G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No.

10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at
No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and
upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach,
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately
vs.
went to the aid of the wounded man.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room,
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
despite defendant's warnings.

CARSON, J.:
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it
be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order
accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either
to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where
as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to
he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be
substantially correct:
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of
simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal
mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy
or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest
building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto,
house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his
door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which lawful right of self-defense.
communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of
vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the
door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing
against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.
xxx xxx xxx
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was
suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out
twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being 4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant
pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines circumstances:
along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a
robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment (1) Illegal aggression.
he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In
the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who
had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against
which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon
the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant,
who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete
employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open
Pascual's wounds. the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be.
No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an
intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief
defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any
personal protection. available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for
the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable
terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the
at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when
and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron"
officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about
as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this
of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge. article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without
intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary"
implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
"crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from
in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo
criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of
Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed
the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such
circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from
was not due to negligence or bad faith. criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one,
and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion
of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada,
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative
vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent
a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in
than real.
larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and
works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal
provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act
committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no
Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap.,
intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code
240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala.,
there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if
213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of
consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of
homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the
definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not
specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with
malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of the
acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it
appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the
code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative
enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely
contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the
crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal
intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of
express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts
negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to
be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction,
except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not.
Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent"
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a
disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked
upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do
harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion
to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same
proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth.
Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt
mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its
sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is
supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the
object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the
civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the
parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal
intention, which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal
negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence
in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary
question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the
various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the
provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would
constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law. He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or
negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary
shall appear. In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion,
without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even
though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
 The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is
equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts
shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and
the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the
absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability
on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the
word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been
said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is
more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal
malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as
employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable
grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not
merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American
statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words
indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not
great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular
individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol.
1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime
that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the
various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general
principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a
crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations
from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the
intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is
sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the
sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation
nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be
deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as
probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which
it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this
subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit
rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito
factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of
the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we
inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery
actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on
the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment
of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance
takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return
of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his
neighbors does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one
deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every
form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the community
deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of
the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of
what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is
credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one
of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines,
because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a
criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of
abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance
of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and
compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the
legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission
criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it
is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to
make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond
question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and
the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the
law's fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose
need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids."
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring
mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On
the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all
cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows
the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from
criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron
Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
(Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342;
Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41;
P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to whether
he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the
circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which
the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent,
criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence
of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on
which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally
guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is
unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and
the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man
undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without
fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according
to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth
otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case
where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends
in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend
under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and
that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if
the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any
crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he
took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under
such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or
criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law"
in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in
article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious
design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear
that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or
excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of
such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report
of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he
advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his
hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound
B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of B was
only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would have been
if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man
so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded
— a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it
is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the
reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this
principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which
are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in
company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with
his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did
not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder,
because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with which he had
undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and
afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and
left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered
assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence
of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had
always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his
sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from
criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in
paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid
found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not
exists rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles
419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with
accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme
court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to
have been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside
his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to
distinguish with which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was
no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts
executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife
and child, more especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended
himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed
the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary,
particularly because the instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his
assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the
consteration which naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to
known or distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might
bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find
from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that
it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme
court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part
of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a
distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and
almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the
voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have
killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried,
"Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim
of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from
the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this
homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph
4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but
only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the
reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the
accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the
accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a
justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that
under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were
rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol.
I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large
stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires
what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would
be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals,
one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the
next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from
criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The
criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza
finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from
criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and
condemned the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed.
Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing
at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and
incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of
May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced
open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his
life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances,
as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without
malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of
self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from
criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or
recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by
him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property
and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the
defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs
of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.
Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according to the
merits of the case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of
the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while
the act was done without malice or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for
the acts committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the defendant under the
erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the
defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to
enter said room, without any justifiable motive.
By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused should
be sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory
penalties provided in article 61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the
costs of both instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed from.
G.R. Nos. 147674-75 March 17, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ANACITO OPURAN, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Anacito Opuran was charged with two counts of murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, for the death of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and Allan Dacles under
separate informations, the accusatory portions of which respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 4693
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Km. 1, South Road, Municipality of Catbalogan,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with
deliberate intent to kill and treachery, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and stab Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., with the use of a bladed weapon (5" long from tip to handle
with scabbard), thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the back of his body, which
wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery. 1
Criminal Case No. 4703
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Purok 3, Barangay 7, Municipality of Catbalogan,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with
deliberate intent to kill, with treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab one Allan Dacles, who was lying on the bench, with the use of a bladed weapon, locally
known as ‘pisao,’ thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the different parts of his body,
which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery. 2
After Anacito entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment, trial ensued. 3
The evidence for the prosecution discloses that on 19 November 1998, at about 6:30 p.m., prosecution
witness Bambi Herrera was studying his lessons inside his house. His brother and a certain Jason
Masbang were outside sitting side by side with each other on a plastic chair; opposite them was Allan
Dacles, who was lying on a bench.4
Moments later, Jason barged into Bambi’s house, shouting: "There’s a long-haired man!" Bambi stood
up and looked through the open door. He saw appellant Anacito Opuran stab Allan on the chest with a
knife while the latter appeared to be trying to stand up from the bench. Although Allan had several stab
wounds on different parts of his body, he managed to stand up and run inside Bambi’s house, with
Anacito chasing him. Bambi immediately locked the door from the inside to prevent Anacito from
entering. But the latter tried to force the door open by thrusting a knife at the door shutter. He also threw
stones at the door. After a short while, Anacito left.5
With Anacito gone, Bambi went out to ask the aid of his neighbors so he could bring Allan to the hospital.
He saw Anacito’s two brothers and asked for their assistance. But one of them merely said: "Never mind
because he [referring to Anacito] is mentally imbalanced." 6 As nobody from among his neighbors
responded to his plea for help, Bambi carried Allan on his shoulders and dragged him to the lower portion
of the neighborhood. Several persons, who were having a drinking session, helped Bambi bring Allan to
the hospital. Allan, however, died about fifteen minutes later.7
At about 7:45 p.m. of the same day, prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., of Barangay San Pablo,
Catbalogan, Samar, was in the house of Demetrio Patrimonio, Sr., seeking medical advice from the
latter’s wife. While there, Tomas heard a commotion outside. He looked out from the balcony and saw
people running. He learned that Anacito had stabbed somebody.8
After about fifteen minutes, while Tomas was on his way home, he saw Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr. He
likewise noticed Anacito hiding in a dark place. When Demetrio Jr. reached the national highway, near
the so-called "lover’s lane," Anacito emerged from his hiding place and stabbed Demetrio Jr. with a knife
about three to four times.9
Tomas immediately ran to the house of the Demetrios to inform them of what he had just witnessed. He
then saw Demetrio Jr. running towards his parents’ house, but the latter did not make it because he
collapsed near the fence. Tomas also caught sight of Anacito running towards the direction of the house
of the Opurans. Meanwhile, Demetrio Jr. was brought by his parents to the Samar Provincial Hospital,
where he died the following day.10
Dr. Angel Tan, Medical Specialist II of the Samar Provincial Hospital, conducted an autopsy on the
cadavers of Allan and Demetrio Jr. He found five stab wounds on Allan’s body, one of which was fatal
because it affected the upper lobe of the right lung and bronchial vessel. 11 Demetrio Jr. sustained four
stab wounds and died of pulmonary failure due to hypovolemia from external and internal hemorrhage.12
For its part, the defense presented, as its first witness, the appellant himself, Anacito Opuran. He
declared that on the evening of 19 November 1998, he was resting in their house in Canlapwas, another
barangay in Catbalogan, Samar. He never went out that night. While he was sleeping at about 8:30 p.m.,
eight policemen entered his house, pointed their guns at him, and arrested him. He was brought to the
police station and detained there until the following morning. He denied being present at the place and
time of the stabbing incidents. He admitted knowing Demetrio Jr. as a distant relative and friend whom
he had not quarreled with. As for Allan, he never knew him. He had no misunderstanding with
prosecution witness Bambi Herrera. He asserted that the accusations against him were fabricated
because he was envied and lowly regarded by his accusers. 13
Subsequent hearings were postponed owing principally to the failure of the defense to present
witnesses. Then on 16 February 2000, the defense moved for the suspension of the hearing on the
following grounds: (1) on 10 January 2000, upon motion of the defense, the trial court issued an Order
authorizing the psychiatric examination of Anacito; (2) in consonance with that Order, Anacito underwent
a psychiatric examination on 26 January 2000 conducted by Dr. Angel P. Tan; (3) Dr. Tan issued a
Medical Certificate dated 26 January 2000 stating that Anacito had a "normal" mental status on that date
but was "suffering from some degree of Mental Aberration," which required further psychiatric evaluation
at Tacloban City.14
The trial court thus ordered a deferment of the hearing and granted the motion for the psychiatric
examination of Anacito at the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (EVRMC), Tacloban City.15
On 3 August 2000, the trial court received the Medical Report of Dr. Lyn Verona, physician-psychiatrist
of the EVRMC, on the psychiatric examination she conducted on Anacito. At the resumption of the
hearings on 20 November 2000, Dr. Verona testified that she examined Anacito three times through
interviews. From her interview with Anacito’s sister, Remedios Opuran Manjeron, she learned of
Anacito’s psychiatric history of "inability to sleep and talking irrelevantly." She found that Anacito had a
psychotic disorder characterized by flight of ideas and auditory hallucinations. She confirmed her
medical findings that Anacito was psychotic before and during the commission of the crime and even up
to the present so that he could not stand trial and would need treatment and monthly check-up. Her
diagnosis was that Anacito was suffering from schizophrenia.16
Remedios Opuran Manjeron testified that she brought his brother Anacito to the National Center for
Mental Health (NCMH), Mandaluyong, in 1986 because Anacito had difficulty sleeping and was talking
"irrelevantly."17 Anacito was treated as an out-patient, and was prescribed thorazine and
evadyne.18 They stayed in Manila for one month. In 1989, they returned to the NCMH, and Anacito was
prescribed the same medicine. Since they could not afford to stay long in Manila for follow-up treatments,
Remedios requested that her brother be treated in Catbalogan. Dr. Belmonte of the NCMH, however,
referred them to the EVRMC. Sometime in 1990, Remedios accompanied Anacito to the EVRMC for
examination. A certain Dra. Peregrino prescribed an injectable medicine. But it was a certain Dr. Estrada
of the NCMH who came to Catbalogan to administer the medicine in that same year. Since then until
the year 2000, Anacito did not take any medicine, nor was he subjected to examination or treatment.19
Anacito’s other sibling, Francisco Opuran, testified that at about 6:00 p.m. of 19 November 1998, he
heard a loud voice outside their house. Anacito heard also the loud voices and then went out. When
Francisco went out to verify, he did not see anything. A few minutes later he saw Anacito at the corner
of the street carrying a knife. He surmised that Anacito had committed a crime, and so he hugged him.
Anacito struggled to free himself, but Francisco brought him to Remedios’ house. Before the incident,
he observed Anacito to be "sometimes laughing, shouting, and uttering bad words, and sometimes
silent."20
In its decision21 of 23 January 2001, the trial court found Anacito guilty of murder for the death of
Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and homicide for the death of Allan Dacles. It decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court Finds Anacito Opuran y Balibalita GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes specified hereunder, to wit:
Murder, in Criminal Case No. 4693, and sentences him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr. in the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus ₱43,500.00 by way of actual
damages, and to pay the costs; and
Homicide, in Criminal Case No. 4703, and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentences him to
suffer an imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum to indemnify the heirs of Allan Dacles in
the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus ₱10,000.00 for burial expenses and to pay the costs.
Anacito seasonably appealed to us from the decision attributing to the trial court grave error in
disregarding the exempting circumstance of insanity.22 He contends that he was suffering from a
psychotic disorder and was, therefore, completely deprived of intelligence when he stabbed the victims.
Even assuming in gratis argumenti that he is criminally liable, he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance
under paragraph 9, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, which is "illness as would diminish the exercise
of the willpower of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts." He
likewise maintains that since treachery was not specifically alleged in the Information as a qualifying
circumstance, he cannot be convicted of murder for the death of Demetrio Jr.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees and avers that Anacito failed to establish with the
required proof his defense of insanity or his claim of the mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower.
The mental state of Anacito, as testified to by Dr. Verona, corresponds to the period after the stabbing
incidents. Further, Dr. Verona was certain that Anacito was not grossly insane, but she was uncertain
that Anacito was "unconscious" at the time he stabbed the two victims. The OSG also argues that
treachery was duly alleged and proved by the prosecution and should, therefore, be treated as a
qualifying circumstance in the killing of Demetrio Jr.
We agree with the OSG and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
In the determination of the culpability of every criminal actor, voluntariness is an essential element.
Without it, the imputation of criminal responsibility and the imposition of the corresponding penalty
cannot be legally sanctioned. The human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an
intellectual process but is dependent to a large degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation.
A man’s act is presumed voluntary.23 It is improper to assume the contrary, i.e. that acts were done
unconsciously,24 for the moral and legal presumption is that every person is presumed to be of sound
mind,25 or that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person.26 Thus, the
presumption under Article 800 of the Civil Code is that everyone is sane. This presumption, however,
may be overthrown by evidence of insanity, which under Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code
exempts a person from criminal liability.27
He who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it,28 for insanity as a
defense is in the nature of confession and avoidance. 29 An accused invoking insanity admits to have
committed the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he is insane. The testimony or proof of an
accused's insanity must, however, relate to the time immediately preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged.30 It is, therefore, incumbent upon accused’s counsel
to prove that his client was not in his right mind or was under the influence of a sudden attack of insanity
immediately before or at the time he executed the act attributed to him. 31
Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can
know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be
measured and judged by his behavior.32 Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward
acts, by means of which we read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then determine
whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. 33
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in
language and conduct.34 However, not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes
insanity.35 As consistently held by us, "A man may act crazy, but it does not necessarily and conclusively
prove that he is legally so."36 Thus, we had previously decreed as insufficient or inconclusive proof of
insanity certain strange behavior, such as, taking 120 cubic centimeters of cough syrup and consuming
three sticks of marijuana before raping the victim;37 slurping the victim’s blood and attempting to commit
suicide after stabbing him;38 crying, swimming in the river with clothes on, and jumping off a jeepney. 39
The stringent standard established in People v. Formigones40 requires that there be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused acted without the least discernment
because of a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of the will.
In People v. Rafanan, Jr.,41 we analyzed the Formigones standard into two distinguishable tests: (a) the
test of cognition – whether there was a "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal
act" and (b) the test of volition – whether there was a "total deprivation of freedom of the will." We
observed that our case law shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on the test of
volition, and has failed to turn up any case where an accused is exempted on the sole ground that he
was totally deprived of the freedom of the will, i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation of
intelligence." This is expected, since a person’s volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is
represented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. 42
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness
who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude that the accused was
insane based on his own perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. 43
Let us examine the evidence offered to support Anacito’s defense of insanity. The appellant points to
the testimony of prosecution witness Bambi Herrera that Anacito was a silent man who would sharply
stare at the lady boarders a few days before the stabbing incident, and would wear Barong Tagalog and
long pants when there was no occasion requiring a formal attire. The appellant also highlights that the
testimony of prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., that there was a 15-minute time interval between
the two stabbing incidents shows that the stabbing spree was without any known motive. 44
The testimonial evidence of the defense also attempted to prove the alleged behavioral oddity of Anacito
two to three days prior to the killing. His sister Remedios noticed that his eyes were reddish and that he
was angry with her.45 His brother Francisco also observed that he (Anacito) would sometimes talk to
himself, laugh, shout, and utter bad words, and , at times, he was just quiet. 46 Also relied upon by the
appellant are the testimony of Remedios on his psychiatric history and the expert testimony of the
EVRMC psychiatrist, Dr. Verona.
A careful scrutiny of the records, however, indicates that Anacito failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the defense of insanity. For one thing, it was only Bambi’s personal perception that there was
no reason or occasion for Anacito to wear Barong Tagalog. Tested against the stringent criterion for
insanity to be exempting, such deportment of Anacito, his occasional silence, and his acts of laughing,
talking to himself, staring sharply, and stabbing his victims within a 15-minute interval are not sufficient
proof that he was insane immediately before or at the time he committed the crimes. Such unusual
behavior may be considered as mere abnormality of the mental faculties, which will not exclude
imputability.47
Anacito’s psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the stringent yardstick established by case law. What
it shows is that Anacito was prescribed thorazine and evadyne, and later an injectable medicine to
remedy "his lack of sleep and noisiness." As the trial court noted, it was never shown that these drugs
were for a mental illness that deprived Anacito of reason. Further, Anacito was just an out-patient at the
NCMH, EVRMC, and Samar Provincial Hospital. While Remedios claimed that she requested the
confinement of Anacito and that the doctors did not refuse her, the fact remains that Anacito was never
confined in a mental institution. Although Dr. Verona testified that there was a recommendation for
Anacito’s confinement, there was no indication in the records as to when the recommendation was made,
who made the recommendation, and the reason for the recommendation. 48
At any rate, in People v. Legaspi,49 we discarded the confinement of the accused at the NCMH prior to
the incident in question to be by itself proof of his insanity, there being no proof that he was adjudged
insane by the institute. Applying this principle to Anacito’s case, we find another cogent reason to reject
his plea of insanity.
The records are likewise clear that Anacito was not subjected to treatment from 1991 until 1999. While
Remedios insisted that the medicine prescribed for Anacito ran out of stock allegedly in 1990, there was
no proof that Anacito needed the medicine during that period. In fact, there was no intimation that he
needed the medicine prior to the stabbing incident. She bought medicine for Anacito only in April 2000
because he was "again noisy in the jail."50 It seems that it was only after the stabbing incident, when he
was in jail, that his symptoms reappeared.
Moreover, as found by the trial court, the results of Dr. Verona’s examinations on Anacito were based
on incomplete or insufficient facts.51 For one thing, she admitted to have examined Anacito for only three
sessions lasting one to two hours each.52 Her one-page medical report53 reads in part:
Patient came in accompanied by policemen and sister. He was fairly kempt in appearance, wearing blue
shirt and pants. Mesomorphic, dark complexion with earring on the left ear. Had flight of ideas, with
auditory hallucination, "kabastosan," "kanan yawa." He further said his sleep was "minanok" and
complained of occasional headache. He had no delusion. Judgment and insight fair. Fair impulse control.
Comments:
From the foregoing interviews and examinations, it is determined that the patient has a psychiatric
disorder. It is most likely that the patient is psychotic before and during the commission of the crime. He
is presently psychotic and cannot stand trial. He would need treatment and monthly check-up.
We observe that Dr. Verona’s conclusions have no supporting medical bases or data. She failed to
demonstrate how she arrived at her conclusions. She failed to show her method of testing.54 Further,
she did not have Anacito’s complete behavioral and psychiatric history. On the witness stand, she
mentioned that Anacito could not distinguish right from wrong, but she was not certain that he was not
conscious of killing his victims in 1998. She also declared that Anacito had a diagnostic case of
schizophrenia, but stated in the next breath that Anacito was not grossly insane. 55
Truly, there is nothing that can be discerned from Dr. Verona’s short psychiatric evaluation report and
her testimony that Anacito’s judgment and mental faculties were totally impaired as to warrant a
conclusion that his mental condition in 1998 when he killed his victims was the same in 2000 when he
was psychiatrically examined. The most that we can conclude is that her findings refer to the period after
the stabbing accident and, hence, would prove Anacito’s mental condition only for said time. It could be
that Anacito was insane at the time he was examined by Dr. Verona. But, in all probability, insanity could
have been contracted during the period of his detention pending trial. He was without contact with friends
and relatives most of the time. He was perhaps troubled by his conscience, by the realization of the
gravity of his offenses, or by the thought of a bleak future for him. The confluence of these circumstances
may have conspired to disrupt his mental equilibrium.
It must be stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period
immediately before or at the precise moment of the commission of the act which is the subject of the
inquiry.56 His mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes
of determining his criminal liability.57
Interestingly, Anacito failed to raise insanity at the earliest opportunity. He invoked it for the first time in
the year 2000 and only after he had already testified on his defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held
that the invocation of denial and alibi as defenses indicates that the accused was in full control of his
mental faculties.58 Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during the hearings, Anacito was attentive,
well-behaved, and responsive to the questions propounded to him. Thus, the shift in theory from denial
and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently after the appellant realized the futility of his earlier
defenses, is a clear indication that insanity is a mere concoction59 or an afterthought.60 In any event,
Anacito failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed Demetrio Jr.
and Allan Dacles. He is thus presumed sane, and we are constrained to affirm his conviction. 61
We likewise reject the alternative plea of Anacito that he be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
diminished willpower. In the cases where we credited this mitigating circumstance after rejecting a plea
of insanity, it was clear from the records that the accused had been suffering from a chronic mental
disease that affected his intelligence and willpower for quite a number of years prior to the commission
of the act he was being held for.62 The situation does not exist in the cases at bar. It was only in 2000
that Anacito was diagnosed as "psychotic" with flight of ideas and auditory hallucinations and was found
to be schizophrenic. There is nothing on record that he had these symptoms the previous years or at
the time he stabbed the victim. Curiously, Dr. Verona did not make a diagnosis of schizophrenia in her
report, only at the witness stand.
We agree with the trial court that treachery cannot be appreciated as far as the killing of Allan is
concerned because the sole eyewitness did not see the commencement of the assault. 63 For treachery
to be considered, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where
no particulars are known as to how the killing began, the perpetration with treachery cannot be
supposed.64
Treachery was correctly appreciated in the killing of Demetrio Jr. Anacito was lying in wait for his victim
in a dark place at the national highway. When Demetrio Jr. reached the "lover’s lane," Anacito emerged
from his hiding place and stabbed the former several times. Anacito’s attack came without warning; it
was deliberate and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no opportunity
to resist or defend himself.65
We do not find merit in appellant’s contention that he cannot be convicted of murder for the death of
Demetrio Jr. because treachery was not alleged with "specificity" as a qualifying circumstance in the
information. Such contention is belied by the information itself, which alleged: "All contrary to law, and
with the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery." In any event, even after the recent amendments
to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words
such as qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense.66
We, therefore, sustain the penalty imposed by the trial court on Anacito. For the crime of murder, which
is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he was correctly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua,
the lower of the two indivisible penalties, since there was no other aggravating circumstance attending
the commission of the crime. For the crime of homicide, which is punishable by reclusion temporal, he
may be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty whose minimum is within the range of prision mayor and
whose maximum is within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period, there being no modifying
circumstances.
Coming now to the matter of damages. While Demetrio Sr. testified that he spent ₱43,500 for the wake
and burial of his son, only ₱11,94567 is substantiated by receipts. Hence, in lieu of actual damages we
shall award to Demetrio Jr.’s heirs temperate damages68 of ₱25,00069 conformably with current
jurisprudence.70
As to the burial expenses for Allan, his father Alfredo Dacles testified that he spent ₱10,000. However,
he failed to present receipts to substantiate his claim. Nevertheless, we also grant temperate damages
in the amount of ₱10,000 on the ground that it was reasonable to expect that the family of the victim
incurred expenses for the coffin, wake, and burial.
The award of civil indemnity of ₱50,000 for the respective heirs of Demetrio Jr. and Allan is affirmed in
line with recent jurisprudence.71 Civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.72
Apart from the civil indemnity, we shall award in favor of the heirs of each victim moral damages in the
amount of ₱50,000 consistent with controlling case law. 73 Moral damages are awarded despite the
absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs. As borne out by human nature
and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on
the part of the victim’s family.74
We shall also award in favor of the heirs of Demetrio Jr. exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000
in view of the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery. 75
Thus, Anacito shall indemnify the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., damages in the total amount of
₱161,945 and the heirs of Allan damages in the total amount of ₱110,000.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM, with modifications as to the damages, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, finding appellant Anacito Opuran guilty of the crimes of murder
in Criminal Case No. 4693 and homicide in Criminal Case No. 4703, and sentencing him to suffer
reclusion perpetua and an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, respectively. Apart from
the ₱50,000 civil indemnity, he is ordered to pay (1) the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., in the amounts
of (a) ₱50,000 as moral damages; (b) ₱25,000 as temperate damages; and (c) ₱25,000 as exemplary
damages, or a total of ₱150,000; and (2) the heirs of Allan Dacles in the amounts of (a) ₱50,000 as
moral damages; and (b) ₱10,000 as temperate damages, or a total of ₱110,000.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., on official leave.
G.R. No. L-45964 April 25, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RESTITUTO FALLER (alias R. Aguilar), defendant-appellant.
L. D. Lockwood for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C. J.:
Restituto Faller was charged with the crime of damage caused to another's property maliciously and
willfully. After hearing the evidence, the Court of First Instance of Rizal found that the damage was not
cause maliciously of and willfully, but through reckless imprudence, and sentenced Restituto Faller,
under paragraph 3 of article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as principal in the crime of damage through
reckless imprudence, to pay a fine of P38 and to indemnify the offended party Ramon Diokno in the
same amount, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. From this decision, an appeal was
taken.
In this instance the appellant assigns as sole error of the court the fact that he was sentenced for a crime
with which he was not charged, contending that a crime maliciously and willfully committed is different
from that committed through reckless imprudence.
The court has not committed this error. The appellant was convicted of the same crime of damage to
property with which he is charged. Reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself. It is simply a way of
committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability. The information alleges that the
appellant acted willfully, maliciously, unlawfully and criminally. To this information no objection was
interposed. Negligence being a punishable criminal act when it results in a crime, the allegation in the
information that the appellant also committed the acts charged unlawfully and criminally includes the
charge that he acted with negligence.
The appealed judgment is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.
Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Moran, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
LAUREL, J., concurring in the result:
If malicious mischief (art. 327, Revised Penal Code) is an offense distinct from damage to property by
reckless imprudence (art. 365, Revised Penal Code) and the latter is not necessarily included in the
former or the situation does not call for the application of other exceptions laid down by this court, the
conviction of the accused under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, notwithstanding his prosecution
under article 327 thereof, was erroneous. An accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him (par. 17, sec. 1, Art. III, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to section
15, par. 2, and section 6, par. 3, of General Orders, No. 58), and for this purpose the law requires that a
complaint or information must charge but one offense, subject to a single exception (sec. II, General
Orders, No. 58). There are two reasons, however, why the decision of the lower court should be affirmed.
First, because the constitutional and legal purpose has been amply served in this case, it appearing that
the accused himself, in the course of the trial, put up the defense that he was at most responsible for
the offense of damage to property by reckless imprudence. This is apparent from the following portion
of the decision of the lower court:
La defensa del acusado, que por cierto no declaro, se hace descansar en el hecho, primero,
que el sitio donde tuvo lugar la coalicion entre el truck y el automovil mencionado es de muy
estrecha dimension, y que no es extraño que ocurriese lo que acaecio. Otra cuestion es la de
que no cabe condenar al aqui acusado con daños a la propiedad bajo el articulo 327 del
Codigo Penal Revisado, sino a lo sumo por daños a la propiedad por imprudencia temeraria,
porque no costa que el acusado habia obrado deliberadamente, esto es, con malicia, y en
tercer lugar, se ha discutido principalmente la cuantia de los daños, pues, segun la defensa,
estos no debieran montar a mas de diez pesos.
En cuanto al primera punto de la defensa se vuelve contra el mismo acusado, pues
precisamente por ser estrecha la rampa del puente debio obrar con mayor cuidado antes de
hacer andar el autobus; en cuanto al segundo punto, concurrimos con la defensa de que no
procede aplicar al presente caso las disposiciones del capitulo noveno del Codigo Penal
Revisado referente a daños. . . .
Secondly, assuming that the two offenses here are dinstinct, I think that they are at least akin to each
other so as to justify the application of the rule laid down in United States vs. Solis (7 Phil., 195),
and United States vs. Quevengco (2 Phil., 412), On these grounds, I concur in the result.
[G.R. No. L-6641. July 28, 1955.]
FRANCISCO QUIZON, Petitioner, v. THE HON. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF
BACOLOR, PAMPANGA, ET AL., Respondents.
Moises Sevilla Ocampo and Pedro S. David for Petitioner.
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Assistant Solicitor General Francisco
Carreon for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. JURISDICTION OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURTS; DAMAGE TO PROPERTY THROUGH
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE; MALICIOUS MISCHIEF. — The justice of the peace court has no
jurisdiction to try the offense of damage to property through reckless negligence or
imprudence if the amount of the damage is P125; it is the Court of First Instance which
has jurisdiction.
2. ID.; ID.; ID. — Damage to property through reckless negligence is not a variant of
malicious mischief. "Malicious mischief", as used in sec. 87, par. 6, of the Judiciary Act, has
exclusive reference to the willful and deliberate crimes described in arts. 327 to 331 of the
Revised Penal Code, and to no other.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
On December 19, 1952, the respondent Chief of Police of Bacolor, Pampanga, filed a
criminal complaint against the herein petitioner, Francisco Quizon, with the Justice of the
Peace Court of said municipality charging Quizon with the crime of damage to property
through reckless imprudence, the value of the damage amounting to P125.00. Quizon filed
a motion to quash on the ground that, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty which might be imposed on the accused would be a fine or from P125.00 to
P375.00, which is in excess of the fine that may be imposed by the justice of the peace
court. The Justice of the Peace forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, but the latter returned it to him for trial on the merits, holding that the justice
of the peace court had jurisdiction. The defendant appealed from this ruling of the Court of
First Instance to this Court on the question of law raised.
Section 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296) provides in part as follows:
"Original jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction:
"(f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more
than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos:"
Sections 87 of said Acts reads as follows:jgc:
"Original jurisdiction to try criminal cases. — Justices of the peace and judges of municipal
courts of chartered cities shall have original jurisdiction over:
"(c) All criminal cases arising under the laws relating to:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(6) Malicious mischief;."
In the cases of People v. Palmon, 86 Phil., 350; People v. Peñas y Ferrer and Rey y Rochas,
86 Phil., 596; and Natividad, Et. Al. v. Robles, 87 Phil., 834, it was held that in the cases
provided for in Section 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 above quoted, the jurisdiction
given to justices of the peace and judges of the municipal courts is not exclusive but
concurrent with the courts of first instance, when the penalty to be imposed is more than
six months imprisonment or a fine of more than P200.00.
The question, therefore, is whether the justice of the peace court has concurrent jurisdiction
with the court of First Instance when the crime charged is damage to property through
reckless negligence or imprudence if the amount of the damage is P125.
We believe that the answer should be in the negative. To hold that the Justice of the Peace
Court has jurisdiction to try cases of damage to property through reckless negligence,
because it has jurisdiction over cases of malicious mischief, is to assume that the former
offense is but a variant of the latter. This assumption is not legally warranted.
Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code is as follows:
"ART. 327. Who are liable for malicious mischief. — Any person who shall deliberately cause
to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding
chapter shall be guilty of malicious mischief."
It has always been regarded of the essence of this felony that the offender should have not
only the general intention to carry out the felonious act (a feature common to all willful
crimes) but that he should act under the impulse of a specific desire to inflict injury to
another; "que en el hecho concurra animo especifico de dañar" (Cuello Calon, Der. Penal
[6th Ed. ] Vol. II, p. 869; Sent. of Tribunal Supremo of Spain, 21 Dec. 1909; 12 Feb. 1921).
"El elemento interno de este delito require, ademas de la voluntad de ejecutar el hecho
dañoso y de la conciencia de su ilegitimidad, el animo de perjudicar, la intencion de dañar.
Si no existe semejante animo el hecho no constituye delito." (II Cuello Calon, p. 870-871).
The necessity of the special malice for the crime of malicious mischief is contained in the
requirement of Art. 327 of our Revised Penal Code, already quoted, that the offender "shall
deliberately cause to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of
the next preceding chapter", i.e., not punishable as arson. It follows that, in the very nature
of things, malicious mischief can not be committed through negligence, since culpa
(negligence) and malice (or deliberateness) are essentially incompatible. Hence, the
Supreme Court of Spain in its decisions of 12 Feb. 1912, 7 Oct. 1931, 13 Nov. 1934 and 5
Oct. 1942, has expressly recognized that this crime is one of those that can not be
committed by imprudence or negligence.
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence"
is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower
degree of criminal liability" is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes
that by their structure can not be committed through imprudence: murder, treason,
robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is
treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a
mere question of classification or terminology. In international crimes, the act itself is
punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude
or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such
descriptive phrases as "homicide through reckless imprudence," and the like; when the
strict technical offense is, more accurately, "reckless imprudence resulting in homicide" ;
or "simple imprudence causing damages to property."
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to
reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of
Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should
be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully.
For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for
the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for
reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional minimum, if the
willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter
could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen
that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful
crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.
It is difficult to believe that the Legislature, in giving Justices of the Peace jurisdiction to
try cases of malicious mischief, did so in total disregard of the principles and considerations
above outlined. Our conclusion is that "malicious mischief" as used in Section 87, par. 6,
of the Judiciary Act, has exclusive reference to the willful and deliberate crimes described
in Arts. 327 to 331 of our Revised Penal Code, and to no other offense.
A further reason for this restrictive interpretation of the term "malicious mischief" used in
section 87 of the Judiciary Act, is that the same constitutes an exception to the general
jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Courts in criminal cases, which had always stood
prior to the said Act at offenses punishable with not more than 6 months’ imprisonment or
a fine of not more than P200.00 or both. To this traditional jurisdiction, the Judiciary Act
added eight (8) specific exceptions in the form of felonies triable in said courts without
reference to the penalty imposable; and malicious mischief is one of these exceptions, while
imprudence resulting in damage to property is not one of them.
For the foregoing reasons, we declare that the jurisdiction over the offense in question lies
exclusively in the Court of First Instance. Hence, the writ of certiorari is granted and the
order of remand to the Justice of the Peace Court is reversed and set aside. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
There is no question that the offense of malicious mischief, that is to say, causing damage
to another’s property willfully and for the sake of causing injury, because of hate, revenge
or other evil motive (Art. 327, Revised Penal Code), is much more serious than damage to
property without intent or malice but through negligence (Art. 365, Revised Penal Code).
If the Justice of the peace court has jurisdiction, as Republic Act 296, Sec. 87 gives him,
to try and decide cases of malicious mischief, logically and with more reason, it should also
be allowed to try and decide cases of the less serious offense of damage to property through
negligence. Actually, however, under the law, this is not always so. Under Art. 365, in
damage to property thru negligence, "the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from
an amount equal to the value of the damage to three times such value." In the present
case, the value of the damage is P125 and three times that amount would be P375 which
is beyond the P200.00 which a justice of the peace court may impose as fine in criminal
cases. For this reason, although I am not convinced of the wisdom and rationale of the law
in this respect, I vote with the majority because the law is on its side.
REYES, A., J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
While it may not be good law to invest municipal and justice of the peace courts with
"original jurisdiction" over criminal cases involving damage to property where the damage
was deliberately cause, but not where the damage was the result of mere negligence, I am
constrained to concur in the majority opinion, because our duty is to apply the law as we
find it and not as we think it should be.
The law has extended the criminal jurisdiction of the above- mentioned courts to cases of
"malicious mischief," but not to cases of damage to property resulting from mere
negligence. We should not legislate by arbitrarily considering the latter as comprehended
in the former. The two are essentially different. Damage to property constitutes
"malicious mischief" only when the object of the perpetrator is "injury of the property
merely for the sake of damaging it." (U. S. v. Generale Et. Al., 4 Phil. 216.) It would be
an incongruity to apply the term to cases of damages to property where that object is
lacking, as where the damage was due to mere negligence.
I therefore vote to grant the writ.
JUGO, J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The majority opinion seems to hold that there is no crime of damage to property through
reckless negligence, for the reason that in the crime of damage to property there should
be malice or deliberate intent to cause it. If that is so, then why remand the case at the
court of first instance? If there is no such crime neither the court of first instance nor the
justice of the peace court can punish it. The result would be that the numerous crimes
committed almost daily of damage to property through reckless negligence would go
unpunished. Reckless negligence alone without any damage is not penalized by the Penal
Code. Article 327 of the Penal Code provides "Any person who shall deliberately cause to
the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding
chapter, shall be guilty of malicious mischief. "That does not mean that a person who
causes damage to property, without deliberate intent, could not commit it through reckless
negligence, for the deliberate intent to commit a crime is common to all crimes.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code defines crimes as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
"Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault
(culpa).
"There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when
the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill."
In the present case damage to property was committed through culpa "imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill." We should not be mislead by the word
"malicious" in the phrase "malicious mischief" for that is only a translation of the word
"daños" as used in the Spanish text which governs. (People v. Abilong, 46 Off. Gaz., 1012.)
The drafter of Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code in using the word "malicious" in the
phrase "malicious mischief" did not add anything to the general concept of crimes as
defined in Article 3, but may have used the word "mischief" simply to distinguish it from
damages which may give rise only to civil liability. However that may be, it is clear that he
referred to damage in general which may be committed with deliberate intent or through
reckless negligence.
In the case of People v. Faller, 67 Phil., 529, it was held by this Court through Chief Justice
Avanceña that a person accused of malicious mischief may be convicted of damage to
property through reckless negligence. If the latter crime is essentially different from
malicious mischief, then the accused could not have been convicted of it.
For the above reasons, I dissent.
G.R. No. 163927 January 27, 2006
ALFONSO D. GAVIOLA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
24413 affirming the ruling2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nava, Biliran, Branch 16, in Criminal
Case No. N-1901, where petitioner Alfonso Gaviola was convicted of qualified theft.
The antecedents are as follows:
On May 25, 1954, Elias Gaviola filed a complaint against Eusebio Mejarito in the then Court of First
Instance of Carigara, Leyte, for quieting of title with a plea for injunctive relief. The suit involved a 40,500-
square-meter parcel of coconut land located in Barrio Calbani, Maripipi, Leyte, identified as Cadastral
Lot 1301 and covered by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 743.3 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 111.
Eusebio, for his part, claimed ownership over the property.
On July 29, 1955, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the complaint and declared Eusebio the lawful
owner of the property. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing, the Court renders judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint and
declaring the defendants the absolute owners and entitled to the possession of the disputed land. The
preliminary injunction which was granted by this Court through Judge Lorenzo Carlitos is ordered
dissolved, with costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.4
The decision became final and executory. On September 3, 1955, the trial court ordered the sheriff to
place Eusebio in possession of the property.5 The sheriff complied with the order on December 19,
1958.6
In the meantime, Eusebio died intestate and was survived by his son, Cleto. Elias Gaviola also died
intestate and was survived by his son, Alfonso.
Almost 30 years thereafter, on October 1985, Cleto filed a complaint against Alfonso and four others for
recovery of possession of a parcel of land and execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 111. The property
involved was located on the north of Lot 1301 and covered by TD No. 1546. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. B-0600.
The plaintiff therein alleged that the houses of the defendants were located in the property that had been
adjudicated to his father, Eusebio Mejarito, in Civil Case No. 111. He prayed that the court issue
judgment as follows:
a) Ordering [the] immediate execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 111, against defendants
Segundo Gaviola and Alfonso Gaviola;
b) Ordering all defendants evicted from any portion of the land they presently occupy as
residential;
c) Ordering all defendants to pay rent in favor of the plaintiff with legal interests imposed
reckoned from June 1984 until full payment of what is due and/or until their complete and
absolute eviction from their respective residences which rent liabilities when computed
annually for each of them is in the sum of PESOS: THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
(P3,600.00), Philippine Currency;
d) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of PESOS: THIRTY
THOUSAND (P30,000.00), Philippine Currency, representing moral damages;
e) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of PESOS: TWENTY-
FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00), Philippine Currency, representing attorney’s fee and
litigation expenses.
Plaintiff prays for such relief and other remedies as may be just and equitable in the premises. 7
In their answer to the complaint, the defendants averred that the property in which their houses were
located is different from that which was adjudicated by the court in Civil Case No. 111 to Eusebio
Mejarito.
The parties could not agree on the identification and metes and bounds of the parcel of land claimed
and owned by the plaintiff and those claimed and owned by the defendants. This impelled the court to
appoint Bienvenido Ricafort, the Officer-in-Charge of the sub-office of the Provincial Assessor, as
Commissioner, to resurvey the property subject of the complaint. A sketch of the property was prepared,
indicating the location of the plaintiff’s lot (Lot 1301) and the parcel of land where the house of Gaviola
stood (Lot 1311). The Commissioner also prepared a report8 stating that the property adjudicated to
Eusebio Mejarito in Civil Case No. 111 was Cadastral Lot No. 1301, while that which belonged to Elias
Gaviola was Cadastral Lot No. 1311; and the old one-storey house of defendant Alfonso Gaviola was
located in the latter lot. The defendant did not object to the report. 9
On May 4, 1990, the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants in Civil Case No. B-0600 and
ordered the complaint dismissed. The court ruled that the parcels of land occupied by the defendants,
inclusive of Lot 1311, were different from the property adjudicated to Eusebio Mejarito in Civil Case No.
111, which is actually Lot 1301. The court also ruled that the plaintiff had no cause of action for the
execution of the court’s decision in Civil Case No. 111 because such decision had long been enforced,
per report of the sheriff.10
Eusebio appealed the decision to the CA which rendered judgment on September 18, 1992, affirming
the decision of the RTC.11 The appellate court declared that the house of Alfonso Gaviola was located
in Lot 1311 covered by TD 1611 under the name of Elias Gaviola. Cleto filed a petition for review on
certiorari with this Court, which was denied due course in a Resolution 12 dated March 24, 1993. Thus,
the CA decision became final and executory. The trial court issued a writ of execution, a copy of which
Sheriff Ludenilo S. Ador served on the defendants on August 5, 1993. 13
In the meantime, Cleto Mejarito left the Philippines and stayed in the United States of America. He
entrusted the land to the care of his nephew, Rafael Lozano.
At 7:00 a.m. on September 6, 1997, Jovencio Mejarito, a nephew of Cleto Mejarito, and a barangay
councilman, saw Gavino Gaviola, Rodrigo Gaviola and Domingo Caingcoy climbing the coconut trees in
Lot 1301. Under the supervision of the spouses Alfonso and Leticia Gaviola, they
gathered 1,500 coconuts worth P3,000.00 from the coconut trees.14 The Officer-in-Charge of the
Maripipi Police Station then filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against the spouses Gaviola and
those who gathered the coconuts in the municipal trial court. 15 In the meantime, the coconuts were
entrusted to the care of the barangay captain.
On February 6, 1998, an Information was filed with the RTC of Naval, Biliran, against the spouses
Alfonso and Leticia Gaviola for qualified theft. The accusatory portion of the decision reads:
That on or about the 6th day of September 1997, at around 9 o’clock in the morning at Brgy. Calbani,
Municipality of Maripipi, Province of Biliran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, and with intent to
gain, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, deliberately took, harvested and gathered one thousand
five hundred (1,500) coconut fruits from the plantation of Cleto Mejarito without the consent and authority
of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the owner amounting to P3,000.00.
Contrary to Law.16
Alfonso admitted that the coconuts were taken upon his instructions, but insisted that the trees from
which they were taken were planted on Lot 1311, the property he had inherited from his father, Elias
Gaviola; the property of private complainant Cleto Mejarito, Lot 1301, was adjacent to his lot. Alfonso
testified that the property was placed in his possession by the sheriff since August 5, 1993, and that
since then he had been gathering coconuts every three months without being confronted or prosecuted
by anybody.17 He insisted that his claim was based on the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. B-0600,
which was affirmed by the CA.18
On April 13, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment convicting Alfonso of qualified theft. The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Alfonso Gaviola y Dimakiling guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of qualified theft; hereby imposing upon him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Ten (10) days of prision correccional, maximum period, as the
minimum, to Eight (8) Years and One (1) day of prision mayor, minimum, as the maximum.
The accused shall pay the private complainant Cleto Mejarito, through his duly authorized
representative, exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 and liquidated damages in the amount
of P3,000.00.
SO ORDERED.19
The trial court ruled that the accused took the coconuts from the coconut trees planted on Cadastral Lot
1301 which was owned by Cleto Mejarito, and not on his own property, Lot 1311, as he claimed.
Alfonso Gaviola appealed the decision to the CA which rendered judgment, on October 1, 2003, affirming
the decision of the RTC. He then filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which the appellate
court denied.
Alfonso, now the petitioner, raises the following issues in the instant petition: (1) whether the prosecution
proved beyond reasonable doubt that he had intent to gain when the coconuts were taken upon his
instruction; and (2) whether he is liable for exemplary and liquidated damages.
On the first issue, petitioner avers that the prosecution failed to prove animus lucrandi (intent to gain) on
his part. He asserts that he had been taking coconuts from the property in broad daylight three times a
year since August 5, 1993 on his honest belief that he was the owner of the land where the coconut
trees were planted. He points out that it was only after he took coconuts on September 6, 1997 that he
was charged of qualified theft.
Moreover, his honest belief that he owned the land negates intent to steal, an essential element of the
felony of theft. He argues that the RTC in Civil Case No. B-0600 declared him to be the owner of the
property where the coconut trees were planted; the property was placed in his possession by the sheriff
and, since then, he had planted bananas and gathered coconuts from the coconut trees.
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General avers that the decision of the RTC,
which was affirmed by the CA, is in accord with the evidence on record. The OSG maintains that under
the decision of the then CFI in Civil Case No. 111, the RTC in Civil Case No. B-0600 and that of the CA
affirming on appeal the RTC ruling, the owner of Lot 1301, the property from which the coconuts were
taken, was Eusebio Mejarito, the private complainant’s father.
We rule against the petitioner.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code defines theft as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.– Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence, against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latter’s consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove
or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and
 3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or
which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the
same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.20
Thus, the elements of theft are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property
belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the
consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things.21
The provision was taken from Article 530 of the Spanish Penal Code which reads:
1. Los que con ánimo de lucrarse, y sin violencia o intimidación en las personas ni fuerza en
las cosas, toman las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad, de su dueño.
2. Los que encontrándose una cosa perdida y sabiendo quién es su dueño se la apropiaren
con intencion de lucro.
3. Los dañadores que sustrajeren o utilizaren los frutos u objeto del daño causado, salvo los
casos previstos en los artículos 606, num. 1., 2. y 3; 608, num. 1; 610, num. 1.; 611;613;
segundo párrafo del 617 y 618. (Art. 437 del Cod. Penal de 1850. – Art. 379, Cdo. Franc. –
Art. 331, Codigo Brasil. – Art. 151, Cod. Austr. – Arts. 461 y 508, Cod. Belg. – Art. 242, Cod.
Alem. – Arts. 422 y 423, Cod. Port. – Art. 402, Cod. Ital.)22
According to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, theft is qualified if coconuts are taken from the
premises of a plantation:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or
fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
For one to be guilty of theft, the accused must have an intent to steal (animus furandi) personal property,
meaning the intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawful possession of personal property which
intent is apart from, but concurrent with the general criminal intent which is an essential element of a
felony of dolo (dolos malus). The animo being a state of the mind may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence, inclusive of the manner and conduct of the accused before, during and after
the taking of the personal property. General criminal intent is presumed or inferred from the very fact
that the wrongful act is done since one is presumed to have willed the natural consequences of his own
acts. Likewise, animus furandi is presumed from the taking of personal property without the consent of
the owner or lawful possessor thereof. The same may be rebutted by the accused by evidence that he
took the personal property under a bona fide belief that he owns the property. 23
In Black v. State,24 the State Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that the open and notorious taking, without
any attempt at concealment or denial, but an avowal of the taking, raises a strong presumption that there
is no animus furandi. But, if the claim is dishonest, a mere pretense, taking the property of another will
not protect the taker:
xxx "In all cases where one in good faith takes another’s property under claim of title in himself, he is
exempt from the charge of larceny, however puerile or mistaken the claim may in fact be. And the same
is true where the taking is on behalf of another, believed to be the true owner. Still, if the claim is
dishonest, a mere pretense, it will not protect the taker."
The gist of the offense is the intent to deprive another of his property in a chattel, either for gain or out
of wantonness or malice to deprive another of his right in the thing taken. This cannot be where the taker
honestly believes the property is his own or that of another, and that he has a right to take possession
of it for himself or for another, for the protection of the latter.25
In Charles v. State,26 the State Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the belief of the accused of his
ownership over the property must be honest and in good faith and not a mere sham or pretense.
In the present case, the trial court found the petitioner’s claim of having acted in the honest belief that
he owned Lot 1301 when he ordered the harvesting of the coconuts barren of probative weight. The trial
court ruled that the petitioner even admitted in Civil Case No. B-0600 that the private complainant’s
property was separate from his:
The accused have put up a defense of ownership although from the records of Civil Case No. B-0600,
Alfonso Gaviola, et al., thru their counsel admitted that from the evidence of Cleto Mejarito especially
Exh. "E," Writ of Execution, it appears that the decision was already executed on December 22, 1958.
Further admitted that:
"The southern boundary of the land of Elias Gaviola (Alfonso) is stated as Melecio Gaviola. Actually the
land of Melecio Gaviola is now owned by plaintiff (Cleto Mejarito), the land having been adjudicated to
his predecessor-in-interest Eusebio Mejarito by virtue of Civil Case No. 111 (Exh. "A") (See also Exh.
"6," Tax Declaration No. 3437, reverse side).
Alfonso Gaviola could not have made a mistake to extricate themselves from the ejectment, Cleto
Mejarito wanted to pursue in Civil Case No. B-0600.
They submitted a well entrenched analyses as they concluded further; to quote:
"Finally, that these three parcels of lands are separate and distinct from each other is confirmed by the
cadastral survey were the lands of plaintiff (Cleto Mejarito), of Elias Gaviola (Alfonso) and of Segunda
Gaviola, are denominated as Cadastral Lot Nos. 1301, 1311 and 1303, respectively. Not only that, their
definite locations and boundaries are even delineated in the sketch prepared by the court-appointed
commissioner, which sketch is now marked as Exhibits "H" and series" (Memorandum of defendants
Gaviolas dated April 13, 1989, in Civil Case No. B-0600).
The general rule is that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require
proof; except when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake and (2) when
shown that no such admission was in fact made. (Atillo III vs. C.A. 266 SCRA 596).27
The findings of the RTC were affirmed by the appellate court. The well-entrenched rule is that the findings
of facts of the trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court, absent any
evidence that the trial court and the appellate court ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts
and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would warrant a modification or reversal of the
outcome of the case. We have reviewed the records and find no justification to modify, much less
reverse, the findings of the trial and appellate courts.
The petitioner cannot feign ignorance or even unfamiliarity with the location, identity and the metes and
bounds of the private complainant’s property, Lot 1301, vis-à-vis that of his own, Lot 1311. Indeed, in his
Memorandum in Civil Case No. B-0600, petitioner as one of the defendants below, categorically stated:
From the above enumeration or statement of boundaries, it is clear that these three parcels of land are
distinct and separate from each other, as the following observations can be made:
1. land of plaintiff and Elias (Alfonso) Gaviola:
a. Both have the same northern boundary: Isabela Mejarito. But the same can be
explained by the fact that sometime in 1934 Isabela Mejarito, through Pastor
 Armoela, sold the land now owned by Elias (Alfonso) Gaviola to him. See Ex. "15."
In fact, the first time that the land bought by Elias Gaviola was declared in his name
was in 1935 in Tax Dec. No. 2839 (Exh. "14") which cancelled in part Tax Dec. No.
1942 (Exh. "16") in the name of Isabela Mejarito.
What caused the confusion (identical northern boundary of the lands of plaintiff and
Elias Gaviola) was that the northern boundary (Isabela Mejarito) of the land of
plaintiff was not adjusted accordingly despite the sale. It should have been changed
to Elias Gaviola to reflect the sale.
b. The southern boundary of the land of Elias Gaviola (Alfonso) is stated as Melecio
Gaviola. Actually the land of Melecio Gaviola is now owned by plaintiff the land
having been adjudicated to his predecessor-in-interest Eusebio Mejarito by virtue
of Civil Case No. 111 (Exhibit "A") (See also Exh. "6," Tax Dec. No. 3437, reverse
side)
2. land of plaintiff and Hermenegildo (Segundo) Gaviola:
a. The eastern boundary of the land of plaintiff is stated as "Hermenegildo Gaviola,"
father and predecessor-in-interest of defendant Segundo Gaviola;
In United States v. Villacorta,29 the Court debunked the claim of the appellant therein that he should not
be held criminally liable for theft (larceny) for honestly believing that he owned the land from which he
took the paddy. That case is on all fours with the present case, in that there was also a court ruling
declaring the private complainant therein as the owner of the land on which the paddy grew. The Court
therein ratiocinated as follows:
The attorney for the appellant in this court attempts to show that the defendant could not be guilty of
larceny, even though it be admitted that he took and carried away the paddy in question, for the reason
that he claimed to be the owner of the land. That question had been decided against him by a court of
competent jurisdiction and he made no objection to said decision. After that decision he could no longer
claim that he was the owner of the land from which he took and carried away the paddy, and moreover,
it was shown during the trial of the cause that Domingo Corpus, by his laborers, had actually planted the
paddy upon the land in question. It is difficult to understand upon what theory the defendant could justify
his claim that he was the owner of the paddy, after a final decision had been rendered against him to
the contrary, and when it was clearly proven that he had not even planted it. The paddy had been planted
by Domingo Corpus upon land which a court of competent jurisdiction decided belonged to him and had
been harvested by him and piled upon the land at the time the defendant entered the land and took and
carried it away. The defendant neither planted the paddy nor reaped it. The court decided, before he
took and carried away the paddy, that the land belonged to Domingo Corpus. The defendant must have
known that the paddy did not belong to him. In view of the litigation, he must have known to whom it did
belong.30

b. The western boundary of the land of Hermenegildo Gaviola (Exh. "31-A") was
previously declared as Melecio Gaviola. But after the case (Civil Case No. 111, Exh.
"A"), it was changed to "Eusebio Mejarito," predecessor-in-interest of plaintiff by
virtue of said case. (Exh. "31-A" and "30-A."
So it is now clear that the land of plaintiff is west of the land of Hermenegildo Gaviola (now Segundo
Gaviola), and that they are two distinct and separate lands.
In fine, we find and so hold that the petitioner’s claim of good faith in taking the coconuts from the private
complainant’s land is a mere pretense to escape criminal liability.
We rule that there is factual and legal bases for the award of P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.
Under Article 223031 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In this case, the petitioner is guilty not only of
simple theft but of qualified theft.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the
Indeed, that the lands of plaintiff, of Elias Gaviola (father of defendant Alfonso), and of defendant petitioner.
Segundo Gaviola (now, but Hermenegildo Gaviola before) are separate and distinct from each other is
shown by the fact that they have been covered by different sets of tax declarations since as early as
1906. It should be noted that the tax declarations that cover each land do not merge with, overlap, or SO ORDERED.
cancel, each other. There appear apparent minor discrepancies but they can easily be explained by two
events: the sale of a portion of the land of Isabela Mejarito to Elias Gaviola and the decision in Civil Case
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
No. 111. If these two events are considered, these apparent discrepancies vanish into thin air.
Associate Justice

Finally, that these three parcels of lands are separate and distinct from each other is confirmed by the
WE CONCUR:
cadastral survey where the lands of plaintiff, of Elias Gaviola and of Segundo Gaviola, are denominated
as Cadastral Lot Nos. 1301, 1311 and 1303, respectively. Not only that, their definite locations and
boundaries are even delineated in the sketch prepared by the court-appointed commissioner, which ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
sketch is now marked as Exhs. "H" and series, of plaintiff. Also, the report to which the sketch is attached Chief Justice
even states that the house of defendant Alfonso Gaviola is located on the land of Elias Gaviola; and Chairperson
while said report enumerates the houses located on the land of plaintiff, neither the house of defendant
Alfonso Gaviola nor of defendant Segundo Gaviola nor of the other defendants are among those
mentioned therein.28 CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

Moreover, petitioner’s land is residential, while that of the private complainant is coconut land. There are
no coconut trees in the lot owned by petitioner, nor is there evidence that he planted coconut trees on MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
private complainant’s property at any time, believing that it was his own land. Petitioner could thus not Associate Justice
have mistaken the property of the private complainant for that of his own.
CERTIFICATION
We further note that petitioner failed to adduce evidence to corroborate his claim that, prior to September
6, 1997, he had gathered coconuts from the coconut trees on the private complainant’s property three
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
times a year, and that the latter or his caretaker was aware thereof but failed to remonstrate.
above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
G.R. No. 174461 September 11, 2013
LETICIA I. KUMMER, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We decide the appeal tiled by petitioner Leticia I. Kummer assailing the April 28, 2006 decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27609. The CA decision affirmed the July 27, 2000
judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, finding the petitioner
and her co-accused Freiderich Johan I. Kummer guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide
in Criminal Case No. 1130.
The Facts
The prosecution's evidence revealed that on June 19, 1988, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., Jesus Mallo,
Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to the house of the petitioner. Mallo knocked at the front door
with a stone and identified himself by saying, "Auntie, ako si Boy Mallo."
The petitioner opened the door and at this point, her son and co-accused, Johan, using his left hand,
shot Mallo twice using a gun about six (6) inches long.3 Malana, who was with Mallo and who witnessed
the shooting, immediately ran towards the west, followed by Mallo. When Malana turned his back, he
saw the petitioner leveling and firing her long gun at Mallo, hitting the latter’s back and causing him to
fall flat on the ground.4
Thereafter, the petitioner went inside the house and came out with a flashlight. Together with her co-
accused, she scoured the pathway up to the place where Mallo was lying flat. 5 At that point, the petitioner
uttered,"Johan, patay na," in a loud voice.6 The petitioner and her co-accused putdown the guns and the
flashlight they were holding, held Mallo’s feet and pulled him to about three (3) to four (4) meters away
from the house. Thereafter, they returned to the house and turned off all the lights. 7
The following morning, policeman Danilo Pelovello went to the petitioner’s house and informed her that
Mallo had been found dead in front of her house. Pelovello conducted an investigation through inquiries
among the neighbors, including the petitioner, who all denied having any knowledge of the incident.
The prosecution filed an information8 for homicide on January 12,1989 against the petitioner and Johan,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 1130.Both accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. They waived the pre-trial, and the trial on the merits accordingly followed.
The petitioner denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she and her children, Johan, Melanie
and Erika, were already asleep in the evening of June 19, 1988. She claimed that they were awakened
by the sound of stones being thrown at their house, a gun report, and the banging at their door.
Believing that the noise was caused by the members of the New People’s Army prevalent in their area,
and sensing the possible harm that might be inflicted on them, Johan got a .38 cal. gun from the drawer
and fired it twice outside to scare the people causing the disturbance. The noise continued, however,
with a stone hitting the window and breaking the glass; another stone hit Melanie who was then sick.
This prompted Johan to get the shotgun placed beside the door and to fire it. The noise thereafter
stopped and they all went back to sleep.
In its judgment dated July 27, 2000, the RTC found the prosecution’s evidence persuasive based on the
testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Ramon Cuntapay and Malana who both testified that the
petitioner shot Mallo. The testimonial evidence, coupled by the positive findings of gunpowder nitrates
on the left hand of Johan and on the petitioner’s right hand, as well as the corroborative testimony of the
other prosecution witnesses, led the RTC to find both the petitioner and Johan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.
Johan, still a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, was released on the recognizance of his
father, Moises Kummer. Johan subsequently left the country without notifying the court; hence, only the
petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction with the CA.
She contended before the CA that the RTC committed reversible errors in its appreciation of the
evidence, namely: (1) in giving credence to the testimonial evidence of Cuntapay and of Malana despite
the discrepancies between their sworn statements and direct testimonies; (2) in not considering the
failure of the prosecution to cite the petitioner’s motive in killing the victim; (3) in failing to consider that
the writer of the decision, Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino, was not the judge who heard the testimonies;
and (4) in considering the paraffin test results finding the petitioner positive for gunpowder residue.
The CA rejected the petitioner’s arguments and affirmed the RTC judgment, holding that the
discrepancies between the sworn statement and the direct testimony of the witnesses do not necessarily
discredit them because the contradictions are minimal and reconcilable. The CA also ruled that the
inconsistencies are minor lapses and are therefore not substantial. The petitioner’s positive identification
by the eyewitnesses as one of the assailants remained unrefuted. The CA, moreover, held that proof of
motive is only necessary when a serious doubt arises on the identity of the accused. That the writer of
the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses does not necessarily make
the decision erroneous.
In sum, the CA found Malana and Cuntapay’s positive identification and the corroborative evidence
presented by the prosecution more than sufficient to convict the petitioner of the crime charged.
On further appeal to this Court, the petitioner submits the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible
error in affirming the RTC’s decision convicting her of the crime of homicide.
In essence, the case involves the credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses and the sufficiency of the
prosecution’s evidence.
Our Ruling
We find the petition devoid of merit.
The petitioner’s conviction is anchored on the positive and direct testimonies of the prosecution
eyewitnesses, which testimonies the petitioner submits to be both inconsistent and illogical. The
petitioner essentially impugns the credibility of the witnesses on these grounds. The petitioner moreover
claims that her conviction was based on doctrinal precepts that should not apply to her case.
Variance between the eyewitnesses’
testimonies in open court and their
affidavits does not affect their
credibility
In her attempt to impugn the credibility of prosecution eyewitnesses Malana and Cuntapay, the petitioner
pointed to the following in consistencies: First, in paragraph 7 of Malana’s July 21, 1988 affidavit, he
stated that after hearing two gunshots, he dived to the ground for cover and heard another shot louder
than the first two. This statement is allegedly inconsistent with his declaration during the direct
examination that he saw the petitioner and Johan fire their guns at Mallo. Second, the July 22,
1988affidavit of Cuntapay likewise stated that he heard two burst of gun fire coming from the direction
of the petitioner’s house and heard another burst from the same direction, which statement is allegedly
inconsistent with his direct testimony where he claimed that he saw the petitioner shoot Mallo. Third, in
his affidavit, Malana declared that he ran away as he felt the door being opened and heard two shots,
while in his testimony in court, he stated that he ran away after Mallo was already hit. According to the
petitioner, these and some other trivial and minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the two witnesses
effectively destroyed their credibility.
We find these claims far from convincing. The Court has consistently held that inconsistencies between
the testimony of a witness in open court, on one hand, and the statements in his sworn affidavit, on the
other hand, referring only to minor and collateral matters, do not affect his credibility and the veracity
and weight of his testimony as they do not touch upon the commission of the crime itself. Slight
contradictions, in fact, even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as these may be
considered as badges of truth rather than indicia of bad faith; they tend to prove that their testimonies
have not been rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and evenimpro babilities, unusual, for no person
has perfect faculties of senses or recall.9
A close scrutiny of the records reveals that Malana and Cuntapay positively and firmly declared in open
court that they saw the petitioner and Johan shoot Mallo. The inconsistencies in their affidavit, they
reasoned, were due to the oversight of the administering official in typing the exact details of their
narration.
It is oft repeated that affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate. Oftentimes, an affidavit is
incomplete, resulting in its seeming contradiction with the declarant’s testimony in court. Generally, the
affiant is asked standard questions, coupled with ready suggestions intended to elicit answers, that later
turn out not to be wholly descriptive of the series of events as the affiant knows them. 10 Worse, the
process of affidavit-taking may sometimes amount to putting words into the affiant’s mouth, thus allowing
the whole statement to be taken out of context.
The court is not unmindful of these on-the-ground realities. In fact, we have ruled that the discrepancies
between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not
necessarily discredit him since ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete. 11 As between the joint
affidavit and the testimony given in open court, the latter prevails because affidavits taken ex-parte are
generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in court. 12
In the present case, we find it undeniable that Malana and Cuntapay positively identified the petitioner
as one of the assailants. This is the critical point, not the inconsistencies that the petitioner repeatedly
refers to, which carry no direct bearing on the crucial issue of the identity of the perpetrator of the crime.
Indeed, the inconsistencies refer only to minor details that are not critical to the main outcome of the
case. Moreover, the basic rule is that the Supreme Court accords great respect and even finality to the
findings of credibility of the trial court, more so if the same were affirmed by the CA, as in this case. 13 We
find no reason to break this rule and thus find that both the RTC and the CA were correct in giving
credence to the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay.
It is not necessary for the validity
the judgment that it be rendered
the judge who heard the case
The petitioner contends that the CA, in affirming the judgment of the RTC, failed to recognize that the
trial court that heard the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay was not the same court that rendered the
decision.14
We do not share this view.
The rule is settled that the validity of a judgment is not rendered erroneous solely because the judge
who heard the case was not the same judge who rendered the decision. In fact, it is not necessary for
the validity of a judgment that the judge who penned the decision should actually hear the case in its
entirety, for he can merely rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis
for his decision.15
Thus, the contention - that since Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino was not the one who heard the evidence
and thereby did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses - must fail. It is
sufficient that the judge, in deciding the case, must base her ruling completely on the records before her,
in the way that appellate courts do when they review the evidence of the case raised on appeal. 16 Thus,
a judgment of conviction penned by a different trial judge is not erroneous if she relied on the records
available to her.
Motive is irrelevant when the
accused has been positively identified
by an eyewitness
We agree with the CA’s ruling that motive gains importance only when the identity of the assailant is in
doubt. As held in a long line of cases, the prosecution does not need to prove the motive of the accused
when the latter has been identified as the author of the crime.17
Once again, we point out that the petitioner was positively identified by Malana and Cuntapay. Thus, the
prosecution did not have to identify and prove the motive for the killing. It is a matter of judicial knowledge
that persons have been killed for no apparent reason at all, and that friendship or even relationship is
no deterrent to the commission of a crime.18
The petitioner attempts to offer the justification that the witnesses did not really witness the shooting as
their affidavits merely attested that they heard the shooting of Mallo (and did not state that they actually
witnessed it). We find this to be a lame argument whose merit we cannot recognize.
That Malana and Cuntapay have been eyewitnesses to the crime remains unrefuted. They both
confirmed in their direct testimony before the RTC that they saw the petitioner fire a gun at Mallo. This
was again re-affirmed by the witnesses during their cross examination. The fact that their respective
affidavits merely stated that they heard the gunshots does not automatically foreclose the possibility that
they also saw the actual shoot in gas this was in fact what the witnesses claimed truly happened.
Besides, it has been held that the claim that "whenever a witness discloses in his testimony in court facts
which he failed to state in his affidavit taken ante litem motam, then an inconsistency exists between the
testimony and the affidavit" is erroneous. If what were stated in open court are but details or additional
facts that serve to supplement the declarations made in the affidavit, these statements cannot be ruled
out as inconsistent and may be considered by the court.
Thus, in light of the direct and positive identification of the petitioner as one of the perpetrators of the
crime by not one but two prosecution eye witnesses, the failure to cite the motive of the petitioner is of
no moment.
of
by At any rate, we find it noteworthy that the lack or absence of motive for committing the crime does not
preclude conviction where there are reliable witnesses who fully and satisfactorily identified the petitioner
as the perpetrator of the felony, such as in this case.
There is no absolute uniformity
nor a fixed standard form of human
behavior
The petitioner imputes error to the CA in giving credence to the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay on
the claim that these are riddled not only by inconsistencies and contradictions, but also by improbabilities
and illogical claims. She laboriously pointed out the numerous improbabilities that, taken as a whole,
allegedly cast serious doubt on their reliability and credibility.
She alleged, among others: (1) that it was abnormal and contrary to the ways of the farmers in the rural
areas for Cuntapay to go home from his corral at about 9:00 p.m., while everybody else goes home from
his farm much earlier, as working late in the farm (that is, before and after sunset) is taboo to farming;
(2) that the act of the petitioner of putting down her gun in order to pull the victim away does not make
any sense because a criminal would not simply part with his weapon in this manner; (3) that it is highly
incredible that Malana, who accompanied Mallo, was left unharmed and was allowed to escape if indeed
he was just beside the victim; (4) that it is unbelievable that when Malana heard the cocking of guns and
the opening of the door, he did not become scared at all; (5) that Malana and Cuntapay did not
immediately report the incident to the authorities; (6) that it was highly improbable for Malana to turn his
head while running; and (7) that it was unusual that Cuntapay did not run away when he saw the
shooting.
We rule, without descending to particulars and going over each and every one of these claims, that
without more and stronger indicators, we cannot accord them credit. Human nature suggests that people
may react differently when confronted with a given situation. Witnesses to a crime cannot be expected
to demonstrate an absolute uniformity and conformity inaction and reaction. People may act contrary to
the accepted norm, react differently and act contrary to the expectation of mankind. There is no standard
human behavioral response when one is confronted with an unusual, strange, startling or frightful
experience.19
We thus hold that the CA was correct in brushing aside the improbabilities alleged by the petitioner who,
in her present plight, can be overcritical in her attempt to seize every detail that can favor her case.
Unfortunately, if at all, her claims refer only to minor and even inconsequential details that do not touch
on the core of the crime itself.
Public documents are admissible in
court without further proof of their
due execution and authenticity
A public document is defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court as follows:
SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are
either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, or private documents required by law to be entered
therein.
All other writings are private. [emphasis and underscore ours]
The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public document. As a public
document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of
its due execution and genuineness; the person who made the report need not be presented in court to
identify, describe and testify how the report was conducted. Moreover, documents consisting of entries
in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.20
In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that it was Captain Benjamin Rubio who was presented in
court to identify the chemistry report and not the forensic chemist who actually conducted the paraffin
test on the petitioner, the report may still be admitted because the requirement for authentication does
not apply to public documents. In other words, the forensic chemist does not need to be presented as
witness to identify and authenticate the chemistry report. Furthermore, the entries in the chemistry report
are prima facie evidence of the facts they state, that is, of the presence of gunpowder residue on the left
hand of Johan and on the right hand of the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the petitioner herself admitted
the presence of gunpowder nitrates on her fingers, albeit ascribing their presence from a match she
allegedly lighted.21 Accordingly, we hold that the chemistry report is admissible as evidence.
On the issue of the normal process versus the actual process conducted during the test raised by the
petitioner, suffice it to say that in the absence of proof to the contrary, it is presumed that the forensic
chemist who conducted the report observed the regular procedure. Stated otherwise, the courts will not
presume irregularity or negligence in the performance of one’s duties unless facts are shown dictating a
contrary conclusion. The presumption of regularity in favor of the forensic chemist compels us to reject
the petitioner’s contention that an explanation has to be given on how the actual process was conducted.
Since the petitioner presented no evidence of fabrication or irregularity, we presume that the standard
operating procedure has been observed.
We note at this point that while the positive finding of gunpowder residue does not conclusively show
that the petitioner indeed fired a gun, the finding nevertheless serves to corroborate the prosecution
eyewitnesses’ testimony that the petitioner shot the victim. Furthermore, while it is true that cigarettes,
fertilizers, urine or even a match may leave traces of nitrates, experts confirm that these traces are
minimal and may be washed off with tap water, unlike the evidence nitrates left behind by gunpowder.
Change in the date of the
commission of the crime, where the
disparity is not great, is merely a
formal amendment, thus, no
arraignment is required
The petitioner claims that she was not arraigned on the amended information for which she was
convicted. The petitioner’s argument is founded on the flawed understanding of the rules on amendment
and misconception on the necessity of arraignment in every case. Thus, we do not see any merit in this
claim.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even after the
plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without causing prejudice
to the rights of the accused. Section 14 provides:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in
double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
[emphasis and underscore ours]
A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is more
formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since the
proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the offense.
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or
information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer
be available after the amendment is made, when any evidence the accused might have would no longer SO ORDERED.
be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be
inapplicable to the complaint or information, as amended.22
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
In People, et al. v. Borromeo, et al.,23 we ruled that the change of the date of the commission of the
crime from June 24, 1981 to August 28, 1981 is a formal amendment and would not prejudice the rights
WE CONCUR:
of the accused because the nature of the offense of grave coercion would not be altered. In that case,
the difference in the date was only about two months and five days, which difference, we ruled, would
neither cause substantial prejudice nor cause surprise on the part of the accused. ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense
was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. 24 The act may be alleged to
have been committed at any time as near as to the actual date at which date the offense was committed, JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
as the information will permit. Under the circumstances, the precise time is not an essential ingredient Associate Justice Associate Justice
of the crime of homicide.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN*

Having established that a change of date of the commission of a crime is a formal amendment, we
Associate Justice
proceed to the next question of whether an arraignment is necessary.

ATTESTATION
Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in notifying him of the nature and
cause of the accusations against him. The importance of arraignment is based on the constitutional right
of the accused to be informed.25 Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
he may be informed of the reason for his indictment, the specific charges he is bound to face, and the assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
corresponding penalty that could be possibly meted against him. It is at this stage that the accused, for
the first time, is given the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is only imperative
that he is thus made fully aware of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature ANTONIO T. CARPIO
of the imputed crime.26 Associate Justice
Chairperson

The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This however,
we hastily clarify, pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments that, by their
very nature, do not charge an offense different from that charged in the original complaint or information;
do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and
do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the
commission of the offense.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

We further stress that an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the rules, MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form. The purpose of an arraignment, Chief Justice
that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, has already been
attained when the accused was arraigned the first time. The subsequent amendment could not have
conceivably come as a surprise to the accused simply because the amendment did not charge a new
offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution.

Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently show that
the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one
month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence cited above, the
change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment - it does not
change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of
an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense
under the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of defenses
used by the petitioner. This is also true with respect to the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner.
The effected amendment was of this nature and did not need a second plea.

To sum up, we are satisfied after a review of the records of the case that the prosecution has proven the
guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence has been
successfully overcome.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated April 28, 2006, convicting the
petitioner of the crime of homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Leticia I. Kummer.
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the accused-
appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder.
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With the approval of the
new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life
imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the
case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished to
continue with the case by way of an appeal.
The information (amended) in this case reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban accuses Francisco Abarca of
the crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed
with an unlicensed firearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot several times KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH
on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY PAUL
KOH gunshot wounds which caused his instantaneous death and as a consequence
of which also caused gunshot wounds to LINA AMPARADO and ARNOLD
AMPARADO on the different parts of their bodies thereby inflicting gunshot wounds
which otherwise would have caused the death of said Lina Amparado and Arnold
Amparado, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced
the crimes of murders as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of his will, that is by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado which prevented their
death. 1
xxx xxx xxx
On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The Solicitor General states accurately the
facts as follows:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had illicit
relationship. The illicit relationship apparently began while the accused was in
Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. His wife was left behind in their
residence in Tacloban, Leyte (pp. 45-47, 65, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).
On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban, Leyte. On the
morning of that date he went to the bus station to go to Dolores, Eastern Samar, to
fetch his daughter. However, he was not able to catch the first trip (in the morning).
He went back to the station in the afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but the bus
had engine trouble and could not leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28, 1985). The accused,
then proceeded to the residence of his father after which he went home. He arrived
at his residence at the V & G Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00 o'clock in
the afternoon (pp. 8-9, tsn, Id.).
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the
act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife
pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping
above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.).
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house of a
PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's
firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his house at V & G Subdivision. He was not
able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it
was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He
fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, Id.). Koh was hit.
Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where
Koh was playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused (pp. 34-
49, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984). Kingsley Koh died instantaneously of cardiorespiratory
arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the
head, trunk and abdomen (pp. 28-29, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984; see also exh. A): Arnold
Amparado was hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet (pp.
17-23, tsn, Oct. 17, 1984; see also exh. C). His wife, Lina Amparado, was also
treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments (p. 23, tsn, Id.). Arnold
Amparado who received a salary of nearly P1,000.00 a month was not able to work
for 1-1/2 months because of his wounds. He spent P15,000.00 for medical
expenses while his wife spent Pl,000.00 for the same purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn, Id.
). 2
On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment, the dispositive portion whereof
reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Francisco Abarca guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder as charged in
the amended information, and pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code which
does not consider the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances when the
law prescribes a single indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48, he is hereby
sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of Khingsley Paul Koh in the sum of
P30,000, complainant spouses Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley Paul Koh and defendant's
wife had illicit relationship while he was away in Manila; that the accused had been
deceived, betrayed, disgraced and ruined by his wife's infidelity which disturbed his
reasoning faculties and deprived him of the capacity to reflect upon his acts.
Considering all these circumstances this court believes the accused Francisco
Abarca is deserving of executive clemency, not of full pardon but of a substantial if
not a radical reduction or commutation of his death sentence.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, thru the Ministry of Justice, Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
xxx xxx xxx
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the court a quo:
I.
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED INSTEAD OF ENTERING A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE;
II.
IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY. 4
The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code defining death
inflicted under exceptional circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder. Article 247 reads
in full:
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. —
Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of
them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt
from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with
respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while
the daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter, or
shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be
entitled to the benefits of this article.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the instant case. There is
no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of
illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst.
Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of
them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in
convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-appellant
discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot,
the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-
appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them
. . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit
the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing
should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by
external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an offense. 5 In People v.
Araque, 6 we said:
xxx xxx xxx
As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code, the above-
quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely provides or grants a privilege or
benefit — amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment —
to a legally married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both of
them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury. Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries, considering the
enormous provocation and his righteous indignation, the accused — who would
otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or serious
physical injury, as the case may be — is punished only with destierro. This penalty
is mere banishment and, as held in a case, is intended more for the protection of
the accused than a punishment. (People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where
physical injuries other than serious are inflicted, the offender is exempted from
punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances
mentioned therein, amount to an exempting circumstance, for even where death or
serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to
no punishment at all. A different interpretation, i.e., that it defines and penalizes a
distinct crime, would make the exceptional circumstances which practically exempt
the accused from criminal liability integral elements of the offense, and thereby
compel the prosecuting officer to plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the
information. Such an interpretation would be illogical if not absurd, since a mitigating
and much less an exempting circumstance cannot be an integral element of the
crime charged. Only "acts or omissons . . . constituting the offense" should be
pleaded in a complaint or information, and a circumstance which mitigates criminal
liability or exempts the accused therefrom, not being an essential element of the
offense charged-but a matter of defense that must be proved to the satisfaction of
the court-need not be pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo,
23 Phil., 368.)
That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest when we
consider that its counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article 423) was found under
the General Provisions (Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering crimes against persons.
There can, we think, hardly be any dispute that as part of the general provisions, it
could not have possibly provided for a distinct and separate crime.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define
and provide for a specific crime, but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for
the killing of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries under the
circumstances therein mentioned. ... 7
xxx xxx xxx
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that is intended for his
protection. 8
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being a punishable
act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying circumstances, We cannot
accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical injuries suffered by Lina
Amparado and Arnold Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant shot the
victim. The Solicitor General recommends a finding of double frustrated murder against the accused-
appellant, and being the more severe offense, proposes the imposition of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is where we disagree. The
accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one committing
an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that the act done amounts
to a felony. 9
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder when alias "Pedro Diplat and Romeo Condaya, alias "Romy," and Bonifacio Palding, alias
he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not "Pacio," and Wilfredo Mitrado, alias "Edo," who were discharged in the municipal
murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by court for insufficiency of evidence, conspiring together and mutually helping one
the Amparados. another, armed with a shotgun and with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and
treachery, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot Cristita Balancio Vda. de Angel inflicting upon her fatal gunshot wounds which
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility. Granting
caused her death as a consequence.
the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he cannot be said to
be entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words
("an waray labot kagawas,") 10 that is not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. [Rollo, p. 4].
by the Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him liable under
the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries through simple
Upon arraignment, both accused-appellants, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty."
imprudence or negligence. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was incapacitated for one and one-
half months; 11 there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the extent of her injuries. We
presume that she was placed in confinement for only ten to fourteen days based on the medical In a decision dated May 27, 1974, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment convicting accused-
certificate estimating her recovery period.) 12 appellants of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to jointly and
severally indemnify the heirs of the deceased Cristita Balancio Vda. de Angel in the amount of
P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. The shotgun and the cartridges used in the commission of the crime
For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the accused-
were ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government.
appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to being
the graver penalty (than destierro). 13
Not agreeing with the decision of the trial court accused-appellants appealed to this Court.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced
to four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in In his brief, accused-appellant Trinidad assigned the following errors:
confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify
Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of
I. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED SERIOUSLY WHEN IT REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE
P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
costs.

II. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY WHEN IT CONCLUDED
IT IS SO ORDERED.
WITHOUT GROUNDS THAT:

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla JJ., concur.

1. It is undeniable that the initial holder of the gun was Isabelo
Trinidad.

2. Isabelo Trinidad made sufficient steps in trying to escape

G.R. No. L-38930 June 28, 1988 suspicion by giving the gun for safekeeping to Romeo
Condaya.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. 3. It is inconceivable for the police authorities to exactly know
ISABELO TRINIDAD, alias "Pedro Diplat," and ROMEO CONDAYA, alias "Romy," accused- where the gun and the cartridges were hidden if not for the
appellants. information furnished them by Romeo Condaya.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. 4. Isabelo Trinidad's presence at the scene of the crime was
established by even the evidence in his behalf [as) his house
is a few meters away from the victim's house.
Domingo V. Pascua for accused-appellant Isabelo Trinidad.

5. Such startling occurrence could have roused Isabelo

Emiliano S. Micu for accused-appellant Romeo Condaya.
Trinidad from his sleep. In fine, when Isabelo Trinidad, after the
burst of gunfire returned to the victim's house it was only to
shield himself from responsibility for the crime which he
concocted.
CORTES, J.:
6. that the evidence clearly establish that Isabelo Trinidad
conveniently evaded direct confrontation with the police
Appellants were accused of the crime of murder on the basis of the following information:
authorities at the initial stage of the police investigation.

That on or about the 16th day of April, 1973, at night, in Barrio San Vicente,
III. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED SO GRAVELY WHEN IT CONVICTED THE ACCUSED (YOUR
municipality of Umingan, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
APPELLANT) OF THE CRIME CHARGED CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Isabelo Trinidad,
On his part, accused-appellant Condaya assigned the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENSE
TO PROVE THE IRREGULARITY RESORTED TO BY THE POLICE AUTHORITIES TO EXACT
ADMISSION BY MEANS OF VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION AND DECEIT FROM THE ACCUSED WAS
IRRELEVANT DESPITE THAT ITS MATERIALITY AND RELEVANCE TO THE CASE IS VERY CLEAR.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE INITIAL INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT
ISABELO TRINIDAD, ROMEO CONDAYA, BONIFACIO PALDING AND WILFREDO MITRADO
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE, BURST OF GUNFIRE WAS HEARD, WERE SEEN A FEW METERS
FROM THE HOUSE OF THE VICTIM CRISTITA BALANCIO VDA. DE ANGEL HURRIEDLY WALKING
TOWARDS THE NORTH AND THAT ROMEO CONDAYA WAS HOLDING A GUN, DESPITE THE
CLEARLY IMPROBABLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES WHO
TESTIFIED ON THIS (SIC) POINTS.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ROMEO CONDAYA LED THE AUTHORITIES TO
THE COLIBANGBANG" TREE AND THE BAMBOO GROVES WHERE THE SHOTGUN (EXH. C) AND
THE CARTRIDGES (EXHS. D, D-1, D-2 AND D-3) WERE ALLEGEDLY RESPECTIVELY RETRIEVED
DESPITE THE UNRELIABLE AND THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH IT WAS
BASED.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ROMEO CONDAYA WAS THE GUN WIELDER
AND THAT HE DID SO UPON THE ACTIVE INDUCEMENT OF HIS CO-ACCUSED ISABELO
TRINIDAD, DESPITE THE TOTAL LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT.
V jeep. Here, Condaya was asked if he had anything to do with the killing of Cristita
AND, FINALLY, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE CRIME CHARGED IN
THE INFORMATION WAS PROVED AND THAT BOTH THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY THEREOF
DESPITE THE TOTAL LACK OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Ultimately, however, as pointed out by accused-appellant Condaya, the issue boils down to whether or
not the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants Trinidad and Condaya
were the persons responsible for the death of the victim.
To support its judgment of conviction, the trial court relied on the following findings:
The evidence for the prosecution tends to establish that in the evening of April 16,
1973, one Cristita Balancio Vda. de Angel was asleep by the balcony of her house
situated at Barrio San Vicente, Umingan, Pangasinan. With her at that time were
her son, Juan Angel, her daughter-in- law and two (2) grandchildren. Suddenly,
there was a burst of gunfire, rousing Juan Angel and his wife from their sleep. Juan
Angel then peeped out from the window to find out what happened as his carabao
was tied just below the said window. As Juan Angel peeped, he saw Isabelo
Trinidad, Romeo Condaya, Wilfredo Mitrado and Bonifacio Palding, about five (5)
to six (6) meters away hurriedly walking towards the North.
Shortly, as Juan Angel's wife shouted. Romeo Condaya who was then holding a
gun, Isabelo Trinidad, Bonifacio Palding, and Wilfredo Mitrado ran farther towards
the North.
It turned out that Cristita Balancio Vda. de Angel was hit by her neck which caused
her death. (Exhibits "A" and "A-1"). So, Juan Angel proceeded to call for help. He
asked somebody to fetch Ignacio Dopale, the Barrio Captain of San Vicente,
Umingan, Pangasinan, who immediately responded to Juan Angel's call for help.
Initial inquiries from Juan Angel, revealed the information that Immediately after the
burst of gunfire, Romeo Condaya, Wilfredo Mitrado, Isabelo Trinidad and Bonifacio
Palding, were seen hurriedly walking towards the North. So that, Barrio Captain
Ignacio Dopale proceeded to the Umingan Municipal Building in Order to report the
matter.
Corporal Dominador Barwel of the Umingan Police Force to whom the case was
referred first fetched Sergeant Casio of the Philippine Constabulary at Umingan,
Pangasinan. Then, they proceeded to the scene of the incident in order to
investigate.
Arriving at the premises, they saw Cristita Balancio Vda. de Angel, already dead as
a result of gunshot wounds suffered at the back of her neck. This investigation again
revealed the information that Isabelo Trinidad, Romeo Condaya, Bonifacio Palding,
and Wilfredo Mitrado, were seen within the vicinity immediately after the gunfire. As
Isabelo Trinidad was then on the premises, he was apprehended and brought to
the Municipal Building of Umingan, Pangasinan. On the way, Isabelo Trinidad
revealed that he had caused the death of Cristita Balancio Vda. de Angel, as in fact
he offered to pay Romeo Condaya the amount of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) to
do the job. However, the intended victim was Juan Angel, because of Isabelo
Trinidad's carabao.
Accordingly, Sgt. Casio and Cpl. Dominador Barwel on April 17, 1973 took steps to
apprehend Romeo Condaya, Wilfredo Mitrado and Bonifacio Palding, at Sta. Rosa,
Umingan, Pangasinan. Wilfredo Mitrado was apprehended on April 18,1973 while
Romeo Condaya was apprehended sometime on April 20, 1973 at Sto. Tomas,
Pangasinan, after being turned over by the Sto. Tomas police authorities. On the
way to Umingan, Pangasinan, Romeo Condaya was verbally interrogated inside the
Balancio Vda. de Angel. Readily, Romeo Condaya admitted the shooting as Isabelo
Trinidad promised to pay him (Condaya) the amount of Five Hundred Pesos
(P500.00). However, this amount remained unpaid. On the same occasion, Romeo
Condaya informed Sgt. Casio and Cpl. Barwel that the gun used in the killing was
hidden somewhere atop a "Colibangbang" tree at Sta. Rosa, Umingan, Pangasinan.
At Sta. Rosa, Umingan, Pangasinan, and upon Condaya's instructions, the 12
gauge locally made buck-shot was recovered. (Exhibit "C"). Thereafter, Romeo
Condaya pointed to the bamboo grove where he hid the cartridges. (Exhibits "D",
"D-1', "D-2" and "D-3").
After their apprehension, Romeo Condaya, Isabelo Trinidad, Bonifacio Palding, and
Wilfredo Mitrado were made to execute sworn statements which, however, they
refused to affirm before the Municipal Judge of Umingan, Pangasinan. [CFI
Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 21-23].
In their testimonies, accused-appellants Trinidad and Condaya denied their participation in the crime
and asserted that after their apprehension they were tortured and maltreated until they signed
documents which they later found out to be their extrajudicial confessions. Hence, their refusal to affirm
their written confessions before the municipal judge.
To prove his innocence, Trinidad emphasized the undisputed facts that he was even among those who
went to Umingan to fetch Sgt. Casio and Cpl. Barwel and that he even remained at the scene of the
crime while, they were conducting their investigation and provided refreshments for the investigators.
The trial court dismissed accused-appellants defense with the following observation:
Before anything else, this Court notes with muffled amusement the manner at which
the accused presented their side of the case. For aware as they were that the
alleged statements taken from them by the authorities of Umingan, Pangasinan
when offered by the prosecution was denied admission, they persisted at presenting
evidence along this line. There really was no need for the accused to do what they
did. As far as this Court is concerned, the supposed irregularity at securing these
admissions was irrelevant. For so it is that these statements were not even
subscribed and sworn to before any competent authority. So that, when the accused
persistently harped at this alleged violence upon their persons, this Court was
furnished a sufficient basis at attributing a semblance of meaning to these
statements. But conformably with our settled constitutional demands of due
process, this Court considers these averments of violence extraneous to this case,
although the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Eddie Soriano's medical certificates had
shown a contrary finding. (Exhibits "H", "H-1", "H-2", "I", "I-1", "I-2" and "I- 3"). [Rollo,
pp. 31-32].
At the outset, it must be stated that the trial court correctly denied the admissibility as evidence of the
written extrajudicial confessions of the accused-appellants. Such denial, however, should not have been
for the reason given, namely, that they were not subscribed and sworn to before the proper authorities,
but, rather, because the requirements of the Constitution were disregarded.
The 1973 Constitution, then in force and effect when the confessions were taken, provided in words that
left no room for doubt:
Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence. [Article IV].
The rule is that when an accused testifies that he signed his confession because he was maltreated, the
prosecution must present evidence to rebut this claim, otherwise the confession will be considered
illegally procured [People v. Inguito, L-53497, October 18, 1982, 117 SCRA 641.] The presumption of
regularity of performance of official duty does not apply to incustody confessions. The prosecution must
prove compliance with the constitutional requirements [People v. Tolentino, G.R. No. L-50103,
November 24, 1986, 145 SCRA 597.]In the instant case, accused-appellants' allegations of torture and
maltreatment were refuted by Dr. Soriano's testimony and medical certificate.
However, since there is no proof that when they made their confessions they were informed of their right
to remain silent and to counsel and that they knowingly and intelligently waived these rights, such
confessions are inadmissible in evidence [People v. Duero, G.R. No. L-52016, May 13, 1981, 104 SCRA
379.] Likewise, the absence of counsel at the time of custodial investigation when the extrajudicial
confession was taken renders it inadmissible [People v. Burgos, G.R. No. L-68955, September 4, 1986,
144 SCRA 1.] It is not enough that the suspect is asked if he needs a lawyer, he must be informed that
if he is an indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him during custodial interrogation [People v.
Tolentino, supra].
It is not only the oral confessions made to the apprehending officers, Sgt. Casio and Cpl. Barwel, that
are tainted but also the written confessions made and signed a few days after their arrest. Thus, the
testimonies of the police officers on the matters allegedly confessed to them by accused-appellants and
the written extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence.
2. As the extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible, the Court is tasked with determining whether there
remains sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
It must be emphasized that no direct evidence was adduced to prove accused-appellants' commission
of the crime charged.
To sustain a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court wove together several pieces of
circumstantial evidence.
The Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for a conviction if:
(1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Sec. 5, Rule 133].
Although no general rule has been formulated as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence sufficient for
a conviction, the established requirement is that the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with
any other hypothesis except that of guilty [People v. Ludday, 61 Phil. 216; People v. Contante, G.R. No.
L-14639, December 28,1964,12 SCRA 653.]
Thus, using the requirements of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence as yardsticks, this
Court is called upon, in this appeal, to ultimately determine whether the circumstantial evidence adduced
during the trial are sufficient for a conviction.
The Solicitor General, in his brief [pp. 13-15], enumerated several circumstances in support of a finding
that accused-appellants were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder of Cristita Balancio Vda. de
Angel, which may be summarize as follows:
1. Before April 16, 1973, accused-appellant, Isabelo Trinidad, bore a grudge against
Juan Angel. Trinidad suspected Juan Angel of having burned the rope of his
(Trinidad's) carabao.
2. Trinidad had warned Juan Angel on April 15, 1973, that he (Trinidad) could have
Juan Angel killed at anytime, even inside the latter's house.
3. In the evening of April 16, 1973, Bonifacio Palding, saw Trinidad and Condaya
(in the course of a drinking session with Palding, and Wilfredo Mitrado) converse
secretly some six (6) meters away from Palding and Mitrado. After this conversation,
Trinidad gave Condaya a home made shotgun and then Trinidad and Condaya,
followed by Palding, and Mitrado, proceeded to the house of Juan Angel.
4. While Palding, was some four (4) meters behind Trinidad and Condaya he
(Palding) heard a gunshot and saw a flash of light near the door of Juan Angel's
house.
5. A few seconds later, Palding, saw Trinidad and Condaya running away from the
house. Palding and Mitrado also ran away in the direction taken by Trinidad and
Condaya.
6. Juan Angel saw Trinidad, Condaya, Palding, and Mitrado running away from the
house as he peeped through a window after he heard the gunshot.
 7. When Palding, and Mitrado caught up with Trinidad and Condaya in a certain
field, Palding heard Trinidad instruct Condaya to take the shotgun to Sta. Rosa,
Umingan, Pangasinan and hide it.
8. After the apprehension of Condaya on April 20 or 21, 1973, the home-made
shotgun was recovered on top of a "colibangbang" tree behind the house of
Condaya's parents, together with three (3) live cartridges hidden in a bamboo grove
nearby.
To this enumeration may be added three (3) more circumstances: (1) that the victim was found dead
near the door inside her son Juan Angel's house; (2) that the victim died of hemorrhage caused by
gunshot wounds; and (3) that two pellets were recovered from her body.
All of these circumstances, eleven (11) in all, have been proven by direct evidence. Together, these
circumstances lead to the conclusion that accused-appellants Trinidad and Condaya were guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the shooting of Cristita Balancio Vda. de Angel.
Even if the eighth circumstance cited by the Solicitor General — that the shotgun and the ammunition
were recovered in the vicinity of the house of Condaya's parents — is disregarded on the ground that
the recovery was the fruit of the tainted confession, the result would be the same because of the
overwhelming circumstantial evidence.
Two (2) of the circumstances also manifest a community of purpose indicative of a conspiracy between
Trinidad and Condaya, which would make both of them equally guilty of the crime [People v. Garcia,
G.R. Nos. L-26105, February 18, 1986, 141 SCRA 336], although only one of them may have pulled the
trigger and actually fired the fatal shot. Where a conspiracy has been proven, a showing as to who
inflicted the fatal wound is not required. [People v. Tala, G.R. Nos. L-69153-54, January 30, 1986,141
SCRA 240].
The rule is that conspiracy must be shown to exist by direct or circumstantial evidence, as clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the crime itself [People v. Vicente, G.R. No. L-26241, May 21, 1969,
28 SCRA 247]. In the instant case, the third circumstance cited by the Solicitor General (that Trinidad
pulled Condaya away from Palding and Mitrado to converse secretly and then gave him the shotgun
before they all went to Juan Angel's house), coupled with the seventh (that Trinidad told Condaya to
hide the shotgun as they were running away from Juan Angel's house), sufficiently proves the conspiracy
between Trinidad and Condaya. The conduct of accused-appellants before, during and after the
commission of the crime are circumstances showing the presence of conspiracy [People v. Cabiltes,
G.R. No. L-18010, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 112].
The crime committed was murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as characterized by the
fact that the victim was shot at close range while she was asleep, thus ensuring the commission of the
crime without risk to the assailants [People v. Dequina, 60 Phil. 279 (1934)]. That Juan Angel, and not
his mother, was apparently the intended victim is not incompatible with the existence of treachery.
Treachery may be taken into account even if the victim of the attack was not the person whom the
accused intended to kill. However, evident premeditation may not be considered as a qualifying
circumstance as it cannot be said that the assailants premeditated on the killing of the actual victim
[People v. Mabug-at, 51 Phil. 967 (1926); People v. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307 (1950)]. Thus, evident
premeditation, although alleged in the information, may not be considered as a qualifying circumstance.
With the abolition of the death penalty in the 1987 Constitution, murder is now penalized by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Absent any modifying circumstances, the penalty
is imposable in its medium period, or from eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of the penalty is lowered by one
degree to prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or from ten
(10) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED and the Court, in the exercise of its
discretion, sentences accused-appellants to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from fourteen (14) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-204 May 16, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GERARDO
CORNEL, Defendant-Appellant.
Pablo Anzures for appellant.
Office of the Assistant Solicitor General Gianzon and Solicitor Jimenez for appellee.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Albay sentencing the
defendant, for the crime of homicide, to an indeterminate prison term ranging from 8 years
and 1 day of prision mayor to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, with
corresponding accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Fabian Burac,
in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The first feature of appellant's case as presented by his counsel de oficio, refers to the
alleged inadequacy of the evidence for the prosecution establishing appellant's identity.
Trinidad Coral, however, personally saw (1) the appellant suddenly assault her deceased
husband (Fabian Burac) with a bolo as the latter was descending the stairs of his house in
the Barrio of San Miguel, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, at about 6 o'clock in
the afternoon of June 8, 1945; (2) after Fabian Burac (then wounded in the forehead) fell,
the appellant threw a stone which hit Fabian's right clavicle, and (3) the appellant thereafter
fled in the direction of his house. The positive testimony of Trinidad was given full credit
by the trial court, and the latter's advantage of observing and hearing the witness should
not be disregarded particularly where, as in this case, Trinidad knew the appellant well and
the latter merely relies on the conjecture that Trinidad might have made a mistake in
identifying her husband's assailant, considering the time of the attack. Apart, therefore,
from the testimony of another witness for the government (Caspara Bendicio) to the effect
that when she asked Fabian not long after the incident in question as to what had
happened, Fabian replied that he had been boloed by the appellant, which testimony
(alleged by the appellant to be inadmissible) was accepted by the trial court under the rule
of the res gestae, there is sufficient proof regarding appellant's identity. Moreover, it should
be remembered that the appellant was prosecuted, though only for physical injuries, even
before Fabian's death which occured several day after June 8,
1945.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under the third assignment of error, counsel for the appellant adopts the view that the
wound on Fabian's forehead, described by Dr. Mariano Cruel, a government witness, as "an
incised vertIcal wound extending from a little above the middle of the eyebrows down to
the lower root of the nose," and cutting "the frontal and the nasal bones also," was
produced not by a bolo or any long, sharp-cutting weapon but by an irregular and hard
object with a sharp edge such as a heavy piece of stone with one or more sharp edges
which, when thrown forcibly from a distance, will necessarily produce, a small apparently
"incised" wound and render the victim unconscious. This contention may be tenable in
forensic medicine, but it is still conjectural and cannot be accepted where a criminal assault
is proved through an eyewitness. chanrobles virtual law library

Contrary to appellant's pretension, the death of Fabian Burac is established by the

testimony of his wife and mother-in-law. The certificate of the civil registrar of Tabaco
dated August 3, 1945, to the effect that the matter had not been registered in his office,
merely shows that no report was made up to the date mentioned, but it cannot conclusively
negate the fact of Fabian's death. chanrobles virtual law library

We have no doubt that Fabian Burac died, as certified by Dr. Mariano Cruel, "of tetanus
secondary to the infected wound." When Fabian last reported for treatment on June 15,
1945, Dr, Cruel already noticed Fabian's rigid muscles and slight lock-jaw, and this is the
very reason why he prescribed anti-tetanic serum, which, not being then available in the
place, was never actually administered on the patient. Appellant's surmise that Fabian
might not have died of tetanus, because there are other diseases sometimes exhibiting
symptoms of tetanus, cannot prevail against the conclusion of Dr. Cruel who in fact treated
Fabian's wound and saw the manifestations of tetanus. The appellant must of course be
held responsible for the natural consequences of his unlawful act. (People vs. Borbano, 76
Phil., 702.) virtual law library

Appellant's defense of alibi - that between 5 p.m. of June 8, 1945 and the morning of June
9, 1945, he was in Tabaco, Albay, - may be worth inquiring into, if Trinidad Coral (already
found to the truthful) was not an eyewitness to appellant's criminal attack. The motive for
the offense is undoubtedly supplied by the circumstance that Fabian once arrested and
threatened the appellant during the Japanese occupation. chanrobles virtual law library

The appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
chanrobles virtual law library

Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Hontiveros, and Tuason, JJ., concur.