes B B
PNEUMATIC
Revised BLEED TRIP OFF light logic
SYSTEM OPERATION
ATA 49
AIRBORNE AUXILIARY No No A A
Added Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) MAINT
POWER
light.

AIRBORNE AUXILIARY No No A A
POWER Added APU EGT gauge
Page 71 of 174

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-800

AIRBORNE AUXILIARY No No B B
POWER Removed retractable door
SYSTEM OPERATION
ATA 49
AIRBORNE AUXILIARY No Yes B B
Removed Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) DOOR
POWER
light
ENGINES:
ATA 72, 73, 77, 78, 80
No Yes B B
POWERPLANT
CFM56-7 engines
EEC SYSTEM
ATA 72, 73, 77, 78, 80
No No B B
POWERPLANT
Added Overboost rating
EEC SYSTEM
ATA 72, 73, 77, 78, 80
No No B B
POWERPLANT
Removed Icing Idle speed
INDICATORS
ATA 72, 73, 77, 78, 80
No No B B
POWERPLANT
Revised Display Format
Page 72 of 174

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-800
INDICATORS
ATA 72, 73, 77, 78, 80
No No A A
POWERPLANT
Added compact engine display
INDICATORS
ATA 72, 73, 77, 78, 80
No Yes B B
POWERPLANT
Removed THRUST alert
INDICATORS
ATA 72, 73, 77, 78, 80
No No B B
POWERPLANT Removed MOTORING indication for bowed
rotor logic

ATA 72, 73, 77, 78, 80
No Yes B B
POWERPLANT Removed REVERSER COMMAND and
REVERSER AIR/GND alerts

ATA 72, 73, 77, 78, 80
No Yes B B
POWERPLANT Replaced REVERSER LIMITED light with
REVERSER light
Page 73 of 174
This Maneuver Differences table, from the Boeing 737-8 to the Boeing 737-800, was proposed by The Boeing Company

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-800
PREFLIGHT INSPECTION Optional installation of two-position tailskid No Yes A A
After takeoff checklist - Landing gear

CLIMB No Yes B B
handle
Read and do Checklist changes due to

NON-NORMAL annunciation and system changes listed in No Yes A A
DESIGN difference tables
Page 74 of 174
This Design Differences table, from the BBJ 2 to the BBJ MAX 8, was proposed by Boeing and validated by TCCA. It lists
the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and checking of flight crew members.
This table in conjunction with the Design Differences and Maneuver Differences tables for the Boeing 737-800 to the
Boeing 737-8 list the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and checking of flight
crew members.

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
BBJ 2
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
BBJ MAX 8
GENERAL Height: 41 feet, 2 inches (12.55 meters) No No A A
ATA 28
Auxiliary fuel controls and indications No No A A
FUEL
ATA 32 Combined Tire Pressure Indication and

No No A A
LANDING GEAR Brake Temperature Monitoring System
ATA 33
Flashing landing lights No No A A
LIGHTS
ANS
ATA 34
Overrun Warnings (ORW) No No A A
NAVIGATION
Perspective Runway Indications (HUD)
Page 75 of 174
validated by the TCCA. It lists the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-9
General Turning radius and passenger capacity No No A A
CONFIGURATION Two- position tailskid standard No No A A
DIMENSIONS Length: 138 feet, 2 inches (42.11 meters) No No A A
LIMITATIONS Revised flap placard speeds No No A A
Increased to:
 MTW
- 195,200 lb.
 MTOW
WEIGHTS - 194,700 lb. No No A A
 MLW
- 163,900 lb.
 MZFW
- 156,500 lb.
Page 76 of 174

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-9
ATA 31
Added Mid Exit Doors to the takeoff
No No A A
INDICATING / RECORDING configuration warning
SYSTEMS
Added Mid Exit Doors and flight deck

indications
* For the specific overwing emergency

ATA 52
exit training requirements, refer to CAR No Yes A* A
DOORS
705.124(2)(a)(iv)(C), 604.143(1)(d),
604.169(2)(b) for flight crew or
705.124(2)(b)(iv)(C), 604.145(a),
604.179(z)(iii) for flight attendants.
Page 77 of 174
This Maneuver Differences table, from the Boeing 737-8 to the Boeing 737-9, was proposed by Boeing and validated by
TCCA. It lists the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and checking of flight
crew members.

AIRCRAFT: CHAR CHNG
B-737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
B-737-9
PREFLIGHT INSPECTION Installation of two-position tailskid No Yes A A
NON-NORMAL
Added MID EXIT DOOR NNC No Yes A A
PROCEDURES
Page 78 of 174
This Design Differences Table, from the Boeing 737-8 to the Boeing 737-8200, was proposed by Boeing and validated by
TCCA. It lists the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and checking of flight
crew members.

AIRCAFT: CHAR CHNG
737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
737-8200
ATA 31
Added Mid Exit Doors to the takeoff
No No A A
INDICATING / configuration warning
RECORDING SYSTEMS
Added Mid Exit Doors and flight deck

indications and associated Non Normal
Checklist
ATA 52
No Yes A* A
* For the specific overwing emergency exit
DOORS
training requirements, refer to CAR
705.124(2)(a)(iv)(C), 604.143(1)(d),
604.169(2)(b) for flight crew or
705.124(2)(b)(iv)(C), 604.145(a),
604.179(z)(iii) for flight attendants.
Page 79 of 174
This Maneuver Differences Table, from the Boeing 737-8 to the Boeing 737-8200, was proposed by Boeing and

AIRCAFT: CHAR CHNG
737-8
TO RELATED
AIRCRAFT:
737-8200
NON-NORMAL
Added non-normal checklist for mid Exit
PROCEDURES No Yes A A
Doors
Page 80 of 174
Appendix 4 – Transition Line Indoctrination (TLI)
Operating Experience for flying multiple series may be accomplished in any B-737
series aircraft. Additional Transition Line Indoctrination (TLI) must be accomplished in
accordance with the table below for those flight crews flying the series listed. When
differences training relates to qualification for FMS, TLI must also include use of
FMS. Such FMS required STLI pertinent to each flight crew member must be obtained
while serving in a flight crew position and include FMS operation. However, LOFT
involving FMS operation in an appropriately configured Level C or Level D FFS may be
substituted.
When differences training relates to qualification for PFD/ND, TLI must also include use
of PFD/ND. Such PFD/ND required TLI pertinent to each flight crew member must be
obtained while serving in a flight crew position and includes PFD/ND operation. For
flight crew members with previous EFIS experience, a 4 hour LOFT session involving
PFD/ND operation in an appropriately configured FSTD (minimum of a level 5 FTD),
may be substituted for 2 TLI Legs as specified in the table below.
Transition Line Indoctrination (TLI) Table
From B73A B73B B73B B73C B73C
Base B-737 B-737CL B-737CL B-737NG B-737 MAX
Aircraft → (Non-EFIS) (EFIS)
To Related
Aircraft ↓
B73A Not Required 2/5 2/5 2/5 Not Evaluated

B-737
B73B 2/5 Not Required 2/5 2/5 Not Evaluated

B-737CL
(Non-EFIS)
B73B 2/5 2/5 Not Required 2* Not Evaluated

B-737CL
(EFIS)
B73C 2/5 2/5 2* Not Required Not Required

B-737NG
B73C Not Evaluated Not Evaluated Not Evaluated Not Required Not Required
B-737 MAX
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1) * Legs of LOFT in a level 5 FTD or higher may be substituted.

2) SLF must be accomplished by a flight instructor or check pilot.
3) 2/5 = minimum of 5 hours of SLF which includes 2 flight segments.
NOTE
725.106 and CAR 705.113.
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Appendix 5 – Head Up Display (HUD) qualification program
1.0 Background
The B-737NG and B-737 MAX (B73C) may be equipped with an optional single or dual
HUD, available through a Rockwell Collins (RC) STC. The B-737NG may be equipped
with RC HUD models HGS-2850 (early B-737-700) and HGS-4000. The B-737 MAX
may be equipped with the RC HGS-6000 HUD. Both the RC HGS-4000 and HGS-6000
HUDs are equivalent in functionality. The RC HGS-4000 HUD is capable of supporting
an Enhanced Flight Vision System (EFVS).
This appendix provides the training, checking and currency requirements for the
operational use by operators of a single or dual HUD for all phases of flight the HUD is
certified for and the operator is authorized to conduct. Annex 1 provides additional pilot
qualification requirements for the EFVS.
NOTES
1. For the purposes of this appendix, the term HUD is used generically to refer to a
Head Up Display. The term HGS refers to a Head Up Guidance System (HGS),
which is a RC HUD equipped with flight guidance for low and reduced visibility
operations. This appendix refers to the terms HUD or HGS as applicable.
2. This appendix does not apply to the RC HGS-2850 HUD.
3. The use of an HGS for low visibility take-off, approach and/or landing by
Canadian operators requires a Transport Canada Special Authorization/Specific
Approval (SA). Sections 9.0 and 10.0 of this appendix provides the training and
checking requirements for conducting taxi and take-off operations using the HUD
(HGS) during reduced and low visibility operations.
2.0 HUD training – General

The HUD qualification requirements of this appendix are necessary to meet the
requirements of CAR 705 or CAR 604, for the initial type training of Canadian pilots to
operate the B73C using a single or dual HUD in a commercial air service or by a private
operator.
The HUD pilot training requirements consist of those related to initial and recurrent
ground and flight training. Unless covered concurrently during an initial or transition
type rating course, a prerequisite to beginning this course of training is prior training,
qualification and currency on the B737C.
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NOTE:
For single HUD operation, training focuses principally upon training events flown in
the left seat by the Pilot-In-Command (PIC) as Pilot Flying (PF). SIC indoctrination
and training is essential. HUD training of Pilot Monitoring (PM) Second-In-Command
(SIC) duties in the right seat is required, when there are SOP differences for the PM,
when the PF is heads up (compared to heads down). SIC HUD familiarization flown
in the left seat is recommended.
2.1 General requirements

2.1.1 The operator should develop procedures in its Company Operating Manual (COM)
for the guidance of its personnel; including:
a. Normal, non-normal and emergency procedures for all phases of flight for
which the HUD is intended to be used;
b. Procedures for use of the HUD should include crew Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs), duties and responsibilities that are specific to each
crew position.
2.1.2 Ground and Flight Training should be provided in the operation of the aeroplane
using the HUD in all phases of flight and weather conditions for which the operator
is authorized in the operator’s Air Operator Certificate (AOC) and the HUD system
is certified in the Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) or supplement.
2.1.3 A TCCA approved Level C or higher B73C Full Flight Simulator (FFS) equipped
with the operator’s specific HUD configuration with day and night visual displays, is
required for HUD flight training and checking.
3.0 HUD Initial Ground Training
3.1 General requirements

Training for air operators should be conducted in accordance with the applicable
provisions of CAR 705.124. Training for private operators should be conducted with the
applicable training requirements for CAR 604.
The initial ground training program should include instructor led instruction and/or CBT
training of the following elements:
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3.1.1 HUD operational concepts, crew duties and responsibilities and operational
procedures including preflight, normal and non-normal operations, and
associated indications.
3.1.2 HUD symbology including characteristics and indications of limit conditions and
failures and differences to PFD symbology.
3.1.3 Inter-relationship of HUD symbology with aeroplane aerodynamics, inertial

factors and environmental conditions.
3.1.4 Function and operational use of HUD controls.
3.1.5 All modes of HUD operation during normal, abnormal and emergency operations.
3.1.6 HUD indications and alerts for low airspeed and high angle of attack, excessive
airspeed, windshear, TCAS, EGPWS/TAWS and other indications and alerts.
3.1.7 Applicable publications including AFM (Supplement) limitations and procedures,

FCOM and HUD pilot training manual content.
3.1.8 SOPs including, all normal, non-normal and emergency operations applicable to
the use of the HUD Crew procedures.
3.1.9 Flight Crew duties and responsibilities specific to each pilot position including a
clear delineation of PF and PM duties, responsibilities, procedural call-outs and
responses during the phases of flight for which HUD operations are anticipated.
3.1.10 Aircraft system and navigation failures and Minimum Equipment List (MEL) items
affecting HUD operation.
3.1.11 Procedures for unexpected deterioration of conditions to less than minimum

Runway Visual Range (RVR) encountered during approach, flare, and rollout.
3.1.12 Demonstration of expected visual references with weather at minimum

conditions.
3.1.13 Expected sequence of visual cues during an approach in which visibility is at or

above landing minima.
4.0 HUD Initial Flight Training

Unless integrated with initial or transition type rating training, flight training dedicated to
HUD familiarization and proficiency is in addition to other required training.
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NOTE
The flight training requirements within this appendix should not be construed to
dictate or limit the scope or content of the course of instruction. Each operator has
their own unique requirements, route structure, fleet composition and operations
policies to consider in developing their training program. Therefore, what follows is to
be considered a guide to operators who are tailoring a HUD training program to fit
their own needs.
4.1 Ground operations

Flight training for ground operations using HUD should include:
4.1.1 HUD deployment, set up and stowage.
4.1.2 Proper pilot eye reference position.
4.1.3 HUD Pre-flight checks including selection of required modes.
4.1.4 Setting of appropriate HUD brightness levels using all brightness controls.
4.1.5 Appropriate and effective use of HUD during ground operations and maneuvers;
4.1.6 Taxi using HUD under day, night, reduced and low visibility conditions.
4.2 Airborne training

Flight Training for in-flight use of HUD should include:
4.2.1 Incorporation of HUD into instrument scan and integration of conventional

displays into scan.
4.2.2 Demonstration and explanation of unique HUD symbology and commonality with
head down displays.
4.2.3 Demonstration of effects of cross-wind including indications of drift and non-

conformal displays.
4.2.4 Manual control of the aircraft including climbs, descents, turns, steep turns,
accelerations and decelerations.
4.2.5 Recognition and recovery from an excessive angle of attack including stall warning
and low airspeed.
4.2.6 Recognition and recovery from flight at excessive airspeed.
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4.2.7 Recognition and recovery from an aeroplane upset/unusual attitude.
4.2.8 Use of HUD with an approved sunvisor or sunscreen under various daytime
lighting conditions.
4.2.9 Vectors to intercept and track selected courses.
4.3 Visual take-offs, Circuits, approaches and landings

Sufficient maneuvers should be flown in visual conditions to demonstrate HUD
symbology and use in relation to glide path, centerline control and crosswind conditions.
All visual approaches should be flown from no closer than approximately 1,000 feet
AGL (3 - 4 NM) to the runway threshold. Flight Training for visual take-offs, circuits,
approaches and landings using HUD should include:
4.3.1 Take-off, circuit, approach and landings. Take-offs and landings should be with no
wind and repeated with 10 knots crosswind day and night.
4.3.2 “Black hole effect” landings; i.e. Landing on a moonless or overcast night, over
water or over dark featureless terrain where the only visual stimuli are lights on
and/or near the airport.
4.3.3 Appropriate use of HUD symbology to establish desired descent angle.
4.3.4 Rejected landing and/or Low energy go-around
4.3.5 Visual Approaches (VMC mode) to include:
i. One approach showing deviations above and below glideslope for

symbology/runway relationship
ii. Straight-in landings with no wind, and repeated with 10 knot crosswind and
at night.
iii. Circling approaches and landing (for operators authorized to conduct

circling approaches) with 10 knot crosswind.
NOTES
1 One half of these (VMC mode) approaches should be flown at different

airports which have dissimilar approach and runway lighting systems.
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2 Special emphasis should be placed on optimizing circling approach

techniques and procedures, for operators authorized to conduct circling
approaches.
3 Approaches with the aircraft in a non-normal flap configuration should be
included.
4.4 Instrument Procedures and Approaches:

Sufficient precision and non-precision instrument approaches, missed approaches and
landings with appropriate weather minimums should be flown to gain proficiency in
these maneuvers. All required approaches should be flown from no closer than the
final approach fix (FAF). Use of the HUD for circling approaches should be trained (for
those operators conducting circling approaches.)
Flight Training for instrument procedures incorporating the use of HUD should include:
4.4.1 Instrument approaches and landing to include the following conditions:
4.4.1.1 CAT I ILS approach to 200 foot Decision Altitude, 2400 RVR visibility
and calm winds.
4.4.1.2 Demonstrate failures and incorrect settings on approach (i.e., missed
runway elevation, airspeed, selected course).
4.4.1.3 Illustrate unique characteristics of symbology in windshear conditions
(i.e., erratic wind speed and direction, flight path, flight path acceleration,
and speed error).
4.4.1.4 Non-ILS approach to 600 foot ceiling and 2 mile visibility and 15 knot
crosswind.
4.4.2 Setting of appropriate HUD brightness for different approach lighting systems.
4.4.3 Demonstration of failures and incorrect settings on approach; i.e., miss-set

runway elevation, airspeed, selected course, etc.
4.4.4 Missed approaches from IFR minimums in Instrument Meteorological Conditions

(IMC) flown using published Missed Approach.
4.5 Non-normal/Emergency operations

Flight Training for Non-normal and Emergency conditions using HUD should include:
4.5.1 Recognition and recovery from an aeroplane upset/unusual attitude.
4.5.2 Recognition and recovery from Windshear alerts and indications, including a
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demonstration of symbology indications in wind shear conditions, i.e., erratic

wind speed and direction, flight path, flight path acceleration and speed error,
etc.
4.5.3 Recognition and recovery from EGPWS/TAWS warning alert.
4.5.4 Recognition and recovery from TCAS Resolution Advisory (RA).
4.5.5 One Engine Inoperative Take-off with engine failure at or above V1 at the lowest
authorized take-off visibility.
4.5.6 Rejected Take-off with an engine failure prior to V1 at the lowest authorized take-
off visibility.
4.5.7 One Engine Inoperative Instrument Approach and Missed Approach
4.5.8 Aircraft system and navigation failures affecting HUD operation.
4.6 Rockwell Collins HGS-6000 Head-Up Guidance System (HGS) with HCP
interface
The HGS-6000 is optional equipment on the B-737-NG and B-737-MAX. Level A
Differences Training is sufficient for pilots already qualified on the Rockwell Collins
HGS-4000 Head-Up Guidance System.
4.7 HUD Training Areas of Special Emphasis

4.7.1 Crew coordination, briefings, call-outs.
4.7.2 Duties of PF and PM.
4.7.3 The availability and limitations of visual cues encountered on approach both before
and after minimum altitudes. This would include:
i. Procedures for unexpected deterioration of conditions to less than

minimum RVR encountered during approach, flare and rollout.
ii. Demonstration of expected visual references with weather at
minimum conditions.
iii. Expected sequence of visual cues during an approach in which
visibility is at or above landing minima.
4.7.4 HUD unique symbology, i.e. Flight Path Vector (FPV), flight path acceleration
symbol, airspeed error tape, Angle Of Attach (AOA) limit bracket, and excessive
pitch chevrons. When this training is complete, the trainee should have a thorough
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understanding of the relationship between aircraft flight path parameters and the
HUD symbology.
4.7.5 Appropriate use of the aircraft symbol vs. the FPV during stall, unusual attitude
and aeroplane upset recoveries.
5.0 HUD initial Pilot Proficiency Check (PPC)
5.1 Minimum checking manoeuvres

The HUD should be used to the maximum extent possible during the initial Pilot
Proficiency Check (PPC). The following manoeuvres using the HUD should be
specifically evaluated during the PPC:
5.1.1 Engine failure on take-off (V1 cut).
5.1.2 Instrument approach and missed approach with One Engine Inoperative (OEI).
6.0 HUD initial line training
6.1 General
HUD initial line training should be under the supervision of a line qualified training or
ACP.
HUD line training should include the PF using the HUD to complete:
6.1.1 Three HUD assisted takeoffs;
6.1.2 One visual approach; and
6.1.3 Three instrument approaches in visibility not less than 1800 RVR.
7.0 HUD consolidation period
7.1 Requirements
Air operator’s pilots require line training and consolidation after initial qualification on the
HUD. A consolidation period should apply prior to utilizing the HUD for instrument
approach operations in IMC. Upon completion of the consolidation requirements, the
pilot should be qualified to conduct HUD takeoffs and approaches to the approach
minima authorized for the air operator.
During consolidation training, the HUD should be used by the PF to complete:
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7.1.1 Five takeoffs;
7.1.2 Five manually flown approaches and landings. (The approaches may be
flown in VMC.)
8.0 HUD recurrent training and checking requirements
8.1 Recurrent Ground Training

Recurrent HUD ground training should be completed as part of recurrent training or as
part of the continuing qualification curriculum, as applicable. Selected HUD related
ground training subjects should be reviewed on a recurrent basis.
8.2 Recurrent Flight Training

Recurrent flight training should be completed as part of recurrent training or as part of the
continuing qualification curriculum, as applicable. Recurrent flight training should be in
accordance with the procedures established in the operator company operations manual
and should include:
8.2.1 Review of HUD system and normal operation;
8.2.2 Review of HUD operating limitations;
8.2.3 Review of selected non-normal and emergency procedures;
8.2.4 One Take-off with crosswind at the lowest authorized take-off minima using HUD
Take-off guidance;
8.2.5 Engine Inoperative Take-off with engine failure at V1;
8.2.6 Rejected take-off;
8.2.7 Straight-in, ILS and Non ILS approach and landing with crosswind to the lowest
authorized landing minimums;
8.2.8 Approach and Missed Approach with crosswind at the lowest authorized landing
minimums in IMC;
8.2.9 One Engine Inoperative Approach and Landing;
8.2.10 Selected non-normal and emergency procedures;
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8.3 HUD Recurrent PPC

The HUD should be used to the maximum extent possible during the recurrent PPC.
The required manoeuvres on recurrent PPCs should include a sample of operations
requiring the use of the HUD.
Recurrent PPCs should include an evaluation of PM duties related to the use of the
HUD in accordance with SOPs, and in consideration of whether the aircraft is equipped
with a single or dual HUD.
The following manoeuvres using the HUD should be specifically evaluated during the
recurrent PPC:
8.3.1 Engine failure on take-off (V1 cut); and
8.3.2 Instrument approach and missed approach with OEI.
9.0 HUD currency requirements

An air operator’s 90-day takeoff, approach and landing currency requirements apply to
each pilot position occupied.
A PF should have completed at least three takeoffs, approaches and landings using the
HUD, in a B73C aeroplane or a TCCA approved Level C (or higher) B73C FFS with day
and night visual displays, within the previous 90 days before acting as PF using the
HUD.
10.0 HUD reduced visibility and low visibility taxi, take-off, approach, landing and
roll-out
The B73C HUD is capable of providing take-off guidance in visibilities as low as 300 ft
(75 m) RVR. The HUD is capable of providing guidance to Category III ILS manually
flown instrument approaches.
The following training and checking requirements for reduced and low visibility
operations in are in addition to the HUD training, checking and currency requirements
provided in the preceding.
NOTE
The training low and reduced visibility training, checking and currency requirements
are derived from the FAA FSB report for the B-737. These requirements apply to an
operator authorized to use the HUD to conduct take-offs at 300 RVR and CAT III ILS
approaches.
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10.1 Ground Training

Ground training for low and reduced visibility HUD operations should include:
10.1.1 The certified capability of the HUD for take-off, approach, landing and roll-
out for low and reduced visibility operations in terms of RVR and Category
of ILS Approach.
10.1.2 The operational characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of the HUD

and aircraft systems for low and reduced visibility operations. Training
should include the arming and activation of HUD and AFCS flight
guidance and all associated controls, indications and annunciations.
10.1.3 The operational characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of ground

facilities (i.e. Instrument approach systems, lighting systems, Surface
Movement Guidance Control System (SMGCS), aerodrome procedures
etc.) supporting low and reduced visibility operations.
10.1.4 Operator’s policies and procedures concerning reduced and low visibility
operations, including the operator’s reporting process, MEL issues,
operational considerations following an RTO or missed approach, Initial
Operating Experience (IOE)/Initial line indoctrination and currency
requirements.
10.1.5 For low and reduced visibility operations predicated on the HUD, a video
demonstration complete with sound, of all modes of HUD operation,
including narrative descriptions and several low weather approach
demonstrations with procedural call-outs and responses. All critical
procedural call-out possibilities should be covered.
10.1.6 An emphasis on the need for rigorous crew discipline, coordination and
adherence to procedural guidelines for use of the HUD as a CAT II/CAT III
approach and landing system.
10.2 Flight training

10.2.1 Low Visibility Take-off
Training predicated on the use of HUD for low visibility take-off to 300 RVR
should include the following conditions:
i. Normal takeoff, clear and calm, repeated with gusty winds

ii. Takeoff, 600 foot RVR; 5 knot crosswind
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iii. Takeoff, 300 foot RVR; 5 knot crosswind, engine failure prior to V1
iv. Takeoff, 300 foot RVR; 5 knot crosswind, engine failure after V1
v. Takeoff with HGS failure; 300 foot RVR
10.2.2 Low Visibility Instrument Approaches

Training predicated on the use of HUD for low visibility approaches should
include the following conditions:
i. CAT II ILS approach to 100 foot DH, 1200 RVR, 5 - 10 kts crosswind
ii. CAT III ILS approach and landing from a 30 degree intercept to the ILS, below
glideslope, weather clear and calm.
iii. CAT III ILS with 700 RVR, wind calm - another ILS with a 10 knot crosswind.
iv. CAT III ILS with various reasons for a missed approach (system downgrade,
“APCH WARN”, etc.).
v. CAT III ILS with various RVRs and crosswinds, include light turbulence.
NOTES
1. Several of the instrument approaches should include a variety of ground and

airborne system failures requiring pilot recognition and appropriate procedural
actions.
2. Demonstration of system/component failures could include flap asymmetry

problems, engine out operations, HGS sensor failures, etc.
3. Demonstration of how HUD failure modes can reduce precision and increase
pilot workload unless PF/PM duties and responsibilities are clearly delineated
and understood.
10.3 Initial Operating Experience (IOE)/Initial line indoctrination

10.3.1 SICs should be observed performing Category II/III PM duties by an
appropriately qualified check pilot upon satisfactory completion of the
HUD training program.
10.3.2 Prior to utilizing the HUD in IMC conditions below RVR 1800, each PIC
must accomplish at least twenty-five manually flown HUD approaches to
Category II/III minima in VMC conditions. Each approach must terminate
in a manually controlled HUD assisted landing or HUD assisted go-
around. In addition, each PIC must accomplish at least twenty-five HUD
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assisted takeoffs in VMC conditions prior to using the HUD mode in IMC
conditions. Upon completion of this requirement the HUD qualified pilot
should then be observed to conduct HUD approaches to company
authorized minima.
10.3.3 Pilots must complete their IOE/Initial line indoctrination for HUD CAT II/III
operations within 60 days of completion of their HUD training. All
previously qualified (in aircraft) pilots should be certified upon satisfactory
completion of the HUD ground and flight training programs.
10.4 Recurrent Training and Checking

In addition to regular training and checking requirements, the following low visibility
operations should be performed during the six-month recurrent training and PPC,:
i. Approach and landing, 700 foot RVR, 10 knot crosswind.

ii. Approach, 700 foot RVR, 10 knot crosswind, light turbulence with missed
approach.
iii. Takeoff, 300 foot RVR, 10 knot crosswind.
iv. Takeoff, 300 foot RVR, engine failure either before or after V1.
v. Selected ground training subjects should be reviewed annually.
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Appendix 5 – Annex 1
HGS 4000 EFVS qualification program – Not for landing credit
1.0 General
The Boeing Business Jet (BBJ) may be equipped with an HGS 4000 HUD with EFVS
capability. The HGS 4000 EFVS provides the capability for descent below published
minima using an Infrared (IR) sensor for the acquisition of the required visual
references to continue the approach to a landing. The HGS 4000 EFVS is not certified
for landing credit based on the EFVS image.
NOTES
1. Operators seeking credit to use the EFVS for descent below published minima to
acquire the required visual references to continue the approach to a landing require
an exemption to the applicable provisions of CAR 602.128, Landing Minima. In
addition, operators also require a Special Authorization/Specific Approval (SA) to
use the EFVS for credit for descent below published minima.
2. The Boeing Business Jet aircraft (BBJ1/BBJ, BBJ2, BBJ3 or BBJ MAX 8) have not
been type certified in Canada and are therefore not on the TCCA TCDS A-146, nor
assigned a TCCA Pilot Type Rating designator.
2.0 EFVS Ground and Flight Training – General

Successful completion of HUD training on the B73C is required as a prerequisite for
EFVS training. HUD and EFVS training can be conducted concurrently.
A TCCA approved Level C or higher B73C Full Flight Simulator (FFS) equipped with
day and night visual displays and able to display a representative IR image, is required
for EFVS flight training and checking.
The EFVS pilot training requirements consist of those related to initial and recurrent
ground and flight training. The EFVS training program should focus upon training
events flown in the left seat by the PIC (PF). EFVS training of PM duties in the right
seat is required. SIC EFVS familiarization flown in the left seat is recommended.
Operators authorized to descend below published minima using the EFVS must
conduct ground and flight training on low visibility and CAT II ILS procedures specific to
the B73C.
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3.0 EFVS Initial Ground Training

The initial ground training program should include a minimum of four hours of
classroom instruction or Computer-Based Training (CBT) to include:
i. EFVS operational concepts and IR theory

ii. EFVS system architecture
iii. EFVS specific HUD symbology and format
iv. EVS videos of flight scenarios
v. EVS operating procedures & limitations
vi. FAA Part 91.176 criteria applicable to EFVS
vii. Runway markings and lighting
viii. Design eye position for proper EVS image
ix. Transition from EVS imagery to non-EVS imagery, visual conditions.
x. EFVS specific visual characteristics including: noise and "blooming", roman
candle effect – rain, burlap effect, burn-in and elimination, NUCC, weather
conditions (fog & visual reference).
xi. Flight crew qualification & training.
xii. Crew duties and responsibilities including duties of PF and PM crew coordination.
xiii. Operational procedures including normal and non-normal operations.
xiv. Crew briefings and callouts
xv. All applicable EFVS AFM, pilot training and FCOM material
NOTE
Completing the HGS 4000 EFVS Computer-Based Training (CBT) completes the
basic ground school.
4.0 EFVS Initial Flight Training

The initial flight training program must include a minimum of 2 hours for the PF (left
seat).
NOTE
The required initial ground training must be summarized during the pre-flight briefing
prior to flight training.
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The following initial flight training should be provided:
4.1 Ground Operations

i. Initialization, system use, checks and tests.
ii. Displays, modes, annunciations
iii. Design eye position
iv. Use of ON/OFF switch and "clear" mode
v. Taxi using EFVS under various lighting and visibility conditions.
4.2 Airwork
The airwork required in Appendix 5, Head-Up Guidance (HUD) qualification program is
sufficient.
4.3 Visual take-offs, circuits and approaches

Flight training should include various daylight and night takeoffs and landings
including:
i. Normal Take-off and Landing with crosswind
ii. Visual approaches to runways at night with minimal lighting (“black hole”
approaches) and use of FPV to achieve desired descent angle.
4.4 Instrument Approaches

i. ILS, GLS, WAAS/LPV approach and landing (At least one of these approaches
as applicable).
ii. ILS, GLS, WAAS/LPV missed approach (At least one of these approaches as
applicable).
iii. Non-ILS approach and landing.
iv. RNP approach and landing – if applicable
4.5 Non-normal/Emergency operations

i. Failure of EFVS, or
ii. Failure of the EFVS preventing continued approach when below published
minima on a Category 1 ILS.
4.6 Special emphasis training

Special training emphasis should be placed in the following areas:
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i. Crew briefings, callouts and SOPs, PF and PM duties, SOPs and CRM.
ii. Transition from EFVS imagery to the unaided scene, visual conditions and
runway acquisition
iii. Instrument failures and warning systems
iv. Recognition of EVFS malfunctions and misleading images
5.0 Initial EFVS line indoctrination

For air operators, PICs should complete line indoctrination employing the EFVS. This
should include at least three EFVS assisted takeoffs at night, one visual approach at
night, and two instrument approaches in VMC.
6.0 EFVS consolidation period

For air operators, a consolidation period should apply prior to utilizing the EFVS for
instrument approach operations in IMC, to qualify a PIC to conduct EFVS takeoffs and
approaches to the authorized minima as set forth in the operator’s operations
specifications.
PICs should accomplish at least three manually flown EFVS assisted night takeoffs,
approaches, and landings to the lowest authorized minima in VMC conditions. Each
approach should terminate in a manually controlled EFVS assisted landing or EFVS
assisted go-around.
7.0 EFVS recurrent training and checking requirements

The recurrent training requirements applicable to the HUD apply with the addition of the
following requirements using the EFVS:
1. Instrument approach and landing, or
2. Instrument approach and landing with acquisition of EFVS image before

published minima and acquisition of image without aid of the EFVS above 100 ft
HAT, to provide required visual references to permit a landing; and
3. Instrument approach with acquisition of EFVS image before published minima

and failure of EFVS below published minima requiring a missed approach above
100 ft. HAT.
Selected ground training subjects should be reviewed on a recurrent basis.
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For PICs, the required maneuvers on subsequent PPCs should include a sample of
operations requiring the use of the EFVS. For SICs, the required maneuvers on
subsequent PPCs should include a sample of PM duties related to the use of the EFVS.
8.0 EFVS currency requirements

An air operator’s PICs should have completed at least one night takeoff, approach and
landing as PF using the EFVS; or have completed at least one night takeoff, approach
and landing as PF using the EFVS in a TCCA approved Level C (or higher) B73C full
flight simulator with day and night visual displays and able to display a representative IR
image, within the previous 90 days before acting as PF using the EFVS. The EFVS
currency requirement can be credited to the HUD currency requirements.
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Appendix 6 – Alternate go-around flaps training
1.0 Requirements
Alternate go-around flaps operations require a separate Airplane Flight Manual (AFM)
Appendix, a supplementary procedure defining flight crew actions, and a TCCA
operational approval. Alternate go-around flaps for B-737NG and B-737 MAX aircraft
certified to conduct Flaps 30 approaches using Flaps 5 during go-around requires flight
crew training. The FAA Flight Standardization Board (FSB) conducted an operational
suitability evaluation and found no handling quality differences between the B-737NG
and the B-737 MAX when conducting the alternate go-around flaps operations in
accordance with the AFM Appendix. A flight crew member who completed training on
either the B-737NG or the B-737 MAX does not need to repeat training in the other
series aircraft.
2.0 General
The use of Flaps 5° for go-around provides for a substantial increase in approach climb
weights in hot and/or high environments. The Flaps 30 approach speeds for Flaps 5
go-around operations require minor model specific speed additives to the standard
Flaps 30 VREF speeds in order to maintain the performance requirements of FAR
25.121(d) /AWM Chapter 525.121(d).
Alternate Go-Around Flaps operations require a separate AFM Appendix, and a
supplementary procedure defining flight crew actions.
Operators are encouraged to develop an approach review and briefing card for use by
flight crews when conducting any Alternate Go-Around Flaps operation.
3.0 Ground Training
Ground training for flight crews current in the B-737NG or the B-737 MAX aircraft is
established at Level B. Training may be administered via computer-based training
(CBT), stand-up lectures, or video and should include performance requirements, speed
additive use, and effect on maneuver margins, alternate go-around procedures, flight
crew callouts, and engine failure procedures. This item must be included in initial,
upgrade, transition, differences, and recurrent training.
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4.0 Flight Training
Flight training for flight crews current in the B-737NG or the B-737 MAX aircraft is
established at Level D. Training must be included in initial, upgrade, transition,
differences, and recurrent training.
Flight training should include the following:
i. A two engine flaps 30° approach to a flaps 5° go-around;
ii. A two engine flaps 30° approach to an engine failure during a flaps 5° go-
around; and
iii. A two engine flaps 30° approach in icing conditions to an engine failure during
a flaps 5° go-around.
Page 102 of 174

Appendix 7 – B-737 MAX special training for flight crews
The purpose of this appendix is to describe ground and flight training requirements
associated with pilot qualification on the 737 MAX modified with Flight Control Computer
(FCC) software version P12.1.2. The MDR Table makes reference to this appendix with
the use of an asterisk (shown as D*).
No pilot may operate the B-737 MAX unless the ground and flight training documented
in this appendix has been completed. References to “pilots” in this section include both
PICs and SICs unless otherwise specified. These Special Training segments can be
stand-alone or embedded into another training curriculum. New TASE have been
added to section 9.2 in support of the required training detailed in this Appendix. The
required training is as follows:
1. Ground Training
1.1 Non-Normal Checklists (NNCs)

Training on the following NNCs:
 Runaway Stabilizer
 SPEED TRIM FAIL
 STABILIZER OUT OF TRIM
 Stabilizer Trim Inoperative
 Airspeed Unreliable
 ALT DISAGREE
 AOA DISAGREE
1.2 FCC software version P12.1.2 for the B-737 MAX
Training in this section emphasizes the design differences associated with FCC
software version P12.1.2 for the B-737 MAX. This training also emphasizes necessary
ground training between the B-737NG and B-737 MAX with FCC software version
P12.1.2 or newer. Pilots may complete this training by accomplishing the applicable B-
737 MAX CBT provided by Boeing or a TCCA approved equivalent.
1.2.1 ATA 22 – Autoflight – FCC – MCAS function
 MCAS function description (as part of the STS).
 Conditions for operation.
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 Erroneous FCC trim commands.

 Flight deck alerting of the failure of the MCAS function.
1.2.2 ATA 22 – Autoflight – FCC – AFDS
 Automatic AP disengagement.
 Temporary FD removal.
 AFDS pitch mode changes following stick shaker.
 Inhibiting of AP nose up trim.
1.2.3 ATA 22 – Autoflight – FCC – STAB OUT OF TRIM
 Alert illumination logic (ground vs. flight).
 Revised NNC.
1.2.4 ATA 22 – Autoflight – FCC – SPEED TRIM FAIL (Speed Trim function)
 Speed Trim function description (as part of the STS)
 Functionality of the SPEED TRIM FAIL light.
 Revised NNC.
1.3 Boeing recommended procedures
Training on the following bullet points that emphasize Boeing recommended
procedures. Pilots may complete this training by accomplishing the applicable B-737
CBT provided by Boeing or a TCCA approved equivalent.
1.3.1 B-737 manual trim operation.
 Manual stabilizer trim operation.
 Manual stabilizer trimming techniques.
 Effects of airspeed and aerodynamic loads on manual stabilizer trim operation.
1.3.2 B-737 Unreliable Airspeed – Determining a Reliable Airspeed
 Recognition of flight deck effects of an unreliable airspeed condition.
 Memory pitch and thrust settings.
 Determination of reliable airspeed indication.
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2. Flight Training
Flight training must be conducted in a suitably qualified B-737 MAX Level C or D FFS
that meets Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT) requirements. The FFS
must have installed a Binary Simulation Load revision 3.23.4_3 or higher and FCC
software version P12.1.2 must be assured to be active. The manual stabilizer trim
system must be evaluated for proper control forces and travel system operation.
The following sub-sections provide and emphasize the training objectives of each
maneuver. This training applies to pilots flying the B-737 MAX, or conducting B-
737NG/B-737 MAX MFF. A suitably qualified B-737NG Level C or D FFS may be used
for some conditions only where noted below.
2.1 Demonstration of MCAS activation for each pilot acting as PF.
2.1.1 MCAS activation during an impending stall (or full stall) and recovery
demonstration during manual flight in a clean configuration.
2.1.2 Demonstrate MCAS activation stabilizer trim responses:
 Stabilizer trim in the nose down direction when above threshold AOA for
MCAS activation during stall.
 Stabilizer trim in the nose up direction when below threshold AOA for MCAS
activation during recovery.
2.2 A runaway stabilizer condition that requires the pilots to use manual
stabilizer trim accomplished by each pilot acting as PF.
2.2.1 Runaway stabilizer training as described in subparagraph 9.2.2.5.
2.2.2 Operation of each manual trim technique (as defined by Boeing).
2.2.3 This training can be completed in a B-737 MAX or B-737NG FFS.
NOTE
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2.3 Use of manual stabilizer trim during approach, go-around and level off
accomplished by each pilot acting as PF.
2.3.1 Use of manual stabilizer trim as described in subparagraph 9.2.2.4.
2.3.2 This training can be completed in a B-737 MAX or B-737NG FFS.
2.4 A Cross-FCC Trim Monitor activation demonstration accomplished by
either pilot acting as PF.
2.4.1 Condition must terminate in a landing in order to demonstrate the updated
STAB OUT OF TRIM light functionality.
2.5 Erroneous high AOA during takeoff that leads to an unreliable airspeed
condition accomplished by either pilot acting as PF.
2.5.1 Demonstrates flight deck effects (i.e. aural, visual and tactile) associated with
the failure.
2.5.2 The discretionary deactivation of nuisance stick shaker in accordance with

Airspeed Unreliable NNC.
2.5.3 Fault occurring during the takeoff procedure.

2.5.4 Must include a go-around or missed approach flown with erroneous high
AOA condition.
2.5.4.1 Special emphasis placed on FD behavior biasing out of view upon
selecting Takeoff/Go-around (TO/GA).
Page 106 of 174

Appendix 8 – Supplemental training guidance to TCCA OE report for

B-737
Contents
1.0 Purpose ................................................................................................................ 108

2.0 Application ............................................................................................................ 108
3.0 Background .......................................................................................................... 108
4.0 Overview............................................................................................................... 109
5.0 Format .................................................................................................................. 109
Annex A – TCCA OE Report Guidance ....................................................................... 110
A1.0 OE Report - Appendix 7 - Purpose ................................................................... 110
A2.0 Ground Training requirements .......................................................................... 111
A2.1 OE Report – Ground Training - General ......................................................... 111
A2.2 Ground Training - NNCs ................................................................................. 112
A2.3 Level B Ground Training ................................................................................. 130
A2.4 Ground Training – Boeing Recommended Procedures .................................. 132
A2.5 Ground Training – Training Areas of Special Emphasis ................................. 133
A3.0 Flight Training ................................................................................................... 135
A3.1 OE Report – Flight Training - General ........................................................... 135
A3.2 Flight Training Profile ...................................................................................... 136
A3.3 OE Report – FSTD Requirements .................................................................. 138
A3.4 Flight Training – Recovery from full stall ......................................................... 141
A3.5 Flight Training – Runaway Stabilizer NNC and manual stabilizer trim operations
during approach and go-around ..................................................................... 147
A3.6 Flight Training – Cross-FCC Trim Monitor activation ...................................... 160
A3.7 Flight Training – Unreliable Airspeed and Multiple Flight Deck Alerts during
Non-Normal Conditions .................................................................................. 164
Annex B – Flight Training requirements matrix ........................................................... 171
Page 107 of 174

1. Purpose
The purpose of this appendix is to provide additional guidance and interpretations of the
training requirements within this TCCA Boeing 737 Operational Evaluation (OE) Report.
2. Application
The guidance within this appendix applies to all series of the B-737 or the specific series
of the B-737, as identified within this appendix.
The Return to Service (RTS) of the B-737-8 (MAX) requires that specific training
requirements of the TCCA B-737 OE Report, be complied with. This compliance
requirement was mandated by an Interim Order (IO) Respecting Certain Training
Requirements (B-737-8 and Other Aircraft), No. 3 dated February 26, 2021, or later
revision. Training mandated by the IO includes Appendix 7 of the OE Report, B-737
MAX Special training for flight crews, and specific Training Areas or Special Emphasis
(TASE), and Flight Simulator Training Device (FSTD) requirements as outlined in this
OE report.
Operators of B-737 series, other than the B-737 MAX, should provide training in the
TASE areas added to the OE report by January 1, 2024, including the subsequent
recurrent training. FSTDs should meet the requirements of the OE report to support this
training.
3. Background
Additional training requirements applicable to the B-737 MAX (B-737-8/-9) and specific
series of the B-737 were established by the Joint Operational Evaluation Board (JOEB)
activity, in support of the RTS of the B-737 MAX. These training requirements were
published in the TCCA B-737 Operational Evaluation (OE). These additional training
requirements apply to the B-737 MAX and other B-737s as identified in the OE report.
TCCA has identified the need to provide guidance in greater detail than that provided by
the OE report (main body) to ensure that pilots qualified on the B-737 MAX and other
series of the B-737 clearly understand the purpose of the training requirements provided
in the OE report.
The focus of this appendix is to provide specific guidance to Appendix 7 of the OE
Report which applies to the B-737 MAX, and guidance on new Training Areas of Special
Emphasis (TASE) and Flight Simulator Training Device (FSTD) requirements of the OE
report. This appendix also provides guidance applicable to the revised NNCs and the
TCCA accepted Boeing Company ground and flight training.
Page 108 of 174

The guidance provided in this appendix includes technical background and

recommendations applicable to the training requirements stated in the OE report. This
guidance is intended to assist Canadian Operators in developing their approved training
programs for the B-737 MAX Return to Service (RTS) and for B-737 specific series
training.
4. Overview
Annex A of this appendix provides specific guidance on Ground and Flight Training, for
the B-737 MAX RTS and guidance on the Training Areas of Special Emphasis (TASE)
applicable to specific series of the B-737. The guidance is focused on the Boeing
Company Ground and Flight Training for B-737 MAX RTS accepted by TCCA and
associated OE Report requirements. The B-737 MAX RTS Flight Training is based
upon the Boeing Company flight training profile accepted by TCCA.
Annex B of this appendix provides a matrix of Initial and Recurrent training requirements
applicable to specific B-737 series.
5. Format
The guidance within this appendix applies to content of the OE report as specified, and
guidance applicable to the required ground and flight training content. Extracts from the
OE report (Main body) are provided in italic font and the applicable guidance provided
immediately adjacent to it. All guidance material is preceded by the Header “Guidance”.
Page 109 of 174

Annex A – TCCA OE Report Guidance
A1.0 OE Report - Appendix 7 - Purpose
(OE Report - Appendix 7) Guidance
Appendix 7 – B-737 MAX special The special training requirements of

training for flight crews Appendix 7 were established following a
Joint Operational Evaluation Board
The purpose of this appendix is to (JOEB) activity led by the FAA, with
describe ground and flight training
TCCA, EASA, and ANAC (Brazil). The
requirements associated with pilot
qualification on the 737 MAX modified aim of the JOEB was to jointly evaluate
with Flight Control Computer (FCC) the ground and flight training proposed by
software version P12.1.2. The MDR the Boeing Company in support of the
Table makes reference to this appendix Return to Service (RTS) of the B-737
with the use of an asterisk (shown as D*). MAX (B-737-8/-9). This training was
accepted by TCCA and was initially
No pilot may operate the B-737 MAX
published in Revision 1 of the TCCA OE
unless the ground and flight training
documented in this appendix has been Report for the B-737, dated Dec 17,
completed. References to “pilots” in this 2020. The training requirements within
section include both PICs and SICs the OE report are intended for
unless otherwise specified. These Special incorporation by Canadian operators into
Training segments can be stand-alone or their approved B-737 training programs.
embedded into another training
curriculum. New TASE have been added This special training must be completed
to section 9.2 in support of the required by pilots prior to being authorized to fly
training detailed in this Appendix. The the B-737 MAX, as stated in the opening
required training is as follows: statement of Appendix 7, and Section 9.9
of the OE Report, and mandated by an
(OE Report – Main Body) Interim Order (IO).
Training Areas of Special Emphasis
9.9 B-737 MAX special training for
(TASE) related to Appendix 7 and
flight crews
specific B-737 series are provided in the
Completion of the ground and flight main body of the OE report at section
training specified in Appendix 7 is 9.2.
required before flying the B-737 MAX.
Page 110 of 174

A2.0 Ground Training requirements
A2.1 OE Report – Ground Training - General
1. Ground Training Section 1. GROUND TRAINING of

Appendix 7 of the TCCA OE Report for
the B-737 provides the requirements for
Ground Training for the RTS of the B-737
MAX.
Sub-section 9.2.1 of the main body of the
OE report provides the TASE
requirements corresponding to this
Ground Training. Some TASE - Ground
Training has been added in support of
the required training for Appendix 7 of the
TCCA OE Report.
The Ground Training requirements in
Appendix 7 includes both Level A and B
training content.
Level A training content for the B-737
MAX RTS includes seven revised Non-
Normal Checklists (NNCs), and new and
revised Flight Crew Operations Manual
(FCOM) and Flight Crew Training Manual
(FCTM) content, QRH Checklist
instructions and RTS simulator training
information and Flight Operations
Technical Bulletins (FOTB).
Level B training includes Computer
Based Training (CBT) content applicable
to B-737 MAX RTS design changes,
manual stabilizer trimming techniques,
and Airspeed Unreliable procedures.
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A2.2 Ground Training - NNCs
1.1 Non-Normal Checklists (NNCs) Seven B-737 NNCs have been revised
for the B-737 MAX. Training on the
Training on the following NNCs: NNCs, may be accomplished as Level A
 Runaway Stabilizer (Self-study). The training for the STAB
 SPEED TRIM FAIL
OUT OF TRIM and SPEED TRIM FAIL
 STABILIZER OUT OF TRIM
NNCs also requires Level B training (e.g.
 Stabilizer Trim Inoperative
 Airspeed Unreliable CBT).
 ALT DISAGREE Changes to the B-737 MAX NNCs in this
 AOA DISAGREE document may be identified by the blue
and magenta colored text.
Operators conducting Mixed Fleet Flying
(MFF) operations with the B-737 MAX
and B-737NG (B73C) should amend their
B-737 NNCs to align with those of the B-
737 MAX for commonality, and should
apply to their TTL/POI for approval.
(Consultation with the TCCA Commercial
Flight Standards (CFS) Division may be
required).
Page 112 of 174

A2.2.1 Runaway Stabilizer NNC
Figure 1
Runaway Stabilizer NNC – Condition statement
Guidance – Runaway Stabilizer NNC
Condition statement
(Figure 1)
The condition statement has been expanded, so that the Runaway Stabilizer NNC
should be used whenever the horizontal stabilizer movement occurs in a manner not
appropriate for the flight conditions.
NOTE: The Runaway Stabilizer NNC is an unannunciated NNC. Pilots
must be trained to recognize stabilizer trim movement in a manner not
appropriate to the flight conditions.
Ground and Flight training should ensure that pilots are familiar with normal stabilizer
trim movement, stabilizer trim rates associated with flap setting, and when stabilizer
trim movement should (and should not) be anticipated.
In a suitably qualified B-737 MAX and B-737NG Level C or D Full Flight Simulator
(FFS), the runaway stabilizer (using the Dual Wire short malfunction (see section
A3.3 OE Report – FSTD requirements)) will be accompanied by the disengagement
Page 113 of 174

of the autopilot (A/P) (with the associated A/P disengagement alerts), MASTER
CAUTION and SPEED TRIM FAIL light illumination.
NOTE: The SPEED TRIM FAIL light may or may not illuminate on the B-
737NG. For more details, refer to section A3.5.2 – Flight Training
guidance – Runaway Stabilizer.
The Pilot Flying (PF) should be vigilant for any uncommanded stabilizer trim
movement following any A/P disengagement and illumination of the MASTER
CAUTION light.
The Pilot Monitoring (PM) is expected to respond to the MASTER CAUTION and
SPEED TRIM FAIL lights per training. Good crew coordination and CRM will be
required to positively identify a runaway stabilizer condition.
Figure 2
Runaway Stabilizer NNC – Memory items
Guidance – Runaway Stabilizer NNC (Cont’d)
Steps 1 to 7 Memory items

(Figure 2)
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The memory items have been revised to align with certification assumptions, and
steps have been added to include the disengagement of the Autothrottle (A/T), and
use of thrust levers and Main Electric Stabilizer Trim.
Step 1 - Control Column…..Hold Firmly

The first step is for the PF to take control of the aircraft using the Control Column
when a runaway stabilizer condition is identified.
Step 2 - Autopilot (if engaged)….Disengage
This step disengages the autopilot if still engaged. If the autopilot is the source of
uncommanded stabilizer movement, disengaging the autopilot may eliminate the
uncommanded stabilizer movement.
Step 3 - Autothrottle (if engaged) … Disengage
This step is required for the PF to establish manual control of thrust, and to prevent
the autothrottle from providing thrust commands that may cause undesirable airspeed
or pitch deviations.
Step 4 - Control column and thrust levers……Control airplane pitch attitude and
airspeed
This step has been expanded to add the use of thrust levers with control column to
control airplane pitch attitude and airspeed. The flight crew should also remain aware
of thrust lever position for situational awareness of the aircraft state.
Airspeed should be controlled to minimize deviations from the airspeed at which the
runaway stabilizer occurred. Increased airspeeds will result in increased
aerodynamic loads and out of trim control column forces.
Should runaway stabilizer movement be allowed to continue, the control column
actuated stabilizer trim cutout switches (control column cutout switches) will stop the
uncommanded stabilizer trim movement, but will not reverse it. Any release of the
control column, will allow the uncommanded stabilizer movement to resume.
NOTE: The control column cutout switches will stop any uncommanded
stabilizer movement, except an aeroplane nose-down stabilizer
movement commanded by MCAS. The incorporation of FCC P12.1.2
SW has eliminated the failure conditions that resulted in uncommanded
MCAS activation. Any such MCAS activated stabilizer movement
should be considered to be valid, and control column forces should be
Page 115 of 174

reduced to avoid increasing the Angle of Attack (AOA) further (since

MCAS activation logic is a function of elevated AOAs.)
Step 5 - Main Electric Stabilizer trim….Reduce control column forces
The Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches will stop and reverse the runaway stabilizer
condition. When released, the runaway will continue.
The PF is expected to actively use the Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches, to
reduce out of trim control column forces prior to activating STAB TRIM cutout
switches. Control column forces should be reduced as much as possible, using the
Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches prior to engaging the STAB TRIM cutout
switches. This will aid in reducing subsequent manual trimming forces.
If use of the control column cutout switches is necessary to stop runaway stabilizer
movement, the Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches should be used to reduce
stabilizer miss-trim to minimize the required control column input.
With proper use of the Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches to reduce stabilizer miss-
trim prior to the activation of manual trim, flight crews should seldom encounter high
forces that require a two pilot effort, or require maneuvers to momentarily reduce
aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer to aid in manual trimming.
Step 6 - If the runaway stops after the autopilot is disengaged…
A runaway stopping after the autopilot is disengaged indicates the runaway may have
originated from the autopilot. For this reason, the autopilot should not be reengaged.
The autothrottle should not be engaged if the autopilot is not engaged.
If the runaway stabilizer condition no longer exists, the checklist is complete.
Step 7 - If the runaway continues after the autopilot is disengaged….
The runaway continuing after the autopilot is disengaged indicates that the autopilot is
not the source of the runaway stabilizer.
Setting both STAB TRIM cutout switches to CUTOUT removes power to the
horizontal stabilizer trim motor, and permits manual trimming of the horizontal
stabilizer using the Stabilizer trim wheel.
The proper trimming of the horizontal stabilizer using the Main Electric Stabilizer Trim
to reduce control column forces prior to activating the STAB TRIM cutout switches is
important in minimizing subsequent manual trimming forces.
The step to Grasp and hold the Stabilizer trim wheel is required for older B-737 series
(Pre B-737NG) where this step was required to control a failed horizontal stabilizer
Page 116 of 174

trim brake for a continued runaway. This step has been retained in the NNC by
Boeing for commonality.
Figure 3
Runaway Stabilizer NNC
Guidance – Runaway Stabilizer NNC (Cont’d)
(Figure 3)
The proper execution of Step 5 is important in correcting an out of trim condition, and
therefore minimize manual trim forces.
Both pilots may need to use Stabilizer trim wheels if manual trim forces are too
difficult for one pilot to trim manually.
Manual trim forces reduce with a reduction in airspeed. Control column and thrust
levers can be used to reduce airspeed. Manual trim inputs will be required as
necessary to reduce control column forces as airspeed is reduced.
The PF should anticipate manual trim input requirements when changing airspeed,
thrust or configuration.
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A2.2.2 Speed Trim Fail NNC
Figure 4
Speed Trim Fail NNC
Guidance – Speed Trim Fail NNC
(Figure 4)
This NNC has been revised to include the explanatory Note.
No adverse handling issues were identified during certification and operational
evaluations where the aircraft was flown within the Practical Operational Flight
Envelope (POFE). The POFE encompasses airspeeds and normal airspeeds
expected during normal operations and anticipated maneuvers consistent with flight
training.
Pilots should strive to maintain the aircraft in trim condition with the SPEED TRIM
FAIL light illuminated to ensure they continue to experience normal control column
force gradients.
During the flight training exercise of Runaway Stabilizer malfunction (Appendix 7 of
the OE report), pilots will experience manual flight (A/P not engaged) with the SPEED
TRIM FAIL light illuminated. There is no requirement to conduct additional flight
training manoeuvers with the SPEED TRIM FAIL light illuminated.
Page 118 of 174

A2.2.3 Stabilizer Out of Trim NNC
Figure 5
Stabilizer Out of Trim NNC
Guidance – Stabilizer Out of Trim NNC
(Figure 5)
This NNC has been revised to describe the illumination of the STAB OUT OF TRIM
light.
This light will illuminate on the B-737 MAX on landing when below 30 knots ground
speed, following an FCC partial failure in flight. The ground and flight training is
intended to ensure that flight crews understand that maintenance action must be
taken prior to any subsequent flight, if this light illuminates on landing.
This condition is demonstrated during the B-737 MAX flight training during the
demonstration of the Cross Flight Control Computer (Cross-FCC) Trim Monitor
activation.
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A2.2.4 Stabilizer Trim Inoperative NNC
Figure 6
Stabilizer Trim Inoperative NNC
Guidance – Stabilizer Trim Inoperative NNC
(Figure 6)
The Condition Statement has been revised to further describe this condition.
This malfunction represents a loss of function of the Main Electric Stabilizer trim
switches. This malfunction should not be confused with a Runaway Stabilizer
malfunction.
NOTE: The Runaway Stabilizer procedure should be executed for any
inappropriate movement of the horizontal stabilizer (Ref. A2.2.1)
Control column forces may develop because of airspeed, thrust or configuration
changes made from the original trim setting. Appropriate manual trimming techniques
will be required depending on the magnitude of the column forces. It may be
necessary to reduce airspeed to reduce manual trimming forces.
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A2.2.5 Airspeed Unreliable NNC
Figure 7
Airspeed Unreliable NNC
Guidance – Airspeed Unreliable NNC
(Figure 7)
An erroneous AOA may trigger unreliable airspeed, Mach and altitude indications. An
intermittent or continuous stick shaker may be associated with an erroneous AOA.
The Additional Information section referenced in the Condition Statement lists
potential causes of unreliable airspeed. This section should be consulted after
completion of the NNC.
The pitch and thrust settings in Step 4 of this NNC are based upon the landing gear
being retracted. The landing gear should therefore be retracted (if extended) to
ensure that a sufficient climb performance capability associated with the pitch and
thrust settings identify in Step 4 can be achieved.
Page 121 of 174

Figure 8
(Figure 8)
An erroneously high AOA may trigger the continuous activation of the Stick Shaker.
The autopilot engagement logic will not permit the engagement of the autopilot after 5
minutes of continuous stick shaker activation. It may be possible to engage the
autopilot for a short period of time, but it will subsequently disengage without
command. The autopilot will not be available for the remainder of the flight.
Flight crews should be aware of this engagement logic and avoid continuous repeated
attempts to re-engage the autopilot, if unable to engage it after this step of the NNC.
Page 122 of 174

Figure 9
Figure 10
Page 123 of 174

(Figure 9)
Steps 20 to 23 have been added to the NNC to provide a procedure to disable a
nuisance stick shaker at the pilot’s discretion. The disabling of a continuous stick
shaker will remove a significant distraction from the flight deck and aid in the effective
recognition of a valid stall warning on the unaffected side.
An erroneously high AOA will activate the Elevator Feel Shift (EFS) module. Control
column forces may be increased by the EFS activation.
(Figure 10)
The Stick Shaker Circuit Breakers (CBs) are identified by CB collars. The Stick
Shaker CBs should be carefully identified and verified prior to pulling.
Figure 11
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(Figure 11)
The Note under Deferred Items has been revised to identify DA/MDA aural callouts
are not provided if BARO minimums are set only on the First Officer’s PFD.
The flight crew should obtain the appropriate pitch attitude and thrust setting in
accordance with the tables indicated in the Performance Inflight chapter of the QRH.
Figure 12
(Figure 12)
The flight crew should anticipate the uncommanded removal of the Flight Director
(F/D) pitch bar during a go-around when TO/GA is pushed (a.k.a. biasing out of view).
The flight crew should be prepared to select an appropriate vertical F/D mode (E.g.
LVL CHG) to get appropriate vertical guidance.
The crew should be aware that the NNCs for the IAS DISAGREE alert, the AOA
DISAGREE alert and the ALT DISAGREE alert accompanied with the IAS
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DISAGREE alert will refer the crew to the Airspeed Unreliable NNC. It is expected
that the PF will action the memory items for the Airspeed Unreliable NNC for the
above referenced alerts.
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A2.2.6 IAS Disagree NNC
Figure 13
IAS DISAGREE NNC
Guidance – IAS Disagree NNC
(Figure 13)
The IAS DISAGREE alert will likely illuminate in the case of an erroneous AOA. The
flight crew should therefore action the Unreliable Airspeed NNC per the IAS Disagree
NNC.
NOTE: The IAS DISAGREE NNC has not been revised.
Page 127 of 174

A2.2.7 ALT Disagree NNC
Figure 14
ALT DISAGREE NNC
Guidance – ALT Disagree NNC
(Figure 14)
The IAS DISAGREE and ALT DISAGREE alerts will likely both illuminate in the case
of an erroneous AOA. The flight crew should therefore action the Unreliable Airspeed
NNC per the Alt Disagree NNC.
Page 128 of 174

A2.2.8 AOA Disagree NNC
Figure 15
AOA DISAGREE NNC
Guidance – AOA Disagree NNC
(Figure 15)
The IAS DISAGREE alert will likely illuminate in the case of an erroneous AOA. The
flight crew should therefore action the Unreliable Airspeed NNC per the IAS Disagree
NNC.
Page 129 of 174

A2.3 Level B Ground Training
1.2 FCC software version P12.1.2 for Pilots are required to successfully
the B-737 MAX complete the Level B ground training
referenced in Section 1.2 of Appendix 7
Training in this section emphasizes the
of the OE Report, prior to being
design differences associated with FCC
software version P12.1.2 for the B-737 authorized to fly the B-737 MAX.
MAX. This training also emphasizes The ground training content focuses on
necessary ground training between the B- differences between the B-737NG and B-
737NG and B-737 MAX with FCC
737 MAX under the topics covered.
software version P12.1.2 or newer. Pilots
may complete this training by Pilots may take the ground training
accomplishing the applicable B-737 MAX developed by the Boeing Company or
CBT provided by Boeing or a TCCA take TCCA approved equivalent training.
approved equivalent.
1.2.1 ATA 22 – Autoflight – FCC –
MCAS function
 MCAS function description (as part
of the STS).
 Conditions for operation.
 Erroneous FCC trim commands.
 Flight deck alerting of the failure of
the MCAS function.
1.2.2 ATA 22 – Autoflight – FCC – AFDS

 Automatic AP disengagement.
 Temporary FD removal.
 AFDS pitch mode changes
following stick shaker.
 Inhibiting of AP nose up trim.
1.2.3 ATA 22 – Autoflight – FCC – STAB

OUT OF TRIM
 Alert illumination logic (ground vs.
flight).
 Revised NNC.
1.2.4 ATA 22 – Autoflight – FCC –

SPEED TRIM FAIL (Speed Trim
function)
Page 130 of 174

 Speed Trim function description

(as part of the STS)
 Functionality of the SPEED TRIM
FAIL light.
 Revised NNC.
Page 131 of 174

A2.4 Ground Training – Boeing Recommended Procedures
(OE Report – Appendix 7) Guidance
1.3 Boeing recommended procedures Pilots are required to successfully

complete the Level B ground training
Training on the following bullet points that referenced in Section 1.3 of Appendix 7
emphasize Boeing recommended
of the OE Report, prior to being
procedures. Pilots may complete this
training by accomplishing the applicable authorized to fly the B-737 MAX.
B-737 CBT provided by Boeing or a The Boeing Company has developed
TCCA approved equivalent. Level B Ground training with video
demonstrations on manual trim operation
1.3.1 B-737 manual trim operation.
 Manual stabilizer trim operation. and determining a reliable airspeed
 Manual stabilizer trimming during an Airspeed Unreliable condition
techniques. because of an erroneous AOA.
 Effects of airspeed and Pilots may take this ground training
aerodynamic loads on manual
developed by the Boeing Company or
stabilizer trim operation.
take TCCA approved equivalent training.
1.3.2 B-737 Unreliable Airspeed –
Determining a Reliable Airspeed
 Recognition of flight deck effects of
an unreliable airspeed condition.
 Memory pitch and thrust settings.
 Determination of reliable airspeed
indication.
Page 132 of 174

A2.5 Ground Training – Training Areas of Special Emphasis
(OE Report (Main Body)) Guidance
9.2 Training Areas of Special TASE - Ground Training has been added
Emphasis (TASE) in support of the required training for
Appendix 7 of the TCCA OE Report.
NOTE
References to “pilots” in this section The TASE in Ground Training for Flight
include both Pilot In Command crew Non-Normal Situations with Multiple
(PIC) and Second In Command alerts (Sub-section 9.2.1.1 of OE Report)
(SIC) unless otherwise specified. should be considered a prerequisite for
Pilots must receive special the same TASE for Flight Training (Sub-
emphasis training in the following section 9.2.2.6 of the OE Report).
areas:
Operators should ensure that the required
9.2.1 TASE - Ground Training emphasis is provided during Ground
Pilots must receive special emphasis on Training on TASE topics that apply to
the following areas during ground Flight Training. This includes the
training: following TASE applicable to Flight
9.2.1.1 Multiple Flight Deck Alerts Training (in the applicable Sub-sections
During Non-Normal of the TCCA OE Report):
Conditions
9.2.2.4 Stabilizer Trim
9.2.2.5 Runaway Stabilizer
Training is required for instances where a
single malfunction results in multiple flight 9.2.2.6 Multiple Flight Deck Alerts
deck alerts and must include flight crew during Non-Normal Conditions
alert prioritization and analysis of the
need to conduct additional Non-Normal 9.2.2.7 Unreliable Airspeed
Checklists (NNC). This training must be Operators should refer to Section A3.0
included in initial, upgrade, transition, and
Flight Training, of this document for
recurrent training.
guidance applicable to flight training, to
9.2.1.5 B-737 MAX Flight Control ensure that pilots have the required
Computer (FCC)
knowledge and understanding of systems
MCAS ground training must address the and procedures for effective flight
latest FCC system description, training.
functionality, and associated failure
conditions to include flight crew alerting.
This training must be included in initial,
Page 133 of 174

transition, differences, and recurrent

training.
Page 134 of 174

A3.0 Flight Training
A3.1 OE Report – Flight Training - General
2. Flight Training Section 2. FLIGHT TRAINING of

(OE Report - Main Body) the B-737 provides the requirements for
Flight Training for the RTS of the B-737
9.2 Training Areas of Special
MAX.
Emphasis (TASE)
Sub-section 9.2.2 of the main body of the
9.2.2 TASE - Flight Training OE report provides the TASE
requirements corresponding to this Flight
Training. Training Areas of Special
Emphasis have been added in support of
the required training for Appendix 7 of the
TCCA OE Report. In addition, these
Training Areas of Special Emphasis apply
to other series of the B-737 as indicated.
Page 135 of 174

A3.2 Flight Training Profile
Figure 16
Boeing Flight Training Profile for Appendix 7 Flight Training
Guidance
(Figure 16)
The flight profile for the Appendix 7 Flight training is depicted in Figure 16 above. The
Boeing Company’s flight training profile is comprised of the following four scenarios:
1. Stall Identification and Maneuver Characteristics Augmentation System
(MCAS) activation
o Full stall – MCAS activation
2. Runaway Stabilizer NNC and manual stabilizer trim operations during an
approach and go-around
3. Cross Flight Control Computer (Cross-FCC) Trim Monitor
4. Airspeed Unreliable NNC
o Erroneous high AOA on takeoff – unreliable airspeed condition
Page 136 of 174

NOTE: Pilots may be trained in accordance with the flight profile

depicted in Figure 16 (above) developed by the Boeing Company or
take TCCA approved equivalent training.
TCCA recommends that the following principals be followed to ensure the maximum
effectiveness of this flight training:
 The focus of this flight training is for pilots to gain a thorough understanding of
the design changes, through a demonstration of system functions, and
associated flight deck effects and indications;
 A focus on training to proficiency should prevail over a focus on grading;
 Pilots should be given the maximum opportunity to interact with the aircraft
controls to get a hands on practical understanding;
 Any mistakes made during training, when effectively identified and corrected,
should be considered to be valuable learning opportunities;
 An emphasis on the strict adherence to Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs) during this training may be relaxed to support the achievement of the
training objectives of further increased understanding of the systems; and
 Discussion and questions should be promoted at appropriate opportunities.
Page 137 of 174

A3.3 OE Report – FSTD Requirements
2. Flight Training Flight Simulator Training Device (FSTD)

Requirements
Flight training must be conducted in
a suitably qualified B-737 MAX  For B-737 MAX pilots training, the Full
Level C or D FFS that meets Upset Flight Simulator (FFS) must be qualified
Prevention and Recovery Training to meet Upset Prevention and Recovery
(UPRT) requirements. The FFS Training (UPRT) requirements, because
must have installed a Binary of the necessity to enter a full stall to
Simulation Load revision 3.23.4_3
demonstrate MCAS activation.
or higher and FCC software version
P12.1.2 must be assured to be  Flight training for Runaway Stabilizer
active. The manual stabilizer trim and use of the manual stabilizer trim as
system must be evaluated for
outlined in Appendix 7 of the OE
proper control forces and travel
system operation. Report, may be conducted in a suitably
qualified B-737 MAX or B-737NG Level
The following sub-sections provide
C or D FFS. The specified Binary
and emphasize the training
objectives of each maneuver. This Simulation Load provides the basis for
training applies to pilots flying the B- 737 MAX and B-737NG FFS
737 MAX, or conducting B- programming and the resulting
737NG/B-737 MAX MFF. A suitably operating characteristics. Boeing has
qualified B-737NG Level C or D FFS issued Simulator Data Bulletins as
may be used for some conditions follow:
only where noted below.
o SDB-737-006: The U.S. FAA
(OE Report - Main Body)
has found Boeing Simulator Data
9.6 Flight Simulation Training Bulletin SDB-737-006 as an
Devices (FSTD) acceptable means for FSTD
An approved Level C of D B-737 sponsors to validate manual
FFS equipped with day and night stabilizer trim wheel forces. The
visual scenes that is representative FSTD sponsors must not allow
of an operator’s specific B-737 use of the FFS to conduct
configuration is required for flight training on manual stabilizer trim
training.
wheel, if the control forces are
The flight training for the B-737 MAX not adequate to meet the training
required in Appendix 7 of this report objectives.
must be conducted in a in a suitably
qualified B-737 MAX Level C or D o SDB-737-008: Boeing has
FFS, that meets Upset Prevention issued a Simulator Data Bulletin
Page 138 of 174

and Recovery Training (UPRT) SDB-737-008 in order to provide

requirements. The FFS must have the same runaway stabilizer
installed a Binary Simulation Load condition for 737NG simulators.
revision 3.23.4_3 or higher and FCC
software version P12.1.2 must be  Flight training for Runaway Stabilizer
assured to be active. For B-737 applicable for all series of B-737
MAX pilots conducting B-737NG/B- required specific FFS requirement and
737 MAX MFF, some flight training are address below.
exercises may be conducted in a
suitably qualified B-737NG Level C Three malfunctions are now available to train
or D FFS only where indicated in the Runaway Stabilizer malfunctions on the B-737
Appendix 7. MAX and/or B-737NG as provided in the table
Stabilizer Trim and Runaway below:
Stabilizer training for all B-737s
requires a FFS that has the required
flight deck effects for this training.
The manual stabilizer trim system FFS – Runaway Stabilizer Malfunctions
must be representative of proper
control forces and travel system ATA MALFUNCTION MALFUNCTION Also Known
operation.
TITLE DESCRIPTION As (AKA)
NOTE
22 FCC Stabilizer Flight Control
Runaway Stabilizer flight Runaway Computer NU
simulator training must be (Nose Up)
conducted using the ATA 27 Stabilizer
malfunction titled Stabilizer Runaway
Runaway (also known as the
Dual Wire short malfunction). Flight Control
Use of the ATA 27 Computer ND
malfunction, Stabilizer (Nose Down)
Runaway – Trim Switch (also Stabilizer
known as the Electric Trim Runaway
Switch Malfunction) is not 27 Stabilizer Stabilizer Dual Wire
permitted for use in Runaway Runaway Runaway Short
Stabilizer flight training. malfunction
Operators should ensure that 27 Stabilizer Stabilizer
the appropriate Runaway Runaway – Runaway Electric Trim
Stabilizer malfunction is Trim Switch Switch
incorporated into their FFS,
malfunction
prior to Runaway Stabilizer
training. The TCCA National The ATA 22 Malfunction titled; FCC Stabilizer
Simulator Evaluation Program Runaway, is specific to the B-737 MAX and is
(NSEP) should be consulted used for training of the third scenario, Cross
on the incorporation of
malfunctions into the FFS and
Page 139 of 174

the subsequent qualification of Flight Control Computer (Cross-FCC) Trim

the FFS for training. Monitor.
The FFS requirements for The two ATA 27 malfunctions available to train
Enhanced Flight Vision System a Runaway Stabilizer are titled; Stabilizer
(EFVS) training is provided in Annex Runaway and Stabilizer Runaway – Trim
1 of Appendix 5 of this report. Switch. TCCA has prohibited the use of the
(OE Report - Main Body) Stabilizer Runaway – Trim Switch
malfunction for training on all series of the B-
10.5 FSTD 737, because this specific malfunction is not
consistent with the certification assumptions for
the Runaway Stabilizer NNC, and may lead to
An approved Level C of D B-737 negative transfer of training and is of an
FFS equipped with day and night
extremely low probability of occurring on the B-
visual scenes that is representative
of an operator’s specific B-737 737.
configuration is required for NOTE: FFS Runaway Stabilizer
checking. malfunctions that prevent the use of
the Main Electric Stabilizer trim per the
The FFS requirements for
Enhanced Flight Vision System NNC are prohibited for training on all
(EFVS) checking is provided in series of the B-737. Operators
Annex 1 of Appendix 5 of this report. should ensure that the appropriate
Runaway Stabilizer malfunction is
incorporated into their FFS, prior to
Runaway Stabilizer training. The
TCCA National Simulator Evaluation
Program (NSEP) should be consulted
on the incorporation of malfunctions
into the FFS and the subsequent
Pilots, other than those flying the B-
737 MAX, must complete this training
no later than January 1, 2024.
Additional guidance on the ATA 27
malfunctions is provided in Section A3.5 Flight
Training – Runaway Stabilizer
Page 140 of 174

A3.4 Flight Training – Recovery from full stall
Figure 17
Boeing Flight Training profile – MCAS demo/full stall
Page 141 of 174

A3.4.1 OE Report requirements - MCAS activation
(OE report - Appendix 7) Guidance
2. Flight Training Stall Identification and Maneuver

Characteristics Augmentation System
The following sub-sections provide and (MCAS) activation
emphasize the training objectives of each
maneuver. This training applies to pilots  Recovery from a full stall – clean
flying the B-737 MAX, or conducting B- configuration – manual flight - both
737NG/B-737 MAX MFF. A suitably pilots
qualified B-737NG Level C or D FFS may
be used for some conditions only where This Stall Identification and MCAS
noted below. activation training must be completed by
2.1 Demonstration of MCAS pilots before they may be authorized to fly
activation for each pilot acting as PF. the B-737 MAX. The training function
must be accomplished by each pilot
2.1.1 MCAS activation during an
impending stall (or full stall) and acting as PF and only in a suitably
recovery demonstration during qualified B-737 MAX FFS as described in
manual flight in a clean section A3.3 above.
configuration.
TCCA recommends an additional
2.1.2 Demonstrate MCAS activation demonstration of the Speed Trim
stabilizer trim responses:
Function, to enhance pilot understanding
 Stabilizer trim in the nose down of the Speed Trim System (STS).
direction when above threshold
AOA for MCAS activation during There are no recurrent training
stall. requirements for this training. Although
not required, TCCA recommends that all
 Stabilizer trim in the nose up
direction when below threshold B-737 MAX operators incorporate this
AOA for MCAS activation during training into their recurrent training
recovery. profiles no later than 36 months after
initial training.
Page 142 of 174

A3.4.2 Flight Training Guidance - MCAS Activation
Guidance
Scenario Purpose:
The purpose of this scenario is to demonstrate the behaviour of the MCAS function
(of the STS) during a stall.
This scenario may also be used to provide additional demonstrations of the normal
operation of the Speed Trim Function (of the STS) during a manually flown climb and
during a stall with flaps extended.
Scenario Guidance:
STS Demonstration during Manually Flown Climb
The aircraft is flown manually to 10,000 feet, immediately after take-off. During the
climb the crew may observe normal operation of the Speed Trim function while in
manual flight.
This demonstration may be accomplished by stabilizing the aircraft in a climb in the
take-off configuration and trimming out any control column forces. Speed should be
changed by a small amount using control column only (no sooner than 5 seconds
after the last stabilizer trim input or 10 seconds after take-off, to allow the Speed Trim
function to work per STS logic.) Stabilizer trim wheel motion, in a manner to increase
control column forces, and proportional to the speed deviation, should be observed.
The control column forces can then be relaxed to return to the original trim speed and
allow the Speed Trim function to reverse the stabilizer trim input. The PF should
avoid making any stabilizer trim inputs during this demonstration.
A key teaching point of this demonstration is to show the Speed Trim function is
intended to discourage speed deviations through increased control column forces,
during the conditions that this function is active.
When the aircraft has been stabilized back to the original trim speed, control may be
transferred to allow the other pilot to complete this demonstration. Flaps may be
retracted after this training event, to clean up the aircraft for the remaining climb.
MCAS Demonstration during stall
The demonstration of the MCAS function is accomplished by conducting a power off
stall in the clean configuration, and recovering at the activation of the Elevator Feel
Shift (EFS). Pilots will be instructed to not trim below the Flaps UP maneuver speed,
and should avoid making any further stabilizer trim inputs during this demonstration.
Page 143 of 174

This demonstration must be conducted at the elevated angles of attack, associated

with a stall and in the clean configuration, in order to activate the MCAS function. The
pilots during the demonstration, should observe all indications associated with
increasing AOA and an impending stall, including stabilizer trim wheel motion rates
and characteristics associated with the MCAS function.
During the deceleration to the stall, the pilots will be instructed to intentionally
disregard the indications of an impending stall, including the Low Airspeed alert,
appearance of the Pitch Limit Indicator (PLI), Stick Shaker, increasing airframe
buffeting until EFS activation. Pilots will initially observe the operation of the Speed
Trim function, through the nose-down motion of the stabilizer trim wheel.
NOTE: The pilot’s should observe that the STS commands the stabilizer
trim motor to operate at a low trim rate with flaps retracted, compared to
a high trim rate with the flaps extended.
As AOA continues to increase the STS will transition from the Speed Trim function to
the MCAS function. Following activation, of the EFS, pilots will recover from the stall
and observe the STS (MCAS and Speed Trim functions) remove (“unwind”) the nose-
down horizontal stabilizer inputs until the original trim reference speed is reached.
Speed Trim System (STS) functions
While this flight training focuses on a demonstration of the MCAS function, pilots
should clearly understand that the MCAS function is one of the two functions of the
Speed Trim System (STS), with the other function being the Speed Trim function.
The MCAS and Speed Trim functions have different activation logic, but have a
similar purpose of commanding stabilizer trim movement to discourage a speed
deviation (and associated Angle Of Attack (AOA) deviation as the case may be)
through increasing control column forces, while in manual flight (autopilot
disengaged).
The STS provides nose down stabilizer trim inputs as the aircraft decelerates from a
reference speed or AOA, and nose up inputs as the aircraft accelerates, to deter the
pilot from further speed deviations through control column forces. Although the rate
and characteristics of stabilizer motion in response to STS commands may vary with
flap setting and acceleration/deceleration, pilots should understand that the MCAS
and Speed Trim functions are fundamentally a Speed Trim System.
NOTE: The control column cutout switches will stop any uncommanded
stabilizer movement, except an aeroplane nose-down stabilizer
movement commanded by the MCAS function. The incorporation of
FCC P12.1.2 SW has eliminated the failure conditions that resulted in
uncommanded MCAS activation. The new software introduced a new
Page 144 of 174

layer of redundancy called the “Software Column Cutout Function” to

mitigate a latent column cutout switch failure. Any such MCAS activated
stabilizer movement should be considered to be valid, and control
column forces should be reduced to avoid increasing the Angle of Attack
(AOA) further (since MCAS activation logic is a function of elevated
AOAs.)
Pilots should gain a fundamental understanding that their first action in response to
any STS stabilizer motion (whether through the Speed Trim or MCAS function) is to
relax control column input to return to the original trim speed, or re-trim as necessary.
When the control column forces are relaxed pilots should observe the STS reversing
the stabilizer trim inputs from the original speed deviation.
Recommended demonstration - Speed Trim Function
The ground training for the STS describes both the Speed Trim and the MCAS
functions of the STS. Although outside the scope of the training requirements of the
OE report, TCCA recommends that an additional demonstration of the Speed Trim
function in a full stall be provided to enhance pilots understanding of the STS.
TCCA therefore recommends repeating a manually entered full stall with flap
extended (e.g. Flap 5) and thrust greater than 60% N1 to activate the Speed Trim
function. The objective of this demonstration is for pilots to recognize how and when
the STS is functioning and for pilots to understand the basic similarity between the
MCAS and Speed Trim functions, while seeing differences with regard to stabilizer
trim rates associated with flap position and characteristics of stabilizer trim wheel
movement.
NOTES:
1. As explained earlier, the STS controls the stabilizer trim motor at
a high trim rate with flaps extended and low trim rate with flaps
retracted.
2. Although the MCAS function controls the stabilizer trim motor at
the flaps extended Speed Trim function rate (high rate), the
MCAS function will not activate with flaps extended.
This demonstration is also intended to show the pilots, that aft Control Column input
(through the control column cutout switches) will stop stabilizer motion associated
with the Speed Trim function (unlike the MCAS function as described earlier).
Full stall training
Pilots may not be familiar with the indications of an impending stall, beyond stick
shaker activation, unless they have had full stall or Upset Prevention and Recovery
Page 145 of 174

Training (UPRT). Pilots will need to be familiar with the indications of a stall beyond
those of the stick shaker, including the activation of the EFS, to effectively observe
the operation of the MCAS function. Demonstrations of AOAs beyond the activation
of the stick shaker requires that the FFS is suitably qualified for this training, and must
meet UPRT training requirements. Pilots must also understand the appropriate stall
recovery inputs, when recovering from a stall beyond stick shaker activation.
Aggressive thrust application should be avoided, since on the B-737 MAX, this may
result in an undesirable pitch up tendency and aggravate the stall recovery or lead to
an aeroplane upset condition. Smooth and deliberate pitch and thrust inputs will be
necessary to avoid a secondary stick shaker activation, stall or upset.
Training applicability and FFS
Training for MCAS activation is applicable to all B-737 MAX pilots and must be
conducted in a B-737 MAX FFS meeting the simulator qualification requirements
stated in Section A3.3 above.
Recurrent Training
Training for MCAS activation is a “one-time” special training event to qualify pilots to
fly the B-737 MAX. There are no recurrent training requirements in the TCCA OE
report.
B-737 operators however are encouraged to incorporate recurrent training at least
every 36 months, to demonstrate MCAS and Speed Trim functions and B-737 stall
identification features, because of the important value of this training.
Page 146 of 174

A3.5 Flight Training – Runaway Stabilizer NNC and manual stabilizer trim
operations during approach and go-around
Figure 18
Boeing Flight Training profile – Runaway Stabilizer/Manual Trimming
Page 147 of 174

A3.5.1 OE Report Requirements – Runaway Stabilizer
2. Flight Training The OE Report Appendix 7 Runaway

Stabilizer training must be completed by
2.2 A runaway stabilizer condition pilots before they may be authorized to fly
that requires the pilots to use the B-737 MAX. The training event must
manual stabilizer trim
accomplished by each pilot be accomplished by each pilot acting as
acting as PF. PF and only in a suitably qualified B-737
MAX or B-737NG Level C or D FFS as
2.2.1 Runaway stabilizer training as
described in subparagraph detailed in section A3.3 above.
9.2.2.5. The TASE for Runaway Stabilizer (OE
2.2.2 Operation of each manual trim report Section 9.2.2.5) applies to all
technique (as defined by Boeing). series of the B-737. This TASE flight
2.2.3 This training can be completed in training must be accomplished in a
a B-737 MAX or B-737NG FFS. suitably qualified B-737 FFS that has
NOTE proper control forces and travel system
operation as stated in Section A3.3
Runaway Stabilizer flight simulator
above. The Main Electric Stabilizer Trim
training must be conducted using
the ATA 27 malfunction titled switches must also be functional for this
Stabilizer Runaway (also known as Runaway Stabilizer training. Any FFS
the Dual Wire short malfunction). malfunction that prevents the Main
Use of the ATA 27 malfunction, Electric Stabilizer trim switches from
Stabilizer Runaway – Trim Switch functioning as designed is prohibited for
(also known as the Electric Trim training for all series of B-737.
Switch Malfunction) is not permitted
for use in Runaway Stabilizer flight The FFS ATA 27 Stabilizer Runaway
training. Operators should ensure (a.k.a. the Dual Wire short malfunction) is
that the appropriate Runaway the FFS malfunction permitted for B-737
Stabilizer malfunction is
MAX and B-737 NG Runaway Stabilizer
Runaway Stabilizer training. The training. Other B-737 FFSs, must have
TCCA National Simulator Runaway Stabilizer malfunctions qualified
Evaluation Program (NSEP) should to meet the preceding requirements. For
be consulted on the incorporation of the B-737NG, Boeing has issued a
malfunctions into the FFS and the Simulator Data Bulletin (SDB-737-008) in
subsequent qualification of the FFS order to provide the same runaway
for training.
stabilizer condition for 737NG simulators.
Page 148 of 174

9.2.2 TASE - Flight Training Pilots, other than those flying the B-737
Pilots must receive special emphasis on MAX, must complete this training no later
the following areas during flight training: than January 1, 2024.
9.2.2.5 Runaway stabilizer Guidance for Runaway Stabilizer flight
Applicable to all series of the B-737: training and manual trim technique is
provided in separate subsections below.
Training must emphasize runaway
stabilizer recognition and timely pilot
actions required by the Runaway
Stabilizer NNC:
i. Demonstrate control column
functionality and its effect on a
runaway stabilizer condition;
ii. Emphasize the need to reduce
control column forces with main
electric stabilizer trim prior to
selecting STAB TRIM cutout.
This item must be included in initial or
transition training and must be
accomplished at least once every 36
months during recurrent training.
NOTE
Runaway Stabilizer flight simulator
training must be conducted using
the ATA 27 malfunction titled
Stabilizer Runaway (also known as
the Dual Wire short malfunction).
Use of the ATA 27 malfunction,
Stabilizer Runaway – Trim Switch
(also known as the Electric Trim
Switch Malfunction) is not permitted
for use in Runaway Stabilizer flight
training. Operators should ensure
that the appropriate Runaway
Stabilizer malfunction is
Runaway Stabilizer training. The
TCCA National Simulator
Evaluation Program (NSEP) should
be consulted on the incorporation of
malfunctions into the FFS and the
Page 149 of 174

subsequent qualification of the FFS

for training.
Page 150 of 174

A3.5.2 Flight Training guidance – Runaway Stabilizer
Guidance
Scenario purpose
The purpose of Runaway Stabilizer training is to train the crew to recognize and
mitigate this malfunction using the Runaway Stabilizer NNC (to maintain control of the
aircraft and establish manual trim controls.)
NOTE
The B-737-100/-200 series do not have a Speed Trim System (STS).
Scenario Guidance:
The Runaway Stabilizer malfunction training is conducted with the crew following Pilot
Flying (PF) and Pilot Monitoring roles in completing the Runaway Stabilizer NNC.
Each pilot must complete this training as PF and PM.
NOTE: The Runaway Stabilizer NNC is an unannunciated NNC. Pilots
must be trained to recognize stabilizer trim movement in a manner not
appropriate for flight conditions.
Ground and Flight training should ensure that pilots are familiar with normal stabilizer
trim movement and when stabilizer trim movement should (and should not) be
anticipated. An example of inappropriate stabilizer movement could be a continuous
uncommanded stabilizer movement without airspeed, altitude or configuration
changes, or Speed Trim System (STS) commanded stabilizer movement within 5
seconds of a Main Electric Stabilizer trim input.
Runaway Stabilizer flight training is provided using the ATA 27 Dual Wire Short
malfunction to trigger the Runaway Stabilizer condition.
In the B-737 MAX Full Flight Simulator (FFS), the runaway stabilizer indications
associated with the Dual Wire short malfunction, will be the autopilot (A/P)
disengagement (if engaged) with the corresponding A/P disengage tone and by the
illumination of multiple annunciator lights (A/P Disengage (flashes), MASTER
CAUTION and SPEED TRIM FAIL). The STAB OUT OF TRIM light illuminates on
landing when below 30 knots ground speed.
The B737NG FFS exhibits similar flight deck effects with the exception of the STAB
OUT OF TRIM light. On the B-737NG, the SPEED TRIM FAIL, FLT CONT system
annunciator and MASTER CAUTION lights can illuminate if there is a STS trim
Page 151 of 174

command in the direction opposite of the runaway. The PF should experience

increasing control column forces if attempting to maintain a desired flight path, and
should check for uncommanded movement of the stabilizer trim wheel.
CAUTION: It is important in training to emphasize that pilots should
always be vigilant for stabilizer trim movement that occurs in a manner
not appropriate for flight conditions. This is to avoid “pre-programming”
pilots to conclude they have a runaway stabilizer, if the A/P disengages
or MASTER CAUTION light illuminates for other reasons.
With the Dual Wire Short malfunction (in a suitably qualified flight simulator), Main
Electric Stabilizer trim switches will stop and reverse uncommanded stabilizer trim
movement until released. If stabilizer movement is allowed to continue, control
column cutout switches will activate to prevent further uncommanded stabilizer trim
movement, but will not reverse it. The uncommanded stabilizer trim movement will
resume with release of the control column.
Each pilot should be given “hands-on” experience on how the Main Electric Stabilizer
trim switches stop and reverse a runaway stabilizer (while the switches are held), and
how the control column cutout will momentarily stop runaway stabilizer movement.
While accomplishing the Runaway Stabilizer NNC memory items, The PF should not
hesitate to use the Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches, to reduce control column
forces. The PF should strive to minimize aircraft airspeed deviations from the
airspeed at which the runaway stabilizer occurred, to avoid having large residual
stabilizer manual trim forces after activating the STAB Trim cutout switches.
With a thorough understanding of the functions of the Main Electric Stabilizer trim and
Control Column cutout switches functions, pilots should gain sufficient confidence in
these control functions that they don’t need to rush to select the STAB Trim cutout
switches to the CUTOUT position, especially before they remove excessive out of trim
control column forces.
FFS malfunctions - Runaway Stabilizer Flight Training
As discussed in Section A3.3, TCCA has established the ATA 27 malfunction
“Stabilizer Runaway” (a.k.a. the Dual Wire Short) as appropriate for Runaway
Stabilizer training. TCCA has prohibited the use of the malfunction for training
Stabilizer Runaway – Trim Switch (a.k.a. the Electric Trim Switch malfunction.)
The Dual Wire short malfunction was established as being the appropriate
malfunction for training, after an aircraft certification review of potential malfunctions
that could result in a Runaway Stabilizer condition. This malfunction permits full
function of all stabilizer controls required in the NNC, and is suitable for any training
Page 152 of 174

events of stabilizer movement not appropriate for the flight conditions, per the
Runaway Stabilizer NNC Condition Statement. Pilots, other than those flying the B-
737 MAX, must complete this training no later than January 1, 2024.
The Electric Trim Switch malfunction is a “legacy” B-737 Runaway Stabilizer
malfunction that simulates a short circuit of one of the Main Electric Stabilizer Trim
switches. An aircraft certification review established this malfunction was of an
extremely low probability of occurring on the B-737 fleet. This malfunction does not
permit the Main Electric Stabilizer Trim switches to reverse runaway stabilizer trim
inputs. This legacy malfunction has led to inappropriate pilot responses, to hastily
activate the STAB TRIM cutout switches during Runaway Stabilizer training, and
experience higher than desired manual trim forces as a result.
TCCA has therefore prohibited Runaway Stabilizer training using the “legacy” Electric
Trim Switch malfunction for all series of B-737 because of its extremely low probability
of this malfunction and the concern that it could result in a negative transfer of
training.
Runaway Stabilizer NNC Memory Items
NOTE: Refer to sub-section A2.2.1 for detailed guidance on the
Runaway Stabilizer NNC and associated memory items (7 steps).
Steps 1 to 3 of the Runaway Stabilizer NNC memory items require the PF to take
manual control of the aircraft by Holding the Control Column firmly and disengaging
the Autopilot and Autothrottle (if engaged).
Step 4 requires the use of control column and thrust levers to control airplane pitch
attitude and airspeed. The flight crew should also remain aware of thrust lever
position for situational awareness of the aircraft state. The PF should continue to
strive to minimize aircraft airspeed deviations from the airspeed at which the runaway
stabilizer occurred, to minimize control column forces. The PF should not hesitate to
use the Main Electric Stabilizer Trim switches, to reduce control column forces, while
accomplishing this step.
Step 5 provides guidance to reduce control column forces through Main Electric
Stabilizer Trim switches as a key step prior to activating the STAB TRIM cutout
switches in Step 7. The PF should strive to remove control column forces as much as
possible prior to activating the STAB TRIM cutout switches. Failure to do so, may
result in excessive manual trim forces.
NOTE: The failure by the PF to reduce control column forces sufficiently
through the Main Electric Stabilizer Trim switches may result in the PF
needing to apply control column displacement sufficient to activate the
Page 153 of 174

Control Column switches. The PF should not assume that a runaway

stabilizer condition has been stopped. (The runaway stabilizer
movement will resume if the control column is released.)
Step 6 requires the crew to determine if the runaway stops after the autopilot
disengages. This step is required to ensure that the autopilot is not the source of the
Runaway Stabilizer.
Step 7 directs the flight crew to select both STAB TRIM cutout switches to CUTOUT
after the runaway stabilizer condition is verified and all preceding memory items have
been completed correctly. This step is also required to permit the manual trimming of
the Stabilizer (Step 8).
The last element of Step 7 to grasp and hold the Stabilizer trim wheel applies to a
stabilizer brake failure in earlier series of the B-737, for which this NNC applies.
By actioning the Runaway Stabilizer NNC, the completion of the memory items will be
assured. The crew may then complete the Speed Trim Fail NNC, since the SPEED
TRIM FAIL light will have illuminated during this malfunction. (The STS (Speed Trim
and MCAS functions) will be inoperative with the STAB TRIM cutout switches in
CUTOUT position.)
NOTE: Crews should not action the Stabilizer Trim Inoperative NNC in
response to a Runaway Stabilizer. This NNC is actioned through a loss
of electric trim through the Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches, or as
directed by the Stab Out Of Trim NNC, which is not the case here.
Actioning the Stabilizer Trim Inoperative NNC will also result in the
requirement to plan for a flaps 15 landing.
Training for Runaway Stabilizer and manual stabilizer trim applies to all B-737s. B-
737 MAX pilots may take this training in a suitably qualified B-737NG Level C or D
FFS. The B-737NG Level C or D FFS must meet the qualification requirements
stated in Section A3.3 above, with the appropriate binary simulation load, and
evaluation of the stabilizer trim system for proper control forces and travel system
operation.
TCCA requires the use of the ATA 27 Stabilizer Runaway (Dual Wire Short
Malfunction) for this scenario. TCCA does not permit use of the ATA 27 Stabilizer
Runaway – Trim Switch (Electric Trim Switch Malfunction) for the reasons stated
above.
Page 154 of 174

As explained earlier, there are differences in the cockpit indications of this malfunction
between the B-737 MAX and B-737NG. The Speed Trim Fail light may or may not
illuminate on the B-737NG FFS during the Runaway Stabilizer Malfunction.
The STAB OUT OF TRIM light illumination logic is different between the B-737 MAX
and B-737NG. This light will only illuminate on the B-737 MAX on landing when
below 30 knots ground speed. The STAB OUT OF TRIM light may illuminate on the
B-737NG if the failure is initiated with the autopilot engaged.
Similar to B-737 MAX Runaway Stabilizer training, for B-737s (other than B-737
MAX), each pilot should be given “hands-on” experience on the Main Electric
Stabilizer trim switches and the control column cutout switch functions.
Recurrent Training
Flight training for Runaway Stabilizer and manual stabilizer trim operation must be
accomplished at least once every 36 months during recurrent training. Recurrent
training should include all of the elements of the special training described above.
Recurrent training may include variations on the flight conditions for the Runaway
Stabilizer as described in the following Recommendations.
Recommendations
The Runaway Stabilizer malfunction should be inserted both in the flaps up and flaps
extended configurations to show pilots the different stabilizer trim rates as a function
of flap configurations. The malfunctions should also be inserted at both the high and
low speed ranges of the aircraft, for pilots to maintain aircraft control at these speed
ranges (e.g. nose-down runaway stabilizer at high speed (near VMO/MMO), and
nose-up runaway stabilizer with flaps extended at appropriate minimum flap
manoeuvering speed.) Training may also be conducted during accelerated flight,
such as a nose-down Runaway Stabilizer during acceleration from 250 KTS, in a
climb above 10,000 feet.
Page 155 of 174

A3.5.3 OE Report requirements – Manual Stabilizer Trim requirements
2. Flight Training Section 2. FLIGHT TRAINING of

2.3 Use of manual stabilizer trim the B-737 explained the Manual
during approach, go-around Stabilizer Trim requirements training for
and level off accomplished by
each pilot acting as PF. the B-737 MAX pilots. This training must
be completed by pilots before they may
2.3.1 Use of manual stabilizer trim as
be authorized to fly the B-737 MAX.
described in subparagraph
9.2.2.4. The training event must be
accomplished by each pilot acting as PF
2.3.2 This training can be completed in
and only in a suitably qualified B-737
a B-737 MAX or B-737NG FFS.
MAX or B-737NG Level C or D FFS.
The manufacturer’s recommended
9.2.2 TASE - Flight Training procedures referred to in the OE report,
refer to the Boeing Company ground
Pilots must receive special emphasis on
the following areas during flight training: and flight training outlined in Appendix 7
of the OE report.
9.2.2.4 Stabilizer trim
Sub-section 9.2.2 of the main body of
the OE report provides the TASE
9.2.2.4.1 Training must emphasize the requirements for this training. This flight
following during manual and
training applies to all B-737s. This
electric trim operations:
TASE flight training may be
a) Manufacturer recommended accomplished in a suitably qualified B-
procedures for the proper
737 FFS that meets the same
use of main electric stabilizer
trim during normal and requirements with regard to proper
non-normal conditions, and control forces and travel system
manual stabilizer trim during operation as stated in Section A3.3
non-normal conditions; above
b) The different manual trim Pilots other than those flying the B-737
techniques recommended by MAX, must complete this training in a
the manufacturer;
suitably qualified B-737 FFS no later
c) The effects of airspeed and than January 1, 2024.
aerodynamic loads on the
stabilizer and the resulting
trim forces in both the nose-
up and nose-down directions
Page 156 of 174

during operations at low and

high airspeeds and/or mach
number; and
d) Use of manual stabilizer trim
during approach, go-around,
and level off.
9.2.2.4.2 This item must be included in
initial or transition training
and must be accomplished at
least once every 36 months
during recurrent training.
Page 157 of 174

A3.5.4 Flight Training guidance - Manual Stabilizer Trim requirements
Guidance
Scenario Purpose
The purpose of this scenario is as follows:
 Demonstration of various manual trimming techniques
 Manually flown descent, approach, go-around and level-off using manual
stabilizer trim
Scenario Guidance
Training on manual trimming techniques immediately follows the Runaway
Stabilizer training for each pilot. This training includes manual trimming techniques
from various stabilizer out of trim conditions and includes, single and two pilot
efforts to manually trim the aircraft. The training also includes manual
demonstrations of trimming at both high and low airspeeds, to demonstrate the
effects of airspeed on aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer and the associated force
required to move the stabilizer trim wheel.
Training should also demonstrate that the initial manual trimming forces (break-out
forces) to start movement of the manual trim wheel may be significantly higher
compared to the subsequent sustained manual trimming forces required. The
training should also provide an opportunity for pilots to experience how the manual
trim forces change as the aircraft approaches a trimmed condition.
The Runaway Stabilizer training should emphasize that using the Main Electric
Trim Switches to minimize Control Column forces prior to activating the STAB
TRIM cutout switches, should minimize the resulting force required to move the
stabilizer trim wheel.
Increased manual trim forces can result because of increased aerodynamic loads
associated with high airspeeds, or pulling or pushing on the control column. A two
pilot effort may be used to correct an out of trim condition. In extreme cases it may
be necessary to relieve the aerodynamic loads to allow manual trimming.
Aerodynamic loads can be relieved by reducing airspeed.
If manual stabilizer trim is needed, it is important to emphasize that the STAB TRIM
cutout switches should be placed in the CUTOUT position prior to extending the
stabilizer trim wheel handles. Personal injury can occur if the stabilizer trim wheel
moves due to electric trim inputs while the stabilizer trim wheel handles are
extended.
Page 158 of 174

The emphasis during the subsequent descent, approach and go-around using
manual trim should focus on the need to anticipate trim changes for airspeed and
configuration changes. This is particularly important during the go-around and
subsequent level off maneuver, where large changes in thrust may result in large
control column forces. Pilots should avoid a tendency to over-trim and should
carefully monitor pitch attitude until the aircraft is fully trimmed and stabilized.
Page 159 of 174

A3.6 Flight Training – Cross-FCC Trim Monitor activation
Figure 19
Boeing Flight Training profile – Cross-FCC Trim Monitor
Page 160 of 174

A3.6.1 OE Report requirements – Cross-FCC Trim Monitor activation
2. Flight Training This Cross-FCC Monitor activation

2.4 A Cross-FCC Trim Monitor training must be completed by pilots
activation demonstration before they may be authorized to fly the
accomplished by either pilot B-737 MAX. The training function must
acting as PF. be accomplished by either pilot acting as
2.4.1 Condition must terminate in a PF and only in a suitably qualified B-737
landing in order to demonstrate MAX Level C or D FFS.
the updated STAB OUT OF
While the FCC Trim Monitor activation
TRIM light functionality.
demonstration is accomplished in flight,
this training scenario must end in a full-
stop landing to demonstrate the updated
STAB OUT OF TRIM light functionality.
Page 161 of 174

A3.6.2 Flight Training guidance – Cross-FCC Trim Monitor activation
Guidance
Scenario purpose
The purpose of this scenario is to demonstrate the Cross-FCC Trim Monitor activation
in response to a Runaway Stabilizer originating from the FCC and the illumination of
the STAB OUT OF TRIM light on landing.
Scenario guidance
This malfunction scenario is a demonstration of the Cross-FCC trim monitor detecting
and stopping an erroneous stabilizer trim command. The stabilizer runaway will be
stopped 1.3 seconds after activation of the malfunction.
If the Cross-FCC Trim Monitor activates in either the operational or the standby FCC
channel, the FCC sends a signal to the other FCC to inhibit its stabilizer trim
commands, this includes autopilot, Control Wheel Steering (CWS), and Speed Trim
System (STS) commands.
If the A/P (CMD A or B) or CWS (CWS A or B) was engaged to the affected FCC
channel (A or B), it will automatically disengage and cause the associated aural and
visual alerts. The SPEED TRIM FAIL light can illuminate automatically, during
MASTER CAUTION recall, or not at all. The STS will no longer be available with the
illumination of the SPEED TRIM FAIL light.
For Fail Operational aerolanes, the NO AUTOLAND status is annunciated.
The STAB OUT OF TRIM light will illuminate after landing when groundspeed is less
than 30 knots. Crews should be vigilant and alert for the illumination of the STAB
OUT OF TRIM light after landing because it may be easily missed during this high
workload phase of flight.
The flight crew should take to the appropriate action in response to the STAB OUT
OF TRIM light illumination on the ground. The crew should report the illumination of
this light for appropriate maintenance action. The crew may action the STAB OUT
OF TRIM NNC, if in accordance with their Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
Any subsequent flight should not be attempted, until the malfunction is rectified.
FFS Runaway Stabilizer malfunction applicable to Cross-FCC Trim Monitor
The ATA 22 malfunction, titled FCC Stabilizer Runaway is used to activate this
scenario.
Page 162 of 174

This training scenario specifically applies to the B-737 MAX and must be conducted in
a B-737 MAX Level C or D FFS meeting the simulator qualification requirements
stated in Section A3.3 (above).
Recurrent Training
Training of this scenario is not required for recurrent flight training. Flight crews
should be reminded on actions to take in response to the illumination of the STAB
OUT OF TRIM light during recurrent ground or flight training.
Page 163 of 174

A3.7 Flight Training – Unreliable Airspeed and Multiple Flight Deck Alerts during
Non-Normal Conditions
Figure 20
Boeing Flight Training profile – High AOA malfunction
Page 164 of 174

A3.7.1 OE Report requirements – Unreliable Airspeed and Multiple Flight Deck

Alerts during Non-Normal Conditions
2. Flight Training This Airspeed Unreliable and Multiple

Flight Deck Alert during Non-normal
2.5 Erroneous high AOA during conditions training must be completed by
takeoff that leads to an
pilots before they may be authorized to fly
unreliable airspeed condition
accomplished by either pilot the B-737 MAX. The training function
acting as PF. must be accomplished by the pilots as a
crew and only in a suitably qualified B-
2.5.1 Demonstrates flight deck effects
(i.e. aural, visual and tactile) 737 MAX FFS.
associated with the failure. Pilots flying only the B-737NG must
2.5.2 The discretionary deactivation of complete this training in a suitably
nuisance stick shaker in
qualified B-737NG FFS no later than
accordance with Airspeed
Unreliable NNC. January 1, 2024.
2.5.3 Fault occurring during the takeoff This training scenario comprises
procedure. unreliable airspeed training during take-
2.5.4 Must include a go-around or off caused by a single erroneously high
missed approach flown with AOA sensor. The erroneously high AOA
erroneous high AOA condition. causes numerous flight deck effects
2.5.4.1 Special emphasis placed on FD including a continuous nuisance stick
behavior biasing out of view upon shaker. The B-737 MAX and B-737NG
selecting Takeoff/Go-around Airspeed Unreliable NNC has provisions
(TO/GA).
for the deactivation of the nuisance stick
(OE Report - Main Body) shaker. This training scenario also
requires a descent, approach and go-
9.2.2 TASE - Flight Training
around after completion of the Airspeed
Pilots must receive special emphasis on Unreliable NNC. The purpose of the Go-
the following areas during flight training: around training is to demonstrate the
9.2.2.7 Unreliable airspeed Flight Director (FD) biasing out of view,
This training applies to pilots flying the B- and the means to re-establish vertical FD
737NG, B-737 MAX, or conducting B- guidance.
737NG/B-737 MAX Mixed Fleet Flying
The Training for multiple flight deck alerts
(MFF).
during non-normal conditions applies to
Training must include erroneous high pilots flying all B-737s. Operators must
angle of attack (AOA) malfunctions. This
develop suitable training scenarios where
training must also include a
Page 165 of 174

demonstration of Flight Director (FD) a single malfunction results in multiple

behavior (biasing out of view) during a flight deck alerts that require timely pilot
go-around or missed approach. action. This training must be
Training must include the discretionary accomplished in a suitably qualified B-
deactivation of nuisance stick shaker in 737 FFS, no later than January 1, 2024.
accordance with Airspeed Unreliable
NNC. NOTE: The Airspeed Unreliable
training, meets the criteria of the
This item must be included in initial,
transition, and differences training and training requirement for multiple
must be accomplished at least once flight deck alerts during non-
every 36 months during recurrent training. normal conditions for the B-737
Either pilot may serve as pilot flying (PF) MAX and B-737NG.
for this training task.
Recurrent Training
Recurrent training may be accomplished
in either a B-737NG or B-737 MAX FFS. Pilots of the B-737 MAX and B-737NG
must accomplish Airspeed Unreliable
training due to an erroneously high AOA
9.2.2 TASE - Flight Training on take-off at least once every 36 months
during recurrent training.
Pilots must receive special emphasis on
the following areas during flight training: Either pilot may serve as PF during this
training. Recurrent training may be
9.2.2.6 Multiple Flight Deck Alerts
accomplished in either a B-737NG or B-
During Non-Normal Conditions
737 MAX FFS that meets the qualification
Applicable to all series of the B-737: requirements of the OE report.
Flight crew training must include In addition to the preceding requirements,
scenario-based training for initial, operators should include airspeed
upgrade, transition, and recurrent flight unreliable training due to other sources of
crew training where a single malfunction
unreliable airspeed, such as pitot and or
results in multiple flight deck alerts that
require timely pilot actions to include: static port blockages, or other air data
system failures.
 Recognition and interpretation of
the non-normal condition. NOTE: Airspeed unreliable
training due to other sources of
 Prioritization of the required pilot unreliable airspeed is an
actions additional requirement to Airspeed
Unreliable training due to an
erroneously high AOA on take-off.
This training may be incorporated
into other recurrent training
events.
Page 166 of 174

Pilots of all B-737s must accomplish

training of multiple flight deck alerts
during non-normal conditions at least
once every 36 months during recurrent
training. Pilots of the B-737 MAX and B-
737 NG who accomplish the Airspeed
Unreliable training due to an erroneously
high AOA on take-off during recurrent
training are considered to have met this
training requirement.
Page 167 of 174

A3.7.2 Flight Training guidance – Unreliable Airspeed and Multiple Flight Deck
Alerts during Non-Normal Conditions
Guidance
Scenario Purpose
The purpose of this scenario is:
 The recognition of an unreliable airspeed condition due to erroneous high
Angle of Attack (AOA) malfunction and successfully complete the Airspeed
Unreliable memory items and NNC;
 Demonstration of FD behaviour during a Go-around/Missed Approach;
 Training of Multiple Flight Deck Alerts during Non-Normal Conditions.
Scenario Guidance
This scenario is triggered by an erroneously high AOA vane on take-off, which will
result in multiple cockpit indications, including the activation of an intermittent or
continuous stick shaker.
Flight crews will be expected to discern whether they have actual or nuisance stall
warning indications based upon the cockpit indications they observe. Flight crews will
need to take appropriate stall recovery actions if valid stall warning indications are
observed (e.g. both stall shakers are active, airframe buffeting etc.)
When the indications of unreliable airspeed are identified and verified, the crew will be
expected to action the Airspeed Unreliable memory items and complete the Airspeed
Unreliable NNC. The continuous stick shaker may be a significant distraction and
may make communication difficult. The Pilot In Command (PIC) is encouraged to
declare an emergency at the appropriate time to gain priority and minimize further
distractions.
The NNC will have to be carefully and methodical read despite the possible
distraction from the stick shaker. It will be acceptable to verbally abbreviate some of
the NNC text provided the abbreviation is clear and accurate.
It will be possible to engage the autopilot in Step 14 of the NNC.
NOTE: The autopilot however will disengage after five minutes of
continuous stick shaker and will no longer be available for the remainder
of the flight. This autopilot behaviour is identified in the Note in Step 14.
The crew should plan to continue the remainder of the flight without
autopilot.
Page 168 of 174

The flight crew may need to remain in a sustained climb until the NNC is completed,
and an appropriate altitude clearance should be obtained from ATC. In this specific
scenario (of a high AOA malfunction), the flight crew should not change the aircraft
thrust, pitch attitude and flap configuration, until a reliable airspeed indication can be
determined and the Flight Director is available and selected ON.
Steps 20 to 23 (at the end) of the Airspeed Unreliable NNC provide for the flight crew
to deactivate the nuisance stick shaker at the PIC’s discretion. The stick shaker
Circuit Breakers (CBs) will have collars to aid in their correct identification. The crew
should carefully identify and verify the correct CB before pulling, especially with the
ambient noise and distraction caused by the continuous stick shaker. In addition to
removal of the distraction of the stick shaker, the control column forces associated
with the EFS will be removed and a reliable stall warning for the opposite side stick
shaker will be made available.
Completion of Airspeed Unreliable NNC
The disabling of the nuisance stick shaker will provide for significantly less distraction
and a quieter environment to assess the situation and plan contingencies, such as
whether to return to land, or proceed to an alternate or destination.
The additional information section of the Airspeed Unreliable NNC should be carefully
reviewed to ascertain the status of the aircraft. NNCs for IAS DISAGREE, ALT
DISAGREE and AOA DISAGREE alerts will likely direct the crew back to the
Unreliable Airspeed NNC, that should be reviewed for any specific actions.
It is advisable to review Deferred Items well before descent for planning. The N1
value and Pitch Attitude for Go-around should be computed in advance. FD behaviour
(biasing out of view when TO/GA is pushed during go-around or missed approach)
should be anticipated.
All operational requirements, remaining aircraft capabilities, weather conditions and
fuel requirements should be considered. The flight crew should carefully assess the
FMC fuel predictions in light of potential erroneous air data inputs to the Flight
Management System (FMS).
Initial training of this scenario applies to pilots flying the B-737 MAX. Either pilot may
serve as pilot flying (PF) for this training scenario. Initial training must be conducted
in a B-737 MAX Level C or D FFS meeting the simulator qualification requirements
stated in Section A3.3 above. For all other B-737 this training must be accomplished
in a suitably qualified B-737 FFS, no later than January 1, 2024.
Page 169 of 174

Recurrent Training
This scenario must be accomplished at least once every 36 months during recurrent
training. Either pilot may serve as pilot flying (PF) for this training task. For all series
of B-737 this recurrent training must be accomplished in a suitably qualified B-737
FFS.
Other AOA malfunctions should be considered for recurrent training such as
erroneously high or low AOA during take-off, level flight or descent. Pitot and/or static
blockages should also be trained on a recurrent basis.
Multiple Flight Deck Alerts during Non-Normal Conditions
The erroneously high AOA in this scenario is an example of a single malfunction
resulting in multiple flight deck alerts that will require timely flight crew actions. The
flight crew will be required to recognize and interpret the non-normal conditions and
prioritize required flight crew actions under demanding conditions. The onset of a
stick shaker activation during take-off may be startling.
Although this scenario should be trained in real time, it is recommended that during
training, the flight crew be discouraged from rushing through the NNC, and take all
the time necessary to consider options after the NNC is completed. This type of
training may be amenable to Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) scenarios,
considering the numerous associated operational considerations.
Page 170 of 174

Annex B – Flight Training requirements matrix
Training Reference Applicability Initial Recurrent Training Comments/

Event Training Recommended
Training
Stall A3.3 Flight B737 MAX Prior to Flying Not Required - Recommended Must be accomplished
Identification Training – B-737 MAX by each pilot as PF
and MCAS Recovery
Activation from Full There are no recurrent
Stall training requirements
for this training. TCCA
OE Report recommends that all B-
Appendix 7 737 MAX operators
section 2.1 incorporate this training
into their recurrent
training profiles no later
than 36 months after
initial training.
Stall A3.3 Flight B-737 MAX Not Required – Not Required - Recommended Recommended training
Identification Training – Recommended in addition to MCAS
and Speed Recovery demonstration (B-737
Trim Function from Full MAX). (Recommend
Demonstration Stall an additional
demonstration of the
Speed Trim function in
a full stall.)
There are no recurrent

training requirements
recommends that all B-
737 MAX operators
incorporate this training
initial training.
Should be
accomplished by each
pilot as PF
Page 171 of 174


Training
Full Stall A3.3 Flight B-737 MAX Prerequisite Not Required - Recommended Prerequisite training for
Training Training – training to stall entry and recovery
Recovery conducting at angles of attack
from Full Stall beyond Stick Shaker
Stall Identification
and MCAS and Must be accomplished
Speed Trim by each pilot as PF
Function
Activation There are no recurrent
Training training requirements
recommends that all B-
737 MAX operators
incorporate this training
initial training.
STS A3.3 Flight B-737 MAX Not Required – Not Required - Recommended Recommend training to
Demonstration Training – Recommended be conducted in climb
during climb Recovery prior to conducting Stall
from Full Identification and
Stall MCAS and Speed Trim
Function Activation
training.
Should be
accomplished by each
pilot as PF
Runaway A3.4 All B-737 Prior to Flying Required FFS must be suitably
Stabilizer Flight B-737 MAX qualified.
Training –
Runaway Required for all Must use only FFS
Stabilizer other B-737 no malfunction ATA 27
NNC and later than Jan Stabilizer Runaway
manual 1, 2024 (Dual Wire Short
stabilizer Malfunction) for this
trim training.
operations
during and Training using FFS
approach malfunction ATA 27
and go- Stabilizer Runaway –
around Trim Switch (Electric
Trim Switch
OE Report Malfunction) prohibited.
Section
9.2.2.5 and Must be accomplished
Appendix 7 by each pilot as PF
section 2.2
Recurrent Training
required no later than
36 months after initial
training.
Page 172 of 174


Training
Manual Trim A3.4 All B-737 Prior to Flying Required FFS must be suitably
Requirements Flight B-737 MAX qualified.
Training –
Runaway Required for all Must be accomplished
Stabilizer other B-737 no by each pilot as PF
NNC and later than Jan
manual 1, 2024 Recurrent Training
stabilizer required no later than
trim 36 months after initial
operations training
during and
approach
and go-
around
OE Report
Section
9.2.2.4 and
Appendix 7
section 2.3
Cross-FCC A3.5 B737 MAX Prior to Flying Not required This training applicable
Trim Monitor Flight B-737 MAX to B-737 MAX only.
Activation Training –
CrossFCC FSS malfunction ATA
Trim 22 FCC Stabilizer
Monitor Runaway.
Activation
Either pilot may serve
OE Report as PF during this
Appendix 7 training.
section 2.4
Unreliable A3.6 B737 MAX Prior to Flying Required FFS must be suitably
Airspeed – Flight B-737NG B-737 MAX qualified.
Erroneously Training –
High AOA on Unreliable Required for B- Either pilot may serve
Take-off Airspeed 737 NG no as PF during this
later than Jan training.
OE Report 1, 2024
Section Recurrent Training
9.2.2.7 and required no later than
Appendix 7 36 months after initial
section 2.5 training.
In addition to
Erroneously High AOA
on Take-off, recurrent
training must include
other malfunctions that
result in an unreliable
airspeed condition.
Page 173 of 174


Training
Multiple Flight A3.6 All B-737 Prior to Flying Required Erroneously High AOA
Deck Alerts Flight B-737 MAX on Take-off on B-737
During Non- Training – MAX and B-737NG
Normal Unreliable Required for all meets the criteria of
Conditions Airspeed other B-737 no Multiple Flight Deck
later than Jan Alerts During Non-
OE Report 1, 2024 Normal Conditions.
Section
9.2.2.6 Suitable failure cases
for this training
requirement must be
established for B-737
Classic and B-737.
Recurrent Training
required no later than
36 months after initial
training.
Page 174 of 174

Boeing 737 Oe Report Revision 2 English

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RDIMS #17171568

Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA)

Boeing 737 Next Generation (NG)

A16WE (FAA) B-737-8 Boeing Business Jet MAX 8 B-737 (FAA)

A16WE (FAA) B-737-8200 Boeing 737-8200 B-737 (FAA)

A16WE (FAA) B-737-9 Boeing 737 MAX 9 B-737 (FAA)

APPROVED: Original signed by F. Meunier______ DATE: _________

MANAGEMENT CO-ORDINATION SHEET

Office of Primary Interest (OPI):

Original approved by Roman Marushko Date: __________

Original approved by Deborah Martin Date: __________

1. Record of revisions ................................................................................................... 4

Revision Sections(s) Date

1 ALL except Appendix 1 2020/12/17

2 Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14 and 2021/10/04

2.2 Regulatory Requirements / Language

4.1 Scope of Report

4.2 Guidance Material

4.3 OE Report Effectiveness

4.4 Application of OE Report

4.5 Alternate Means of Compliance

4.6 AQP/OEB Report relationship

4.8 Differences between Boeing 737 MAX and Boeing 737NG

4.9 Differences between B-737-8 and B-737-9

4.10 Boeing 737-800 Boeing Converted Freighter (BCF)

4.11 Rockwell Collins right seat Head Up Display (HUD) installation

4.12 Boeing 737-8 Boeing Business Jet (BBJ) MAX 8

4.13 Revised Flight Control Computer (FCC) software evaluation

4.15 Boeing 737-8200

4.16 Appendix 8 - Purpose

EASA European Union Aviation Safety Agency

PMS Performance Management System

6.11 Specific Flight Characteristics – A maneuver or procedure with unique handling

7. Pilot type rating

B-737-100 Boeing 737 B73A (TCCA)

B-737-600 Boeing 737 Next Generation (NG)

Boeing Business Jet

A-146 B-737-8 Boeing 737 MAX 8 B73C (TCCA)

A16WE (FAA) B-737-8 Boeing Business Jet MAX 8 BB-737 (FAA)

8.1 Related Aircraft on same TCDS

8.2 Related Aircraft on different TCDS

9.1 Previous experience

9.2 Training Areas of Special Emphasis (TASE)

a) Manufacturer recommended procedures for the proper use of main

9.2.2.5 Runaway stabilizer

Training must include the discretionary deactivation of nuisance stick shaker in

9.3 Specific flight characteristics

9.4 Seat dependent tasks

9.5 Training requirements not applicable to the B-737 series

9.6 Flight Simulation Training Devices (FSTD)

9.7 Training equipment

9.8 Differences Training between Related Aircraft

d) Airspeed Bugs and Flap Maneuvering Speeds

9.8.6 Runway Situational Awareness Tools (RSAT) system

9.9 B-737 MAX special training for flight crews

9.10 Landing from a No flap or Non standard flap approach

10. Pilot checking

10.2 Specific flight characteristics

10.3 Seat dependent tasks

10.4 Other checking items

10.7 Differences Checking between Related Aircraft

11. Pilot currency

11.1 Differences Currency between Related Aircraft

12. Operational suitability

APPROVED: Original signed by F. Meunier DATE: ___

B73A B-737 A/A C/C C/C D/D NOT

B73B B-737CL C/C C/B A/A (3) C/B NOT