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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Nuclear energy, energy that is released in significant amounts in processes that

affect atomic nuclei, the dense cores of atoms. It is distinct from the energy of
other atomic phenomena such as ordinary chemical reactions, which involve only
the orbital electrons of atoms. One method of releasing nuclear energy is by
controlled nuclear fission in devices called reactors, which now operate in many
parts of the world for the production of electricity. Another method for obtaining
nuclear energy, controlled nuclear fusion, holds promise but has not been perfected
by 2020. Nuclear energy has been released explosively by both nuclear fusion and
nuclear fission. See also nuclear power.

Nuclear incidents involve detonation of a nuclear device whereas radiological

incidents produce radiation without detonation of a nuclear device.

Nuclear incidents (blast, detonation,explosion) Involves a nuclear explosion

(fission) Victims can have contamination and/or exposure Examples:

Nuclear weapon detonation, Improvised Nuclear Device detonation

A radiological emergency may be defined as any situation which gives rise to an

abnormal or unexpected radiation hazard. This definition covers anything from a
minor laboratory spill involving a few megabecquerels of radioactive solution up
to a major reactor accident in which many thousands of terabecquerels of fission
products may be released. Basically an emergency can arise because of:

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1. A loss of shielding, resulting in high radiation levels.

2. A loss of containment, resulting in a release of activity.

3. An uncontrolled criticality, which is, effectively, the rapid generation of a large

radioactive source and high levels of radiation.

i. LOSS OF SHIELDING
ii. Small sealed sources

Small sealed sources, usually y-emitters, are widely used in industry, medicine and
teaching. It is unlikely that a source of less than say 100 MBA could result in
excessive dose to a person (unless, for example, it was carried in the pocket) and so
loss of shielding would probably be a local incident. Such sources are usually
handled by tongs and stored in small lead-lined pots. The most common loss of
shielding incidents occur when a source is removed from its container by some
person who fails to return it. The best method of protecting against this situation is
to use installed alarm instruments which show when the source is out of its pot.
Regular source musters minimize the possibility that the situation will remain
undetected for a long period of time.

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 CHAPTER TWO

Safety Fundamentals publication in regard to nuclear installations regard to nuclear

installations Radiation protection objective

Radiation protection objective: To ensure mitigation of the radiation. Mitigation

of the radiation consequences of any accident consequences of any accident

Technical safety objective: Technical safety objective: To take all reasonably

practical measures to prevent reasonably practical measures to prevent accidents in
nuclear installations and to accidents in nuclear installations and to mitigate their
consequences mitigate their consequence

 New Preparedness and Response Safety Requirements

i. Take migratory action at the scene;
ii. Prevent deterministic effects;
iii. Render first aid and treat radiation injuries;
iv. Reasonably reduce stochastic effects
v. Reasonably limit non Reasonably limit non--radiological effects;
vi. Reasonably protect the environment
vii. Reasonably prepare for the resumption of normal activity
 Responsibility of the operator (people at scene)
 Immediate actions to preventing/ reducing Immediate actions to preventing/
reducing releases and/or exposures and other source of releases and/or
exposures and other source of hazards
Experience shows -- must have arrangements to:
1. Recognize an emergency condition
2. Direct the immediate mitigatory action actions
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 3. Must address serious Must address serious –– unlikely emergencies
4. Consider all aspect of the mitigatory action and Consider all aspect of the
mitigatory action and condition present during the emergency condition
present during the emergency
5. Requires immediate action by the operator Requires immediate action

Large sealed sources

Large sealed sources such as those used for industrial processing or radio- graphy
and medical radiotherapy are usually housed in specially constructed containers
with mechanical means for controlling the time of exposure. The containers are
designed to withstand normal mechanical accidents and to resist fire. The
possibility of inadvertent exposure of the source is minimized by the design of the
equipment, but alarm systems are desirable to detect fault conditions. The majority
of accidents involving sources of this type have been in industrial radiography.
This process is often performed in difficult conditions on construction sites where
no form of installed monitoring equipment is used. A number of accidents have
occurred in which the radioactive source had become detached from the operating
mechanism and when the mechanism was retracted into the storage position the
source remained unshielded. In some cases the source was found by some person
who, being unaware of its nature, placed it in a pocket. As a result very large, and
sometimes fatal, doses were received. Apart from using the appropriate equipment,
prevention of this sort of situation requires good training and strict adherence to a
monitoring procedure by Radiological emergencies are situations involving a
radiation exposure from a radioactive source. When referring to an emergency
situation regardless of its type, “radiation emergency” term is often used.

 Radiological incidents

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 o Victim can have contamination and/or exposure
o Examples:
 Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD): explosive/non-explosive
 Hidden radioactive source: radiological exposure device (RED)

Lessons Learned
 Experience shows workers and respond at Experience shows workers
and respond at greatest risk
1. Did not knowing what to do did not knowing what to do
2. Where not provided with appropriate Where not provided with
appropriate equipment
3. All possible people/conditions not considered

 In plant operators
 Off-site responders site responders
 People in near in near-by areas

The information contained in this document cannot be changed or modified in any

way and should serve only the purpose of promoting exchange of experience,
knowledge dissemination and training in nuclear safety.

The information presented does not necessarily reflect the views of the IAEA or
the governments of IAE A Member States and as such is not an official record.

The IAEA makes no warranties, either express or implied, concerning the

accuracy, completeness, reliability, or suitability of the information. Neither does it
warrant that use of the information is free of any claims of copy right infringement.

The use of particular designations of countries or territories does not imply any
judgment by the

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IAEA as to the legal status of such countries or territories, of their authorities and
institutions or of the delimitation of their boundaries. The mention of names of
specific companies or products (whether or not indicated as registered) does not
imply any intention to infringe proprietary rights, nor should it be construed as an
end or semen Torre commendation on the part of the IAEA

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 CHAPTER THREE

Basic Principal for Intervention in Nuclear

Unique Characteristics:

 A very large quantity of radioactive material is present in the core of a

present in the core of a nuclear reactor after any nuclear reactor after any
significant period of power significant period of power operation;
 Significant energy release continues for a very long time after shutdown;
 A reactor has no ‘‘natural’ or ‘intrinsic ’ power level , and rapid power
excursions are possible.

Basic Safety Functions: Functions:

 Confinement of radioactive Confinement of radioactive materials, control of

materials, control of operational discharges, and limitation of accidental
releases;
 Removal of residual heal from the core;
 Control of the reactivity.

Medical Management in nuclear intervention

The past century has seen rapid growth of radiological sciences and nuclear
technologies and their wide applications in our society. While enjoying the benefits
of utilizing them in energy production, radiation medicine and other industries, we
also face the risks from radiological and nuclear incidents, either accidental or
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intended, large-scale or small-size, such as the Cs accident in Goiânia, Brazil
(IAEA, 1988), the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in former USSR
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(IAEA, 1992), the Po poisoning incident in London, UK (Bailey et al., 2008),

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and more recently the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in Japan (IAEA,
2015, IAEA, 2015).

Since the time nuclear energy has been harnessed and was put to use in industry,
medicine, scientific research, military and numerous other fields, undesirable
radiation incidents or accidents of variable scales have time and again
overshadowed the benefits reaped from it by the mankind. 1 Human exposure to
nuclear radiations due to accidents, sabotage and terrorism are a reality and leave
in their wake perplexing challenges to competent but relatively unprepared
healthcare providers.2, 3

The primary principles and objectives of response to nuclear/radiological

emergencies includes mitigation of accidents at the site of occurrence and of
individual health hazards, rendering primary first aid and imparting injury
treatment, reduction of chances of delayed outcomes in the general population,
protection of environment and addressing to their psychological impact. On the
basis of severity of the nuclear/radiological events and their effects, necessary
response should be mobilized without any delay through a trained and equipped
team.4

Each radiation accident may lead to an acute emergency. Assessment for ionizing
radiation exposure and the extent to which the patient is afflicted with radiation
induced damage is to be done immediately. This is important to arrive at the
provisional diagnosis, and to decide the requirement of hospitalization, type of
hospital facility and super-specialty care imperative in the case. The following
primary aspects are required to be deliberated for patient care in accidents due to
radiation:

(a)Assessment of damage and its extent

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 (b) Choosing the type of healthcare facility

(c) Providing suitable medical care

(d) Prognosis assessment

Medical Physicist in Nuclear Security

On the 5th April 2009, Barack Obama addressed a huge crowd in Hradcanske
Square, Prague, in one of the first major foreign policy speeches of his presidency.
He spoke of a post-Cold War world in which the threat of global nuclear war had
receded, but the risk of nuclear attack had not. Hedescribed the Cold War’s legacy
of thousands nuclear weapons, and warned of the menace of nuclear terrorism, and
the ultimate threat “to our global safety, our security, our society, our economy, to
our ultimate survival” [1].

The future of nuclear security is not addressed easily. International, multi-

professional conferences are vital precisely because of the scale of the challenges
and the diversity of expertise required. As a medical physicist, I am no expert in
international diplomacy or nuclear smuggling. Instead, as someone who oversees
all aspects of small-scale radiation use, I hope to draw some parallels between
medical and nuclear uses of radiation, and make some suggestions for both their
futures. The challenges both communities face are the same: controlling access to
dangerous material, creating a strong security culture, cooperating with the wider
world and engaging the public. I would like to focus on three challenges for the
future of nuclear security: public engagement, nuclear terrorism and cyber security.
The medical sector has benefited greatly from the nuclear community’s expertise;
perhaps we can contribute some suggestions in return.

The Current Situation

In the seven years since President Obama spoke of “dangers that recognize no
borders”, much has happened globally. We have experienced the Fukushima
disaster and a series of North Korean weapons tests. Syria has descended into
bloody civil war, the government has collapsed in Libya, and ISIS, or Da’esh, has
taken control of vast swathes of territory. We have endured terrorist attacks in

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Pakistan, Kenya, France, and throughout the Middle East. Diplomatic tensions
have been heightened and populist movements have grown in popularity [2–4].

There has also been tremendous progress. The USA and Russia signed the New
START arms treaty, a historic nuclear deal was struck with Iran, the Amendment
to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) came
into force, and four Nuclear Security Summits have been held, the latest this year.

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 CHAPTER FOUR

Communication in nuclear emergency

After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in Japan (2011) induced
by a major earthquake and a tsunami, European Union (EU) Member States
recognised that legal requirements and practical arrangements of public
communication and transparency in case of a nuclear or radiological emergency in
Europe should change [1]. Nuclear emergency plans in general and public
communication and transparency arrangements in particular, developed after the
Chernobyl accident in the 20th century, did not correspond to the new social and
political environment [2]. Over this period, public information needs changed [3],
the mass media landscape evolved [[4], [5], [6]], cross-border arrangements for
public communication proved rather ineffective [7], stakeholder engagement
became an important aspect of emergency management [8,9] and higher level of
transparency of nuclear safety authorities and industry was required [[10], [11],
[12]].

Although EU Member States (MS) did not experience any direct radiological
consequences, the Fukushima accident had an impact on the increased level of risk
perception of nuclear installations [13], the negative perception from consumers
towards food and other products from Japan [14], the adaptation of legal norms for
residues of radionuclides in food and other products [15] and the nuclear energy
policy changed in some EU countries [16,17].

Not only the Fukushima Daichii accident but also recent nuclear and radiological
emergencies indicate the need to update public communication plans and practices

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in Europe. Tomkiv et al. [24] recognise that one of the most significant
components of uncertainties in nuclear emergency management are contradictory
information and communication aspects, technical and measurement uncertainties,
societal impacts and societal framing, as well as ethical aspects. For instance, the
case of Cs-137 contamination at nuclear safety authorities’ premises in Finland
(STUK) on 7th of March 2016 (INES 1) revealed a mismatch between public
information needs and perceptions versus official communication from the nuclear
safety authorities. The first communication of the nuclear safety authority in
Finland caused great misunderstandings of the event, resulting in high levels of
risk perception among the public (Perko and Martell, 2019).

The unusual event at the nuclear power plant Krško, Slovenia, on 4th of June 2008
showed that cross-border communication in case of a nuclear emergency should be
improved [25]. One of the main communication problems was the poor translation
of press releases from the original Slovenian language in different European
languages (the EU has 24 official languages). For instance, the word “alert” was
wrongly translated into “alarm” at the European level [26]. This caused
unnecessary breaking news on different European television channels, among
others, BBC in the United Kingdom and also in Norway and Luxembourg. In
addition, the original public information on the emergency provided by the
Slovenian Nuclear Safety Authority was presented only in 15% of the newspapers’
articles in Slovenian neigh bouring countries. The rest were not quoting the
original source of information [26].

The successive emergency events at the Tricastin nuclear site during the period
July–September 2008 triggered a new initiative from the operator and the institute
for radiation protection and nuclear safety (IRSN), under the supervision of the
French nuclear safety authority, as they were urged to engage with stakeholders
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[27]. A pluralistic committee was established in order to allow different
stakeholders involved in emergency and post-emergency management to discuss
research results and respond to public concerns. The pluralistic committee gathered
experts from the nuclear power plant operator, the technical support organisation
IRSN, institutional representatives, various local decision-makers and local
stakeholders including the representative of the regional health agency, members
of the Local Information Commission (with representatives of the local authority,
trade unions) and a representative of an environmental non-governmental
organisation.

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 CHAPTER FIVE

Intervention of Co-operation in nuclear emergency

In the past two decades, numerous disasters have taken place in the world and each
of them has caused a lot of financial losses, physical disabilities, and deaths [[1],
[2], [3]]. The Gujarat earthquake in India in 2001, the Bam earthquake in Iran in
2003, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Sichuan earthquake in China in 2008, the
Haiti earthquake in 2010, the Pakistan floods in 2010, the Fukushima nuclear
emergency in Japan in 2011, the Uttarakhand floods in 2013, were examples of the
most devastating ones. Unfortunately, such disasters will also occur in the future,
hence it is quite clear that the humanitarian community should plan to manage
future disasters more appropriately so that their losses are minimized [[4], [5], [6]].

Providing relief and needed items in an efficient manner is the aim of humanitarian
logistics. In the humanitarian space, different agents such as government, local and
international NGOs, the military and private sector organizations are present.
Usually, no single agent has enough resources to manage and respond correctly to
a destructive disaster. Hence, it is necessary to strengthen the coordination and
interaction of various aid agencies [7]. For example, about 700 NGOs and 40
counties provided their humanitarian aids to respond to the Asian Tsunami in 2004
[8,9].

Since each aid agencies has its own culture, operational methods, logistic expertise
and capacity, it is challenging to achieve coordination between them [[10], [11],
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[12], [13]]. However, due to the influential role of coordination in the success of
relief operations, this issue is receiving more attention by practitioners and
researchers.

REFERNCES
1. International Atomic Energy Authority (1977) Handling of Radiation

Accidents, IAEA Proceedings Series STI/PUB/463.

2. ICRP Publication 40 (1984) Protection of the Public in the Event of Major

Radiation Accidents: Principles for Planning.

3. ICRP Publication 28 (1978) The Principles and General Procedures for

Handling Emergency and Accidental Exposures of Workers. Akleyev, 2016

4. Akleyev AV (ed.). Consequences of radioactive contamination of the Techa

River. Chelyabinsk: Kniga, 400p; 2016 (in Russian).

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7. J. Radiol. Prot., 37 (3) (2017), pp. R19-R42

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Tikhomirov, Y.B. Kholina S. Utz et al.

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Publ. Relat. Rev. (2013)

E. Latré et al.

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national context revisited

Energy Pol. (2017) E. Latré et al.

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nuclear energy in Belgium

Energy Res. Soc. Sci. (2019) B.B.F. Wittneben

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Environ. Sci. Pol. (2012)

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A. Nagurney et al.

14.A Generalized Nash Equilibrium network model for post-disaster

humanitarian relief Transport Res Part E (2016)

M. Zhao et al.

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rescue facility locations to improve humanitarian logistics management

Saf Sci (2018)

B. Balcik

16.Coordination in humanitarian relief chains : practices , challenges and

opportunities

Int J Prod Econom J (2010)

G. Aldashev et al.

17.Goodwill bazaar : NGO competition and giving to development

J Dev Econ (2010)

18.H. Mance, Britain has had enough of experts, says Gove. Financ. Times
(2016), (availablehttp://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?
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19.R. Black, Nuclear power “gets little public support worldwide” (2011),
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