Reliability Engineering and System Safety 131 (2014) 29–39

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Reliability Engineering and System Safety

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ress

Bayesian-network-based safety risk analysis in construction projects

a,b a,n b,c a d
Limao Zhang , Xianguo Wu , Miroslaw J. Skibniewski , Jingbing Zhong , Yujie Lu
a School of Civil Engineering & Mechanics, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, Hubei 430074, China
b Department of Civil & Environmental Engineering, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-3021, USA
cInstitute of Theoretical and Applied Informatics, Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland
d Department of Building, School of Design & Environment, National University of Singapore, Singapore

article info abstract

Article history: This paper presents a systemic decision support approach for safety risk analysis under uncertainty in tunnel construction.
Received 6 February 2014 Fuzzy Bayesian Networks (FBN) is used to investigate causal relationships between tunnel-induced damage and its in fluential
Received in revised form variables based upon the risk/hazard mechanism analysis. Aiming to overcome limitations on the current probability
16 May 2014 estimation, an expert confidence indicator is proposed to ensure the reliability of the surveyed data for fuzzy probability
Accepted 14 June 2014 Available assessment of basic risk factors. A detailed fuzzy-based inference procedure is developed, which has a capacity of
online 24 June 2014
implementing deductive reasoning, sensitivity analysis and abductive reasoning. The “3σ criterion” is adopted to calculate the
Keywords:
characteristic values of a triangular fuzzy number in the probability fuzzification process, and the α-weighted valuation
Construction safety
method is adopted for defuzzification. The construction safety analysis progress is extended to the entire life cycle of risk-
Fuzzy Bayesian networks (FBN)
Tunnel leakage prone events, including the pre-accident, during-construction continuous and post-accident control. A typical hazard
Risk analysis concerning the tunnel leakage in the construction of Wuhan Yangtze Metro Tunnel in China is presented as a case study, in
Case study order to verify the applicability of the proposed approach. The results demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed approach
and its application potential. A comparison of advantages and disadvantages between FBN and fuzzy fault tree analysis
(FFTA) as risk analysis tools is also conducted. The proposed approach can be used to provide guidelines for safety analysis
and management in construction projects, and thus increase the likelihood of a successful project in a complex environment.

& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Construction is one of the most dangerous industries in the world
[1]. The ramifications of construction accidents are growing with trends
toward larger-scale and more complex construction projects [2], especially in
developing countries, like China. With the exploita-tion of urban underground
space, underground construction has presented a powerful momentum for the
development of a rapid economy worldwide in the past ten years. Due to
various risk factors in complex project environments, safety violations occur
frequently in metro construction. On January 12, 2007, the Pinheiros Station
on Metro Line Four at Sao Paulo’s Aquarium in Brazil collapsed, causing the
death of seven people [3]. On July 6, 2010, a tunnel collapse also took place
in Prague, Czech Republic, causing a 15-meter-wide sunken pit [4]. On
August 23, 2012, a metro line leak caused chaos in Warsaw, Poland. Water
flooded into the tunnel at the planned Powisle station, causing considerable
transportation problems in the
n Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: limao_zhang@hotmail.com (L. Zhang),
wxg0220@126.com (X. Wu), mirek@umd.edu (M.J. Skibniewski),
jb_zhong@126.com (J. Zhong), bdgluy@nus.edu.sg (Y. Lu).
already gridlocked city [5]. In China, the number of construction accidents
shows a rising trend in metro construction projects. On November 15, 2008,
21 people were killed as a result of a road cave-in above a metro tunnel under
construction in Hangzhou [6]. Also, on December 25, 2012, eight people were
killed and five others hurt in a fatal tunnel explosion in north China’s Shanxi
province [7]. Tunnel construction entails to be a highly complicated project
with large potential risks, which can bring enormous dangers to public safety
[8]. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the causal relationship and safety
risk mechanism of construction failures in tunnel construction by considering
the accident scenario and real-time safety analysis, aiming to provide decision
support for assuring the safety of tunnel construction.
To avoid heavy casualties and property losses caused by safety violations,
innumerable studies have introduced risk-based analysis into safety
management practice. Risk analysis can be divided into qualitative and
quantitative risk analysis [9]. The former includes fault tree analysis (FTA),
comprehensive fuzzy evaluation method (CFEM), check list, and others;
while the latter includes job risk analysis method (LEC), influence diagrams,
Neural Networks (NN), support vector machines, decision trees, and others.
The above risk-based analysis methods make a significant contribution to
safety risk

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2014.06.006
0951-8320/& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
30 L. Zhang et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 131 (2014) 29–39
analysis and management in complex engineering projects [10,11], however,
they are confined to static control management [12]. Khakzad [10] indicated
FTA unsuitable for complex problems with its limitation in explicitly
representing dependencies of events, updat-ing probabilities, and coping with
uncertainties. Yang et al. [13] regarded LEC unsuitable in complex dynamic
environments, resulting from the insufficiency in timely diagnosing and
dealing with various problems. When associated parameters, such as
geological, design and construction parameters are changed, the
aforementioned methods cannot accurately illustrate the updated features of
dynamic environ-ments as the construction progress evolves. Nor can
professional supports or suggestions be provided in real time as the
parameters are updated. Recently, Bayesian networks (BN) has been proposed
to model the complexity in man-machine systems [14]. BN can describe
dependencies between variables both qualitatively and quantitatively, and is
suitable for knowledge representation and reasoning [15]. Also, BN is
powerful in dealing with uncertainty information, and can be used for
reliability and failure analysis in complex environments [16,17].
In conventional BN analysis, the occurrence probability of root nodes is
always regarded as a crisp value [18]. However, in the construction
engineering fields, it is difficult or nearly impossible to obtain exact values of
probability due to a lack of sufficient data [19]. Thus, a group decision-
making technique is generally employed to assess the occurrence probability
of root nodes. Hanss [20] indicated that the fuzzy set theory (FST) provided a
successful tool to solve engineering problems under uncertainty. The
uncertainty can be taken into account in terms of intervals or fuzzy numbers
[21]. Currently, FST and BN have both emerged as powerful and effective
tools for knowledge reasoning in uncertainty environments [22]. Thus, it is
certainly quite appropriate to investigate the amalgamation of FST and BN,
which may well prove to provide an indispensable means of incorporating
uncertain factors/elements in a probabilistic risk analysis model domain [23].
This paper therefore investigates the possibility of merging BN and FST,
which is Fuzzy Bayesian Networks (FBN), to provide an alternative means to
facilitate the construction failure analysis in tunnel construction. Currently, a
universally accepted standard regarding the safety risk analysis procedure has
not been reached in tunnel construction. A systemic decision approach based
upon FBN is developed with step-by-step procedures in detail, aiming to
provide guidelines for safety manage-ment in tunnel construction throughout
the entire life cycle, with the pre-accident, during-construction continuous and
post-accident con-trol included. A typical hazard concerning the tunnel
leakage in the construction of Wuhan Yangtze Metro Tunnel in China is
presented as a case study. Results demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed
fuzzy decision approach and its application potential.
This paper is organized as follows. The fundamental theory and the
proposed decision analysis procedure are introduced in Section 2. In Section
3, an expert confidence indicator is proposed for the fuzzifica-tion in
probability assessment of basic risk factors. In Section 4, a fuzzy-based
decision analysis approach, with the capacity of deductive reasoning,
sensitivity analysis and abductive reasoning, is developed based on Bayesian
inference. In Section 5, the proposed method is applied to fuzzy decision
support for safety assurance in a tunnel case. A comparison of advantages and
disadvantages between FBN and fuzzy fault tree analysis as risk analysis tools
is presented in Section 6. The conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2. Methodology
2.1. Bayesian networks
Bayesian networks (BNs) are a combination of two different mathematical
areas, graph theory and probability theory, which
consists of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) and an associated joint probability
distribution (JPD). A BN model with n nodes can be represented as BoG, Θ4,
where G stands for a DAG with n nodes, and Θ stands for the JPD of the BN
model. The nodes {X1,…, Xn} in the graph are labeled by related random
variables. The directed edges between nodes represent association
relationships among variables. DAG contains conditional independence
assumptions, and the relations represented by DAG allow JPD to be specified
locally by the conditional probability table (CPT) for each node. Assuming
π(Xi) is the parent nodes of Xi in DAG, the CPT of Xi is denoted by P(Xi|
π(Xi)). The JPD of P(X1,…, Xn) can be written as Eq. (1).
2.2. Fuzzy set theory and Fuzzy Bayesian Networks
Fuzzy set theory (FST) is first introduced by Zadeh [24] with an effort to
deal with uncertainty due to the imprecision and vagueness. FST provides a
basis to generate powerful problem-solving techniques with wide
applicability, especially in the field of decision making [25]. A fuzzy set P is
usually indicated by a tilde "⁓”, where X is characterized by a membership
function Fp(x) with an interval [0,1]. The function Fp(x) represents the
member- ship value of x in P . In general, FST uses triangular, trapezoidal or
Gaussian fuzzy numbers to convert the uncertain numbers into fuzzy numbers
[26]. Without loss of generality, triangular fuzzy numbers are often utilized to
provide more precise descriptions and to obtain more accurate results [27].
Thus, in this paper, triangular fuzzy numbers are used for representing
probabilities of root nodes in a BN model. A fuzzy number P ¼ (a, m, b) is
called a triangular fuzzy number if its membership function is given by Eq.
(2). Herein, a, m, and b represent the lower least likely value, the most likely
value, and the upper least likely value, respectively. The constants [a, b] give
the lower and upper bounds of the available area, reflecting the fuzziness of
the actual data. Assuming two triangular two triangular namely Ã1 =(a1,m1, b1)
and Ã2 =(a2,m2, b2) the operation between A1 and A2 can be defined by Eq (3)
including the addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division (see the work
of Mentes and Helvacioglu [19]).
When constructing a BN model, analysts are confronted with insufficient
data concerning probabilities of root nodes. In the engineering practice, the
occurrence of an extremely hazardous event is rare, and therefore, the data
would be rare. In the absence of sufficient data, it is necessary to work with
rough estimates of probabilities [28]. Under such uncertain circumstances, it
is considered inappropriate to use conventional BN for computing the system
failure probability. FST offers an analysis frame that can deal with
imprecision in input failure probabilities for the estima-tion of probability of
the leaf root, and such analysis is termed fuzzy Bayesian network (FBN).
With regard to FBN, it is essential to choose the proper fuzzy probability
measure as to conduct the fuzzy Bayesian inference. Based upon the work of
Halliwell et al. [29],
 L. Zhang et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 131 (2014) 29–39
the fuzzy marginalization rule, and fuzzy Bayesian rule can be calculated by
Eqs. (4) and (5), respectively. Herein, T stands for the leaf root, while Xi
stands for the root nodes. Combing with Eq. (3), the FBN-based inference
techniques can then be fulfilled.
2.3. A FBN-based decision approach
FBN provides a possible way to conduct decision support analysis under
uncertainty. Quantitative FBN analysis is a system project and requires
several steps. For the implementation of the fuzzy decision analysis for safety
management in tunnel construction, a systematic fuzzy decision approach is
developed using FBN, as seen in Fig. 1. In the proposed approach, the
following five steps are adopted:
 Step (1) Risk/Hazard identification: Carry out the preliminary risk
mechanism analysis for the construction failure, reveal potential
risks/risk factors and their causal relationships, and then identify
root nodes (RNs), intermediate nodes (INs) and their leaf nodes
(LNs).
 Step (2) BN model construction: Identify potential failure-
consequence scenarios of the target risk, develop failure logic by
means of conditional probability distribution, and then build up a
topology of the failure network connecting all specific nodes.
 Step (3) Fuzzy probability assessment: Carry out the expert
investigation for probability estimation of root nodes, gather the
data, transform the linguistic and fuzzy expressions into fuzzy
numbers, and then calculate the fuzzy probability of root
nodes based upon the fuzzification process.
 Step (4) Fuzzy decision analysis: Take advantage of the
advanced reasoning features of FBN, and carry out risk analysis,
including deductive reasoning, sensitive analysis and abductive
reasoning. Meanwhile, convert the calculating fuzzy probability
into a crisp value based upon the defuzzification process, and
then rank the results.
 Step (5) Decision making: Find out critical risks and risk factors
according to risk analysis results, propose corresponding con-trol
measures for risk response, and make up decisions in real time.
Meanwhile, the implementation effect of the risk mon-itoring and
reviewing can provide feedback and suggestions for optimizations
in previous steps.
Steps (1), (2), and (5) rely on the elicitation of knowledge from experts
using a standard technique (e.g., Chapman [30]). The following sections
highlight steps 3 and 4, respectively.
3. Fuzzy probability assessment
Fuzzification plays a crucial role in fuzzy decision analysis, which
attempts to define the basic data into a fuzzy probability set
Risk/Hazard identification BN model construction Fuzzy probability assessment
Risk mechanism analysis Potential failure scenarios
Reveal causal relationships Develop a failure logic
Build up a network
Identify basic nodes
topology
Fig. 1. A FBN-based decision approach with detailed step-by-step procedures.
31
and uses them in subsequent computation [31]. Owing to the high potential
risks for the tunnel construction in complex environ-ments, the fuzzy
probability analysis should meet the highly required precision for safety
assurance in tunnel construction practice.
3.1. Limitations on current fuzzy probability assessment
In fuzzy-based probability analysis, the imprecise failure prob-abilities of
root nodes are defined by characterizing the basic event with a suitable
membership function [32]. It is difficult to have an exact estimation of the
failure rate due to a lack of sufficient data. Generally, a group decision
making method is therefore employed to define linguistic terms to assess the
fuzzy probability of occurrence of root nodes. However, two main
deficiencies exist during the current fuzzy probability assessment process
based up the traditional group decision-making technique:
(1) In traditional expert investigation, all the collected survey data are
obtained without any kind of data reliability evaluation. Actually, most
interviewed individuals may have different confidence levels toward their
own subjective judgments due to the difference in education background,
working experience and risk attitudes. Thus, a certain deviation exists in
the data reliability among different interviewed individuals. For instance,
the reliability of the investigation data obtained from a project engineer
with 30 years of working experience is comparatively higher than that
from an engineer with 5 years of working experience. It is therefore
necessary to carry out the reliability evaluation for the surveyed data,
with both the expert ability and subjectivity taken into account.
(2) In regard to the division of probability intervals, five linguistic terms
[very low (VL), low (L), medium (M), high (H), and very high (VH)] are
commonly used to assess the probability of occurrence. The current
probability span is excessively large within a single interval. For instance,
the scope of “H” ranges from 21.5% to 67% (see Abdelgawad & Fayek,
[33]). Such rough intervals division cannot meet the required precision
for failure probability assess-ment of root nodes in tunnel engineering
practice.
3.2. Expert confidence evaluation
An expert confidence indicator is proposed to reveal the reliability of the
data acquired from interviews. On one hand, the expert judgment ability
should be first taken into account. In construction practice, it is generally
considered that the judgment ability of individuals tends to become
increasingly sophisticated and stable with the accrual of educational
background and work-ing experience. The judgment ability level, denoted by
ζ, is then increased accordingly. The judgment ability is divided into four
levels, represented by “I–IV” as seen in Table 1. The level “I” with a score ζ
¼ 1:00 stands for the highest reliability for the expert judgment ability. On
the other hand, the expert confidence indicator involves a kind of subjective
measurements. It is
Fuzzy decision analysis Decision making
Expert investigation Forward reasoning Critical risks/risk factors
Data gathering Sensitivity analysis Safety control measures
Probability fuzzification Backward analysis Monitoring and reviewing
32 L. Zhang et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 131 (2014) 29–39

Table 1 3.4. Data gathering

Setting of expert judgment ability level.
Assuming one considers the occurrence probability of a specific
Levels Descriptions ζ
root node is in the kth interval with a subjective reliability ψ, the
I 1. Domain experts with more than 30 years of working experience. 1.0 expert confidence indicator θ for that node lying in the kth interval
2. Professors within the research field of tunnel construction. can then be calculated by Eq. (6). In general, θ is lesser than 1,
II 1. Domain experts with 10–20 years of working experience. 0.9
2. Associate Professors within the research field of tunnel which means that the root node has a residual probability of 1 θ
construction. lying in other intervals. The information of the residual probability
III 1. Domain experts with 5–10 years of working experience. 0.8 is usually ignored in most cases, regardless of the potentially
2. Assistant Professors within the research field of tunnel useful information. According to the Gaussian distribution pat-
construction. terns of random variables, the occurrence probability tends to
IV Domain experts with 1–5 years of working experience. 0.7
fluctuate around its expectation, and decrease gradually as it goes
far away from the expectation. Thus, a simplified formula con-
cerning the distribution of residual probability (1 - θ) among other
intervals is presented, as seen in Eq. (7).
Table 2 1 θ;

Divisions of occurrence probability intervals.

k 1
ð
þ >j 1
> ¼
>
Intervals (k)Lower boundary (a k) Mean (c k) Upper boundary (a k 1)
> 8

p i
> >
;
>

> 18
3 0.15 0.20 0.25 < ð þ

1 0 0.03 0.05 > θ

2 0.05 0.10 0.15 ¼> a

4 0.25 0.30 0.35 > ∑9

>

>
> ¼ þ
>
>
>
ð
5 0.35 0.40 0.45 1 Þ
>

>j k
6 0.45 0.50 0.55 >
7 0.55 0.625 0.70 :
8 0.70 0.775 0.85 3.5. Fuzzification
9 0.85 0.925 1.00

In an actual case, there are S experts involved in the investiga-tion. For

necessary to collect individuals' subjectivity information related to their
judgments during the expert investigation. Thus, the sub-jective reliability
level, denoted by ψ, is proposed to measure the experts' reliability towards
their judgments by themselves. The subjectivity reliability ψis divided into
five levels with a score of “1.0, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, and 0.6”, respectively. The higher
the ψ, the more reliable the judgment.
Taking both the judgment ability level ζ and the subjectivity reliability
level ψ into consideration, the expert confidence indi-cator, denoted by θ, is
then calculated by Eq. (6). In this way, the reliability of the collected data can
be secured.
θ¼ζ ψ
the purpose of data normalization processing, the average occurrence
probability of a specific basic event lying in the ith interval is calculated to be
Pi (1rir9) using Eq. (8). According to the Gaussian distribution patterns of
random variables, the data reliability for the random variable lying in the
interval [E(p) 3σ, E(p)þ3σ] reaches up to 99.7%, where E(p) stands for the
expecta-tion and σ stands for the standard deviation [35]. The above
mentioned principle is also called the “3σ criterion”. In this paper, the “3σ
criterion” is adopted to calculate the characteristic values of a triangular fuzzy
number in the probability fuzzification process, and the related formulas are
seen in Eqs. (9)–(11).
S
Pi ¼ ∑ pi=S ð8Þ
ð6Þ
i¼1

9
3.3. Probability interval division m ¼ EðPÞ ¼ ∑ ðci PiÞ ð9Þ
i¼1
9 ð10Þ
It is known that the size of the probability intervals can indicate the σ ¼ DðPÞ ¼ ∑ ½ðci EðPÞÞ 2 pi &

reliability of the estimation. Short intervals indicate that the statistic is
precisely known, while wide intervals indicate uncer-tainty. To reach the
highly required precision for the occurrence probability of the top event in the
tunnel construction practice, it is better to conduct a group of short intervals,
rather than that of wide intervals. However, according to Dawes' experiment,
the use of 5–9 point scales is likely to produce slightly higher mean scores
relative to the highest possible attainable score, and a larger number is usually
impractical [34]. Therefore, in this research, the occurrence probability of root
nodes is divided into 9 intervals, represented by “1–9”. As seen in Table 2, the
kth interval is defined by [ak, ak þ 1] together with a mean ck (1rkr9). During
the expert investigation, the purpose of questionnaires is to collect the
information of two types, namely the occurrence probability interval k and
subjectivity reliability level ψ. For the “Probability interval k”, interviewed
individuals are required to fill in a number ranging from 1 to 9 (as seen in
Table 2). For the “Subjectivity reliability level ψ”, they are required to fill in a
number ranging from 1.0 to 0.6. If they fail to evaluate the data reliability
within a reliable degree of more than 0.6 by themselves, that field can be left
blank.
sffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi i ¼ 1
a ¼ m 3σ; b ¼ m þ3σ ð11Þ
where ci refers to the mean of the ith probability interval as shown in Table 2;
a, m, and b refer to characteristic values of a triangular fuzzy number.
4. FBN-based safety risk analysis
Each construction failure shows different status and character-istics along
with the construction progress, including before, during and after a specific
accident. Accordingly, safety control of risk-prone events can be divided into
three stages in the overall work process: namely pre-accident, during-
construction, and post-accident control. Taking advantage of the powerful
reasoning features within FBN models, the deductive reasoning, sensitivity
analysis and background reasoning techniques can be used for safety analysis
and management in the above three stages, respectively. In this way, the real-
time and effective support can
 L. Zhang et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 131 (2014) 29–39 33

be provided for decision makers in the entire management process of failures
in tunnel construction.
4.1. Deductive reasoning
Deductive reasoning aims to predict the probability distribu-tion of the
risk event (or leaf node) T under the combination of risk factors (or root
nodes) X1, X2… Xn. The state of each risk factor is treated as evidence input Þ
into a FBN model. Probability distribu-tion of T, represented by P(T¼1), is
calculated by Eq. (12). P(T¼1) can be served as an indicator to evaluate the
potential safety level of the risk event (T), helping decision makers take
proper preven-tions in advance.
2
n
PðT ¼ 1Þ ¼ ∑½PðT ¼ 1jX1 ¼ x1; X2 ¼ x2; :::; Xn ¼ xnÞ
1
PðX1 ¼ x1; X2 ¼ x2; :::; Xn ¼ xnÞ& ð12Þ
where n stands for the number of the root nodes. Each root node X i has two
different states, denoted by “Yes/No” respectively. Thus, n root nodes
n
contribute to 2 combinations. P(T¼1|X1 ¼x1, X2 ¼x2,…, Xn ¼xn)
represents the CPT of T, while P(X 1 ¼x1,X2 ¼x2,…,Xn ¼xn) represents the
joint probability distribution of X.
4.2. Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis plays an important role in probabilistic risk
assessment, aiming to illustrate the performance of each risk factor's
contribution to the occurrence of a construction failure. In this research, three
key performance indicators (KPIs), REV, RRV, and AVG, are proposed to
measure the contribution of each risk factor Xi toward the risk event T. Key
risk factors can then be identified as to help engineers determine the main
checkpoints at the construction stage.
REV(Risk Expansion Value) is used to assess the performance of risk
REV
factor when an accident or failure (T) occurs. Posterior probability
distribution can provide reliable references for fault diagnosis. Posterior
probability distribution of risk factor Xi, represented by P(Xi ¼xi|T¼t), can
be calculated by Eq. (16). Xi is more likely to become the direct cause of an
accident or failure (T) when P(Xi ¼xi|T¼t) is close to 1.
PðT ¼ 1jXi ¼ xiÞ&∅PðT ¼ 1Þ; i ¼ 1;
2; :::; n ð16Þ
4.4. Defuzzification
In many applications of fuzzy set theory in the field of decision making,
decision makers are faced with a problem of selecting one from a collection
of possible solutions. The selection process of the best solution may require
ranking or ordering fuzzy numbers. In the above fuzzy-based decision
analysis, the calculated results for the root or leaf node remain to be a fuzzy
triangular number, denoted by Pj ¼(aj, mj, bj) (j¼1,2,…,K). For the purpose
of risk ranking in the Bayesian inference, it is therefore necessary to
transform fuzzy values into a crisp value at the defuzzification stage.
Specifically, the objective of defuzzification is to determine an exact value as
the representative of the fuzzy number. Currently, several defuzzification
methods have been developed, such as the center of gravity (COG) [36],
mean of maxima (MOM) [37], center of maxima (COM) [38], and the height
method (HM) [39]. According to Detyniecki and Yager [40], some
information was lost during the transforming process in the above
defuzzification methods. Detyniecki and Yager [40] then proposed an α-
weighted valuation method, and results indicated the proposed method was
efficient in reducing the information loss. Therefore, the α-weighted valuation
method is adopted for defuzzification, and presented in a case study later in
this research.
~
Assuming a triangular fuzzy number P ¼(aj, mj, bj) (see Fig. 2), the
~

expansion for each risk factor Xi, represented by I (Xi). The membership function of P, represented by F P(x), is given by previous Eq. (2).
REV
higher the value of I (Xi), the more responsibility Xi has in risk expansion Using the α-weighted valuation method, a generalized formulation of the
REV
of T. I (Xi) can be calculated by Eq. (13). RRV (Risk transformed exact value is derived by Eq. (17). Herein, Fα¼{x|F(x)Zα} is the
Reduction Value) is used to assess the performance of risk reduc-tion for each α-level set of F(x), Average(Fα) is an average of the α-level set, and f(α) is
RRV RRV
risk factor Xi, represented by I (Xi). The higher the value of I (Xi), the the α-weighted valuation function. Generally, Average(F α) can be calculated
RRV by Eq. (18).
more responsibility Xi has in risk reduction of T. I (Xi) can be calculated ð
by Eq. (14). AVG (Average Sensitivity ValðFÞ ¼ R 1f α dα ð17Þ
1
0 Average FαÞ f ðαÞdα
Measure) is used to measure the average sensitivity of risk factor X i,
AVG AVG
represented by I (Xi). The higher the value of I (Xi), the
SM R0 ð Þ
more responsibility Xi has in risk sensitivity of T. I (Xi) can be calculated
by Eq. (15). Average F uα þvα 18
REV ð αÞ¼ 2 ð Þ
I ðXiÞ ¼ ½MaxfPðT ¼ 1jXi ¼ xiÞg⊖PðT ¼ 1Þ&∅PðT ¼ 1Þ; i ¼ 1; 2; :::; n
where uα represents the lower bound of the α-level set, and can be calculated
ð13Þ by Eq. (19); vα represents the upper bound of the α-level set, and can be
RRV
I ðXiÞ ¼ ½PðT ¼ 1Þ MinfPðT ¼ 1jXi ¼ xiÞg&∅PðT ¼ 1Þ; i ¼ 1; 2; :::; n calculated by Eq. (20), respectively. Usually, we set f (α)¼1, and thus the
transformed exact value can be defined by Eq. (21).
ð14Þ
AV G 1 REV RRV uα ¼ ðmj ajÞ αþaj ð19Þ
I ðXiÞ ¼ 2 ½I ðXiÞ I ðXiÞ&; i ¼ 1; 2; :::; n ð15Þ
Among the above three KPIs, one can be used in conjunction with the vα ¼ bj ðbj mjÞ α ð20Þ
other two, and be verified by their results as well. Normally, the identified 1 1
½ð Þ þ
factors at the top of the ranking list of each indicator are considered as the key ValðFÞ ¼
2
R
aj α
1
0 dα
m
0 j aj þbj
risk factors for safety control and management in real projects.
1 j j R j jÞ j α&d
j þ ðmajj b2m bjα
m a m b¼ þ þ ð21Þ

4.3. Abductive reasoning ¼ 2 aj þbj þ 2 þ 2 4

Compared to the traditional risk-based methods, such as FTA, CFEM and 5. Case study
NN, the feature of abductive reasoning technique is unique and matchless in
FBN inference [10]. Abductive reasoning aims to obtain the posterior Wuhan Yangtze Metro Tunnel (WYMT), known as “the first metro tunnel
probability distribution of each risk across the Yangtze River in China”, is an important
34 L. Zhang et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 131 (2014) 29–39

route connecting two large cities, comprising the metropolitan area of Wuhan,
namely Wuchang and Hankou. It is a double-spool tunnel with a total length
of almost 6200 m. The tunnel construc-tion started in April, 2008, and the
hydrogeological section of WYMT is shown in Fig. 3. A slurry shield
machine with Φ of 6.52 m in cutter diameter is utilized to push the tunnel
from Jiyu Bridge Station to Jianghan Road Station. Fig. 4 illustrates the
working site of the construction of WYMT. In construction practice, the
tunnel waterproof works are generally regarded as a highly complicated
project associated with large potential risks. Statistics showed that the
phenomenon of water leakage existed in more than half of the existing tunnels
[41]. A case concerning the risk analysis of the tunnel leakage in the
construction of WYMT is presented in this research. A specific monitoring
section is chosen to present the detailed fuzzy-based risk analysis, where the
tunnel exactly passes under the foundation of Jiangbei Levee with a height of
25.3 m from the foundation base to the tunnel roof. Jiangbei Levee is
regarded as a significant life line for flood control in Wuhan, concerning the
safety of nearly 10 million lives. Thus, no fault is permitted while the tunnel
is crossing under the existing
Fp(x)
structure. A Bayesian network model is established and offered as a decision
support tool for safety assurance, providing real-time and effective support for
decision makers in the overall drilling process.
5.1. Step 1: Risk/hazard identification in tunnel leakage
Tunnel leakage is considered a big potential threat to the quality of tunnel
construction, as well as its subsequent opera-tional safety. For one thing, the
underground enclosure structure can be softened due to the leakage, leading to
the structure deformation and damage. Also, the leakage can cause subsidence
and even cracks in the foundation, resulting in excessive uneven settlement.
On the other hand, the seepage water can accelerate erosion rates of built-in
equipment, such as steel rails, commu-mication and lighting facilities. Thus,
the service life of power lines and equipment can be reduced at the
operational stage, associated with the increased operation and maintenance
costs.
Due to complexities in the underground construction techniques and the
surrounding environments, the occurrence of the tunnel leakage is a
complicated process where numerous risk factors interact together and
contribute to the construction failure (T). In order to secure the waterproof
works in tunnel construction, it is therefore necessary to investigate risk

mechanism of the tunnel leakage first. Based upon engineering practices and
1.0 theoretical analysis, four types of influential variables involved in the tunnel
leakage are revealed as follows: (1) Poor Geological Conditions (B 1): The
tunnel excavation works can cause a change to the seepage field of the
α underground water, leading to a disturbed zone around the tunnel. The
underground water then drains toward the tunnel excavation. The tunnel
leakage is very likely to occur in poor geological conditions; (2)
Unreasonable Design Parameters (B2): For a long time in tunnel construction
0 practice, designers concentrate almost all their energies on the structure
a uα m vα b x safety, regardless of the
~
Fig. 2. Membership function of a triangular fuzzy number P .

Fig. 3. Hydrogeological conditions in the cross section of WYMT.

Fig. 4. Working site of the construction of WYMT: (a) slurry shield machine; (b) tunnel segment; and (c) tunnel structure.
 L. Zhang et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 131 (2014) 29–39 35

importance of the tunnel waterproofing and drainage system design [42]; (3) 5.3. Step 3: Probability assessment
Poor Construction Quality (B3): The construction quality plays a crucial role
in the waterproof works, and the poor construc-tion quality is generally During the expert investigation, questionnaires are adminis-tered to a
considered as the direct cause of the tunnel leakage. For instance, the tunnel group of experts. A total of 100 questionnaires are distributed, and 85 are
leakage frequently occurs where the tunnel segments are damaged or badly returned (the return rate is about 85%), of which 8 are invalid and 77 are
valid. Among 77 valid question-naires, the reviewed experts consist of 52
installed; (4) Improper Management (B4): Effective management can be
domain experts with at least of five years of working experience, and of 22
beneficial to the risk prevention, and vice versa. The leadership, human
research workers in this field. According to their experience and knowl-edge,
resources and management capacity are called “soft” factors which are the experts individually evaluate occurrence probability intervals of root
positively related to project successes in total quality management practices nodes together with their subjective reliability levels. The expert confidence
[43]. For a specific project, the above four influential variables can be further
indicator θ among individuals is then calculated by Eq. (6). In addition, the
refined.
reliable confidence is distributed among 9 intervals using Eq. (7). For
instance, during the occurrence probability assessment for the root node X 8
¼“damage in tunnel segments”, one expert with a judgment ability ζ ¼0.8
considers the probability interval was within 3th interval, associated with a
subjectivity reliability ψ ¼0.7. That is to say, the most likely occurrence
5.2. Step 2: Establishment of a BN model
probability for x1 is between 15% and 25% (see Table 2) with a completely
Between 2006 and 2013, researchers at Huazhong University of Science reliable confidence
and Technology have developed safety control systems for metro construction
and operation tasks for Shenyang, Zhengzhou, Shenzhen and Wuhan metro
systems. The researchers also have developed early warning web-based θ¼0.56 using Eq. (5). The residual reliable confidence
systems for safety control of each project. A large number of safety related
knowledge resources have been accumulated during the progress on these
projects [44,45]. On a basis of the previous risk mechanism analysis in tunnel Table 3
Descriptions of nodes in TLBN.
leakage, the potential risk/risk factors and their causal relationships are
revealed. In the meantime, the Delphi technique is used to reach consensus Nodes Descriptions
among different experts' opinions [46]. First, the risk engineer is interviewed
to establish the structure of the BN model for tunnel leakage, and then sent to T Tunnel leakage
B1 Poor Geological Conditions
the senior risk coordinator for feedback. Modifications as recom-mended by B
2 Unreasonable Design Parameters
the senior risk coordinator are then presented to the risk engineer for further B3 Poor Construction Quality
review and feedback. With prior expert knowledge taken into account, the B4 Improper Management
logic diagram is subsequently used to build up the failure-consequence X1 Shallow underground water
X
scenario from the top to bottom nodes using a directed acyclic graph (DAG). 2 High water content of soil
X3 High slurry pressure
In accordance with the aforementioned Steps 1 and 2 in the proposed fuzzy
X4 Large percolation coefficient
decision approach, a tunnel leakage Bayesian network (TLBN) is established X5 Low curvature of tunnel segments
(see Fig. 5); where 14 root nodes contribute to the failure of the leaf node X6 Low waterproof capability
(tunnel leakage). The descriptions of all nodes are illustrated in Table 3. X7 Improper grouting ration
Meanwhile, the joint probability distribution (JPD) represents relations among X8 Damage in tunnel segments
X9 Poor installation of tunnel segments
various nodes. For instance, the fuzzy JPD of T in TLBN is presented, as seen X
10 Poor grouting quality
in Table 4. X
11 Poor sealing quality
X
12 Incomplete surveying documents
X
13 Unqualified sub-contractor
X
14 Improper schedule scheme

X7 X8
X6 X9

X5 X10

X4 X11

X3 B2 B3 X12

X2 X13
B1 B4
X1 X14
T

Root Node Intermediate Node Leaf Node

Fig. 5. Established network model for TLBN in tunnel construction.

36 L. Zhang et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 131 (2014) 29–39

Table 4 Table 5
Fuzzy JPD of the leaf node (T) in TLBN. Results of fuzzy probability assessment for root nodes in TLBN.
B
1 B2 B3 B4 P(T¼t|B1,B2,B3,B4), t ¼Yes/No Root nodes Fuzzy probability Root nodes Fuzzy probability
assessment assessment
T¼No T¼Yes

a m b a m b
No No No No 1 0
No No No Yes 0.2 0.8 X1 0.07 0.08 0.09 X8 0.12 0.14 0.16
X
No No Yes No 0.2 0.8 2 0.05 0.06 0.07 X9 0.07 0.08 0.09
X
No No Yes Yes 0.7 0.7 X3 0.04 0.06 0.08 10 0.08 0.09 0.10
X X
… … … … … … 4 0.10 0.12 0.14 11 0.11 0.12 0.13
X
Yes Yes No No 0.4 0.6 X5 0.09 0.11 0.13 12 0.08 0.10 0.12
X
Yes Yes No Yes 0.6 0.4 X6 0.17 0.19 0.21 13 0.10 0.12 0.14
Yes Yes Yes No 0.8 0.2 X
X7 0.07 0.08 0.09 14 0.07 0.08 0.09
Yes Yes Yes Yes 1 0

of the tunnel leakage occurrence turned out to be (0.0648, 0.0882, 0.1141)

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0 the site selection phase is related to geological parameters, such as
Fig. 6. Results of occurrence probability distributions among all intervals for the root node X1
obtained from one expert.
1 θ¼0.44 is distributed among the other 8 intervals, as seen in Fig. 6.
Generally, the expert knowledge is considered as a scarce resource which is
not able to provide universal consultation or real-time guidance [47]. In this
way, the data use efficiency can then be highly improved. Subsequently, the
frequency of each root node is calculated, and the average occurrence
probability of a specific root node lying in the ith interval is obtained using
Eq. (7). Finally, the “3σ criterion” is used to convert the accumulated
probabilities into fuzzy failure rates based upon Eqs. (8)–(10). Results of
fuzzy probability assessment of the aforementioned 14
root nodes X1–X14 (see Fig. 5) are presented in Table 5.
5.4. Step 4: Result analysis
In the light of actual observations of root nodes, the developed TLBN
model can be used as a decision tool to carry out real-time Bayesian inference
by updating probabilities. Then real-time and effective support for safety
assurance of construction failures can be provided for decision makers in the
overall work process, including pre-accident, during-construction, and post-
accident control.
5.4.1. Pre-accident control
Pre-accident control aims to calculate the probability distribu-tion of the
occurrence of tunnel leakage (T) before the tunnel passes through the
foundation of Jiangbei Levee. Sufficient time can then be left for decision
makers to optimize the construction scheme. In the proposal phase, decision
makers do not have a deep understanding about the factual situation related to
the project risks. Though they are told that serious risks exist in tunnel
leakage, they have no pathway to realize the actual status of potential risks,
not to mention the safety assurance. In this situation, the prior fuzzy
probability of risk factors (Xi) is first entered into TLBN as input evidence.
As the output, the probability
using Eq. (12), as seen in Table 6. Then Eq. (21) is employed to transform the
fuzzy probability into a crisp number which is Val(F)¼8.88%. Usually, we
set the significant level α¼5%. Since Val(F)¼8.88%4α, and thus the results
indicate that the safety of the tunnel waterproof is not significantly assured.
In the site selection phase, decision makers may face many possible
schemes of site selection, say, three schemes denoted as A, B, and C,
respectively. As a matter of fact, the main influence on the tunnel leakage in
underground water, soil type, and percolation coefficient. Thus, we list the
geological parameters of each scheme, enter the current states (Yes or no) into
TLBN as evidence, and then compare the results of model outputs. From the
perspective of safety assurance, decision makers will have more interests in
the scheme with a lower occurrence probability of tunnel leakage. Obviously,
the results as seen in Table 6 show that the Scheme C turns out to be the most
competitive scheme, since the predicted occurrence probability of tunnel
leakage in Scheme C (Val(F)¼4.76%oα¼5%) is lower than that in the other
two schemes. In this way, the construction scheme can be optimized
continuously until the high potential safety risk is under control.
5.4.2. During-construction continuous control During-construction continuous
control aims to determine key
risk factors which have a greater impact on the occurrence of the construction
failure, and therefore pays much more attention to those checkpoints in the
construction phase. At present, this work depends excessively on domain
experts. Adopting the sensitivity analysis technique in Bayesian inference,
TLBN is able to identify key construction parameters, accordingly.
In the construction phase, values related to geological para-meters are
defined, and then entered into TLBN as given evidence. Using Eqs. (13)–(15),
three key performance indicators (KPIs), REV, RRV and AVG of risk factors
(X5–X14) are calculated. As shown in Fig. 7, the results indicate that the
ranking list of these three KPIs is approximately consistent. Meanwhile, X10
(Poor grouting quality), X11 (Poor sealing quality) and X12 (Incomplete
surveying documents) are at the top of the ranking list concerning each
indicator. It is clear that these three risk factors are remarkably sensitive to the
occurrence of tunnel leakage. It is therefore necessary to place more emphasis
on ensuring the rational status of these construction parameters.
5.4.3. Post-accident control
Post-accident control aims to identify the most likely direct cause once the
accident or failure occurs, and then carry out real-time diagnosis and proper
measures. In the current situation, the most desirable action decision makers
consider is to invite field
 L. Zhang et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 131 (2014) 29–39
Table 6
Probability distribution of the occurrence of tunnel leakage (T).
Phase Scenario
Proposal phase Prior probability
Site selection phase A: X1 ¼No, X2 ¼No, X3 ¼No, X4 ¼Yes
B: X1 ¼No, X2 ¼No, X3 ¼Yes, X4 ¼No
C: X1 ¼No, X2 ¼No, X3 ¼No, X4 ¼No
Fig. 7. Ranking results of risk factors (X5–X14) in sensitivity analysis of tunnel leakage.
experts to join expert group meetings. Then the field experts discuss to
conduct causes of the accident, and propose prompt control measures. This is
likely to miss the critical time of problem-handling, causing more serious
losses. Adopting the background reasoning technique in Bayesian inference,
we are able to simulate the evolution route of accidental occurrence in real
time.
Using Eq. (16), the posterior probability distribution of the risk factors
(X5–X14) can be calculated when the tunnel leakage occurs, as seen in Fig.
8(a). The results indicated that X6 ¼Yes (with a 45.72% chance) is most
likely to be the direct cause. As a result, the fault diagnosis should concentrate
on the factor X6, and the practical check confirmed our deduction.
Consequently, X6 ¼yes can be entered into TLBN as an extra given evidence
for the subsequent background reasoning. The results as seen in Fig. 8
(b) show that X8 ¼Yes (with a 32.84% chance) turns out to be the most
unfavorable factor, which should be the focus of practical diagnosis for next
fault diagnosis until the accident is under control. In this way, the route for
fault diagnosis in tunnel leakage can be extracted.
5.5. Step 5: Implementation effects
In accordance with the FBN-based failure analysis results, several rational
suggestions measures can be proposed for the safety assurance in the
construction of WYMT. At the design and pre-construction stage, the owner
pays much more attention on securing the quality of the tunnel waterproofing
and drainage system design, as well as the accuracy and completeness of
surveying documents. At the construction stage, the contractor strictly
controls the selection of tunnel segment suppliers in the bidding process.
Clear provisions concerning the producing, sto-rage, transport, and unloading
of tunnel segments are specified in the supply contract. Also, the contractor
performs the field experiments of the grouting and sealing quality ahead of
time, in order to determine optimal parameters in the real grouting and sealing
process. In addition, the frequency of seepage monitoring is increased,
ensuring the feedback analysis of the field data in real time. Furthermore,
emergency supplies, equipment and personnel
38
37
P (T¼1) Val (F)
(0.0648, 0.0882, 0.1141) 0.0888
(0.1362, 0.1599, 0.1841) 0.1600
(0.2369, 0.2727, 0.3080) 0.2726
(0.0356, 0.0472, 0.0602) 0.0476
are prepared in advance to cope with the construction failure which is very
likely to occur. With effective safety control measures adopted, the
underground construction of WYMT goes smoothly, and the slurry shield
machine successfully completes its journey across the Yangtze River on 22
September, 2011.
6. Discussion
FBN is a technology with huge potential for applications across many
domains. This paper discusses FBN and its application in safety risk analysis
in tunnel construction. The proposed metho-dology uses fuzzy number-based
probabilities to conduct FBN-based risk analysis under uncertainty, since it is
capable of calculating the system reliability and identifying the most sensi-
tive causes causing the occurrence of safety violations. As a matter of fact,
fuzzy fault tree analysis (FFTA) as a safety risk analysis tool is also
recommended to be used in the construction industry [48]. Abdelgawad and
Fayek [33] developed a FFTA-based approach to automate both qualitative
and quantitative for the assessment of risk events in construction projects.
Ferdous et al. [31] presented a methodology for a fuzzy based computer-aided
fault tree analysis tool to conduct the fuzzy based probability analysis and
sensitivity analysis. Mentes and Helvacioglu [19] developed a FFTA metho-
dology for spread mooring systems by combining the effects of operational
failures and human errors under fuzzy environment, and the results showed
that FFTA was more flexible and adaptive than conventional FTA for fault
diagnosis and hazard estimation in complex systems. Comparisons of
advantages and disadvantages between FBN and FFTA are then presented as
follows:
(1) From a perspective of deductive reasoning, both FBN and FFTA can be
used to calculate the occurrence probability of an undesired event using
the deductive reasoning technique. Each FFTA can be mapped to its
corresponding FBN when transforming AND-gates and OR-gates into
CPT, and thus produce similar results during predictive analysis as long
as basic events are independent of each other. However, a FBN does not
necessarily have an equivalent FFTA due to its different causal
relationships (specified in CPT) rather than simple Boolean functions
such as OR-gate and AND-gate. Moreover, FBN and FFTA are both able
to handle uncertainty using data obtained from expert knowledge, in
order to over-come the limitation due to a lack of sufficient statistic data
in the construction industry.
(2) From a perspective of sensitivity analysis, FBN produces a more reliable
measure of performance of each risk factor’s contribution than FFTA by
providing the most probable configuration of primary events leading to an
accident. Particularly, among the proposed three KPIs in the FBN
methodology, one can be used in conjunction with the other two, and be
verified by their results as well. The identified factors at the top of the
ranking list of each indicator should be considered as the key risk factors
for safety control and management in real projects. In addition, compared
to FFTA, sensitivity analysis in the FBN inference does not need to
 0.5 L. Zhang et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 131 (2014) 29–39
0.45

Probability
0.4
0.25
0.35 0.5

Posterior
0.3 0.45

Probability
0.4
0.2 0.25
0.35
0.15

Posterior
0.3
0.1
0.05
0.2
0
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X5 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X14
Risk Factor Risk Factor
Fig. 8. Fault diagnosis in safety control of tunnel leakage: (a) P(Xi|T¼1); and (b) P(Xi|T¼1, X6 ¼Yes).

get minimal cut set, and the computational efficiency is therefore greatly
increased.
(3) From a perspective of abductive reasoning, one of the unique
characteristics of FBN for safety risk analysis is its ability for obtaining
posterior probabilities in the light of actual observa-tions of root nodes.
Unlike prior probabilities, the posterior probabilities have been updated
using the accident’s latest information, and thus can reflect the
characteristics of the accident more specifically than prior probabilities.
FBN can repetitively substitute the posteriors for priors in the accident
re-analysis when a new set of accident related information is observed.
This substitution not only continuously reduces the data uncertainty, but
it also provides the accident scenario with real-time and up-to-date
analysis. However, this abduc-tive reasoning capacity is not possessed in
FFTA-based risk analysis approach.
7. Conclusions and future works
Tunnel construction is typically a highly complicated project associated
with large potential risks. In recent years, safety risk analysis and
management of tunnel construction have attracted broad attention because of
its close relation with public safety. Due to a lack of sufficient data, it is
difficult to have an exact estimation of the failure rate of the occurrence
probability of undesired events. A decision approach based upon FBN for
failure analysis in tunnel construction is developed in this research. A typical
hazard concerning the tunnel leakage in the construction of WYRT in China
is used to verify the applicability of the proposed approach. Results
demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed method, as well as its application
potential.
support tool to provide guidelines for failure analysis in tunnel construction,
and is worth popularizing in other similar projects.
The holistic FBN methodology proposed in this paper also has some
limitations. During the risk/hazard identification and BN model construction
process, large amounts of scattered knowledge are accumulated from the
tunnel construction practice, including explicit and tacit knowledge.
Numerous domain experts have participated in the collection, editing,
reorganizing work of the safety related knowledge resources, making an
essential contribu-tion to securing a qualified conceptual causal frame for the
development of the cause-effect network model. However, this process is
laborious and relies greatly on domain experts. In addition, we should
improve the conditions of validity and robustness of the probability
distribution (prior probabilities and conditional probability) of variables in the
proposed FBN model by data from a lot of event reports and experiments. Our
subsequent research goal will focus on automatic knowledge acquisition
regarding different knowledge resources, as well as adopting an Expect
System (ES) technique to develop a real-time expert system for knowledge
management.
Acknowledgments
The National Science and Technology Support Plan (No. 51378235),
Wuhan City Construction Committee Support Project (Nos. 201334 and
201207) and China Scholarship Council (CSC) are acknowledged for their
financial support of this research.

Also, there are some other projects encountering the similar situation,
where the statistical data is insufficient and high potential risks exist in
complex environments, such as coal mining, dam monitoring, nuclear power
plants and others. Specifically, during the fuzzy decision analysis, there
increases the need for precise failure probabilities for the purpose of failure
analysis in project management practice. To reach the highly required preci-
sion for the fuzzy decision analysis, the expert confidence indi-cator can be
first proposed to ensure the reliability of collected data during the fuzzy
probability assessment, with the expert judgment ability and subjectivity
being fully considered. With the capacity of deductive reasoning, sensitivity
analysis and abductive reasoning in Bayesian inference, the safety assurance
progress can be extended to the entire life cycle of risk-prone events,
including the pre-accident, during-construction and post-accident control,
accordingly. The proposed method can be used as a decision