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I just said to myself, my God, what is this? What’s happening here? How could people do
this to other people? (Dr. Leon Bass, an American soldier upon arriving at the Buchen-
wald concentration camp in 1945)
This article describes a procedure for the study of destructive obedience in the laboratory.
It consists of ordering a naive S to administer increasingly more severe punishment to a
victim in the context of a learning experiment. (Stanley Milgram, 1963, p. 371)
1
W22-4537/95/woO-ooO1$03.00/1 0 1Y95 The Sociely fur the Psychological Study of Social Ir~ues
2 Miller et al.
Introduction
In terms of a criterion that many in academia would value above all others,
namely to have one's work and ideas make an impact-upon students, scholars
from a host of academic disciplines, authors, researchers, critics (both friend and
foe), and the lay reader-Stanley Milgram's' experiments on obedience to au-
thority are surely among the most celebrated in the history of psychology (Mil-
gram, 1963, 1965, 1974). In a virtually seamless flow of academic debate and
published commentary, the Milgram experiments, from their first appearance
over 30 years ago, have stimulated thought as has perhaps no other single
research program. The main objectives of the articles in this issue are to track the
progress of that impact in contemporary research and to suggest directions for the
future.
As Elms (this issue) suggests, the towering impact of the Milgram obe-
dience experiments clearly rests upon the very sobering social issues raised by
the research itself. It is the phenomenon of destructive obedience-more specifi-
cally, the prospect, raised by Milgram's extensive research program, that such
behavior could be elicited from very large numbers of seemingly normal, aver-
age persons-that was, and remains, the core issue. Milgram, and a generation
of subsequent commentators, have drawn parallels not only to Nazi Germany, but
also to an array of scenarios involving destructive obedience, such as the My Lai
Massacre in Vietnam, the mass suicide, under the directive of Jim Jones, at
Jonestown, and to crimes of obedience more generally (e.g., Darley, 1992;
Kelman & Hamilton, 1989).
Before previewing the content of this issue in more detail, let us step back,
for a moment, to examine the foundation upon which this issue is built: Mil-
gram's paradigm, his observations, and his conceptual analyses.
The Beginning
'Stanley Milgram was born in 1933 in New York City and died in December 1984
Perspectives on Obedience: Introduction 3
Milgram’s decision to frame the obedience project in the shadow of the Holo-
caust was of paramount significance because of the powerful emotions and
intellectual controversies associated with efforts to understand the Holocaust
itself. From their inception, the obedience experiments were seemingly endowed
with an undeniably inflammatory, provocative essence, qualities that were, in an
important sense, distracting in terms of Milgram’s primary objectives.
Milgram described an experimental paradigm for studying obedience to
malevolent authority (see Elms, this issue). Following in the tradition of the
famous conformity studies of his mentor, Solomon Asch, Milgram exposed
participants to a simple, but intense decisional conflict: To either remain defiant
or to yield to an experimenter’s demands at the expense of violating one’s
personal values.
gram’s own observations, have focused upon social influence that has its origin
in the authority/subordinate relationship between the experimenter and the teach-
er-subject. However, as we indicate below (see The Advantages and Disadvan-
tages of the “Obedience” Metaphor), several papers in this volume emphasize
other forms of social influence, including expert power and the norms of socially
appropriate social interactions.
In his first publication, Milgram reported what for many will always consti-
tute the key “Milgram finding:” 65% of the participants obeyed the experimen-
ter’s orders that they shock, in steadily increasing magnitude, a protesting victim
to the point of maximum punishment. It was not that Milgram had actually
solved a problem or confirmed a theory that made this research so provocative.
Rather, his experiments raised extraordinarily vital and sobering questions. Why
were subjects so obedient under circumstances that, on the surface, would not
seem to warrant such influence? Why were the findings so unexpected? What did
the surprisingly high rate of obedience in others tell us about ourselves, about our
naive assumptions regarding human nature? Did Milgram actually isolate one of
the crucial processes that, in a vastly larger and historically complex context, had
made the genocide of the Holocaust possible? These are questions that were on
everyone’s minds. Until Milgram, however, no one had had the required combi-
nation of personal motivation, intellectual discipline, technical ingenuity, and
some would say, courage, to mount a major research effort to address them.
Regardless of the actual findings, Milgram’s unprecedented contribution was in
extending the analysis of obedience from that of speculation and philosophical
analysis, i.e., talking or thinking about the issue, to that of controlled behavioral
observations under systematically varied contexts. The importance of this simple
fact, in terms of the sheer impact of these experiments upon generations of
students, in our estimation cannot be overemphasized (see Miller, this issue).
In addition to the unexpectedly high proportion of obedient subjects, anoth-
er major finding was the intense stress experienced by many participants, graph-
ically reported by Milgram:
I observed a mature and initially poised businessman enter the laboratory smiling and
confident. Within 20 minutes he was reduced to a twitching, stuttering wreck, who was
rapidly approaching a point of nervous collapse. He constantly pulled on his earlobe, and
twisted his hands. At one point he pushed his fist into his forehead and muttered: ‘Oh
God, let’s stop it.’ And yet he continued to respond to every word of the experimenter, and
obeyed to the end. (1963, p. 377)
This incongruence between emotion and behavior suggested that under social
pressure, many individuals will engage in behaviors that produce considerable
distress in others and in themselves; these are behaviors that they, in principle,
Perspectives on Obedience: Introduction 5
would consider themselves incapable of performing, and that, in fact, they would
not perform without such influence. Milgram noted that “one might suppose that
a subject would simply break off or continue as his conscience dictated. Yet, this
is very far from what happened” (1963, p. 377).
learner role expressed anxiety that the experimenter “relieved” by saying that he
would assume the learner role initially himself). The subject was then ordered by
the peer (confederate) to continue shocking the experimenter, but at the 150 volt
level, the experimenter instructed the shocks to cease. All subjects immediately
obeyed these instructions. Thus, the key issue being examined in this research is
obedience to authority, not aggression. Subjects are as willing to obey an order to
stop shocking as they are to continue. A control condition (Variation l l ) , in
which subjects were simply asked to select their own shock levels without any
directive from the experimenter, had also shown that subjects invariably chose
the lowest shock levels.
Asch (1956) had shown that the most powerful inhibitor of conformity was
a situation in which subjects had an ally who defied the (otherwise) unanimous
group. Milgram performed an analogous variation (17) in which four (apparent)
subjects arrived for an experiment on the effects of “collective teaching and
punishment” on memory and learning. Only one of the individuals was a true
subject. A rigged draw produced the learner and three teachers. The script called
for the other “subjects” (assistants) to withdraw at the tenth (150 volt) and
fourteenth levels (210 volt), respectively. This defiance of authority was an
extremely powerful influence on subjects, with only 10% continuing to follow
instructions to the 450 volt level. Thus, when defiance was shown to be a
concrete behavioral option resulting in no harmful consequences, the power of
the authority and the credibility of the threatening prods (such as “you have no
other choice”) were substantially diminished.
However, when the learner later asked to be released, the experimenter ignored
the agreement and continued issuing orders to the subject. Obedience was re-
duced to 40%, still a sizable degree of compliance under such conditions. The
power of the authority was thus intact even under conditions that might reason-
ably be viewed as delegitimizing.
How might an individual respond in this type of experiment if he or she was
not instructed personally to shock the learner, but was assigned a subsidiary task
(e.g., clerical recording) while another person was doing the actual lever press-
ing? When a peer (assistant) obeyed all orders, 37 of the 40 subjects in this
variation (93%) remained in their role and took no action in terms of leaving the
scene or rescuing the learner. In documenting the phenomenon of the “noninter-
vening bystander,” this particular experiment has been of particular interest to
those who see important elements of the nature of “evil” in the obedience experi-
ments. Milgram interpreted this important result in terms of responsibility:
Any competent manager of a destructive bureaucratic system can arrange his personnel so
that only the most callous and obtuse are directly involved in violence. The greater part of
the personnel can consist of men and women who, by virtue of their distance from the
actual acts of brutality, will feel little strain in their performance of supportive functions.
They will feel doubly absolved from responsibility. First, legitimate authority ha5 given
full warrant for their actions. Second, they have not themselves committed brutal physical
acts. (1974, p. 122)
Regardless of the specific situation, why didn’t people simply walk out of
Milgram’s laboratory once they surmised what was developing in terms of their
inner moral conflict? Milgram ( 1 974) identified critical factors that, in the aggre-
gate, define a context that is conducive to obedience. Here we briefly review
Milgram’s own theorizing. As we indicate below (The Advantages and Disad-
vantages of the “Obedience” Metaphor), some authors in the present volume
present theoretical positions that supplement or supplant Milgram’s theoretical
analysis.
Overarching Ideology
learn to value obedience, even if what ensues in its name is unpleasant. We also
trust the legitimacy of the many authorities in our lives, even if abuses of this
trust occasionally occur, for example in the domains of politics, corporate finan-
cial institutions, or child-care services. In this context, people become vulnerable
to the dictates of illegitimate authority because they are habituated to presume
legitimacy and are unpracticed in the act of defying authority when this is the
appropriate response.
Also reflecting the socialization of obedience is our expectarion that some-
one will be in charge in whatever setting we encounter. Milgram’s participants
anticipated that the project would be directed by a knowledgeable authority in the
person of a research psychologist. In the mind-set of research subjects, therefore,
obedience was set into motion long before they actually arrived, before the
experimenter’s orders were issued and the learner was crying out in pain. A
major lesson of social psychology is the power of preconceptions to influence
perception and behavior so as to confirm those prior beliefs (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).
Thus, contributing to the strain involved in Milgram’s laboratory was the simple fact
that people never expected to face the prospect of defying the experimenter.
Binding Factors
will gradually escalate the level of inflicted punishment under orders. Although
Modigliani and Rochat (this issue) quote Milgram to the effect that his subjects
were thrown into a swift moving stream with its own momentum, Milgram did
not give great emphasis to the temporal, incrementally developing aspect of his
experiments.
Research on a phenomenon known as “the foot in the door effect” (Freed-
man & Fraser, 1966)indicates that once an individual agrees to a relatively trivial
request, he or she is far more likely to agree to a much more demanding request
at a later time. As a result of the initial small-scaled behavior, a change in self-
perception occurs that facilitates subsequent compliance with the larger, more
demanding request. Such action then is consistent with the individual’s self-
perception as “the kind of person who agrees to do such things.” The “gradual-
ness” factor is relevant to the generalizations that have been made from Mil-
gram’s findings to other contexts where the implications of engaging in immoral
actions under authority are not realized at the start, but materialize after an
individual becomes enmeshed in a bureaucratic chain of command (Darley,
1992; Gilbert, 198 1). One reason why people underestimate the observed results
in the obedience research is that they fail to appreciate the powerful but subtle
self-perception changes that occur over the course of the experiment. (See Mil-
ler, 1986, chap. 8, for an extended critical review of Milgram’s theoretical
model).
Milgram’s initial (1963) report also was the catalyst for two controversies,
one ethical, the other methodological, that were to become inextricably associ-
ated with the obedience studies. Shortly following the initial obedience report,
Diana Baumrind published an essay in the American Psychologist (1964) attack-
ing the ethics of Milgram’s treatment of his research subjects as well as the
implications and value of the investigation. A rebuttal by Milgram (1964) ap-
peared five months later. Their exchange was the impetus for a renaissance of
sensitivity to ethical issues in human experimentation. The scholarship in this
area is now voluminous. Although in many respects a highly unique form of
psychological research, the obedience experiments have been routinely featured,
for over 30 years, in any serious discussion of ethical issues in research with
human subjects.
With respect to Milgram’s specific procedure, subjects were informed in a
postexperimental interview of the deceptions involved and were introduced to the
“learner” in a spirit of “friendly reconciliation.” Milgram actually went beyond
the usual debriefing procedure, mailing to each subject a thorough account of the
basic research project (see Elms, this issue). Although there is no documented
evidence that any of his subjects experienced lasting psychological harm, Mil-
Perspectives on Obedience: Introduction 11
gram clearly approached the limits (and in the view of some, exceeded the limits)
in terms of ethical guidelines in human research, specifically in terms of respect-
ing the participant’s right to withdraw. He blatantly challenged this right, partic-
ularly in the use of increasingly constraining “prods” for those subjects hesitating
to continue administering punishment. What he learned in so doing has been of
inestimable value in the eyes of countless scholars and social scientists. Whether
or not he was ethical will depend, at least in part, on one’s position regarding the
cost/benefit analysis of the research (see Miller, 1986, chap. 5 , for an extended
discussion of the ethical controversy).
A comment is in order regarding conceptual replications of the Milgram
paradigm. In absolute terms, the number of obedience experiments, performed
by other investigators using Milgram’s paradigm, is certainly low. One can
contrast the obedience studies with two other classic research programs in social
psychology, namely the Asch conformity paradigm and the Darley and LatanC
studies on bystander intervention. As with the obedience studies, both the Asch
and the Darley and Latane methodologies involved a considerable use of decep-
tion and produced strong conflict and emotion in many of their participants. Yet,
unlike the Milgram studies, these paradigms were to stimulate numerous subse-
quent investigations. Given the extraordinary popularity and unwavering interest
in the obedience studies, it is ironic that they have not generated a correspond-
ingly large empirical literature. While the precise reasons for this circumstance
remain unclear, it is virtually certain that the ethical features of Milgram’s para-
digm have been viewed as uniquely problematic.
Given the intense ethical criticism that was to surround the obedience re-
search, essentially on the grounds that Milgram’s subjects were exposed to
unacceptably high levels of stress, it was paradoxical that a methodological
challenge also appeared shortly after the initial publication. Orne and Holland
(1968) claimed that a majority of Milgram’s subjects had operated on the overrid-
ing assumption that no serious harm or injury could be inflicted upon another
person in the context of a laboratory experiment. In Orne and Holland’s view,
there were a number of cues-“demand characteristics of the experiment”-
suggesting to subjects that no one in fact was being harmed, e.g., the experimen-
ter’s impervious manner in light of the learner’s cries of pain. According to Orne
and Holland, a variety of factors were likely to have influenced Milgram’s
subjects to behave, both in terms of administering “punishment” and expressing
anxiety, but the heart of their claim was that Milgram had not in fact demon-
strated destructive obedience to malevolent authoriiy.
A considerable literature also was to develop on this methodological contro-
versy (Miller, 1986, chap. 6). A variety of studies conducted with diverse sub-
jects (e.g., children-Shanab & Yahya, 1977), and targets of punishment (e.g.,
puppies-Sheridan & King, 1972), in nonlaboratory settings (e.g., hospital-
Hofling, Brotzman, Dalrymple, Graves, & Pierce, 1966) and in different coun-
12 Miller et al.
Methodological Diversiry
Defining Obedience
Raven’s (French & Raven, 1959; Raven, 1965, 1993) treatment of legiti-
mate power differs in some important respects from Milgram’s analysis of obe-
dience. According to Raven (1992, p. 220), implicitly or explicitly, the legitimate
authority states:
“I have a right to ask you to do this and you have an obligation to comply.” Thus such
terms as “obliged” or “obligated,” “should,” “ought to,” “required to” may signal the use
of legitimate power. Legitimate power is most obvious when it is based on some formal
structure-a supervisor or higher ranking military officer influencing a subordinate.
Raven describes other social norms that may mandate an obligation to comply-
such as norms of reciprocity (“1 did that for you, so you should feel obligated to
do this for me”) and equity (“1 have worked hard and suffered, so I have a right
to ask you to do something to make up for it”).
Thus Raven focuses on duty and obligation while Milgram either took no
theoretical position early on (see Elms, this issue), commented on eclectic forces
at work in the paradigm, or focused on the subordinate’s allocation of respon-
sibility to the authority when in an agentic state (1974). Raven speculates that
legitimate influence rests on social norms specifying obligations of the teacher to
the experimenter. Thus, questions about duty and obligation (not responsibility
for consequences) would tap this influence mechanism, and, according to Raven,
not all of these norms stem from relative positions in a social hierarchy. Consis-
tent with this conclusion, and in commenting on Staub’s (1989) analysis, Miller
(this issue) agrees that “obedience is not a monolithic conceptual entity.”
ing the subjects into a “swift flowing stream;” and they quote Milgram’s saying:
“Upon entering the laboratory the individual becomes integrated into a situation
that carries its own momentum” (1965, p. 72). These portions of Milgram’s
writings support Modigliani and Rochat’s analysis, which focuses on the dynam-
ically evolving features of the experimenter-teacher encounter itself, features
that “can enhance, impede, or divert the flow that threatens to sweep subjects
inexorably toward obedience.”
gram. Three of the papers in this issue (Miller, Lutsky, and Rochat and Mo-
digliani) address different elements of the historical perspective.
Defiance
of appropriate social interaction that restrain the teacher from discontinuing the
shocks would apply whether or not the two interactants were in a superior-
subordinate relationship.
Miller notes that Staub (1989) discusses a variety of important social-psy-
chological processes that function, in addition to obedience to authority, as
determinants of genocide and other politically sanctioned massacres. These in-
clude
the initial feelings of hostility driven by perceived threats or difficult life circumslances,
the devaluation of outgroups, the entrapment involved in a gradual progression of increas-
ingly dehumanizing actions, and the role of bystanders-their actions or, more signifi-
cantly, their non actions.
Staub is quoted (by Miller and by Lutsky) to indicate that the focus on obedience
may have slowed the analysis of genocide-presumably by obscuring other
causal determinants of evil. Others have objected to the obedience focus because
it serves to excuse the destructively obedient individual from blame. Lutsky
contrasts the intentionalist (obedience) explanation of the Holocaust with func-
tional explanations, which “see the Holocaust as evolving from bureaucratic
developments and rivalries, improvisation, individual and group initiatives, and
other external conditions and forces.”
We would agree that the pendulum may have swung too far in the direction
of explaining socially sanctioned evil solely as a consequence of obedience to
authority. However, as Miller (this issue) indicates, Milgram’s work is the prima-
ry reason that we consider ordinary psychological processes as sources of evil-
and that we are “intellectually comfortable” in presuming that this is a viable
perspective to pursue. Further, we agree with Elms that Milgram probably would
not have been disappointed if his data remained figural while theoretical explana-
tions evolved across time. He indicated to one of us (AM) that his greatest
frustration was that the controversies associated with the obedience studies had
diverted attention from his original and lasting concern, the nature of obedience
to authority. It is our hope that the ideas considered in this issue will serve as a
catalyst for further discussion and research on the substantive features of destruc-
tive obedience.
We have divided the papers in this issue into two sections. The first, “The
Obedience Paradigm: Origins, Historical Contexts, and Contemporary Views on
its Meaning,” contains papers by Elms, Miller, Lutsky, Hamilton and Sanders,
and Collins and Brief. The second section, “Analyzing Obedient and Disobe-
dient Behavior,” contains papers by Modigliani and Rochat, Darley, Meeus and
Raaijmakers, A . Brief et al., and Rochat and Modigliani.
18 Miller et al.
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