2012 9th International Conference on Electrical Engineering, Computing Science and Automatic Control

Mexico City, Mexico. September 26-28 , 2012

Optimal Detection of Multiplicative Watermarks in

Laplacian Channels
Mario Gonzalez-Lee, Luis J. Morales-Mendoza
Rene F. Vazquez-Bautista, Efren Morales-Mendoza
FIEC Poza Rica, Universidad Veracruzana
Av. Venustiano Carranza S/N, Col. Revolucion, Poza Rica, Veracruz, Mexico
E-mail:mglezlee@gmail.com

Abstract— In this work, we propose a model for an
optimal detector of digital watermarks for Laplacian
channels, the watermark embedding algorithm is the
multiplicative embedding rule in time domain, the op-
timal detection equation and the threshold equation are
derived using maximum likelihood (ML) and Neyman-
Pearson criterion. The resulting system is blind and has
very low complexity. Computer simulations are carried
out applying the proposed model to audio signals and
results prove that the proposed system is able to de-
tect watermarks even if the watermarked object was
severely attacked by noise, low pass filtering among
other attacks.
Keywords: Digital Watermarking, Laplacian channel,
Maximum likelihood, Neyman-Pearson criterion, Audio
watermarking system.
I. Introduction
Digital watermarking has been an active research field
which had produced very interesting approaches, however,
there is a lot of work that has be done before considering
watermarking as a solid discipline.
A very helpful approach is to establish analogies to
the very strong field of the theory of communication, in
this context, we can think of a watermark as a signal
that propagates through some transmission channel. This
channel can be modeled using a known Probability Density
Function (PDF).
In this work, we focus in the case of the watermark
propagating through a Laplacian channel, a Laplacian
channel is a channel that can be statistically modeled using
a Laplacian PDF.
There are some proposals by other authors that studied
the case of the Laplacian channel, for example, in [1],
the Laplacian model is used to derive a detector for
watermarks in the wavelet transform domain using ML
criterion, and the decision threshold equation is derived us-
ing the Neyman-Pearson criterion. Their work was applied
to image watermarking in the discrete wavelet transform
domain. They compared their results to a similar approach
that considered modeling the discrete wavelet transform
coefficients using a Gaussian distribution and concluded
that Laplacian model can result in a better performance
compared to the Gaussian model approach. However, they
don’t provide any evidence that their model can be used
in practical watermarking systems.
In [2] a semi-blind multiplicative watermarking ap-
proach for audio and speech signals has been introduced.
The detection of the watermark is accomplished by us-
ing the optimal ML detector aided by the channel side
information for Gaussian and Laplacian signals in noisy
environment. They applied their scheme to speech and
audio signals. The algorithm was applied to low frequency
components of the host signal. In addition, the power of
the watermark was controlled to have inaudibility using
perceptual evaluation of audio quality (PEAQ) and per-
ceptual evaluation of speech quality (PESQ) algorithms.
However, a drawback of this proposal is that it is semi-
blind.
The authors of [3] propose a system designed to enforce
the integrity and security of fingerprint images using
watermarking techniques. They apply the ML watermark
detection method to detect the watermark within discrete
wavelet transform (DWT) coefficients of fingerprint im-
ages. The ML method they use is based on Bayes’ decision
theory and the Neyman-Pearson criterion, they use both
Generalized Gaussian (GG) and Laplacian models as PDF.
In [4] a digital watermarking system in the Discrete
Cosine Transform (DCT) domain is proposed. This wa-
termarking system satisfy some perceptual constraints.
Under these constraints, robust and fragile watermark-
ing techniques are designed by varying the watermark
strength. The optimum detection structure is constructed
based on the Laplacian model. It is claimed that it can
detect the tampered regions very accurately. That sys-
tem can be used in copyright notification and protection,
broadcast monitoring and tracking, and authentication
and tamper-proofing.
An finally, a multiplicative spread spectrum watermark-
ing technique in curvelet domain is presented in [5] .
Watermarked curvelet coefficients are modeled using GG
distribution, Laplacian distribution and Cauchy model.
Watermarking detectors are designed employing locally
most powerful (LMP) approach.
In this paper, we derive an optimal detector for the
Laplacian channel that unlike previous approaches, has
very low complexity. First, the derived detector variables

IEEE Catalog Number: CFP12827-CDR

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 2012 9th International Conference on Electrical Engineering, Computing Science and Automatic Control
Mexico City, Mexico. September 26-28 , 2012

in this paper are much simpler than previously discussed k Watermark

User’s Key
approaches, second, both the embedding and detection Generator
is done in temporal domain, furthermore the proposed
system is blind, that is to say, it doesn’t need the original W
cover nor any other parameter such as the embedding gain
as is done in [2]. Our approach only needs the watermarked X Watermark
Cover
signal and a user’s key. Embedding
In next section, we will present the watermark propa-
gation model. XW

II. Watermarking Embedding Model N

Noise Channel
The watermarking model used in this work is presented
in detail in this section, the main properties of the vari- ∗
XW
ables involved in the process are presented as well and
pertinent considerations.
Watermark
The watermarking model is shown in Fig. 1, we can
Assesment
identify the main input variables: the cover, which is a
signal that will carry the watermark, a user’s key which is Fig. 1: Watermark propagation model.
used to generate a pseudo-random signal (the watermark)
and the embedding gain which is related to the embedding
energy of the watermark. The watermarking model just stated are the basis to
In this work, a watermark is a binary signal W = [wi ] derive the model introduced in this work. In next section,
with wi ∈ {−1, 1}. This watermark holds the following the Laplacian statistical model will be discussed.
relations:
III. Laplacian Channel Model
E(W) = 0, (1)
As stated in last section, the cover interferes the wa-
termark, thus effectively taking the same role as the
V(W) = 1. (2) transmission channel. In this work, we are interested in
channels that can be accurately modeled using the lapla-
That is to say, the expected value of the watermark cian PDF, so first we will review the pertinent aspects of
equals zero and its variance equals 1. the Laplacian statistical model.
It is simple to prove that (1) and (2) hold if the number The Laplacian PDF is defined as:
of −1’s equals the number of 1’s in signal W. However,
the demonstration will no be derived here. In [6] a rigorous 1 −| αx |
demonstration is derived. p(x) = e , (3)
2α
This watermark is embedded in the cover signal X in
for −∞ < x < ∞, here we denote a Laplacian PDF with
such a way that it’s not noticeable. Ideally, the cover
parameter α as L(α).
signal doesn’t degrades the watermark, however in practice
Main statistics of Laplacian PDF are its mean, variance
this is not true, the sole embedding process damage the
and the shape parameter α; those values are estimated,
watermark, in consequence, we model the effects of the
given that xi ∈ L(α) as:
cover within the channel block of the model, and attacks to
the watermark are modeled as noise in the channel during N
the propagation of the watermark. 1 X
µ̂ = xi , (4)
Once the watermark reaches the detector, it has to as- N i=1
sess the presence of the watermark, usually by computing
statistics that measures the presence of the watermark σ̂ 2 = 2α2 , (5)
in the possibly watermarked signal and compares it to a
threshold that is also computed. If the computed statis- and
tics surpasses the threshold value, then the watermark is
N
detected, otherwise, the watermark is considered to be 1 X
absent. The complete watermark propagation model and α̂ = |xi |, (6)
N i=1
a block diagram of the detection process are depicted in
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 respectively. for any sequence of length N .
The computed detection statistic is often known as the These statistics for the model will suffice for deriving
decision variable d and the other statistic is the threshold the optimal decision variables, specially, one should keep
T h. in mind (6) which will be very useful latter in this paper.

IEEE Catalog Number: CFP12827-CDR

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978-1-4673-2169-3/12/$31.00 ©2012 IEEE
 2012 9th International Conference on Electrical Engineering, Computing Science and Automatic Control
Mexico City, Mexico. September 26-28 , 2012

k Watermark Thus, if we can estimate the value of g used during the

User’s Key
Generator embedding process, then, we can detect the watermark in
the signal under analysis.
W Considering that the cover, and thus the channel, could
∗ Compute be statistically modeled as L(α) according (3), we will use
Watermarked SW
Detection the ML criterion to derive the optimal detection variable.
Samples Assume that a vector of samples θ is recovered at the
Variable (d)
receiver, then, we have the following likelihood function:
N
Compute Y 1 −| xαi |
L(θ) = e . (9)
Threshold 2α
i=1
(T h)
Next, a logarithmic transform is applied in order to
Th simplify (9):
N 
 xi 
X 
No L = −N ln 2α − (10)
α
 .
Watermark d ≥ Th i=1
0 d
Present Recalling that xi ∈ L(α), we have from (7):
1 yi
xi = , (11)
Watermark 1 + gwi
Present and (10) becomes:
N  
Fig. 2: Watermark detection model. X  yi 
L = −N ln 2α −  α(1 + gwi ) .
  (12)
i=1

IV. Watermark Detection Variables for Now, finding the maximum of (12), we get:
Laplacian Channels N  
∂L X ∂  yi 
In this section, the optimal decision variables will be de- =−  α(1 + gwi ) ,
  (13)
rived considering a Laplacian channel and a multiplicative ∂g i=1
∂g
embedding rule. resulting in the following equation:
A. Watermark Embedding Rule
N   
The multiplicative embedding rule is defined as: ∂L X yi yi
=− Sign wi (1 + gwi )−2 .
∂g i=1
α(1 + gw i ) α
yi = xi (1 + gwi ), (7) (14)
Since wi ∈ {−1, 1} and |gwi | ≪ 1, then 1+gwi is always
where yi is watermarked sample, wi is i -th watermark positive, we can get rid of the absolute value operation,
bit and g is watermark embedding gain which controls and by using the Taylor series for (1 + x)m ≈ 1 + mx for
the watermark energy and robustness. Multiplicative rules |x| < 1, we have:
exhibit several desirable properties, the most important is
the inherent masking effect that allows greater embedding N
strength while watermark imperceptibility holds. ∂L X y  y 
i i
=− Sign wi (1 − 2ĝwi ). (15)
∂g i=1
α α
B. Optimal Detection of Watermarks
Solving (15) for the embedding gain ĝ we get:
We can proceed to derive the optimal detection vari-
ables: the detection variable d, which is a measure of the N  
 yi  w i
P
presence of the watermark within a given signal; and the α
i=1
threshold T h, which provides reference to decide if the ĝ = N
. (16)
y 
signal is watermarked.
P  i
α
A handy approach to watermark detection is performing i=1
an estimation of the gain (ĝ), analyzing (7), clearly, we And finally, since α > 0 the optimal detection variable
have two possible outcomes for an estimator: is given by:
N
(
0 if no watermark was embedded 1 X
ĝ ≈ . (8) d = ĝ = |yi |wi , (17)
g otherwise N αy i=1

IEEE Catalog Number: CFP12827-CDR

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978-1-4673-2169-3/12/$31.00 ©2012 IEEE
 2012 9th International Conference on Electrical Engineering, Computing Science and Automatic Control
Mexico City, Mexico. September 26-28 , 2012

where,
N
1 X
αy = |yi |. (18)
N i=1
In order to detect the watermark, the decision variable d
must be compared to a threshold, a watermark is present
if d ≥ T h, the general threshold equation derived from the
Neyman-Pearson criterion proposed in [6] is given as:

T h = E(d) + erfc−1 (1 − 2Pf p )

p
2 V(d). (19)
Where Pf p is the false positive probability, in other
words the probability that the system determines that a
watermark is present when actually no watermark was
embedded. And erfc−1 (x) is the inverse complementary
Fig. 3: Detection variable response for our worst case cover, it
error function.
was watermarked using key number 500.
Computing both E(d) and V(d) from (17) we get:

N N
1 X µ|yi | X In next section we will evaluate the model as an optimal
E(d) = E(|yi |)wi = wi = 0, (20) estimator of the embedding gain, and then, we will present
N αy i=1 N αy i=1
an evaluation of performance of the model in the presence
1 X
N of attacks.
V(d) = V(|yi |)wi2 , (21)
N 2 αy2 i=1 A. Detector Performance
Since the PDF of a distribution of a random variable |x| One of the most important evaluation parameters for
distributed accordingly f (x) is f (|x|) = f (x) + f (−x) for a watermarking system is the detection behavior of a
x > 0, we have for the L(αy ) that g(x) = 2L(αy ) (Because given model for an arbitrary set of different watermarks;
its symmetry), clearly it becomes an exponential and thus ideally, the detector variable from (17) should have a zero
its variance is αy2 , using (21), we get: response for any watermark different from the embedded
watermark. In practice, it is not possible due the fact that
1 the cover signal is correlated to the watermark. In practical
V(d) = . (22)
N situations, the detector variable outputs a very low value
Finally, the threshold equation is: for any watermark different to the embedded one.
r In a good detection model, only the system’s response
2 to the watermark that was embedded in the cover should
T h = erfc−1 (1 − 2Pf p ) . (23)
N cross the threshold value, furthermore, this response
This completes the derivation of the detection variables should be much larger than the response for any other
for the detection model proposed in this paper. In next watermark, and the smaller the response of watermarks
section, computer simulations will be carried out. different to the embedded one, the better the model is.
In Fig. 3, we can see the computed detection variable, a
V. Computer Simulations gain value of g = 0.02 was used to embed a watermark and
In this section we present simulation results that val- 1000 different watermarks were tested, only the watermark
idate (17) and (23), firstly, we will show the detection that was actually embedded, in this case, watermark
capabilities of proposed model, and then, we will show number 500, crosses the computed threshold (in dotted
that (17) is an accurate estimator of the gain and in line), whilst, the other watermarks produce a very low
consequence, is an accurate watermark detection model. response from the detector variable, which confirms that
All test were carried out under the following scenario: the derived detector is optimal under the ML criterion.
the watermark was embedded in non overlapping blocks Fig. 3 shows the system performance for our worst case,
with length of 2 times the sampling frequency of the however, we can see that the performance of the model is
song using (7). Detection is made in the same block wise remarkable.
approach, d and T h are computed for each block using (17)
and (23) and the responses for each block are accumulated B. Estimator Performance
and averaged. We let Pf p = 10−6 . All sound files used for Since (17) is claimed to be the optimal estimator of the
our tests were uncompressed 16-bit stereo WAV files with embedding gain, in this section, we evaluate the model as
48000 Hz sampling rate. an estimator of g.

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 2012 9th International Conference on Electrical Engineering, Computing Science and Automatic Control
Mexico City, Mexico. September 26-28 , 2012
Fig. 4: Estimation of gain value for different covers, actual
embedding values are shown for comparison.
Fig. 5: Error percentage of error for different covers.
In this experiment, several sound files were watermarked
and the detection variables d and T h were computed; only
twenty results are shown in Fig. 4,we can see in this figure
that all values closely achieve the actual embedding gain.
The percentage of error in the estimation is shown in
Fig. 5, we can see that the worst case is below the 6% of
error in the estimation of d, this is the same worst case
cover used to compute the results in Fig. 3.
The error was computed according the following equa-
tion:
Fig. 6: Detection variable d versus decay value in an echo
addition attack.
C. Detection Performance Under Attacks to the Water-
mark
In this section, we present the system performance when
the watermarked song is attacked so we will be able to
verify if the watermark stills being detectable.
An attack to a watermark is a signal processing oper-
ation that damages the watermark and is either inten-
tional or unintentional. When the attack is done with the
intention of damaging the watermark in order to make
the detector fail to detect the watermark it is called an
intentional attack, otherwise it is called unintentional,
such operations are carried out with different proposes,
for example, compress for reduced hard disk usage, which
is not in fact an effort to wipe the watermark.
First, we added an echo signal in the watermarked song,
the main parameter is the decay factor which controls how
fast the echo decays to zero. The results can be seen in Fig.
6, we can see that the system performs very well for large
values of the decay factor.
Then, additive white noise was added, it can be seen
that the watermark was detected until high amplitude
noise was added. A plot of detection variable versus noise
amplitude is shown if Fig. 7.
The next attack performed is a low pass filter, in
Fig.8 the performance of the system for various cutoff
frequencies is shown, it was expected that the watermark
  is not capable of being detected for low cutoff frequencies
 gactual − ĝ  since a watermark is a signal with mostly high frequencies.
Error = 
  × 100, (24)
gactual  Again, the system exhibits very good performance.
Finally, we present the detection characteristics for an
where gactual is the gain actually used during the embed- inversion attack, the inversion attack exploits the fact that
ding of the watermark, of course ĝ = d. inversion of the phase is not noticeable to the human
In next section, we will perform several performance auditory system, it can be seen in Fig. 9 that this attack
tests when the watermark is attacked. doesn’t affect the watermark detection process at all.

IEEE Catalog Number: CFP12827-CDR

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 2012 9th International Conference on Electrical Engineering, Computing Science and Automatic Control
Mexico City, Mexico. September 26-28 , 2012
Fig. 7: Detection variable d versus noise amplitude in a white
noise addition attack.
Fig. 8: Detection variable d versus cutoff frequency in an low
pass filtering attack.
Fig. 9: Detection variable d for different keys in a invert attack.
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VI. Conclusions
We performed two experiments, in the first one, the song
was watermarked with a watermark length equal to the
number of samples of the song (a full length approach), we
found that this approach has some difficulties, for example,
the memory needed for allocating both the song and the
watermark could be a drawback for some applications,
in addition, a full length detection system based on the
proposed model fails to detect watermarks for many attack
classes, making it a fragile watermark system. For that
reason, we decided to focus in a block wise approach.
Block wise approach has many advantages, first, the
song doesn’t need to be complete and stored in the
receiver, the detection can be started as soon the song
arrives and within a few seconds, the system would be
able to detect the watermark instead of waiting for the
whole song to arrive to the detector, a second advantage,
memory requirement is fairy reduced compared to the full
length approach.
Even when many approaches prefer the use of some
transform domain claiming superior performance, it is
done at the expense of many arithmetic operations, how-
ever in our approach, the number of such operations
is reduced due the low complexity of the detector, in
addition, there is not need of applying any transform
on the data since all process is performed in temporal
domain. Those properties would help for developing real
time applications.
The proposed system achieves a remarkable perfor-
mance, it was able to detect watermarks even under heavy
attacks, so model’s reliability has been proved.
Acknowledgements
Authors wish to thank the FIEC Poza Rica of The
University of Veracruz for the support for this work.
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