Rabor vs.

Civil Service Commission

Cena vs. Civil Service Commission

FACTS
Dionisio Rabor is a utility worker in the Office of the Mayor in Davao City. Because he
already reached the age of 68, he was advised to apply for retirement. However, he wished for
an extension [of service] so that he could still avail of the benefits of the retirement laws given to
the employees of the Government by GSIS. One of the requirements [in the retirement law] is
that you have served for 15 years in the government. By that time, he was just in his 13th year
in the government. That was why he requested for an extension of service. He also presented a
GSIS certificate with a notation to the effect that his service was extended for him to complete
the 15-years requirement for retirement. The Government of Davao City wrote to the Regional
Director of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI (CSRO-XI). Director Cawad then stated that
Rabor’s request was contrary to Memorandum Circular No. 65 for it was stated in that
memorandum that employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 should
not be retained and, only in meritorious cases, may be extend only for 6 months. Mayor Duterte
then informed Rabor about the decision of CSRO-XI and advised him to stop reporting starting
August 16, 1991.
Then, he sent a letter to CSRO-XI asking for extension and asking for another 2 years
so he could avail the benefits given to government employees. His request was denied. Rabor
next wrote to the Office of the President seeking for reconsideration of CSRO-XI. The Office of
the President referred it to the Civil Service Commission but again, CSC dismissed his appeal
and affirmed decision of CSRO-XI and stated CSC M.C No 27, s. 1990:
1. Any request for extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen years
service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the
career service who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) and shall be granted for a period of not exceeding one (1) year.
Plus the fact that as early as October 1988 Rabor already reached the retirement age.
On October 28, 1992, invoking the decision in Cena v. Civil Service Commission, the
petitioner sought for reconsideration and asked for reinstatement with back salaries and benefits.
And again, his reconsideration was denied. Then he filed a petition to the Supreme Court appealing
from CSC. Rabor contends that his case squarely falls within the ruling in the case of Cena.
Opposing, CSC stated that it is different for the court gave the discretion to the Land Registration
Authority.
 CENA’s case
Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metropolitan
Manila. Before reaching his 65th birthday, for his total years in the service will just be 11 years and 9
months bythen, Cena requested the Secretary of Justice, through the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority ("LRA") that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the fifteen-year
service requirement to enable him to retire with the full benefit of an Old-Age Pension under Section
11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. If Cena's request were granted, he would complete fifteen (15) years of
government service on 15 April 1994, at the age of sixty-eight (68) years. CSC affirmed his request
but for 1 year only so he filed an appeal to the SC and the SC granted his request. Thus the court
concluded:
Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) and
Department of Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11
years, 9 months and 6 days of government to complete the fifteen-year service so that he may
retire with full benefits under Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146

The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and ordinary meaning"
of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146.  Section 11 may be quoted in its entirety:

Sec. 11 Conditions for Old-Age Pension. — (a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid to a member who
(1) has at least fifteen (15) years of service;
(2) is at least sixty (60) years of age; and
(3) is separated from the service.
(b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an employee at
sixty-five-(65) years of age with at least fifteen (15) years of service; Provided, that if he has less than fifteen
(15) years of service, he shall he allowed to continue in the service to completed the fifteen (15) years.

While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there were (and still are)
two (2) administrative issuances which prescribe limitations on the extension of service that may be
granted to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age; the Civil Service Commission
Circular No. 27, Series of 1990 and Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President. The
former limits the extension for only three years and the latter, only on meritorious reasons, limits up
to 6 months only. And Medialdea, J. resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2)
administrative regulations by, firstly, considering as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No. 27 and,
secondly, by interpreting the Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65
as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena. Medialdea, J wrote:
 The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an
administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that administrative regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions  . . . The rule on limiting to one
the year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of
sixty-five (65) years, but has less than fifteen (15) years of service under Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 27, S. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relationship or
connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect . The rule was an addition to
or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no
power to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146.

ISSUE:
WON the ruling, regarding the validity of CSC M.C No. 27, in the case of Cena can be use as
basis for granting Rabor’s request.

HELD:
NO. Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail in the statute to
be implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing or enabling
statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be very little need (or
occasion) for implementing administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the inability
of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in respect of any
relatively complex subject matter, that makes subordinate, delegated rule-making by
administrative agencies so important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably; demanded is
a showing that the delegated legislation consisting of administrative regulations are germane to the
general purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately
applied in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to this test we
now turn.

Like what Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes said in the ruling of People v. Exconde case:

It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable
activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may
constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and regulations to implement a
given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and
complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect . All that is required is
 that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to standards that the law prescribes

Plus, not only P.D. No. 1146 is the statute that should appropriately be examined is the
present Civil Service law there is Administrative Code of 1987 which provides  the Commission was
acting as "the central personnel agency of the government empowered to promulgate policies,
standards and guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel administration in the
government."

Another thing, the SC find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible
extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable
relationship or is not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The
physiological and psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings are in fact
related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected from individual persons. The
policy considerations which guided the Civil Service Commission in limiting the maximum extension
of service allowable for compulsory retirees, were summarized by Griño-Aquino, J. in her dissenting
opinion in Cena:

Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that
extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give
a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect discriminate against
those who enter the service at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and of
next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of qualified young
civil service applicants who have already passed the various government examination but
must wait for jobs to be vacated by "extendees" who have long passed the mandatory
retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to complete 15
years so they may qualify for old-age pension.

SC’s conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent:
that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1)
thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be
read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the
head of the government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow
extension of the service of an official or employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age
without completing fifteen (15) years of government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be
exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of
1990.