d. Define probable cause. Who determines probable cause?

Two (2) kinds of probable cause

MICROSOFT CORPORATION VS. FARAJALLAH, GR No. 205800, September 10, 2014;

FACTS

Microsoft Corporation and Adobe Systems Incorporated (petitioners) are corporations organized and existing under the laws of
the United States. Microsoft Corporation is the owner of all rights including copyright relating to all versions and editions of
Microsoft software and the corresponding user’s manuals, and the registered owner of the “Microsoft” “MS DOS” trademarks in
the Philippines. Adobe Systems Incorporated is the owner of all rights including copyright relating to all versions and editions of
Adobe Software.

Samir Farajallah, et al (respondents) are the directors and officers of New Fields (Asia Pacific), Inc., a domestic corporation

Petitioners claim that in September 2009, they were informed that New Fields was unlawfully reproducing and using unlicensed
versions of their software.

Orion Support Inc was asked by petitioners to assist in the verification of this information. Hired Serrano and Moradoz to detect
unauthorized copies of Microsoft and Adobe.

 Case was assigned to police inspector Padilla (trained also to distinguish original from counterfeit software)

3 of them went to NF. Using legitimate business pretext, they were able to use 2 of NF’s computers and found that there are at
least 2 computers using the same product identification and/serial numbers of MS and Adobe. This indicates that the software
is being illegally produced or copied

NF is using only one installer - first 3 sets of numbers of product ID is the same

All 90 computers of NF did not have cert of authenticity by MS

Search warrant apps filed, several items seized (17 CD installers, 83 Computers)

RTC ruled to quash all warrants and directed that “all items to be seized should be returned” bec they should have identified
and specified the computers they were taking. CA affirmed

ISSUE

W/N lower courts committed GAD in granting Motion to quash despite having probable cause and personal knowledge of the
warrant applicant

RULING:

Yes. We find reason to overturn the rulings of the RTC and CA, since there was grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
facts. The CA sustained the quashal of the warrant because the witnesses had “no personal knowledge of the facts upon which
the issuance of the warrants may be justified,” and the applicants and the witnesses merely relied on the screen shots acquired
from the confidential informant.

CA said that hearsay info can be the basis for issuance of search warrant if followed up personally and validated. It is clear
from evidence that Padilla and company were able to personally verify the informant’s tip.

So, there was probable cause for issuance of search warrant and requirement of personal knowledge is satisfied.

ANTONIO LEVISTE VS. JUDGE ALAMEDA, RTC MAKATI, G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010- 
Facts:
On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste charging him with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on
January 12, 2007, before the RTC of Makati. The private complainants-heirs of de las Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment
of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper
offense. The RTC thereafter issued the Order granting the motion by the complainants, thus, allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation.
Later, the trial court issued the other order that admitted the Amended Information for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Petitioner questioned these two orders before the appellate court.
 
Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court entered the plea of "not guilty" for him. Prior to this, the petitioner filed an Urgent
Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela, which the trial court granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the crime of murder
is not strong. The trial court went on to try the petitioner under the Amended Information. Then, the trial court found the petitioner guilty of
homicide. From the trial court's decision, the petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. The appellate court confirmed the decision of the trial court. The
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition to the SC.
 
Issue: Whether or not the trial court should have made a judicial determination of probable cause.
 
Ruling: 
 
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during
preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial.
Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether that function
has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a
case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
 
The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused under custody in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
 
Paragraph (a), Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed by the RTC. To move the court to conduct a judicial
determination of probable cause is a mere superfluity, for with or without such motion, the judge is duty-bound to personally evaluate the resolution
of the public prosecutor and the supporting evidence. In fact, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and
foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. What the Constitution underscores is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1)personally evaluate the report and
the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a
personal determination of the existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the
prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
 
The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the accused before any
warrant may be issued. Petitioner thus cannot, as a matter of right, insist on a hearing for judicial determination of probable cause. Certainly,
petitioner "cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the [judge's] examination of the records should be [since t]he extent of the
judge’s examination depends on the exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the case require."

BORLONGAN VS. JUDGE LIMSIACO, GR No. 143591, May 5, 2010-

Facts:

Atty. Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees against
Urban Bank and the petitioners before the RTC of Negros Occidental. Atty. Peña anchored his claim for compensation on the
Contract of Agency allegedly entered into with the petitioners, wherein Peña undertook to perform such acts necessary to
prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay
City. 

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Attached to the
motion were several documents in an attempt to show that the respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban
Bank or by the petitioners. 

However, Atty. Peña filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor, claiming that said documents were
falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders
nor officers and employees of ISCI. Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that
they were falsified. 

In a Resolution, the City Prosecutor found probable cause for the indictment of petitioners for four (4) counts of the crime of
Introducing Falsified Documents. Consequently, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or
For Reinvestigation, insisting that they were denied due process because of the nonobservance of the proper procedure on
preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the right to
submit their counter-affidavit. Then they argued that since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were
submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in
issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention with the Rules of Court. Petitioners further prayed that the information be
quashed for lack of probable cause. 

MTCC denied the omnibus motion primarily on the ground that preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case –
which fell within the jurisdiction of the first-level court. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying
that it was issued in accordance with the Rules of Court. 

Petitioners immediately instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the CA which dismissed the petition. Thus, petitioners filed the
instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: 

Whether or not there was probable cause to pursue the criminal cases to trial. (NONE)

Held: 

Petitioners were charged with violation of Introduction of Falsified Document in a judicial proceeding. The falsity of the
document and the defendant’s knowledge of its falsity are essential elements of the offense. The office of the City Prosecutor
filed the Informations against the petitioners on the basis of the Complaint-Affidavit of respondent Atty. Peña. Based on these
documents and the complaint-affidavit of Atty. Peña, the City Prosecutor concluded that probable cause for the prosecution of
the charges existed.

This Court, however, cannot find these documents sufficient to support the existence of probable cause. 

Probable cause is such a set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without restoring to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify
conviction.
We do not see how it can be concluded that the documents mentioned by respondent in his complaint-affidavit were falsified.
There is no indication that the assertion was based on the personal knowledge of the affiant. 

The reason for the requirement that affidavits must be based on personal knowledge is to guard against hearsay evidence.
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written,
as well as oral statements.

The requirement of personal knowledge should have been strictly applied considering that petitioners were not given the
opportunity to rebut the complainant's allegation through counter-affidavits.

The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of the public prosecutors function without any
showing of grave abuse of discretion or manifest error in his findings. Considering, however, that the prosecution and the court
a quo committed manifest errors in their findings of probable cause, this Court therefore annuls their findings.

Bureau of Customs vs. Hon. Agnes Devanadera,  G.  R. No. 193253- Rosal

Read also:

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS VS. HON. AGNES DEVANADERA, G .R. No. 193253- 

FACTS: Private respondent UNIOIL Petroleum Philippines, Inc. is engaged in marketing, distribution, and sale of petroleum, oil
and other products, while its co-respondent OILINK International, Inc. is engaged in manufacturing, importing, exporting,
buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in at wholesale and retails of petroleum, oil, gas and of any and all refinements and
byproducts thereof. Except for respondent Victor D. Piamonte who is a Licensed Customs Broker, the other private respondents
are either officers or directors of UNIOIL or OILINK.
 
In a complaint-affidavit dated December 15, 2008, Atty. Balmyrson M. Valdez, a member of the petitioner BOC's Anti-Oil
Smuggling Coordinating Committee that investigated the illegal withdrawal by UNIOIL of oil products consigned to OILINK,
accused the private respondents of unlawful importation under Section 3601 and various fraudulent practices against customs
revenue under Section 3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP).

In a letter dated December 15, 2008, Commissioner Morales referred to the Office of Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuno
the said complaint-affidavit, together with its annexes, for preliminary investigation. During the said investigation, BOC's
counsel appeared and all of the private respondents submitted their respective counter-affidavits.

In a Resolution dated May 29, 2009, public respondent Arman A. De Andres, State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice
(DOJ), recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause. The Resolution was approved by public
respondents Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Pedrito L. Ranees and Chief State Prosecutor Zuflo. On automatic review, the
Resolution was affirmed by then Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales.
 
Dissatisfied, the BOC filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the public respondent, the Acting Secretary of
Justice Agnes VST Devanadera, in a Resolution dated December 28, 2009.

On March 11, 2010, the BOC filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was dismissed outright due to procedural effect.

ISSUE: Whether the Acting Secretary of Justice gravely abused her discretion in affirming the dismissal of the BOC's
complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause.

HELD: NO. Since the allegations in the BOC's complaint-affidavit do not constitute the crime of unlawful importation under
Section 3601 of the TCCP and various fraudulent practices against customs revenue under Section 3602 of the TCCP, the
Acting Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion when she affirmed the State Prosecutor's dismissal of the
BOC's complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause.

The settled policy of noninterference in the prosecutor's exercise of discretion requires the courts to leave to the
prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.
As the Court explained in Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Tan:

The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of information in court is essentially
an executive function that is lodged, at the first instance, with the public prosecutor and,
ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. The prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice have wide latitude
of discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation; and their findings with respect to the existence or
non-existence of probable cause are generally not subject to review by the Court.

Consistent with this rule, the settled policy of non-interference in the prosecutor's exercise of discretion
requires the courts to leave to the prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Courts can neither override their determination nor
substitute their own judgment for that of the latter. They cannot likewise order the prosecution
of the accused when the prosecutor has not found a prima facie case.

Nevertheless, this policy of non-interference is not without exception. The Constitution itself allows
(and even directs) court action where executive discretion has been gravely abused. In other
words, the court may intervene in the executive determination of probable cause, review the
findings and conclusions, and ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable
cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly
administration of justice.
Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should
be held for trial.

ROBERTS VS. CA, 254 SCRA 307- 

FACTS
Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. had a Number Fever Promotion where "all holders of crowns and/or
caps of Pepsi products bearing the winning 3-digit number will win the prize printed on the crown/cap. On May
25, 1992, it was announced that the winning number for the next day was "349". Several thousand holders of
"349" went then to Pepsi to redeem but Pepsi refused to pay. These holders filed complaints for estafa against
the officers of Pepsi.

After several procedural maneuvers by petitioners' counsel (including a petition for review with the Secretary
of Justice on the finding of PC by the prosecutor), respondent Judge denied the Motion to Suspend Proceedings
and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest and the Motion to Defer arraignment, and directed the
issuance of the warrants of arrest and setting the arraignment.

Petitioners filed a certiorari with CA with application for TRO against Judge Asuncion alleging GAD. CA granted
TRO. However, with the issuance of the decision of the Secretary of Justice dismissing the petition for review,
the CA dismissed the case as moot. MR denied.

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the respondent judge had not the slightest basis at
all for determining probable cause when he ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest. After finding that a copy
of the public prosecutor’s Joint Resolution had in fact been forwarded to, and received by, the trial court on 22
April 1993, the CA denied petitioners’ application for writ of preliminary injunction. The CA ruled that the Joint
Resolution “was sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by respondent Judge in convincing himself that
probable cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest” and that the
“mere silence of the records or the absence of any express declaration” in the questioned order as to the basis
of such finding does not give rise to an adverse inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys in his favor the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty. Roberts, et al. sought reconsideration, but
meanwhile, the DOJ affirmed the finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor. The CA therefore
dismissed the petition for mootness.

ISSUE: 
Whether respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the arrest of the petitioners
without examining the record of the preliminary investigation and in determining for himself on the basis
thereof the existence of probable cause.

RULING:
YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest
without examining the records of the preliminary investigation and in determining for himself on the basis
thereof the existence of probable cause.

The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the proposition that the investigating
prosecutor’s certification in an information or his resolution which is made the basis for the filing of the
information, or both, would suffice in the judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest. In Webb, this Court assumed that since the respondent Judges had before them not only the 26-page
resolution of the investigating panel but also the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and even the counter-
affidavits of the respondents, they (judges) made personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the records
of the case.

In this case, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on 12 April 1993 with the trial court. A copy of
the Joint Resolution was forwarded to, and received by, the trial court only on 22 April 1993. And as revealed
by the certification of respondent judge’s clerk of court, no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of
stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in
the course thereof were found in the records of this case as of 19 May 1993. Clearly, when respondent Judge
Asuncion issued the assailed order of 17 May 1993 directing, among other things, the issuance of warrants of
arrest, he had only the information, amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not
have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he
made no specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of warrants of arrest “after June
21, 1993.” It may, however, be argued that the directive presupposes a finding of probable cause. But then
compliance with a constitutional requirement for the protection of individual liberty cannot be left to
presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic.

SKEECHERS, USA, INC. VS. PACIFIC, GR NO. 164321, March 23, 2011-

FACTS:

At the outset, a brief narration of the factual and procedural antecedents that transpired and led to the filing of the motions is in order.
The present controversy arose when petitioner filed with Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila an application for the issuance of
search warrants against an outlet and warehouse operated by respondents for infringement of trademark under Section 155, in relation to Section
170 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. In the course of its business, petitioner has
registered the trademark "SKECHERS" and the trademark "S" (within an oval design) with the Intellectual Property Office (IPO).
Two search warrants were issued by the RTC and were served on the premises of respondents. As a result of the raid, more than 6,000 pairs of
shoes bearing the "S" logo were seized.
Later, respondents moved to quash the search warrants, arguing that there was no confusing similarity between petitioner’s "Skechers" rubber
shoes and its "Strong" rubber shoes.
On November 7, 2002, the RTC issued an Order quashing the search warrants and directing the NBI to return the seized goods. The RTC agreed
with respondent’s view that Skechers rubber shoes and Strong rubber shoes have glaring differences such that an ordinary prudent purchaser would
not likely be misled or confused in purchasing the wrong article.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the RTC Order. On November 17, 2003, the CA issued a
Decision affirming the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE:

WON The Court Of Appeals And The Search Warrant Court Acted Contrary To Law In Holding That There Is No Probable Cause For Trademark
Infringement

RULING:

YES. Applying the Dominancy Test to the case at bar, this Court finds that the use of the stylized "S" by Interpacific in its Strong rubber shoes
infringes on the mark already registered by petitioner with the IPO

In determining similarity and likelihood of confusion, jurisprudence has developed tests: the Dominancy Test and the Holistic or Totality Test. The
Dominancy Test focuses on the similarity of the prevalent or dominant features of the competing trademarks that might cause confusion, mistake,
and deception in the mind of the purchasing public.

Duplication or imitation is not necessary; neither is it required that the mark sought to be registered suggests an effort to imitate. Given more
consideration are the aural and visual impressions created by the marks on the buyers of goods, giving little weight to factors like prices, quality,
sales outlets, and market segments.

 In contrast, the Holistic or Totality Test necessitates a consideration of the entirety of the marks as applied to the products, including the labels and
packaging, in determining confusing similarity. The discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the predominant words, but also on the
other features appearing on both labels so that the observer may draw conclusion on whether one is confusingly similar to the other.

Relative to the question on confusion of marks and trade names, jurisprudence has noted two (2) types of confusion.: (1) confusion of goods
(product confusion), where the ordinarily prudent purchaser would be induced to purchase one product in the belief that he was purchasing the
other; and (2) confusion of business (source or origin confusion), where, although the goods of the parties are different, the product, the mark of
which registration is applied for by one party, is such as might reasonably be assumed to originate with the registrant of an earlier product, and the
public would then be deceived either into that belief or into the belief that there is some connection between the two parties, though inexistent.

While it is undisputed that petitioner’s stylized "S" is within an oval design, the dominant feature of the trademark is the stylized "S," as it is
precisely the stylized "S" which catches the eye of the purchaser. Interpacific did not simply use the letter "S," but it appears to the SC that based
on the font and the size of the lettering, the stylized "S" utilized by respondent is the very same stylized "S" used by petitioner; a stylized "S" which
is unique and distinguishes petitioner’s trademark. Indubitably, the likelihood of confusion is present as purchasers will associate the respondent’s
use of the stylized "S" as having been authorized by petitioner or that respondent’s product is connected with petitioner’s business. The placement
of the “S” design on Strong rubber shoes is also similar to that of Skecher’s. All other attributes of the Skechers’ rubber shoes are also in Strong
rubber shoes. Interpacific’s Strong rubber shoes also used the color scheme of blue, white and gray utilized by petitioner. Even the design and
"wavelike" pattern of the midsole and outer sole of Interpacific’s shoes are very similar to petitioner’s shoes, if not exact patterns thereof.
Both the RTC and the CA applied the Holistic Test in ruling that respondent had not infringed petitioner’s trademark. For its part, the RTC noted the
following supposed dissimilarities between the shoes, to wit:

1. The mark "S" found in Strong Shoes is not enclosed in an "oval design."
2. The word "Strong" is conspicuously placed at the backside and insoles.
3. The hang tags and labels attached to the shoes bears the word "Strong" for respondent and "Skechers U.S.A." for private
complainant;
4. Strong shoes are modestly priced compared to the costs of Skechers Shoes

Based on the foregoing, this Court is at a loss as to how the RTC and the CA, in applying the holistic test, ruled that there was no colorable
imitation, when it cannot be any more clear and apparent to this Court that there is colorable imitation. The dissimilarities between the shoes are
too trifling and frivolous that it is indubitable that respondent’s products will cause confusion and mistake in the eyes of the public. Respondent’s
shoes may not be an exact replica of petitioner’s shoes, but the features and overall design are so similar and alike that confusion is highly likely.
Neither can the difference in price be a complete defense in trademark infringement

The dissimilarities between the shoes are too trifling and frivolous that it is indubitable that respondent’s products will cause confusion and mistake
in the eyes of the public. Respondent’s shoes may not be an exact replica of petitioner’s shoes, but the features and overall design are so similar
and alike that confusion is highly likely.

MILLER VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, GR No. 165412, May 30, 2011- 

FACTS: Petitioner George Miller is a British national and an inmate at the Maximum Security Compound of the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa City. he wrote two confidential letters addressed to NBP Superintendent Col. Gregorio Agalo-os which
contain a report on alleged irregularities and drug activities of respondent Bernardino and Rodolfo Bernardo. On January
6, 1999, at around 2:00pm, Miller was stabbed at the back of his head. An investigation was thereafter conducted. In the
course of the investigation, Quirante and Ceballos admitted their participation in the attack on the petitioner. PGIII Lopez
recommended that Quirante and Ceballos be charged with Frustrated Murder and the case be placed under further
investigation “pending the establishment of sufficient evidence to indict inmates Rodolfo Bernardo, Giovan Bernardino,
and Ace Apid”. Prosecutor Padilla issued his resolution finding the evidence sufficient to charge Quirante with attempted
murder while dismissing the case against Ceballos for insufficiency of evidence. Thereafter, information for attempted
murder was filed against Quirante.
 On December 2, 1999 Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo executed new affidavits which contained more detailed information
of the incident and pointed to Bernardo and Bernardino as the “masterminds” with   Aprid being an accomplice. Bernardo
an Aprid allegedly planned the killing together with Toledo, Quirante who agreed to kill and Ceballos as a lookout.
Prosecutor Leopoldo Macinas issued his Memorandum addressed to the City Prosecutor finding probable cause against
Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo in conspiracy with Bernardino, Aprid and Bernardo, for the crime of attempted murder. 

Bernardino filed a petition for review with the DOJ arguing that there was no sufficient evidence presented to support a
claim of conspiracy, which was based merely on conflicting testimonies or affidavits in a language foreign to the affiants.
Public Respondent Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez, excluded Bernardino from the charges despite a prima facie
case against him having been established by the evidence on record. According to Secretary Perez, the new affidavits of
Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo are not credible considering the length of time they were executed since the commission of
the crime and also because said documents cannot be considered newly discovered evidence. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied. On appeal, CA rendered its decision sustaining the ruling of Secretary Justice. Hence
this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec Perez is right in determining the probable cause to exclude Bernardino. 

HELD: Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he was prosecuted. To determine the existence of probable cause, there is a need to conduct a preliminary
investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to
determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof. It is a means of discovering which person or persons may be reasonably charged with a crime.
It is well-settled that the determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information in court is
an executive function which pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then to the Secretary
of Justice. The Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor, after which he shall direct
the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary
investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. However,
this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or nonexistence of probable cause by examining the records
of the preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly administration of justice.  Although policy
considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to the prosecutors findings, courts should never shirk from
exercising their power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine whether the prosecutors findings are supported by
the facts, or by the law.

In this case, Secretary Perez disregarded the new (English) affidavits executed by Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo, saying it
was an afterthought or made simply upon the prodding or influence of other persons. He also stated that Quirante,
Ceballos and Toledo all participated in the investigations of the Bureau of Corrections. No mention, however, was made of
the fact that said new affidavits firmly reiterated what Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo declared in their earlier Tagalog
affidavits and their verbal admissions during the investigation proceedings conducted by PGIII Lopez. These Tagalog
affidavits in turn, although executed two weeks after the initial preliminary investigation conducted by Prosecutor Padilla,
were properly admitted and considered by the investigating officer, Prosecutor Macinas who took over during the
reinvestigation of the case. The recommendation of Prosecutor Padilla which initially found probable cause only against
Quirante, explicitly reserved the inclusion of Bernardo and Bernardino whose complicity may eventually be established, by
qualifying the dismissal of the case as against them for insufficiency of evidence, with the words without prejudice to the
refiling of the same in the event that evidence against them may be unearthed by concerned authorities. The reservation
made by Prosecutor Padilla for the inclusion of other persons who may have had complicity in the commission of the
crime was grounded on reasonable belief that there were other conspirators or masterminds, on the basis of the findings
of PGIII Lopez during the investigation by the Bureau, the verbal admissions of Quirante and Ceballos as to their
culpability and the alleged masterminds they identified. Hence, the English affidavits submitted during the reinvestigation
cannot be considered an afterthought and executed merely upon the influence of certain persons, and Prosecutor Macinas
properly admitted those in evidence. The term probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is
believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the
reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.

PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO, July 10, 1994- 

Facts: A search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of an "undetermined quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalias" in the premises of appellant's house was issued by RTC Judge Arturo de
Guia. The said warrant was not implemented immediately due to the lack of police personnel to form the raiding team. After a
raiding team was finally organized, it was agreed upon that PO1 Venerando Luna will buy shabu from appellant and after his
return from appellant's house; the raiding team will implement the search warrant. PO1 Luna with a companion proceeded to
appellant's house to implement the search warrant. Barangay Capt. Maigue, Del Rosario and appellant witnessed the search at
appellant's house. The police found a black canister containing shabu, an aluminum foil, a paltik .22 caliber atop the TV set,
three used ammunitions in a cup and three wallets, one containing the marked money. Normando del Rosario was charged
with Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions and Illegal Sale of Regulated Drugs. 

Issues: 

1. Whether or not the implementation of the search warrant was lawful and that the object seized may be used to prove Del
Rosarios guilt? 

2. Whether the ammunition was validly seized as an incident to a lawful arrest?

Held: 1. No. According to the version of the prosecution, during the alleged buy-bust operation, accused appellant handed
over to Veneracion Luna, the alleged poseur-buyer, a quantity of shabu, and Luna in turn paid accused-appellant a marked 100
bill and then returned to the police station and informed the raiding team that he had already bought the shabu from accused-
appellant. Thereupon, the raiding team proceeded to the house of accused-appellant to implement the search warrant. The
version of the prosecution is highly incredible. The record is devoid of any reason why the police officers did not make any
attempt to arrest accused-appellant at the time he allegedly sold the shabu to Veneracion Luna who was accompanied by
another police officer. That was the opportune moment to arrest accused-appellant. The version foisted by the prosecution
upon this Court is contrary to human experience in the ordinary course of human conduct. The usual procedure in a buy-bust
operation is for the police officers to arrest the pusher of drugs at the very moment he hands over the dangerous drug to the
poseur-buyer. That is the every reason why such a police operation is called a "BUY-BUST" operation. The police poseur-buyer
"buys dangerous drugs from the pusher and bust" (arrests) him the moment the pusher hands over the drug to the police
officer. We thus entertain serious doubts that the shabu contained in a small canister was actually seized or confiscated at the
residence of accused-appellant. In consequence, the manner the police officers conducted the subsequent and much-delayed
search is highly irregular. Upon barging into the residence of accused-appellant, the police officers found him lying down and
they immediately arrested and detained him in the living room while they searched the other parts of the house. Although they
fetched two persons to witness the search, the witnesses were called in only after the policemen had already entered accused-
appellant's residence and, therefore, the policemen had more than ample time to plant the shabu. At any rate, accused-
appellant cannot be convicted of possession of the shabu contained in a canister and allegedly seized at his house, for the
charge against him was for selling shabu. Sale is totally different from possession.

Moreover, the search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized only the search and seizure shabu and
paraphernalia for the use thereof and no other. The described quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known
as shabu and its paraphernalia". A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a
fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The Constitution itself
and the Rules of Court, specifically mandate that the search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus,
the search warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned, much less described
with particularity, in the search warrant. 2. NO. Neither may it be maintained that the gun was seized in the course of an
arrest, for as earlier observed, Del Rosario's arrest was far from regular and legal. Said firearm, having been illegally seized,
the same is not admissible in evidence.

DE LOS SANTOS VS. MONTESA, 247 SCRA 85-Alonzo

FACTS: The husband of the petitioner, Pedro, was a patrolman. He was gunned down along with a few others which result in
his and another person’s death. The NBI conducted an investigation that pointed to Hipolito and a few others as responsible for
the crime. Hipolito et al. were charged with murder and frustrated murder. Their detention was ordered upon a finding of
probable cause by Judge Pagarogon. The records were forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan. The prosecutor found
no probable cause and ordered the release of Hipolito, et al. Petitioner asked the DOJ to disqualify the prosecutor from
investigating the case. The DOJ granted the request and assigned the case to a new prosecutor. The new prosecutor found
probable cause thus they were charged before RTC Malolos, Bulacan. No bail was recommended and no warrants or arrests
were issued. Hipolito, et al., immediately learned of the filing of information. They filed a manifestation and motion to defer the
issuance of warrants and prayed for suspension of proceedings on the ground that they are filing a petition for review of the
prosecutor’s resolution before the DOJ. They also filed a petition for bail notwithstanding the fact that they have not yet been
arrested or placed under the jurisdiction of the court. The court denied their motion. They filed another petition entitled
"Reinstatement of the Petition to Grant Bail in the above entitled cases and Motion to Reduce Bail Bond and Motion to Set
Petition for Hearing with Manifestation to Surrender the Accused on the Hearing of this Petition." The trial court consolidated
this with the petition for bail and set them for a hearing. It also directed the prosecutor to forward the records of the
preliminary investigation. Hipolito, et al. then filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest due to lack of probable cause and
withdrew their petition for reinstatement. The court quashed the warrant and set the hearing for the determination of the
existence of probable cause. The court found the probable cause but instead of issuing warrants for the purpose of acquiring
jurisdiction over the persons of the accused, it ex mero motu granted bail despite the absence of a petition for bail (previously
withdrawn). The prosecution filed a motion to cancel bail bonds and issuance of warrants. This was denied on the ground that
orders were already final and executory. 

On certiorari before the CA, the CA ruled in favor of the prosecution and ordered the arrest of Hipolito, et al. They filed a
petition before the SC but the same was dismissed. The complaint was reinstated. Respondent judge asserts that he is not
administratively liable for what he did because he was merely guided by the doctrine in Lim vs. Felix,   to the effect that the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest should be personally determined by the judge. Since in
these cases the issuance of the warrants of arrest was based solely on the certification of the state prosecutor, he granted the
motion to quash the warrants of arrest and, considering that on the date of the hearing to determine probable cause the
witnesses for the prosecution did not appear and the private prosecutor submitted the issue on the basis of the proceedings
had at the preliminary investigation and the affidavits of witnesses, he formally resolved it on such basis. He further alleges
that since he found the evidence purely circumstantial, except as against Romeo Permejo who was positively identified as the
gunman, he believed that the evidence of guilt against the others was not strong and, accordingly, admitted them to bail in the
amount of P80,000.00 each.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Montesa was guilty of gross ignorance of the law and dishonesty. 

HELD: YES. The determination of probable cause in the issuance of a warrant of arrest is mandated by Section 2, Article III of
the Constitution. 5 Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest means such facts and circumstances which would
lead to a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. 6 A hearing is not necessary, therefore. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge, following the established doctrine and procedure, shall either (a) personally evaluate the report
and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest, or (b) if on the face of the information he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
prosecutor's certification and require the submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Since the accused unilaterally withdrew their petition for bail, there was then
nothing to be heard or acted upon in respect thereof. Even if they did not withdraw their petition, they have no right to invoke
the processes of the court since they have not been placed in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of their liberty by
reason or as a consequence of the filing of the information. For the same reason, the court had no authority to act on the
petiion. Even if it be conceded for the sake of argument that the application for bail was regularly filed, the respondent judge
wantonly ignored the due process requirement of hearing to afford the prosecution reasonable opportunity to prove that
evidence of guilt of the applicants is strong.
VICENTE LIM VS. HON. FELIX- Asirit

At the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate,
Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and
Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin.  Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman
Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.   For the crime of multiple
murder and frustrated murder, the accused were Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate (petitioners in G.R. Nos.
94054-57), Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho
(petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69.) The RTC of Masbate concluded that a probable cause has been established for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners plus bail for provisional
liberty.

The entire records of the case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate.   Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C.
Alfane was designated to review the case. A petition to transfer the venue of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the
Regional Trial Court of Makati was filed by petitioners and granted by the SC.

On July 5, 1990, the respondent court (RTC Makati) issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners
herein.  The respondent Judge said:

“In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate which
found the existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was committed and that all the accused are probably
guilty thereof, which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the Regional Trial Court
four separate informations for murder.  Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by
law have declared the existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and there is no visible
defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor’s certification in each information xxx”

Issue: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution’s
certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists

Held: No.

The Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires “x x x probable cause to be personally
determined by the Judge x x x”, not by any other officer or person.

If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in
Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause.   The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. 
The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied.  The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent
Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners.   There was no
basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution.  He could not possibly have known what transpired in
Masbate as he had nothing but a certification.  Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners’ motion for the
transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a
probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.

   9. AMARGA VS. ABBAS, 98 Phil. 739- Batondo

Facts: The respondent Judge, Macapanton Abbas, after receiving An information with a certification stating that the petitioner
fiscal, Amarga has conducted a sufficient preliminary investigation pursuant to the provision of RA732, and2) One supporting
affidavit of one witness (Jubair) stating that he saw the deceased Dugusan Paspasanwas shot and killed by three gunmen,
Dismissed the criminal handled by the petitioner against Appang et. al on the ground that;1. The affidavit of Jubair is hearsay
and does not possess gravity for the establishment of the existence of probable cause.2. So as the certification of the
petitioner fiscal wont warrant the existence of probable cause. Therefore, there can be no prima facie evidence as to necessity
for the issuance of warrant of arrest against the accused. Thus,the petitioner filed a petitioner for certiorari and mandamus
contending that petitioner has already conducted a preliminary examination and thus it is ministerial function for the
respondent to issue arrest warrants. Upon the other hand, the respondent judge argues that the issuance of a warrant of
arrest involves a judicial power which necessarily imposes upon him the legal duty of first satisfying himself that there is
probable cause,independently of and notwithstanding the preliminary investigation made by the provincial fiscal under
RepublicAct No. 732; and to that end he may require the fiscal to submit such evidence as may be sufficient to show at least a
prima facie case.

Issue: Whether or not the certification of a prosecutor is sufficient to issue a warrant of arrest.

Held: No. The constitution mandates that the determination of probable cause depends upon the judgment and discretion of
the judge or magistrate in issuing warrant of arrest. It simply means that sufficient facts must be presented to the judge or
magistrate issuing the warrant to convince him, not that the particular person has committed the crime, but that there is
probable cause for believing that the person whose arrest is sought committed the crime charged. In the case at bar, the
petitioners certification that he had already conducted a preliminary investigation in the case does not sufficiently warrant the
existence of probable cause. Nor thesingle affidavit submitted to the respondent as it is not enough for the respondent judge to
exercise his judicial function to determine the existence of probable cause. However, the petition is granted to continue the
hearing of the case in the ground of lack of prosecution and that refusal of the prosecution to submit additional affidavit is not
a valid ground for the dismissal of a case.Amarga v. Abbas 98 Phil. 739 (1956)Facts: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a
preliminary investigation of Arangale upon complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale
harvested palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangales land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted the records of
the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charged in the complaint.
Fiscal Salvani returned the records to JudgeSamulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records was premature because
JudgeSamulde failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused. Judge Samulde sent there cords back to Fiscal
Salvani stating that although he found that a probable cause existed, he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested.
Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case againstJudge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. RTC dismissed the petition on the
ground that the fiscal had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to the performance of the act to be required of the judge
and that the latter had an imperative duty to perform it. Nevertheless, JudgeSamulde was ordered to issue a WA in accordance
with Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules ofCourt.ISSUE: Whether or not it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a
WA of the accused in view of his finding, after conducting a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused
committed the crime charged.Ruling: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE
ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OROFFICER. Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC,a PI is conducted on the
basis of affidavits to determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. To determine whether a
WA should issue, the investigating judge must have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by
searching questions and answers; he must be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and there must be a need to place the
accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary,
upon the investigating judge to issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not

to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. The fiscal should,instead, have filed an information
immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.20th Century Fox vs CAI.THE FACTSPetitioner
20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in conducting searches and seizures in connection with the
NBIs anti-film piracy campaign. Petitioner alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law).The NBI
conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3)
applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the private respondents. The lower court issued the
desired search warrants. The NBI,accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items
described in the three warrants.Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the search warrants and release the seized
properties, which was granted by the lower court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the lower court. The CA
affirmed the trial court.II.

10.  Quintero vs. NBI, 162 SCRA 467- Cabanban 

Facts:May 19, 1972 – Petitioner Eduardo Quintero was a delegate of the 1 st District of Leyte in the 1971 ConCon. He disclosed
     

in his speech that certain persons had distributed money to some delegates to influence them in the discharge of their
functions.

Quintero delivered to the Concon the ‘payola” he himself received, for Concon’s action. However, he did not reveal the names
of those who gave him money. Eventually, he was pressured to name them so he released a sworn statement addressed to the
Concon, mentioning the names of the persons who gave him the “payola”.

In his statement, it appeared that varying amounts of money were being handed to him by different people from different
offices, some from other delegates, from wives of representatives.

The then First Lady Imelda Marcos was among those implicated in Quintero’s expose.

Due to this, Pres. Ferdinand Marcos made a statement saying that he will uncover the people behind this act making Quintero
as a tool. That same day, NBI agents raided the house of Quintero on the basis of a search warrant issued by the CFI Manila
Judge Asuncion. NBI claimed to have found bundles of money in Quintero’s residence.

NBI filed a criminal complaint for direct bribery against Quintero with the court issuing a TRO enjoining the use in any
proceeding of the objects seized by NBI from his residence.

The search warrant delivered to the occupant of the searched premises was issued in connection with the offense of “grave
threats” and not “direct bribery” which was the criminal complaint filed against Quintero.

Issue: Whether or not the questioned search warrant issued by the judge is null and void for being violative of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court

Ruling: YES. The Court finds, and so holds, that the questioned search warrant issued by the judge is null and void for being
violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court

No relation at all can be established between the crime supposedly committed and the evidence ordered to be seized.  There
was thus no ground whatsoever for the respondent judge to claim that facts and circumstances had been established, sufficient
for him to believe that the crime being charged had been committed.

The circumstances prevailing before the issuance of the questioned search warrant and the actual manner in which the search
was conducted, all but imperfectly, and yet strongly suggest that the entire procedure, from beginning to end, was an
orchestrated movement designed to destroy the petitioner’s public image with “incriminating evidence” and that the evidence
allegedly seized from his residence was “planted’ by the raiding party.
The search warrant was declared null and void. It shall have no force and effect

11. Soliven & Beltran vs. Makasiar, November 18, 1988 (Note that this was widely             criticized)-
Caldingon
FACTS:
The respondent judge issued a warrant against petitioner Beltran pursuant to the filing of a complaint-affidavit (Libel) against
them by the President of the Philippines. (Cory Aquino)
The case at bar is a petition raised by one of the petitioners, Beltran, who wants to call for an interpretation of the
constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest.

The petitioner assailed that his constitutional right was violated when the respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest
without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.

Beltran's interpretation of the words "determined personally" convinced him that the judge is solely responsible to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.

He contends that his constitutional rights (petitioner Beltran) were violated when respondent RTC Judge issued a warrant for
his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, to determine probable cause.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the
warrant of arrest was issued.

HELD:
No. The Court did not find any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
respondent judge. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. The judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses.

Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution

 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

What the Constitution requires is that the issuing judge must satisfy himself first with the criteria in finding
probable cause. And to satisfy himself doesn't mean to he is required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. The Constitution mandates that he shall:

(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.

12. Umil vs. Ramos, et al., July 9, 1990 with the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration in November,
1991- Carias

FACTS:
         The respondents assert that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as they have
been legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid informations filed in court against them. The petitioners counter that
their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first
conducted, so that the informations filed against them are null and void. The record shows that the persons in whose behalf
these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense, when
apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of
valid information filed against them in court
         In Umil v. Ramos case, The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received
confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the
St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue,  Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed
in the hospital records as Ronnie  Javelon,  is actually  Rolando Dural, a member  of the NPA  liquidation squad,  responsible
for the killing  of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day  before. Dural was then transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the
CAPCOM, for security reasons.  While confined thereat, Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who
went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car.
Consequently, Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of “Double Murder with
Assault upon Agents of Persons in Authority.” A petition for habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of
Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva.  The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus. A Return of the Writ was
filed. Umil and Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-
Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they were accordingly released.
         In Roque vs. De Villa case, the arrest was justified. Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had
with him letters to Renato Constantino and other members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a
member of the National United Front Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of subversive documents
found in the house of her sister in Caloocan City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a fragmentation grenade for
which she had no permit or authority to posses.
         In Anonuevo & Ramos case. The arrest without warrant is justified. Both are admittedly members of the standing
committee of the NUFC and, when apprehended in the house of Renato Constantino, they had a bag containing subversive
materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition for which they had no license to possess or carry
         In  Vicky Ocaya case, she arrived at a house subject to a search warrant. Ammunition & subversive documents were
found in her car.
         In Nazareno case, Narciso Nazareno was identified by Ramil Regala as the latter’s companion in killing Romulo Bunye II.
ISSUE: 
Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any warrant of arrest for the crime of rebellion.
HELD:
Yes. Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People’s Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion
being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he  was committing an
offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the
nature of continuing crimes. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance  of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed
conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The
arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedur in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a
judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and   the granting of bail if the
offense is bailable. The absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt
acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The
arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted authorities.
*An arrest is in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as
the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in
our communities. The Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which
they were arrested. Not evidence of guilt, but “probable cause” is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the
performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant. The courts should not
expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113,
particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting
officers are not liable.  But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for
the crime of arbitrary detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:

1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without warrant, and in relying
on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such
arrests violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of the

Philippines/New People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions, and subversive documents found in their

possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the requirements on the admissibility of extrajudicial

admissions;

4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;

5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.

We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.

13. P. vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465- De Vera

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus to review the decision of the City Court of Butuan City.
On September 15, 1980 The city fiscal and assistant fiscal of Butuan City filed an information charging Rogelim Yee with
serious slander by deed. On July 14, 1980, Rogelim Yee willfully attacked and assaulted Ofelia V. Torralba in the presence of
her visitors, teachers, and classmates which caused her embarrassment and inconvenience.

A preliminary investigation was made and it was determined that there was probable cause and the fiscal recommended bail in
the amount of P600.

Respondent judge, instead of issuing a warrant of arrest, as has been the time-honored practice, conducted an ex parte
preliminary examination by scanning the record to determine once more the existence of probable cause.

After a perusal of the affidavits, he concluded that the offense committed was either slight slander by deed committed in the
heat of anger or slight physical injuries, a light felony. Because the information was filed sixty-four days after the offense was
committed, respondent judge dismissed the case sua sponte (Sua sponte refers to action taken by the court without the
prompting of the parties.)  on the ground of prescription. The dismissal order was issued on September 17, 1980 or two days
after the filing of the information.

Issue: WoN respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for dismissing the case
after pursuing his own preliminary investigation.

Ruling: No, Respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion for lack of jurisdiction.
This case illustrates the mischief or prejudice arising from the act of the city judge in duplicating the preliminary examination
held by the fiscal. Here, respondent judge on the pretext of determining probable cause arrived at the conclusion (before
arraignment) that the criminal liability of the accused was extinguished by prescription.
What respondent judge actually did was not to verify whether the fiscal’s determination of probable cause was correct but to
find out whether the criminal liability of the accused was already extinguished, which is a different matter.
Extinction of criminal liability presupposes not merely probable cause but the guilt of the accused.
In the instant case, the investigating fiscal gave accused Yee a chance to be heard at the preliminary investigation. He did not
submit any counter-affidavit. He was furnished by the fiscal with a copy of the latter’s resolution wherein he found that there
existed a prima facie case for grave slander by deed against the accused. Yee did not controvert that resolution.
The case against him was terminated because of the precipitate or premature order of dismissal issued by respondent judge on
his own volition on the basis of his independent assessment of Yee’s criminal liability.
Although in the instant case we find that the city court erred in dismissing the case on its own motion on the contro versial
ground of prescription, nevertheless, the petition has to be dismissed because no appeal was seasonably made from the
dismissal order and certiorari and mandamus are not substitutes for an appeal that had lapsed.

Certiorari is not a substitute for appeal as held time and again by this Court.—Where an appeal would have been an adequate
remedy but it was lost through petitioner’s inexcusable negligence, certiorari is not in order. Time and again, this Court
dismissed petitions for certiorari to annul decisions or final orders which could have, but were not, appealed. They were
dismissed because certiorari cannot take the place of an appeal (3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court 178, citing Profeta
vs. Gutierrez David, 71 Phil. 582; Republic vs. Maglanoc, 123 Phil. 508). 

14. Placer vs. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463- 

15. Geronimo vs. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435-
FACTS:
These interrelated petitions arose from the controversy over the mayoralty elections in 1980, wherein the petitioner who was elected to the post of
mayor of Baras, Rizal was subsequently disqualified as a candidate for mayor by this Court's affirmance of the Commission on Elections' decision on
the ground that he was a political turncoat.
 
On January 8, 1980, private respondent Julian Pendre filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify petitioner Meliton
C. Geronimo from running as a candidate for the mayorship of Baras, Rizal on the ground of political turncoatism.
 
After hearing the petition, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8305 disqualifying Geronimo. Geronimo filed a motion to reconsider the said
resolution, and two days before the elections, he filed with this Court a petition for certiorari to restrain the COMELEC from implementing its
resolution. The same day, this Court issued a temporary restraining order against the COMELEC.
 
In the 1980 elections, Geronimo won against his oppoonent, Bayani Ferrera. On March 11, 1980, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9554,
reinstating the proclamation made earlier by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Baras, Rizal in favor of Geronimo as the winning candidate for
mayor but the proclamation was declared temporary subject to the decision of this Court on the petition for certiorari filed by Geronimo.
 
This Court rendered a decision in G.R. No. 52413 dismissing the petition for certiorari and ordering the lifting of the restraining order. The Court
ruled that Geronimo is disqualified to run for being a political turncoat. Geronimo's motions were denied thereafter.
 
The petitioner together with some of his political followers of more than fifty persons entered en masse the Municipal Hall of Baras, occupied its
premises and continued to do so until May 13, 1982, causing a paralyzation of official business in the municipality. COMELEC issued a resolution
finding Geronimo guilty of contempt and on May 14, 1982, Geronimo and his followers were forcibly taken out and arrested.
 
On May 19, 1982, Geronimo filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that there is no legal basis for his arrest and detention since the COMELEC's
resolution no. 82-605 holding him in contempt was issued with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction.
 
In the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, Geronimo maintains that there is no legal basis for his detention. He contends that the
resolution of the COMELEC ordering his detention was issued with grave abuse of discretion or without jurisdiction. Geronimo anchors his charge
that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion on three grounds: (1) that the questioned resolution was not properly promulgated; (2) that
Ferrera did not acquire the plurality of votes for the mayorship of Baras; and (3) that Julian Pendre who filed the motion for contempt had no
personality to institute the same because he did not file his candidacy for the position of mayor, of Baras, Rizal.
 
ISSUE:
WON there is legal basis for Geronimo’s arrest and detention
 
RULING:
None. It is an undisputed fact that all the criminal charges were the result of the events that transpired before and until the May 14,1982 incident,
when Mr. Geronimo was forcibly taken out of the municipal building of Baras by the military. The charges were also filed almost successively: one
on March 20; one on April 12; one on April 14; two on May 4, two on May 14, and one on May 19, — and with the same court and presided over by
the same judge.
 
In one of the criminal complaints wherein about 75 people were charged, the warrants of arrest were issued on the same day that the preliminary
examination was conducted. Such a hasty and manifestly haphazard manner of conducting the preliminary examination to determine probable
cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest and eventually for the filing of the necessary information cannot be sanctioned by this Court. A
judge must first satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. The requirements are strict. The
examination must be legitimate and not a feigned one intended to justify a course of action already predetermined.
 
The Court ruled in the case of Salonga v. Patio that the purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and
also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials.
 
Similar caution is warranted for the issuance of warrants of arrest. In the case at bar and especially considering the background circumstances
which led to the filing of charges, we find it highly improbable for the judge to be able to determine the existence of reasonable grounds to believe
that the offenses have been committed and that each and every one of the seventy-six (76) persons are probably guilty thereof in a matter of a few
hours and to proceed with the issuance of the warrants of arrest also on the same day. It should be remembered and the judge should have taken
into account that all the offenses which were allegedly committed were only the product and result of the outburst of the feelings and emotions of
the people of Baras due to the highly tense situation in the municipality, which culminated with the May 14, 1982 incident. The judge, therefore, in
conducting his preliminary investigation should have ascertained with double care if, indeed, there was ample evidence to warrant the issuance of
arrest warrants and eventually the filing of criminal information against such a big number of persons, most of whom were impelled by different
motivations and whose respective participations were of varying natures and degrees. One of the crimes charged was sedition, a particularly grave
offense not to be lightly treated by any prosecuting officer or judge. The possibility of prolonged detention because of the charge should have been
considered.

16. JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR, ET AL., G.R.NO. 92163, June 5, 1990
Constitutional Law – Warrant of Arrest – Judge Should Personally Determine Probable Cause
 
FACTS:
In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. The warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Jaime Salazar. Said crime arose from the failed coup attempts against then
President Corazon Aquino. There was no bail set for Enrile due to the seriousness of the crime charged against him. Enrile was
then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed a habeas corpus case questioning his detention and alleging that the crime
being charged against him is nonexistent. He insists that there is no such crime as rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder.Enrile invoked the ruling in the landmark case of People vs Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion
cannot be complexed with common crimes such as murder; as such, the proper crime that should have been charged against
him is simple rebellion – which is bailable.
 
Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. He claimed that it only took Judge
Salazar one hour and twenty minutes (from the raffling of the case to him) to issue the warrant. Enrile claimed that such
period is so short that it was impossible for the judge to have been able to examine the voluminous record of the case from the
prosecution’s office – that being, the constitutional provision that a judge may only issue a warrant of arrest after personally
determining the existence of probable cause has not been complied with.
 
For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned and that it should be ruled
that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes like murder.
 
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned.
2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined probable cause in the case at bar.
 
RULING:
1. No. The said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also noted that there was actually a previous law (P.D. 942)
which sought to abandon the Hernandez doctrine. The said law provided that graver crimes may not be complexed
with rebellion. However, President Corazon Aquino repealed said law (by virtue of the power granted to her by the
1986 Freedom Constitution). That being, the Hernandez doctrine, which reflects the rebellion law under the Revised
Penal Code, still stands. The courts cannot change this because courts can only interpret laws. Only Congress can
change the rebellion law (which the SC suggested in order to strengthen the rebellion law). But as it stands, Enrile is
correct, there is no such crime as rebellion with murder. Common crimes such as murder are absorbed. He can only
be charged with rebellion – which is bailable.
2. Yes. There is nothing irregular with the fact that Judge Salazar only took an hour and twenty minutes to issue the
warrant from the time the case was raffled to him despite the fact that the prosecution transmitted quite a voluminous record
from the preliminary investigation it conducted. It is sufficient that the judge follows established procedure by personally
evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. Just because Judge Salazar had what some
might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not,
or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed.