AVOIDING CIRCULAR LOGIC IN CLIMATE MODELING

An Editorial Essay

H. RODHE 1 , R. J. CHARLSON 2 and T. L. ANDERSON 3∗

1 Department of Meteorology, Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
2 Department of Atmospheric Sciences and Department of Chemistry, University of Washington,
Box 351640, Seattle, WA 98195-1640, U.S.A.
3 Joint Institute for the Study of the Atmosphere and Oceans, University of Washington, Box 351640,
Seattle, WA 98195-1640, U.S.A.
E-mail: tadand@u.washington.edu

Abstract. The current debate on climate change and its policy implications often hinges on the cred-
ibility of global climate models. In considering this topic, we point out the danger of circular logic
if climate model inputs (specifically, climate forcings) are determined from the same temperature
record against which climate model outputs are tested. We suggest specific guidelines for avoiding
this danger.

Following a careful listing of uncertainties, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change (IPCC) stated in its 1995 scientific assessment:
‘Nevertheless, the balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence
on global climate’. [1]
In arriving at this conclusion, the IPCC relied substantially on climate model
simulations that included both positive climate forcings by greenhouse gases and
negative forcing by anthropogenic sulfate aerosols. Ignoring the fact that the negat-
ive sulfate forcing was developed from independent evidence, some skeptics of the
IPCC statement have accused climate modelers of inventing it in order to bridge the
gap between simulated and observed changes in temperature over the past century
[2]. While we disagree strongly with these skeptics, their accusation does raise an
important issue – the danger of circular logic in climate modeling.
It is true that when negative forcing by anthropogenic sulfate aerosols was added
to climate model simulations, a significantly improved agreement (e.g., see Fig-
ure 1) between measured and modeled temperature changes was observed [3]. This
result, it seems obvious to state, can only be invoked as supporting the hypothesis
of ‘discernible human influence on global climate’ if the forcings were determined
by methods that are independent of the temperature record. Because the negative
sulfate forcing was derived from chemical mass balance considerations and optical
data [4], we are convinced that the IPCC statement is on solid ground in this regard.
∗ Corresponding author.

Climatic Change 44: 419–422, 2000.

420 EDITORIAL ESSAY

Figure 1. Measured and modeled global-annual average surface temperature change from 1860 to
1990. Climate model simulations use greenhouse gas forcings only (dashed line) or the forcings
from both greenhouse gases and sulfate aerosols (solid line). A better fit is obtained when sulfate
aerosols are included than when they are not. This improved agreement, as more known forcings
are added to the models, supports the hypothesis of ‘discernable human influence on global climate’
to the extent that the input forcings have been determined by methods that are independent of the
temperature record. (Adapted from Figure 15 in ref. 1.)

Yet one can find examples in the climate modeling literature of using the tem-
perature record to derive aerosol climate forcings. For example, a paper titled ‘The
Missing Climate Forcing’ uses the discrepancy between measured and modeled
temperature change over the last century to deduce, ‘that aerosol effects on clouds
have caused a large negative forcing, at least –1 Wm−2 ’ [5]. Another author reasons
as follows: ‘By comparing observed differences in hemispheric mean temperatures
with results from a simple climate model, one can place limits on the possible
magnitude of any SO2 derived forcing’ [6]. Similar logic can be found in other
modeling studies [7]. While these papers may not be circular in themselves, it
would be circular to use forcings so derived in a climate simulation that is then
tested against the temperature record.
Climatologists have often used temperature records to explore statistical rela-
tionships with hypothesized forcing agents or mechanisms (e.g., orbital changes,
volcanoes, solar variability, or greenhouse gases [8].) These statistical explorations
are legitimate and valuable. Problems arise, however, if one attempts to quantify
climate forcings from the temperature record. For such an attempt to succeed, four
major conditions must be fulfilled:

1. the quality of the temperature data is adequate for the task,

2. the Earth’s temperature record is a manifestation of the response to forcings,
rather than unforced variability,
3. current models accurately describe the climatic response to forcings, and
 EDITORIAL ESSAY 421

4. all important forcings, their variations, and their uncertainties have been
accurately included except for the one that is to be quantified.
Using temperature records and climate models to deduce climate forcings
(and/or feedbacks) obviously would require a faithful inclusion of all uncertain-
ties. Current uncertainties in direct aerosol forcing (e.g., as given by IPCC [9]),
other forcings (e.g., solar [10]), natural unforced variability of temperature [11],
and climate model sensitivity [12] are sufficiently large that any missing forcing
deduced in this manner would itself have a large uncertainty that includes zero
(see, e.g., [6].)
The notion of a missing forcing is nevertheless an important one, for it under-
lines a fundamental difficulty with all current climate simulations: the probable
existence of forcings imposed on the climate system that we cannot yet quantify
with confidence. Examples of both positive and negative forcings could be cited,
including direct forcing due to soil dust and carbonaceous aerosols and indirect
forcing due to the influence of all kinds of aerosols on clouds. Some of these
forcings may be larger than the direct forcing by sulfate aerosols [13]. They are
suspected of being important because of what is understood about the mass bal-
ances and radiative properties of the respective geophysical systems, not because
of the temperature record. Their improved quantification is a daunting research
challenge.
Should one then attempt to make best estimates of these additional, uncertain
forcings and incorporate them into the climate models? It would seem logical to
do so in the hope that being inclusive of more variables will advance the art of
modeling toward a more definitive validation test against temperature data. On
the other hand, the uncertainties in these additional forcings mean that the current
best estimates may be seriously in error. If a number of groups try out various
magnitudes and combinations of these uncertain forcings, it is likely that some of
the model outputs will show good agreement with observations. This, in turn, might
be mistakenly accepted as confirmation both of the climate sensitivity of the model
and of the magnitudes of the uncertain forcing agents. Herein lies the insidious
danger of circular logic.
Progress in climate modeling requires that this danger be avoided. With this in
mind, we suggest the following guidelines:

• Climate change simulations should, in general, only incorporate forcings for

which the magnitude and uncertainty have been quantified using basic phys-
ical and chemical principles. Other simulations should be considered to be
sensitivity studies.
• Climate models should only be used in conjunction with the temperature
record to quantify poorly known climate forcings if all four conditions lis-
ted above are clearly fulfilled. With the present uncertainties of the climate
system, it is unlikely that such a requirement can be met.
422 EDITORIAL ESSAY

The degree of uncertainty in both climate forcings and models of future climatic
response leaves us in the unsatisfactory situation that all climate predictions are
to some degree conditional. This circumstance will be improved if, and only if,
the forcings are determined more accurately and the models are more completely
validated against observations. The problem at present, as noted over a decade ago,
is that ‘. . . there are still too many tunable parameters in our models and too few
quantitative observations of external climatic forcings over the past century’ [14].
Policy makers should be aware that climate models are not and can never be perfect,
and yet they constitute the only rational means for estimating the effects of the
diverse radiative forcings being imposed on the climate system by human activity.
In this respect, they have been central to our progress to date. By incorporating
forcings determined from physical and chemical principles, these models helped
to form the basis for the IPCC assessment that recent global-scale temperature
variations appear to contain a discernible anthropogenic signal.

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