Creativity and Rationality

Author(s): BERYS GAUT

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 70, No. 3 (SUMMER 2012), pp.
259-270
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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 BERYS GAUT

Creativity and Rationality

"One must, I say, be a visionary , makea cursory

oneself dismissal of either view, since
a visionary. The poet makes himself a visionary
number eminent philosophers and literary w
through a long, a prodigious, and rational disor-
among their adherents.
dering of all the senses. Every form of love, of
suffering, of madness; he searches himself, he con-
i. Ir rationalism. The idea of poetic creati
sumes all the poisons in him, keeping only their
fundamentally irrational has its earliest phi
quintessences."1 Thus did Arthur Rimbaud, in
ical expression in Plato. In Phaedrus he say
a letter dated May 15, 1871, to his friend, Paul
"if any man come to the gates of poetry w
Demeny, announce his self-conception of his av-
the madness of the Muses, persuaded th
ocation as a poet. The seventeen-year-old poet's
alone will make him a good poet, then shall
manifesto bears ample testimony to the idea of the
his works of sanity with him be brought to n
poet as madman, but it also points in a contrary
by the poetry of madness, and behold, their
direction, to the poet as a rational being, in that
nowhere to be found."2 According to Plato,
telling phrase, "raisonné dérèglement de tous les
are four kinds of divine madness- love, pro
sens " (rational disordering, or reasoned derange-
Bacchic celebration, and poetry- and poetry
ment, of all the senses). The tradition of the poet as
lowest of these.3 Plato draws on the earlier
a rational being is as venerable as that of the poet
idea of poetry as an inspiration from the
as fundamentally irrational, and one may wonder
but he seems to have been the first to construe
what Rimbaud was after in his apparently para-
inspiration as a kind of madness.4 His chief argu-
doxical self-identification with both views. Part of
ment, to which I will return, is presented in Ion
what I argue in this article is that Rimbaud's para-
and holds that poetic emotions are fundamentally
dox is no paradox at all, that one should under-
irrational, since they are felt even when there are
stand certain exercises of creativity as involving
no events that would justify them.
both rational and irrational aspects. There is thus
Plato's charge of madness proved to be enor-
a way in which the traditions of thinking of cre-
mously influential, not least on poets, whose attes-
ativity as an irrational disposition and of thinking
tations run from John Dryden's famous couplet,
of it as a rational disposition are both correct, a
"Great wits are sure to madness near allied, / And
point for which I argue partly on philosophical
thin partitions do their bounds divide" to Byron's
and partly on psychological grounds. But I also ar-
more pithy summation, "We of the craft are all
gue that this composite view is fundamentally ra-
crazy."5
tionalistic in character, for exercises of creativity,
It also continued to find philosophical de-
even when they incorporate irrational elements,
fenders, who developed arguments different from
are necessarily rational in a certain respect.
Plato's. Arthur Schopenhauer argues at length in
The World as Will and Representation that genius
I. TWO TRADITIONS is "closely akin to madness," on the grounds that
both the genius and the madman abandon the
I begin with a very brief sketch Principle
of the two
of Sufficient Reason, chiefly the claim
that every
traditions, with the aim of counseling event has a cause.6
against
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70:3 Summer 2012
© 2012 The American Society for Aesthetics

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 260 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

Friedrich Nietzsche too stands in the irrational- idence, derived from an early Arabic translation,
ist tradition. In The Birth of Tragedy he traces that Aristotle wrote not "or else" one with a touch
the demise of classical Greek tragedy to Eu- of madness, but "rather than" one with a touch of
ripides, whom Nietzsche accuses of "aesthetic madness.13
Socratism," the introduction of reason into the Aristotle's account of the composition of po-
aesthetic realm.7 For Nietzsche, the power of etry holds it to be a process of making (poiēsis in
tragedy essentially depends on its Dionysian wis-Greek), which, like all such processes, starts with
dom, of the underlying, primordial unity of allsome goal, refines that goal, and develops means
things, which can be grasped only by instinct, not to it. For tragedy, the goal is to elicit fear and
by reason. And Nietzsche avers that reason under- pity in the audience with the aim of achieving a
mines creativity, for creative accomplishment de- catharsis of these emotions ( Poetics , chapter 6).
pends on instinct, whereas reason can only be crit-The means to achieve the goal include a type
ical: "While in all productive men it is instinct thatof plot that involves reversals of fortune and
is the creative-affirmative force, and conscious- recognition (chapters 6 and 11), and characters
ness acts critically and dissuasively, in Socrates it isworthy of pity (chapter 13). Tragedy is thus ac-
instinct that becomes the critic, and consciousnesscorded a teleological analysis, and Aristotle also
that becomes the creator- truly a monstrosity perapplies that analysis to how it should be made: in
defectum !"8 chapter 17, for instance, he advises the poet to
sketch out first the general structure of the plot,
which generates the basic tragic emotions, before
ii. Rationalism. Though it was less influential,
filling in the details of the episodes. For Aristotle,
the tradition that holds that creativity is a rational
then, poetic creation is a rational activity of mak-
disposition is coeval with the irrationalist view, for
ing, involving the selection and refinement of suit-
it is also to be found in Plato. Plato's charge of ir-
able goals and the use of the best means to achieve
rationality is made specifically against the poets: them.
in contrast, he holds, in some dialogues at least,
The theory of creation as a rational activity was
that painters, musicians, and sculptors, whom we
adopted in the Christian account of God's creation
would now regard as artists, are following a craft
of the world as the exercise of rational agency,
(i technē ), and craft for Plato is a rational activity.9
filtered through neo-Platonic sources, but it seems
Also, in Timaeus the demiurge who creates the to have had less influence than the irrationalist
universe, that ultimate act of creation, exercises
tradition on the narrower question of artistic cre-
reason in crafting the world out of disordered mat-
ation, despite the Renaissance analogizing of the
ter, following the patterns laid out in the eternal
artist to God.14 But it still appears intermittently,
forms.10
and even at the height of Romantic theorizing,
Unlike Plato, Aristotle defends the rationality
in Charles Lamb's 1826 essay, "Sanity of True
of poetic creativity, though the significance of his
Genius," where Lamb remarks, "It is impossible
response has, through textual bad luck, often been
for the mind to conceive of a mad Shakespeare."15
missed. He is frequently quoted, not least by psy-
It also has a contemporary defender in Jon Elster,
chologists, as saying that all men who are outstand-
who argues that all artistic creation is a matter of
ing in philosophy, poetry, and the arts are melan-
an artist aiming to maximize artistic value, subject
cholic. So holds the author of the Problems , but to constraints.16 But the worries about the ratio-
that author is not Aristotle, for the work is largely
nalist view persist: Jerrold Levinson, in criticizing
a product of the later Peripatetic school.11 There is,
Elster's account, objects that the view makes
however, a passage in the Poetics in which Aristo-
artistic creation too predominantly rational an
tle says that "poetry demands a man with a special
activity.17
gift for it, or else one with a touch of madness in
him; the former can easily assume the required
mood, and the latter may actually be beside him- II. CLARIFYING THE CLAIMS

self with emotion."12 But as several scholars have

argued, the claim that a poet might be mad in mak- Though there are two broad traditions, th
ing his art is inconsistent with the basic framework many different kinds of claims in each tra
developed in the Poetics , and there is textual ev- So we need to clarify some concepts.

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Gaut Creativity and Rationality 261

vant, mathematical
i. Mental Illness and Irrationality. First,reasons, con- b
irrational.
sider the relation of mental For the reasons
illness are too abstruse and
to irrationality.
specialized
Being irrational does not entail for such an indictment
being to be reason-
mentally
ill: if I fail to get out of able.
bed, So the reasons, failure
though of appropriate
I judge that sen-
I really ought to do so, sitivity
I am to which
weak impugns someone as I
willed. irrational,
am
must be ones for
thereby irrational in my action, that areitgraspable
is not to an ordinary
guided per-
son. They must
by what I judge that I have most reason to do. be, as I will say, clear and evident
However, though I am irrational,
reasons.
I am not men-
tally ill- otherwise most ofReasons come in different
us would sorts. Since r
be mentally
ill much of the time. ity is a matter of appropriate sensitivity
Conversely, does being one can be rational
mentally in respect
ill entail that of som
but irrational
one is irrational? Full-blown in respect oftypi-
schizophrenia others. My
slumbering
cally involves extreme cognitive in bed makessuch
delusions, me practically
as
believing that one is beingbut controlled
I need not thereby
by an be cognitively
alien
force or that one possessesmy belief that I ought to
supernatural get up is a ra
powers.
grounded beliefs.
These are extremely irrational on my awareness
Consider,of the ne
some work
though, mood disorders, such done. My
as manic problem is that
depression
act appropriately
(also known as bipolar disorder); on that belief.
in milder casesCognit
tive, and
there are no severe cognitive practical reasons
distortions, but canthe be inde
each other. Even
sufferer feels grinding depression orwithin
manicthese broad ty
ela-
tion. Are these cases of mental illness without
sons, rationality may fail inirra-
one respe
tionality? Not so. Besides in others. A person
theoretical may be irrational in
irrationality,
some
the irrationality of beliefs, and beliefs, but notirrational-
practical others: she may b
in respect of
ity, the irrationality of actions, beliefs
such as about matters that
weakness
of will, there is affectiveself-interest,
irrationality, but rational in respect of
the having
of irrational emotions and beliefs, for instance.
feelings. Someone who
suffers from a fear of spiders mayisknow
The moral that when
thatwe inquire
the
someone
feared spiders are perfectly is rational
harmless, soor irrational,
he is not a fu
tohe
cognitively irrational. But that
isquestion requires us tofor
still irrational, specify
spects
the fear is not grounded in the person
its object; heisknows
rational the
or irration
overall
object is not dangerous. The judgment of rationality
chronically depressed or irrat
bipolar patient, though hesummary
knows judgment, that nothing in light par- of these m
ticularly bad is happening,judgments.
is affectively irrational.
Once we acknowledge theFinally, existence of or
judgments of rationality affective
irrationality
apply to many
irrationality, we should hold that mental being
states or doings, such as be-
mentally
liefs, feelings, and actions, but not to all such states.
ill entails being irrational.
Some, for instance, have no representational con-
tent and, therefore, judgments
iL Rationality and Irrationality. What of rationality
is get no
meant
by talk of rationality and grip. If I am in pain because youA
irrationality? strike me hard, I is
person
am not
rational just in case she is thereby rational; nor, if I feel no
appropriately pain, am
sensitive
to reasons. If I believe itI thereby irrational. There is because
is raining a reason why I do or I see
that it is raining, I am indothat
not feel pain, but that is a reason
respect in the sense of my
rational;
a causal explanation, not evidence.
belief is sensitive to the perceptual in the sense of a norma- It is
tive fact.
appropriately sensitive, since I take myMy response of pain is not rational nor the
seeing
is it irrational; it
rain to be evidence for there is, as I will put
being it, nonrational.
rain, rather
than being evidence against it.
To say that I am irrational is to impugn my
III. OBJECTIONS TO RATIONALISM
rationality, but not just any failure of appro-
priate sensitivity to reasons indicts someone of
The advantage
irrationality. If someone fails to understand of adopting a rationalist,
a com- bro
plex chain of reasoningAristotelian
that line is that it holds that
supports a creative
mathe- ac-
matical proof, she is nottivities fall into a classto
sensitive of activities
all the with which
rele-

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 262 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

we are familiar, namely,state of rational

mind is irrational, makings
so is her mental state of on
sort or another. Cookingwhen shea meal
takes is a rational ac
up their position.
However, one should
tivity, involving a worthwhile end reject the charge ofsome-
(having ir-
thing nourishing to eat)rationalism.
andFirst, takingemotions can thebe rationally felt
appropri-
ate means to that end; even toward objects one
making a only
chairimaginessimilarly
to exist:
involves adopting a valuable
for instance, one goal
can imagineand events andtaking
feel gen- a
more complex series of uine emotions
steps toward
tothem as part of ait.
realize rational
Thes
actions of making thingsprocessexhibit
of planning what to do, such
both as deciding
final ratio
what career one should
nality (since the end pursued pursue. Second, if all re-
is worthwhile) and
instrumental rationalitysponses (since
to fictions were the means
irrational, are ap
as Plato alleges,
propriate to achieving we could
that not discriminate,
end).as They we do, between those
raise no
responses that are
special puzzles or difficulties: clearly irrational
there is no (for example,
place fo
puzzling talk of divine inspiration,
fearing subconsciou
the innocent victim in a horror film) from
irrational processes, and so
those that are on.
not (for Paradigm
example, fearing the serialexam-
killer neatly
ples of creative activity who threatens fit him). Third,
this since model:
emotions a
are ubiquitous
artist producing a creative in our responses
painting hasto fictions,
the wereaim o
producing a work with these certain valuable
emotions systematically irrational, we qualitie
would
and takes appropriate have to hold that allto
means artworks that are works that
secure of fic- end
tion (a large class)
So let us begin by assuming that are fundamentally
creative evaluatively
activi
ties involve this kind of familiar
flawed; but that is highlyrational
counterintuitive.20making
and consider some objections to it, drawn from
the irrationalist tradition.18
ii. Spontaneity. A second ground for challeng-
ing rationalist accounts of creativity derives from
/. Plato and the Paradox of Fiction. The the observation that creative ideas often just
strongest of the philosophical objections is Plato's "pop" into our minds: they come to us sponta-
argument in Ion. There Socrates says of Ion, theneously, independently of the will. Henri Poincaré
rhapsode, who recites poetry to crowds: recounts how solutions to mathematical problems
sometimes came to him without being immedi-
ately preceded by any conscious thought on the
There he is, at a sacrifice or festival, got up in holiday at-
matter, citing examples when he was walking on a
tire, adorned with golden chaplets, and he weeps, though
cliff, strolling down the street, and placing his foot
he has lost nothing of his finery. Or he recoils with fear,
on the steps of a bus.21 At a less exalted level, most
standing in the presence of more than twenty thousand
of us have had the experience of ideas coming to us
friendly people, though nobody is stripping him or doing
unbidden when in the shower or going for a walk;
him damage. Shall we say that the man is in his senses?19
the experience has been dubbed by Margaret Bo-
den "the bath, the bed and the bus."22 Since such
Plato's charge is that the emotions of poetry arethoughts arise independently of the will, one might
irrational: the poet, the rhapsode, and his audi- argue that they are not subject to a rationalist ac-
ence may feel fear or sorrow, though they knowcount: since they arise independently of the will,
that nothing bad has really happened. But surelythey are not rationally assessable; and since they
an emotion directed toward an object that one be-are not rationally assessable, they are irrational.
lieves does not exist is an irrational emotion. This However, both steps of that argument are un-
is the earliest extant formulation of one version of sound. Consider the second step: even if sponta-
the paradox of fiction. neous ideas were not subject to rational assess-
One might object that to impugn the rational- ment, this would not support the irrationalist's
ity of the listeners and reciters of poems is not to claim that there is an irrational element to creativ-
impugn the poet's rationality: the emotional rum- ity. Irrational states are to be distinguished from
blings of her audience may bear no relation to the nonrational ones, as we have seen. For some state
poet's own feelings. But that reply will not answer to be irrational actually requires it to be subject
Plato's charge: the poet, if she is to test the success to rational assessment; spontaneous states would
of her poetic communication, should put herself therefore be nonrational, like pain as a sensation,
in the place of her audience, so if the audience's but not irrational.

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 Gaut Creativity and Rationality 263

speech, social for

Nor is the first step sound, isolation, and anxiety.) states
mental For instance,
th
arise independently of the
a study willand
by Kinney are
otherssometimes
examined thirty-six
tionally assessable. Beliefs are subject
adults with schizophrenic to rati
biological parents who
assessment, though theyhad been adopted by nonschizophrenic parents
are independent of
and a to
will.23 We do not choose control group of a that
believe further thirty-six
it is rain adult
adoptees
if we see that it is so; but thewith belief
nonschizophrenic
thatbiological
it is par-
rai
is a rational one, since itThe
ents. conforms to the
subjects were independently evide
assessed for
and the belief that it schizotypal
is not and schizophrenic would
raining signs and for incre-t
case be irrational. Likewise, someone's
ative achievements fear
using the Lifetime of
Creativity
mestic spiders is notScales.
a state that
For subjects without isany willed, bu
schizotypal signs,
the peak
nevertheless irrational, sinceoverall spiders
creativity ratingarewas relatively
not d
gerous. Hence, at least some
low (with a mean ofspontaneously g
1.64), it was higher in subjects
erated states can be rationally assessed.
with one schizotypal sign (a mean of 1.98), highest
for subjects with two or more schizotypal signs but
iii. Psychological Evidence no schizotypal about
or schizoid personality
Creativity disorder (a
Mental Illness . The most mean of 2.19), somewhat lowerevidence
powerful for subjects with
the irrationalist can adduce in her favor is the con- a schizotypal or schizoid personality disorder (a
siderable body of psychological data that supports mean of 2.12), and lowest for the single subject
a strong, though contingent, link between artistic with schizophrenia (a mean of l).26 Other studies
creativity in particular and various kinds of mental have shown a similar inverted-U distribution: full-
illness. blown schizophrenia undermines creativity, but,
up to a certain point, increasing closeness to it
Kay Jamison is a psychiatrist who is an expert on
manic depression. She has documented that of the measured by number of symptoms tends to en-
thirty-six major British and Irish poets born be- hance creativity. This kind of distribution provides
tween 1705 and 1805, thirteen (that is, more than evidence that a degree of irrationality may en-
a third) were probably bipolar I (the most serious hance creativity, but severe irrationality may un-
form of the disease), including Lord Byron, Percy dermine it.
Bysshe Shelley, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William The prevalence in creative people of these and
Blake, and William Cowper. A further six of the a variety of other mental problems, including
poets, including John Keats and Robert Burns, suf- suicidal states, pathological anxiety, alcoholism,
fered from milder forms of the disease (bipolar II and drug abuse,, has also been demonstrated in
or cyclothymia). Jamison also studied forty-seven the most wide-ranging study of the relationship
eminent contemporary British writers and artists between mental illness and creativity to date.
and discovered that thirty-eight percent of them Arnold Ludwig examined 1,004 eminent individ-
had been medically treated for a mood disorder. uals, about whom at least one biography was
In contrast, only one percent of the general pop- published in The New York Times Book Review
ulation suffers from bipolarity and another one between 1960 and 1990. The individuals studied

to two percent from cyclothymia. The prevalence were categorized into eighteen professions, in-
of bipolar disorder among writers and poets has cluding poetry, the visual arts, social and natural
been corroborated by other studies.24 Jamison also sciences, business, and exploration. Eighty-seven
suggests a mechanism for how bipolarity enhances percent of the poets suffered from a mental dis-
creativity, arguing that manic phases are excellent order of some sort during their lifetimes, seventy-
for generating creative ideas, and normal or mildly seven percent of fiction writers, fifty-one percent
depressed phases of the disease are ones in which of social scientists, and twenty-eight percent of
the generated ideas can be subject to criticism, natural scientists.27 Ludwig also showed that men-
refinement, and elaboration.25 tal health problems were predictive of whether a
Much work has also been done on the link person was in the top quartile or bottom quartile
between creativity in the arts in particular ofand
achievement across the range of professions
schizophrenia-spectrum diseases and schizotypy.studied.28 He also noted the same inverted-U dis-
tribution between creativity and mania, along with
(Schizotypy is a syndrome of signs that correlate
probably
with a genetic liability for schizophrenia: signs in- most forms of psychopathology, which
clude magical thinking, recurrent delusions, weodd
saw held in the Kinney study.29

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 264 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

iv. Assessing the Evidence. The

domains, such as poetry, thanpsychological
in others, such as
evidence and its significance science. In Ludwig'shave study, twenty-eight
been percent
queried
on various grounds. Psychologists of natural scientists suffered from lifetime
aremental almost as
disputatious as philosophers. illness, and this Iis slightly
will lower than the thirty-
consider three
objections. two percent of the population who suffer from it
First, Robert Weisberg and others have ob- according to one study.34 So if there is a causal
jected that in some of these studies, evidence of connection between mental illness and creativity,
mental illness is based on creative people's self- the evidence suggests that it will obtain only in
reports, but, given the prevalence of the belief some domains, particularly artistic ones.
that creativity and madness are associated, partic- However, Ludwig also found that having a men-
ularly in the Romantic era, which is the subject of tal illness was predictive of whether an individual
Jamison's main study, creative people have reason in his sample was in the upper quartile of achieve-
to exaggerate their mental problems.30 ment as opposed to the lower quartile across a
However, self-reporting is not employed in all wide variety of professions, including natural sci-
such studies (for instance, it is not employed in ence.35 So suffering from a mental illness makes
Ludwig's and Kinney's research). More impor- it more likely in general that someone is highly
tantly, the degree of problems reported in some creative rather than being creative at a less emi-
cases is evidence of mental problems, whatever nent level. Moreover, even if the causal relation
the artist's beliefs about the link between cre-held only in some domains, such as artistic ones,
that would still constitute a threat to the rational-
ativity and madness: of the thirty-six major poets
Jamison examines, two (Thomas Chatterton and ist model, since the model is a general one and so
Thomas Lovell Beddoes) killed themselves, and applies to creativity in all domains.
four (including Cowper) were committed to asy- There is a way, though, to account for the varia-
tion in incidence of mental illness across domains
lums. If an artist is so taken by the idea of being
that would undermine the link to creativity in any
a mad genius as to kill himself or to act in ways
that get him committed, that degree of adherencedomain. For being mentally ill might explain why
to the madness-creativity view is in itself goodsome people enter some domains, but it would
evidence of severe mental problems.31 play no role in explaining why they are creative
Second, it may be noted that the correlation in those domains. Perhaps the link is not between
between mental illness and creativity does not mental
es- illness and creativity but between mental
tablish the direction of any causal relationshipillness and which profession is chosen: a greater
between them. Perhaps creative activity causes proportion of people with mental problems are
mental illness, rather than vice versa.32 Creative
attracted to becoming poets than scientists, but
activity, which goes beyond established routinestheir mental illness has nothing to do with their
and often results in many failures before some- creativity in these domains. Call this the domain-
thing is achieved, may be stressful, and this may
preference hypothesis .36
induce mental illness in some people. Is this a good hypothesis? A good way to test
it out is to consider an example. Blake claimed
It is plausible that this happens in some cases,
to be surrounded by the spirits of the dead
particularly if the creative activity is part of a per-
son's profession, and so more than intrinsic and
re- to have talked to Michelangelo, Raphael,
wards hang on creative success. But in many cases Milton, Dryden, Voltaire, Satan, and others. Those
the causal link plausibly runs from mental illness who knew him took him to be sincere in these
claims,
to creative activity. Mental illness typically starts in and one friend, John Varley, asked him to
adolescence or early adulthood, a time that usu- sketch his visions. Here is Varley's account of one
vision:
ally predates the launch of the career in which
creativity is exercised. Moreover, mentally ill cre-
ative people often have close family relations who
On hearing of this spiritual apparition of a Flea, I asked
him if he could draw for me the resemblance of what
suffer from their illness or variants of it, but these
relations may not be creative in any significant
he saw. ... I felt convinced by his mode of proceeding,
way.33 that he had a real image before him, for he left off, and
Third, the correlation between creativity and began on another part of the paper, to make a separate
mental illness holds much more strongly in some drawing of the mouth of the Flea, which the spirit having

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Gaut Creativity and Rationality 265

opened, he was prevented least

from sometimes an artist'
proceeding with the fi
sketch, till he had closed it.
on the nature of his men
logical evidence poses th
During the time occupied in completing the drawing, t
The evidence supports a
Flea told him that all fleas were inhabited by the souls
holds that creative activit
such men, as were by nature bloodthirsty to excess, a
tional and irrational elements.
were therefore providentially confined to the size a
form of insects; otherwise, were he himself for instan
the size of a horse, he would depopulate a great porti
of the country.37 IV. THE RATIONALIST-COMPOSITE MODEL

Blake made two sketches of the flea during his v

In the light of this evidence, how should the r
sion, and later based a tempera painting on it: T
nalist respond? She should allow that irration
Ghost of a Flea (1819, Tate Britain). The pain
ements can play a role in creative activities in
ing shows a strange, hybrid man-flea figure, pos
cases, which favors a composite model. But
in a theater-like setting of wooden floorboard
composite model has, I will argue, a fundam
tightly enclosed by curtains, with a backdrop
tally rationalist character, for certain exercis
open view of a night sky with four stars, the brigh
rationality are necessary for creative activity.
est of which is plummeting to the ground, indic
tive of the figure's fallen status.
i. Rational HeBegin
Irrationality. resembles
by considerin
basic shape a muscular man,
result but
of rational his
choice scaly
theory. Thomasskin
Sche
toned golden red, green, and
argues that it canbrown,
be rational in and he h
certain conflict
elongated, hooked fingers,
uations towing-like plumes
impair one's rationality ove
or even c
his ears, and a head that
oneselfisto almost fused
become irrational: thisinto
may, for t
body by a short, muscular neck
stance, be the withresponse
most rational promineto extor
vertebrae. Between the index
since finger
by becoming and
irrational onethumb
renders on
his right hand he grasps a curved
insusceptible stinger, who
to certain threats.38
shape echoes that of his tongue,
A vivid to pierce
thought experiment the
by Derek sk
Parfi
of his victims. And in his left
lustrates hand
this.39 Parfit he grasps
imagines a bo
a case where a
to contain their blood, into
breaks intowhich
your house.his Yougolden ey
call the police
stare intently and toward which
since your house ishis curved
isolated, they willtong
take
obtrudes lasciviously. time to arrive. Meantime, the robber threaten
According to the domain-preference
kill your children unless you open hypothe
the safe, w
sis, Blake's bipolarity contains
led him to choose
your valuables. What shouldpaintinyou d
and poetry as his domainwould beof activity,
irrational not to openbutthe safe,his sincei
ness had nothing to do children
with would
his be creativity
killed; but it would withalso b
the domain. That is highly
rational to openimplausible.
the safe, since the Creati
robber is
ity requires the production
likely to kill of you andoriginal
your children and val
to prevent
able items. The originality of The
from recording Ghost
the number of hisofcar aandFlerep
derives almost entirely ingfrom Blake's
it to the police. visionary
Fortunately, you have ae
perience. Other featuresthat willof the
render you painting are re
temporarily irrational: w
atively unoriginal: Blake's
the robber painting
threatens to kill style, for
your children, youi
stance, is derivative from
beg him tohis do so, admired
since you love them master
so much
primarily Michelangelo. when Though the work
the robber tortures is ski
you, you will plead
fully painted, its valuehim to largely
continue, since depends
it is so painful.on Confroth
strangeness and compelling
with this madman, nature of the
the robber's ima
best strateg
of the flea, particularly if without
to flee we appreciate
harming anyone, the wor
confident
as we should, in the context of its
you are so befuddled, youmaking
will not record as hi d
number. creativity of the work
scribed by Varley. So the
and thereby Blake's creativity as
Parfit's fable is wildly its maker,
entertaining and deeply d
pends on his vision, which derives
improbable; but it succeedsfrom
in proving his
the pos-susce
tibility to the intensesibility of cases of, and
feelings in his phrase, " rational
hallucinatio
associated with his severe bipolar
irrationality."40 There are illness. Hence,
situations in which it is

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266 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

tionality?
rational, even rationally Clearly he could
required, to notmakebe so byonesel
virtue
of choosing
irrational. Rational choice not to take has
theory the treatment,
longsince no
recog
treatment
nized this possibility for was available. But
situations ofhe could be ra-
conflict; my
tional possible
thought is that it is also by virtue of recognizing
in cases that ofhis creativ
cre
ity depended
ative activities, and indeed may in part
beonmore his irrational
commo episodes
and being
there. Sometimes, given pleased that he
someone's was intermittently
psychologica
irrational.
set, a good or even required way of pursuing one
rational aim of being creative is to
Cases of rational irrationality fallmake
into a broaderone-
self irrational to someclassdegree or to
of rational strategies other, perhap
promote creativity.
even by inducing mentalCreative actions and discoveries
illness in oneself. sometimes de-For th
pend on
irrational person thinks or luck: a famous
feels in example is Alexander
nonstandar
Fleming's discovery
ways, and these may provide the germsof penicillin from observation
for original
ideas. Recall Rimbaud's of areasoned
bacterial culture on which the mold pénicil- o
derangement
all the senses: it was a lium
rational
had grown. Such attempt to not
cases are, however, inducones
states of extreme irrationality
of pure luck: theyin himself
require someone to spotfor cre
the sig-
nificance
ative purposes; in practice itfor his project of the
involved thelucky ingestio
event. Since
one cannot
of large quantities of hash and induce such lucky events,
absinthe so a as
good tostrat-in
duce visions. Judging by egy to
thepromote serendipitous
quality of discoveries
his poetryis to be
he succeeded in his aim. open toHethe possibilities
was rationally that one's environmentirra-
tional. Nor was Rimbaud throwsunique
up. Someone in who pursuing
is open in this sense thi
strategy: indeed, one of need the
not be actively
main looking for things for
reasons that arehi
becoming a poster boy useful
for to her
the projects;
1960s she may simply be alive
countercul
ture was his imprimatur to for
the possibility
the use that she of may come across
drug such
taking
things and be willing,
to enhance creativity, though if she does so, to pursue
his followers' result the
opportunities they
were generally less artistically throw up. In his Preface to The
successful.
There is a second class Spoils of cases.
of Poynton , Henry Bipolar
James explains dis-
how he
order can be treated withgot whatlithium
he calls the "germ"carbonate;
of the story from buta
some bipolar writers andconversation
artistsat dinner who
and remarksarethat most of
given thi
his taking
treatment decide to stop stories sprang the
from such germs; sosince
pills, James seems
they
to have had
find the treatment reduces a strategy creativity:
their of openness to environmen-
in tw
tal luck.42 of such artists decided
studies, seventeen percent
The strategy of openness
to stop taking the medicine.41 This can is
also bethe
applied to
convers
case to Parfit's: rather one's
than mental life:
a free associations
drug of ideas may
inducing irra-
lead one to new insights,
tionality in someone rational, thisand openness
drug to such induce
rationality in someone mental processes is a good strategy
irrational. Butforthis generatingis still
new ideas. The Surrealist
case of rational irrationality: if being technique of in
automatic
a state o
irrationality promotes writing, which consists in trying
creativity in to remove
some con- people
and if their aim is to be
scious creative,
control from the writing then it anis ratio
process, was
nal for them to induce attempt to employ free associations forby
irrationality creativerefusin
purposes. And A. E. Housman
the drug. Given the prevalence of used bipolar
to go for long disor
walks after lunch,
der among creative people, having imbibed
such cases a beer, which
may not
be uncommon. Note, too, he describes as a "sedative
that if to the
a brain"; he would
person's over
regularly havethen,
riding aim is to be creative, lines or entiregiven
stanzas of poems
particula
come to him while
features of her psychology, she he wasmay
thinking of benothingrationally
in
required to stop taking particular.43
the drug These examples
and arerender
not ones where herself
irrational for periods. one is using irrational processes: free association
These are cases where there is a choice about is not irrational, but is nonrational in the sense ex-
whether to induce or to eliminate abnormal states
plained earlier, for there is no ground for rational
in oneself. But what of cases before the inven- appraisal or criticism of this flow of associations
tion of drugs to treat bipolarity, where a bipo-and ideas.44 The strategy of rational irrationality,
lar creative person could not choose to treat then,
his falls into a wider class of rational strategies of
condition? Could Blake be rational in his irra- openness to one's environment and one's mental

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 Gaut Creativity and Rationality 267

This account
life: it requires being open to the of chimp art is controversial.47
possibility that
one's irrational mentalBut, since I amcan
states interested in defending a one's
promote modal
creativity, and one may claim, it is not
even the correctnesspursue
actively of the accountsteps
that
to induce them in oneself. matters but the fact that it is coherent and rep-
Not all instances of irrationality that figure in resents a possible state of affairs, and hence can
creative activities are ones of rational irrationality. function as a thought experiment. So let us treat it
Consider weakness of will. Suppose that Sylvia, a as such for present purposes. Now, suppose that a
successful poet who suffers from manic depres- particular chimp produces a canvas that is some-
sion, is offered lithium treatment. She believes, what original and attractive: should we say that
correctly, that taking the lithium would remove he is being creative in his painting? There is rea-
her impetus to write poetry. But she decides after son to deny this: if the chimp is interested only in
careful reflection that her poetry is not worth it: disrupting his environment and lacks the capacity
she would rather be free of her crushing depres- to grasp the artistic merits of the canvas, the fact
sions than to continue as a poet. She has, however, that he produced an artistically satisfactory result
always feared medical treatments, and, though she is a matter of luck. This is even clearer in the cases
resolves to take her medicine, she backs down. where the trainer removed the canvas at the cru-
So she continues to write poetry, while sincerely cial point, since these depend on the trainer's artis-
regretting that she does not take her treatment. tic discrimination; and so from the chimp's point
Sylvia suffers from weakness of will, and is cre- of view, it was luck that resulted in an original and
ative only because of her weakness of will. Since valuable canvas.
she is weak willed, she is practically irrational, and In describing someone as creative, we accord
she is creative because she is irrational. But she her a kind of credit for her activities, and we
do not give credit for mere luck. Luck can, of
is not rationally irrational, for her overall consid-
ered judgment is that she should take the pills. Shecourse, play an important part in creativity, as in
Fleming's chance discovery of penicillin. But such
is irrational simpliciter .45 So not all cases of irra-
cases are ones where someone uses luck in being
tionality that foster creativity are ones of rational
irrationality. But a large and significant classcreative.
of This is not the situation with the chimp:
cases falls into this type. luck intervenes, but the chimp does not exploit
luck in his painting.
ii. Product-Value Rationality. Sylvia is irra- The reason why the chimp's output is depen-
tional in respect of exhibiting weakness of will.dent on luck, despite his production of something
But if reasons come in a broad variety, it may original
be and valuable, is that he lacks the capacity
that appropriate sensitivity to a particular typeto
ofevaluate his painting artistically, and so artistic
evaluations can play no role in guiding his painting
reasons is required to be creative. That is the claim
that I now defend. According to Denis Dutton, activities. So, to be creative requires one to exer-
drawing on the work of Thierry Lenain, ape paint- cise an evaluative ability of the relevant kind. This
constraint on creativity falls into a general class
ings are not artworks, since a chimp does not have
of conditions on the concept. It is not sufficient to
the relevant appreciation of artistic values, but
rather are the product of the chimp's enjoyment be
of creative that one produces something original
splashing paint around, of creating a mess. Many and valuable; for the production may be a matter
of these works are ones that the chimp's trainer of pure luck (such as when I spill a pot of paint
has removed when the trainer judges the result and it happens to produce a beautiful canvas); or
be obtained by means of exhaustive, mechanical
to be artistically satisfactory; were the chimp left
unsupervised, he would carry on brushing paint search procedures, devoid of the exercise of un-
onto the paper until it became an unintelligible derstanding (as in some computerized methods of
drug discovery); or merely by following precisely
mess. (My wife, who is a teacher, tells me that this
is true of some three- and four-year-old childrenstated rules (as in painting by numbers). So to be
creative, it matters not just what is produced, but
too.) And if a chimp is interrupted while painting,
also how it is produced.48 Possessing an evalua-
he will not go back to look at the painting again.
So the works are not art but are the producttive
of ability is one of the constraints on the manner
of making something that is essential to its being
the chimp's enjoyment in, to use Lenain's terms,
creative.
"disruption" and "pseudo-artistic play."46

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 268 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

There is an internal connection between this nal all the time in their creative activities.
evaluative ability and a type of rationality. Whenthough
a the account of creativity I have of
is composite, in drawing on elements of th
painter evaluates her work in making it, she judges
rationalist tradition, its fundamental charact
what artistic value properties it has and what ones
rationalist.
it should have in the light of her progress so far.
So she takes the artistic values , actual and poten-
tial, of her painting as reasons to form it one way
v. CONCLUSION
rather than another. These reasons are grounded
on the actual and potential values of her paint-
ing: call these product-value reasons. We have seen I have argued for a rationalist-composite a
that rationality consists in appropriate sensitivity creativity that has the following features
of
to reasons. So in evaluating her work in making it,
the painter exhibits a kind of rationality: call this 1. Modal asymmetry: creative activity re
product-value rationality ; that is, she shows sen- the exercise of a particular rational cap
sitivity to reasons grounded on the value of the(product-value rationality), but it does n
product. quire the exercise of an irrational capacity
So another way to put the claim that creativity 2. Rational irrationality : many, though not
requires an evaluative ability is to say that creativ- parent instances of simple irrationality in
ity requires product-value rationality: a sensitivity creative are really instances of being ratio
to reasons grounded on the value of the product. irrational.

Hence, there is a type of rationality that is re-

quired to be creative. In the case of the painter From the first claim, it follows that the account is
these product-value reasons are artistic ones, but fundamentally rationalist in character. From the
the reasons vary with the type of creative activ- second, it follows that those cases of creativity,
ity: for instance, in the case of scientific creativity, where one is simply irrational in some respect, are
scientific reasons are the relevant product-value
less common than the evidence appears to sug-
ones.
gest. But even when one is rationally irrational,
The possession of product-value rationality is
one still is irrational in some respect, though one
fully compatible with being irrational hasin other made oneself so; and some cases of
rationally
respects. Sylvia is irrational in not taking
creativity,her
as in the weakness of will example, may
medicine because she fails to do whatbeshe ones judges
of simple irrationality in some respect. So
it is all-things-considered best to do, so
theshe is ir-
account defended draws on both the rationalist
rational in respect of being weak willed.and But since traditions but is in a fundamental
irrationalist
she is creative, she must still be sensitiveway
to rationalist.
artistic The rationalist needs to adapt her
reasons, and therefore is product-valueaccount
rational.49
to incorporate the psychological evidence
A creative person must exhibit product-value
but can do so without changing the account's fun-
rationality, and so must be rational in somerationalist
damental re- character.50
spect. But there is no requirement that a creative
person be irrational in any respect. There is no
BERYS GAUT
tenable a priori argument for that claim; and it
Department of Philosophy
is in tension with the empirical evidence. Ludwig
University of St. Andrews
notes that eighty-seven percent of the St.eminent
Andrews,po-Fife, KY16 9AL
ets he studied suffered from mental health prob-
United Kingdom
lems, so that leaves thirteen percent who did not,
and poets, as we saw, are the most prone internet:
to men-bng@st-andrews.ac.uk
tal illness of all creative professions. So there is a
modal asymmetry between the role of rationality
1 . Arthur Rimbaud, Illuminations and Other Prose P
and irrationality in creativity: whereas possession
ems , trans. Louise Varese (New York: New Directions, 195
of a particular kind of rationality is required to be
p. xxx.
creative, there is no similar requirement2.that the
Plato, Phaedrus , 245a, in The Collected Dialogues
creative person be irrational in any respect.
eds. EdithVery
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Prince
many creative people, even in the arts, are ratio-
University Press, 1961).

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 Gaut Creativity and Rationality 269

3. Plato, Phaedrus, 248d-e.

For a reply to this objection, see my "Creativity and Skill,"
4. Penelope Murray, "Poetic Genius
in The Idea of Creativity, eds. Michael Krausz,and Its Classi
Denis Dutton,
Origins," in Genius : The and History
Karen Bardsley (Leiden:of an Idea , ed. Pen
Brill, 2009).
Murray (Oxford: Blackwell, 19. Plato,1989), p.
Ion, 535d-e, in The 18.
Collected For
Dialogues, eds. an overv
of Plato on creativity, see Hamilton and Cairns.
Elizabeth Asmis, "Plato on
etic Creativity," in The Cambridge 20. See my Art , Emotion Companion and Ethics (Oxford to Plato
Univer-
Richard Kraut (Cambridge sityUniversity
Press, 2007), chapter 9, Press, for a defense 1992).
of the rational-
5. John Dryden, Absalom ity of emotions and toward Achitophel
fictional situations. See also,Tamar lines
163-164, in his Selected Poems Szabó Gendler , andeds. Karson Steven N. Zwicker
Kovakovich, "Genuine Rational
David Bywaters (London: Penguin,
Fictional 2001),Debates
Emotions," in Contemporary p. 118; and
in Aesthetics
Redfield Jamison, Touched and the withPhilosophy Fire:
of Art, Manic-Depressive
ed. Matthew Kieran (Maiden,
ness and the Artistic Temperament MA: Blackwell, 2006). (New York: Free Pr
1993), p. 2. 21. Henri Poincaré, "Mathematical Creation," in The
6. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Rep- Creative Process: Reflections on Invention in the Arts and
resentation , vols. I and II, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Sciences , ed. Brewster Ghiselin (University of California
Dover, 1969). The quotation is from vol. I, p. 190. Schopen- Press, 1985), p. 26.
hauer discusses genius and madness in vol. I, pp. 184-194, 22. Margaret A. Boden, The Creative Mind: Myths and
and vol. II, pp. 376-402. Mechanisms, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 25.
7. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and the 23. Arguably, necessarily so: see Bernard Williams,
Case of Wagner , trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: "Deciding to Believe," in his Problems of the Self
Random House, 1967), sections 12 and 13. (Cambridge University Press, 1973).
8. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and the Case of Wag- 24. Jamison, Touched with Fire, chap. 3; and Nancy
ner, p. 88. C. Andreasen, "Creativity and Mental Illness: Preva-
9. Plato, Górgias , 449d5^t50cll, in The Collected Di- lence Rates in Writers and Their First-Degree Relatives,"
alogues, eds. Hamilton and Cairns, gives painting, music, American Journal of Psychiatry 144 (1987): 1288-
and sculpture as examples of crafts, though at 501el-502a8 1292.
he excludes some types of musical performance from being 25. Jamison, Touched with Fire, chap. 4.
crafts. 26. Dennis K. Kinney, Ruth Richards, Patricia A. Low-
10. Plato, Timaeus , 27d4-30cl, in The Collected Dia- ing, Deborah LeBlanc, Morris E. Zimbalist, and Patricia
logues, eds. Hamilton and Cairns. Harlan, "Creativity in Offspring of Schizophrenic and Con-
11. Sir David Ross, Aristotle, 6th ed. (London: trol Patients: An Adoption Study," Creativity Research Jour-
Routledge, 1995), p. 11. Psychologists falsely attributing nal 13 (2000-2001): 17-25.
this view to Aristotle include Jamison, Touched with Fire, 27. Arnold Ludwig, The Price of Greatness: Resolv-
p. 51; Robert W. Weisberg, Creativity : Understanding Inno- ing the Creativity and Madness Controversy (New York:
vation in Problem Solving, Science, Invention , and the Arts Guilford Press, 1995), p. 149.
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2006), p. 91; and Albert Rothenberg, 28. Ludwig, The Price of Greatness, p. 1 1.
Creativity and Madness: New Findings and Old Stereotypes 29. Ludwig, The Price of Greatness, p. 8.
(Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 149. 30. Weisberg, Creativity, pp. 380-385; R. Keith Sawyer,
12. Aristotle, Poetics, chap. 17, 1455a32-34, in The Explaining Creativity: The Science of Human Innovation
Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Trans- (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 86-87; and Gary
lation, vol. II, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton University Becker, "The Association of Creativity and Psychopathol-
Press, 1984). ogy: Its Cultural-Historical Origins," Creativity Research
13. Stephen Halliwell, The Poetics of Aristotle: Trans- Journal 13 (2000-2001): 45-53.
lation and Commentary (London: Duckworth, 1987), pp. 50 31. Alternatively, it is sometimes alleged that re-
and 145-148; and D. W. Lucas, Aristotle: Poetics (Oxford searchers are influenced by their belief in the creativity-
University Press, 1968), pp. 177-179. madness link to misattribute one of these traits to people: see
14. For an overview, see Milton C. Nahm, Genius and Rothenberg, Creativity and Madness, p. 150, on Andreasen.
Creativity : An Essay in the History of Ideas (New York: However, several studies, including the Kinney study, use
Harper, 1965). independent testing for creativity and mental illness.
15. Charles Lamb, "Sanity of True Genius," in his Elia 32. Weisberg, Creativity, pp. 367-368.
and the Last Essays of Elia, ed. E. V. Lucas (London: 33. Jamison, Touched with Fire, p. 95; and Ludwig, The
Methuen, 1912), p. 212. Price of Greatness, p. 5.
16. Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rational- 34. Ludwig, The Price of Greatness, p. 1 47. The popula-
tion estimate was made by the Epidemiological Catchment
ity , P recommitment, and Constraints (Cambridge University
Press, 2000), especially part III. Area study, the largest of the population surveys that Lud-
17. Jerrold Levinson, "Elster on Artistic Creativ-
wig discusses.
ity," in The Creation of Art: New Essays in Philo- 35. Ludwig, The Price of Greatness, chap. 9.
sophical Aesthetics, eds. Berys Gaut and Paisley Liv- 36. This is part of Ludwig's explanation for the vari-
ingston (Cambridge University Press, 2003), especially
ation across domains; see especially his "Method and
p. 238. Madness in the Arts and Sciences," Creativity Research
18. A different objection to the rational making ap- Journal 11 (1998): 93-101. See also Weisberg, Creativity ,
proach is that the creative process cannot be ideological. pp. 378-379.

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 270 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

37. Quoted in G. E. Bentley,47.Jr., Lenain's The

position Stranger
is, in fact, more nuanced
from than Par-
adise: A Biography of William Dutton's Blake (Yale
brief discussion University
might suggest: for instance, Lenain Press
2001), pp. 377-378. thinks that apes, though they should not be credited with
38. Thomas C Schelling, The
making art in Strategy
anything like the human of Conflict
sense, have an el-
(Harvard University Press, ementary 1960), aesthetic
p. sensibility
18. (Lenain, Monkey Painting ,
39. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford p. 177); and he discusses the chimp Congo, who would get
University Press, 1984), pp. 12-13. annoyed if his painting were removed before he was finished
40. Parfit, Reasons and Persons , p. 13. with it (p. 91). Lenain's account has also been challenged:
41 . Reported in Jamison, Touched with Fire, p. 245. Peo- see Frans de Waal, The Ape and the Sushi Master: Cultural
ple vary, though: seventy-seven percent of subjects in the Reflections by a Primatologist (London: Penguin, 2001),
studies found that lithium enhanced their productivity or chap. 4.
did not affect it. 48. See my "Creativity and Imagination," in The Cre-
42. Henry James, "Preface to The Spoils of Poynton," ation of Art, ed. Gaut and Livingston, especially pp. 149-151;
in The Creative Process , ed. Ghiselin, p. 151. and my "The Philosophy of Creativity," Philosophy Com-
43. A. E. Housman, The Name and Nature of Poetry , in pass 5 (2010): 1034-1046, especially pp. 1040-1041.
The Creative Process , ed. Ghiselin, pp. 90-91. 49. Product-value rationality must be exercised at some
44. Ernst Kris, writing in the Freudian tradition, argues point in the creative process, but it need not be exercised at
that artistic creativity involves regression in service of theevery point: for instance, free association requires one to set
ego, by which he means that the ego's secondary (rational) aside judgments of value, but product- value rationality in
processes use the more primitive (primary) processes of the this sort of case is exercised at the later selection and edit-
id in the creative act. See Ernst Kris, Psychoanalytic Explo- ing phase. However, since product-value rationality is only
rations in Art (New York: International Universities Press, one kind of rationality, one can exercise it continuously in
1953), especially chap. 3. The tenability of psychoanalyticthe creative process, even when the process simultaneously
accounts is widely disputed by psychologists, but it is worth involves elements that are irrational or nonrational in other
noting that Kris's account has the same basic structure asrespects.
that which I have identified, since a rational process em- 50. This article is a revised version of the 2011
ploys a different kind of process (though, given the role of Wollheim Memorial Lecture, delivered on Friday, Octo
imagination in primary processes, I would argue that pri-28, 2011, at the 69th Annual Meeting of the American S
mary processes should count as nonrational, rather thanety for Aesthetics. I owe my interest in creativity in par
irrational). the writings of Richard Wollheim, who pursued the ques
45. To say that Sylvia is irrational simplicitęr (or sim- of how art is made- and relatedly the question of creativ
ply irrational, as I will also put it) is not to say that she in art- throughout his long career. There is also a more
is completely irrational or even overall irrational. Rather, cific reason for the coupling of Wollheim and creativity
being irrational simpliciter contrasts with the complex state my mind. Paisley Livingston and I organized a confer
of being rationally irrational. Sylvia is simply irrational in in 2000 called "The Creation of Art," which was inten
a certain respect, in being weak willed; but she can be ra- in part to explore themes in Wollheim's work and which
tional in other respects. And, as I shall argue shortly, she attended. It was in writing a paper for that conference t
must be rational in one particular respect if she is to be I first began to think about creativity. Versions of this a
creative. cle were also delivered at the "Touched: Philosophy M
46. Quoted in Denis Dutton, The Art Instinct : Beauty, Art" conference in Liverpool, at New York Univers
Pleasure, and Human Evolution (Oxford University Press, Edinburgh University, and the University of St. Andre
2009), p. 7; Dutton draws on Thierry Lenain, Monkey Paint- I am grateful to audiences at all these occasions for th
ing (London: Reaktion, 1997). helpful comments on the article.

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