LESSON MANUSCRIPT (16th Week, Crim Law 1, Book I, RPC)

PROFESSOR: J/DIR. ROMEO L. OGOY, TLPE (Ret.)

Lesson Topic: Continuation of Modification and Extinction of Criminal Liability under Article 89, RPC; P.D.
968, as amended by R.A. No. 10707; and Prescription of Violation of Special Laws under Act 3326

I. Prayer then Recapitulation of the previous topic of week 15 and entertain some clarificatory
questions.

II. Continuation of Modification and Extinction of Criminal Liability:

a. Effects of Pardon by the Offended Party (Article 23, RPC)

Under Article 23, RPC, express waiver by the offended party extinguishes civil liability of the offender
with regards to the interest of the former;

However, pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action except as provided in Article
344 of this Code (RPC) which provides a rule on pardon in crimes against chastity such as:

i. Adultery;

ii. Concubinage

i. Seduction;

ii. Abduction; or

iii. Acts of Lasciviousness;

These are called “private crimes” but pardon by the offended party is not a mode of extinguishing
criminal liability;

It is just a circumstance that will prohibit the prosecution of the offender, or the institution of criminal
action;

It does not even prohibit the continuance of a prosecution if the offended party pardons the offender
after the institution of criminal action;

Neither does it order the dismissal of said case. The only act that according to Article 344 extinguishes
the penal action and the penalty that may have been imposed is the “Marriage” between the offender
and the offended party. (People vs. Miranda, G.R. No. 38171, October 6, 1932; Alonte vs. Savellano, G.R.
No. 131652, March 9, 1998);

However, pardon or forgiveness in marital rape is a mode of extinguishing criminal liability;

Before, Article 344 also covered rape as a crime against chastity. Since R.A. 8353, which amended the
RPC, took effect in 1997, Rape is no longer considered a crime against chastity;

Having been reclassified as a crime against persons, it is no longer considered a private crime, or one
which cannot be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved party. (People vs. Estibal,
G.R. No. 208749, November 26, 2014);
Hence, pardon by the offended party in rape as evidence by execution of affidavit of desistance will not
prohibit the institution of criminal action or the continuation of prosecution of the offender;

b. Pardon in the form of Marriage:

Pardon in the form of marriage shall totally extinguish criminal liability arising from seduction,
abduction, or acts of lasciviousness. (Article 89, RPC);

The marriage between the offended party and offender shall also extinguish criminal action if the same
is already instituted, or penalty if the same is already imposed. (Article 344, RPC);

There are two rules under Article 344, RPC, in connection with marriage as a mode of criminal
extinction:

i. First, in cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of
the offender with the offended party shall extinguished the criminal action or remit the penalty already
imposed upon him;

ii. Second, this rule on criminal extinction shall also be applicable to the co-principals,
accomplices, and accessories;

A, B, and C, helping one another, sexually abused a woman X three times, each of them taking turns in
committing acts of lasciviousness with her;

Subsequently, A married X. Marriage extinguished the criminal liability of as principal with respect to
acts of lasciviousness that he personally committed and the criminal liability of B and C as co-principals
by reason of conspiracy;

But the criminal liabilities of A, B, and C by reason of conspiracy with respect to the acts of lasciviousness
committed personally by B and that by C are not extinguished since neither B and C married X;

Article 344 provides marriage as a mode of extinguishing criminal liability arising from Rape. According
to Justice Regalado, since rape is now a crime against person, it should be considered as deleted from
the text of Article 344;

In case of rape, the applicable rule is now Article 266-C of the RPC as amended by R.A. No. 8353;

Under this provision, subsequent marriage between the offender and he offended party shall extinguish
the criminal action or penalty: Provided, that the crime shall not be extinguished or penalty shall not be
abated if the marriage is “void ab initio”;

It seems that R.A. No. 8353 adopted the first rule in Article 344 of the RPC but not the second rule;

Hence, marriage between the offender and offended party will not extinguish the criminal liability of the
co-principal, accomplice or accessory of the crime of rape;

c. Forgiveness in Marital Rape:

In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty. (Article 266-C of the RPC);
Marriage is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability for marital rape because the parties are already
married. Hence, forgiveness is enough to extinguish this liability;

d. Pardon by the Chief Executive:

Grant of pardon is an act of forgiveness, and thus, it relieves the person pardoned from the penal
consequences of the crime but it does not erase or blot out the crime itself;

Pardon does not make person innocent of the crime from which he was convicted. As far as the law is
concerned, a person pardoned is still a convicted criminal although he will not suffer the penal
consequences of his criminal act;

The very act of forgiveness implies the commission of wrong, and that wrong has been established by
the most complete method known to modern civilization;

Pardon may relieve the offender from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a
completion, but they cannot erase the stain of bad character, which has been definitely fixed.
(Monsanto vs. Factoran Jr., G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989);

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. This power is conferred by
the Constitution, hence, only the Constitution can limit the exercise thereof;

Section 19, Article VII, 1987 Constitution, provides that:

“except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided by this Constitution, the President

may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by
final judgment”;

The only instances in which the President under the Constitution may not extend pardon are as follows:

i. Impeachment case;

ii. Cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and

ii. Cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no
favorable recommendation coming from the Comelec. (Risos-Vidal vs. Lim, G.R. No.
206666, January 21, 2015);

These constitutional limitations are exclusive;

Under Article 89, RPC, pardon totally extinguishes the criminal liability of the convict. Hence, pardon is
just a mode of extinguishing criminal liability;

Same as Death of the offender (People vs. Henry Go, G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014) pardon is not a
mode of extinguishing the crime itself;

Person pardoned will not serve the penalty imposable for the crime to which he was convicted and will
be eligible to hold government office;

However, he is not entitled to demand his lost earnings during the pendency of his case and
reinstatement to his former position as government employee. (Mondanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239,
February 9, 1989);
But pardonee may apply for “re-appointment” and the concerned Department may reinstate him to his
former position, if the same is still vacant. (Sabello vs. DECS, G.R. No. 87687, December 26, 1989);

Nonetheless, by way of an exception, a pardoned person may be given such right to back wages and
reinstatement where the President on the basis of his innocence pardoned him. (Garcia vs. Commission
on Audit, G.R. No. 75025, September 14, 1993);

e. Conditional Pardon:

It refers to the exemption of an individual within certain limits or conditions, from the punishment
which the law inflicts for the offense he had committed resulting in partial extinction of his criminal
liability;

In Conditional Pardon, the prisoner (PDL) shall have served at least one-half (1/2) of the minimum of his
original indeterminate and/or definite sentence;

However, in the case of a prisoner who is convicted of heinous crime as defined in R.A. No. 7659 and
other Special Laws, he shall have served at least one-half (1/2) of the maximum of his original
indeterminate sentence before his case may be reviewed for conditional pardon;

f. Commutation of Sentence:

It is simply defined as “reduction or mitigation of a duration of a prison sentence of a prisoner”;

It is also one of the powers vested by the Constitution in the President to “reduce or mitigate” the
sentenced penalty imposed by the court upon favorable recommendation by the Board of Pardons and
Parole;

It is extended to a qualified Offender, after taking into considerations some circumstances surrounding
his case like:

a) the sentence was too harsh a penalty as to the crime committed;

b) old age;

c) suffering from lingering terminal ailment; and

d) youthful offender, etc.;

Commutation of sentence is also a form of an Executive Clemency like Pardon, granted by the President
in his pardoning powers exclusively vested in him by the Constitution;

Thus, any requirements or conditions as well as disqualifications applicable to Pardon shall also be
applicable to Commutation of Sentence;

g. Good Conduct Time Allowance (Article 97, RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 10592):

Under Article 94, Good Conduct Time Allowance is one of the modes of Partial Extinction of Criminal
Liability, including Commutation of Sentence, and Conditional Pardon;
GCTA may be earned while the Offender is undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving his sentence.
(Article 97, RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 10592);

The Good Conduct of any Offender:

i. qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29, of this Code; or

ii. of any convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation; or

iii. detention center or any other local jail

shall entitle him the following deductions from the period of his sentence:

1) During the first two years of imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty
days (20) days for each month of good behavior during detention;

Before amendment by R.A. No. 10592, deduction during the first two years, is only 5 days for each
month of good behavior during detention;

2) During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
deduction of twenty-three (23) days for each month of good behavior during detention;

Before amendment, deduction is only 8 days;

3) During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive of his imprisonment, he shall
be allowed a deduction of twenty-five (25) days for each month of good behavior during detention;

Before amendment, deduction is only 10 days;

4) During the eleventh year and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be
allowed a deduction of thirty (30) days for each month of good behavior during detention;

Before amendment, deduction is only 15 days;

5) At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another

deduction of fifteen (15) days, in addition to numbers one to four hereof, for each month of study,
teaching, and mentoring service time rendered;

Before amendment, there is no additional 15 days of deduction for studying, teaching and mentoring
service time rendered;

An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above allowances for good
conduct. (Article 97, RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 10592);

h. Parole:

The concept of Parole is likewise one of the community-based corrections that can be availed of by the
Offender whose sentence involving indeterminate penalty containing:

i. minimum term/limit;

ii. maximum term/limit;

It is governed by the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), Act 4103;

In Parole, Offender already served the minimum term or limit of his indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment and now eligible for release on parole, if not suffering from any ground of
disqualifications;

Serving the minimum term of his imprisonment shall not entitle Offender for his immediate release from
jail or any penal institution invoking the service of sentence. It shall only make him eligible for Parole;

If Offender has not been released on Parole, he shall continue to serve up to the maximum term of his
Indeterminate penalty imposed by the court; or

He shall be recommended for executive clemency, if qualified, by way of conditional pardon, or

commutation of sentence;

Some basic conditions embodied in the Release on Parole include the following:

1) Every Prisoner released on parole shall report to the parole officer or any officer designated
by the Board of Pardons and Parole, during the period of parole surveillance equivalent to the remaining
portion of the maximum sentence imposed upon him or until final release and discharge by the BPP;

2) The parole officer or officials designated shall keep such records and make reports and
perform such other duties as may be required by the Board;

3) The limits of residence so such paroled prisoner during his parole may be fixed and from time
to time changed by the said Board in its discretion;

4) During the period of surveillance, such paroled prisoner shall show himself to be a law-
abiding citizen and shall not violate any of the laws of the Philippines islands;

In the coverage of ISLAW, under Section 2, of Act 4103, and other related laws, the benefits of parole or
Indeterminate Sentence are not applicable to the following:

1) Those convicted of an offense of Treason, Conspiracy or Proposal to Commit Treason,

Misprision of Treason, Rebellion or Sedition, Espionage, Piracy, or Mutiny on the high seas or Philippine
waters;

2) Habitual Delinquents, or those who, within the period of ten (10) years from the date of
release from prison or last conviction of the crimes of Serious or Less Serious Physical Injuries, Robbery,
Theft, Estafa, and Falsification, found guilty of the said crimes a third time or oftener; but it does not
include those who are recidivists;

3) Those who have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence. The law contemplates
confinement in prison and not in mental hospital;

4) Those who violated the terms of conditional pardon previously granted to the prisoners;

5) Penalty of imprisonment, the maximum term of which does not exceed one year;
 6) Death penalty or life imprisonment (Section 2 of Act 4103), or Reclusion Perpetua (R.A. No.
7659, as amended by R.A. No. 9246);

7) Those suffering from mental disorder as certified by a government psychiatrist/psychologist.

(BPP Revised Rules, and Regulations);

8) Those who have pending criminal case or cases (BPP Revised Rules, and Regulations);

9) Use of trafficked victims. (Section 11, R.A. No. 9208, as amended by R.A. No. 10364);

Under ISLAW, in imposing a “prison sentence” for an offense, the court shall sentence accused to an
Indeterminate sentence. Hence, ISLAW, is not applicable in imposing non prison sentence such as
destierro and disqualification. (Perlas vs. People, G.R. No. 84637-39, August 12, 1989); or rehabilitation
for the use of dangerous drugs;

i. Probation:

Probation as defined by law, is a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is
released subject to the conditions imposed by the court to the supervision of Probation Officer. (Section
3, P.D. No. 968);

The concept of Probation is that the court convicts and sentences the accused but the execution of the
sentence, imprisonment or fine may be suspended and placed him on probation;

During the period of time fixed by the court, the probationer is provided with treatment and imposed
conditions and placed under the supervision of a Probation Officer;

If the Probationer violates any of the conditions, the court may revoke his probation and order him to
serve the sentence originally imposed;

Otherwise, or no violation at all, he shall be discharged by the court after the period of Probation;
whereupon the case against him shall be deemed terminated. (Budlong vs. Palisok, G.R. No. 60151, June
24, 1983);

Under Section 9, P.D. No. 968, as amended by R.A. No. 10707, the following are the disqualified
offenders and the benefits of Probation Law shall not be extended to:

1) Those sentenced to serve as maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years (Section
9, P.D. No. 968); unless the crime involved is possession or use of Dangerous Drugs committed by the
first time Minor Offender. (Section 70, R.A. No. 9165);

2) Those convicted of any crime against National Security;

3) Those who have been previously convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment or more than six months and one day and/or a fine of more than P1000;

4) Those who have been once on Probation under the provisions of this Decree;

5) Those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of the law
became applicable. (Section 9, P.D. No. 968, as amended by R.A. No. 10707); and
 6) Those convicted of dangerous drug trafficking or pushing. (Section 24, R.A. No. 9165);

Even if defendant is not disqualified to the benefits of Probation Law, the mere fact that its grant is
essentially discretionary on the part of the court, the application for Probation may be denied if the
court finds (Section 8, P.D. No. 968):

a) Offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his
commitment to an institution;

b) There is undue risk that during the period of probation the Offender will commit another
crime;

c) Probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed.

Under Section 10, P.D. No. 968, every Probation order issued by the court shall contain conditions, in
substance, requiring that:

1) Probationer shall present himself to the probation officer within seventy-two (72) hours from
receipt of said order;

2) Report to Probation Officer at least once month;

3) Cooperate with the program of supervision;

4) Meet his family responsibilities;

5) Devote himself to a specific employment and not to change said employment without the
prior written approval of the Probation Officer;

6) Undergo medical, psychological, or psychiatric examination and treatment and enter and
remain in a specified institution, when required for that purpose;

7) Pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training;

8) Attend or reside in facility established for instruction, recreation or residence of persons on

probation;

9) Refrain from visiting houses of ill-repute;

10) Abstain from drinking intoxicating beverages to excess;

11) Permit to Probation Officer or an authorized social worker to visit his home and place or
work;

Under Section 4, P.D. No. 968, as amended by R.A. No. 10707, Probation could be applied based on
modified decision. It is now provided that:

“when a judgment of conviction imposing non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed,

and such judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall
be allowed to apply for probation based on the modified decision before such decision becomes final”;
Applying for Probation based on a modified decision rendered by the appellate court, and seeking
review of the said decision are mutually exclusive remedies;

Under Section 4, P.D. No. 968, as amended by R.A. No. 10707, the accused shall lose the benefit of
Probation should he seek a review of the modified decision which already imposes a probationable
penalty;

Distinction between Conditional Parole and Probation:

i. Parole is granted by the executive through the Board of Pardons and Parole under
DOJ; while Probation is a judicial grant through an Order of the Court;

ii. Parole is governed by Act 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law; while Probation is
governed by P.D. No. 968, as amended by R.A. No. 10707;

iii. The penalty of not exceeding one (1) year or of Life Imprisonment, Reclusion
Perpetua and Death, the Offender is disqualified for the grant of Parole; while the penalty of more than
six (6) years, the Offender is disqualified to avail for Probation;

iv. After the expiration of the period for parole, it is the Board of Pardons and Parole
which will issue the Final Certificate of Discharge; while in Probation, it is the Court that will issue the
Final Discharge/Release of the Probationer;

v. The Offender is eligible for Parole after serving the minimum limit of the
Indeterminate penalty and suspends the unserved portion of the maximum penalty; while in Probation,
there is suspension of service of sentence and the Offender has not commenced the execution of
sentence;

vi. In Parole, there are basic conditions imposed by the BPP to be complied with by the
Parolee like regular reporting to the Parole Officer, and the like; while in Probation, it is the Court that
imposed conditions to the supervision of the Probation Officer;

vii. The Offender can only apply Probation within the period of perfecting an appeal;
while in parole, offender is eligible for parole after serving the minimum term of the indeterminate
penalty;

III. Prescription of Violation of Special Law (Act 3326):

a. Period of Prescription:

Under Section 1, Act 3326, violations penalized by Special Acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such
Acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:

i. Violation of Ordinance -- 2 months

ii. Fine -- 1 year

iii. Imprisonment for 1 month -- 1 year

 iv. More than 1 month (but less than 2 years) -- 4 years

v. 2 years or more (but less than 6 years) -- 8 years

vi. 6 years or more -- 12 years

Applying Section 1 of Act No. 3326, the period of prescription for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is “four years”
because the penalty for it is “not more 1 year”;

There are laws that provide period of prescription of crimes punishable thereunder;

Republic Act 3019, and Republic 7080 provide a special rule on the period of prescription;

For corruption under R.A. No.3019, and plunder under R.A. No. 7080, the prescriptive period is 20 years;

But, the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees
through corruption or plunder, from them or from their nominees or transferees shall not be barred by
prescription, laches, or estoppel. (Section 15, Article XI, 1986 Constitution; Section 6, R.A. No. 7080);

Act No. 3326 does not apply to corruption and plunder with regards to the rule on period of prescription
since under R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 7080 provide a special rule on the period of prescription;

However, Act No. 3326, on the rule on commencement and interruption of the running of prescriptive
period is still applicable to crimes under R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 7080 (Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
Nos. 169823-24 and 174764-65, September 11, 2013);

Under Section 24, R.A. No. 9262, the period of prescription for:

i. physical violence against woman and psychological or economic violence against

women involving controlling her conduct -- 20 years

ii. sexual violence and other psychological violence -- 10 years

Under Section 12, R.A. No. 9208, as amended by R.A. No. 10364 shall prescribe:

i. trafficking in person --- 10 years

ii. if committed by a syndicate, or in large scale, or against a minor -- 20 years

The prescriptive period shall commence to run from the day the trafficked victim is released from the
condition of bondage or in case of a child from the day he reaches the age of majority;

Under R.A. No. 8042, period of prescription shall be:

i. illegal recruitment -- 5 years

ii. Illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage -- 20 years

Under Section 36, R.A. No. 11313 (Safe Space Act), gender based sexual harassment in public spaces
involving:

i. wolf-whistling or similar act -- 1 year

ii. making offensive body gesture -- 3 years

 iii. stalking -- 10 years

b. Commencement of the Running of the Period:

Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for
its investigation and punishment. (Section 2, Act No. 3326);

The phrase “institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment” may either be
disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word “until”. (People vs. Duque, G.R.
No. 100285, August 13, 1992);

c. Interruption of the Running of Period:

The prescription shall be interrupted when “judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment” are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy. (Section 2, Act No. 3326);

a). Panaguiton Principle – in the case of Panaguiton vs. DOJ, G.R. No. 167571, November 25,
2008, expressly abandoned the “Zaldivia principle”;

Under the present rule, the term “proceedings’ should now be understood either as executive or judicial
in character:

1. executive when it involves the investigation phase; and

2. judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment state;

Hence, institution of proceeding, whether executive or judicial interrupts the running of prescriptive
period;

Applying the Panaguiton principle, the commencement of the following proceedings for the prosecution
of the accused effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offense charged of:

i. Filing of complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor.
(Panaguiton vs. DOJ, Ibid; People vs. Panagilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012);

ii. Filing of complaint for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities with SEC (SEC
vs. Interport Resources Corporation, G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008);

iii. Filing of complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019, with the Office of the Ombudsman. (Disini
vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 169823-24 and 174764, September 11, 2013);

However, preliminary investigation for violation of R.A. No. 3019 by alleged cronies of Marcos not
involving ill-gotten wealth conducted by PCGG is “void ab initio” and could not interrupt the “20-year
prescriptive period” for violation of R.A. No. 3019;
The investigatory power of the PCGG extended only to alleged ill-gotten wealth cases. (People vs.
Romualdez and Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166510, April 29, 2009);

b) Jadewell Principle – In Jadewell Parking System Corp. vs. Lidua Sr., G.R. No. 169588, October
7, 2013, Supreme Court applied the Zaldivia principle to prescription of violation of “Ordinance”
interpreting Act No. 3326;

The provision in the Rules on Criminal Procedure regarding the interruption of prescription by institution
of criminal action is not applicable to violation of “Ordinance” because case involving this crime is
covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure;

Hence, the filing of complaint involving violation of ordinance for preliminary investigation with the
prosecutor’s office will not interrupt the running of prescription;

Jadewell principle is not compatible with Panaguiton case and other affirmatory cases since while the
latter abandoned the Zaldivia, the former affirmed it;

Because of the irreconcilability of these principles, the application of the “Jadewell” case should be
confined to violation of “Ordinance”;

If the crime is punishable under the RPC or Special Law other than Ordinance, principle other than
“Jadewell” should be applied even if the crime is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure;

d. Rules on Interruption of Prescription:

The following rules shall be observed pertaining to the interruption of period of prescription:

i. Felony – If the crime is punishable by a RPC, the filing of complaint for preliminary
investigation interrupts the running of prescriptive period;

Article 91, RPC, does not distinguish whether the complaint, the filing of which interrupts the running of
prescriptive period, pertains to that filed in the prosecutor’s office for preliminary investigation; or in
court for action on the merits. (Francisco vs CA, G.R. No. L-45674, May 10, 1983);

The Francisco rule applies even if the crime is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedures;

In People vs. Baustista, G.R. No. 168641, April 27, 2007, the Supreme Court applied the Francisco
principle to slight physical injuries, which is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure;

ii. Offenses under Special Law – If the crime is punishable by a Special Law, the
proceedings, the institution of which interrupts running of prescriptive period, are either executive or
judicial;

Hence, the running of the prescriptive period for offense punishable under special law shall be
interrupted upon filing of complaint for preliminary investigation. (Panaguiton vs. DOJ, supra; SEC vs.
Interport Resources Corporation, supra; Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, supra; People vs. Panagilinan, supra);
This rule is applicable even if the case is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedures. In fact, the
Panaguiton case and Pangilinan case involve violation of B.P. Blg. 22, which is covered by the Rules on
Summary Procedures;

However, void preliminary investigation conducted without authority will not interrupt the running of
the prescriptive period for a crime. (People vs. Romualdez and Sandiganbayan, supra);

iii. Violation of Ordinance – If the crime is punishable by an Ordinance, the institution of

which interrupts running of prescriptive period, is judicial;

Hence, the filing of complaints involving the violation of “Ordinance” for preliminary investigation will
not interrupt the running of “two-month” prescription;

The provision in the Rules on Criminal Procedures regarding the interruption of prescription by
institution of criminal action is not applicable to violation of “Ordinance” because case involving this
crime is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedures. (Jadewell Parking System Corp. vs. Lidua, supra);

END OF THE MANUSCRIPT, WEEK 16, CRIM 1

PROFESSOR: J/DIR. ROMEO L. OGOY, TLPE (Ret.)