Hazardous Area Risk-Based Evacuation Simulation and

Analysis of Building Construction Sites

Ying Hua 1; Jun He 2; Jian Gong 3; and Jincheng Zhao 4

Abstract: Building construction sites are highly complex and uncertain, and frequent incidents of dangerous events can easily lead to
casualties. Thus, both risk assessment and evacuation analysis are fundamental to safety management. This paper proposed a methodology
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by Ozyegin Universitesi on 10/29/21. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.

for risk-based evacuation analysis and illustrated its application with a case study. First, a joint probability model was proposed for the risk
assessment of hazardous areas on construction sites, in which hazards are classified and identified by risk factor analysis. Second, a modified
two-dimensional cellular automaton (CA) model was established to simulate the evacuation process by coupling the risk probability of
hazardous areas into the evolution rule. A case study was presented to show that the risk-based evacuation model can describe the
real-life situation as pedestrian movement is disturbed due to the occurrence of random events, especially in hazardous areas with high
joint probabilities of risk. This study contributes to the body of knowledge by (1) assessing the risk of hazardous areas on construction
sites with a probabilistic method; and (2) simulating the emergency evacuation process with a computational method considering the
influence of hazardous areas. Therefore, a systematic approach to risk-based evacuation analysis in which the coupling between risk assess-
ment and evacuation simulation is achieved. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001798. © 2020 American Society of Civil Engineers.
Author keywords: Construction site; Hazardous area; Joint probability; Cellular automaton; Evacuation.

Introduction
Building construction sites have a wide distribution of hazards,
which potentially can result in accidents and injuries. In 2018,
the Bureau of Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development
in China reported 734 construction accidents and 840 fatal injuries
(MOHURD 2018). It is essential to assess the risk before the
occurrence of accidents and analyze the evacuation process to make
proper plans in case of an emergency. Therefore, both risk assess-
ment and evacuation analysis are significant to safety management
on construction sites.
The identification and quantification of hazards are the basis
for evaluating the safety of the working environment (Fang et al.
2002), but trying to identify all potential hazards is impractical,
time-consuming, and counterproductive (El-Sayegh 2008). Hence,
it is necessary to sort out hazardous areas, which makes it possible
to assess the risk reasonably and efficiently. Labor safety consti-
tutes the top priority for safety management. However, it is difficult
1
Ph.D. Student, Dept. of Civil Engineering, School of Naval Architec-
ture, Ocean and Civil Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ., Shanghai
200240, China. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1402-1796. Email:
ying.hua@sjtu.edu.cn
2
Associate Professor, Dept. of Civil Engineering, School of Naval
Architecture, Ocean and Civil Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ.,
Shanghai 200240, China. Email: junhe@sjtu.edu.cn
3
Professorate Senior Engineer, Shanghai Construction Group Co., Ltd.,
No.666, East Daming Rd., Shanghai 200080, China. Email: gongjian
.scg@qq.com
4
Professor, Dept. of Civil Engineering, School of Naval Architecture,
Ocean and Civil Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ., Shanghai 200240,
China (corresponding author). Email: jczhao@sjtu.edu.cn; zhao_jcr@
hotmail.com
Note. This manuscript was submitted on May 20, 2019; approved on
September 20, 2019; published online on March 16, 2020. Discussion per-
iod open until August 16, 2020; separate discussions must be submitted for
individual papers. This paper is part of the Journal of Construction En-
gineering and Management, © ASCE, ISSN 0733-9364.
for managers to assess risks and make evacuation plans depending
only on their subjective experience. Although various computa-
tional models have been proposed for decades, related literature
on emergency evacuation of construction sites is scarce, and no
approach has been suggested to date to address risk-based evacu-
ation analysis for construction safety management.
There is a lack of understanding of how risk-based evacuation
analysis can be systematically conducted, the challenges, and its
practical value. A clear gap exists between academic research
and industrial needs. Therefore, this paper fills this gap by propos-
ing a methodology in which the risk assessment is incorporated in
the evacuation analysis on construction sites. In addition, a case
study was conducted to illustrate the application.
Literature Review
Hazard identification and risk assessment are the first steps in
construction safety management (Perlman et al. 2014). During
the occurrence of risk events, hazards may lead to catastrophic con-
sequences and require immediate evacuation. Thus, it is significant
to propose innovative approaches for evacuating the construction
site (El Meouche et al. 2018).
Generally, brainstorming, case-based approaches, and checklists
are the most frequently used tools to identify hazards for construc-
tion projects (Lyons and Skitmore 2004). Other techniques, such
as root cause analysis (Huang and Hinze 2003), the Delphi method
(Hallowell and Gambatese 2010), and fault tree analysis (Aljassmi
and Han 2013), also appear in the literature. In terms of risk assess-
ment, fuzzy sets theory (FST) and analytical hierarchy process
(AHP) play a dominant role among various analytical methods
that have been developed and utilized (Kangari and Riggs 1989;
Mustafa and Al-Bahar 1991; Carr and Tah 2001; Abdelgawad
and Fayek 2010; Taroun 2014; Islam et al. 2017). Although FST
is efficient in modeling uncertainties by linguistic analysis when the
available information is not numerical, and AHP can provide clear
solutions to ill-structured decision-making problems, they are not

© ASCE 04020047-1 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2020, 146(5): 04020047

 widely used in practice for their limitations. FST is more suitable
for assessing risk qualitatively rather than quantitatively due to
computational complexity, and AHP is difficult for decision makers
to use with intangible, vague criteria (Taroun 2012). Moreover,
risks are treated independently and interactions between them are
not considered in most methods (Siraj and Fayek 2019).
Despite the abundance of published articles focusing on con-
struction risk assessment, only a few are related to evacuation
analysis. GIS and building information models (BIMs) have been
used to optimize the site layout and path planning to facilitate the
evacuation process (El Meouche et al. 2018; Kim and Lee 2019).
Although several computational models have been used for evacu-
ation simulation, for example, the social force model (Helbing and
Molnar 1995), the cellular automaton model (Blue and Adler 1998),
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by Ozyegin Universitesi on 10/29/21. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.
the lattice gas automaton model (Marconi and Chopard 2002), and
the agent-based model (Bonabeau 2002), far too little effort has been
devoted to evacuation analysis of construction sites. Said et al.
(2012) and Marzouk and Al Daour (2018) proposed agent-based
simulation frameworks to analyze emergency evacuation plans.
The agent-based model describes heterogeneous humans easily, but
the size of the parameter space has a practical upper limit and the
simulation process is computationally expensive.
For risk-based evacuation analysis, a large and growing body
of literature has investigated the uncertainty of the environment
for emergency or even disaster evacuation: for instance, marine ac-
cident, hurricane, earthquake, flood, and fire (Vanem and Skjong
2006; Apivatanagul et al. 2012; Bernardini et al. 2016; Kolen and
van Gelder 2018; Li and Zhu 2018). In those circumstances, the
need for the coupling between risk assessment and evacuation
analysis is universal and worth studying. Regarding the construc-
tion site, countless hazards exist with the potential to create a threat
to life. Although there is a consensus from both the academic circle
and the construction industry that risk-based evacuation analysis is
a meaningful task for safety management, no studies have been
conducted to date. Therefore, this paper focused on filling the gap
by proposing a methodology to incorporate risk assessment in
evacuation simulation on construction sites.
The objective of this study posed significant challenges. Com-
plexity stems from the characterization of randomness and uncer-
tainty when assessing the risk of hazardous areas with a proper
probabilistic method. Complexity also arises from the difficulty
of coupling the risk probability of hazardous areas into evacuation
simulation, i.e., how the evolutionary rules of an evacuation model
embody the risk assessment outputs. This paper overcame the chal-
lenges by proposing a joint probability model and a modified
cellular automaton (CA) model for risk-based evacuation analysis.
The joint probability of risk events in hazardous areas, which can
be taken as obstacles with certain occurrence probabilities, is
coupled into the CA model for considering the impact of hazardous
areas on the evacuation process indirectly.
Compared with the analytical techniques mentioned previously,
the proposed methodology has the following benefits. First, the joint
probability model can describe the uncertainty of risk, consider the
correlation between hazardous areas, and assess the risk probability.
Second, the CA model is flexible and efficient for large-scale com-
putational simulation in complex situations because of its discrete-
ness in space and time, with evolution rules that are easily expanded
for various research topics. Third, the coupling between risk assess-
ment and evacuation simulation is achieved indirectly by setting
obstacles with certain probabilities of occurrence in the CA model,
so that the algorithm is simple and suitable for random simulation.
In addition, this systematic approach assists site managers in making
the proper evacuation plans in advance, because live evacuation
drills are limited due to ethical and practical considerations.
© ASCE 04020047-2
J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2020, 146(5): 04020047
The joint The risk-based
probability model evacuation model
LEC Two-dimensional
cellular automaton
Hazardous Marginal
areas distribution Floor field
Fault tree Risk factor Correlation
analysis identification structure Transition
probability
Modify
Multivariate Evacuation
joint probability model
Fig. 1. Methodology flowchart.
Methodology
The framework of the proposed methodology for risk-based evacu-
ation analysis on construction sites consists of two models (Fig. 1).
The first is a joint probability model for identification and assess-
ment of hazardous areas based on the risk factor analysis and the
multivariate joint distribution, and the second is a modified CA
model that couples the joint probability of risk into evacuation sim-
ulation. Hence, the research objective to incorporate risk assess-
ment in evacuation analysis was achieved. Specific details are
described in the following sections.
Identification and Assessment of Hazardous Areas
Identification of Hazardous Areas
According to the construction process and stages, three major
construction areas are outlined: (1) foundation construction area,
(2) temporary construction and auxiliary production area, and
(3) main construction and decoration area. There are countless
hazards in these three construction areas that have the potential
to create a threat to life, health, or property. Because it is impractical
to identify all of them, as stated in the “Introduction” section, this
study defined hazardous areas, in which a group of hazards exists,
for risk identification and assessment.
A reasonable and effective summary of hazardous areas needs
to contain as many hazards as possible, reflect the general situa-
tion of the work environment, and ensure the simplification and
practicality of the risk assessment model. As a result, 18 hazard-
ous areas A1 − A18 are determined according to the construction
process and spatial distribution of hazards. Specific names and
major forms of accidents in each hazardous area are listed in
Table 1. The construction site is an ever-changing environment,
where hazardous areas continue to change as construction is
underway. These 18 hazardous areas are common for most build-
ing construction sites, but they may not exist at the same time.
For a specific construction scenario, hazardous areas can be de-
termined accordingly.
Every hazardous area is different, and each has a combination
of risk factors that affect the occurrence of dangerous events.
A set of risk-assessment indexes for construction projects is
presented in Specification for Identification, Monitoring and Con-
trol Technology of Major Hazard Installations in Construction
Engineering (Chinese Standards 2017) (Fig. 2). According to
J. Constr. Eng. Manage.
 Table 1. Hazardous areas and main forms of accidents Labor service resources u11
Hazardous areas Main forms of accidents Operator skills u12

Foundation construction area Safety awareness u13

A1 : Excavation area Electric shock, mechanical damage, Operator
Employment with certificates u14
falling accident U1
Physical condition u15
A2 : Foundation pit area Collapse, mechanical damage
A3 : Pile foundation area Mechanical damage, object strike Performance u21
A4 : Stacking area Collapse, object strike
Installation and removal u22
Temporary construction and auxiliary production area Equipment
Test and acceptance u23
A5 : Temporary electricity lines Electric shock, fire U2
A6 : Welding area Fire, explosion Temporary electricity u24
A7 : Form board operation area Collapse, falling accident, fire Maintenance u25
A8 : Rebar working area Mechanical damage, object strike, fire
A9 : Material storage area Collapse, object strike, fire Certification u31
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by Ozyegin Universitesi on 10/29/21. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.

A10 : Material transport area Mechanical damage, object strike, fire

Material Testing u32
Main construction and decoration area U3 Transportation u33
A11 : Steel structure work area Mechanical damage, electric shock, fire

Comprehensive evaluation of
A12 : Concrete construction area Mechanical damage, electric shock, Making and stacking u34
object strike

construction risk
A13 : Door, floor, and curtain Fire mechanical damage, electric shock Enterprise qualification u41
wall decoration area Construction Construction technology u42
A14 : Waterproofing and heat Fire falling accident, poisoning method

U
preservation work area U4 Design, construction plan
A15 : Tower crane operation area Falling accident, mechanical damage, and implementation u43
electric shock
Expert demonstration of
A16 : Edge area Falling accident, object strike construction plan u44
A17 : Scaffolding area Collapse, mechanical damage, object
strike Operation conditions u51
Operating
A18 : Construction elevator Mechanical damage, falling accident, environment Surrounding environment u52
operation area electric shock U5
Climate conditions u53

Safety protection and sign u54

Main technical parameters u55

the risk-assessment index set and the nature of dangerous events, all
Safety management system u61
possible risk factors in 18 hazardous areas are tracked based on a
Safety
fault tree (FT) analysis method (Table 2). management Project security staffing u62
U6 Safety management goals u63
Risk Assessment of Hazardous Areas Safety education u64
The uncertainty of an event can often be characterized by random- Pre-safety activities u65
ness, fuzziness, or nonspecificity. Despite the complexity and
Safety supervision, inspection
diversity of construction projects, risk events usually are noninde- and acceptance u66
pendent and probabilistic. Therefore, the multivariate joint distri-
bution was used to establish a random mathematical model for Fig. 2. Risk assessment index set for construction projects.
assessing the risk probability of construction uncertainty.
Multivariate Joint Distribution
The most widely used multivariate joint distribution model for
the joint probability density function (PDF) and the joint CDF
engineering risk analysis is the normal copula function method
of X are
(He and Gong 2016), i.e., the Nataf model (Liu and Der Kiureghian
1986). This probabilistic model is relatively convenient and accu- φn ðz; R 0 Þ
rate for normal distribution and lognormal distribution. It can fX ðxÞ ¼ f X1 ðx1 Þf X2 ðx2 Þ · · · fXn ðxn Þ ð2Þ
φðz1 Þφðz2 Þ · · · φðzn Þ
be constructed by two decoupled processes, which are marginal
distribution modeling and correlation structure modeling. The mar-
FX ðxÞ ¼ Φn ðz; R 0 Þ ð3Þ
ginal distribution describes the characteristics of variables, whereas
the correlation structure depicts the correlation among them. where f Xi ð·Þ = PDF of X i ; f X ð·Þ = joint PDF of X; FX ð·Þ = joint
Consider standard normal variates Z ¼ ðZ1 ; Z2 ; : : : ; Zn Þ, CDF of X; φð·Þ = standard normal PDF; and φn ðz; R 0 Þ and
which can be obtained by marginal transformations of X ¼ Φn ðz; R 0 Þ = n-dimensional normal PDF and CDF with zero means,
ðX 1 ; X 2 ; : : : ; X n Þ unit standard deviations, and correlation matrix R 0 .
Zi ¼ Φ−1 ½FXi ðxi Þ; i ¼ 1; 2; : : : ; n ð1Þ Estimation of Marginal Distribution
This paper estimated the marginal distribution of hazardous areas
where FXi ð·Þ = cumulative distribution function (CDF) of X i ; based on the LEC method proposed by security experts Graham
and Φð·Þ = cumulative probability of the standard normal and Kinney (1980) for quantitative characterization and evaluation
distribution. Based on the rules of probability transformation, of risks in hazardous situations. The value-at-risk D is the product

© ASCE 04020047-3 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2020, 146(5): 04020047

 Table 2. Risk factors identified by FT analysis μln D ¼ μln L þ μln E þ μln C ð6Þ
Ai Risk factors uAi qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
A1 u11 u12 u13 u21 u24 u25 u41 u42 u43 u51 u52 u53 u54 u55 u61 u62 σln D ¼ σ2ln L þ σ2ln E þ σ2ln C ð7Þ
u63 u64 u65
A2 u11 u12 u21 u24 u25 u34 u41 u42 u43 u44 u51 u52 u53 u55 u61 u63 u66 Therefore, the PDF and the CDF of the marginal distribution are
A3 u11 u12 u13 u14 u21 u22 u23 u24 u25 u31 u33 u41 u42 u43 u44 u51 u52 u53
u54 u55 u61 u62 u63 u64 u66 1 2 2
A4 u13 u22 u34 u51 u52 u53 u61 u63 fD ðx; μln D ; σln D Þ ¼ pffiffiffiffiffiffi ef−½1=ð2σln D Þðln x−μln D Þ g ð8Þ
2πσln D x
A5 u13 u24 u31 u34 u51 u53 u54 u61 u66
A6 u11 u12 u13 u14 u24 u31 u34 u51 u53 u54 u61 u62 u66 Z x
1 2 2
A7 u11 u12 u13 u21 u24 u31 u34 u42 u43 u44 u51 u53 u54 u61 u62 u63 u64 u66 FD ðx; μln D ; σln D Þ ¼ pffiffiffiffiffiffi ef−½1=ð2σln D Þðln t−μln D Þ g dt
A8 u11 u12 u13 u14 u21 u24 u25 u31 u32 u33 u34 u42 u51 u53 u54 u61 0 2πσln D t
 
u62 u63 u64 u66 ln x − μln D
A9 u31 u34 u52 u53 u54 u61 u62 u63 u64 u65 ¼Φ ð9Þ
σln D
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by Ozyegin Universitesi on 10/29/21. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.

A10 u13 u22 u33 u34 u51 u52 u53 u54 u61 u62 u63 u64
A11 u11 u12 u13 u14 u21 u24 u25 u31 u34 u42 u43 u51 u53 u54 u61 u62 u63
u64 u66 Establishment of Correlation Structure
A12 u11 u12 u13 u21 u24 u25 u31 u33 u42 u43 u51 u53 u54 u61 u62 u64 u65 Hazardous areas are not completely independent, and may be
A13 u12 u13 u14 u23 u24 u25 u34 u42 u51 u52 u53 u54 u61 u62 u66 caused by the same risk factors. As a result, the correlation matrix
A14 u13 u14 u15 u31 u34 u42 u51 u52 u54 u61 u62 u63 can be obtained from the relationship between risk factors that each
A15 u11 u12 u13 u14 u15 u21 u22 u23 u24 u25 u31 u34 u41 u43 u51 u52 u53 u54 hazardous area contains (Table 2). The correlation coefficient is
u61 u62 u63 u64 u65 u66 given by
A16 u13 u34 u43 u51 u54 u61 u64 u66 8
A17 u11 u12 u13 u14 u15 u25 u31 u33 u34 u43 u44 u51 u52 u53 u54 u61 u62 > PQðuA ∩uA Þ
>
< k¼1 i j W k
u63 u64 u66 ; i≠j
A18 u12 u13 u14 u15 u21 u22 u23 u24 u25 u31 u33 u34 u43 u51 u52 u53 u54 u61 ρi;j ¼ QðuAi ∪ uAi Þ ð10Þ
>
>
u63 u64 u66 : 1; i¼j
8
>
> 1; Condition 1
<
of three factors: risk likelihood/probability L, exposure frequency W k ¼ 0.5; Condition 2 ð11Þ
E, and consequences C >
>
: 0; Condition 3

D¼L×E×C ð4Þ where i; j ¼ 1; 2; : : : ; 18 = number of hazardous areas; uAi and

The standard deviation of D from the product formula usually is
large due to the subjectiveness of L, E, and C. Thus the logarithmic
formula can be used
ln D ¼ ln L þ ln E þ ln C
According to the central limit theorem, if an index is influenced
by independent factors and each factor does not have a dominant
influence, the index converges to a normal distribution. Because
L, E, and C are mutually independent, it can be assumed that
ln D ∼ Nðμ; σ2 Þ (Nowak and Collins 2000). Thus
uAj = risk factors of hazardous area Ai and Aj ; Qð·Þ = number
of elements in a set; and W k = weighting factor with different
values under three conditions. The 18 hazardous areas are subor-
dinate to three major construction areas (Table 1). Hence,
Condition 1 means that the kth element of uAi ∩ uAj belongs to
risk factor set U 3 , U 4 , U 5 , or U 6 in Fig. 2. Condition 2 means that
ð5Þ Ai and Aj belong to the same construction area, and the kth element
of uAi ∩ uAj belongs to risk factor set U 1 or U 2. Condition 3 means
that Ai and Aj belong to different construction areas, and the kth
element of uAi ∩ uAj belongs to risk factor set U 1 or U 2.
0
Additionally, the correlation coefficient ρi;j of Z is determined
by the correlation coefficient ρi;j of X through an integral func-
tional relationship

Z Z    0
∞ ∞ xj − μ j
xi − μ i φ2 ðzi ; zj ; ρi;j Þ
ρi;j ¼ f Xi ðxi Þf Xj ðxj Þ dxi dxj
−∞ −∞ σi
σj φðzi Þφðzj Þ
Z ∞ Z ∞  
xi − μ i xj − μ j 0 Þdz dz
¼ φ2 ðzi ; zj ; ρi;j i j ð12Þ
−∞ −∞ σi σj
0 is unique and can be expressed by
The solution of ρi;j
0
ρi;j ¼ ρi;j F ð13Þ

where F, satisfying F ≥ 1, is a function of ρi;j and the coefficient of variation δ ¼ σ=μ. When both X i and X j belong to the lognormal
distribution, the function F is
lnð1 þ ρi;j δ i δ j Þ
F ¼ Fðρi;j ; δ i ; δj Þ ¼ qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ð14Þ
ρi;j lnð1 þ δ 2i Þ lnð1 þ δ 2j Þ

© ASCE 04020047-4 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2020, 146(5): 04020047

 Thus, the correlation coefficient matrix R 0 of the standard
random vector Z is given by
2 0 0 3
ρ1;1 ρ1;2 · · · ρ10 ,18 M-1,-1 M-1,0 M-1,1
6 ρ0 0 · · · ρ20 ,18 7
6 2;1 ρ2;2 7 M0,-1 M0,0 M0,1
6 7
R0 ¼ 6 . . . . 7 ð15Þ
6 .. .. .. .. 7
4 5 M1,-1 M1,0 M1,1
0 0 0
ρ18;1 ρ18;2 ··· ρ18;18

Given the multivariate joint distribution constructed by the

marginal distribution and the correlation structure, the joint prob- Fig. 3. Moore neighbors and their preference matrix.
ability of each hazardous area is obtained by
n 18 o
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by Ozyegin Universitesi on 10/29/21. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.

P ¼ P ∩ X i ≤ bi ¼ FX ðbÞ ð16Þ
i¼1
where b ¼ ðb1 ; b2 ; : : : ; b18 Þ = safety limit value. When calculating
the joint probability of the hazardous area Ai , the safety limit value
0
is taken as μi =σi , and the values of the remaining area Aj are ρi;j · Short-distance interactions are repulsive, whereas long-distance
μi =σi according to the correlation structure. Thus
0
bi ¼ ðρi;1 0
· μi =σi ; ρi;2 0
· μi =σi ; : : : ; ρi;18 · μi =σi Þ
where μi ¼ μln DðAi Þ ; and σi ¼ σln DðAi Þ . Therefore, the joint prob-
ability model is established for the risk assessment of hazardous
areas on building construction sites.
Risk-Based Evacuation Simulation
When risk events or even large-scale disasters occur on construc-
tion sites, the evacuation process is complicated, and live drills
are limited for ethical reasons. However, with the help of the cel-
lular automaton model, the evacuation process can be simulated
effectively.
Two-Dimensional Cellular Automaton
The concept of cellular automaton was proposed by computer
scientists Von Neumann (1966) to simulate the self-replication phe-
nomenon of living systems with recursive automata. It has been
successfully applied to the study of vehicle flow and traffic net-
work, e.g., Nishinari and Takahashi (1999). For research on pedes-
trian dynamics, the concept of the floor field (Burstedde et al. 2001)
was proposed to substitute the individual intelligence for simulating
the environmental influence on pedestrians.
Basic Structure
The basic structure of the CA model is a two-dimensional grid in
which each cell is occupied by an obstacle, a particle (a pedestrian),
or is empty. The size of each cell is 40 × 40 cm, which is a typical
space for a pedestrian to occupy in a dense crowd.
The evolution rules of the CA model are defined in the
local spatial range, which means that the next moment of a cell
depends only on its own state and neighbor cells. The three most
commonly used types of neighbor cells are Von Neumann, Moore,
and extended Moore. In this paper, a 3 × 3 preference matrix Mij is
established based on Moore neighbors to represent preference
probabilities of each pedestrian (Fig. 3).
Floor Field
The influence of the environment on pedestrians is described by the
floor field, which can be divided into the static field S and the dy-
namic field D. The static field represents the attraction of different
locations in an evacuation scenario based on the exit distance. It
does not evolve over time and does not change due to the presence
of pedestrians. The dynamic field is constantly updated and modi-
fied as the pedestrian moves to simulate the long-distance interac-
tion. It is affected by diffusion and decay, and eventually will dilute
and disappear.
interactions are attractive and are transmitted by the floor field.
ð17Þ The CA model is constantly changing according to the movement
of pedestrians, which in turn changes the transition probability of
the floor field.
Transition Probability
In the floor field model, fermions represent pedestrians and bosons
represent pedestrian traces. The bosons are coupled to the fermions
locally to drive the fermions in a preferential direction, thereby
inducing long-range interactions between the fermions. Thus the
transition probability pij in the direction ð0; 0Þ → ði; jÞ at every
time step t → t þ 1 is given by
pij ¼ N expðβJ s Δs ði; jÞÞ expðβJ d Δd ði; jÞÞð1 − nij Þdij ð18Þ
P
where i; j ¼ 1; −1; N = normalization factor to ensure ði;jÞ pij ¼
1; nij = occupation number, i.e., nij ¼ 0 for empty cells and nij ¼ 1
for occupied cells; and
Δs ði; jÞ ¼ τ s ði; jÞ − τ s ð0; 0Þ
Δd ði; jÞ ¼ τ d ði; jÞ − τ d ð0; 0Þ ð19Þ
where τ s ði; jÞ and τ d ði; jÞ = occupation numbers of static s-bosons
and dynamic d-bosons for cell ði; jÞ, respectively. The static var-
iable J s reflects the individual’s familiarity with the environment,
and the dynamic variable J d indicates the individual’s dependence
on other people’s traces, β is the inverse temperature, dij is a cor-
rection factor for considering the direction that the particle has
come from, and α is the decay probability of the dynamic field.
Coupling Risk Assessment and Evacuation Simulation
Floor Field
At a certain construction stage, main buildings, foundation pits,
temporary constructions, and so forth are defined as obstacles with
determinate locations. Pedestrians tend to reach the exit with the
shortest distance, which is
Disi;j ¼ minfDis1i;j ; Dis2i;j ; : : : ; Disni;j g ð20Þ
where n = total number of all exit cells. The shortest distance to
exits is available for all cells. Thus the difference between
maxDis and Disi;j is taken as the static field value Si;j

© ASCE 04020047-5 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2020, 146(5): 04020047

 No.1 Decoration stage No.4 Foundation pit support stage
No.2 Later main construction stage No.5 Excavation Stage
No.3 Early main construction stage No.6 Pile foundation stage

No.2

No.1 No.4 No.5 No.6

4m A2
A3

4m
A17 A1
A18
A13 A10
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by Ozyegin Universitesi on 10/29/21. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.

A14
A16 A7 A4 A6
A10
A15 A8 A5
No.3 A11 A9 Fig. 5. Schematic diagram of hazardous areas in the evacuation model.
A12
A10

A4
Hazardous area Ai
6m
Fig. 4. Three-dimensional illustration of the case scenario and hazar-
dous areas.
Si;j ¼ maxDis − Disi;j
Apart from cells occupied by obstacles, each cell carries an ad-
ditional dynamic field to reflect the traces of pedestrian movement.
If the target cell is occupied, the pedestrian will not move. If more
than one pedestrian shares the same target cell, only one will be
selected based on relative probabilities. Additionally, the coding
method, i.e., the Hansen–Hurwitz method or the cumulative sum
method, is adopted to realize the randomization on pedestrian flow.
Case Study
Case Scenario
A 150 × 100 m construction site under a certain working condition
was assumed for the case study. The construction of six main
buildings is underway at different stages (Fig. 4). A fire is burning
out of control in Building 1, and all construction workers need to
evacuate urgently. Hence, a risk-based evacuation model should be
ð21Þ established.
The size of each cell is 40 × 40 cm, so 375 × 250 ¼ 93,750
cells were divided for the CA model. Some cells were occupied
by obstacles; 240 construction workers were randomly distributed
in the remaining cells. Hazardous areas existed around obstacles
(Fig. 5). Most of them were annular, with a width of 1.2–2 m.
Currently, the model simulates only the horizontal evacuation of
the ground, i.e., the vertical evacuation within the main buildings
is not considered.

Modification of Transition Probability Risk Assessment of Hazardous Areas

Hazardous areas proposed in this paper exist in the cell space, and
risk events occur randomly. The uncertainty of risk is characterized
by the joint probability. For the risk-based evacuation model, a
correction coefficient nrij is introduced to the transition probability
formula [Eq. (18)]. Thus, the modified transition probability prij is
given by
prij ¼ N expðβJ s Δs ði; jÞÞ expðβJ d Δd ði; jÞÞð1 − nij Þdij nrij
The value of nrij is determined by random sampling according to
the joint probability. If risk events in hazardous areas occur, the
pedestrian will not move to the target cell with nrij ¼ 0. Otherwise,
the pedestrian takes the original route to the target cell with nrij ¼ 1
Pðnrij ¼ 0Þ ¼ P
Pðnrij ¼ 1Þ ¼ 1 − P
Performing risk assessment prior to the simulation model is essen-
tial. The authors determined 851 sets of data for the proposed 18
hazardous areas with L, E, and C values from evaluation reports of
actual engineering projects. The data were determined by construc-
tion experts with their experience to ensure professionalism. Hence,
means and standard deviations of ln D were calculated with L, E,
ð22Þ and C values (Table 3). According to Eqs. (8) and (9), the proba-
bility density curve and the cumulative distribution curve of D was
obtained (Fig. 6).
After marginal distributions of hazardous areas are estimated
based on the LEC method, the correlation structure is given by risk
factor analysis. Table 4 gives the correlation coefficient matrix R 0
calculated by Eqs. (10), (13), and (15). Given the multivariate joint
distribution constructed by the marginal distribution and the corre-
lation structure, the joint probability P of risk in hazardous areas
can be obtained by Eq. (16) (Table 5).
ð23Þ

Risk-Based Evacuation Analysis

The risk-based approach is established for evacuation simula-
tion considering the influence of hazardous areas on building con-
struction sites. Therefore, the objective of this paper to incorporate
risk assessment in evacuation analysis is achieved for safety man-
agement. A case study is conducted in the next section to illustrate
the application.
With the results of joint probabilities, the modified CA model for
risk-based evacuation was established. Due to the lack of empirical
data, the parameters of the modified transition probability formula
[Eq. (22)] were assigned by experience: J s ¼ 5, J d ¼ 0.5, β ¼ 10,
and α ¼ 0.6.

© ASCE 04020047-6 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2020, 146(5): 04020047

 Table 3. Logarithmic means and standard deviations of L, E, C, and D To illustrate that the risk-based evacuation model is superior to
Ai μln L σln L μln E σln E μln C σln C μln D σln D the basic evacuation model, the case scenario was simulated 50
times for each of them. The main difference lay in whether the joint
A1 1.02 0.87 1.19 0.56 1.74 1.02 3.94 1.45
probability of random occurrence of risk events in hazardous areas
A2 1.66 0.47 1.43 0.57 2.04 0.50 5.13 0.89
A3 1.03 0.42 1.35 0.62 2.13 0.70 4.50 1.03 was considered.
A4 1.16 0.87 1.09 0.65 1.85 0.46 4.10 1.18
A5 0.76 0.69 0.99 0.60 2.10 0.65 3.85 1.12
A6 0.83 1.01 0.96 0.53 1.98 0.34 3.77 1.19 Results and Discussion
A7 1.55 0.53 1.20 0.39 1.70 0.56 4.45 0.86 The simulation program first calculates the static field based on the
A8 1.54 0.12 1.31 0.32 1.17 0.34 4.02 0.48 network topology. The center of each cell
A9 1.35 0.68 1.20 0.52 1.26 0.76 3.81 1.14 pffiffiisffi a node of the network.
The distance between nodes is 1 or 2 for Moore neighbors.
A10 1.66 0.38 1.08 0.25 1.73 0.52 4.48 0.69
A11 1.66 0.46 1.21 0.44 1.36 0.44 4.23 0.77
Then the adjacency list and the weight list are obtained to form
A12 1.62 0.55 1.03 0.43 1.71 0.75 4.35 1.03 the network topology (Fig. 7). Because the static field represents
the attraction of exits, values at three exits were the largest (Fig. 8).
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by Ozyegin Universitesi on 10/29/21. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.

A13 1.67 0.44 1.36 0.34 1.45 0.45 4.49 0.71

A14 1.40 0.64 0.98 0.52 1.30 0.88 3.68 1.21 Under different calculation steps, the dynamic field is presented in
A15 1.14 0.80 0.61 0.69 2.42 0.76 4.18 1.30 Fig. 9 to reflect the traces of pedestrian movement.
A16 1.40 0.57 1.28 0.45 1.67 0.68 4.35 1.00
A17 1.06 0.90 1.49 0.59 1.89 0.73 4.44 1.30 Evacuation Process
A18 1.44 0.66 0.60 0.73 1.61 0.59 3.66 1.15 Animated evacuation records show that herd behavior, i.e., pedes-
trians tend to gather with others while moving toward the exits, is

0.018 1.0
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
0.015 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10
A11 A12 A13 A14 0.8
A15 A16 A17 A18
0.012
FD(x,μ,σ)
fD(x,μ,σ)

0.6
0.009
0.4
0.006 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
0.2 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10
0.003 A11 A12 A13 A14
A15 A16 A17 A18
0.000 0.0
0 50 100 150 200 250 0 100 200 300 400 500
(a) x (b) x

Fig. 6. Probability density curve and cumulative distribution curve of D: (a) probability density curve; and (b) cumulative distribution
curve.

Table 4. Correlation coefficient matrix R 0 for multivariate joint distribution

Ai A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 A17 A18
A1 1 0.53 0.59 0.27 0.19 0.23 0.40 0.33 0.39 0.37 0.42 0.44 0.31 0.32 0.44 0.25 0.36 0.31
A2 0.53 1 0.52 0.32 0.26 0.23 0.41 0.28 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.21 0.32 0.27 0.34 0.25 0.37 0.31
A3 0.59 0.52 1 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.47 0.41 0.30 0.35 0.34 0.39 0.31 0.30 0.44 0.24 0.49 0.42
A4 0.27 0.32 0.24 1 0.34 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.39 0.51 0.19 0.15 0.30 0.37 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.29
A5 0.19 0.26 0.24 0.34 1 0.63 0.45 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.32 0.27 0.38 0.34 0.30 0.46 0.34 0.34
A6 0.23 0.23 0.28 0.26 0.63 1 0.56 0.53 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.31 0.42 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.39 0.31
A7 0.40 0.41 0.47 0.26 0.45 0.56 1 0.64 0.41 0.41 0.48 0.43 0.37 0.39 0.43 0.39 0.53 0.41
A8 0.33 0.28 0.41 0.23 0.41 0.53 0.64 1 0.37 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.29 0.47 0.41
A9 0.39 0.23 0.30 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.41 0.37 1 0.58 0.41 0.36 0.32 0.48 0.43 0.29 0.44 0.36
A10 0.37 0.26 0.35 0.51 0.37 0.37 0.41 0.43 0.58 1 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.45 0.37 0.36 0.48 0.42
A11 0.42 0.25 0.34 0.19 0.32 0.38 0.48 0.41 0.41 0.32 1 0.69 0.46 0.39 0.55 0.35 0.49 0.45
A12 0.44 0.21 0.39 0.15 0.27 0.31 0.43 0.41 0.36 0.34 0.69 1 0.37 0.30 0.47 0.29 0.47 0.43
A13 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.38 0.42 0.37 0.37 0.32 0.37 0.46 0.37 1 0.45 0.45 0.33 0.44 0.44
A14 0.32 0.27 0.30 0.37 0.34 0.36 0.39 0.37 0.48 0.45 0.39 0.30 0.45 1 0.39 0.31 0.46 0.38
A15 0.44 0.34 0.44 0.26 0.30 0.34 0.43 0.38 0.43 0.37 0.55 0.47 0.45 0.39 1 0.32 0.59 0.63
A16 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.46 0.34 0.39 0.29 0.29 0.36 0.35 0.29 0.33 0.31 0.32 1 0.38 0.37
A17 0.36 0.37 0.49 0.29 0.34 0.39 0.53 0.47 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.44 0.46 0.59 0.38 1 0.61
A18 0.31 0.31 0.42 0.29 0.34 0.31 0.41 0.41 0.36 0.42 0.45 0.43 0.44 0.38 0.63 0.37 0.61 1

© ASCE 04020047-7 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2020, 146(5): 04020047

 Table 5. Joint probabilities of risk in hazardous areas (%) fluctuant due to the occurrence of risk events in hazardous areas
Ai P around obstacles. Pedestrians may have short repetitions or even
pauses during the movement, especially in areas with high joint
A1 28.17
probabilities of risk. In particular, Fig. 11 compares the difference
A2 63.90
A3 54.46
of pedestrian movement in the vicinity of obstacles south of the
A4 29.60 construction site under different calculation steps between the
A5 37.99 two models. The risk-based evacuation model showed that pedes-
A6 34.26 trians were hindered in the hazardous area A8 , where risk events
A7 82.12 occurred frequently with high joint probability. Generally, the vola-
A8 95.45 tility of pedestrian movement is enhanced in hazardous areas.
A9 41.49 Trajectories of the last escaped person are presented in Fig. 12 to
A10 89.53 show the most difficult escape location. In the basic evacuation
A11 72.22 model, it is on the west side of Building 3. However, the result
A12 47.37
was not absolute in the risk-based evacuation model. It was in
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by Ozyegin Universitesi on 10/29/21. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.

A13 99.26
A14 99.26
the middle of Buildings 1 and 5 opposite the south Exit 1 in 41
A15 43.05 calculations. It was on the west side of Building 3 in eight calcu-
A16 49.33 lations, and in the middle of Buildings 2 and 4 in one calculation.
A17 52.79
A18 40.95 Evacuation Time
According to experience, the average evacuation speed of construc-
tion workers is about 1.3 m=s. For the basic evacuation model
in which the influence of hazardous areas is not considered, the
simulation process was calculated 50 times (Fig. 13). The maxi-
mum time, the time for a 95% confidence interval, and the average
time were
tmax ¼ 60.6 s

t0.5 ¼ ½60.0 s; 60.1 s

t̄ ¼ 60.1 s

For the risk-based evacuation model in which the influence of

hazardous areas was considered, the simulation process was
calculated 50 times (Fig. 13). The maximum time, the time for
Fig. 7. Network topology and detail at enlarged scale.
a 95% confidence interval, and the average time were
tmax ¼ 82.8 s

t0.5 ¼ ½68.0 s; 72.0 s

t̄ ¼ 69.9 s

Therefore, when the influence of hazardous areas was consid-

ered, the average evacuation time increased by 16.3% and the maxi-
mum time increased by 36.5%. The main reason was that the
volatility of pedestrian movement was stronger in the risk-based
evacuation model.
The evacuation program is written in Mathematica software
version 11.0 and run on an Intel Core i7-7700 CPU @ 3.60GHz.
The calculation time of the static field was about 3 days. The addi-
tional calculation time for the case was less than 3 h.

Case Scenario Optimization

Fig. 8. Static field of the basic evacuation model and the risk-based
evacuation model.
obvious (Fig. 10). Compared with the basic evacuation model, the
risk-based evacuation model has some valuable features suggesting
that it is a practical attempt to characterize the pedestrian behavior
in an emergency evacuation situation. Evacuation paths are more
The original construction site layout can be optimized based on the
simulation results. For example
1. Construction roads can be arranged on the main evacuation
paths to facilitate the transportation of construction materials
and the emergency evacuation of pedestrians.
2. Exit layout can be changed to improve the evacuation efficiency,
according to the pedestrian flow. In this case, the size of the
northwest exit and the south exit can be increased, and the posi-
tion of the south exit can be adjusted west slightly.
3. Temporary construction structures can be adjusted to provide
an unobstructed movement path for pedestrians. In this case,

© ASCE 04020047-8 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2020, 146(5): 04020047

Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by Ozyegin Universitesi on 10/29/21. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.

Fig. 9. Dynamic field under different calculation steps of the risk-based evacuation model: (a) 1 step; (b) 50 steps; (c) 100 steps; and (d) 150 steps.

the position of the rebar working area and the stacking area fa-
cing the south exit need to be adjusted eastward.
Model Validation
Both the joint probability and the cellular automata are simplistic
methods of complex processes, and hence it is essential to validate
the reliability of the outputs. However, a fundamental challenge
arises from the absence of empirical data with which to compare
them. Thus a partial validation applied to the risk-based evacuation
model is presented as a proposal for verifying the reliability.
For qualitative validation, it is easy to verify if certain phenom-
ena are reproduced by the model. The simulation results showed
that the pedestrian movement may have short pauses due to the
occurrence of risk events in hazardous areas, which is an accurate
representation of the model to describe panic and obstruction in the
real evacuation process. In terms of quantitative validation, the au-
thors did not conduct an experiment to verify the evacuation time
for ethical considerations. Theoretically speaking, the proposed
joint probability model for risk assessment of hazardous areas
has a theoretical and practical basis based on the data from actual
engineering projects and the risk analysis method. Thus the average
results of the random-related evacuation model can be statistically
accurate as long as it is calculated a sufficient number of times.
In addition, the floor field CA model has been demonstrated to
be able to replicate evacuation phenomena according to a few field
experiments (Lu et al. 2017). It is reasonable to incorporate risk
assessment in evacuation simulation by setting obstacles with a cer-
tain probability of occurrence in the CA model.
However, theoretical validation is not sufficient, because the
comparison with experiments is a critical step in assessing the
accuracy of a simulation model quantitatively. Empirical data from
experiments can be used in the calibration of parameters and the
validation of simulation results. To address them appropriately, a
more comprehensive validation study is planned for the next stage
of the research.

© ASCE 04020047-9 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2020, 146(5): 04020047

Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by Ozyegin Universitesi on 10/29/21. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.

Fig. 10. Pedestrian distribution under different calculation steps of the risk-based evacuation model: (a) 1 step; (b) 50 steps; (c) 100 steps;
and (d) 150 steps.

Fig. 11. Pedestrian distribution near the south exit under 1, 50, 100, and 150 calculation steps: (a) basic evacuation model; and (b) risk-based
evacuation model.

© ASCE 04020047-10 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2020, 146(5): 04020047

 Calculation 1 Calculation 26
Calculation 2 Calculation 27
Exit 2 Calculation 3 Calculation 28
Calculation 4 Calculation 29
Calculation 5 Calculation 30
Calculation 6 Calculation 31
Calculation 7 Calculation 32
Calculation 8 Calculation 33
Calculation 9 Calculation 34
Calculation 10 Calculation 35
Calculation 11 Calculation 36
Calculation 12 Calculation 37
Calculation 13 Calculation 38
100 m Calculation 14
Calculation 15
Calculation 39
Calculation 40 Exit 3
Calculation 16 Calculation 41
Calculation 17 Calculation 42
Calculation 18 Calculation 43
Calculation 19 Calculation 44
Calculation 20 Calculation 45
Calculation 21 Calculation 46
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by Ozyegin Universitesi on 10/29/21. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.

Calculation 22 Calculation 47
Calculation 23 Calculation 48
Calculation 24 Calculation 49
Calculation 25 Calculation 50

Exit 1

150 m
(a)

Calculation 1 Calculation 26
Calculation 2 Calculation 27
Exit 2 Calculation 3 Calculation 28
Calculation 4 Calculation 29
Calculation 5 Calculation 30
Calculation 6 Calculation 31
Calculation 7 Calculation 32
Calculation 8 Calculation 33
Calculation 9 Calculation 34
Calculation 10 Calculation 35
Calculation 11 Calculation 36
Calculation 12 Calculation 37
Calculation 13 Calculation 38
100 m

Calculation 14 Calculation 39
Calculation 15 Calculation 40 Exit 3
Calculation 16 Calculation 41
Calculation 17 Calculation 42
Calculation 18 Calculation 43
Calculation 19 Calculation 44
Calculation 20 Calculation 45
Calculation 21 Calculation 46
Calculation 22 Calculation 47
Calculation 23 Calculation 48
Calculation 24 Calculation 49
Calculation 25 Calculation 50

Exit 1

150 m
(b)

Fig. 12. Trajectories of the last escaped person in 50 calculations: (a) basic evacuation model; and (b) risk-based evacuation model.

Conclusions assessment of hazardous areas based on the multivariate joint

The primary contribution to the body of knowledge of this study is
to fill the gap in the existing literature by proposing a methodology
which incorporates risk assessment in evacuation analysis on con-
struction sites. In terms of theoretical aspects, this study bridges
two important research domains of safety management. In terms
of practical contributions, this study has the potential to provide
practical advice on making plans and decisions related to emer-
gency evacuation, because labor safety is the top priority. The main
research findings are as follows:
1. Eighteen hazardous areas were determined to describe the com-
plexity and uncertainty of construction sites with risk factor
analysis. A joint probability model was proposed for the risk
distribution.
2. A modified two-dimensional CA model was established for
risk-based evacuation simulation by considering the joint
probability of risk as a correction coefficient for the transition
rule. Random events in hazardous areas are taken as obstacles
with certain occurrence probabilities in the simulation model.
Thus the coupling between risk assessment and evacuation
simulation is achieved indirectly.
3. A case study was conducted for illustrating the potential engi-
neering application. Results showed that the pedestrian move-
ment was disturbed due to the occurrence of random events in
hazardous areas, especially those with high joint probabilities of
risk. The average evacuation time increased by 16.3%, and the

© ASCE 04020047-11 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2020, 146(5): 04020047

 60.9
50 calculations Average value
60.6
Evacuation Time (s)
60.3
60.0
59.7
0 10 20 30
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by Ozyegin Universitesi on 10/29/21. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.
(a) Number of calculations
Fig. 13. Results of the evacuation time in 50 calculations: (a) basic evacuation model; and (b) risk-based evacuation model.
maximum evacuation time increased by 36.5% when the influ-
ence of hazardous areas was considered. In addition, the original
construction site layout was optimized with proper evacuation
planning advice based on simulation results.
Limitations and Future Work
Several limitations that can be improved by future work need to be
acknowledged. First, the probabilistic model is limited by the lack
of publicly available databases for establishing an exact probability
distribution. To address this limitation, an appropriate combination
of research techniques can be employed for risk identification.
Second, the present simulation model does not considered the
impact of speed, number, and location of pedestrians, all of which
may influence the evacuation process. Third, the parameters of the
transition probability formula assigned by experience lacks calibra-
tion. On the basis of the promising methodology presented in this
paper, future work will involve validation of the risk-based evacu-
ation model and application for actual construction projects.
Data Availability Statement
Data generated by the authors or analyzed during the study are
available at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/13dpWegYhA9vNa89
DL3jh9G9T5mAtetr_/view?usp=sharing. Information about the
Journal’s data-sharing policy can be found here: http://ascelibrary
.org/doi/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001263.
Acknowledgments
Support from the National Key Research and Development
Program of China (No. 2017YFC0805500) is gratefully
acknowledged.
References
Abdelgawad, M., and A. R. Fayek. 2010. “Risk management in the
construction industry using combined fuzzy FMEA and fuzzy AHP.”
J. Constr. Eng. Manage. 136 (9): 1028–1036. https://doi.org/10.1061
/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000210.
Aljassmi, H., and S. Han. 2013. “Analysis of causes of construction defects
using fault trees and risk importance measures.” J. Constr. Eng.
© ASCE
J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2020, 146(5): 04020047
85
80
Evacuation Time (s)
75
70
65
60
50 calculations Average value
55
40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50
(b) Number of calculations
Manage. 139 (7): 870–880. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943
-7862.0000653.
Apivatanagul, P., R. A. Davidson, and L. K. Nozick. 2012. “Bi-level opti-
mization for risk-based regional hurricane evacuation planning.” Nat.
Hazard. 60 (2): 567–588. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-011-0029-9.
Bernardini, G., M. D’Orazio, and E. Quagliarini. 2016. “Towards a ‘behav-
ioural design’ approach for seismic risk reduction strategies of buildings
and their environment.” Saf. Sci. 86 (Jul): 273–294. https://doi.org/10
.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.010.
Blue, V., and J. Adler. 1998. “Emergent fundamental pedestrian flows from
cellular automata microsimulation.” Transp. Res. Rec. 1644 (1): 29–36.
https://doi.org/10.3141/1644-04.
Bonabeau, E. 2002. “Agent-based modeling: Methods and techniques for
simulating human systems.” Supplement, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA
99 (S3): 7280–7287. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.082080899.
Burstedde, C., K. Klauck, A. Schadschneider, and J. Zittartz. 2001.
“Simulation of pedestrian dynamics using a two-dimensional cellular
automaton.” Phys. A: Stat. Mech. Appl. 295 (3–4): 507–525. https://doi
.org/10.1016/S0378-4371(01)00141-8.
Carr, V., and J. Tah. 2001. “A fuzzy approach to construction project
risk assessment and analysis: Construction project risk management
system.” Adv. Eng. Softw. 32 (10–11): 847–857. https://doi.org/10
.1016/S0965-9978(01)00036-9.
Chinese Standards. 2017. Specification for identification, monitoring and
control technology of major hazard installations in construction engi-
neering in Fujian. [In Chinese.] DBJ/T13-91-2017. Fuzhou, China:
Housing and Urban-Rural Development of Fujian.
El Meouche, R., M. Abunemeh, I. Hijaze, A. Mebarki, and I. Shahrour.
2018. “Developing optimal paths for evacuating risky construction
sites.” J. Constr. Eng. Manage. 144 (2): 04017099. https://doi.org/10
.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001413.
El-Sayegh, S. M. 2008. “Risk assessment and allocation in the UAE con-
struction industry.” Int. J. Project Manage. 26 (4): 431–438. https://doi
.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2007.07.004.
Fang, D. P., R. X. Lan, S. H. Wu, and B. Hua. 2002. “Safety evaluation of
the working conditions on the construction sites.” [In Chinese.] J. Saf.
Environ. 2 (2): 43–46. https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1009-6094.2002
.02.012.
Graham, K., and G. Kinney. 1980. “A practical safety analysis system for
hazards control.” J. Saf. Res. 12 (1): 13–20.
Hallowell, M. R., and J. A. Gambatese. 2010. “Qualitative research:
Application of the Delphi method to CEM research.” J. Constr. Eng.
Manage. 136 (1): 99–107. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943
-7862.0000137.
He, J., and J. Gong. 2016. “Estimate of small first passage probabilities of
nonlinear random vibration systems by using tail approximation of ex-
treme distributions.” Struct. Saf. 60 (May): 28–36. https://doi.org/10
.1016/j.strusafe.2016.02.003.
04020047-12 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.
 Helbing, D., and P. Molnar. 1995. “Social force model for pedestrian dy-
namics.” Phys. Rev. E 51 (5): 4282. https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE
.51.4282.
Huang, X., and J. Hinze. 2003. “Analysis of construction worker fall ac-
cidents.” J. Constr. Eng. Manage. 129 (3): 262–271. https://doi.org/10
.1061/(ASCE)0733-9364(2003)129:3(262).
Islam, M. S., M. P. Nepal, M. Skitmore, and M. Attarzadeh. 2017. “Current
research trends and application areas of fuzzy and hybrid methods to the
risk assessment of construction projects.” Adv. Eng. Inform. 33 (Aug):
112–131. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aei.2017.06.001.
Kangari, R., and L. S. Riggs. 1989. “Construction risk assessment by lin-
guistics.” IEEE Trans. Eng. Manage. 36 (2): 126–131. https://doi.org
/10.1109/17.18829.
Kim, K., and Y. Lee. 2019. “Automated generation of daily evacuation paths
in 4D BIM.” Appl. Sci. 9 (9): 1789. https://doi.org/10.3390/app9091789.
Kolen, B., and P. van Gelder. 2018. “Risk-based decision-making for
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by Ozyegin Universitesi on 10/29/21. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.
evacuation in case of imminent threat of flooding.” Water 10 (10):
1429. https://doi.org/10.3390/w10101429.
Li, J., and H. Zhu. 2018. “A risk-based model of evacuation route optimi-
zation under fire.” Procedia Eng. 211: 365–371. https://doi.org/10.1016
/j.proeng.2017.12.024.
Liu, P., and A. Der Kiureghian. 1986. “Multivariate distribution models
with prescribed marginals and covariances.” Probab. Eng. Mech.
1 (2): 105–112. https://doi.org/10.1016/0266-8920(86)90033-0.
Lu, L., C. Chan, J. Wang, and W. Wang. 2017. “A study of pedestrian group
behaviors in crowd evacuation based on an extended floor field cellular
automaton model.” Transp. Res. Part C Emerg. Technol. 81 (Aug):
317–329. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trc.2016.08.018.
Lyons, T., and M. Skitmore. 2004. “Project risk management in the
Queensland engineering construction industry: A survey.” Int. J.
Project Manage. 22 (1): 51–61. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0263-7863
(03)00005-X.
Marconi, S., and B. Chopard. 2002. “A multiparticle lattice gas automata
model for a crowd.” In Proc., Int. Conf. on Cellular Automata,
231–238. New York: Springer.
Marzouk, M., and I. Al Daour. 2018. “Planning labor evacuation for
construction sites using BIM and agent-based simulation.” Saf. Sci.
109 (Nov): 174–185. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2018.04.023.
© ASCE 04020047-13
J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2020, 146(5): 04020047
MOHURD (Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development). 2018.
“Bulletin on the production accident of municipal housing engineer-
ing and special governance action situation in 2018.” [In Chinese.]
Accessed March 22, 2019. http://www.mohurd.gov.cn/wjfb/201903
/t20190326_239913.html.
Mustafa, M. A., and J. F. Al-Bahar. 1991. “Project risk assessment using the
analytic hierarchy process.” IEEE Trans. Eng. Manage. 38 (1): 46–52.
https://doi.org/10.1109/17.65759.
Nishinari, K., and D. Takahashi. 1999. “A new deterministic CA model for
traffic flow with multiple states.” J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 32 (1): 93.
https://doi.org/10.1088/0305-4470/32/1/010.
Nowak, A. S., and K. R. Collins. 2000. Reliability of structures.
Chongqing, China: Chongqing Univ. Press.
Perlman, A., R. Sacks, and R. Barak. 2014. “Hazard recognition and risk
perception in construction.” Saf. Sci. 64 (Apr): 22–31. https://doi.org/10
.1016/j.ssci.2013.11.019.
Said, H., A. Kandil, and H. Cai. 2012. “Agent-based simulation of labour
emergency evacuation in high-rise building construction sites.” In
Proc., Construction Research Congress 2012: Construction Challenges
in a Flat World, 1104–1113. Reston, VA: ASCE.
Siraj, N. B., and A. R. Fayek. 2019. “Risk identification and common risks
in construction: Literature review and content analysis.” J. Constr. Eng.
Manage. 145 (9): 03119004. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943
-7862.0001685.
Taroun, A. 2012. “Decision support system (DSS) for construction project
risk analysis and evaluation via evidential reasoning (ER).” Ph.D. thesis,
Faculty of Humanities, Univ. of Manchester.
Taroun, A. 2014. “Towards a better modelling and assessment of
construction risk: Insights from a literature review.” Int. J. Project
Manage. 32 (1): 101–115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2013
.03.004.
Vanem, E., and R. Skjong. 2006. “Designing for safety in passenger ships
utilizing advanced evacuation analyses—A risk based approach.”
Saf. Sci. 44 (2): 111–135. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2005.06.007.
Von Neumann, J. 1966. Theory of self-reproducing automata. Champaign,
IL: University of Illinois Press. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555
/1102024.
J. Constr. Eng. Manage.