Why Aristotle Called Ethics Ethics: The Definition of ᾗϑοςEudemian Ethics 2,2

Author(s): Charles Chamberlain

Source: Hermes, 112. Bd., H. 2 (2nd Qtr., 1984), pp. 176-183
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
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176 CHARLES CHAMBERLAIN

Socratesgainedan admissionfrom Polus underone understandingand then

interpretedit underthe otherunderstanding.The effect of this trickerywas to
force Polus to admitsomethingwhichis not a logicalconsequenceof his true
position. When the fallacy is removed, Polus' position remainsunchanged
and unchallenged.Yet, the argumentis nonethelessvaluableto the 'Gorgias'
and for the readerbecauseit drawsanotherinterlocutorand the readerinto a
deeperdiscussionin whichPolus' strongestposition(i. e. Callicles')is argued
and refuted. This is, I believe, a correct and meaningfulsolution to the
problemof the Polus argument.

The Queen'sCollege,Oxford JOSEPHPATRICKARCHIE

WHY ARISTOTLE CALLED ETHICS ETHICS:

THE DEFINITION OF fGo4 EUDEMIAN ETHICS 2,2

We know thatAristotlecoinedthe adjectiveijGtx6qand usedit to describe

the writingswhich we now call ethics'. 'Hhxo6; comes from So;,,which is
usually rendered>>character((, so that Tatfjtn6' will be >mattersconcerned
with character<.It is not strangeto find Aristotleinventingtermsfor things;
his approachto philosophicalquestionsoften uncoveredmany >>nameless<(
regions which he might either name or simply indicate as such2. What is
strikingis that the new field of ethicsgets its namefrom fjAo; - >>character((.
This prompts the question what Aristotle found in human characterso
appropriateas to give the new field its name. I believethat the definitionof
AGocfound in the 'EudemianEthics', though not without problems,helps
explainwhy Aristotlecalled ethics ethics.
Let us firstbeginwith the generaloutlinesof his ethicaltheory.He divides
the soul into two parts - that which >has reason<and that whichdoes not3.
I See L.S.J. s.v. 1,9Ix6g. The importance of the new field is emphasized by GAUTHIERand
JOLIF, L'Ethique a Nicomaque (Louvain 197f), 11 1 - 2. Aristotle's use of ra ilOxd is examined in
detail by FRANZ DIRLMEIER, Zur Chronologie der Grossen Ethik des Aristoteles, S. Ber. Heidelb.
Akad. d. Wiss. (Heidelberg, 1970), pp. 7-20.
2 N.E. 2,7,1107b2: noXX& 8' taoiv dwvovugta. See also 1107b29-31; 1108b4-6;
3,7,1115b25-26; 4,4,1125b17- 18. 26-29; 4,6,1127all -12. 13-14. Aristotle is more
concerned with the nameless categories in N.E., less so in E.E., not at all in M.M. according to
DIRLMEIER, ed., Aristoteles: Nikomachische Ethik, Berlin 1956, 315 (with references).
3 The conception recurs throughout Aristotle's works. See for example, Protr. fr. 6, p. 35,
11. 6-8 (Ross); M.M. 1,1,1182a17-24; N.E. 1,7,1097b33-1098a5; 1,13,1102a27ff.; 6,1,
1139a3-6; E.E. 2,1,1220a8-11; Polit. 1,5,1254b8-9; 7,14,1333a16-18; 7,15,1334b18-19;

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 Why Aristotle called EthicsEthics:The Definitionof AGo4in EudemianEthics2,2 177

The rational part of the soul is able to view the dpXatiof things, attain to
calculation, practicaland theoreticalwisdom, use inductionand deduction.
Its dpTraiare the so-calledintellectualvirtueswhichAristotletreatsin book 6
of the 'NicomacheanEthics'. The irrationalsoul is the seat of the emotions
(na,tir) - anger, fear, hate - or in more generalterms, of desire(6pe,t14)4.
This will include not only the emotions, but also bodily drives like hunger,
thirst and sexual desire5. Aristotle devotes books 2 through 5 of the
'NicomacheanEthics' to the ethicalvirtuesand relatedmatters.
But the irrationalsoul is not completelybeyond the bounds of reason.
Accordingto Aristotle,the 6)loyov >)sharesin reason(X6yog)in a way, in so
far as it is obedientto it and carriesout its orders.In the sameway we say that
we pay attention(txsiv X6yov)to our fatherand our friends<<6. He then goes
on to admit that because the irrationalsoul can >listen to reason(((in very
much our sense of that phrase),it can be said to have reasonalso, although
not in the same sense as the rationalsoul: >>Butif we can say that it (sc. the
irrationalsoul) has reasonalso, then the rationalsoul will also be dividedin
two, parthavingreasonin the propersenseof the term, the otherin the sense
of obeying one's father(<. So it appearsthat for Aristotlethe bipartitionof
the soul into reasoning:unreasoningis not a perfectlymechanicaldivision.
The fact that the irrationalcan ?listento reason<< makesit in a senserational.

An. 3,9,432a30- 31. Dispute has arisen over the meaning and consistency of Aristotle's division.
See W. W. FORTENBAUGH, On the Antecedents of Aristotle's Bipartite Psychology, G.R.B.St., 11
(1970), 241 - 250, for a summary of the problem. Though Aristotle may work with other types of
theoretical division of the soul (as in the passage cited above from 'De Anima'), his system of
ethics is firmly grounded upon the bipartite division. Where Aristotle speaks of t6 X6yov tXov
and T6 dXoyov, I shall for convenience use the traditional terms >)rational((and >>irrationalsoul<x
without intending anything more than to reproduce his distinction in English.
4 6pElSi is more inclusive than tnt3usia; see N.E. 1,13,1102b30: T6 8' tGun1rtx6v xal
6Xo; 6pewrtx6v. See also E. E. 2,7,1223a26-27; 2,10,1225b24 -26. 'Ent9ugia often refers to
bodily drives like hunger and thirst; see W. W. FORTENBAUGH,Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions,
Arch. Gesch. der Philos., 52 (1970), 66- 70.
S See FORTENBAUGH,Antecedents, 248 - 250 (cited above in note 3).
6 N.E. 1,13,1102b30- 32: T6 8' ?AniGugurtx6vxaz 6?Xcoc6psxrtx6v ptfeX?t nirX t
xatrxo6v tOTIvaOToO xaLl nretlapXtx6v. o1Trw 8i xc ToOVnarpb; xat T6&v(p(ov pagtv 9xeiv
X6yov. Cf. also his words a few lines earlier (b3 - 14): totxw t xadlAXXiinS (pOot;Tfi juxiq
dXoyo; clvat, FsT?Xouca gtvoto ntj X6you. So also Polit. 7,14,1333a16- 18: 8ttpntai 8t &uo
gtprq tiq wuXfi, dv t6 ttv EXEt A6yov xaG' avto6, r6 8' outx AeXt v xa9' a&r6, 6,6yw8'
6nrcxooEtv 8uvdgisvov. So also E.E. 2,1,1219b28- 31: U'noxeFiako8io g,pr wVXN5T? X6you
FtEXovTa,OU T6v au5r6v8t Tp6nov FxriXv X6yoUdppo, dAXXT iTv trcj nitdrTttv, TO8t
tV6
T(i xai
al &XOOEIV nsrr.UXtVal.
7 N. E. 1,13,1 103al - 3: ?i 8t .Xp xai toGro pdvatXoyov EXctv,8tirov toxtcz xaii t6 A6yov
txov, T6 giv xup(co; xcti tv a(rC, T6 8t 6)xanp TOCnarp6; ixouotix6v tl. At E.E. 2,1,
1219b28- 31 (quoted above in note 6), the same point is made: both parts oshare in reason, but
not in the same way - one gives orders, the other obeysx<.

12

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178 CHARLES CHAMBERLAIN

Because the irrational soul has the ability to obey reason, though it is itself
irrational, we even find Aristotle asserting that the irrational soul belongs to
the rational. In book 1 of the 'Nicomachean Ethics' he says: >>Therational
soul has two senses: that which is obedient to reason, and that which possesses
reason and uses it intelligently<<8. Here the words >>obedientto reason<< clearly
refer to what he will call the irrational soul. The passage has been suspected of
being a gloss, and in fact it does add little to the sense of the whole section9. If
it is from Aristotle, however, it again emphasizes the difficulty of cleanly
separating the two parts of his soul. Since the irrational soul obeys reason, it
can never really be separated from the rational soul, even in theory. The
closeness is shown by the fact that at one point (N.E. 1,7) Aristotle can
classify the irrational soul as part of the rational, while at another (N.E. 1,13)
he speaks of the irrational soul as rational because it obeys reason .
So it appears that the irrational soul is not totally divorced from reason; at
least reason can make its commands obeyed. This stipulation - that the
rational soul imposes its orders on the irrational - is crucial to Aristotle's
ethical thought as a whole. We may wonder what mechanism exists whereby
X6yo4 makes its orders felt and binding on 6pF,?ig, since without some way of
modifying desire, moral development would be impossible. As Aristotle's
metaphors show, he conceives this process in terms of a ruling part imposing
discipline on an inferior and obstreperous part"1. In order to discover how
i#Gogfunctions in this scheme, we must turn to book 2 of the 'Eudemian
Ethics' 12
In chapter 2, Aristotle gives what is in effect a formal definition of 'Go;,
but because the text is corrupt, we must examine it carefully. The following is

8 N. E. 1,7,1098a3 -5: TOVX6yov EXovro Trot5rou "

6bt 6 gtv ; Ftnin?x? &yw
BOY@,T6 6' XC,
tXov xaci 8lavooie,uvov.
9 BURNETbrackets toOtou ... 8tavooO[icvov as an interpolation; JOHN BURNET, ed., The
Ethics of Aristotle (1900; rpt. 1973), p. 35. He is followed by GAUTHIERand JOLIF,VOI.1I, part 1,
pp. 56- 57. STEWARTwell says: >>Whilethe sentence itself, then, is doubtless an interpolation, its
doctrine is strictly Aristotelian.x< J.A. STEWART, ed., Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of
Aristotle (Oxford 1892), 1, 99. More recently W.W. FORTENBAUGH,Zu der Darstellung der Seele
in der Nikomachischen Ethik 1 13, Philol. 114 (1970), 290, argues for the genuineness of the
passage.
10 The consequence is that for Aristotle, reason has power over human irrationality. As
DIRLMEIERsays in another connection: >>Diearistotelische Ethik ist eine Ethik der Rationalitat.xo
(Chronologie, p. 7, cited above in note 1).
11 See also N.E. 3,12,1119b7 -8; 1, 13,1102b14 - 18; Polit. 1, 13,1260a4-7.
12 Scholarly opinion now inclines to place the E.E. early in Aristotle's career, before the N. E.
Thus DIRLMEIER, Chronologie, p. 1 (cited in note 1); C.J. ROWE, The Eudemian and
Nicomachean Ethics: A Study in the Development of Aristotle's Thought, Proc. Cambr. Philol.
Soc., Supplement 3 (Cambridge 1971); A.J.P. KENNY, The Aristotelian Ethics: A Study of the
Relationship Between the 'Eudemian' and 'Nicomachean Ethics' of Aristotle (Oxford 1978).

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 Why Aristotle called Ethics Ethics: The Definition of iwSo; in Eudemian Ethics 2,2 179

the Teubnertext of SUSEMIHL,

still the only criticaledition of the E. E.: 80
torw <TO> Go; ToVTowuXfi; xaTa ntITaxttxbv XO6yov<TOVtkXOyou wv,>
6uvaiwvou 8' axoXouaitv t4, X6yq noi6ro6;13. In spite of the textual
difficulties, it is possible to elicit a meaningfrom the words: >>Therefore
let
<the>iGo; be this - a quality of the irrationalpart of the soul which (sc.
part) is neverthelessable to follow reason, in accordancewith commanding
reason(<14
The text makes two claims: one, that 1Go4 is a quality of the irrational
soul; two, that the irrationalsoul can follow reason.The first point does not
tell us muchabout `iGogexceptthat it belongsin the irrationalsoul, whilethe
secondpoint is the sameas that madeat N.E. 1,13, mentionedabove, namely
that the irrationalsoul obeys reason. Manyeditorsand translators,however,
by reading6uvctvivilfor 8uvapi?vou here, makeiVSog,not the irrationalsoul,
the entitywhichcan follow reason15. Sincethis is an importantdistinction,let
us examinethe text carefully.
First, the presenceof tCoTCsignals the appearanceof a carefullythought
out definition,and remindsus of the definitionsof emotionsin book 2 of the
'Rhetoric'16 Next we must weigh the editor's conjectureTOG tlo6you gi-v,
which places iwog in the irrational soul. The phrase is suggested by the
presenceof the participle&uvaji-voo,which will not construewithout some
supplement,and by the particle8S, which points to a lost contrast, perhaps
one betweenthe rationaland irrationalsouls17.However,the locationof i'og
within the irrationalsoul is guaranteedby the larger context of book 2.
Beginningin chapter2, Aristotlemoves to considerthe >>ethical<( virtues,that

13 E.E. 2,2,1220b5 -6. [Aristotelis Ethica Eudemia.] Eudemi Rhodi Ethica, ed. Fr. SUSEMIHL
(Leipzig, 1884). 1 have also used the following works: J. SOLOMON, Ethica Eudemia (Oxford
1915); H. RACKHAM, ed., Aristotle: The Athenian Constitution, The Eudemian Ethics, On
Virtues and Vices (Cambridge 1938) - the Loeb edition; FRANZ DIRLMEIER, ed., Aristoteles:
Eudemische Ethik, (Berlin 1969); VIANNEY D-CARIE, ed., Aristote: Ethique a Eudeme (Paris
1978). M.J. WOODS, ed., Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics: Books 1 - 3 (Oxford 1981), reached me too
late for inclusion.
14 1 follow the Loeb editor RACKHAM in putting a comma or
dash after ToiYro(i4o; is this -

15 Thus SOLOMON: >>Aquality in accordance with governing reason

belonging to the irrational
part of the soul which is yet able to follow reason.(( RACKHAM: >>Aquality of the spirit in
accordance with governing reason that is capable of following reason.<<So also DECARIE, p. 88.
Contra, DIRLMEIER, p. 22 and commentary ad loc. SUSEMIHL prints &uvagtvou, but mentions the
conjecture 8uva4ivrj in his Addenda et corrigenda, p. 123.
16 Chapters 2 through 8. FORTENBAUGH, Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions, pp. 45 - 53 (cited
above in note 4), argues that the presence of coT. need not indicate a popular definition, or one
that is only tentative, but that Aristotle is making a serious attempt at defining. Whether the
Eudemian passage offers a formal definition of essence or not, it does give valuable information
about Aristotle's conception of ?Go4.
17 See DIRLMEIER'S commentary ad loc.

12*

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180 CHARLES CHAMBERLAIN

is, those of the irrationalsoul8. We may assumethat the discussionof AGor,

takes place in the context of the irrationalsoul. However,though it is in a
sense superfluousto stipulatethat AGogbelongs to the irrationalsoul, it is
certainly correct Aristotelian doctrine. Furthermore, given the special
functionof A1ogwhichwill emerge,it is appropriateto state in the definition
that it is locatedin the irrationalsoul. Thereforeboth the &?and SUSEMIHL'S
gv may stand.
toO &X&6you
(FRITSCHE'S)
Now the participle8ovagtvou, thoughit has a grammaticalconstruction,
presentsa problem of sense. In particular,it seems strangethat Aristotle
should be remindingus that the irrationalsoul >can neverthelessfollow
reason<( just here.This is good Aristoteliandoctrine,of course,but it is not to
the point in a definitionof fjoq. For reasonsof coherence,then, I preferthe
reading &uva,itvn, which will modify not6tii;, and give a point to the
passage:>>THaois a qualitywhich, thoughlocatedin the irrationalsoul, can
neverthelessfollow the ordersof reason<<19. The kind of reasonwhichfjAo;
follows is called >orderingreason<<(tnttaxttx6; X6yo;) or >the kind of
reason which gives commands(A.ittatdtt8v)(x and is reflectedin the passage
from N. E. quotedabove:>>The irrationalsoul sharesin reasonin a way, in so
far as it is obedient to it (xarnixoov atroi3) and carries out its orders
(Fstkz,apXtx6v)<x20.Thereis, then, a kind of reasonbelongingto the rational
soul which >>gives orders<<(?tntaxrtnx6 X6yo4)and thereis a qualityof the
irrationalsoul, fAo4, which is >>according to ?tntaxttx6q X6yoq;x. What
Goc, seems to be is the part of the soul whichcan listen to reason.
irrational
Here is preciselythe mechanismwhich can make the irrationalsoul listen to
reason, reluctantlyperhaps,>>aswe say we obey our fatherand friends<<. We
may say that irgogis the mediatorin the soul betweenreasonand desire;it
bringsthe unrulyimpulsesand emotions underthe sway of reason. It is the
rationalisland in the sea of irrationality.
Supportfor this interpretationof E. E. 2,2 comes from Stobaeus21.Near
the beginning of the section entitled nFpi toO 'ItxoO -6oo;tqfig ptlooopia;,

18 See E.E. 2,1,1220a8- 11: bnEi6' al 8tavoinnxai (sc. dpcTcai)gTa X6you, ait tv Totai3rat
Toil X6'yov9XovTo, O btvraxrtx6v tart Ti; WuyXfit X6yov AX%?t, at 8' ibltxai ToG&X&yougttv,
dxoXou&ittntxoG 8t xard (piatv rj 6'yov EXovrt. Here we find the same constellation of words
and concepts: tntraXrtx6v, tOi &X6yougtv, dxoXovulnnxoO 8M.The parallel moment in N.E.
would be 1,13. We shall see in Stobaeus more support for the conjecture.
19 For dxoXou&to in this sense (>follow, be subject to(<), cf. N.E. 7,6,1149bl: 6 9ug6c
dloXou3EWt r X6Cyq)ncon, i 8' Anrtugia O?.For 8t used adversatively, see E.E. 2,4,1221b29- 31:
at ptv (sc. &petlat)toO X6yov tXovTo; 48avonnxai,.. . at 8t TO dIX6you,tXovtoq 8' 6peE,v. See
also the wording of Polit. 7,14,1333a16- 18 (quoted above in note 6).
20 N.E. 1,13,1102b30-31 (quoted in note 6). See also the language of E.E. 2,1,1220a8- 11

(quoted in note 18): tnttaxrtx6v trfi Wuyfic.

21 1 have used the text of CURTWACHSMUTH, lohannis Stobaei Anthologium, 2 vols in 1
(Berlin 1884).

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 Why Aristotle called Ethics Ethics: The Definition of fA3o4in Eudemian Ethics 2,2 181

we find severaldefinitionsof i'Sog, purportedlyfrom ?those aroundPlato<<,

all of whichare close in wordingor sense to the text of E. E. 2,2. I reproduce
the entire passage, numberingthe definitionsfor ease of reference:AMSo; 5
toatt
(1) not6,rn TOV5
dL6you gtpouV5fi Tgi 6Xn toraxrtIXC ty?1 g
IOV

(2) dXoyov gtpo; ,ti j,yuXfir; Fi&toqtivovi'caxoovstv CoX6yp

(3) nlrao4 na vuxf; atUvov
gwSlittx6vgtlpo; tir ExuoXi p 6P 6C1VTCv ) XOyIXCPr
(4) n6rdo;f5t 66prOrtx6vgpo;V pO4 lJXli;, tvovEnctxoUFt)tVt0i0 XoytXOi3
,lx
(5) 6pg1 WvuXf;itpaxttxi'
(6) x;ViSthC,Til x,uxric;xaG' 6pg.djv-
(7) iot6oil d&X6you [top(ou xvuxfics
(8) 'uXij;too3dtX6yougtpou4 inot6tic, xar' ntitaxttx6v X6yov8uvagtvi
tj xoytxXo axaxao9etv.
Since these eight definitionsoffer various descriptionsof AiV;, we must
sort throughthem carefullyfor both wordingand sense23.In definitions2, 3
and 4, AGo;is called not just a part of the irrationalsoul, but apparentlyis
made equal to the whole of the irrationalsoul. In definitions 1 through4,
furthermore,this partof the soul is said to be accustomedto obey the rational
soul. It is certainlysound Aristoteliandoctrine,as describedabove, to make
the irrationalsoul obey reason. What seemserroneoushere is to equateA3o;
with the whole of the irrationalsoul, unless of courseby 6.oyov gipo; (2),
nraGhlrtx6vgtpo;, (3), and 6pFxrtx6v gpoQ (4) is meant a part of the
irrationalsoul itself. Moredecisiveare definitions1, 7 and 8, whichspeakof
AM;oc as a ?qualityof the irrationalsoul((.
In definition1, iGo; is a qualityof the irrationalsoul, but sincethe quality
itself is not furtherdescribed,this definitionis not very helpful. Definition7,
callingAV0r,>>aqualityof the irrationalsoul<<,is promisingbut also curtailed.
Only in definition8 do we find a close parallelto the Eudemianpassage,so
close thatit can be usedto restoreboth text and sense. 'Hoc; is againa quality
of the irrationalsoul, not identical to it. This is an importantdistinction.
TH&o;is not simplyanothername for the irrationalsoul; thereis no warrant
in Aristotlefor sucha usage. Ratherit is some qualityor powerinherentin the
irrationalsoul. Onlyin definition8 is the idea of potentialyintroduced- this
qualityhas the power(8uvagtvn) to follow the rationalsoul. It is not just the
irrationalsoul itself, but a certainfacultylocatedthere.Finally,Ag3o;follows

22 WACHSMUTH,II.38, lines 3- 13. In definition 8, as DIRLMEIERnotes (commentary ad loc.,

p. 241), xar' tniraxrtx6v is needlessly altered to xao 6notaxTtx6v by USENERand printed by
WACHSMUTH.I have retained the reading of the mss.
23 Definitions 5 and 6 hold little of importance for the present inquiry and may safely be

ignored.

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182 CHARLES CHAMBERLAIN: Why Aristotle Called Ethics Ethics etc.

the rational soul >>accordingto ordering reason<(,just as in the Eudemian text.

Definition 8 thus reproduces that offered in E. E. 2,2 so closely that we may
use it to support the reading 6uvactvn offered above, and assert that for
Aristotle i'jog is the mechanism by which desire is brought into line with
reason.
Let us consider how this model of ?Go; might function in the ethical
virtues discussed in N.E. 2 through 5. Aristotle here introduces his well-
known theory of the mean: that all ethical virtues are states of soul which lie
between two extremes. Thus courage (av6pcict) is the mean lying between
rashness (GpaavTrj) and cowardice (tXkita); similarly moderation
(o(ppoaunvi ) lies between profligacy (dtxoXaoia) and insensitivity
(dvatotaloia)24. The mean in every case is supplied by the >>correctaccount<
(6pG6; X6yo;) from the rational part of the soul. What this means in practice
is that the courageous man, for instance, has correct knowledge about proper
and improper fears, and feels them accordingly25. Human excellence as a
whole is achieved when both parts of the soul, rational and irrational,
function together, the rational side arriving at the >>correctaccount< for the
irrational side to abide by26.
This much is standard Aristotelian doctrine; what can be added is the role
of #G3ogin overall human excellence. As Aristotle knew and we are well aware,
reason and desire often conflict. I may believe that it is correct not to fear
death in defending my country, but I may still feel fear. Or again, I may
believe it is correct to eat moderately while still feeling the desire to eat
immoderately27. If we are not fortunate to develop the proper habits in
childhood, as Aristotle recommends, we must go through the process as
adults28. We must work to change our desires so that they accord with the
orders of reason - what we have rationally decided as correct. According to
Aristotle, desire can be changed by the exercise of ',o;, which has the power
to compel fear or anger or desire in general to ?listen to reason((, and in time
to change29.

24 The scheme of E.E. 2,3,1220b37ff., in which simple dvato31qoia is the extreme, is replaced
in N.E. 3,11,1119a5ff. by a discussion of what sort of insensitivity this might be. Aristotle decides
that it has not received a name because of its rarity. See also N.E. 2,7,1107b4 -8.
25 This qualification is necessary because, as Aristotle makes clear, not every kind of courage
constitutes dv8pe-it. For example, one who faces a whipping with a stout heart is not &6vpeIog
(N.E. 3,6,11 15a23 -24), nor, on the other hand, is one a coward who fears 15Ip'g toward his
family (11 115a22- 23). The 6pG64 X6yog supplies the rule for determining what fears to fear, how
greatly, for how long, and so forth. See N.E. 2,3,1104b21 -24.
26 N.E. 6,12,1144a6ff.
27 This condition, known as dtxpaoia, is discussed by Aristotle in N.E.7,1 - 10.
28 N.E. 2,1,1103b23 - 25; 10,9,1179b31 - 35.
29 Cf. N.E. 1,3,1095a10: ToI; 8t xaTc X6yoV
Trg 6ptpe4i ntoougtvoig.

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 UDO W. SCHOLZ: Der 'Scipio'des Ennius 183

Given the importantrole of iwog in moral development,it may now be

appreciatedwhy he invented the name rai IVx6a(>mattersconcerningthe
?Gog(<)to describehis ethicalwritings30.It is the workingin one's soul of iAo,
which bringsabout moral excellence,that is, the managingof desireso as to
be what reasonorders.Withoutsome way of modifyingdesire,humanbeings
would be doomed to have split personalities- beings possessinga vision of
an orderlyexistence,but unableto put a checkon their>>natural(( impulsesor
urges.To be sure, some of us neverdo, and this raisesthe questionwhetherall
souls possessiwog or only a lucky few. I believeAristotlewould answerthat
thoughthe actualachievementof virtueis rare,the potentialfor it is presentin
all humansouls in the form of iGo;31. The problemis that both the rational
and irrationalsouls must function in harmonyto achieve complete human
excellence,so that even the presenceof iVGog cannotguaranteethat all humans
will reachthat goal.

Universityof Arizona CHARLESCHAMBERLAIN

30 Cicero also coined a word to render rz iGtxd into Latin - moralis comes from mores just
as GtSx6gcomes from 1lOo4(De fato, 1).
31 Cf. N.E. 2,9,1109a29-30: &6l6np T6 so oindviov xai A1tQVET6V xai xaX6v. N.E.
6,13,1144b4-6: ntdatyaxp6ox?i Exaorn T-rv i,9~V DdpY1V (?1 n;' XCLi yap 8ixatot xCLI
xvi dv5prnot xci tXT6ca txogisv ?C% ?X yVsrfig.
O3(0ppOVIXOi

DER 'SCIPIO' DES ENNIUS

Die maf3geblichenFragmentsammlungen von J. VAHLEN und E. H. WAR-

MINGTON haben fur den 'Scipio' des Ennius ein, wohl dem Pro6m zuzurech-
nendes, Testimonium und - in unterschiedlicher Reihenfolge - 9 Bruch-
stucke mit 14 z. T. nicht vollstandigen Verszeilen zusammengetragen 1.
Wenn andere Sammlungen, wie etwa von C. PASCAL2, auf 25 Zeilen bzw.
Zeilenreste kommen, bedeutet dieser Zuwachs nicht nur eine quantitative
Zeugnisvermehrung, er verandert auch qualitativ entscheidend unsere Vorstel-
lung uber dieses verlorene Werk des Messapiers: In diesem 'Scipio auctus' laf3t
sich der Dichter stolz ansprechen und feiern (Enni poeta salve. .., sat. 6 f. V.),

1 J3 VAHLEN, Ennianae poesis reliquiae, Leipzig 21903, 212 ff. (als var. 1 - 14; danach die fol-
genden Zitate); E. H. WARMINGTON, Remains of old Latin I, London 21956, 394ff.
2 C. PASCAL, Lo 'Scipio' di Ennio, Athen. 3, 1915, 369ff. (= Scritti varii di letteratura lati-
na, Torino 1920, 1 ff.); vgl. E. BOLISANI, Ennio minore, Padova 1935, 34ff.

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