Why is Aristotle's Brave Man So Frightened?

The Paradox of Courage in the "Eudemian Ethics"

Author(s): John F. Heil
Source: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 29, No. 1 (March 1996), pp.
47-74
Published by:
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40913773
Accessed: 19-12-2015 14:09 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 BraveMan So
Whyis Aristotle's
TheParadoxofCourage
Frightened?
in theEudemianEthics
JohnF. Heil

Ethics1
In BookIII oftheEudemian considersa paradoxabout
Aristotle
courage:
1 Thebraveman2is fearlessinthefaceofextremely
fearful
cir-
cumstances
(1228b4-9).
2 Extremely thingsproduceextreme
fearful fearsinthosewho
fearful
findthemextremely (1228bl2-14).
3 Thebravemanfindshiscircumstances fearful
extremely
(1228bll-12).
4 Hence,he has extreme from2 and 3).
fears(1228bl4-15,
5 Thus,he is notfearlessin thefaceofextremely
fearful
circum-
stances(1228bl5-17,from3 and 4).
6 So, thebravemanis bothfearlessand notfearless(1228bl5-
17,from1 and 5).

1 Hereaftercitedas EE. All translations

are myown and are based on SusemihTs
Teubnereditionof the Greektext,thoughI have also consultedWalzerand
Mingay'snewOCT edition. Mytranslationsofpassagesfrom theNicomacheanEthics
arebased on Bywater's OCT edition(hereafterEN). See References
forall works
citedinthispaper.

alwaysspeaksinthemasculineaboutthe'braveman'(andreios).
2 Aristotle UnlessI
am reporting view,I will speakof theT>raveperson'and followthe
Aristotle's
conventionofalternating
genderascriptions
periodically.

APEIRONa journalforancientphilosophyandscience
47-74$3.00©Academic
0003-6390/96/2901 & Publishing
Printing

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
48 JohnF.Heil

Theparadoxis thatinorderforthebravemantobe fearlesshe must

be frightened. His fearlessstate,ifit is to be at all virtuous,mustbe
exhibited interrifyingcircumstances3, buttheverypresenceand recog-
nitionof such circumstances guaranteesthatthebraveman will be
rackedwithfear- hardlya condition we shouldcall 'fearless'.
Atfirst we
blush, might take this argument tobe one ofthosesophis-
tikoilogoithatAristotleoccasionallyintroducesin the courseof his
investigations - likethebeautiful littleargument inNicomachean Ethics
VII 2 whichshowsthatstupidity combinedwithincontinence canactu-
allybe a virtue,sincea personcouldhave amazinglyfalsebeliefsand
yetactso wildlyat odds withthemthathe endsup alwaysdoingthe
rightthing.The puzzle raisedaboutthebraveman'sfear,however,is
notso facetiousand Aristotle neveridentifies it as sophisticin origin.
Nordo we findanything likeitinPlato.4On theevidencewe have,then,
it is fairto supposethatthisparadoxis Aristotle's own. Whatwe do
knowis thathe takesitquiteseriously and devotesa lengthy discussion
to it. Indeed,as we shall see, he thinkstheproperresolutionof this
paradoxis thekeytounderstanding thepsychology ofcourage.
Myobject in thispaper is first
to examine the premisesofAristotle's
argument, he
showingwhy accepts them and thus whyhe thinkstheir

3 Life-threatening
situations to be exact:see EE III 1, 1229b2-4and cf.EN HI 6,
1115a24-6.Aristotle
famously limits
putsstrict onthecontexts inwhichcouragecan
be manifested and, at times,seemsto suggestthatit is a virtuewhichmaybe
possessedonlybycitizen-soldiers and manifested Atother
onlyon thebattlefield.
times,however, Aristotledoesnotmakecouragequiteso context-specific. Whathe
doesclaimis thatcourageis limitedto 'thefinest'(takala)circumstancesand that
peoplemustbelievethesetobe thecircumstances ofwar,sincecity-statesbestow
theirhighest'honors'forwar-time heroics(EN IE 6, 1115a29-32),
butthisremark
leavesopenthepossibility thatsomecommunities maybestowequallyhighhonors
forcertain
non-military actsofheroism.Tobe sure,throughout inthe
hisdiscussion
Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotleoperateswithmilitary courageas hisparadigm, hence
inhisconcluding remarks thebravemanas onewho'chooseswhatis
he describes
nobleinwar,atthecostofthose[other goodsthathepossesses]'(ENIII 9,1117bl4).
Butthereisnomention intheEudemian Ethicsofthisapparent ofcourage
restriction
tothecontext ofwar(andcf.TopicsVI 13,151al2).TheNicomachean and Eudemian
Ethics inthisregardintheirtreatments
differ ofcourage,a pointnotmentioned by
Mills1980inhiscomparison ofthetwotexts.
4 ThereareperhapsslighttracesofitinPlato(cf. Laches192B-3D, 358E-60B,
Protagoras
Phaedo 68D5-13andLaws647B9-C1). See theAppendixfora briefoverviewofthese
Platonicantecedents.

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Whyis Aristotle'sBraveMan So Frightened?49

paradoxicalconclusion iscompelling andimportant. Second,I showthat

his solutioninvokesa distinction betweenthebraveman'semotional
stateand whatI willcallhismotivational state:thebravemanhas fear,
but he actsfearlessly.Last,I addresswhatseemsto be a devastating
consequenceof such an accountof courageforAristotle'stheoryof
virtue:namely,thatthe brave man turnsout to be an 'enkratic'or
personwhomuststruggle
self-controlled withhisemotionsand,there-
fore,seemsto fallshortofvirtueby Aristotle's own standards.I argue
thatAristoteliancourage is indeed a sortofenkrateia - moreprecisely a
formofkarteria -
offortitude butthatthiscausesno deepcontradictions
inhistheory and is,infact,consistent withotherdemandshe makeson
moralvirtue.
TheaccountofcourageI attribute toAristotle challengesthreewide-
spreadassumptions which have led tomisinterpretations ofAristotelian
courage and histheory of virtuein it
general.First, is sometimes assumed
thatthe 'Doctrineof theMean' requiresthevirtuouspersonto have
moderatefeelings.5 Thusvirtueinvolvesnevergetting extremely angry,
nevertakingintensepleasurein anything, neverhavingextremefear,
and so forth.IfthiswereAristotle's position,however,thenhistheory
wouldcontaina striking contradiction, sinceinhisdiscussionofcourage
- a virtuewhichoccupiescenterstagein histheoryand is indeedthe
firstvirtueaddressedinbothofhislectures on ethics- he is committed
to theclaimthatthebraveman is notjustmoderately, but extremely
frightened.6This is because thebrave man has theappropriate feelings,
i.e.,feelingswhichsuittheparticular circumstances, and ifwe are to

5 See,forourpurposes,Pears1980whichI discussbelow.
6 TheNicomachean andEudemian accountsofcourage,thoughclearlywrittenon two
different
occasions,coverroughly thesamegroundand appearlargelyconsistent
witheachother.On theissueofthebraveman'sfear,theybothhavevaluablethings
tosay.Hence,eventhoughitis onlyin theEudemian Ethics
thatAristotleputsthe
questionoffearintheformofa paradox,I willdrawonbothtextsfreely. I takeno
positionhereon thequestionofwhichtextis priorin time.Thetraditionalview,
handeddownfromJaeger and morerecently defendedbyRowe1971,holdsthat
theNicomacheanEthicsisthelaterandmorematureofthetwo.Kenny1978and1979
seekstooverturn thetradition.
I aminclinedtothinkthatworriesoverpriorityare
ill-founded.
Aristotleseems to have workedand reworkedhis notesover an
extendedperiodoftime,so theremaynotbe enoughtemporal unityinanyonetext
tomakesenseofaskingaboutitstemporal toanother
priority text.

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
50 JohnF.Heil

makesenseofAristotle's viewwe mustunderstand hisDoctrineofthe

Meaninthisway.7
Second,it is commonlythoughtthatan essentialrequirement of
Aristotelian virtueis a certainstruggle-free harmonybetweenthera-
tionaland nonrational partsofthesoul.8Thisassumptiongainssome
supportfromthetext.AtonepointAristotle claimsthatthenonrational
part ofthe soul'obeys reasonin the self-controlled
man,butpresumably
itlistensevenbetter inthetemperate andbraveman,sinceitagreeswith
reasonabout everything' (EN I 13, 1102b26-8).But,if 'agreesabout
everything' (pantahomophone?) is meantto indicatean absenceof all
struggle in the soul, then again Aristotle'stheoryrunsagroundon
courage. The brave man, as we shallsee,mustendure thefearinhissoul
and hencemusttosomeextentstruggle witha desirewhichis pushing
intheoppositedirection fromhischosenand habitualcourseofaction.
If we expectto finda coherentview in Aristotle, then,we need to
interpret his notionofpsychological harmonyin sucha way thatit is
compatible withat leastcertainkindsofstruggle in thesoul.Theinter-
esting lesson we learn from a study courage thatit is possible-
of is
and,indeed,somesituations in lifemakeitnecessary - fora virtuous
to with
person struggle gooddesires, onesendorsed byreason,henceit
mustbe Aristotle's view thatthemerepresenceofemotionalstruggle
neednotindicatetheabsenceofvirtue.
The last assumptionI wish to challengeconcernsan issue which,
on a broaderlevel, has receivedconsiderableattentionin recent
scholarshipon ancientethics:what is the role of emotionin the

7 Of course,even on thisinterpretation,the Doctrineof the Mean may not be a very

attractiveview. JuliaAnnas 1993 argues thatthe doctrineis eithertrivialor false,
trivialifmeantto referto appropriatefeelings,falseifmeant to referto moderate
feelings(60-1). She is rightthata doctrineof moderationwould provide a false
accountofvirtue,but I'm notconvincedthatthenotionofappropriatefeelingscan
amount to nothingmore thanthe trivialidea that'the mean way to feelis just the
rightway to feel,or is simplyto be identifiedwith the way the agent feelswhen
doing therightthing'(60). At some level,yes,thedoctrinewill become triviallytrue
but,as our examinationof courage will nicelyillustrate,it makes sense initiallyto
ask how the virtuousperson shouldfeel and our answer here can be given inde-
pendentlyof our answer to the question of how the virtuousperson should act. It
is obvious,forthemostpart,how thebrave personshould act;itis notat all obvious
how he should feelwhileacting.

8 Duff1987 presupposes this.See my discussionbelow.

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Whyis Aristotle'sBraveMan So Frightened?51

motivation ofvirtuousaction?Does, say,a generouspersonactin any

sensebecause ofhergenerousfeelings? Does a justpersonseektorectify
an injusticein partbecauseofhis outrage?It has becomefashionable
to contrastAristotle withtheStoicson thisquestion,sincetheStoics
arguestrenuously thatvirtueprecludesactingout of emotion,while
Aristotle seemsto holdjusttheopposite,thatvirtuerequiresemotion
as a motivational component in action.9Itis unclear,however,whether
thiscontrast is accurate.The Stoics,to be sure,are emphaticaboutthe
incompatibility oftheemotionswitha lifeofvirtueand theyexplicitly
argue that emotionis neithersuitablenor necessaryto motivate
virtuousaction.10 The good person,says Seneca,will not get angry
whenhisfather is murderedor hismotherraped,buthe willcertainly
seekjust retribution, thushe will act 'becauseit is right,notbecause
he is in pain' (deIra I 12).
The case is farless clearforAristotle. It is no doubta cornerstone
of his ethicsthatVirtuehas to do withour affections (pathe)as well
as our actions'(EN II 3, 1104bl3-14).nBut,grantedthatappropriate
emotionalresponsesare, in his view, an essentialpart of beinga
virtuousperson,is it also truethatAristotle places a generalrequire-
ment on all virtuousaction that it be motivated in part by these
appropriate I
feelings? suggest not. As we shallfind in his discussion
ofcourage,Aristotle drawsa firmdistinction betweenacting'because
ofreason'(dia logon)and actingbecause ofemotion'(diapathos)- a
distinction whichis groundedin his divisionofthesoul intorational
and nonrational parts- and he vigorouslymaintainsthatvirtuous
actionis always dia logonand neverdia pathos}2The brave man's

9 See,forinstance,
Nussbaum1987(164-5),Cooper1988(36),Annas1993(63-6),as
wellas Pears1980andDuff1987.
10 Althoughtheyacknowledgetheimportance
ofcertain'good feelings'(eupatheiai)
whicharemilder,
rational
emotions
ofsomesort(cf.DiogenesLaertiusVII 115).
11 See alsoEN H 6,1106bl6-17,
24;II 9,1109a23;HI 1,1109b30;
cf.EE II 1,1220a29-31.
12 Thelogos-pathos distinction,developedoriginally byPlatoinRepublic X,ispervasive
inAristotle's
ethics.To citejusta fewpassages:EE II 1,1220al-2;III 1,1229al-4;EN
13, 1095a4-ll;III 1,Illla33-b3; III 8,1117a6-9;IV 5, 1125b34-5;
V 6, 1134a20-land
BookVIIpassim. Although thedistinctionis oftenexpressedas reasonversusdesire,
we shouldbe careful nottoconflate itwiththemoreHumean,cognitive-desidera-
tivedistinctionthatAristotle developsin thedeAnimaand deMotuAnimalium in

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
52 JohnF.Heil

emotional statethusplaysnomotivationalrole.Thesourceofhisaction,
rather,is a rationalchoice an
guidedby habituateddesireto do the
rightthing:he acts'as reasontellshim,forthesake ofwhatis noble'
(EN III 7, 1115bl3).Aristotle's
virtuouspersonis, to be sure,notthe
same as a Stoic sage, but his actionsshare the same motivational
structure.

DefendingtheParadox

glance,itseemsthatAristotle
At first oughtto dissolvehisparadoxby
denying the truthof premise(2). This premiseseems mostdirectly
for
responsible undermining the braveman's and pushing
fearlessness
theparadoxthrough. ThetextI haveparaphrasedreadsliterally:

[1] Fearful
thingsarethosethatareproductiveoffearineachindividual
towhomtheyarefearful. iftheyareextremely
So,forinstance, fearful
[tosomeone], thenhis fearwould be if
strong; slightly then
fearful,
weak.(EE III 1,1228bl2-14)13

It is not obviouswhat the firstpartof thisclaimamountsto. Is

Aristotle definingwhathe meansby 'fearful'? In otherwords,is his
pointjust that when we say 'X is to
fearful him'we meanthat'X makes
himfrightened'?14 Ifso, thenwe mayhaveno reasonto rejectpremise
(2) afterall, as long as we agreeto themeaningof Aristotle's terms.
We might then move on to rejectpremise(3), refusingto admitthat

ordertoexplainanimalmovement ingeneral(cf.Nussbaum1983).Thelogos-pathos
is intendedto pickouttwodifferent
distinction sources
ofmotivation (cf.Cooper
1988)andis appliedstrictly tohuman action.
13 Someemendation ofthefirst I acceptthesuggestion
lineofthetextis required. of
Dirlmeier1969(a variation on Bonitz)whichisjustifiedbyappealtohaplography.
Walzerand Mingay,in theirrecentOCT edition,agreewithDirlmeier, butalso
suggestemending the hoi('towhom') ofthemanuscriptsto hei as'
('insofar or'qua'),
presumably on thegroundsthatit makesbettersenseof thehoionclause that
immediately follows.I do notfindthischangenecessary,however, andtheirtextual
is weak.
justification
intheLaches(198B5-6),
14 Socrates, presentsthesameclaimas ifheweresettingouta
thingsaresimplythosethatproducefear.'
'Weholdthatfearful
definition:

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Whyis Aristotle'sBraveMan So Frightened?53

thebraveman findshis circumstances extremely sinceifwe

fearful,
saythatsomething is extremely tohimwe meanthatsomething
fearful
is causinghim to be extremely and we may not wish to
frightened,
makethatclaim.
On theotherhand,Aristotle mightnotbe simplydefining histerms.
In fact,I suspecthe is interestedinestablishing
a moresubstantial point
abouthumanpsychology, namely, thatwhatever fearful
appears tosome-
one will tend to producefearin him. So, to use one of Aristotle's
examples,if somethingappears terrifying to you, thenyou will be
terrified it.
by Though he does not employ languageofappearance
the
here,Aristotle introducesita bitlaterwhenhe returns tothequestionof
whatis fearful tothebraveman.

[2]Now,ingeneral,fearful
thingsaresaid tobe thosethatareproduc-
tiveoffear,but[morespecifically]
thingsofthissortareall thosethat
to
appear (phainetai) be productiveof damagingpain. (EE III 1,
1229a33-5)

LikewiseintheRhetoric,hecallsfearful 'anything thatappears(phaine-

tai)to have tremendous powerfordestroying us or inflicting
injuries
whichtendto cause tremendous pain' (RhetII 5, 1382a28-30).Thusthe
phrase'fearfulto theindividual'in ourEudemian Ethicspassagecanbe
glossed'appearingtohimtohavetremendous powerforcausingpain,
etc'and anything thatappearsso,Aristotle says,producesfear.Thereis
an immediate problemwiththis,however,and we needlookno further
thanthedeAnimatosee whatitis:

[3] Wheneverwe believe(doxasomen) thatsomethingis terribleor

fearful,we are directly
affectedalong with it (euthussumpaschomen),
and likewiseifwe believethatsomething is encouraging. Butas tothe
appearance(katatenphantasian)we areinthesamestatethatwe would
be in ifwe wereobserving terrible
orencouraging thingsin a picture.
(deAnm 3,427b21-4)

The appearanceof something fearfuldoes notnecessarily produce

fear.Dependingon ourbeliefsabouttheexperience, we maybe more
or less compelledby theway thingsappear to us. Why,then,in the
Eudemian Ethicswould Aristotle
thinkto say otherwise? How can he
possibly defend premise(2)? Perhaps we can find a way out of this
difficultyifwe considera furtherpassage in thede Anima.

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
54 JohnF.Heil

[4]Weoften think
ofsomethingfearful but[ourthought]
orpleasant,
although heart
togetfrightened,
tellsusnot(oukeleuei)15 our ismoved
if are
or, [we thinking of]something some
pleasant, other
partofus.(de
Anm9,432b30-3al)

Ifyou arejustconjuring up imagesofa fearful situation, thensuch

appearances are likea picture in the sensethat are
they accompanied by
a beliefthatyou are notactuallyin thatsituation. Does thisimply(as
passage [3] seemsto claim)thatappearancesonlybecomecompelling
whenwe holdsomeadditional abouttheirreality?
belief Notnecessarily.
In fact,passage [4] suggeststheverydifferent claimthatwithout some
explicit the
beliefabout unreality ofsuch appearances we will find
them
compelling. Ifso,itseemsplausible thatthe'belief in the appearanceof
fearful circumstances in
mentioned passage [3] may take theformof
simplyhavingno reasonto doubtthatwe are in those circumstances.
The worriesraisedby thede Anima,then,do notmattermuchto the
discussionintheEudemian Ethics whereAristotle isclearlypresupposing
thatthebravemanknowshe is in a certainsituation - i.e.,he does not
thinkhe is day-dreaming orseeinga pictureorwatching a play.On this
assumption, then,Aristotle is claimingthatifthebraveman'scircum-
stancesappearextremely fearful tohim,he willbe extremely frightened
by them.
Still,shouldn'twe objectthatobviousandimportant differences exist
betweenpeopleinregardtotheiremotional reactions tothingstheyfind
fearful? Indeed,wouldn'tthisbe whatreallydistinguishes thebrave
manfromtherest?He is notterrified upon finding himself in a terrifying
situation, i.e.,a situationthatproducesterror intherestofus.Hence,we
mightconcludethat,evenifwe acceptpremise(3),(4) does notfollow,
since(2) is false.Thatis,evenifwe grantthatthebravemanfindshis
circumstances extremely fearful, itdoes notfollowthathe has extreme
fearssinceextremely fearfulthingsneed notproduceextremefearsin
everyone who finds them so. Thus we could dissolvetheparadoxof
couragebydenyingpremise (2).
Aristotle, however,does notwantto rejectpremise(2) and forgood
reason.Whenwe deny(2) in thisway,we commitourselvesto saying

15 The Greekconstruction hereis important:ou keleuei,governingan infinitive, means

'tellsus not. . .' (i.e., explicitlyforbids)ratherthan 'does nottellus . . / (i.e., remains
silent).See Smyth§§ 2691-2.

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Whyis Aristotle'sBraveMan So Frightened?55

thathowa personfindshiscircumstances isindependent ofthatperson's

character. Whenwe proposethatthebravemanmightfindhiscircum-
stancesidenticaltothewayourcircumstances appeartous and,yet,have
very different
emotions than we have, we are proposingthathowthings
appeartosomeonehaslittletodo with what sortofpersonheis.Aristotle
certainly does notwanttomakesucha move.Ourcharacter has a great
deal todo withhowthingsappeartous,so muchso thatAristotle even
says we are for
responsible how certain thingsappear tous, insofaras we
areresponsible forourcharacter (EN III 5, 1114bl-3).16
On Aristotle's view,then,thereis a closeinternal connection between
ourphantasiai and ourpathe, betweentheway thingsappearto us and
ouremotionalreactions. Indeed,thisis why,whenhe definestheemo-
tionoffearintheRhetoric, hedoesnotneedtomakeanyexplicit reference
to thecharacter ofthepersonwho is in fear,butonlyneedsto say that
'fearis somesortofpainordisturbance/row anappearance ofan impend-
ing evil whichis destructive or painful'(Rhet II 5, 1382a21-2). On theview
impliedby our of
proposedrejection premise (2), however, fearhas no
interestingconnection with how thingsappear to us and, so,would have
to be definedquitedifferently - e.g.,as an irrational disturbance -
makingexplicit reference toa person's character and judgments. Hence,
to denypremise(2) forthereasonwe consideredis to rejectone ofthe
coreprinciples ofAristotle's moralphilosophy: thatthereis an internal,
non-contingent relation betweenhowthingsappeartous and ouremo-
tionsand character. Now we understand whyAristotle holdspremise
(2) tobe true.
At thispointit mightbe suggestedthatpremise(3) oughtto go.
Perhapswhatdistinguishes thebravemanfromtherestofus is thathe
doesnotfindhiscircumstances extremely fearful. Hence,evenifpremise
is
(2) true,(4) does notfollow, since (3) is false.Thatis,evenifitis true
thatextremely fearfulthingsproduceextreme fearsinpeoplewho find
themextremely fearful,itdoesnotfollowthatthebravemanhasextreme
fears,sincethebraveman does notfindhis circumstances extremely
fearful. Notice,however,thatthismoveis possibleonlyon a particular
interpretationofpremise(1). To saythatthebravemanis fearless inthe
faceofextremely fearful circumstances may mean one of two things.It

16 On theconnection
betweencharacter
andhowthings appear,seealsothediscussion
ofphronesis
inBookVI (especially
1140bl6-20
and 1144a34-6).

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
56 JohnF.Heil

maymeanhe is fearless incircumstances thathefindsextremely fearful

or it may mean he is fearlessin circumstances thatother, non-brave
peoplefindextremely fearful. Denyingpremise(3) meansadoptingthis
secondinterpretation ofpremise(1).
Aristotle sees thesetwo possibleinterpretations, but he rejectsthe
secondone fora veryimportant reason.We do not tendto ascribe
couragetopeoplewhoremainfearless incircumstances thattheythem-
selvesdo nottaketobe fearful. Ifthebraveman,saysAristotle, is fearless
insituations thatarefearful toothers, butnottohimself, 'thenwe would
saythatcourageisnothing impressive' (EE III 1,1228blO-ll).Thatis,we
do notpraiseorattribute any virtuetosuch a person.Wedo,ontheother
hand,holdcouragetobe something 'impressive' Hence,we do
(setnnori).
a
expect person both to find hissituation terrifying andto remain fearless
inthefaceofitbeforewe callhim'courageous'.Putting itthisway,we
can see thatcontainedin ourveryconceptofcourageis theseed ofthe
paradoxthatAristotle generates.17
As philosophers, we may,I suppose,be inclinedto rejectthisordi-
nary,unreflective notionof courage.Perhapswe should deny that
courage ceases to be an impressivequalityifwe hold thatthebrave
person is someone who is fearlessin situations thatotherpeople find
fearful,but thatshe does not. Why should that necessarily makecourage
something easy or unremarkable? Perhaps the reasonsuch situations are
notfearful toherisbecauseofsomething remarkable andvirtuous about
her.Whatis impressive aboutthebraveperson,we mightsay,is pre-
ciselyher advancement in understanding over ordinarypeople,her
insightthatthethings most people find fearful arenotreallyfearful at
all,andhereffort inlightof thisunderstanding to overcome her all-too-
humanhabitof gettingfrightened by thingsshe knowsare nottruly
fearful.It is no smalltask(a) to discover thetruthaboutthingsand (b)
to reassembleourbeliefsand retrain behaviorin accordancewith
our
thisnew knowledge.Anyonewho has studiedPlato'sPhaedoand has
seriouslyattempted to incorporate intoherown lifeSocrates'sinsight
thatdeathis reallynothing fearful, reconstruct
to herownthought and

17 Incidentally,premise(1) clearlyhas endoxic status:noticethe dokeiat 1228b4and

the edokeiat bl5. That a brave person is fearlessis part of the common conception
ofcourage,theessentialtruthofwhichAristotlewants to preserve.

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Whyis Aristotle'sBraveMan So Frightened?57

actionaccordingly, can certainly appreciatewhycourageis indeedas

rareand praiseworthy as we all takeittobe.18
Aristotlerejectsthisphilosophical viewofcouragebecausehe rejects
any view thatsays most -
people includingmostintelligent people-
are wrongabout the world.'Thingswhichare thoughtto be so by
everyone,we say thattheyare so, and anyonewho triesto undermine
thisconvictionwillhardlybe tellingus anything moreconvincing' (EN
Andthisis no lessthecase fortheobjectsoffear:
X 2, 1172b36-3a2).19

[5] Thosethingsthatare fearful

to mostpeople,i.e.,anything
thatis
fearfultohumannature,thesewe callactually(haptos)fearful.
(EE III
1,1228b24-6)

IfAristotle'sbraveman did notfindsuch thingsfearful,

thenhe would
be mistakenabout the world, and thiswould be an unacceptable con-
ceptionofvirtue.No one wants thegood persontobe wrongabout such
importantmatters.To suggestthatour attainmentofvirtuewould leave
us with more falsebeliefsthan we startedout with is surelyto parody
theidea ofexcellence.Given thatthereare,accordingto Aristotle,fearful
thingsin theworld,thesewill appear fearfulto thevirtuousperson.

[6] It is themarkofa bravemanto endurethingswhichbothareand

appearfearful toa humanbeing.(EN III 8, 1117al6-17)

Thus Aristotleholds premise(3) tobe true:thebrave man does indeed

findhis circumstancesextremelyfearful,since theyare actuallyso.20

18 TheStoicsand Epicureansfoundedtheirtherapeutic on justsucha

philosophies
Socratic ofvirtue.See Nussbaum1986and 1987.
conception
19 In thispassageAristotle
is attacking whoarguethatpleasureis nota
philosophers
good.
20 The haplos-tini
distinction is crucialto Aristotle's
ethics.Haptosis usuallybest
translated
'unqualifiedly'or 'simply',thoughhereI have renderedit 'actually'.
Something thatis F 'unqualifiedly'
mayor maynotbe F 'to a particular person'
butAristotle
(tint), holdsthatwhatis,e.g.,good,bad,pleasant,painful, encourag-
and so forth
ing,fearful, toa virtuouspersonis also good,bad,etc.unqualifiedly.
Thushe says,'We oughttopraythatthethingsunqualifiedly goodareinfactalso
thethings
goodforourselves'(ENV 1,1129b5-6). Sometimes Aristotle
suggeststhat

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
58 JohnF.Heil

DissolvingtheParadox

What,then,doesAristotle plantodo aboutthisparadox?If,as we have

seen,heacceptsthetruth ofthefirst threepremises,thenclearlyhemust
acceptthetruth of(4),(5) and (6). Indeedhe does.Aristotle holdsall six
linesoftheargument tobe true.Whathe doesnotacceptis that'fearless'
in line(1) meansthesame as 'fearless'in line(5). 'Fearless'in line(1)
referstoa different
psychologicalstatethan'fearless'inline(5).Hence,line
(6) embodiesno paradoxorcontradiction. Aristotledissolvesthepara-
dox by arguingthatthebravemanis fearlessin one sense,butnotin
another. Hereis whathe says:

[7] Thebravemanis in a fearlessstatetowardthese[actuallyfearful

things]and he enduresfearfulthingsofthissort,whicharefearful to
himin one way,butin anotherway not.Theyare fearful to himqua
humanbeing,butonlyslightly to himquabrave.
or notat all fearful
Thesethings,however, sincetheyarefearful
reallyarefearful, tomost
people.(EE IH 1,1228b26-30)

Thebraveman,saysAristotle, findshiscircumstances fearfulinsofar

as he is human,but findsthemunfearful insofaras he is brave.He is
frightened insofaras he is human,but fearlessinsofaras he is brave.
Somehow, braveman'scouragemakeshimfearless,
the whilehishuman
nature makes him frightened.But,what does mean?
this Is 'part'ofhim
and
fearless 'part' of him frightened?Is the braveman a schizophrenic?
We maybeginto understand thesensein whichthebraveman is
fearlessbylookingat a further passagefromtheEudemian Ethicsand a
supporting passagefromthe Nicomachean Ethics.

[8]Itis puzzlingwhetheranything tothebraveman,whether

is fearful
he even But
getsfrightened. does anything preventhimfromgetting
inthe
frightened way just we described? Courage,afterall,is a stateof
following reason(akoloutkesislogoi) hisreasontellshimtoprefer
toi and
(haireisthai) is noble.This is why someonewho endures(fru-
what

itis thevirtuouspersonalonewho providesthestandardbywhichwe discover

whichthings butas wehaveseenwithsomevalues
aregood,bad,etc.unqualifiedly,
towhichhe
thestandard
(e.g.,thatpleasureis a goodthingorthatdeathis fearful)
appeals is 'themajority ofpeople'.

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Whyis Aristotle's
BraveMan So Frightened?59

fearful
pomenon) thingsnotbecauseofthisis eitherrashorinsane,but
becauseofwhatis noble- he aloneis brave.
someonewhois fearless
HI
(EE 1,1228b39-9a4)

[9]Thebravemanis as undisturbed as a humanbeingcan

(anekptektos)
be.So,whilehewillbe frightenedeveninthesecircumstances [thatare
fearful toa humanbeing],hewillendure(hupomenei)themas heought,
i.e., as reasontellshim,forthe sake of what is noble. (EN III 7,
1115blO-13)

To saythatthebravemanis fearlessis to describehispsychological

stateof'following reason'and 'enduring'his fearfulsituation.He has
judgedthatthereis something good tobe doneand thismotivates him
topursueitinspiteofthedanger- 'hisreasontellshimtoprefer what
isnoble.'21He is fearless,
forinstance,whenhedivesintotheicycurrents
to save thedrowning childpreciselybecausehisactionis motivated by
hisjudgmentthatitwouldbe a good thingto save thechild.He is not
calledfearlessbecausehe is calmor becausehe has no fearoftheicy
currents. Indeed,he is notcalm.He is frightened by hiscircumstances
and,as we have seen,ifhe werenotfrightened, thenhe would hardly
be actingbravely.Thesenseinwhichthebravemanis fearless, then,has
nothing to do with his emotionalstate.Aristotle's
use of 'fearless'
here
refersnotto anyfeelings in thebraveman,butrathertohishabituated
tendencyto do therightthingin spiteofhis fear.Let us call thishis
motivational
state.22

21 Recall thatvirtueof character,forAristotle,'resultsfromhabit' (EN II 1, 1103al7),

hence it is 'all important'thatwe be 'habituated in a certainway rightfromour
youth' (1103b24-5).A habitinvolves notjust a tendencyto do something,but also
thepositiveenjoymentof actingon thistendencyand pain in actingagainstit (II 3,
1104b3-5).Findingsomethingpleasant,moreover,implieshaving a desireforit (cf.
de An II 3, 414b4-6).Hence the virtuousperson,when she sees somethinggood to
do, necessarilyhas a desireto do it.Aristotle'sview requiresno tertium
quidbetween
believingthatsomethingoughtto be done and wantingto do it.Thus thevirtuous
personhas an 'affective'commitment to thegood. ThisexplainswhyAristotleseems
to assume in thepassage above thatjudging some actionto be good implies(forthe
virtuousperson) being motivated to performit. The expressions 'acting dia logon'
Cbecause ofreason') and 'actingdia kaloriCbecause ofthenoble') thusdescribethe
same motivationalsource in a virtuousperson.
22 Pears 1980argues thatAristotleis using 'fearless'herein a 'behavioral'sense which

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
60 JohnF.Heil

The specialstatethatAristotleascribesto thebravemanshouldbe

contrastedwitha hostofotherpossiblemotivational stateswhichmight
lie behindsimilar-lookingactions.You mightjump in afterthechild
becauseyouwanttobe a heroonthefront pages.Youmightdo itbecause
yourlifehas becomeso miserablethatyoureallydo notcareifyouare
sweptawaybythecurrents. You mightdo itbecauseyouwanttoavoid
a lawsuitfromtheparentsoravoidbeingridiculedas a cowardbythe
community. Butactingoutofambition, miseryorfearcanneverconsti-
tutean act ofcourage.Aristotle puts suchmotivational
all statesin a
generalcategory whichhe callsacting'because ofemotion'(diapathos)?3
Here our actionis determined by some occurrentemotion and the

'commentsonly on the mannerof the agent's conduct' (179). This is exactlyright,

althoughtheterm'behavioral'could mislead us, suggestingthatall sortsofobserv-
able behaviorare relevantto thedescription.But a calm complexionand a graceful
movementof limbs are not the kinds of featuresAristotleis concernedwithwhen
he attributesfearlessnessto thebrave man. It is ratherthe internal'behavior' of the
personthatis at issue. Pears knows this,but he goes wrongwhen he insiststhat,in
otherpassages, the 'fearless'stateof thebrave man 'clearlyrefersto his feelings. . .
So itmustmean thathe will notbe troubledby emotionalperturbation.'I arguejust
thereverse:thebrave man doeshave strongemotions(offear),so his 'fearless'state
must not referto his feelings.Dirlmeier1969 (311) draws a distinctionbetween
(where 'nothing fromthe externalworld reaches him') and furchtlos
furcht-frei
(where 'the impressions reach him like everyone else, but then the difference
begins'),and he agrees withme thatAristotleattributessomethinglikethelatterto
thebrave man. Dirlmeierdoes not,however,go on to develop wherehe thinksthis
crucial'difference'lies.
23 Aristotlerecognizes othercauses of apparentlybrave action,but these too may
ultimatelyamountto actingdia pathos,specificallythepathosofconfidence.(1) You
mayperforma brave-lookingactionbecause you have some expertiseor experience
in thematter(EE III 1, 1229al4-16;EN HI 8, 1116b3-5).Aristotlepointsout,however,
thatyour experienceeffectively rendersthe situationunfearfulto you and, hence,
thereis no opportunityforcourage. In situationswhere you see thatno amountof
skillor preparationcan make thesituationsafethereis ample roomforcourage,but
then your action will not be motivatedby confidencein your skill,since this is
preciselywhat is lacking.(2) You may also performa brave-lookingactionbecause
you are badly deceived about yoursituation(EE TH1, 1229al6-18;EN HI 8, 1117a22-
8). You face the situationwithconfidencebecause you have eitheroverratedyour
own capabilitiesor underratedthedangerofyourcircumstances.Here again, as in
thecase of the skilledperson,yoursituationdoes not appear fearful,so thereis no
possibilityforcourage. (Cf. Laws I, 649D, where Plato lists ignoranceamong the
'affectionswhichby naturetend to make us exceptionallyconfident.')

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Whyis Aristotle'sBraveMan So Frightened?61

desireswhichforma partofit,notbyouridea ofwhatwould

particular
bravemanalwaysactsI3ecauseof
be thegood thingto do. Aristotle's
reason'or 'becauseofthenoble'(dialogonordiakalon:see note18) and
neverdiapathos.

[10]Peoplefeelpainwhentheyareangryandpleasurewhentheytake
revenge. Butthosewho fightbecause
of this,
though are
they good
arenotbravesincethey
fighters, donotactbecauseofwhatisnobleor
butbecauseofemotion.
as reasontellsthem, (ENin 8,1117a6-9;
cf.EE
III 1,1229a3)

view,I argue,is thatthebraveman is frightened

Aristotle's in the
straightforward senseofbeing in the emotionalstatethat we call fear,
buthe is fearless
becausehe is notmotivated by hisfearand does not act
on it.His emotionis disengagedfromhis action.Thisis whyAristotle
saysthebravemanis frightened quahuman,butfearlessquabrave.Itis
a normaland healthyqualityofbeinghumanthatwe getfrightened by
situations.
life-threatening Moreover, whywe getfrightenedis explained
byour'humannature'(recallpassage[5]above),perhapsbysomebasic
humaninstincts and desires.24It is, however,onlya specialqualityof
being brave that a
explainswhy personwho is frightened does notact
on his fear,does notrunaway,butis 'as undisturbed as possible'and
'endures'his situationbecausethereis something good worthrisking
hislifefor.

Courageas Enkrateia?

The positionI am ascribingto Aristotlehas theadvantageof taking

theclaimthatthebravemanexperiences
seriously genuinefearwiththe
intensity
appropriatetothefearfulness ofhiscircumstances.But,as we
knowfromtheRhetoric, fearis a 'sortofpain or disturbance'
and pain,
on Aristotle's
view,impliesa desireto avoidthepainfulobject.25Being

24 SeeNussbaum1978:'Aristotleseemstoassume... thattherearecertain
desiresthat
areinnateandpresentinall men;amongthesearesexualdesireandthedesirefor
(382).
self-preservation'
25 DeAnII 2,413b24;II 3,414b4-6.
Thereisa significant
wrinklehere:doespainalways
translate
intoa desiretoavoidthepainfulobject?Doesn'tpainoftenimplya desire

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
62 JohnF.Heil

genuinely frightened, then,impliesbeingdisposedtofleeor,at least,to

protect one'shealthand life.Butthebravemanis certainly notdisposed
toflee(orotherwise avoid)hissituation. Itseems,therefore, thathe can
hardly have any genuine fear. On the other hand, if he is actually
frightened, then it must be the case that his disposition to remain and
endurehissituation prevailsover his disposition to run away. But this
presupposes a conflictof desires: his fear will be workingagainsthis
virtuousdisposition. Thebraveman,then,willbe a sortofcontinent or
self-controlled person who must struggle with his emotions in orderto
the
perform right action.But this is not a virtue for Aristotle, who holds
self-control tobe distinct
(enkrateia) from andinferior tovirtue.26 Theman
ofcourage,therefore, willabsurdlypossessno virtueafterall. It seems
we have two ratherunsavorychoices:eitherthebrave man has no
genuinefear,makingitimpossible onAristotle's viewforhimtobebrave
in anyrealsense;or he does have genuinefear,meaningthathe must
struggle withhisemotions andthereby be doomedtoa condition ofmere
self-control.This,itturns out,is another of the
way expressing paradox
ofcourage.
I arguethatAristotle's bravemanhas genuinefearand is,therefore,
disposed to run away, but he is morestrongly disposedto endurehis
situation forthe sake of a
performinggood action. Butdoesn'tmyview
renderthe brave man merely self-controlled? Other commentators have
rejectedsuchan enkratic picture of Aristotelian courage.AntonyDuff
complainsthatany accountof courage which has thebraveperson
suppressingor struggling withher emotionscannotbe Aristotelian.
Moralvirtue, forAristotle,always'involvesbothright actionandappro-

todoawaywiththeobject?Somepeoplerunfromhornets, butotherstrytosmack
them.Thispointcouldbearimportantly on thequestionoftheroleoffearinbrave
action,butAristotle nevermentions it.He alwaysspeaksin termsofavoidance
(phuge),thoughitseemsclearthatmanycasesofpaincauseus topursue theobject
(albeitina specialway).
Aristotle
26 EE II 11,1227bl6;EN IV 9, 1128b34. waversconsiderably inhisremarks
onenkrateia.He seemstoagreewiththecommonopinionthatitis 'outstanding and
praiseworthy' and,at onepoint,evencallsita virtue(EE TL7,
(EN VII 1,1145b8-9)
1223bl2).Generally,however, itfrom
hedistinguishes aretebythepresence ofsome
sortof conflict betweentheperson'srationaland nonrational tendencies. The
nonrational partofa virtuousperson'ssoul,he says,'agreeswithreasonabout
everything' (EN 113,1102b26-8).

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Whyis Aristotle'sBraveMan So Frightened?63

priatepassion'(2) andallvirtuous actionmust'expressandbe motivated

byemotions whichembodyanunderstanding ofwhatisgoodandnoble'
(8).Hence,anyaccountthathasthebraveperson'sfearsworking against
heractionmustnotbe Aristotle's or,ifitis,thenAristotle is notdescrib-
ing a virtue,but a less perfectstateof self-control. Duffrealizesthe
of
implausibilitysuggesting thatthe braveperson's/e#r motivates herto
faceherfearful circumstances, so hearguesthattheemotionofconfidence
is neededin orderto 'providea motiveforcourageousaction'(10). (I
shallhave something to say abouthow confidence fitsintothepicture
at theend ofthepaper.)Furthermore, Duffargues,thebraveperson's
confidence 'does notsimplyoutweigh herfear:it so transforms herfear
thatsheis no longerdisturbed ormovedtoflight, as thecowardand the
continent agentaredisturbed and moved'(11).
David Pearsadoptsa similarstrategy inhistreatment ofthisproblem.
Thebraveman'sfearis 'contributory Pears
fear,' argues,'becauseitwill
contribute totheaction;butitwillnotnecessarily be theonlyfeeling that
contributes toit.'Whilefull-fledged fearwillleadtofrightened behavior,
'contributory fearneed not produceconductthatis fearful'(178-9).
Furthermore, thebravemanwillnotbe merelyself-controlled sincehis
'contributory' fearis not
'medial,' excessive, and 'does not have to be
controlled, because it makesa correctcontribution to the action'by
modifying thewayinwhichtheactionis performed (181).27
Pear'ssuggestion thatthebraveman'sfearis 'medial'hasno support
fromthetext.Aristotle neverclaimsthatthebravemanis onlymoder-
atelyfrightened. Wehavelearned,infact,thatheis committed tosaying
thathe getsextremely frightened. Itis perhapssurprising thatAristotle
doesnotascribemoderatefearstothebraveman,sincehe does saythat
thecowardis someonewhogetstoofrightened and does notfeelenough
confidence, whiletherashpersonis someonewho feelstoo confident

27 StephenLeighton 1988triestodevelopthisnotionoffearas a contributing in

factor
virtuousaction.He makesfeara friendly emotionthathelpsus ina number
ofways,
e.g.,bylettingus knowthatwe arein danger.ThoughI agreewithLeighton (and
Duff)thatAristotelian emotionsplaya crucialrolein ourperception and under-
standingoftheworld,I thinkitmissesthepointtobringup the'good' aspectsof
fear.Thereis an irreducibly
badaspecttofearthatmustbe dealtwithinanyaccount
ofcourage:namely, thatfearis a painfuldisturbance
whichinvolvesa desiretoflee
and which,therefore, mustnotbe acteduponwhenthereis a good actionto be
performed.

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
64 JohnF.Heil

anddoesnothaveenoughfear(EN II 7,1107a33-b4; III 7,1115b33-16a2).

Buttheexcessiveand deficient emotionalintensity in thesecases is a
matteroftheemotion'sbeinginappropriate tothesituation.Thecoward
is excessivelyfrightenedbecause he is frightenedby rustlingleaves
whichare notfearful at all. The rashpersonis excessivelyconfident
becauseshe is confidentthatshe can beat Milo,theworldchampion
eventhoughshehasneverwrestled
wrestler, beforeinherlife.Thebrave
man,however,has appropriate emotions.

[11]Someone whoendures oftheright

andisfrightened forthe
things,
right in
reason, the
rightwayand atthe
right -
times and for
likewise
- isbrave.(ENm 7,1115bl7-19)
confidence

Thereis no mention hereofmoderation. Whatis important forAris-

totleis thatthebravemanhavefearswhichaccurately reflectthenature
ofhiscircumstances, andinextremely fearful situations itis appropriate
tobe extremely frightened. Aristotle never suggests otherwise and thus
Pears'sclaimthatthebraveman'sfearsaremoderateis false.28
Duff'sclaimthatvirtuousactionmustbe motivatedby emotions
whichembodyourconception ofthegood also lackssupportfromthe
text.The onlytimeAristotle speaksofbeingmotivated by emotionis
when he contrastsitwith being motivated by 'reason' or 'the noble'.To
be sure,acting because ofwhat is noblehas a certain emotional, orrather
desiderative, componentto it: thinks
Aristotle thatif we have been
brought up properly, thenwe will habituallywant to do goodthingsand
will takepleasurein so doing.Thisis why he insiststhat,evenin the
terrifying contextin whichcourageis displayed,'thegoal would seem
tobe pleasant,althoughthepleasureis obscuredby thesurroundings'
(EN III 9, 1117bl-2).Ifactingon ourdesiretodo thegood thingis what
Duffmeansby'beingmotivated byemotion,' thenhe is righttosaythat
all virtuousactionhas sucha motivation. ButDuffseemstowantall of
theemotionsthatsomeonemaybe experiencing at themomentofher
actionto contribute a motivation fortheaction.Thisclaim,however,
Aristotle denies.The fearthatthebraveman is experiencing does not

28 Urmson 1973 argues nicelyfora distinctionbetween a doctrineof the mean and a

doctrineof moderation.It may be perfectlyconsistentwitha doctrineof the mean
to 'make a real night'of drinkingon special occasions,but it would clearlyviolate
a doctrineof moderation(162).

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Whyis Aristotle'sBraveMan So Frightened?65

provideanymotivation forhis action,noris it 'transformed/ as Duff

suggests,intosomeinnocuous'expectation ofevil' (11).Evenifhisfear
did mutateinto a kind of intellectual appreciationof his terrifying
toseehowthiscouldprovideanymotivation.
itisdifficult
situation, Duff
is drivento claimthatthebravemanreallyhas no fear,butas we have
seen,thisviewcontradicts thetext.
Theidea thatouremotions, on Aristotle'sview,embodyourconcep-
tionofgoodandbad is right as faras itgoes.Ofcourse,thisconsideration
isindependent ofthequestionofwhether emotions motivateouractions.
I getangrywhenmyfriendsuffers someinjustice, butmyattemptto
remedythesituation neednotbe motivated bymyanger.I mighttake
actionbecause it is rightto do so. My angermay well manifest my
conception ofwhatis goodandbad,butitneednotmotivate myaction.
Duffcould,however,makea deeperpointhere.Ifouremotionsdo
serveto revealour conceptionof good and bad, thenwouldn'tit be
troubling to findAristotle's virtuouspersonstruggling withheremo-
tions?Wouldn'tthisindicatean inconsistent orconfusedconception of
good and bad? Not necessarily.Struggleimpliesinconsistency only on
theassumption thattheworldneverpresents us withsituations
inwhich
theappropriate responseinvolvescompeting emotions.Does Aristotle
believein sucha world?No. The mostfinelytunedemotionswillnot
ensurethatwe smoothly negotiatesituations inwhichwe arepresented
withbothgood and bad - savingthechildby riskingourlife- and
indeedthemorewe perfect oursensibilities,themorepronounced some
ofourstruggles may be. We are rightly terrified the
by icycurrents and
wantto avoid them,butwe also rightly wantto save thechild.In such
cases,a conflictofdesiresis inevitable forthevirtuousperson.

Courageas Karteria

Emotionalstruggledoes notnecessarily indicatea lackofvirtueor the

presence of mere self-control.
Both Pears and Duffassumethatifwe
muststruggleagainstany of our emotions,thenwe cannotbe fully
virtuous.I tend,on theotherhand,toagreewithHardiethat'an action
whichisbothright andeffortful manifests
continence onlyifwhatmakes
itdifficult
is thefactthattheagenthas "bad" desires,i.e.desireswhich
he would nothave ifhe werevirtuous'(403).The braveman'sfearis
appropriateand his desireto avoid deathis a perfectly good desire.
Indeed,he willavoid his situation
life-threatening ifhe finds thereis
nothing noble to be done. Suffering
pain or destruction forno good

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
66 JohnF.Heil

reason,Aristotle has toldus,is themarkofinsanity.But,incaseswhere

thereis something nobletobe done,thepainand fearofthebraveman
doesnotmagically vanish.Norshouldit.Courageis 'painful'{epilupori),
Aristotlesays,and itis 'byenduring
painfulthingsthatpeoplearecalled
brave'(EN III 9, 1117a32-4).

Hence,itisnottrueinthecaseofeveryvirtue
thatitisexercised
with
pleasure,exceptto theextentthatthegoalis obtained.
(EN IH 9,
1117bl5-16)29

Furthermore, muchoftheworryoverwhether couragemightdegen-

erateintoself-control is misplaced,giventhatenkrateia is technicallya
stateof controlling pleasures,
just as the contrasting state of akrasia
is
specifically a stateofbeingovercome bypleasures(ENVII 7,1150al3-14;
cf.EE II 8,1224a34).Aristotle recognizes a distinctstateofenduring pain
whichhe callskarteria orfortitude and whichseemstobe morerelevant
totheproblemsraisedbycourage.He doesnotdevotemuchdiscussion
to it,butit showsup in theEudemian Ethics'slistofmeanstatesright
alongsidethevirtues. Thekarterikos person,we caninfer, issomeonewho
enduresnot'all pain alike'buttheright kindsofpain (EE II 3, 1221a9,
28-31;cf.EN VII 7, 1150al4-15).Thisseemsto be preciselythespecial
abilityofthebraveman,an abilitysignified byAristotle's constantuse
oftheterm'enduring'(hupomenein) inhisdiscussionofcourage.30
Theredoesnotseemtobe anymutualincompatibility betweenvirtue
and karteria in theway perhapstha^peoplehave thoughtvirtueand
enkrateia to be incompatible. The latter, by definition, involvestaking
pleasure inopposing things this
(e.g., piece ofcake, on the onehand,and
thedietthatI wishtomaintain, ontheother).Butitis possiblenottotake
pleasurein such opposingthingsand thereis a betterstatecalled

29 Aristotle'searlierremark inBookII (1104b7-8)

that'someonewhoenduresterrifying
thingsand enjoysit,or at leastis notin pain,is brave,butifhe is in pain,he is
cowardly' is easilymisleading.Aristotlemustbe referring
tothepleasure(orpain)
ofpursuingwhatis goodin thefaceofadversity, notthepainofadversity itself.
Sincehedoesinsistthatthegoalofcourageoughttobe 'pleasant/ hispointinBook
II is thatanyonewhodoesnotfindthisgoalpleasantinterrifying situationsis not
brave.The braveman will enjoydoingwell; he will not enjoythe fearhe is
experiencing whilehe is doingwell.
andkarterein
30 Cf.Laches193A9,wherehupomenein areusedas synonyms.

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Whyis Aristotle'sBraveMan So Frightened?67

'temperance' (sophrosune)whichinvolvesno conflict betweenourpleas-

ures.Itis notclear,however,thatsucha stateis possiblewithregardto
pains.Aristotlecertainly does notrecognizeanyvirtuethatensuresan
absenceofconflict betweenall ofourpains,nordoes he everclaimthat
we canachievea stateinwhichallofourvirtuousactionsareguaranteed
tobe unimpededbyanysortofpain.Thereis oneobviousreason:many
painsare completely beyondourcontrol.Aristotle, at one point,gives
theexampleofa snakebite(EN VII 7, 1150b9).Thoughwe mayhave
somecontroloverwherewe step,once thebiteis inflicted thepain is
inevitableand mayseverelyhinderwhateveractionswe wishto per-
to findanalogouscases ofpleasure(thoughin the
form.It is difficult
Nicomachean EthicspassageaboveAristotle offers laughteras an exam-
ple). Perhapshaving certain C-fibers in our brain stimulated by elec-
trodeswould constitute a pleasurebeyondourcontrol, in thesenseof
producingan impediment to ouractionsin spiteofourfinecharacter.
Apart from theseexotic cases, however,ourpleasuresseemintimately
boundup withourcharacter and therefore, on Aristotle's view,within
ourcontrol - hencethevirtueoftemperance. Therearesomesignificant
casesofpain,however,thatarenota function ofourcharacter atall,but
ofourbasic humanconstitution. In suchcases,all we can do is either
give intothemor endurethem.Our fearof life-threatening circum-
stances,Aristotleargues, is one such pain thatis beyond our control.

[13]Somethingsofnecessityappearfearful
toevery
human beingand
shakeup (diatarattein)
everyone,sinceitisentirely that- just
possible
as heatandcoldandsomeoftheother forces
aremorethanweandthe
conditionofourhuman bodycanstand- thesameistruewithsome
oftheaffections
ofoursoul.(EEIII 1,1229bl7-21)

I wouldargue,is bothnecessaryfortheopera-
Thevirtueofkarteria,
tionof courageand perfectly consistent withthe otherAristotelian
Ifthebravemanwillinevitably
virtues.31 experiencefear,thenhe must
possesskarteria.
He mustendurepainwhileheperforms hisnobleaction.
Thereis no possibility
oftraining
himself nottobe frightenedwithout

31 Indeed,atonepointAristotle
evenseemstothink ofkarteria
as thevirtuous
partner
oftemperance(EN X 9, 1173b33).
I wishtothankJimHankinsonforsuggesting to
methatkarteria
maybe an importantconceptforunderstandingAristotle's
viewof
courage.

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
68 JohnF.Heil

also becomingutterly totheworldand sucha person,says

'insensitive'
'would
Aristotle, be a madman or incapableofpain' (EN III 7,1115b26).
[14]Whilewhatisfearfulisnotthesameforeveryone,wedo saythat
thereis something[namely,death]whichis even beyonda human
is
being.This,then, fearful
to at
everyone, leasttoanyonewithany
(EN JH7,1115b7-9)
sense(toigenounechonti).

Ofcoursewe mustbe carefulwhenwe talkaboutemotionsthatare

beyondourcontrol. It is tempting to thinkthatsomeofthesearemere
bodily disturbances, perhaps akin tosweatinginhotweather, blinking in
or
brightlight flinching at sudden movement. The braveman, itmight
be suggested,is notgenuinelyfrightened, but simplytrembling. The
Stoicsfamously triedtomaketheseineliminable affections,such as the
apparentfright of thevirtuous ina
person life-threatening situation, into
physiological disturbances.32 FortheStoics,ifsomething is beyondour
control, it mustnotbelongto thesoul. Aristotle, however,refusesto
makesucha movehere.Had hewantedtomaketheseaffections bodily,
he wouldnothaveendowedthemwithsuchrich,cognitive content and
he wouldnothavecalledthem'affections ofthesoul'.Grantedthat,on
Aristotle's view,everyaffection ofthesoulinvolvescertainphysiologi-
calchanges(cf . deAn 1 1,403a3-27), itisnotthebodilynatureofthebrave
man'sfearthatputsitbeyondthereachofhisvirtue.As we haveseen,
it is theexistenceof fearful thingsthatmakeshis fearinevitable. The
in
tragicflaw,ifitis one,liesnotintheperson,but theworld.

32 ComparetheexamplethatAristotle givesin thedeAnima(see passage[4])about

notbeingfrightened offearfulimages'althoughourheartis moved/Seneca,a late
Stoic,arguesthatthereareplentyofquasipassions(flinching, etc.)which
trembling,
sensussunt'(Epistula71.29)
even thegood personwill suffer,'Hi enimomnescorporis
pulsus'(deIraII 3.2).To theextent
or'corporis haveanundeniably
thatsuchaffections
psychologicalcomponent, however,Senecaconcedesthat'thoseaffections that
resultfromsomecondition ofthegenerallotofmanand therefore befalleventhe
wisest,amongwhichmustbe placedforemost thatmentalshock(ictusanimi)which
us aftertheimpression
affects aremovements
ofinjury... Alltheseaffections ofa
mindthatwishesnottobe affected and arenotpassions,butthebeginnings that
arepreliminary topassions(principia deIraII 2.2-5).See also
adfectibus:
proludentia
EpictetusFr9; CiceroTD HI83;Plutarch VirtMor449A-B.

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Whyis Aristotle'sBraveMan So Frightened?69

on Confidence
Postscript

in thispaperabouthow theemotionofconfidence,
I havesaid nothing
whichbothPearsand Dufftaketobe a crucialfactor,fitsintoAristotle's
accountofcourage.Thisis,inpart,becauseI do notthinkAristotleever
fullyworksout the rolehe wantsconfidence to play. Whenhe first
introducescouragein theEudemian he saysonlythatthebrave
Ethics,
manis 'concernedwithfears'(periphobous),
butthengoeson todescribe
courageas 'thebeststatein regardto emotionsoffearand confidence
(periphobouskai tharre)'(EE III 1, 1228a26-37).In theNicomachean
Ethics
he makesa greateffort
toincludebothemotionsthroughouthisdiscus-
sion,butinmostcasesgivesonlylipservicetoconfidence
andultimately
decidesthat:

[15]Thoughcourageis concerned withtheemotionsoffearand confi-

dence,itdoes notconcernbothin thesameway,buthas moreto do
withfearful sincesomeonewhois undisturbed
things, andintheright
stateinregardtotheseis morebravethansomeonewho[achievesthis]
in regardtocircumstanceswhichinspireconfidence
(tatharralea).
(EN
III9,1117a29-32)33

ThemainproblemthatAristotle needstoresolve,I think, is howboth

fearand confidence cancoexistsimultaneously inthebraveman,given
thathe considersthemtobe 'in somesenseopposites(posenantid)' (EE
III 1, 1228a29).Indeed,confidence is describedin theRhetoric as a state
ofbeing'unaffected' infearful
(apatheis) situations(RhII 5,1383a28)and
is ultimatelydefinedin termsofitsopposition to fear:

[16] Confidenceis theoppositeof fear,henceit is theexpectation,

accompanied byan appearance, thatthingsbringingsafetyarenearby
and thatfearful
thingsare faroffor notthereat all. Boththeterrible
thingswhicharefaroffandthethings bringing
safetywhicharenearby
areobjectsofconfidence.
(RhII 5, 1383al6~20)

33 TheGreektermtharraleon is thedevilto translate.

It can referbothto someone's
being'fullofconfidence'
and to a situation's
being'a cause ofconfidence'or 'an
objectofconfidence'
(Aristotle
rarely thecauseofanemotion
distinguishes from its
object).Context
alonecandecidewhichmeaningis intended.

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
70 JohnF.Heil

But,ifconfidenceinvolves 'an appearance thatfearfulthingsare far

offor not thereat all/ thenhow can Aristotle'sbrave man, who knows
full well that fearfulthingsare extremelyclose, have any confidence
whatsoever? We certainlybegin to sympathize with Duffs attempt
(mentionedearlier) to save Aristotleby having the brave man's fear
transform intoconfidence.I have alreadyshown,however,thatthisis not
an optionon Aristotle'sview.
The mistake,I believe, is to thinkthatconfidenceis the opposite of
fear and, to the extentthat Aristotlebuys into that assumption,his
account can go nowhere. Confidencehas a very different, and more
complex, structure than fear.Unlike fear,it is an emotionwhich takes
the individual herselfas part of its object.We have confidencein our-
selves, in our own abilities,to undertakea particulartask.34Aristotle
nevershows an appreciationofthecomplex,self-referential structureof
confidence.For this reason, I believe, he does not and cannot give an
adequate accountofhow it comes intoplay in thecase ofbrave action.
Nonetheless,thereis a small hint in the textof one way in which
Aristotlemighttryto fitconfidenceinto the picture.At one point,he
draws thefollowingcomparisonbetweentheoptimisticperson (euelpis)
and thebrave man:

[17]Thosewhoareoptimistic arenotthereby brave,sinceitis because

theyhavegainedvictory manytimesovermanythingsthattheyfeel
confidentindangeroussituations. Yet[thesetwotypes]aresomewhat
similarinthatbothareconfident,butthosewhoarebraveareconfident
while the othersare
forthe reasonsgivenearlier(dia ta proterori),
confidentbecausetheythinktheyare superblyin controland could
suffer
nothing. (EN III 8,1117a9-14)

Whatexactlyarethe'reasons givenearlier'forthebrave man's confi-

dence? Ifwe knew thesourceof his confidence,we would be in a much
betterposition to understandhow Aristotleintendsit to operate. The
problem,however,is thatno priordiscussioncan be found.What,then,

34 True,we can feelconfidentaboutthingswhichhavenothing to do withourown

forinstance,
I canfeelconfident,
abilities. willwinWimbledon
thatBecker thisyear.
ButthissortofconfidenceisnotwhatAristotletakestobe relevanttocourage.The
examples butnotbrave,allinvolve
hegives,atanyrate,ofpeoplewhoareconfident,
a person'sconfidenceinherownability toperformsomeaction.

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Whyis Aristotle'sBraveMan So Frightened?71

to?Themostlikelycandidate,I would suggest,is some-

is he referring
thinghe has been emphasizingthroughout his entirediscussionand,
indeed,something hehasmentioned yetagaininthesentence justbefore
passage[17]:thebravemanis distinguished fromothers in thathe alone
performs his action'because of what is noble' (dia to kalori).
Others
perform daringfeatswithgreatconfidence becauseoftheiroptimism,
orbecauseoftheirfury, orbecauseofsomeotheremotion(diapathos),
butthebravemandoesso becauseofhiscommitment todoingtheright
thing.Thissuggeststhatthesourceofhisconfidence has todo withthe
specialmotivational structureofbraveaction,theverystructure that
Aristotleelucidatedinordertosolvetheparadoxofcourage.Thebrave
man,then,would feelconfident preciselybecauseof his tendencyto
endurefearforthesakeofthenoble.He is confident inhisabilityto do
theright thinginthe faceofpainandadversity.IfI am right thatAristotle
is incliningtowardssome suchaccountas this,thenperhapshe does
havesomeappreciation forthecomplexityofconfidence and,ultimately,
someexplanation ofhowitcouldcoexistsimultaneously withfear.

Appendix

One ofmyclaimsin thispaperis thattheparadoxofcouragefoundin

theEudemian thoughI also citedin n.4
Ethicsis originalwithAristotle,
somepassagesinPlatowhichanticipate discussionincertain
Aristotle's
ways (Laches 192B-193D, 358E-360B,
Protagoras Phaedo 68D5-13andLaws
647B9-C1).SomebriefcommentaboutthesePlatonicantecedents may
be usefulbywayofcomparison withAristotle.
In theLaches, Socratesgenerates a paradoxwithregardtotheintellec-
tualcomponent ofcourage(as opposedtotheemotionalelementwhich
Aristotleis addressingin the Eudemian Ethics).Couragecannotbe a
matter offoolishlyfacingdanger,says becausethenwe would
Socrates,
notcallitsomething excellent;buttheadditionofintelligence seemsto
rendera personlessbrave,sincesomeonewhofacesdangerbecauseshe
has calculatedthatherchancesforsurvivalare good is notas braveas
someonewhofacesdangeragainsttheodds (i.e.,withoutthebenefits of
intelligence).The suppressedpremises which push the argument
through wouldseemtobe (1) bravepeoplefacerealdanger,but(2) for
someonewho knowsherchancesare good and,hence,whosechances
aregood,thereis no realdanger beingfaced.Aristotleendorsesbothof
theseclaimsand,tothatextent, heagreeswiththeconception ofcourage
thatunderliestheargument. Whathe rejectsis thesuggestion thatthis

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
72 JohnF.Heil

sortofintelligence (i.e.,military expertise) wouldhave anything to do

withgenuinecourage.Thisseemstobe whyAristotle criticizes Socrates
forholdingthatcourageis knowledge(EN III 8, 1116b3-23; EE III 1,
1229al4-16,1230a4-10):facingyoursituation because ofyourtechnical
knowledgeor experience is onlypseudo-courage, insofaras itimplies
thatyoursituationis essentially Butdoesn'ttheLachesshow
risk-free.
thatSocratesagreeswithAristotle on thispoint?Why,then,does Aris-
totlesay thatSocrates'sconception ofcourageinvolvessuchtechnical
knowledge?Perhaps he thinks that Socrates is somehowcommitted to
theclaimthattheadditionofintelligence ofanysortentailsan increase
in theperson'sexcellence.By focusingexclusively on theintellectual
of
aspect virtue,then, Socrates cannot adequatelyexplainwhy the
additionofmilitary expertise does not have theeffect ofincreasing the
person's excellence.
TheProtagoras does discussa problemwiththeemotional stateofthe
braveperson:ifhe has fear,thenhebelievesthatsomething terribly bad
is present;but surelyno one would deliberately somethinghe
face
believedtobe bad; on theotherhand,onlya cowardwouldtrytoavoid
theterriblecircumstances of,e.g.,thebattlefield. Hence,ifthebraveman
facessuch circumstances, thenhe mustalso believethatsomething
is present,
'noble'(kalori) ofwhichthecowardis ignorant: 'so,ingeneral,
whenbravemenarefrightened they do nothave shameful fears'(360A8-
B2).As we haveseen,Aristotle is influenced by this discussion whenhe
comesto givehisownaccountofcourage,butnoticethatthedilemma
raisedin theProtagoras is concernedwithonlyone halfoftheparadox
Aristotleconsiders intheEudemian Ethics.
Platorecognizes a problemin
attributingfear to the brave person not because courage seems also to
requirefearlessness, but because fear seems tobe something 'shameful.'
ThePhaedocomesclosesttoarticulating thesortofparadoxAristotle
in.Socratesclaimsthatmostpeople(i.e.,non-philosophers),
is interested
iftheyfacedeathbravely,do so onlybecausetheyare morefrightened
ofotherthings- greater evilssuchas shameorunhappiness, I suppose
- 'althoughsurelyitis absurdforsomeonetobe bravebecauseoffear
and cowardice'(68D11-13).Butthisis notAristotle's paradoxsincehe
wouldagreewithSocratesthatanycaseofacting'bravely'because offear
is indeeda kindofcowardiceandnotcourageatall.Aristotle's paradox
concerns genuinecourage,thevirtue, notsomedegenerate pseudo-cour-
age. To be sure,Aristotle and Socratesdisagreeaboutwhatgenuine
courageis (I discussedtheSocraticconception earlierinmypaper),but
theyagree that it is a praiseworthy thing and hencedoes notinvolve
acting outof fear.

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Whyis Aristotle'sBraveMan So Frightened?73

In theLawswe do findPlatoarguingthatthevirtuouscitizenwill
'needtobecomefearlessandfearful'(647B9-C1),butherethereis noreal
paradoxbecause Plato is referringto two virtues:aidosor
different
'modesty'(understoodas a fearofshame)and courage(understood as
towardenemies).
a fearlessness

Department ofPhilosophy
TrinityUniversity
715StadiumDrive
San Antonio,Texas78212
email:jheil@trinity.edu

References

Annas,J.TheMorality (Oxford:
ofHappiness. Press1993).
OxfordUniversity
I. Bywater,
EthicaNicomachea.
Aristotle. OxfordUniversity
ed. (Oxford: Press1894).
. Eudemi F. Susemihl,
Ethica.
Rhodii ed. (Leipzig:Teubner1884).
Press
R. Walzerand J.Mingay,eds. (Oxford:OxfordUniversity
. EthicaEudemia.
1991).
Cooper,J.'SomeRemarks onAristotle's Southern
MoralPsychology', Journal
ofPhilosophy
s.v.27 (1988)25-42.
F. Aristoteles
Dirlmeier, Ethik
Eudemische W. de Gruyter
(Berlin: & Co. 1969).

Courage',Ratio29 (1987)2-15.
Duff,A. 'Aristotelian
Hardie,W.F.R.Aristotle's
Ethical 2nded. (Oxford:
Theory ClarendonPress1980).
Ethics.
Kenny,A. TheAristotelian ClarendonPress1978).
(Oxford:
. Aristotle's oftheWill.(NewHaven:YaleUniversity
Theory Press1979).

CourageousPassions',Phronesis
S. 'Aristotle's
Leighton, 33 (1988)76-99.
intheEudemianandNicomachean
ofAndreia
Mills,M.J.'TheDiscussions Phronesis
Ethics',
25 (1980)198-218.
M.Aristotle's
Nussbaum, DeMotuAnimalium. Princeton
(Princeton: Press1978).
University
. "The"CommonExplanation"
of AnimalMotion',Morauxand Wiesner,eds.,
Studienzu einigenDubia,Aktendes 9. Symposium
imCorpusAristotelicum:
Zzveifelhaftes
Aristotelicum. W. de Gruyter
(Berlin: & Co. 1983)116-56.
. 'Therapeutic Epicurusand Aristotle',
arguments: and Striker,
Schofield eds.,The
NormsofNature:StudiesinHellenistic
Ethics.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress
1986) 31-74.

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
74 JohnF.Heil

. 'TheStoicson theExtirpation
ofthePassions',Apeiron
20 (1987)129-77.
Pears,D. 'Courageas a Mean',Rorty,
ed.,EssaysonAristotle's
Ethics.
(Berkeley:
University
ofCaliforniaPress1980)171-87.
Rowe,C.J.TheEudemian
andNicomachean
Ethics.
(Cambridge:
Cambridge Press
University
1971).
H.W.Greek
Smyth, Grammar. HarvardUniversity
(Cambridge: Press1920).
J.O.'Aristotle's
Urmson, Doctrine oftheMean',AmericanPhilosophical 10 (1973)
Quarterly
AlsoinRorty,
223-30. ed.,EssaysonAristotle's
Ethics.
(Berkeley: ofCalifor-
University
niaPress1980)157-70.

This content downloaded from 128.226.37.5 on Sat, 19 Dec 2015 14:09:51 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions