INTERPOL

Radiological Nuclear Countermeasures

Template
Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention
(RadNuc) Unit

Original: English
Available in: Arabic, English, French, Spanish

INTERPOL For official use only

Introduction
“Two decades after the end of the Cold War, we face a cruel irony of history — the risk of a
nuclear confrontation between nations has gone down, but the risk of [a] nuclear attack has
gone up. It is increasingly clear that the danger of nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest
threats to global security to our collective security." President Barak Obama address to the
Nuclear Security Summit 2010

Radiation is all around us and comes in different forms. It only becomes a concern when it is
above background levels. Nuclear and other radioactive materials, or materials that produce
radiation above the normal background rate, are generally well protected.

However, the possibility that terrorists or other criminals might obtain nuclear or radioactive
materials for malicious use has become a real threat to global security and has become more
acute due to advances in information technology, financial globalization and the increased
use of such materials for lawful purposes.

The consequences of a terrorist group developing the capacity to use nuclear or radioactive
materials to achieve their goals could be catastrophic.

The world’s law enforcement services must be prepared to confront the threat presented by
terrorists who have developed a nuclear capability, either by obtaining a complete nuclear
device, albeit this scenario is highly unlikely, or obtaining the materials and attempting to
create one. The protection of civil nuclear facilities is an issue of great importance as well.
There is also the risk of terrorists dispersing radioactive material that is dangerous to human
life. Several methods of dispersal are possible and police services need to consider how to
prevent and respond to these situations.

Additionally, nuclear or other radioactive materials are appearing with increasing frequency
in organized and environmental crimes, such as illegal disposal schemes carried out for
profit.

Dangerous levels of radiological contamination can easily spread from one country to the
next. As such, the threats of Radiological Nuclear terrorism affect not just individual
countries but entire regions. Moreover, such an event would have alarming ramifications for
national security and economic and political stability on a global level. Accordingly, the
prevention of such incidents is of the highest priority.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the lead international agency that works
for the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. Its key roles

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contribute to international peace and security, and to the world's Millennium Goals for
social, economic and environmental development. One of its responsibilities is to provide
guidance on the safe and secure management of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

All nuclear and other radioactive materials are required by international law to be licensed
as are the institutions that hold, produce, transport or otherwise use them and the IAEA is
the regulatory authority for this. It is when nuclear and other radioactive materials fall out
of regulatory control that the matter becomes one of particular interest to law enforcement
agencies. Being out of regulatory control can include materials that are lost or stolen and the
possession of materials in this manner, is an offence and potentially very harmful both to the
person(s) in possession of the materials and people within the communities where the
material is being held. Generally, radioactive materials used for malicious purposes have
been obtained by criminal means, for example smuggled or stolen from facilities that use
and/or store them.

Nuclear and other radioactive materials that are within regulatory control will be held in a
safe and secure manner with appropriate safeguards surrounding them, although the degree
of safety & security surrounding non-nuclear radioactive isotopes is not as stringent as that
which is applied to nuclear materials. This is another area of interest/concern to law
enforcement officials. Nuclear and other radioactive materials that are out of regulatory
control, i.e. being held unlawfully may not have such safeguards surrounding them,

The purpose of this template is to highlight: the risk of nuclear material/radioactive isotopes
from falling into the hands of terrorists or other criminals; the vulnerability of this material;
and the vulnerability of institutions where they are legitimately held.

The template will provide a brief overview of the material, the legitimate purpose it may be
used for and the type of premises where it may be found. It will explain some of the
vulnerabilities to the material/premises and list some of the agencies that may assist law
enforcement communities with securing the material/premises, thereby preventing its
theft/loss and subsequent possession by terrorists or other criminals.

The template will also explain how INTERPOL’s Radiological Nuclear Terrorism Prevention
Unit (part of the INTERPOL CBRNE Terrorism Prevention Programme) can assist Law
Enforcement Agencies through a process of partnership engagement with the industries
concerned to ensure a greater understanding of the threat, risk and vulnerabilities they face
with regard to nuclear material / radioactive isotopes that are legitimately held, together

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with the development of response protocols and contingency plans that will help reduce the
risk of such material from falling into the hands of terrorists or other criminals.

The material (see Appendix A)

 Nuclear material
Uranium – Natural, Low enriched, Highly enriched.
Particularly 235U, exists in nature with low fraction 0.7% of natural uranium.
Plutonium
Particularly 239Pu, (produced in nuclear reactors). Highly lethal, but not highly
radioactive.
There are other types of nuclear material, but the above are the ones that would be
of particular concern, should they fall out of regulatory control and be acquired by
terrorists or other criminals.

 Radioactive Isotopes:
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) categorises radioactive isotopes as
either category 1, 2 or 3. IAEA Code of conduct for the safety and security of
radioactive sources.

Category 1 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected would be likely to

cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact
with them, for more than a few minutes. It would probably be fatal to be close to this
amount of unshielded material for a period of a few minutes to an hour. These
sources are typically used in practices such as radiothermal generators, irradiators
and radiation teletherapy.

Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause

permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with
them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this
amount of unshielded material for a period of hours to days. These sources are
typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate
brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy.

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 Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause
permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with
them, for some hours. It could possibly – although unlikely – be fatal to be close to
this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These
sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high
activity sources (for example, level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and
spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. (IAEA Code of Conduct)

There are many radioactive sources and examples of these are:

Caesium-137
This is used in: food irradiation; a wide variety of industrial instruments; medical
diagnosis and treatment; the sterilisation of medical equipment.
Cobalt-60
This is used in: cancer radiotherapy; non-destructive testing of welds and castings;
large variety of measurement and test instruments; food irradiation.
Strontium-90
This is used as: tracers in medical and agricultural studies; power source in specialist
long-life, light-weight power supplies; electron tubes; treatment of eye diseases and
bone cancer.
Americium-241
This is used in: Smoke alarms, Calibration sources, Control gauges.
Iridium-192
This is used in: Industrial radiography, Calibration sources, Industrial gauges.

Locations (see Appendix B)

 The types of venues where nuclear material is legitimately held are:
o Nuclear power plants
o Fuel processing facilities
o Universities
o Military facilities
o National laboratories
 The types of venues where radioactive isotopes are legitimately held are:
 Hospitals
 Universities

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  Oil Wells
 Construction sites
 Industries (a wide range of)
 Food processing plants/Agricultural industries
 Modern buildings including homes – smoke alarms; computer printers
 Cinemas/Movie theatres
 Transportation vehicles

The risk

The security infrastructure surrounding nuclear installations is robust, particularly with

regard to the manufacture, transportation and storage of nuclear weapons (for those
countries that possess them), although the July 2012 incursion onto the Y12 nuclear security
complex in the USA, revealed that even these establishments can be found wanting. Whilst
there was no threat or any risk to the nuclear material itself, those persons trespassing on
the site were able to do so with some impunity and for a significant period of time. The
security surrounding reprocessing plants, research reactors and research universities, which
hold nuclear material, whilst fairly rigid is not as vigorous. Consequently there is a possibility
that persons with criminal intent may seek to exploit this lower level of security in order to
access nuclear material. Should they do so there is a very real risk of them developing an
improvised nuclear device (IND) or trafficking the material thereby allowing others to
develop and detonate an IND. Whilst an IND would not produce a nuclear yield as this
requires nuclear fusion, which will only be obtained by a conventional nuclear weapon, it
would have a devastating effect in terms of death, injury and contamination.

Another concern is the security surrounding radioactive isotopes. Many of these are held in
common locations within communities, e.g. hospitals, health centres, universities,
commercial industry etc., and whilst there are security safeguards in place they are not
always rigidly adhered to. There are many examples that may be cited where security
checks have revealed extremely lax practices, e.g. the security code to a cabinet in a hospital
where radioactive isotopes were stored, having the security code written on the door and
other cases where cabinets that house radioactive isotopes have been left unlocked for
periods of time, suffice to add that criminals/terrorists will seek to exploit these omissions. It
is also relatively easy to strip a radioactive source from a large industrial machine that uses a

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radioactive isotope as part of its mechanism, for example a radiotherapy machine in a
hospital, or a sterilization machine in a food processing plant.

Again persons with criminal intent may seek to exploit such lax security and steal radioactive
isotopes and there is a very real risk of them being used to create a Radiological Dispersal
Device, which is also referred to as a Radiation Dispersal Device (RDD). Alternatively as with
nuclear material, it may be trafficked by criminals/criminal organizations to persons that
would use them for this purpose. Whilst it is unlikely that an RDD would be as lethal as an
IND, it would cause widespread harm and contamination and the use of such a weapon by
terrorists would have a huge psychological and economic impact on communities with long
term implications for the government of a country where one was detonated.

An example of the impact this could make occurred in Russia in 1996, when a television
reporter received a tip off that a ‘radioactive weapon’ had been hidden in Izmaylovsky Park,
in eastern Moscow. Following an extensive search, a container containing Caesium-137
strapped to sticks of dynamite was discovered. It was believed that this had been planted by
Chechen rebels, although this has never been proven. Whilst there was no detonation of the
device, it caused widespread concern amongst the population at that time, and had it been
detonated that concern/anxiety would have increased exponentially. The key thing is that
the threat of such a device being used promotes fear within the general public and if one
were to be detonated then the wider implications of this on a government and the economy
of a country would be extensive.

Radioactive isotopes do not have to be used as part of a bomb to cause harm, in fact they do
not need to be dispersed/disseminated in any way to produce a damaging effect. Simply
leaving a radioactive isotope concealed in a place where a person or persons will be exposed
to the radiation will be enough to cause at the least a long term adverse effect on someone’s
health and at the worst, severe sickness or even death. There have been examples of where
this has taken place, for example: In France at the La Hague reprocessing plant, a man tried
to kill his employer with radioactive discs which he placed under the seat of his employer’s
car. The use of a radioactive isotope in this manner is referred to as a Radioactive Emission
Device (RED).

Radioactive material is highly toxic and another means of using a radioactive isotope to
cause serious harm or death is by poisoning someone with it. Examples of this include:
Rhode Island USA (1998) a student mixed Iodine-125 in his fellow students food with the
deliberate intention of poisoning them; Germany at WAK, a small scale reprocessing plant in

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Karlsruhe (2001), a man attempted to poison his ex-wife with plutonium that he had stolen
from work. Probably the best known example is the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, in
London in November 2006. Litvinenko was a Russian dissident who received a lethal dose of
radiation poisoning, through the ingestion of Polonium-210. The implications of this
particular case for the Metropolitan Police Service, the UK Health Protection Agency, the UK
Government and other agencies was immense and the multi-agency operation surrounding
the investigation ran for many months and the investigation remains ongoing after seven
years.

There have been many recorded cases of the theft of radioactive isotopes and often these
will only come to light when an inventory is carried out at a site where they are used. An
example of this is a recent case in Syria (2012) where it was discovered that fourteen
radioactive sources were missing from two oil exploration sites, Homs and Al-Hasaka, both
part of the Kahtanea oil field. These sources were used in mining and oil exploration devices
such as: density and moisture gauges, industrial gamma projectors and pilots for crawler
radiography. At the time of the theft, the radioactive decay of the sources was significant.
This is being investigated as a theft of radioactive sources. A more recent example of the
theft of a radioactive source took place in Moscow, where police reported that they had
‘detained a college teacher who had a 14 Kilograms of a dangerous radioactive substance in
his home and garage’. Russian media has reported from open sources that it is believed that
the teacher had been to the Chernobyl site and removed radioactive material, thought to be
scrap metal and contaminated soil from there with the intention of using it to irradiate
another person. (March 2013).

Every year, thousands of sources are decommissioned or abandoned throughout the world.
In addition there are many ‘orphan sources’ these being radioactive isotopes that have
become lost, much of this followed the collapse of the former soviet union and the
subsequent loss of control/security surrounding such material. According to the IAEA there
are a large number of ‘lost or stolen’ radioactive sources that remain unaccounted for
throughout the world. While regulatory requirements for in-place secure storage exist, the
US Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) works to remove these unused and unwanted
sources for permanent, safe disposition. As part of the US National Nuclear Security
Administration’s nuclear security mission, GTRI works to reduce and protect vulnerable
nuclear and radiological materials located at sites worldwide. However there are still
occasions when radioactive sources are removed from abandoned items of equipment that

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have been dismantled for scrap. The contamination of scrap metal by radioactive material
being mixed with it is a continuing problem. An example of this is the Goiânia accident in
Brazil in 1987, where an old radiotherapy source, which contained a small quantity of
Cesium-137 was stolen from an abandoned hospital site in the city and led to widespread
contamination of parts of the city, a number of deaths, sickness and a catastrophic impact
on the population and the economy of Goiânia.

Radioactive materials can be found in many places and law enforcement personnel need to
become familiar with what is within their jurisdiction. Most major sources will be known to
the safety regulator in the country because they will be licensed and/or in a licensed facility,
but some of these sources are highly portable (such as radiography equipment) and may be
legitimately moved from one jurisdiction to another.

Triggers
There are a number of suspicious behaviour triggers that that could indicate a behavioural
resolve or intent by someone to engage in the unlawful acquisition of nuclear or other
radioactive material. These can include:

Outsider threat
 Attempts to penetrate premises where nuclear or other radioactive material is kept.
 Suspicious or unusual interest in facilities housing nuclear or other radioactive
material, this could include approaching staff that work at a facility and trying to
obtain information regarding the facility itself or expressing an interest in the security
surrounding it.
 Suspicious people loitering outside facilities that house nuclear or other radioactive
material; taking notes, photos, video recording or drawings (surveillance).
 Making breaches into the security of the facilities.
 Attempts to acquire access passes, key codes or other means of access.
 Attempts to obtain identification documents of staff working at facilities that house
nuclear or other radioactive material.

Insider threat (trusted person)

 Change in that person’s political, religious or social ideology, particularly if
accompanied by a changing attitude towards violence.

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  Unexplained periods of absenteeism.
 Dramatic change in appearance.
 Becoming withdrawn or unwilling to socialise.
 Becoming furtive, secretive or excessively anxious or suspicious.
 Sudden change in financial status, such as coming into a lot of money.
 Desire to work alone or outside regular working hour, without explanation.
 Interest in working outside their usual role to gain access to nuclear or other
radioactive material.
 Unusual interest in the security of the facilities.
 Downloading technical information on CBRNE agents not relating to their work.
 Evidence of record tampering or covering-up action.
 Attempt by the person to conceal aspects of their work.

Law enforcement engagement

It is important for law enforcement officers to engage with the agencies/people within their
jurisdiction that legitimately hold/use nuclear or other radioactive materials. This will
include premises such as those listed in Appendix B (the list is not exhaustive) and others
where it may be found albeit the premises themselves are not licensed to hold nuclear or
other radioactive materials, for example scrap metal dealers. They should establish a sound
relationship with the key people within these agencies/industries/businesses etc., to discuss
security arrangements for the safeguarding of the materials that they hold and to develop
effective response protocols/contingency plans for the local law enforcement responders.
These will include security infrastructure, alarm systems, response mechanisms and will
involve an effective partnership working with the local police, a facilities security staff and its
management team. Through the establishment of a close working relationship between
employees of facilities/commercial premises that hold nuclear or other radioactive materials
and the police, a mechanism and environment that will allow and encourage the reporting of
suspicious behavior/incidents by those employees will be created.

These response protocols and contingency plans need to be enshrined in memoranda of

understanding, which will be signed and endorsed by both the local police commander and
the facilities executive. The systems that have been agreed will require regular testing and
the response mechanisms will require periodic exercising, to ensure they work.

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The stronger the relationship that exists between law enforcement personnel, security staff
and those responsible for the management of security and safeguarding systems at facilities
that hold nuclear or other radioactive materials, the more effective will be the capability to
protect them.

Law enforcement agencies employ counter terrorist security advisors or have access to them
and these can provide expert advice about target hardening of facilities and the materials
that they contain. They can also provide expert advice on the security vetting of staff that
work at such premises and with these materials.

Things to consider – protection 3D:

 Deter: Improve/enhance the overt physical and electronic security measures
that might provide a serious deterrent to a would be intruder.
 Detect: Improve/enhance the alarm systems to ensure detection of an
attempted
entry. This can also include the CCTV recording of an incident.
 Delay: Improve/enhance the physical security measures that will delay any
intruder for a sufficient length of time to allow for an effective
response.

For the above to work effectively, it is essential that detection comes before delay.
Detection must be achieved at the earliest possible point.

Things to consider – protection 3P:

 Premises: These must have good security measures which comply with the above
Deter, Detect, Delay (3D) planning process.
 People: Steps should be taken to reduce the access to nuclear and other
radioactive materials thereby ensuring only those who are trained and
trusted have authorized access.
 Policies: As there is usually a frequent turnover of staff, a facility or site which
holds nuclear and other radioactive materials must have a security
policy
that is constantly reviewed and updated.

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Agencies that can assist
 INTERPOL’s CBRNE Terrorism Prevention Programme (CBRNE TPP)
The INTERPOL CBRNE Terrorism Prevention Programme’s mission is to counter the
CBRNE terrorist threat through the provision of intelligence and threat analysis,
together with a programme of awareness training and capability/capacity building to
the member countries of INTERPOL. Additionally it provides access to specialised
expertise in this particular field of law enforcement.
 INTERPOL Radiological Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit (Rad Nuc TPU)
Within INTERPOL’s CBRNE TPP is the Radiological Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit
(Rad Nuc TPU). Through its work within the international community, in particular its
partnership working with the below list of agencies and others, it is able to assist
international law enforcement agencies with the provision of expert advice, guidance
and support in the development of response protocols and contingency plans to help
reduce the risk of nuclear or other radioactive material from falling into the hands of
terrorists or other criminals.

 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Office for Nuclear Security (Part of the
UN)
The Office of Nuclear Security is responsible for coordinating and implementing the
Agency's Nuclear Security Plan to prevent, detect and respond to acts of nuclear
terrorism and threats thereof.
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (US)
The FBI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, or WMDD, has built a cohesive
and coordinated approach to incidents involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or
chemical weapons—with an overriding focus on prevention. To do its job, the WMDD
proactively seeks out and relies upon intelligence to drive preparedness,
countermeasures, and investigations designed to keep threats from becoming reality.
It also taps into the tactical and technical expertise of other FBI operational and
support divisions, embedding personnel in these components as needed and
coordinating investigations and initiatives. Throughout these efforts, the WMDD
supports the broader work of the U.S. government as a leading partner and active
contributor to policy decisions.

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 Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) (US)
The NNSA is responsible for the management and security of the United States
nuclear weapons, nuclear non-proliferation, and naval reactor programs. It also
responds in coordination with other agencies to nuclear and radiological
emergencies in the United States and abroad. Additionally, NNSA federal agents
provide safe and secure transportation of nuclear weapons and components and
special nuclear materials along with other missions supporting the national security.
 Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) (US)
The mission of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative is to reduce and protect
vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide.
 Second Line Defense (SLD) (US)
The Office of Second Line of Defense works to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear and
radiological materials by securing international land borders, seaports and airports
that may be used as smuggling routes for materials needed for a nuclear device or a
radiological dispersal device. This is part of the Department of Energy NNSA.
 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)
The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) is an international
partnership of 85 nations and four official observers committed to working
individually and collectively to implement a set of shared nuclear security principles.
The mission of the GICNT is to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and
respond to nuclear terrorism by conducting multilateral activities that strengthen the
plans, policies, procedures, and interoperability of partner nations. The United States
and Russia serve as Co-Chairs of the GICNT
 EU CBRN Centres of Excellence (EU CBRN CoE)
EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence project, launched in 2010, is an
Initiative of the European Union. It is implemented jointly by the European
Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the United Nations Interregional Crime
and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). The creation of the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation
Centres of Excellence (CBRN CoE) aims to implement a coordinated strategy for CBRN
risk mitigation at international, regional and national levels. The origin of the risk can
be criminal (proliferation, theft, sabotage and illicit trafficking), accidental (industrial
catastrophes, in particular chemical or nuclear, waste treatment and transport) or
natural (mainly pandemics).

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Conclusion
The threat from the illicit use of nuclear or other radioactive materials is real and the
potential for harm by such actions is immense. It is of such international concern that the
statement made by President Obama at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit continues to
resonate with world leaders. Following the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, the Seoul
Communique was published and it includes the following statement:

‘We, the leaders, gathered in Seoul on March 26-27, 2012, renew the political commitments
generated from the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit to work toward
strengthening nuclear security, reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism, and preventing
terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials. Nuclear
terrorism continues to be one of the most challenging threats to international security.
Defeating this threat requires strong national measures and international cooperation given
its potential global political, economic, social, and psychological consequences‘.

The activity of the Nuclear Security Summit is maintained as preparations are underway for
the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, which will be held in The Hague in The Netherlands in
March of next year. This process continues to help drive the international forum on
combatting and preventing nuclear or radiological terrorism.

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Appendix A

The material

 Nuclear material
Includes:
Uranium
Naturally Occurring Uranium - 238U
Low Enriched Uranium (LEU)
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) – e.g. 235U

Plutonium
Nuclear Reactor produced Plutonium-239.

 Radioactive Isotopes:
There are many radioactive sources and examples of these are:

Cesium-137

 Food irradiation
 Wide variety of industrial instruments
 Medical diagnosis and treatment
 Sterilisation of medical equipment
 Calibration Sources
 Industrial Radiography

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  Well Logging

Cobalt-60

 Cancer radiotherapy
 Non-destructive testing of welds and castings
 Large variety of measurement and test instruments
 Food irradiation
 Industrial Radiography
 Calibration Sources

Strontium-90

 Tracer in medical and agricultural studies

 Power source in specialist long-life, light-weight power supplies
 Electron tubes
 Treatment of eye diseases and bone cancer
Americium-241

 Smoke alarms
 Calibration sources
 Control gauges

Iridium-192
 Industrial radiography
 Calibration sources
 Industrial gauges

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Appendix B
 The types of venues where nuclear material is legitimately held are:

 Nuclear power plants and fuel processing facilities

 Universities - research laboratories, research reactors

 Military facilities – weapons, industrial use, plus others (e.g. military hospitals)

 The types of venues where radioactive isotopes are legitimately held are:

 Hospitals – radiotherapy treatment, x-ray machines, cancer therapy units and

implantable isotopes/equipment, sterilization equipment

Cancer therapy Blood irradiator X-ray machine Sterilization

equipment

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 Oil Wells - well logging and pipeline inspection, radiography equipment

 Construction sites

Moisture density gauges Radiography equipment

 Industries - gauges for all types of uses

 Food processing plants/Agricultural industries - sterilization equipment

 Modern buildings including homes - smoke detectors

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 Printers - ionization systems to precipitate static

 Cinemas/Movie theatres - Tritium exit signs.

 Transport – Gauges in trucks, planes, ships.

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