Safety Science 83 (2016) 80–92

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Safety Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ssci

Risk assessment of bridges under multiple hazards in operation period

Jelena M. Andrić, Da-Gang Lu ⇑
Research Group of Reliability and Risk Engineering (RARE), School of Civil Engineering, Harbin Institute of Technology, Huanghe Road 73, 110090 Harbin, PR China

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Over the past several decades, the number of disasters around the world has been amplified. Moreover,
Received 18 July 2015 the impacts of disasters on communities have attracted extra attentions, requiring efficient measures of
Received in revised form 14 October 2015 disaster management. Similarly, safety problems of bridges have become public topics since bridges rep-
Accepted 3 November 2015
resent essential parts of highway infrastructure that have been exposed to multiple hazards during their
life cycle. In this paper, a novel framework of disaster risk assessment is proposed, by combining Fuzzy
Analytical Hierarchy Process (FAHP) with fuzzy knowledge representation and fuzzy logic techniques
Keywords:
into a single integrated approach. A survey about collapsed bridges in the past few decades has been con-
Multiple hazards
Bridges
ducted. From this investigation the potential hazards have been identified. The FAHP approach is applied
Risk assessment to ranking risk factors since it is more systematic, accurate and effective than traditional AHP. Risk indi-
Bridge safety cators, the probability of occurrence, the impacts of disasters and disaster consequences are analyzed
Hierarchical risk breakdown structure from expert opinions. The bridge risk is computed by implementing fuzzy logic tools on the risk factors
Fuzzy AHP and their parameters. The proposed method is practical and efficient for a quick and reliable multi-
Vulnerability hazards risk analysis and assessment of bridges. Based on the level of disaster risks to which the bridge
is exposed, an appropriate bridge safety management plan is required to reduce or prevent the effects of
the disasters. A case study is examined for a bridge in Tianjin, People’s Republic of China. The results illus-
trate the applicability of the proposed risk assessment method of bridges under multiple hazards.
Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction theory, calculation models, proficiency of the performed calcula-

Over the past several decades, the frequency of disasters and
their impacts on communities have increased enhancing needs
for more efficient safety measures, disaster risk reduction and ade-
quate management plans. Therefore, constructing resilient infras-
tructures and making resilient cities which could reduce the
probability of failure and recovery time represents the grand chal-
lenge (Bruneau et al., 2003; Godschalk, 2003). Further, the safety
problem of bridges has become a public topic since they have vital
roles in highway infrastructure systems, in which they represent
the most vulnerable components (Liu and Frangopol, 2006). Thus,
bridge safety is priority of everyone involved in traffic.
Bridges have been exposed to different risks during their life-
cycle period (Dawen and Wenda, 2009). In the planning phase of
the bridge construction project, the risk arises from the uncertain-
ties of the bridge preliminary design scheme, the selection of the
bridge location, and the height of the passage area. During the
design phase, uncertainties come from the implemented design
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +86 13351100980.
E-mail addresses: jln.andric@gmail.com, jln.andric@hit.edu.cn (J.M. Andrić),
ludagang@hit.edu.cn (D.-G. Lu).
tions and related analyses. The risks in the construction phase have
their origins from construction techniques, sudden accidents, nat-
ural disasters and human factors. Finally, during the operation
phase, the risks are associated with unexpected accidents, natural
disasters and human actions. A disaster aftermath always results in
damage and collapse of the bridge. Consequently, the traffic capac-
ity would be reduced and the losses due to bridge damage or col-
lapse would be present. Such losses include: (1) cost of a
reconstruction or rehabilitation process and (2) cost of the traffic
disruption.
The task of risk assessment is aimed to enable decision-makers
to develop: (1) optimal safety measures; (2) maintenance strate-
gies, and (3) disaster management plans. These objectives include:
enhancing bridge safety, reducing the level of risk, preparing
bridges for disasters and enabling fast recovery. Therefore, it is
necessary to identify potential threats to bridges during their oper-
ation periods; to develop a unified risk assessment framework and
a pragmatic method that will assist estimating potential risk levels
by considering the identified risk factors. Such an approach would
take a part in the decision-making process for bridge safety man-
agement measures in order to prevent bridge collapse and casual-
ties. In different communities, bridges are exposed to different

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2015.11.001
0925-7535/Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
 J.M. Andrić, D.-G. Lu / Safety Science 83 (2016) 80–92
hazards. Similarly, the risk of a bridge depends on the location, size
and structural type of the bridge.
Recently, the problem of risk assessment of bridges under mul-
tiple hazards has been paid much attention to. However, most of
the existing models for multi-hazard risk assessment of bridges
are based on traditional probabilistic approaches.
In this paper, we make use of the Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Pro-
cess (FAHP) method for risk rating and prioritization, and fuzzy
logic approach as in particular well-suited for risk assessment.
The aim is to address the limitations of the existing models and
to bridge the gap in current understanding of the subject by
proposing a new fuzzy logic-based framework with the proposed
disaster risk assessment method. The risk assessment of a bridge
can reliably be conducted by using subjective judgments of
experts. In fact, the proposed risk assessment method synthesizes
fuzzy AHP, fuzzy knowledge representation and fuzzy logic into a
single integrated approach. According to the author’s best knowl-
edge, the application of the concepts of fuzzy AHP and fuzzy logic
theory for bridge risk assessment under multiple hazards has not
been studied yet. Furthermore, the bridge risk assessment model
presents a sound basis for development of decision-making tool
for bridge safety management.
Kuo and Lu (2013) highlighted their conclusion that a subjective
judgment involving individual knowledge is a more efficient tool
for risk analysis and assessment than a probabilistic approach.
Zadeh (1965) introduced the fuzzy set theory, with the aim to solve
problems characterized with high uncertainties involved. Fuzzy set
theory and fuzzy logic can handle imprecise data sets including
information featuring non-statistical uncertainties. In addition,
these methods have been shown to be effective tools for risk
assessment in other engineering and industry areas, such as risk
assessment in software engineering (Engel and Last, 2007), con-
struction industry risks (Liu and Tsai, 2012), risks in marine
(Goerlandt et al., 2015), risks in mining engineering (Malinowska,
2011), among others.
Based on the above literature, the benefit of the concept of fuzzy
logic over the other procedures is the ability to model vague data
which can be further used for decision making process (Ross,
2009). Also, the fuzzy logic theory enables identifying the weak
points in technical systems when they relate to criteria of risk
and safety (Petrović et al., 2014). Besides, the main advantage of
fuzzy set theory compared to other methods is the ability to oper-
ate with linguistic variables since some events cannot be described
numerically.
We suggest this approach to be implemented for: (1) decision-
making process regarding bridge safety, maintenance and manage-
ment, and (2) bridge design (the proposed method is proactive, and
the risk assessment could help to improve the design of bridge
structures to become more resistant).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
describes a fuzzy logic-based framework for disaster risk assess-
ment for bridges. Section 3 illustrates a Hierarchical Risk Break-
down Structure of bridges. The procedure for hazards ranking
based on Fuzzy AHP approach is explained in Section 4. Section 5
introduces the proposed method for disaster risk assessment in
bridge engineering. Section 6 illustrates the applicability of the
methodology to a case study. Finally, Section 7 draws conclusions
and directions for further study.
2. Fuzzy logic-based framework for disaster risk assessment of
bridges
The process of disaster risk assessment for bridges can be
divided into simple steps. The proposed framework is hierarchi-
cally structured, in which the steps are logically ordered. Fig. 1
81
Fig. 1. Conceptual fuzzy logic-based framework for disaster risk assessment.
illustrates a schematic of the proposed novel conceptual frame-
work to quantify disaster risk of a bridge following a similar format
used for risk management (AS/NZS4360, 1999).
The four key modules of the framework include: (1) hazard
identification; (2) risk ranking; (3) risk analysis; (4) risk assess-
ment. Hazard identification has the task to detect all potential
threats that could cause damage, deterioration and collapse of
bridges. Research on the collapsed bridges has been carried out
with the purpose to detect the hazards which led to failure. The
significance of hazards is different and it should be ranked to make
the risk order. Further, the identified hazards have been hierarchi-
cally arranged in order to enable easier risk ranking, which signi-
fies an important role in disaster risk assessment. The risk ranks
are evaluated according to the judgments of decision makers.
Afterwards, risk indicators for each hazard are evaluated. Risk indi-
cators are defined as the likelihood of hazard occurrence, the disas-
ter impact, and consequences of the disaster. Input data for risk
indicators is obtained through subjective judgments of experts
according to individual knowledge and experience and it is col-
lected by surveys. Moreover, fuzzy risk indicators have been com-
puted through the fuzzification and aggregation process, as
illustrated in Fig. 1. Finally, the risk of the bridge is calculated by
aggregation and defuzzification process.
2.1. Hazard identification
Hazard identification presents the starting point of the pro-
posed framework. During the operation period, bridges have been
exposed to many hazardous events which have the potentials to
cause damage to bridge structures. A literature survey of the col-
lapsed bridges around the world has been carried out in order to
identify disasters which led to failures. If the disaster had occurred,
then the potential hazard must exist (Du and Lin, 2012). These sur-
veys were conducted in the USA, Colombia and China. In addition,
the collected data is graphically presented by countries and time
periods, and classified according to disasters as highlighted in
Figs. 2–5.
According to the causes of the collapse, the potential hazards
can be classified into groups:

Geological hazards: earthquake, tsunami, liquefaction, soil,
landslides.

Windstorms hazards: hurricanes, tornadoes, typhoons.

Hydraulic hazards: flood, debris, scour, drift.
82 J.M. Andrić, D.-G. Lu / Safety Science 83 (2016) 80–92

Traffic hazards: ship collision with the bridge, vehicle collisions,
overloading.

Construction hazards: lack of design, construction quality,
deterioration.

Human-made hazards: fire, explosions, terrorist attacks.
Further, the collected risk factors are analyzed with the aim to
estimate the degree of their influences on the bridge structures.
2.2. Risk ranking
In different multi-criteria decision making problems, Analytical
Hierarchical Process (AHP), fuzzy AHP (FAHP), Analytical Network
Process (ANP) and other similar methods have been employed for
solving these kinds of problems.
The AHP approach has been shown as a practical method for
multi-criteria decision making. The decision problem in AHP is
decomposed into a break-down structure of interrelated compo-
nents and it is organized hierarchically in order to determine the
significance of each criteria (Vashishtha and Ramachandran,
2006). The AHP approach is developed by Saaty (1980) and it
outlines a break-down structure of goal, factors and sub-factors
in a hierarchical configuration. In addition, this method is shown
efficient for solving a variety of problems in IT project prioritiza-
tion (da Silva Neves and Camanho, 2015); electric supply planning
(Rojas-Zerpa and Yusta, 2015); machinery safety (Caputo et al.,
2013); maintenance (Salmeron and Lopez, 2010). On the other
hand, the weakness of traditional AHP is that it doesn’t consider
ambiguity which is entailed in human subjective judgement
(Mangla et al., 2015) since it appears inadequate for decision mak-
ers to express their judgments in the form of the exact numeric
value of the 9-point scale. A decision maker feels more confident
to express his or her opinion in the form of linguistic variables
(Zheng et al., 2012).
Therefore, fuzzy AHP is a more suitable method for evaluating
hazard prioritization for bridge risk assessment since it captures
imprecise judgements of decision makers (Das, 2011). This method
has been introduced by Van Laarhoven and Pedrycz (1983). Com-
pared to other MCDM methods, fuzzy AHP is more precise and effi-
cient in handling fuzziness of the data involved in measuring
alternatives or judgements of different decision variables
(Sezhian et al., 2011). In this study, a method based on fuzzy
AHP is preferred for risk ranking due to its advantage over the
other decision-making methods.
2.3. Risk analysis
Risk analysis is the key process in risk assessment and safety
management and it embraces three points: (1) the likelihood of a
disaster occurrence (hazard analysis); (2) the impact of the disaster
(vulnerability analysis); (3) the consequence of disasters (loss
analysis).
Hazard analysis indicates the probability or likelihood of disas-
ter occurrence at a particular site of the bridge location. In general,
it can be assessed by qualitative or quantitative analysis. The qual-
itative analysis evaluates hazards based on subjective judgments of
experts. The quantitative analysis appraises the quantitative mea-
sures of hazards. Usually, the hazard analysis is carried out by
quantitative methods such as a probabilistic approach. Moreover,
the probabilistic theory is based on a series of experiments and

40 Statistics of Collapsed Bridges in the USA during period

Number of collapsedd bridges

1951 – 1988
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Fig. 2. Collapsed bridges in the USA during period 1951–1988 (Harik et al., 1990).

180 Statistics of Collapsed Bridges in the USA during

period 1989 – 2000
Number of collapsed bridges

160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

Fig. 3. Collapsed bridges in the USA during period 1989–2000 (Wardhana and Hadipriono, 2003).
 J.M. Andrić, D.-G. Lu / Safety Science 83 (2016) 80–92 83

Statistics of Collapsed Bridges in Colombia

20 during period 1986 – 2001
18

Number of collapsed bridges

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Terrorist Flood Scour Lack of Construction Overloading
attack Design

Fig. 4. Collapsed bridges in Columbia during period 1986–2001 (Diaz et al., 2009).

Statistics of Collapsed Bridges in China during period

80 2000 – 2012
Number of collapsed bridges

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Flood Construction Overload Collision Design Construction Debris
scheme quality

Fig. 5. Collapsed bridges in China during period 2000–2012 (Fu et al., 2013).

statistical data. However, disaster risk assessment in this research
is carried out based on subjective judgments of experts. Further,
risk analysis and assessment based on subjective judgments, which
includes individual experience and knowledge, is a more efficient
tool than the probabilistic approach according to Kuo and Lu
(2013).
The vulnerability analysis of bridges outlines the impact of a
disaster, expressed as bridge damage state. Additionally, the dam-
age state is related to a damage ratio, which is defined as the
reconstruction costs to the replacement cost. According to (DHS,
2009), five different damage states for bridges are defined: no
damage, slight, moderate, extensive, and complete damage.
Disaster losses, or consequences of disasters, have been mea-
sured in terms of their influence on communities, environment
and people. Disaster losses involve four aspects: direct economic,
direct social, indirect economic and indirect social losses
(Cimellaro et al., 2010).
Direct economic losses comprise bridge repair, rehabilitation
and reconstruction costs, and cost of bridge equipment replace-
ment, debris removal and temporary bypass construction. Such
losses have been estimated for each structural bridge component
(foundations, bearings, piers, beams, girders). In addition, costs of
non-structural bridge elements, such as lightning, bridge drainage,
traffic and signaling installation, grounding, monitoring, and road-
way heating systems, have been included.
Indirect economic losses have been caused by traffic disruption.
Bridge users have been required to select other routes since the
functionality of a bridge is reduced or closed for traffic. Besides, a
new route will enhance travel time and distance which will result
in higher travel expenses. To estimate this loss, information on
traffic flow before and after the disaster, new total travel time
and new distance are required.
The direct social losses have been expressed in the number
of dead and injured people who are on the bridge during a
disaster. This number varies on the day time when the
disaster occurs and the age of people (Peek-Asa et al., 1998).
During the light day, the number of victims is higher than at
night time.
The indirect social losses have been associated with the number
of dead and injured people because of traffic disruption due to
bridge dysfunction.
2.4. Risk assessment
Risk is the possibility of harmful consequences or expected
losses resulting from interactions between natural and human-
made hazards and vulnerable conditions. In general, disaster risk
represents a multiplication function of three parameters: hazard
(H) – the probability of disaster occurrence; vulnerability (V) –
the impact of disaster; and loss (L) – the consequences of the dis-
aster. Mathematically, disaster risk is expressed by following
equation:
R¼HV L ð1Þ
3. Hierarchical risk breakdown structure of bridges
In this study, 15 possible risk factors are listed, which could
contribute to bridge collapse. Additionally, these identified poten-
tial hazards have been arranged hierarchically in order to form
Hierarchical Risk Breakdown Structure (HRBS). HRBS has been
introduced by Tah and Carr (2000) with the purpose to enable sys-
tematic detailed risk analyses and ranking.
84 J.M. Andrić, D.-G. Lu / Safety Science 83 (2016) 80–92

In this paper, potential hazards have been organized and classi- e is constructed according to the pair-wise
judgment matrix X
fied in the HRBS referring to their origin. Further, the hierarchy comparison:
entails three levels. On the first level is the goal of the problem 2 3
which is the total bridge risk. The goal, bridge risk, has been
~x11 . . . ~x1n
impacted by two hazard categories. Therefore, the bridge risk has e ¼6
X 4 ... ...
7
... 5 ð2Þ
been decomposed into two factors: natural and man-made haz- ~xn1 . . . ~xnn
ards. They have been placed in the second level. The most relevant
sub-criteria for each of the criteria have been put in the third level. where ~xij is the importance of factor i over the factor j expressed as
Earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, floods, debris, scour, ice, soil fuzzy judgment. Further, in matrix X e element ~xji represents the
and the age of the bridge belong to category of natural hazards reciprocal value of element ~xij .
(Fig. 6). Such risk factors are more unpredictable and uncontrol-
1
lable as their origin is in nature. The other category consists of col- ~xji ¼ ð3Þ
~xij
lision, overloading, deterioration, construction and design, fire and
terrorist attack. Human-made hazards are more controllable com- Many researchers proposed different linguistic scales for mea-
pared to the first group. suring the verbal judgment of importance. Usually, linguistic vari-
ables for expressing preference of alternatives of decision groups
have triangular or trapezoidal fuzzy numbers as membership func-
4. Fuzzy AHP-based method for disaster risk ranking of bridges tions (Sadi-Nezhad and Damghani, 2010). Further, definition and
operational laws of fuzzy numbers are provided. Triangular fuzzy
In order to estimate hazard weights and perform risk ranking, number represents m ~ ¼ ða; b; cÞ, in which the membership function
a method based on the fuzzy AHP concept is proposed. The pro- lm~ of m
~ is defined by:
posed procedure uses opinions of decision makers to estimate 8 xa
risk rankings. Every decision maker has been asked to express < ba ; a 6 x 6 b
>
their judgment on hazard importance compared to other hazards lm~ ðmÞ ¼ 1; x ¼ b ð4Þ
>
: cx
in the form of set of questionnaires. The importance of each cb
; b6x6c
hazard is denoted by fuzzy knowledge representation technique,
and fuzzy judgement matrices have been formed. Furthermore, The values a, b and c represent lower, medium and upper bound of
fuzzy number m, ~ respectively.
fuzzy weights have been computed. Afterwards, fuzzy weights
from different decision makers have been aggregated to form a In fuzzy set theory, the operational laws of two triangular fuzzy
single value. The aggregation process is carried out by aggrega- numbers a ~ ¼ ðb1 ; b2 ; b3 Þ are given as follows
~ ¼ ða1 ; a2 ; a3 Þ and b
tion operator. At the end, fuzzy weight values are converted into (Chen and Chen, 2003):
numerical values which will be used in process of disaster risk ~ ¼ ða1 ; a2 ; a3 ÞðþÞðb1 ; b2 ; b3 Þ ¼ ða1 þ b1 ; a2 þ b2 ; a3 þ b3 Þ
~ðþÞb
a ð5Þ
assessment.
The process of risk ranking consists of seven steps which have
a ~ ¼ ða1 ; a2 ; a3 ÞðÞðb1 ; b2 ; b3 Þ ¼ ða1  b1 ; a2  b2 ; a3  b3 Þ
~ðÞb ð6Þ
been outlined below:
Step 1: Linguistic scale for evaluation of fuzzy judgment matrix:
a ~ ¼ ða1 ; a2 ; a3 ÞðÞðb1 ; b2 ; b3 Þ ¼ ða1 b1 ; a2 b2 ; a3 b3 Þ
~ðÞb ð7Þ
The relationships between goal and factors, and between factors
and sub-factors in traditional AHP approach, are established by  
judgement matrix or pairwise comparison matrix X, constructed ~ ¼ ða1 ; a2 ; a3 Þð=Þðb1 ; b2 ; b3 Þ ¼ a1 a2 a3
~ð=Þb
a ; ; ð8Þ
for the factors on the same level. An element in row i and column b3 b2 b1
j represents the judged value of attribute i over the attribute j. The
values of verbal judgments in matrix X in traditional AHP are given ~ ¼ k  ða1 ; a2 ; a3 Þ ¼ ðka1 ; ka2 ; ka3 Þ
ka ð9Þ
as crisp numerical values which are evaluated on 9-point scale  
(Table 1). In fuzzy AHP, a linguistic scale with linguistic variables 1 1 1 1
¼ ða1 ; a2 ; a3 Þ1 ¼ ; ; ð10Þ
is used to compare the importance of sub-factors and fuzzy ~
a a3 a2 a1

Fig. 6. Hierarchical risk breakdown structure of a bridge.

 J.M. Andrić, D.-G. Lu / Safety Science 83 (2016) 80–92
Table 1
Saaty’s scale of relative importance of attributes i over attribute j.
Verbal judgment of importance
Same importance
Moderate importance
Strong importance
Very strong importance
Absolute importance
Values in middle
In case of three triangular fuzzy numbers, the multiplication oper-
ator rule is:
a ~ ~c ¼ ða1 ; a2 ; a3 ÞðÞðb1 ; b2 ; b3 ÞðÞðc1 ; c2 ; c3 Þ
~ðÞbðÞ
¼ ða1 b1 c1 ; a2 b2 c2 ; a3 b3 c3 Þ
Step 2: Data collection for establishment of pair-wise comparison
matrices: Decision groups have been asked to state their judgments
about pair-wise comparison for the sub-factors within the same
above factor. Their decisions are collected through set of question-
naires. Further, the fuzzy judgement matrices are created using the
collected data.
Step 3: Consistency test: When the fuzzy comparison matrices
are established, the next step is to check their consistency. In order
to test the consistency, the fuzzy comparison matrices should be
firstly converted into traditional comparison matrices by convert-
ing the elements which are triangular fuzzy numbers into crisp
values. To convert the elements from triangular fuzzy numbers
into corresponding crisp values, the defuzzification process is
applied to them. The ‘center-of-centroid’ method is suggested to
be used for defuzzification process which represents central value
of triangular fuzzy numbers, because of its symmetry. If the tradi-
tional comparison matrix is consistent, then the fuzzy comparison
matrix is consistent too (Zheng et al., 2012). Further, the consis-
tency of the traditional comparison matrix X is checked.
Firstly, the maximum eigenvalue, kmax from the comparison
matrix X should be estimated. Then, the consistency test of the
comparison matrix is performed in two steps:
kmax  n
CI ¼
n1
where CI – consistency index, n is the dimension of square matrix.
CI
CR ¼
RI
where RI – random consistency index and CR is consistency ratio.
Random consistency index RI is the consistency index value
from the random generated matrix. Saaty (1980) has generated
randomly reciprocal matrix using scale 1/9, 1/8, . . ., 1, . . ., 8, 9 and
the average value for random consistency index of the randomly
500 generated matrixes for different values of n is specified in
Table 2.
If the value of CR is smaller than 0.1, then the judgment matrix
has good consistency. Otherwise, the judgment matrix doesn’t
have acceptable consistency, hence it should be modified.
Step 4: Calculation of the priority weights: The next step is to cal-
culate the weight of elements in each level of hierarchy with
respect to an element on higher level. First, the eigenvector is com-
puted by normalization of the geometric mean:
Table 2
Random consistency index RI.
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
RI 0 0 0.58 0.9 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45
85
!1n
Y
n
v~ i ¼ ~xij ð14Þ
Value j¼1
1 e and ~xij is the element in
where n is the dimension of fuzzy matrix X,
3
5 matrix X belong to the i-th row and j-th column, v~ i is the geometric
7 mean of criterion and it is given as triangular fuzzy number since
9 the elements of the matrix are fuzzy triangular numbers.
2, 4, 6, 8 ~ i , which is
The outcome of this step is the weights for each risk w
a triangular fuzzy number. It is calculated by
v~
~ i ¼ Pn i
w ð15Þ
i¼1 v~ i
Step 5: Aggregation of opinions of decision groups: When the
weights of each risk factor are obtained, then the next step is to
ð11Þ
aggregate the results of different decision makers into single com-
bined preference for each hazard. The aggregation value of hazard
weights given by the decision groups is estimated using the for-
mula (Chen, 2000):
1X m
FW i ¼ ~ i;k
w ð16Þ
m k¼1
where FW i represents fuzzy weight of the i-th hazard, m – is the
~ i;k is the fuzzy weight
number of decision makers in the group, and w
for the i-th hazard which is result from the opinion of the k-th deci-
sion maker.
Step 6: Defuzzification of the priority weights: The defuzzification
process is used to convert fuzzy weights into numerical values. In
this case, the representative method which is applied for defuzzifi-
cation of fuzzy weights is based on Leung and Cao (2000):
w1 þ 2w2 þ w3
Wi ¼ ð17Þ
4
where W i is crisp value of i-th hazard weight; and (w1 ; w2 ; w3 ) is the
triangular fuzzy value of i-th hazard weight.
Step 7: Normalization: Further, crisp weights of hazards are
normalized.
5. Fuzzy logic-based disaster risk assessment method for
ð12Þ
bridges
The proposed method follows up the fuzzy logic-based frame-
work for disaster risk assessment described in Section 2. In addi-
ð13Þ
tion, the risk has been computed based on risk factors (hazards)
and their parameters. In this research, the weights of hazards are
evaluated by fuzzy AHP approach as described in Section 4. Fur-
ther, expert opinions on the risk parameters for every hazard have
been denoted by fuzzy knowledge representation. Moreover,
aggregation operator has been applied to aggregate expert opin-
ions for every parameter of risk factors and to compute fuzzy value
of risk factors. Finally, the overall bridge risk is estimated by aggre-
gation of the influence of fuzzy risk factors, and the defuzzification
method is applied to convert it from fuzzy to a crisp value. The pro-
cess of quantifying the disaster risk index involves eight steps. A
step-by-step procedure is outlined below:
Step 1. Selection of linguistic scale: There have been various types
of linguistic scales for subjective judgment. The linguistic scale is
defined as the set of linguistic variables. Linguistic variable repre-
sent mapping from the unit interval Ie with e 2 [0, 1] into the value
range of the membership functions l 2 [0, 1] (Möller and Beer,
2013). Mathematically, it represents a fuzzy number. In literature,
there are different types of fuzzy numbers such as triangular,
10 trapezoidal, bell-shape and they are used in decision-making pro-
1.49
cess depending on the particular situation (Bede, 2013). Moreover,
the interval and membership function are nominated by designers
86 J.M. Andrić, D.-G. Lu / Safety Science 83 (2016) 80–92
according to their knowledge about the nature of the problem.
Similarly, the linguistic scale is chosen according to the type of
the fuzzy numbers which is suitable to describe and present partic-
ular linguistic variables for a certain problem.
Step 2. Linguistic data collection for hazard likelihood, bridge vul-
nerability and disaster loss: Risk indicators have been evaluated
for every risk factor by experts (Zeng et al., 2007). Expert judg-
ments are provided in linguistic terms that have been defined in
the previous step since linguistic terms are used to define logical
judgments (Ölçer and Odabasßi, 2005). In this case, the risk param-
eters, the probability of disaster occurrence, bridge vulnerability
and disaster consequences have been estimated by experts in
bridge engineering. Their subjective judgment is provided through
surveys and questionnaires about risk indicators for every hazard.
Step 3. Fuzzification: Fuzzification is a process which converts
values of linguistic variables into corresponding fuzzy sets using
linguistic scale. Experts provide their opinions about risk parame-
ters using linguistic variables. In this step, the collected data about
the risk parameters for every hazard which have been expressed as
linguistic variables is converted into corresponding fuzzy sets.
Step 4. Fuzzy aggregation of expert opinions: Aggregation is a pro-
cess in fuzzy logic that combines expert judgements and individual
opinions on risk indicators in order to form a single combined pref-
erence fuzzy set. In this study, expert judgments are weighted
equally. To aggregate their judgment on risk indicators, the follow-
ing equations are applied (Chen, 2000):
1X n
FLi ¼ FLij ð18Þ
n j¼1
1X n
FIi ¼ FIij ð19Þ
n j¼1
1X n
FC i ¼ FC ij ð20Þ
n j¼1
where i-th risk factor; j-th expert; and n – the number of experts;
FLi – is the fuzzy likelihood of occurrence of i-th risk factor; FIi –
is the fuzzy disaster impact of i-th risk factor; FCi – is the fuzzy con-
sequences of disaster of i-th risk factor.
Step 5. Compute fuzzy risk factor: The multiplication operator is
applied on the fuzzy likelihood of occurrence (FLi), fuzzy impact
of disaster (FIi) and fuzzy consequence of disaster (FCi) in order
to obtain fuzzy risk factor (FRFi). The proposed aggregated equation
for calculating i-th fuzzy risk factor (FRFi) corresponding to i-th
hazard is:
FRF i ¼ FLi ðÞFIi ðÞFC i ð21Þ
Step 6. Compute fuzzy risk index: The overall fuzzy risk index (FR)
is computed by
X
m
FR ¼ W i ðÞFRF i ð22Þ
i¼1
where W i is the weight of i-th hazard calculated by proposed
method in Section 4, and m is the number of total identified risk
sub-factors, FR – fuzzy risk and it is a fuzzy triangular number.
Step 7. Defuzzification: Defuzzification is an inverse process of
fuzzification, in which a fuzzy risk value is turned into a numerical
risk value by one of the defuzzification methods. The most com-
monly used method is ‘Center-of-Gravity’. Firstly, the aggregated
fuzzy risk is converted into matching fuzzy sets using the linguistic
scale and fuzzy sets degree of membership are established (Zeng
et al., 2007). Mathematically, it is specified by:
Pk
i¼1 Y i  lðyi Þ
R¼ Pk ð23Þ
i¼1 lðyi Þ
here, k – is the total number of fuzzy sets in linguistic scale, Yi is the
center of i-th fuzzy set, and lðyi Þ is the membership function of i-th
matching fuzzy set (Zeng et al., 2007).
Step 8. Classification of bridge risk: The bridge risk can be classi-
fied in different risk categories and it is carried out based on crisp
risk ratings. The maximum risk range is determined based on the
highest risk indicator rating in linguistic scale. Moreover, the like-
lihood of occurrence, the impact of disaster and the consequences
of disaster are multiplied, and the fuzzy risk result in terms of crisp
score becomes risk rating. The crisp scores are calculated using
‘Center-of-gravity’ from previous step. Finally, the crisp risks have
been defined in different crisp risk ranges. A safety and manage-
ment plan for the bridge can be recommended on the basis of risk
level.
6. Case study: A bridge in Tianjin, China
6.1. Description of the bridge in Tianjin, China
A single-tower cable stayed bridge in the downtown of Tianjin
in China, across over the Haihe River, is investigated for a case
study (Fig. 7). The bridge was designed with three spans arrange-
ments: 145 + 48 + 42 m with the total length of 235 m; and the
width of the bridge is 15 m. The main steel box girder passes
through single tower which is 78 m in height and 75° tilted. On
the deck, traffic is functioning in six lanes, three lanes in each
direction.
6.2. Procedure of risk prioritization for the bridge in Tianjin
Step 1: Linguistic scale for evaluation of fuzzy judgment matrix:
The linguistic scale of relative importance for pair-wise compar-
ison with a triangular fuzzy numbers adopted from Cheng
(1997) is used to measure subjective judgements of experts.
This scale is given in Table 3, and it is shown in Fig. 8.
Step 2: Data collection for establishment of pair-wise comparison
matrices: Three set of questionnaires have been established in
order to collect data from decision makers. The first set of ques-
tions is about the comparison of the importance of natural haz-
ards; the second set of questions is about the comparison of the
importance of man-made hazards, and the third is about the
importance of natural hazards over the man-made hazards. In
this survey, three members from the Department of Disaster
Reduction and Mitigation at Harbin Institute of Technology
have been asked to give their opinion on the basis of their
knowledge and expertise for each sub-factor on the third level
and factors on the second level in the hierarchy. The pair-wise
comparisons are made according to Table 3. Furthermore, judg-
ment matrixes for Level 2 and Level 3 are assembled for each
Fig. 7. The Bridge in Tianjin (photo taken by Author 1).
 J.M. Andrić, D.-G. Lu / Safety Science 83 (2016) 80–92
Table 3
Saaty’s scale of relative importance used in the pair-wise comparison of fuzzy AHP.
Linguistic variable Fuzzy number Membership function
Equally important ~
1 (1, 1, 3)
~ 5;3;1
More important 3 (1, 3, 5)
Strongly more important ~
5 (3, 5, 7)
Very strongly more important ~
7 (5, 7, 9)
Absolute important ~
9 (7, 9, 9)
decision maker (DM). Level 2 includes: natural risks a1, and arti-
ficial risks a2. Moreover, Level 3 consists of risk factors: earth-
quakes b1, tsunamis b2, hurricanes b3, floods b4, debris b5,
scour b6, ice b7, soil b8, the age of the bridge b9, collision b10,
overloading b11, deterioration b12, construction and design b13,
fire b14 and terrorist attack b15. Then, the importance of risk fac-
tors to total risk is calculated by multiplying the weights of
Level 2 referring to their group and weights assessed in Level
3. The pair-wise comparison matrices of the factors and the
sub-factors are summarized in Tables 4–12.
Step 3: Consistency test: The consistency test for every matrix is
performed and results of the test are provided at the bottom
rows of Tables 4–12. Every judgment matrix is consistent.
Step 4: Calculation of the priority weights: The priority weights
are expressed as triangular fuzzy numbers, and the results are
given in the last Column in Tables 4–12.
Step 5: Aggregation of decision group’s opinions: After the aggre-
gation process of decision maker group’s is completed, the esti-
mated values of fuzzy weights for each hazard are given in
Table 13. The decision of each decision maker is weighted
equally.
Step 6: Defuzzification of the priority weights: The fuzzy weights
are converted into crisp value and the result is shown in the
3rd Column in Table 13.
Step 7: Normalization: When the crisp ranks values are assigned
to hazards, the next step is the normalization process of the
ranks value. The results are obtained in the 4th Column in
Table 13.
6.3. Procedure of risk assessment for the bridge in Tianjin
Step 1. Selection of linguistic scale: A triangular shape of mem-
bership functions are selected since this type of membership
function is used in case of more precise linguistic terms
(Ivezić et al., 2008). Trapezoidal membership function is used
for linguistic variables when there is no precise difference
between fuzzy terms. Thus, a five-member linguistic scale
for likelihood, impact and consequences is adopted from
Yucel et al. (2012) as depicted in Fig. 9. To define a logical
judgment, a set of linguistic terms for each risk parameter
Fig. 8. Linguistic scale of relative importance used in the pair-wise comparison of fuzzy AHP.
87
Table 4
Computed weights of Level 2 appraisal factors by DM1.
a1 a2 A
a1 (1, 1, 3) (1, 3, 5) (0.178, 0.75, 2.676)
1 1 
a2 (1, 1, 3) (0.08, 0.25, 1.195)
are summarized in Table 14. The Likelihood of hazard
occurrence is rated by linguistic terms: Very Rare (VR), Rare
(R), Moderate (M), Frequent (F), and Very Frequent (VF). Sim-
ilarly, the bridge vulnerability to disaster is ranked by linguis-
tic terms: No Damage (ND), Slight Damage (SD), Moderate
Damage (MD), Extreme Damage (ED), and Complete Damage
(CD). Linguistic variables: Very Small (VS), Small (S), Middle
(M), Big, (B), Very Big (VB) are utilized to rate disaster losses.
Step 2. Linguistic data collection for hazard likelihood, bridge vul-
nerability and disaster loss: Three linguistic data sets about the
likelihood of occurrence, the impact of disaster and the conse-
quences of disaster have been collected from experts by surveys
and questionnaires. In this survey, five decision makers from
the Department of Bridge Engineering in Harbin Institute of
Technology have been asked to evaluated risk indicators in lin-
guistic terms for every hazard. In Tables 15–17, the collected
data is summarized.
Step 3. Fuzzification: The collected linguistic data from Tables
15–17 is transformed into fuzzy values referring to the adopted
linguistic scale in Fig. 9 and Table 14.
Step 4. Fuzzy aggregation of the experts’ opinion: Individual
decision-makers opinion about risk parameters have been
aggregated into collective preference fuzzy risk parameter for
every hazard using fuzzy aggregation rules described in Sec-
tion 5 under Step 4 referring to Eqs. (18)–(20). The second, third
and fourth columns in Table 18 present the results of aggrega-
tion of experts’ opinion about the hazard probability, bridge
vulnerability and disaster l.
Step 5. Compute fuzzy risk factor: Further, the concept of fuzzy
arithmetic is applied in order to estimate aggregated fuzzy
degree of risk factors and it is performed by Eq. (21). Results
of fuzzy degree of risk parameters are summarized in the last
column of Table 18.
Step 6. Compute fuzzy risk index: The overall fuzzy risk of bridge
is estimated by following Eq. (22):
X
m
FR ¼ W i  FRF i ¼ ð0; 0:09; 0:029Þ
i¼1
Step 7. Defuzzification: The aggregated fuzzy risk is converted
into crisp risk value by defuzzification procedure, in which
the linguistic scale from Fig. 9 is used. The matching fuzzy sets
88 J.M. Andrić, D.-G. Lu / Safety Science 83 (2016) 80–92

Table 5
Computed weights of Level 3 appraisal factors by DM1.

b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 B1
b1 (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3) (7, 9, 9) (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) (1, 1, 3) (7, 9, 9) (1, 1, 3) (0.07, 0.21, 0.71)
1 
b2 ; 1; 1 (1, 1, 3) (7, 9, 9) (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) (1, 1, 3) (1, 3, 5) (7, 9, 9) (1, 1, 3) (0.06, 0.21, 0.63)
31 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1  1 1 
b3 ; ; ; ; (1, 1, 3) 7;5;3 7;5;3 9;7;5 5;3;1 5;3;1 ; ;1 (0.01, 0.02, 0.07)
91 91 7  91 91 7  51 31 
b4 ; ;1 5;3;1
(3, 5, 7) (1, 1, 3) (1, 3, 5) (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3) 5;3;1
(0.03, 0.08, 0.38)
51 31  1 1  1 1  1 1  1 1  1 1 
5;3;1 ; ;1 ; ;1 5;3;1 5;3;1 5;3;1
b5 (3, 5, 7) (1, 1, 3) (1, 3, 5) (0.02, 0.06, 0.26)
1 1  51 3  51 3 
b6 ; ;1 3 ; 1; 1
(5, 7, 9) 3 ; 1; 1
(1, 3, 5) (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3) (0.04, 0.11, 0.39)
51 3  1 1  1  1 
3 ; 1; 1 ; ;1 ; 1; 1 ; 1; 1
b7 (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) (1, 1, 3) (1, 3, 5) (1, 1, 3) (0.03, 0.11, 0.34)
1 1 1 51 31 1 31  1 1  31  1 1  1 1 
b8 ; ; 9;9;7
(1, 3, 5) 3 ; 1; 1 5;3;1 ; 1; 1 ; ;1 (1,1, 3) 5;3;1
(0.01, 0.04, 0.14)
91 9 7  1  31  51 3 
3 ; 1; 1 3 ; 1; 1 ; 3 ; 1; 1
b9 (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) 3 1; 1 (1, 3, 5) (1,1, 3) (0.03, 0.15, 0.36)

Consistency check: kmax = 9.89; CI = (9.89  9)/8 = 0.111; CR = CI/RI = 0.111/1.45 = 0.077 < 0.1.

Table 6
Computed weights of Level 3 appraisal factors by DM1.

b10 b11 b12 b13 b14 b15 B2

1 1  1 1 
5;3;1 5;3;1
b10 (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3) (1, 3, 5) (1, 1, 3) (0.04, 0.12, 0.57)
b11 (1, 3, 5) (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3) (3, 5, 7) (1, 1, 3) (0.09, 0.23, 0.94)
1 
b12 (1, 3, 5) ; 1; 1 (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3) (3, 5, 7) (1, 3, 5) (0.07, 0.28, 0.85)
1  31  1 
b13 ; 1; 1 ; 1; 1 ; 1; 1 (1, 1, 3) (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) (0.04, 0.21, 0.51)
31 1  31 1 1 31 1 1 1 1 
b14 ; ;1 ; ; ; ; ; ;1 (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3) (0.02, 0.06, 0.25)
51 3  71 5 3  71 51 3  51 31  1 
3 ; 1; 1 3 ; 1; 1 5;3;1 5;3;1 3 ; 1; 1
b15 (1, 1, 3) (0.03, 0.1, 0.3)

Consistency check: kmax = 6.36; CI = (6.36  6)/5 = 0.072; CR = CI/RI = 0.072/1.24 = 0.058 < 0.1.

Table 7
Computed weights of Level 2 appraisal factors by DM2.
highest risk rating assigned to a risk in linguistic scale (Fig. 9
and Table 14). In Table 19, crisp risk ratings for linguistic risk
a1 a2 A parametric scale with reference to Table 14 are presented. Five
1 
a1 (1, 1, 3) 5;3;1
1 (0.08, 0.25, 1.195) different crisp risk values have been computed by defuzzifica-
a2 (1, 3, 5) (1, 1, 3) (0.178, 0.75, 2.676) tion process using ‘Center-of-Gravity’ method and correspond-
ing to such crisp values, four possible risk categories (Risk
from linguistic scale and the membership degree of bridge Category 1–4) are defined with a range of (0.11–0.74). The high-
fuzzy risk belonging to these fuzzy sets are: est risk rating is 0.74 assigned to risk factors and the lowest risk
rating is 0.11. Further, risk categories describe four risk levels:

Very Low: l ¼ 0:77. Low Risk (LR), Moderate Risk (MR), High Risk (HR), and Very

Low: l ¼ 0:64. High Risk (VHR) as it is summarized in Table 20. In addition,
bridge safety management measures have been prescribed for
The procedure is illustrated in Fig. 10. every risk range.
The bridge fuzzy risk is converted into crisp risk value by Specific bridge safety management measures, in which infor-
‘Center-of-gravity’ method according to Eq. (23): mation technology is included, are proposed based on the assessed
bridge risk level:
0:1  0:77 þ 0:25  0:64
R¼ ¼ 0:17
0:77 þ 0:64 1. Bridge Management System (BMS) is used in case of moderate
Step 8. Classification of bridge risk: The bridge risk can be catego- bridge risk level. BMS integrates four basic modules: inventory;
rized in different risk categories depending on the bridge risk technical condition and safety; serviceability and operation;
level. Different risk categories are divided based on the risk and planning and budget (Bien, 1999; Bień, 2000). When bridge
ratings ranges. The maximum range has been decided on the exceptional conditions are noticed by multi-dimensional

Table 8
Computed weights of Level 3 appraisal factors by DM2.

b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 B1
b1 (1, 1, 3) (7, 7, 9) (7, 7, 9) (5, 7, 9) (7, 7, 9) (1, 3, 5) (3, 5, 7) (3, 5, 7) (1, 3, 5) (0.12, 0.32, 0.69)
1 1 1 1 1  1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1  1 1 1
b2 ; ; (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3) ; ;1 ; ;1 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; (0.01, 0.02, 0.05)
91 91 71 1  51 31  51 31  91 71 51 91 71 51 71 51 31 91 91 71
b3 ; ; 3 ; 1; 1
(1, 1, 3) 5;3;1 5;3;1 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; (0.01, 0.02, 0.05)
91 91 71 91 71 51 91 71 51 71 51 31 91 91 71
9;7;5 7;5;3 7;5;3 7;5;3 9;7;5
b4 (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) (1, 1, 3) (1, 3, 5) (0.01, 0.04, 0.10)
1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1  1 1 1
b5 ; ; (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) 5;3;1
(1, 1, 3) 9;7;5 7;5;3 7;5;3 ; ; (0.01, 0.03, 0.07)
91 91 7  91 91 7 
5;3;1 5;3;1
b6 (5, 7, 9) (5, 7, 9) (3, 5, 7) (5, 7, 9) (1, 1, 3) (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) (0.06, 0.15, 0.42)
1 1 1 1 1  1 1  1 1 1
b7 ; ; (5, 7, 9) (5, 7, 9) (3, 5, 7) (3, 5, 7) ; ;1 (1, 1, 3) 5;3;1 ; ; (0.03, 0.08, 0.23)
71 51 31 51 31  71 51 31
7;5;3 5;3;1 7;5;3
b8 (3, 5, 7) (3, 5, 7) (3, 5, 7) (3, 5, 7) (3, 5, 7) (1, 1, 3) (0.04, 0.10, 0.27)
1 1 
5;3;1
b9 (7, 7, 9) (7, 7, 9) (5, 7, 9) (7, 7, 9) (1, 3, 5) (3, 5, 7) (3, 5, 7) (1, 1, 3) (0.10, 0.25, 0.58)

Consistency check: kmax = 10.03; CI = (10.03  9)/8 = 0.1287; CR = CI/RI = 0.1287/1.45 = 0.089 < 0.1.
 J.M. Andrić, D.-G. Lu / Safety Science 83 (2016) 80–92 89

Table 9
Computed weights of Level 3 appraisal factors by DM2.

b10 b11 b12 b13 b14 b15 B2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
7;5;3 7;5;3 ; ;
b10 (1, 1, 3) (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) (0.02, 0.06, 0.16)
91 91 7 
b11 (3, 5, 7) (1, 1, 3) (1, 3, 5) ; ;1 (5, 7, 9) (5, 7, 9) (0.10, 0.26, 0.72)
1 1  51 31 
5;3;1 5;3;1
b12 (3, 5, 7) (1, 1, 3) (5, 7, 9) (5, 7, 9) (0.07, 0.18, 0.55)
b13 (7, 9, 9) (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) (1, 1, 3) (7, 9, 9) (7, 9, 9) (0.16, 0.44, 0.99)
1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
b14 ; ;1 ; ; ; ; ; ; (1, 1, 3) (1, 3, 5) (0.02, 0.04, 0.11)
51 31  91 71 51 91 71 51 91 91 71 1 1 
5;3;1 9;7;5 9;7;5 9;9;7 5;3;1
b15 (1, 1, 3) (0.01, 0.03, 0.08)

Consistency check: kmax = 6.51; CI = (6.51  6)/5 = 0.102; CR = CI/RI = 0.102/1.24 = 0.082 < 0.1.

Table 10 is directly analyzed. Continuous monitoring of the bridge pro-

Computed weights of Level 2 appraisal factors by DM3.
a1 a2
a1 (1, 1, 3) (1, 3, 5)
1 1 
5;3;1
a2 (1, 1, 3)
information analysis in the BMS, bridge managers can close
some or all bridge lanes in order to prevent potential bridge col-
lapse and casualties. Some of the BMS are: Pontis in the USA,
TBMS in Taiwan and others.
2. Remote monitoring systems are applied to bridges exposed to
high risk levels. Sensors (fiber optic sensors, seismometers,
etc.) are distributed over the bridge components in order to pro-
vide structural health monitoring (SHM) whose task is to warn
about unusual detections. Moreover, SHMS is merged with
wireless sensor network (WSN) to allow devices to collaborate
and more effectively measure a structure to improve spatial
resolution, network resilience and advance in-situ analysis
(Harms et al., 2010). These systems are based on general-
purpose sensing platforms which supports TinyOS, a compre-
hensive software solution for WSN.
3. Smart Structural Health Monitoring Systems (SSHMS) are very
efficient tools for safety management of bridges exposed to very
high level risks since they enable capturing real-time data that
vides immediate warning of coming danger. For example, infor-
A mation about the significant changes to bridge structural
(0.178, 0.75, 2.676)
response such as exceeding the maximum allowed displace-
ment or overload is instantly detected and the warning is issued
(0.08, 0.25, 1.195)
at the same moment. Giangarra et al. (2011) have developed a
software infrastructure that enables continuous more accurate
and real-time monitoring of bridges as described.
According to Table 19, the risk level of the bridge in Tianjin is
moderate and appropriate bridge safety management plans and
measures should be enforced for bridge safety management.
6.4. Discussions
The level of bridge risk obtained by the proposed method is
compared to the result estimated by a fuzzy logic controller
(Andrić and Lu, 2014). In the risk assessment model based on the
fuzzy logic controller, the vulnerability component of risk
indicators is analyzed and the expected level of risk is expressed
as the damage level. However, in the case of this study, the results
have shown that the expected level of risk is moderate damage.
According to crisp risk categorization, the moderate damage is
equivalent to moderate risk in this research. Nevertheless, the level
of risk is moderate and the results are compatible with each other.

Table 11
Computed weights of Level 3 appraisal factors by DM3.

b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 B1
b1 (1, 1, 3) (5, 7, 9) (5, 7, 9) (1, 3, 5) (5, 7, 9) (3, 5, 7) (5, 7, 9) (3, 5, 7) (1, 3, 5) (0.11, 0.33, 0.88)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1  1 1 1
b2 ; ; (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3) ; ; (1, 3, 5) ; ; ; ;1 ; ;1 ; ; (0.01, 0.03, 0.12)
91 71 51 1  71 51 3  71 51 3  51 31  51 31  71 51 31
b3 ; ; 3 ; 1; 1
(1, 1, 3) 5;3;1
(3, 5, 7) 5;3;1 5;3;1 5;3;1 ; ; (0.01, 0.04, 0.14)
91 71 5  71 51 3 
5;3;1 5;3;1
b4 (3, 5, 7) (1, 3, 5) (1, 1, 3) (3, 5, 7) (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) (0.04, 0.14, 0.47)
1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1
b5 ; ; 5;3;1 7;5;3 ; ; (1, 1, 3) 5;3;1 7;5;3 5;3;1 ; ; (0.01, 0.02, 0.07)
91 71 51 71 51 3  91 71 51
7;5;3 5;3;1 7;5;3
b6 (3, 5, 7) (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) (1, 1, 3) (1, 3, 5) (1, 1, 3) (0.03, 0.08, 0.28)
1 1 1 1 1  1 1  1 1  1 1 1
b7 ; ; (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) ; ;1 (3, 5, 7) ; ;1 (1, 1, 3) 5;3;1 ; ; (0.02, 0.05, 0.19)
91 71 51 51 31  51 3  91 71 5 
7;5;3 5;3;1 3 ; 1; 1 5;3;1
b8 (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) (1, 3, 5) (1, 1, 3) (0.02, 0.08, 0.27)
1 1 
5;3;1
b9 (3, 5, 7) (3, 5, 7) (1, 3, 5) (5, 7, 9) (3, 5, 7) (5, 7, 9) (1, 3, 5) (1, 1, 3) (0.07, 0.23, 0.67)

Consistency check: kmax = 9.964; CI = (9.964  9)/8 = 0.121; CR = CI/RI = 0.121/1.45 = 0.083 < 0.1.

Table 12
Computed weights of Level 3 appraisal factors by DM3.

b10 b11 b12 b13 b14 b15 B2

1 1 1
b10 (1, 1, 3) (1, 3, 5) (3, 5, 7) ; ; (3, 5, 7) (1, 1, 3) (0.07, 0.18, 0.54)
1 1  71 51 31 1 1 1
b11 ; ;1 (1, 1, 3) (1, 3, 5) 9;7;5
(1, 3, 5) ; ; (0.03, 0.08, 0.24)
51 31 1 1 1  1 1 1 71 51 31
7;5;3 5;3;1 9;7;5 7;5;3
b12 (1, 1, 3) (1, 1, 3) (0.02, 0.04, 0.14)
b13 (3, 5, 7) (5, 7, 9) (5, 7, 9) (1, 1, 3) (3, 5, 7) (1, 3, 5) (0.16, 0.45, 1.13)
1 1 1 1 1  1  1 1 1 1 1 1
b14 ; ; 5;3;1 3 ; 1; 1 ; ; (1, 1, 3) 7;5;3
(0.02, 0.04, 0.13)
71 5 3  71 51 3 
3 ; 1; 1 5;3;1
b15 (3, 5, 7) (3, 5, 7) (3, 5, 7) (1, 1, 3) (0.07, 0.21, 0.58)

Consistency check: kmax = 6.409; CI = (6.409  6)/5 = 0.082; CR = CI/RI = 0.082/1.24 = 0.066 < 0.1.
90 J.M. Andrić, D.-G. Lu / Safety Science 83 (2016) 80–92

Table 13 Table 16
Fuzzy, crisp and normalized risk rank. Impacts of disasters assigned by experts in linguistic terms.

Hazards Fuzzy weight of the Crisp Normalized Hazards E1 E2 E3 E4 E5

hazards rank rank
Earthquake MD ED SD CD MD
Earthquake (0.01, 0.16, 1.69) 0.505 0.149 Tsunami ND MD MD CD ED
Tsunami (0.005, 0.06, 0.69) 0.204 0.06 Hurricane SD MD MD SD SD
Hurricane (0.001, 0.02, 0.21) 0.063 0.02 Flood MD ED SD MD MD
Flood (0.004, 0.06, 0.80) 0.231 0.07 Debris ND SD SD ND SD
Debris (0.002, 0.02, 0.32) 0.091 0.03 Scour ED SD SD SD ED
Scour (0.006, 0.06, 0.76) 0.221 0.065 Ice MD SD ND ND SD
Ice (0.004, 0.05, 0.564) 0.167 0.05 Soil SD SD SD SD MD
Soil (0.002, 0.04, 0.47) 0.138 0.041 The age of the bridge MD MD MD SD MD
The age of the bridge (0.009, 0.12, 1.15) 0.350 0.10 Collision ED ED MD SD ED
Collision (0.004, 0.04, 0.58) 0.166 0.049 Overloading ED MD SD ED MD
Overloading (0.009, 0.09, 1.11) 0.325 0.096 Deterioration ED MD SD MD SD
Deterioration (0.006, 0.07, 0.88) 0.256 0.076 C&D MD MD MD ND ED
Construction and (0.01, 0.16, 1.54) 0.467 0.138 Fire MD ED ED ED SD
design TA SD SD CD ED ED
Fire (0.002, 0.02, 0.25) 0.073 0.022
Terrorist attack (0.003, 0.03, 0.42) 0.121 0.036

Table 14
Table 17
Linguistic classification of grades of risk factors.
Consequences of disasters assigned by experts in linguistic terms.
Hazards (H) Vulnerability (V) Losses (L) Triangular fuzzy numbers
Hazards E1 E2 E3 E4 E5
Very rare No damage Very small (0, 0, 0.3)
Earthquake B VS VB VB S
Rare Slight damage Small (0, 0.25, 0.5)
Tsunami VS VS M VB M
Moderate Moderate damage Middle (0.3, 0.5, 0.7)
Hurricane M VS M S S
Frequent Extreme damage Big (0.5, 0.75, 1)
Flood M VS M M S
Very frequent Complete damage Very big (0.75, 1, 1)
Debris VS VS B VS VS
Scour B VS S S S
Ice S S S VS VS
Table 15 Soil M S S S S
Likelihoods of hazards assigned by experts in linguistic variables. The age of the bridge M M M S M
Collision B VS B S S
Hazards E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Overloading VB M M B S
Earthquake F VR R R R Deterioration B M M M M
Tsunami VR VR R R VR C&D M M M VS B
Hurricane R R VR M VR Fire M VS B B S
Flood M R VR R M TA VS VS VB B M
Debris VR VR R R R
Scour M R M M M
Ice M VR R M R
AHP, fuzzy knowledge representation and fuzzy logic into an inte-
Soil R VR M M R
The age of the bridge M M F R VR grated approach for disaster risk assessment of a bridge. Firstly, 15
Collision M VR R M VR potential hazards have been identified from the literature review
Overloading F VF F F VF involving collapsed bridges worldwide during different time
Deterioration F M F M F
periods (the USA, China, and Colombia). Further, the fuzzy AHP
C&D M VR M R F
Fire R VR R R VR
procedure is applied to evaluate risk weights in order to rank risk
TA VR VR VR R VR factors. The fuzzy set theory is suitable to express expert’s logic
opinion about risk indicators. In addition, risk factors are identified
7. Conclusions as linguistic values with corresponding membership functions.
Moreover, risk factors are presented as triangular fuzzy
In this research, a new method is developed in order to assess numbers. According to the crisp risk rating, the optimal strategies
bridge risk level and provide corresponding measures for bridge and plans for bridge safety and disaster management may be
safety management. The proposed technique combines fuzzy selected.

Fig. 9. Five member linguistic scale for evaluation H, V and L.

 J.M. Andrić, D.-G. Lu / Safety Science 83 (2016) 80–92 91

Table 18
Aggregated fuzzy risk’s parameters and fuzzy degree of risk factors for every hazard.

Hazards Hazard probability Bridge vulnerability Disaster consequences Fuzzy degree of risk factors
Earthquake (0.1, 0.3, 0.5) (0.36, 0.6, 0.78) (0.38, 0.6, 0.76) (0.014, 0.108, 0.296)
Tsunami (0, 0.1, 0.38) (0.36, 0.55, 0.74) (0.26, 0.4, 0.6) (0, 0.022, 0.169)
Hurricane (0.06, 0.2, 0.46) (0.12, 0.35, 0.58) (0.12, 0.3, 0.54) (0.001, 0.021, 0.144)
Flood (0.12, 0.3, 0.54) (0.28, 0.5, 0.72) (0.18, 0.3, 0.54) (0.006, 0.045, 0.210)
Debris (0, 0.15, 0.42) (0, 0.15, 0.42) (0.1, 0.15, 0.44) (0, 0.003, 0.078)
Scour (0.24, 0.45, 0.66) (0.2, 0.45, 0.7) (0.1, 0.3, 0.56) (0.004, 0.061, 0.259)
Ice (0.12, 0.3, 0.54) (0.06, 0.2, 0.46) (0, 0.15, 0.42) (0, 0.009, 0.104)
Soil (0.12, 0.3, 0.54) (0.06, 0.3, 0.54) (0.06, 0.3, 0.54) (0, 0.027, 0.157)
The age of the bridge (0.22, 0.4, 0.64) (0.24, 0.45, 0.66) (0.24, 0.45, 0.66) (0.013, 0.081, 0.279)
Collision (0.12, 0.25, 0.5) (0.36, 0.6, 0.84) (0.2, 0.4, 0.66) (0.008, 0.06, 0.277)
Overloading (0.58, 0.85, 1) (0.32, 0.55, 0.78) (0.36, 0.6, 0.78) (0.067, 0.281, 0.608)
Deterioration (0.42, 0.65, 0.88) (0.22, 0.45, 0.68) (0.34, 0.55, 0.76) (0.064, 0.161, 0.455)
C&D (0.22, 0.4, 0.64) (0.28, 0.45, 0.68) (0.28, 0.45, 0.68) (0.017, 0.081, 0.296)
Fire (0, 0.15, 0.42) (0.36, 0.6, 0.84) (0.26, 0.45, 0.7) (0, 0.041, 0.247)
TA (0, 0.05, 0.34) (0.34, 0.6, 0.8) (0.3, 0.45, 0.66) (0, 0.014, 0.179)

Fig. 10. Matching fuzzy sets for overall fuzzy risk.

Table 19
Crisp risk levels.

Likelihood (H) Impact of disaster (V) Consequences (L) Fuzzy risk rating (H  V  L) Crisp risk (rating)
Very rare No damage Very small (0, 0, 0.027) 0.11
Rare Slight damage Small (0, 0.016, 0.125) 0.14
Moderate Moderate damage Middle (0.027, 0.125, 0.343) 0.20
Frequent Extensive damage Big (0.125, 0.422, 1) 0.50
Very frequent Complete damage Very big (0.343, 1, 1) 0.74

Table 20
Crisp risk ranges and categories.

Risk category Risk range Bridge safety measures

Risk Category 0 (0–0.10) Not defined
Risk Category 1: Low Risk (0.11–0.14) Avoid
Risk Category 2: Moderate Risk (0.15–0.20) Bridge management system
Risk Category 3: High Risk (0.21–0.50) Remote monitoring system
Risk Category 4: Very High Risk (0.51–0.74) Smart structural health monitoring system
Risk Category 5 (0.75–1.00) Not defined

The following conclusions can be drawn from this research:
(1) The case study has demonstrated the applicability of the
proposed method for disaster risk assessment in bridge engi-
neering. Further, it has been an effective tool for quick disas-
ter risk analysis and decision-making for optimal bridge
safety management.
(2) Fuzzy AHP approach has shown as a more effective method
for risk ranking compared to traditional AHP since uncer-
tainties from vague and fuzzy data have been considered
in risk ordering process.
(3) Fuzzy logic has presented as more practical compared to the
traditional probabilistic approach as it has been verified in a
case study. Also, lexical uncertainties that come from impre-
cision, vague and fuzzy data have been included in risk
assessment process.
(4) The proposed fuzzy logic-based method could be applied for
risk assessment in other industry or engineering areas. For
example, it could be applied in construction project risk
management. Firstly, the HRBS should be formed from the
possible risk factors which could occur during the construc-
tion period. Further, ranking procedure should be applied to
92 J.M. Andrić, D.-G. Lu / Safety Science 83 (2016) 80–92
risk factors. Finally, the total risk of construction project
could be evaluated using the fuzzy logic-based method, in
which the data about the risk indicators, the probability
and consequences should be collected from construction
project managers.
Acknowledgements
The financial support received from the National Science Foun-
dation of China (Grant Nos. 51378162, 51178150, 50978080), the
Research fund from Ministry of Science and Technology of China
(2013BAJ08B01), the Open Research Fund of State Key Laboratory
for Disaster Reduction in Civil Engineering (SLDRCE12-MB-04),
and the Specialized Research fund for the doctoral program of
higher education (20112302110005) is gratefully appreciated.
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