The middle republic (264–133 

BC)
The first two Punic Wars
Rome’s rapidly expanding sphere of hegemony brought it almost immediately into
conflict with non-Italian powers. In the south, the main opponent was Carthage. In
violation of the treaty of 306, which (historians tend to believe) had placed Sicily in the
Carthaginian sphere of influence, Rome crossed the straits of Messana (Messina;
between Italy and Sicily) embarking on war. (Rome’s wars with Carthage are known as
the “Punic Wars”; the Romans called the Carthaginians Poeni [Phoenicians], from
which derived the adjective “Punic.”)
First Punic War (264–241 BC)

The western Mediterranean during the Punic Wars

Carthage had long enjoyed treaties with Rome. The earliest known, which probably
dated from the first year of the Roman Republic, as Polybius believed (508 or 507 by his
reckoning), may well have renewed previously made contacts with Etruscan Rome. Such
agreements to limit the spheres of interest of the two parties would readily be renewed
by Rome, which in the 5th and 4th centuries had no great interest in what went on
outside Italy and had no objection to the merchants of Carthage dominating the western
Mediterranean. When Rome enrolled some of the Greek cities of south Italy as “naval
allies,” a new situation was created, since these cities had trading interests that the
farmers of Latium had not enjoyed. Further, the Greek cities in Sicily,
especially Syracuse, were being hard pressed by the Carthaginians in the west and
centre of the island, while the Syracusans under Hieron II were challenged by
the Mamertines, Italian mercenaries who had seized Messana and were plundering
northeastern Sicily. The Mamertines appealed to both Rome and Carthage for
assistance, and the Carthaginians, unwilling to see Messana and control of the Sicilian
straits fall into Hieron’s hands, established a Punic garrison in the town. The Romans,
who themselves had expelled another company of mercenaries from Rhegium (Reggio)
in the toe of Italy, captured the Carthaginian commander while under a flag of truce and
compelled the Punic force to withdraw.

Thus Rome and Carthage were brought face to face across the straits, and a crisis was
precipitated by the appeal by Messana. Although some senators hesitated, the Roman
people largely supported war with Carthage. Both Rome and Carthage were eager to
deny to the other control of the straits, and, even if war had been avoided at this point, it
would probably have come in time. A balance of power, such as that which
the Hellenistic monarchies in the East, with longer diplomatic experience and a
common culture, tried to maintain, was more difficult to achieve in the West.

Roman war galley

When the Romans, with Hieron, had occupied eastern Sicily and captured Agrigentum,
they were faced with a decision that fundamentally affected their future history. If they
decided to try to drive the Carthaginians completely out of Sicily, they would have to
smash the Punic navy, and, since they had virtually no ships of their own, they would
have to build a fleet. However, they were practical as well as determined, and before
long they had over 100 ships ready. More surprising was the success that attended this
fleet when it first went into action off Mylae (Milazzo) in 260 and defeated an enemy
with centuries of seafaring experience.

After this victory the Romans in 256 boldly sent an expeditionary force to Africa to
attack Carthage itself, but this daring adventure under Marcus Atilus Regulus ended in
failure. The war dragged on in Sicily, where the Carthaginians were gradually confined
to their western fortresses of Drepana (Trapani) and Lilybaeum (Marsala). When their
fleet was finally defeated off the Aegadian (Egadi) Islands in 241, they capitulated. By
the terms of the settlement they agreed to evacuate Sicily as well as to pay Rome an
indemnity, but they remained an independent power.
Second Punic War (218–201 BC)
During the decades between the wars, the Carthaginians had been busy building up
an empire in Spain which would help to compensate for the loss of Sicily, Sardinia, and
Corsica. The foundations of this dominion were laid by Hamilcar Barca, who had shown
great military ability as commander in Sicily during the last stages of the First Punic
War. In 237 he crossed to Spain with his nine-year-old son Hannibal, who had been
made to swear eternal hatred for Rome. He quickly occupied southern and eastern
Spain and managed to dismiss a Roman protest over the expansion of the Punic frontier
to the north. When Hamilcar died in 229/228 BC, he was succeeded by his son-in-
law Hasdrubal, who established a new base at Carthago Nova (Cartagena). In 226–225
Hasdrubal made a treaty with the Romans, by which he agreed not to cross the Ebro
River with an armed force, while the Romans possibly assured him that they would not
interfere with his conquests south of the river.

A hundred miles south of the Ebro was the Iberian seaport of Saguntum (Sagunto), with
which Rome had made an alliance. If this was negotiated before the Ebro treaty, then
presumably the alliance was virtually annulled by the agreement; if Rome accepted the
alliance after 226, it infringed the spirit and perhaps the letter of the treaty. Thus, when
Hannibal, who succeeded Hasdrubal in 221, decided to regard the conquest of Spain as
only preliminary to an attack upon Italy, he could use Saguntum to provoke Rome to
action. In 219, therefore, when he was ready to challenge Rome, he attacked
Saguntum. Disregarding Roman protests, he finally took it after an eight-month siege.
This rendered a rupture with Rome inevitable, while it set his own hands free for further
advance.

Even if he had not technically broken any agreement with Rome, Hannibal had
deliberately provoked an incident which he knew would lead to war. For some time
Barcid policy in Spain had been essentially defensive in regard to Rome, but Hannibal
now moved to the offensive, and Rome accepted the challenge. Apart from the
unprovoked seizure of Sardinia, Rome’s policy after the First Punic War had not been
deliberately aggressive: the Gallic wars were defensive in spirit, and the Illyrian
campaigns were a necessary piece of police work. Rather, without pursuing deep-laid
plans, Rome dealt with each situation as it arose. If Hannibal chose to question Roman
interference in Spain, Rome was willing to face the consequences.
View Hannibal's campaign against Rome with the siege of Saguntum
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Hannibal’s decision to leave his base in Spain, cross the Alps, and invade northern Italy
was crowned with success and culminated in a series of victories at Trebbia, Trasimene,
and Cannae. However, although he won over much of southern Italy, including Capua,
he failed to break Rome’s determination to fight on, and he failed to undermine the
loyalty to Rome of the Latin cities and central Italy. Hence he had to cast his strategic
net more widely. This attempt too failed. His ally, Philip V of Macedonia, achieved little;
the revolt of Syracuse against Rome was soon crushed; and the defeat of the Scipios in
Spain failed to result in the expulsion of the Romans from the peninsula. Hannibal’s
own movements and strength in Italy were checked by the delaying strategy of Quintus
Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, and the breakthrough to Italy by his
brother Hasdrubal was foiled at the Metaurus. Finally Rome produced a
military genius in Scipio Africanus, who drove the Carthaginians from Spain, persuaded
his reluctant countrymen to allow him to invade Africa, won such success there that
Hannibal was recalled from Italy to save Carthage, and finally defeated Hannibal
at Zama.
Battle of Zama
By the terms of the peace, Carthage was left as an independent state but had to give up
everything outside an area roughly equivalent to that of modern Tunisia, to surrender its
fleet, and to pay an indemnity over a period of 50 years. The Numidian
prince Masinissa, whose cavalry had rendered Scipio invaluable service at Zama, was
rewarded with an increase of territory. As Rome’s ally, he stood watch over his
neighbour Carthage, which by the treaty with Rome was forbidden to make war on
anyone in Africa without the permission of Rome (and any war at all outside Africa).

The effects of the war on Rome and Italy, on the constitution, on economic and social
life, on religion and thought were profound, and it proved to be a turning point not only
for them but for the history of the whole ancient world. No contemporary power could
endanger the existence of Rome. The Hellenistic monarchies of the east still flourished,
but at Rome’s touch they collapsed like a house of cards. German and
other barbarian tribes in the north could threaten, and the emergent Parthian empire
beyond the Euphrates might at times appear menacing, but for centuries such dangers
were held at arms’ length.