Comprehensive Risk Management in

Horizontal Directional Drilling Projects

Maria Krechowicz, Ph.D. 1

Abstract: Nowadays, horizontal directional drilling (HDD) technology is one of the most popular trenchless construction methods for
installing pipelines under obstacles. Both risk analysis and risk management are key tools helping to meet today’s challenging trenchless
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construction project demands connected with quality, deadlines, costs, and legal issues. In this paper, a new model based on proactive and
holistic approaches is presented, which is an extension from traditional risk analysis toward complex risk management in HDD projects.
Fuzzy fault tree analysis, fuzzy weighted index, and a risk response matrix supported the risk management process. Overall, 147 risk remedia-
tion strategies for all the identified HDD risks were proposed. The following types of risk response strategies were applied: passive and active
risk retention, risk transfer, risk elimination, and risk cause or effect reduction. The practical application of the proposed risk management
model for HDD projects was shown in an example. The application of the proposed risk management model allows one to effectively reduce
the risk of basic events occurrence and provides a remarkable reduction of the risk of the top event’s occurrence. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)
CO.1943-7862.0001809. © 2020 American Society of Civil Engineers.

Introduction situations can cause serious economic problems, as well as problems

Horizontal directional drilling (HDD) has evolved from a specialty
construction technique to one of the most popular trenchless con-
struction methods for installing pipelines and conduits under ob-
stacles or in areas where open-cut methods are problematic to apply.
Nowadays, it has become a multi-billion-dollar annual industry
worldwide. The installation process can be divided into three stages:
drilling a small-diameter pilot hole along the desired alignment,
enlarging the pilot hole to the required diameter to accommodate
the product pipe, and pulling the product pipe back into the enlarged
borehole. It is a steerable system, and this method has a capability to
track and steer a cutter head during the drilling process. Willoughby
(2005), Bennett and Ariaratnam (2008), and Najafi (2013) have all
presented more detailed descriptions of the HDD process.
Each trenchless or open-cut construction of a pipeline or under-
ground utility should be associated with a certain level of uncertainty
due to conducting works in variable ground and water conditions,
which are significantly affected by technical disturbances, human
factors, and economic considerations. In the case of trenchless con-
struction, the possibility of recognizing ground and water conditions,
obstacles on the route of the drilling, and access to the applied tools
and the pipeline being installed are much more limited compared
with open-cut constructions. It also results in limitations and diffi-
culties related to reacting in suitable time to the occurrence of emer-
gency situations, unwanted events, and problems during the project
execution. In addition, the equipment used in HDD technology is
very expensive, and any damage caused by design errors that have
not been identified and corrected on time, carelessness, ignorance
and lack of contractor skills, and other unforeseen emergency
1
Engineer, Faculty of Management and Computer Modelling, Kielce
Univ. of Technology, Al. 1000-lecia Państwa Polskiego 7, 25-314 Kielce,
Poland. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4213-3149. Email: maria
.krechowicz@gmail.com
Note. This manuscript was submitted on June 7, 2019; approved on
October 8, 2019; published online on February 22, 2020. Discussion period
open until July 22, 2020; separate discussions must be submitted for indi-
vidual papers. This paper is part of the Journal of Construction Engineer-
ing and Management, © ASCE, ISSN 0733-9364.
with the project execution.
It is also important to define what exactly risk is. The new ISO
31000 (ISO 2018) standard focuses more on the effect of incom-
plete knowledge of the unwanted events or circumstances on an
organization’s decision making and defines risk as the “effect of
uncertainty on objectives.” It is an extension from traditional risk
analysis toward risk management, which aims to force a change in
the traditional understanding of risk, ordering organizations to tai-
lor risk management to their needs and objectives. That is why it is
so important to adjust the risk management model to the require-
ments of a new standard and provide HDD stakeholders with a
comprehensive risk management model.
Risk analysis is one of the substeps of risk assessment within the
risk management process, and it falls between risk identification and
risk evaluation. It is only one component of project risk management,
which concerns the analysis of the risk cause and effect relationships
and quantitative risk assessment. It is characterized by a technical
approach and product focus (van Staveren, 2009). Risk management
offers much more than risk analysis. It covers risk assessment, risk
treatment, and risk recording and reporting, as well as risk monitor-
ing and review [ISO 31000 (ISO 2018)]. It should be applied to the
entire process of a project, from the feasibility phase through to op-
eration and maintenance. It is characterized by the process focus and
a multiproblem and holistic approach that allows one to consider
interests of many stakeholders (van Staveren, 2009).
Some valuable solutions on troubleshooting and mitigation in
HDD technology were presented by Ariaratnam et al. (2004),
Bennett and Ariaratnam (2008), Willoughby (2005), Bayer (2005),
and Strater et al. (2006, 2007), as well as by Gelinas and Mathy
(2004). Donovan and Hanford (2012) stressed the importance of
incorporating a risk management strategy in HDD projects and gave
some general guidelines on proper site investigation and design in
HDD projects. Although those publications provided some valuable
solutions for dealing with emergency situations in HDD projects, in
the literature there are no works that are comprehensive, structured,
and tailored to the HDD project specificity risk management models.
In the literature, no risk management model for HDD construc-
tion projects was found that takes into account the complete risk

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J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2020, 146(5): 04020034

 Table 1. Identified basic and intermediate events
Intermediate
events Basic events’ symbols and names
Problems with X1: Improper calculations of loads and stresses that
management exceed the product pipe capacity during the installation
X2: Not taking into consideration the allowable
bending radius of drill pipes or the product pipe
X3: Improper choice of the external pipe coating
X13: Downtime in the installation due to unavailable
equipment
X18: Contractor’s error
X19: Problem with supply and quality
X22: Improper cost calculations for the investmentb
Problems with X4: Loss of communications with the drill rig
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the machines X5: Drill tool failure due to the material’s fatigue
X6: Drill rig breakdown
X7: Mud motor breakdowna
X8: Mud cleaning system breakdowna
X9: Roller blocks failurea
X10: Roller cradles failurea
X11: Side cranes breakdowna
X12: Ballasting system breakdowna
Problems with X14: Unexpected natural or man-made subsurface
the ground obstacles
X15: Borehole collapse
X16: Blocking of the drilling pipe or product pipe
installation due to the swelling of clay and silt
X17: Drilling fluid seepage
Problems with X20: Legal problem
the environment X21: Severe weather conditions
a problems in the analyzed installations: downtime in installation
If used.
b (18%), unexpected natural subsurface obstacles (15%), drilling fluid
Only for midi and maxi HDD.
management strategy based on proactive and holistic approaches.
Krechowicz (2017a, b) proved that effective proactive risk manage-
ment in complex building construction projects resulted in effective
project realization in accordance with the planned schedule and
budget specified in the contract. When dealing with emergency
situations, most HDD contractors use only the rules of thumb that
they have developed over the years. Many owners, engineers, and
contractors are unable to start the risk management process early in
the project planning phase because they do not have any compre-
hensive risk management model that could be a reasonable tool to
effectively model and reduce the risk level. It often results in creat-
ing unrealistic project delivery and performance options.
In order to confirm the necessity of analyzing the risk in HDD
projects, the author carried out a survey of 14 enterprises dealing
with trenchless construction of pipelines using HDD technology in
Europe and the US. The survey is based on rich HDD contractors’
experiences from 5,940 HDD installations. Approximately 31.5%
of the analyzed HDD installations were carried out in Poland,
28.6% in France, 23.6% in the Netherlands, 15.5% in the US,
and 1.2% in Germany. Of these, 34.8% of the analyzed installations
were mini, 25.8% midi, and 39.4% maxi HDD. The surveyed com-
panies were asked if a risk analysis model in HDD technology is
needed. A full 100% of respondents answered that it is needed. The
surveyed companies were also asked if there is a need to develop a
risk management model in HDD technology; 93% of respondents
confirmed that it is needed. Moreover, the surveyed companies
were asked to give suggested actions to be taken to prevent or over-
come 22 problems in HDD projects. The problems were the same
as the basic events specified in Table 1. The obtained results were
analyzed, and the most valuable were used for preparation of the list
of risk treatment strategies.
© ASCE
J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2020, 146(5): 04020034
The objective of this work was to develop a new comprehensive
risk management model dedicated to HDD projects, which is based
on proactive and holistic risk approaches. It is an extension of tradi-
tional risk analysis toward complex risk management in HDD
projects.
Methodology for Comprehensive Risk Management
of HDD Projects
Risk management is a defined process for identifying, analyzing,
and responding to risks through the life of the project in order to
achieve the acceptable risk level, often through applying risk treat-
ment. In the proposed model the risk management process in HDD
technology was divided into five steps: risk assessment, risk treat-
ment, risk register, risk monitoring and review, and risk financ-
ing (Fig. 1).
Risk Assessment
Risk Identification
The first substep of the risk assessment stage is risk identification.
The methodology of identifying risks is shown in the first column
in Fig. 1. Gierczak (2014a) presented a risk identification process
and qualitative risk assessment in HDD projects. Feedback from
expert surveys from 5,940 HDD projects in five countries was
shown. It allowed for assessment of the frequency of occurrence
and the influence on the project failure of 38 risks in HDD technol-
ogy. It was found that the following problems were the most frequent
seepage (15%), unexpected human-made subsurface obstructions
(11%), not taking into consideration allowable bending radius of drill
pipes or product pipe (10%), drill rig breakdown (10%), and bore-
hole collapse (10%).
The influence on HDD project failure was assessed using a scale
of 1 to 5 (with 1 being the least important and 5 being the most
important). The following problems had the highest influence on
HDD project failure in the analyzed installations: borehole collapse
(3.6), operator lacking required skills (3.6), blocking of the drilling
pipe or product pipe installation due to swelling of clay and silt
(3.4), unexpected natural subsurface obstacles (3.4), and drill pipe
failure due to material’s fatigue (3.3). It was a basis for carrying out
quantitative risk assessment and preparing risk management strat-
egy for HDD projects.
Risk Analysis
The second substep of the risk assessment is risk analysis. In this
substep, the author’s risk analysis model was applied, which is
based on fuzzy fault tree analysis. The model has been described
in detail by Gierczak (2014b). However, it has been modified to
adapt to the needs of comprehensive risk management. The main
changes include the fact that it has been connected to the risk re-
sponse matrix (RRM), the fuzzy fault tree has been drawn in a hori-
zontal format, the consequences and fuzzy risks of unwanted basic
events, as well as risk reduction coefficients, have been taken into
account in the calculations, and it has been extended to include
sensitivity analysis. Fig. 2 shows the proposed hybrid fuzzy fault
tree (FFT) and RRM for HDD projects.
The model was drawn in a horizontal format, so the top event,
namely unsuccessful HDD project, was placed on the left of the
page, and the four intermediate events to the right were further di-
vided into the basic events in the middle of the page. The top event
was fully defined as the HDD failure by not meeting the project
04020034-2 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.
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Fig. 1. Proposed methodology of risk management in HDD projects.
objectives, exceeding the cost stated in the budget or time assumed
in the project schedule in the contract, or not meeting the quality
standards. The four intermediate events and 22 identified basic
events are presented in Table 1.
The basic events and their consequences of occurrence were de-
scribed in detail by Gierczak (2014b). Safety risks involved with
HDD projects are also assessed by the group of experts through the
presented framework, e.g., safety risk connected with a utility strike
is assessed within the basic event X14 (unexpected natural or
human-made subsurface obstacles); safety risk connected with se-
vere weather condition is assessed within basic event X21 (severe
weather conditions); safety risk connected with accidents on the
building site caused by improper employee training program,
improper operation and maintenance of machines, or improper
supervision is assessed within the basic event X18 (contractor’s er-
ror); safety issues connected with failure of the tools and machines
are assessed within the basic events X5–X12.
The level of detail to which the FFT was developed is crucial
because it determines how significant the final result will be. It was
extended to the mechanisms needed to identify functional depend-
encies between the events while ensuring the consistency and read-
ability of the analysis were not lost. In the proposed model, the
occurrence of any of the basic events is sufficient to lead to the
top event occurrence, which is represented in the proposed FFT
by OR gates. Fig. 2 shows the proposed hybrid fuzzy fault tree
and risk response matrix for the risk assessment and management
in HDD projects. To make it more useful and clear, it illustrates the
example of the Australian project, which will be the subject of
analysis in the next section of this paper.
Because of the fact that in the FFT structure there are only OR
gates and identical events do not occur on separate fault tree (FT)
branches, the methodology of general tree studies was applied to
the logical (qualitative) analysis of the hybrid FFT and risk
management matrix (RMM).
In the case of solving FT for the risk assessment in HDD proj-
ects, using a conventional approach based on the application of
probability theory could lead to gaining inadequate information
in the risk analysis or escalating the uncertainty of the analysis.
There is a lack of sufficient historical data to determine the prob-
ability distribution for basic events in HDD technology, and the
crisp failure rates of various problems in HDD cannot be obtained.
Moreover, the basic events in HDD technology are not stationary
© ASCE 04020034-3
J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2020, 146(5): 04020034
but dynamic and dependent on time, human factors, and variable
conditions of the environment. A solution to this problem is the
application of a fuzzy sets theory, which allows one to decrease
the uncertainty and lack of precision in the problems with gaining
crisp values of the basic events’ probability. Fuzzy sets permit the
gradual assessment of the membership of elements in a set, which is
described by a membership function valued in the real unit interval
[0, 1] (Zadeh, 1965), e.g., the statement “Element a is a member of
Set A” is not necessarily either true or false, but can be true to some
degree (membership degree). In this way, a gradual transition be-
tween the linguistic terms is allowed. Fuzzy sets theory is often used
in risk assessment, monitoring, and control in the construction indus-
try. Its efficiency was proved by Abdelgawad and Fayek (2011),
(2012), Shoar et al. (2019), and Skorupka and Kuchta (2016).
The proposed risk assessment model is an expert system, in
which the groups of HDD experts familiar with the analyzed project
and the risk management model assess the probability of basic events
occurrence applying the following linguistic terms: very low (VL),
low (L), medium (M), high (H), and very high (VH). In order to
show how the groups of experts understand certain linguistic terms,
it was needed to create trapezoidal membership functions for them.
The methodology of creating the membership function as well as the
requirements for the experts and the factors that should be taken into
account in the assessment of unwanted events probabilities were pre-
sented by Gierczak (2014b). It is important to remember that the
groups of experts assessed the probability assuming taking no risk
remediation strategies.
The risk connected with the basic event occurrence for the mem-
bership degree αjk can be calculated from the formula given in
Eq. (1)
Y
Rg g
Xiαjk ¼ PXiα · CXi · wzXi ð1Þ
jk
z∈Z
where Pg
Xiα = fuzzy probability of the basic event Xi occurrence,
jk
which should be read from the trapezoidal membership function
for the membership grade αjk from the left and right side
ðPg g
Xiaα ; PXidα Þ and where after substituting these in Eq. (1),
jk jk
two values of the risk of the basic event occurrence will be reached:
Rg jk
g
Xiaα from the left side and RXidα from the right side; αjk ¼ jkth
jk
membership degree to the set of fuzzy probabilities defining each
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Fig. 2. Proposed hybrid fuzzy fault tree and risk response matrix for the risk assessment and management in a HDD project in Australia.

linguistic value, j ¼ 0; 1; 2; : : : ; m − 1, where m is the number of
the analyzed membership grades; k = step of changes of the mem-
bership grades to the fuzzy set, k ¼ 1=ðm − 1Þ; CXi = factor rep-
resenting consequences of the basic event occurrence Xi; wzXi =
total risk reduction factor for the chosen risk treatment strategies
of a given type for the basic event Xi, wzXi ≠ 0 (this will be ex-
plained in detail in section “Risk Treatment”); and Z = set contain-
ing all types of the risk treatment strategies, defined by Eq. (2)
for all the identified basic events. When assessing the basic events
risks without considering introducing any risk treatment (or using
only passive risk acceptance
Q strategy), a total risk reduction factor
in Eq. (1) equals 1 ( z∈Z wzXi ¼ 1), so no risk reduction is reached.
The top event fuzzy risk from the left and right side, Rg tαajk ,
Rgtαdjk , can be calculated from Eq. (3) for various values of the
membership grade α by substituting fuzzy risks values Rg Xiaαjk
and Rg Xidα , which were calculated from Eq. (1)
jk

Z ¼ fRT-P; RT-A; EL; TR; ER; CRg ð2Þ 02 0 13

Yn Rg
Xiaαjk
where RT-P = passive risk retention; RT-A = active risk retention; Rg
tαjk ¼
@41 − @1 − A5
EL = risk elimination; TR = risk transfer; ER = reduction of the risk i¼1
100
effect; and CR = reduction of the risk cause. 2 0 13 1
Each of the basic events can lead to unwanted event occurrence Yn RgXidαjk
and is equally important in terms of its effect. That is why the factor · 100%; 41 − @1 − A5 · 100%A ð3Þ
100
reflecting the consequences of a basic event Xi occurrence CXi ¼ 1 i¼1

© ASCE 04020034-4 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2020, 146(5): 04020034

 where Rg tαjk = fuzzy risk connected with the top event occurrence
for the membership degree αjk (%).
In the end of the risk analysis, it is needed to choose the right
crisp value of top event risk from the fuzzy set. It requires carrying
out a defuzzification process. The crisp risk (after defuzzification)
connected with the top event occurrence can be calculated applying
the center of area (COA) method from Eq. (4)
Pm g Pm
g 
j¼0 Rtaαjk · αjk j¼0 Rtdαjk · αjk
RCOA
t ¼ 0.5 P m α þ P m α ð4Þ
j¼0 jk j¼0 jk
where RCOA
t = defuzzified value (risk connected with the top event
occurrence) (%); Rg taαjk = extreme (from the left side) values of the
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top event risk for jkth membership grade (%); and Rg tdα = extreme
jk
(from the right side) values of the top event risk for jkth member-
ship grade (%).
Risk Evaluation
The third substep in risk assessment is risk evaluation, which aims to
determine whether a considered HDD project entails an acceptable or
unacceptable risk level. It should be based on the following param-
eters: the results of the risk assessment (percentage value of the top
event
Q risk calculated assuming taking no risk remediation strategies,
z∈Z wXi ¼ 1) and the results of the sensitivity analysis. It is impor-
z
tant to individually set the borderline of acceptable and unacceptable
risk level of basic event and top event occurrence for each HDD
project, owner, and contractor considering the specificity of the
project as well as technical, economic, and legal conditions.
Sensitivity analysis is carried out to determine the critical factors
of the HDD project, which in particular should be a subject of risk
treatment. After implementing risk response strategies for a particu-
lar event, risk analysis can be carried out once again to assess the
impact of the solutions applied to the entire system. The sensitivity
analysis of the system was carried out using a fuzzy weighted index
(FWI). With this indicator, the share of each of the basic events
leading to the occurrence of the unwanted top event is measured.
The fuzzy weighted indicator for the basic event Xi is defined by
the following formula:
FWIXi ðRCOA
t ; RCOA
ti Þ ¼ RCOA
t − RCOA
ti ð5Þ
where RCOA = risk of the top event occurrence taking into account
t
the basic event Xi, (%); and RCOA = risk of the top event occurrence
ti
without taking into account the basic event Xi (%). The basic event
for which the greatest value of the fuzzy weighted indicator is ob-
tained is considered as the most important. After calculating FWI
values, it is also recommended to mark in bold any relevant critical
events in the hybrid FFT and RMM in order to focus particular
attention to choose proper risk management strategies for them.
Risk Treatment
The process of selecting and implementing of various measures to
lower or modify risk is called risk treatment. Its proper preparation
and execution is vital for the success of the risk management pro-
cess. In the proposed risk management methodology, four types of
risk treatment were analyzed: risk retention (absorption), risk trans-
fer, risk elimination (avoidance), and risk reduction.
Risk retention is connected with accepting the risk’s consequen-
ces and is generally divided into passive and active acceptance. Pas-
sive risk retention concerns documenting of the risk existence. In
such a case, the contractors take responsibility for all consequences
connected with unwanted events’ occurrence. Active risk retention
is also about documenting the risk’s existence, but in this case,
© ASCE 04020034-5
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contingency plans are prepared, including scenarios for the actions
to be taken should the unwanted event ever occur. It can be also
applied for residual risk that remains after risk reduction.
The consequences of risk can be also either shared with or to-
tally carried out by someone other than an owner. This is called risk
transfer. Such an action requires the existence of a party who will be
willing to bear the risk. The most common form of risk transfer is
transferring risk to insurance companies, which is typical for a risk
with very low probability of occurrence and significant consequen-
ces. The insurance premium grows with the increase of the risk of
an unwanted event’s occurrence. This form of risk treatment can be
applied to the residual risk that remains after risk reduction.
It is important not to limit the risk management strategy to a
fatalistic approach. That is why the proposed approach to risk man-
agement is not oriented in the belief in the inevitability of events but
also considers risks in a more proactive manner, which is also based
on holistic approaches. That is why the proposed approach is
mainly focused on effective action through the analysis of the po-
tential risks and measures to reduce their causes or consequences,
as well as risk elimination.
Risk reduction assumes the removal of one or more causes of the
risk, one or more consequences of the risks, or both the risk causes
and consequences. It is vital to adjust the most appropriate method
of risk reduction to the nature of risk by checking whether the result
or the cause is dominant in the considered risk.
Risk elimination refers to undertaking such actions so that risk is
no longer present (e.g., giving up the project or choosing a different
design option). It is advised to apply it to risks with both a high
probability of occurrence and very serious consequences, espe-
cially in the cases when risk retention, reduction, and transfer are
not appropriate at a reasonable costs.
Thanks to the application of a hybrid FFT and risk response ma-
trix, it is possible for each analyzed basic event to check what types
of risk treatment strategies are available and how many actions (s)
from each group are possible to apply for a particular basic event
Xi. Some of the risk treatment strategies are dedicated for, e.g., plas-
tic pipes, steel pipes, or steering systems sensitive to interferences,
for example. That is why it is recommended to consider the ana-
lyzed HDD project specificity and take into consideration only
those actions that may concern it.
The hybrid FFT and RRM also one allows to assign to a given
unwanted event Xi the number of chosen risk treatment strategies
(t) of a given type (passive and active risk retention, risk transfer,
risk elimination, and risk cause or effect reduction). In the last col-
umn of the RMM, there is a calculated comprehensive indicator
illustrating the
Q possibility of lowering the risk level for a given
basic event z∈Z wzXi . Such a combination of methods enables a
holistic view of all unwanted events by presenting dependencies
occurring among them and the possibilities of reacting to the risk
for each event. On a separate sheets of a hybrid FFT and RMM, it is
recommended to analyze several alternatives of risk management
strategies and choose the most relevant one.
Tables 2–5 present all identified risk treatment possibilities for
individual basic and undeveloped events. Some of the risk response
options assigned to the individual basic events can be used alter-
natively, whereas for the others, it would be favorable to use them
in combination. Risk response options are grouped according to
holistic (risk elimination, risk cause reduction, and risk effect re-
duction) or fatalistic (active and passive risk retention and risk
transfer) risk management approach. For each suggested action, it
is needed to state in which phase of the investment realization it
should be introduced and the party responsible for its implemen-
tation. Some of the risk response options listed in Tables 2–5 have
already been selectively used in good HDD projects in highly
J. Constr. Eng. Manage.
 Table 2. Proposed risk remediation strategies for the problems with management class and their risk reduction coefficients rgXi
Symbol Risk remediation strategy rgXi
CR(X1)a, CR(X2)a Checking the correctness of the designer’s calculations and designed alignment using the 0.60
appropriate computer programa
CR(X1)b Selection of a proven design company with references from previous similar projects 0.70
CR(X3)a Proper choice of protective coating for the steel pipesb 0.70
CR(X3)b Using pipelines with increased resistance to stress cracking or with an additional external 0.70
protective coatingc
CR(X3)c Using fiber-cement coating for ductile iron pipelinesd 0.70
ER(X3)a Using secondary steel pipe insulation made of epoxy resins and fibreglass 0.80
CR(X13)a Appropriate preparation of the work schedule 0.70
CR(X18)a Choosing a contractor with experience in carrying out a similar project and references 0.70
CR(X18)b Certified specialist training for the contractor’s employees 0.70
CR(X18)c Appropriate supervision and highly specialized consulting at the construction site 0.60
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CR(X18)d Use of drilling rigs with full automation of the process to avoid operator’s mistakes 0.70
CR(X18)e Use of contact grouting to block potential seepage paths of the drilling fluide 0.65
CR(X18)f Filling the annular space (after the installation of electric cables) with the thermal cement 0.80
mortar to avoid overheating of the cable during power transmission at high voltage
CR(X18)g Applying augmented reality in horizontal directional drilling project to increase the drill 0.90
rig operator’s awareness of underground utilitiesf
ER(X18)a Use of breakaway swivels in order to avoid deformation of the pulled pipe caused by 0.60
applying too high pulling force
ER(X18)b Application of strain gauge to measure the stress that the pipe is subjected to during the 0.80
installation
ER(X18)c Warranty deposit that is gradually deducted from each part of the contractor’s 0.80
remuneration as a means of securing the owner
ER(X18)d Applying poroscope to check the condition of the pipe’s insulation during the pullback 0.60
CR(X19)a Selection of certified suppliers and materials 0.70
ER(X19)a Applying poroscope to check the condition of the pipe’s insulation during the pullback 0.70
CR(X22)a Choosing the right type of contractf 0.80
CR(X22)b Risk sharing between the contractor and ownerg 0.70
CR(X22)c Collaborative partneringh 0.60
RT-P (X1, X3, X13, X18, X19, X22)a Documenting of the risk existence 1.00
CR(X1)c, CR(X2)b, CR(X3)d, CR(X18)h, Applying alternative project delivery methods (APDM) such as construction manager at 0.70
CR(X19)b, CR(X22)d risk (CMAR)i
Note: CR = reduction of the risk cause; ER = reduction of the risk effect; TR = risk transfer; EL = risk elimination; RT-A = active risk retention; and RT-P =
passive risk retention.
a
Example computer programs were presented by Wiśniowski et al. (2004), Deltares (2019), and Plastic Pipe Institute (2008).
b
Some practical guidelines have been given by Pedrazza (2011) and Willoughby (2005).
c
In the case of applying plastic pipes.
d
Some practical guidelines have been given by Ertelt (2011).
e
Some guidelines have been given by Bennett and Ariaratnam (2008).
f
Some guidelines have been given by Fenais et al. (2018).
g
Some practical guidelines have been given by Willoughby (2005).
h
Some practical guidelines have been given by Hallager and Hald (2009).
i
Some practical guidelines have been given by Francom et al. (2016).

developed countries. Still, their selective application without being
based on a complete risk management strategy tailored to the HDD
project is not adequate and can lead to omitting other important
actions having a significant impact on the project risk level.
The RMM can be developed to a higher level of detail for indi-
vidual basic events. It is recommended to extend it in particular for
critical events. In the extended RMM, in the place of the number of
available and chosen risk treatment strategies (s and t), the risk re-
duction factors uzXi and wzXi are introduced. They are obtained for a
given number of available and chosen risk treatment strategies for
each type of risk response strategy from the set Z. It allows one
to clearly show how each type of risk treatment from the set Z in-
fluences the basic event risk level, which was previously calculated
using FFT. Further development of the matrix allows one to see how
the integration of different types of risk treatment strategies from the
set Z [e.g., active risk retention (RT-A) and risk elimination (EL)]
affects the value of the risk reduction factor for the analyzed un-
wanted event. This is helpful when assessing the desirability of
undertaking various types of risk response strategies for the analyzed
basic events. It is particularly important in the case of critical events
for which risk treatment should be carried out especially carefully.
Fig. 3 presents the integration of FFT with the extended RMM on the
example of MIDI HDD installation in Australia for one of the critical
events (X17).
In order to develop the extended RMM, it is needed to use
Eqs. (6)–(11). The vector of risk reduction factors for the basic
event Xi from the set of all types of risk treatment strategies Z
is defined by
!
rzXi ¼ ½rz1Xi ; rz2Xi ; : : : ; rzhði;zÞXi  ð6Þ
where z ∈ Z hði; zÞ = function that returns the number of all risk
response strategies for a given basic event Xi.
The vector of the chosen risk reduction factors for the basic event
Xi for a given type of risk treatment strategies (z) is defined by
!
czXi ¼ ½cz1Xi ; cz2Xi ; : : : ; czhði;zÞXi  ð7Þ

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 Table 3. Proposed risk remediation strategies for the problems with the machines class and their risk reduction coefficients rgXi
Symbol Proposed risk remediation strategy rgXi
CR(X4)a Identification of a disturbance sourcea 0.90
CR(X4)b Temporarily disabling the source of interferencesa 0.80
ER(X4)a Making offset measurements or using a special strong transmitter or a transmitter with a different operating frequencya,b 0.90
ER(X4)b Appropriate drilling procedures in the case of lack of ability to steer the drilling tools (no reaction to steering)c 0.80
ER(X4)c Use of a rope with blocks for positioning the pontoon while tracking the broadcast probe under rivers with a strong 0.90
currenta
CR(X4)c Application of devices to damp vibrations during drilling in rocks (vibration-dampening isolators, stabilizers) 0.80
CR(X4)d Use of lithium batteries with longer operating hoursa 0.90
CR(X4)e Use of transmitters double-insulated with fibreglass to prevent overheating when drilling in abrasive soil or rock 0.90
CR(X4)f Application of spiders to prevent breakage of the probe’s power cabled 0.80
CR(X4)g Use of cables with a suitable protective jacket, e.g., cross-linked high heat water resistant insulated wired,e 0.80
CR(X4)h Using stabilizers to make sure the reamer does not drill out the hole 0.80
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EL(X4)a Use of a gyroscopic system, especially in the areas with strong magnetic disturbances and limited access to the area 0.60
above the crossing, also if the terrain prevents the distribution of surface grids of the loop system
CR(X5-12)a Conducting regular inspection of the drilling tools and equipment as well as drilling tools and equipment prestart checks 0.75
CR(X5-12)b Proper maintenance of drilling tools and equipment 0.75
ER(X6)d Use of new generation drilling rigs with displayed error messages and a possible remote machine diagnostics on site 0.80
CR(X7)c Use of mud motor components that have elastomeric elements for only one downhole trip due to the content of oils, 0.80
diesel, and other organic fluid additives making the predictable run life of the elastomeric elements difficult to determine
RT-A(X5-12)a Having basic spare parts/additional rented mud motor/drill rig/support rollers on the construction site, the presence of a 0.75
competent mechanic on the construction site
RT-A(X5)b, RT-A(X7)b Performing a trench or withdrawing tools from the borehole 0.90
RT-P(X4-12)a Documenting of the risk existence 1.00
Note: CR = reduction of the risk cause; ER = reduction of the risk effect; TR = risk transfer; EL = risk elimination; RT-A = active risk retention; and RT-P =
passive risk retention.
a
In the case of using steering systems sensitive to interferences.
b
In the case when the measurement vertically above the transmitter is very difficult or impossible to perform.
c
Some guidelines have been given by Willoughby (2005).
d
In the case of wireline systems.
e
Some guidelines have been given by Bennett and Ariaratnam (2008).

The auxiliary vector used for calculating the total risk reduction Risk Register
factor for the basic event Xi for a given type of risk treatment strat-
During the third stage of risk management, it is necessary to prepare
egies (z) is defined by
a dynamic document used for recording risk management process for
!
0z 0z 0z 0z
all the identified risks, which will facilitate ownership and manage-
rXi ¼ ½r1Xi ; r2Xi ; : : : ; rhði;zÞXi  ð8Þ ment of each unwanted basic event. Such a risk register can be stored
as a document held on a computer or on a database. A risk register

rzgXi ; czgXi ¼ 1 should include risk event symbol, its description, probability of oc-
0z
hði;zÞ
∧g¼1 rgXi ¼ ð9Þ currence, consequences, party responsible for risk treatment, and
1; czgXi ¼ 0 chosen risk treatment strategies’ symbols and descriptions. In addi-
tion to this, it is important to document the occurrence of individual
The total risk reduction factor for the available risk treatment emergency events that happened during the analyzed HDD installa-
strategies of a given type for the basic event Xi is defined by tion and describe in detail developed contingency plans (even if they
8Q are additional and do not seem to be needed at the moment) and the
< hði;zÞ rz !
g¼1 gXi j rzXi j ≠ 0 plan for the maintenance of drilling machines and tools. A risk regis-
uzXi ¼ ð10Þ
: ! ter needs to be updated regularly and should be an indispensable item
1; j rzXi j ¼ 0 in any HDD project management meeting.

The total risk reduction factor for the chosen risk treatment strat-
egies of a given type for the basic event Xi is defined by Risk Monitoring and Review
8Q The fourth stage of risk management in HDD technology is risk
< hði;zÞ r 0z j ! rzXi j ≠ 0 monitoring and review. During this stage, corrections should be
g¼1 gXi
wXi ¼
z
ð11Þ made and the risk analysis method used should be updated. The
: !
1; j rzXi j ¼ 0 risk analysis model should take into account technological advan-
ces in HDD technology and new drilling devices and machines
Several combinations of introducing risk response strategies launched on the market. Additional newly discovered risk factors
should be considered, especially for critical events and events with should also be taken into account.
relatively high FWI. The calculations of the top event occurrence
RCOA
t should be repeated taking into consideration the values of risk
Risk Financing
reduction coefficients (rgXi ) for the chosen risk treatment actions,
and the most favorable alternative should be chosen. It is also ad- In the fifth stage of risk management in HDD technology, the sour-
vised to compare the risk level of the basic events before and after ces of risk financing should be defined. A financial reserve should
risk treatment. be provided in the company’s budget to cover the costs related to

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 Table 4. Proposed risk remediation strategies for the basic events from the geotechnical problems class and their risk reduction coefficients rgXi
Symbol Proposed risk remediation strategy rgXi
CR(X14)a Carrying out literature research, gathering historical data, interviewing residentsa 0.90
CR(X14)b Balancing geotechnical survey costs with the risk reduction levelb 0.90
CR(X14)c Selection of a proven, certified company conducting geotechnical investigations 0.90
CR(X14)d Using several methods of locating underground urban infrastructure (for urban and postindustrial areas) 0.70
CR(X14)e Carrying out proper geotechnical tests adjusted to the specificity of the projecta,c,d 0.70
CR(X14)f Proper interpretation of the results of geotechnical surveyd 0.90
CR(X14)g Carrying out a trial drilling (for MAXI HDD installations) 0.70
CR(X14)h Exposing and monitoring the existing underground infrastructure located close to the HDD alignment 0.80
CR(X14)I Applying augmented reality to increase the drill rig operator’s awareness of underground utilitiese 0.90
TR(X14)a Use of the baseline geotechnical report and risk transfer record in the contract (for MIDI and MAXI HDD installations)f 0.80
TR(X14)b Contract entry for extra compensation due to differing site conditionsg 0.80
EL(X14-17)a Change in the HDD alignment 0.60
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RT-A(X14)a Emergency procedures for a utility strike 0.90

RT-P(X14-17)a Documenting of the risk’s existence 1.00
CR(X15)a Using the proper composition of drilling fluid (e.g., with the addition of sodium carboxymethylcellulose and 0.65
long-chain polymers, based on the combination of polymers with farinaceous clay, or with polymers and fibrous
materials)h
CR(X15)b, CR(X17)c Using a casing pipe to protect the first hole section 0.60
CR(X15)c, CR(X17)d Using the cuttings transport injected with pulsed drilling fluidj 0.70
ER(X15)a Assisting pipe pullback using pipe ramming 0.80
ER(X15)b Assisting pipeline pullback using pipe thruster 0.80
ER(X15)c Applying proper drilling proceduresi 0.80
ER(X15)d Assisting the pipeline pullback using additional drill rig 0.80
ER(X15)e Grouting of the borehole and retrying a product pipe installation 0.80
EL(X15)b Using a drilling fluid reverse circulation system (DFRCS)k 0.80
RT-A(X15)a Contingency plan: product pipe removal using pipe ramming 0.90
RT-A(X15)b Contingency plan: recovery of the drill string using a pneumatic impact device 0.90
RT-A(X15)c Contingency plan: using the pipe thruster device to extract the jammed pipeline 0.90
RT-A(X15)d, RT-A(X16)a Contingency plan: assisting the pipeline removal using additional drill rig 0.90
CR(X16)a Proper assessment of the ground swelling potential combined with the application of drilling fluid with the addition of 0.60
clay inhibitors if requiredl
ER(X16)a Using a pressure module to obtain precise information about the current bottom pressure under static conditions and 0.80
during circulation in the borehole
RT-A (X16)a Contingency plan: using a hydraulic knife to cut the stuck pipeline and save expensive drilling tools 0.90
RT-A(X16)c Contingency plan: drill string or product pipe recovery applying a rescue tool 0.90
CR(X17)a Using a proper drilling fluid composition (a mixture of water and farinaceous clay, with the addition of 0.40–0.60
long-chain polymers, with appropriate additives)h
CR(X17)b Using special drilling fluid system dedicated to achieve long-term rheological stability in the presence of salts, acid 0.65
gases, and soluble calciumm
ER(X17)a Carrying out the calculations of the maximum allowable pressure and the minimum required downhole pressure and 0.80
using relief wells if needed
ER(X17)b Carrying out the calculations of the maximum allowable pressure and the minimum required downhole pressure and 0.80
using piezometers if needed
ER(X17)c Using a pressure module to obtain precise information about the current bottom pressure under static conditions and 0.80
during circulation in the borehole
RT-A(X17)a Contingency plan: observation and removal of the drilling fluid from the terrain surface 0.90
Note: CR = reduction of the risk cause; ER = reduction of the risk effect; TR = risk transfer; EL = risk elimination; and RT-A = active risk retention.
a
Some guidelines have been given by Bennett and Ariaratnam (2008).
b
Some guidelines have been given by van Staveren (2007) and US Subcommittee on Geotechnical Site Investigations (1984).
c
Some guidelines have been given by Donovan and Hanford (2012) and Gelinas and Mathy (2004).
d
Some guidelines have been given by Strater et al. (2006).
e
Some guidelines have been given by Fenais et al. (2018).
f
Some guidelines have been given by Staheli and Maday (2009).
g
Some guidelines have been given byWilloughby (2005).
h
Some guidelines have been given by Ariaratnam et al. (2004) and Bayer (2005).
i
Some guidelines have been given by Willoughby (2005).
j
Some guidelines have been given by Han et al. (2010).
k
Some guidelines have been given by Wei et al. (2011) and Kong, Y. and Ma, B., “Inside jet flow method for cuttings removal in HDD,” China Patent
No. 103527092 B (2015).
l
Some guidelines on indication of shrink-swell potential were presented by Naval Facilities Engineering Command (1986).
m
Some guidelines have been given by MI SWACO (2019).

carrying out the risk management process in the organization (fees the losses of an organization after unwanted events occurrence: in-
for a group of experts assessing risk levels or risk manager, among surance, captive insurance, contingency reserves, internal or exter-
others). Moreover, one or a combination of the following measures nal funds, cash borrowings from external borrowings, and financial
could be applied to ensure the economic provision of funds to cover reinsurance.

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 Table 5. Proposed risk remediation strategies for the basic events from the
problems with the environment class and their risk reduction coefficients rgXi
Symbol Proposed risk remediation strategy rgXi
CR(X20)a Making a photographic documentation of existing 0.90
elements of terrestrial infrastructure
CR(X20)b Using drilling rigs with a noise reduction system 0.80
CR(X20)c Conducting the works not during the breeding 0.90
period of birds
CR(X20)d Obtaining the required permits before the 0.80
construction starts
CR(X21)a Using weather forecasts and warnings from the 0.80 Fig. 4. Membership function for the probability of the basic events
Institute of Meteorology and Water Management
occurrence for the maxi HDD project in Australia (Experts group 7).
CR(X21)b Using a protective cover for plastic pipelines (in 0.80
the case of low temperatures)
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CR(X21)c Using a special construction protecting the 0.80

welding machine or welder from rain, snow and
wind
CR(X21)d Using a special construction protecting the 0.80
equipment in winter
CR(X21)e Earlier preparation of the equipment 0.90
ER(X21)a Conducting works on a continuous basis 0.70
RT-A(X21)a Contingency plan: evacuation plan in the case of 0.90
severe weather conditions
RT-P(X20-21)a Documenting of risk existence 1.00
Note: CR = reduction of the risk cause; ER = reduction of the risk effect;
TR = risk transfer; EL = risk elimination; RT-A = active risk retention; and
RT-P = passive risk retention.
Example of Application
The practical application of the proposed risk management model
for HDD projects was carried out on 22 examples, which allowed
for integration of professional experiences and feedback from vari-
ous countries, such as Australia, Mexico, Thailand, Poland, and the
Netherlands. In this paper, the application of the proposed risk
management model is shown on one example. The analyzed midi
HDD in Queensland State, Australia, was connected with installa-
tion of a 250-mm steel multiproduct pipeline in rural area over a
distance of 1,300 m, with maximal depth of 27 m. Ground condi-
tions included mix of sands, gavel, and clay in a nonuniform mix.
Paratrack II was applied for steering.
The linguistic terms assessing fuzzy probability of the identified
basic events occurrence that were obtained from the group of HDD
specialists assuming applying only passive risk retention strategies
or no risk remediation strategies are shown in Fig. 2. The member-
ship function for the probability of the basic events occurrence,
which was developed for the seventh group of experts for the maxi
HDD project in Australia, is shown in Fig. 4.
For the analyzed projects, two alternatives of risk treatment
strategies were compared. In the first alternative, it was assumed
that only passive risk retention (documenting risk existence) would
be applied. The second alternative included the most relevant risk
response strategies, and they were finally applied by the contractor.
The risk response strategies that were finally applied by the con-
tractor in the Australian HDD project are presented Q in Table S1.
The total values of the risk reduction coefficients z∈Z wzXi for
all the identified events are shown in Fig. 2.
Table 6 presents the fuzzy risks connected with the basic events’
occurrence for the midi HDD project in Australia. They were cal-
culated from Eq. (1), assuming taking no risk remediation strategies
Q
( z∈Z wzXi ¼ 1). In order to carry out those calculations, it was re-
quired to read the basic events’ probabilities from the membership
function (Fig. 4) from the left and right side for various membership
grades α with a step k ¼ 0.05. Due to the ampleness of the results,
only chosen results for membership grades α 0, 0.5, and 1.0 are
presented in Table 6.
Sensitivity analysis was carried out in order to measure the
share of each of the basic events leading to the occurrence of the
unwanted top event, as well as to identify critical events for each
project. The values of the FWI were calculated for all the basic
and underdeveloped events from Eq. (5). In the case of the HDD
project in Australia, X16 and X17 were the critical events that in
particular should be a subject to risk treatment: FWIX16 ¼ 5.55%
and FWIX17 ¼ 1.37%.
The distribution of the fuzzy risk connected with the top event
occurrence for the MIDI HDD project in Australia (Specialist
group 7) is shown in Fig. 5. It was created for two alternatives after
calculating the risk of the top event occurrence for various member-
ship grades with the step k from Eq. (3). It clearly illustrates the risk
reduction for the top event.
The crisp risk connected with the top event occurrence of each
of the analyzed HDD projects was calculated applying the center of
area method from Eq. (4). The top event probability for Alternative
1 was 97.22%, and for Alternative 2, it was 75.94%.

Fig. 3. Integration of the FFT with the extended RMM for the example of midi HDD installation in Australia for one of the critical events.

© ASCE 04020034-9 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

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 Table 6. Fuzzy risk connected with the basic events occurrence for MIDI HDD project in Australia for various membership grade values
Fuzzy risk of the basic event occurrence (%)
X1, X4, X5, X6, X7,
X8, X9, X10, X11, X13, X14, X15,
X2, X3 X19, X20 X18, X19, X21, X22 X17 X16
Membership
grade (αjk ) Rg
Xiaα Rg
Xidα Rg
Xiaα Rg
Xidα Rg
Xiaα Rg
Xidα Rg
Xiaα Rg
Xidα Rg
Xiaα Rg
Xidα
jk jk jk jk jk jk jk jk jk jk

0.00 0.00 6.00 2.00 16.00 11.00 35.00 30.00 72.00 52.00 100.00
0.50 0.00 4.00 4.00 13.50 13.50 32.50 32.50 62.00 62.00 100.00
1.00 0.00 2.00 6.00 11.00 16.00 30.00 35.00 52.00 72.00 100.00

stakeholders engaged in the project. It is important to stress that

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risk analysis complements risk management. Both are desired

Fig. 5. Distribution of the fuzzy risk connected with the top event
occurrence for the midi HDD project in Australia for two alternative
configurations of risk response strategies.
It is important to verify the risk management results by compar-
ing the calculated basic event risks and top event risk level with the
project run. Both analyzed installations were completed success-
fully. In the case of the HDD project in Australia, introducing risk
treatment early in the project allowed for quick reactions to un-
wanted event occurrence. Thanks to proper assessment of the
ground swelling potential combined with the application of drilling
fluid with the addition of clay inhibitors [CR(X16)a] and monitor-
ing bottom pressure [ER(X16)a], it was possible to notice even mi-
nor swelling of the clay and react quickly and effectively by
increasing the inhibition concentration in the drilling fluid. Thanks
to carrying out the right risk assessment, the contractor was pre-
pared for it because the risk of this event occurrence was assessed
as very high and the value of FWI for this event was very significant
(FWIX16 ¼ 5.55%). All in all, the HDD project in Australia was
completed without any problems.
The author also applied the proposed risk management model
(with risk treatment strategies presented in Tables 2–5) for 21 other
HDD projects. In the cases when all recommended risk treatment
strategies were introduced, the projects were carried out without
any significant problems. The successful HDD projects verified the
correctness of the proposed risk management model. Furthermore,
in those HDD projects where not all recommended risk manage-
ment strategies were introduced, a visible convergence was noticed
between the critical events identified during risk assessment and
real unwanted events that occurred during the installations. This
also confirms the correctness of the proposed risk management
model.
Conclusions
The presented risk management model aims to give a helping hand
to all HDD professionals and managers who have the motivation
to create attainable and successful HDD projects that benefit all
and can be blended into a modern framework based on proactive
and holistic approaches, such as presented in the proposed model. It
is vital to emphasize that any risk management system cannot be a
100% guarantee that nothing wrong will happen during the project.
There is also a residual risk that remains after implementing the
proposed most-recommended risk management strategy. However,
applying the proposed model allows one to reduce the foreseeable
failures in HDD projects.
The application of the proposed risk management model based on
the hybrid fuzzy fault tree and risk response matrix allows for effec-
tively reducing the risk of basic events’ occurrence and provides a
remarkable reduction of the risk of the top event’s occurrence. De-
pending on a chosen configuration of the proposed 147 risk treat-
ment strategies, various risk reduction values can be reached for a
particular basic event Xi. In the presented HDD project, introducing
the risk management model allowed for a reduction in Q the basic
events’ riskQof occurrence from 28% up to 88% ( z∈Z wzXi ¼
0.72 up to z∈Z wzXi ¼ 0.12). It resulted in a reduction of the risk
of the top event’s occurrence by 21.28% in the case of full imple-
mentation of the proposed risk management strategy for the HDD
installation in Australia.
Application of this model enables a better understanding of fail-
ure mechanisms and allows one to compare various alternatives of
risk treatment strategies in order to choose the most favorable one.
Although it is recommended to start the risk management process
early in a project, this risk management model is versatile, and even
if it had not been introduced at the beginning of the project (fea-
sibility study), it can be also applied at later stages of the HDD
project (design, construction, or even during reconstruction if the
first construction attempt failed).
In the analyzed 22 HDD projects, there were some cases in
which not all recommended risk treatment strategies for a particular
critical event Xi were finally introduced by the contractor or de-
signer. In such cases, a convergence was perceived between the
critical events identified during risk assessment and real unwanted
events that occurred during the HDD installations. This confirms
the correctness of the risk assessment and the need to introduce
all the recommended risk treatment strategies. All in all, the appli-
cation of the proposed risk management model in the 22 analyzed
HDD projects allowed sufficient quality of those projects to be
achieved with higher probability and proved to be an effective tool
for responding to today’s HDD construction challenges.
The limitation for the proposed approach is the need to involve
HDD experts who define risk levels in the risk assessment step. Par-
ticular care needs to be taken with the proper choice of the experts,
because years of experience in HDD projects of a particular size,
expertise, and practical skills are required. They need to be familiar-
ized with the factors determining the risk level for all identified
events. Moreover, it is important to create separate a membership

© ASCE 04020034-10 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2020, 146(5): 04020034

 function for each group of experts, which reflects the way in which
they understand the certain term (e.g., low risk). The author is cur-
rently working on a new model, in which the need to involve experts
will be eliminated.
Data Availability Statement
Some or all data, models, or code generated or used during the
study are available from the corresponding author by request, in-
cluding a Microsoft Excel sheet with risk analysis and evaluation
before and after risk treatment.
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Supplemental Data
Table S1 is available online in the ASCE Library (www
.ascelibrary.org).
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