WWW.NGOSAFETY.

ORG

INSO SYRIA
Q U A R T E R LY R E P O R T
1 July - 30 September | Q3 2019

INSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity
conducted or omitted on the basis of this report.
Stichting International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) CONFIDENTIAL - NGO use only
registered 17 January 2019, non-profit Foundation (ANBI)
No copy, forward or sale
in the Netherlands, KvK 73728489 at Hague Humanity
Hub, Fluwelen Burgwal 58, ‘s-Gravenhage, 2511-CJ, © INSO 2019
Netherlands
S U M M A RY & A S S E S S M E N T
The third quarter of 2019 (hereafter Q3 2019) opened as the government of Syria (GoS) continued a renewed ground campaign
in the North. As it closed, the potential for a second large-scale military intervention in Syria, led by Turkey, loomed in the East. A
total of 6,639 conflict driven security incidents were recorded across Q3 in all. Although lower than the 7,486 incidents recorded
in Q2, conflict activity nonetheless remained higher than Q1 or in either quarter of the latter half of 2018.

The levels of recorded GoS and organised armed group (OAG) activity both fell from Q2. However, this belied the intensity of
fighting along Northern Syria frontlines and largely reflects the unilateral imposition by Russia of a ceasefire at the end of August
(although in practice far from a complete cessation) after GoS secured substantial territorial gains. Among the wider parties to
the Syria conflict, only activity by Kurdish forces (SDF/YPG) increased over Q2, while Islamic State (IS) activity decreased and that
of international military forces (IMF) remained largely unchanged.

As of the end of Q2, GoS’ resurgent offensive in Northern Syria, launched in April, had become characterised by an escalating
stalemate. GoS aerial and artillery bombardment was intensive, but advances on the ground mostly incremental in the face of
concerted OAG resistance. This stalemate was broken in Q3, with GoS seizing control in August of all that remained of OAG con-
trolled Northern Hama and securing significant advances in Southwest Idleb, including the town of Khan Shaykun. That Russia
imposed a ceasefire – and that it was largely sustained throughout September – reflects its continued political interest in not
alienating Turkey, which remains wary that a full-scale GoS offensive in Idleb would invite mass insecurity and displacement
along its border.

While conflict activity in Eastern Syria comparatively remained far lower than in the North, this masked mounting tensions be-
tween Turkey, the US and SDF. As of the time of writing – outside the period of this report – Eastern Syria has been convulsed by
stark changes in context after Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) launched a military offensive to challenge SDF control along the Turk-
ish-Syrian border. Turkey had long regarded growing SDF presence as a critical security threat and throughout July signalled that
it was prepared to launch unilateral action. In an attempt to forestall Turkish intervention, the US brokered an agreement to
establish a so-called safe zone. While appearing to reduce the risks of military confrontation after the agreement was announced
on 7 August, it soon became apparent that the US, SDF and Turkey had irreconcilable understandings of the dimensions of any
so-called safe zone and who would control it. As the flaws of the agreement were increasingly exposed towards the end of Q3, a
TAF offensive was not inevitable. However, in an abrupt reversal of US policy on 6 October, US President Trump abandoned
efforts at deterrence and on 9 October a TAF incursion began.

Insecurity in Southern Syria in Q3 also remained at low levels, though as in the East was equally not insignificant as OAGs contin-
ued to challenge GoS authority in Dar’a governorate. The South was also struck by a resurgence of Israeli airstrikes in an illustra-
tion of the potential impact on Syria of wider geopolitical tensions between Israel and Iran.

Against the backdrop of these developments, NGOs were adversely impacted by insecurity in 33 incidents across Q3, the largest
single proportion of which – ten – were the result of indiscriminate GoS and Russian aerial and artillery bombardment in Idleb.
How significantly NGOs are exposed to conflict activity along Idleb frontlines in Q4 will hinge in part on if the Russian ceasefire
introduced in September continues to hold. This relative lull may continue if GoS prioritises a response to the abrupt shifts in
context in the East. However, the possibility of renewed GoS efforts to advance, particularly towards the M5 highway, and with
them a re-escalation in airstrikes, cannot be discounted. Safety and access dynamics in Eastern Syria itself meanwhile have been
and will continue to be significantly reshaped as territorial control changes.

Ross Baillie
Director - INSO Syria
October 2019
The views expressed in this report remain the sole responsibility of the author.

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q3 2019 P a g e |2

I . T HE S TAT E O F T H E C O N F L I C T
1.1 CONFLICT ACTIVITY OVERVIEW
INSO, Figure 1: Conflict Activity by Actor and Quarter (Q3 2015 – Q3 2019)

18,942
319
257
1,078
16,226
480
2,795
366
14,245
1,282 14,112
328 261
13,441
341 393
12,437 12,808
2,606
1,058 12,223 851
1,286
11,562 11,288 846
259 907
530 1,647
2,175 405 1,340 584
1,046 541 10,159 1,116 364
628
553
745 897
620 1,030 700
1,844 2,311
1,342 685 1,497
1,503 7,780
1,377
783
296 7,486
1,125 518 120
14,493 625 6,639
448 399 118
5,540 1,067
766
11,492 1,527 275
10,343
10,960 267 4,748 845
643
387 4,136 234
8,544 8,529 8,421 8,168 8,439 642
8,007 896 416
330
6,946 604
824
401
4,991 5,275
733 4,635
3,347
2,718
1,982

Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

GOS OAG(s) IS SDF IMF

A total of 6,639 conflict driven security incidents were recorded across Q3. Although lower than the 7,486 incidents recorded in
Q2, conflict activity nonetheless remained higher than Q1 or in either quarter of the latter half of 2018 (see Figure 1).

Elevated conflict activity was driven in particular by the continuation of a renewed GoS ground campaign, launched in Q2, in the
Northwest (again, see Figure 1). That the pace of GoS and OAG operations fell from the previous quarter was in part a reflection
of a unilateral ceasefire imposed by Russia in September and belies the intensity of frontline fighting. Compared to Q2, in which
GoS advances were largely marginal, Q3 saw GoS secure a large swathe of territory, breaking what had been an escalating stale-
mate to overrun remaining areas of OAG control in Northern Hama and advancing into south-eastern Idleb to seize the town of
Khan Shaykun.

Only the activity of Kurdish forces was higher in Q3 than Q2, with SDF intensifying arrest operations of suspected IS and anti-SDF
spoiler group members in Ar-Raqqa and Al-Hasakeh governorates, while in Aleppo, YPG units escalated armed clashes with TAF
and OAGs along Tal Refaat frontlines and pro-YPG groups in Afrin and Euphrates Shield areas contributed to an unprecedented
level of IED attacks. IMF operations fell from Q2, but regional and international actors were nonetheless intrinsically linked to key

INSO, Figure 2: Conflict Activity by Governorate (Q4 2018 – Q3 2019)

2018 2019 Percentage Change Q2
Governorate/Region Difference Comparsion
Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 vs. Q3 2019

RURAL DAMASCUS SOUTH 266 85 78 112 44% 34

Between 25% than 50% growth
AL-HASAKEH EAST 209 209 220 286 30% 66
DAR'A SOUTH 158 166 177 187 6% 10 Less than 25% growth

LATTAKIA NORTH 214 188 603 601 0% -2

No Change
AR-RAQQA EAST 175 216 222 221 0% -1
QUNEITRA SOUTH 4 28 27 26 -4% -1
IDLEB NORTH 605 1055 2642 2531 -4% -111
More than 25% negative growth
ALEPPO NORTH 690 791 858 794 -7% -64
DEIR-EZ-ZOR EAST 1080 767 633 547 -14% -86
HAMA NORTH 598 1097 1889 1236 -35% -653 Between 25% and 50% negative growth

HOMS SOUTH 34 41 34 48 - 14
AS-SWEIDA SOUTH 33 24 13 14 - 1
DAMASCUS SOUTH 56 62 36 20 - -16 Low Conflict Activity

EASTERN HOMS EAST 14 16 51 16 - -35

TARTOUS NORTH 3 3 - -3
Total 4136 4748 7486 6639 -11% -847

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q3 2019 P a g e |4

INSO, Figure 3: Conflict Activity by Region and Actor (Q2 vs Q3 2019) developments, not least mounting tensions between the US, SDF
Turkey. As is now well-documented as of the time of writing, these
5976 tensions would subsequently lead to the beginning of a Turkish
124
offensive in Eastern Syria. However, this is beyond the scope of this
895 5147
47
205
1
report – which is focused solely on conflict activity in Q3. IS activity
672
was also lower, though far from insignificant, including increased
IED attacks in southern Al-Hasakeh.

Geographically, the North unsurprisingly accounted for the over-

4883 whelming majority of security incidents (see Figure 3). In a further
4222
indication of the intensity of fighting along Northwest frontlines,
1145
42
1085 incident volumes remained largely unchanged in Idleb governorate
57
501
365
561
407 (see Figure 2), even despite the Russian instigated ceasefire (which
389 269 118
121
51
162 230 143
55 270 in practice was never a complete cessation) throughout Septem-
EAST NORTH SOUTH EAST NORTH SOUTH
Q2 Q3 ber. Overall incident volumes were fractionally lower in the East
GOS OAG IS SDF IMF
than in Q2 (again, see Figure 3), though Deir-Ez-Zor and southern
Al-Hasakeh continued to be characterised by acute insecurity. The South saw a slight increase incidents, centred in particular on
Rural Damascus as GoS redoubled efforts to consolidate control around the capital through arrest operations, the seizure of
property and demining.

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q3 2019 P a g e |5

1 . 2 OV E R V I E W B Y R E G I O N
1.2.(1) North

GoS Advances in Idleb

The start of Q3 overlapped with the third month of a renewed GoS campaign in Idleb, launched in April. In the first two months
of the offensive, GoS gains were limited to a handful of communities in northern Hama (see Figure 6). By July GoS and Russia had
conducted 2496 aerial attacks. Although the airstrikes were dispersed across 30 sub-districts in northwest Syria, 88% of the
attacks were recorded in eight subdistricts (see Figure 7): Kafr Nobol, Khan Shaykun, Kafr Zeita, Kansaba, Heish, Madiq Castle,
Ehsem and Ma’arrat An Nu’man.

GoS’ attempts to advance on two fronts – (1) towards Kabani in northern Lattakia, and (2) from Kafr Nabutha towards Khan
Shaykhun – were hampered by robust OAG resistance and counterattacks behind GoS positions. This dynamic continued
throughout July, with both sides incurring heavy casualties and equipment losses. Despite the increase of conflict activity, Russia
and Turkey continued to reaffirm their commitment to a so-called demilitarised zone and, following the 13th round of Astana
talks on 01-02 August, Russia declared a unilateral ceasefire on 02 August.

By the end of the talks, no substantive outcomes addressing the situation in Idleb were reached. While shelling continued, no
airstrikes were observed until 05 August. However, on 05 August as reports of negotiations between Turkey and the US on the
principles of a potential safe zone in northeast Syria began to surface, the ceasefire in Northwest Syria was abruptly broken and
GoS subsequently made large territorial gains. In breaking the escalating stalemate that had prevailed at the end of Q2, GoS was
enabled by greater support from Russian and Iranian ground forces, a change in tactics in favour of operations at nightfall – uti-
lising night vision equipment unavailable to OAGs to outmanoeuvre them – and less coordinated and coherent OAG defence.
HTS in particular almost entirely withdrew its forces given the likelihood of heavy losses.

The renewed GoS offensive focused on control of Hbit town where OAGs established a blockade to prevent GoS from advancing
towards Khan Shaykhun. Hbit town was finally seized by GoS forces on 11 August. Concurrently GoS forces began approaching
Khan Shaykhun from the east by opening another front near Skik town.

By 19 August GoS forces cut the M5 highway north of Khan Shaykun, leaving the town and the remaining OAG territories of
northern Hama essentially under GoS control (see Figure 6). One of TAF’s 13 observation points – at Murak – proved inconse-
quential, as GoS forces advanced past it without engaging the Turkish troops stationed there. By August 30, GoS seized the last
major population centre (Tamanaah) in south east Idleb (see Figure 6), threatening to advance further along the M5 towards
Ma’arrat An Nu’man, which observed a stark increase in conflict activity after 17 August.

However, on 01 September, Russia declared another unilateral ceasefire – perhaps spurred by an incident in which demonstra-
tors breached the Turkish border. No further attempts to advance were made by GoS forces, with only 50 aerial attacks recorded
in September (see Figure 5). Shelling however continued unabated, with 75% of the attacks focused on Kafr Nobol, Heish,

INSO, Figure 5: GoS Activity by Week and Incident Type, Idleb and Northwest Frontlines, April to September 2019
800

700

203
600
204

500 204

148
193
159
400 176 117
130 99
152 151
138 74
300 132 85
135 145 120
103
60 19
164 98
26
200 230 91 381 6 26 115
29
302 308
53 268 253
235 52 215 175 167
100 202 189 202 184 182 189
149 139 156 166
119 20
96 91 92
60 0
0 1
3 3 27 21
0 0 1
0 1
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4
Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep

Airstrikes Barrel Bombs Direct and Indirect Fire

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q3 2019 P a g e |6

Kansaba, Ma’arrat An Nu’man and Ziyar sub-districts. That Russia instigated the ceasefire – even If in practice it was never a
complete cessation – demonstrates a desire not to alienate Turkey, which remains wary that GoS advances could invite mass
insecurity and displacement along its border. From a Turkish perspective, the breach caused by the demonstrators appeared to
validate this concern.

By the end of Q3, the ceasefire was still holding, although GoS offensive units remained mobilised along frontlines. The tempo of
the conflict in Northwest Syria in Q4 will primarily depend on arrangements between Russia and Turkey. With TAF having
launched a military offensive in Northeast Syria as of 9 October – outside of the period of this report – GoS and Russia will likely
refrain from committing to a renewed offensive in Northwest Syria in order to be positioned to capitalise on SDF vulnerability.
However, should the offensive resume, the M5 highway is assessed to be of immediate strategic importance to GoS and as such
communities along the route will likely be subject to increased aerial attacks and further displacement.

The humanitarian impact of the GoS offensive across Q2 and Q3 was high. By the end of August (and from April), GoS and Russia
had carried out over 4,681 aerial attacks (the vast majority involving multiple attacks) across 31 sub-districts, impacting 257 com-
munities in Northwest Syria. This led to displacement in excess of 500,000 people, mainly towards Northern Idleb. Over 35
health facilities were impacted by either airstrikes or indirect fire attacks, and damage to key social infrastructure was severe.
This included at least 18 schools, seven markets, and seven bakeries. Furthermore, large swathes of wheat fields were damaged
during the conflict, exacerbating food shortages and the price of bread.

HTS Unchallenged by Rival OAGs

As observed in previous GoS offensives, inter-OAG tensions in northwest Syria dropped significantly between Q2 and Q3. Inter-
OAG assassinations and IED attacks decreased by 75% from 53 incidents in Q2 to 13 incidents in Q3.

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q3 2019 P a g e |7

After securing almost complete territorial control in January at the expense of OAG rivals operating under the umbrella of the
National Liberation Front (NLF), the prospects of an open inter-OAG conflict between HTS and other factions was significantly
reduced. The events in January revealed that NLF was far from a unified bloc that could eventually challenge and quash HTS’
dominance in Northwest Syria.

But as the dominant group and de facto governing authority, HTS has increasingly become the primary focus of civilian resent-
ment over worsening conditions. This was highlighted in a series of anti-GoS demonstrations across Northwest Syria, where sev-
eral anti-HTS slogans were also openly displayed. Concurrently, a prominent ex-HTS commander released a three-minute video
on 09 September, accusing HTS of corruption and abuses of power.

These events prompted rumours of HTS fragmentation and collapse. However, this appeared unlikely as of the end of Q3. HTS
avoided a forceful approach to the demonstrations and reacted by organising counter pro-HTS demonstrations. In response to
the accusation of corruption, HTS arrested the journalist that released the video on his social media channel, but at the same
time publicly announced the formation of a ‘Supervisory Committee’ which would work on introducing reforms and reducing
corruption.

With no imminent direct threat from other OAGs, away from frontlines HTS has focused on community outreach. Throughout
the GoS offensive the HTS affiliated National Salvation Government (NSG) has run an extensive media campaign purporting to
highlight how its ministries were responding to the humanitarian needs of the newly arrived IDPs from Northern Hama. At the
end of Q3, the NSG even unveiled an ambitious housing project that would permanently accommodate large numbers of IDPs at
the border towns. HTS also directed its efforts at shoring up its ranks through a series of recruitment campaigns across North-
west Syria, frequently holding recruitment events at major population centres attended by prominent religious and military lead-
ers. Images from the events showed that the events were attended primarily by adolescent males who were recently displaced
as a result of the GoS offensive.

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q3 2019 P a g e |8

While the rumours of HTS collapse will nonetheless persist and some internal rifts almost certainly exist, HTS has used the pause
in GoS advances across September to consolidate its position in NW Syria and will likely remain the dominant OAG actor in Idleb
in Q4.

Insecurity in Northern Aleppo

The security environment in Northern Aleppo in Q3 remained volatile, both along frontlines and beyond them.

Tensions along Tal Refaat frontlines between the YPG and OAGs/TAF persisted, though neither side attempted to advance. Nota-
bly, the YPG initiated substantially more attacks compared to OAG/TAF (112 to 47). This was likely due to a combination of: (1)
with the GoS offensive in NW Syria, TAF and OAGs aimed at keeping the frontlines in Northern Aleppo stable; (2) the presence of
Russian forces at Tal Refaat, which limited the likelihood of a heavy OAG/TAF response and (3) amid continued rhetoric of a TAF
military incursion in the Northeast, the YPG was likely signalling to TAF that they were poised to retaliate by escalating attacks in
Northern Aleppo.

While very little change was observed in crime and assassination rates, IED attacks continued at an unprecedentedly high level
throughout Q3, increasing by 11% (see Figure 8). A total of 101 IED incidents (including seizures) meant that in Q3, IEDs became
a daily occurrence in Northern Aleppo, often with high numbers of civilian casualties. Authorship could not be verified beyond
doubt in most cases; however, pro-YPG cells and inter-OAG disputes were assessed to be the primary drivers behind the trend.

Throughout the year local security forces have introduced additional measures to stem the rate of IED attacks – including in-
creased surveillance, additional vetting at checkpoints, curfews and increased police visibility. In an attempt to retain public con-
fidence, local police forces under the National Army also intensified arrest operations across Q3 of suspected perpetrators,
which rose by 154% (see Figure 8). However, the cumulative impact so far has been minimal.

As an area that over which control has changed more than any other in the Syria conflict – between GoS, OAGs, IS and TAF –
security and local governance in Northern Aleppo has been and can be expected to remain fragmented, feeding insecurity. This
dynamic may be compounded further in Q4 by Turkey’s redeployment of a significant proportion of OAG factions in the National
Army as ground forces in its Northeast offensive, potentially leaving behind a security vacuum.

INSO, Figure 8: Insecurity in Northern Aleppo by Incident Type (Q2 vs Q3 2019)

200%

154%
150%

100%

56%
50%

11%
0%
-4% -8% -11%

-50% -42%

Indirect/Direct Fire Indirect/Direct Fire IEDs Assasinations Crime Demonstrations Arrests

(TAF/OAG initiated) (YPG initiated) (Attempts)

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q3 2019 P a g e |9

1.2.(2) East

Tensions along the Turkish – Syria border and a so-called safe zone

At the time of writing – outside of the period of this report – Eastern Syria has been convulsed by a series of stark changes in
context. After US President Trump abruptly abandoned US efforts at deterrence, on 9 October Turkish Armed Forces (TAF)
launched a military offensive to challenge SDF control along the Turkish-Syrian border.

Tensions along the border resurfaced in July. In a show of

force, TAF visibly mobilised, accompanied by public state-
ments from Turkish President Erdogan that Turkey was pre-
paring to launch military action. This escalation was far from
unprecedented and tension had mounted to similar levels at
several points previously, including January 2018 when TAF
initiated 68 cross border fire attacks on SDF positions – more
than had been recorded in the entire year prior. Turkey has
long viewed the expanding zone of SDF control in Eastern
Syria as a critical security threat, making no distinction be-
tween Kurdish Self Administration security forces (the YPG
and SDF) and the PKK – the latter an internationally pro-
scribed armed group that was originally founded with the
aim of forging an independent Kurdish state within Turkey.

That the SDF became the US’ ground partner in its anti-IS campaign in Syria created a paradox. Turkey – as a member of NATO –
and the SDF were key US allies. Yet their interests – the SDF in seeking autonomy in Syria and Turkey in confronting it – were
diametrically opposed. This tension has been at the centre of deteriorating relations between Washington and Ankara and was

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q3 2019 P a g e | 10

INSO, Figure 11: Targeted Attacks on SDF Personnel by District, Eastern Syria (Q2 vs Q3 2019)

125

84

65
61
57

44

33

20 21
15
8 10 10 10
7 6 6 7
3 3 3 1

DEIR-EZ-ZOR AL MAYADIN ABU KAMAL AL-HASAKEH QUAMISHLI RAS AL AIN AL-MALIKEYYEH AR-RAQQA ATH-THAWRAH TELL ABIAD AIN AL ARAB
DEIR-EZ-ZOR AL-HASAKEH AR-RAQQA ALEPPO

Q2 2019 Q3 2019

compounded in July by further signs of military cooperation between Turkey and Russia, not least the delivery to Turkey of a
Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile defence system. As a member of an alliance that was in essence established as a collective
defence mechanism against the Soviet Union, Turkey’s purchase of a Russian weapons system also represented something of a
paradox. In response to Turkey’s apparent drift from NATO, the US suspended Turkey’s participation in the F-35 fighter jet pro-
gramme, concerned that the deployment of the S400 system would allow Russia to gain sensitive data on aircraft that are to be
the backbone of future NATO air operations. Some elements of the US government also threatened economic sanctions, though
none materialised.

Against this wider backdrop, the US entered into negotiations with Turkey throughout July on proposals for a so-called safe zone
for Northeast Syria that it hoped would be sufficient to address Turkey’s security concerns and forestall unilateral Turkish mili-
tary action. Talks floundered over differing interpretations as to the length and breadth of the zone and who would control it.
Turkey insisted that the zone should extend along the full 480km of its border and 30km into Syria, terms that the SDF refused to
accept given that this would encompass several major population centres.

An agreement was eventually announced on 7 August. However, none of these fundamental points were resolved. A commu-
nique released by the US Embassy in Ankara gave three broad points of supposed consensus. First, the rapid implementation of
(unspecified) measures to address Turkey’s security concerns. Second, that the US and Turkey would establish a joint operations
centre to coordinate and manage the establishment of a safe zone. Third, that the safe zone would become what was labelled a
‘peace corridor’ and every effort made so that Syrians displaced to Turkey could return to Syria. The inclusion of the final point
appeared to have been at the behest of the Turkish government and most likely intended as a message for domestic political
audiences amid a worsening economy and growing hostility in some quarters towards Turkey’s Syrian refugee population.

Following the agreement, on 8 and 24 September US and Turkish forces conducted two joint military patrols within Northeast
Syria, as well as several aerial patrols. Yet these measures fell far short of Turkey’s expectations. Both patrols (see Figure 9), were
largely limited to short stretches of the border in Tell Abiad district, conspicuously avoided major population centres and lasted
only several hours before TAF crossed back into Turkey. In a speech at the UN General Assembly – coinciding with the second
joint patrol – President Erdogan again reiterated the position that a safe zone should extend along the full length of Turkey’s
border with Northeast Syria and 30km deep, allowing for the return (he claimed) of up to 2 million Syrian refugees.

Despite Turkey’s growing dissatisfaction with the implementation of the agreement, the US appeared unlikely to make further
concessions. Turkey’s proposal for the safe zone was irreconcilable with the interests of the SDF and from a US perspective
risked de-stabilising ongoing anti-IS operations – at this stage a key US priority. The so-called safe zone agreement in this sense
began to increasingly resemble the June 2018 Menbij roadmap. Controlled by SDF, Menbij district is similarly viewed by Turkey
as a security threat to its border. Under the agreement, the US and Turkey ostensibly agreed on a roadmap towards the with-
drawal of Kurdish influence from the area and a greater role for Turkey in local security and governance. Joint US and TAF patrols
were subsequently established. However, they remained confined to the outer limits of the district and only cosmetic changes

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q3 2019 P a g e | 11

INSO, Figure 12: IS Activity by District, Eastern Syria, (Q2 vs Q3 2019)

134

93
86 87

66

34 36
31
23
19
16
13

3 4 5
2 1 2 1 1 1

DEIR-EZ-ZOR AL MAYADIN ABU KAMAL AR-RAQQA ATH-THAWRAH TELL ABIAD AL-HASAKEH QUAMISHLI AL-MALIKEYYEH TADMOR AIN AL ARAB
DEIR-EZ-ZOR AR-RAQQA AL-HASAKEH EASTERN HOMS ALEPPO

Q2 2019 Q3 2019

were made to local governance – YPG advisers withdrew, but the SDF affiliated Menbij Military Council was unaltered.

While the fundamental paradox at the centre of the US’ relations with Turkey and the SDF, the legacy of the Menbij roadmap
and divergent understandings of the so-called safe zone may have meant that a breakdown in the agreement was inevitable, a
TAF offensive in Northeastern Syria was not. The US was in complete control of the airspace – access to which would be essential
in order for TAF to extend close air support to advancing ground forces. For as long as US troops were deployed along the bor-
der, the risk of direct confrontation was also prohibitively high. This changed abruptly when on 6 October President Trump an-
nounced in a phone call with President Erdogan that the US would no longer act to prevent TAF military action along the border,
in effect giving Turkey the strategic space needed to launch an offensive and abandoning US efforts at deterrence.

Targeted Attacks on SDF and IS activity

Beyond tensions with TAF, targeted attacks on SDF personnel remained a prevalent feature of the security landscape in Eastern
Syria across Q3. While a significant proportion of recorded incidents were instigated by IS authored, IS was far from the sole au-
thor, with other anti-SDF groups also active in conducting attacks (see Figures 11 & 12 for a comparison of attacks on SDF and IS
activity by district).

The largest volume of targeted attacks on SDF remained concentrated in Deir-Ez-Zor governorate (see Figures 10 & 11), where IS
also remained the most active. In contrast to Q2, Al-Hasakeh governorate saw the second largest concentration of attacks,
fuelled in particular by a sharp spike in IED detonations in Al-Hasakeh district. Whereas only eight IED attacks were recorded in
Q2, a total of 30 were recorded in Q3, the largest concentration of which centred upon Al-Hasakeh City (11) and in the vicinity of
the North line in Shadadah and Markada districts (which recorded 11 and six incidents respectively). The majority were assessed
to be IS authored in a potential indicator of increased IS presence and capability in the area, prompting SDF to launch an in-
creased number of search and arrest operations (see Figure 10). In Ar-Raqqa by contrast, and particularly Ar-Raqqa City, attacks
on SDF fell compared to Q2 (see Figure 11), likely as a result of increased SDF security measures – including the installation of
security cameras, new security checkpoints and a motorcycle ban – as well as the high profile arrest of a large IS cell in early Au-
gust.

Although it is possible that IS will seek to exploit conflict between SDF and TAF in Q4 to escalate attacks, this is far from certain.
The overall volume of IS activity in Q3 was actually lower than Q2 (falling from 399 incidents to 275) and having lost substantial
manpower in the US-backed SDF campaign of the past three years, is reliant on local support networks in areas where it has tra-
ditionally exercised presence and influence. IS activity will also not be solely focused on SDF, as demonstrated in Q3 by a signifi-
cant volume of IS activity in not just SDF, but also GoS controlled areas of Deir-Ez-Zor governorate’s Abu Kamal and Al-Mayadin
districts.

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q3 2019 P a g e | 12

1.2.(3) South

OAG activity in Dar’a

Despite being notionally reconciled to GoS authority for over a year (since June 2018), OAG activity remained a persistent chal-
lenge to GoS authority in Dar’a governorate across Q3.

A total of 101 OAG incidents were recorded in the governorate in all (see Figure 15). While scarcely different from the volume of
OAG activity documented in Q2, emerging shifts in OAG tactics were evident. In particular, Q3 recorded almost twice the num-
ber of OAG initiated IED attacks (up from 11 in Q2 to 21). Significantly, this included the first recorded BBIED attack in Dar’a since
May 2017 – detonated as GoS conducted a raid on a suspected OAG location. Q3 also witnessed the first recorded attack on
Russian personnel in Dar’a in recent record, when an IED detonated against a Russian military police convoy on the road be-
tween Dar’a and As-Sweida cities. Both incidents and the overall number of IED incidents appeared to point to steadily growing
OAG capabilities.

OAG activity was particularly evident in Dar’a and Mzeireb sub-districts (see Figure 13), where the Dar’a al-Balad and Tafas Cen-
tral Committees – essentially the local representative bodies of former OAGs – increasingly sought to challenge GoS control. Fur-
ther North in As Sanamayn, a stand-off continued between GoS and a local OAG calling itself Hizb ut-Tahrir that earlier in 2019
all but forced GoS to withdraw from the town.

Across these locations, violence was most evidently manifested in a cycle of retaliatory targeted attacks and assassinations (see
Figure 15). Critically, these attacks are not limited solely to between GoS and OAGs, but also between OAGs and Iranian militias
that have established a nascent presence in the southwest of the governorate.

Although OAG activity In Dar’a is assessed to remain localised – borne principally out of grievances over issues including lack of
public service provision and conscription, rather than a coordinated campaign governorate-wide – it serves cumulatively to un-
derscore the continued gaps in GoS authority. Since re-establishing control over Dar’a in June 2018, GoS has avoided a large-
scale military response to residual GoS activity. While the possibility that this will change in Q4 cannot be discounted, potentially

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q3 2019 P a g e | 13

INSO, Figure 14: Conflict Activity by Governorate and Actor (Q2 vs Q3 2019) in select areas such as Sanamayn, it
remains unlikely. With the bulk of its
fighting forces committed to North-
241 west frontlines, GoS is acutely aware
3 226
10
that it is already overstretched and
20 9
that a wider confrontation would risk
a spiral into renewed open conflict
109
101
with OAGs on a greater scale.
136
131 130

25 8
16
10 Resurgent Israeli Airstrikes
5
21 90 16 6
26
6
3
34
6 While core GoS territory in Central
51 54
76 41 5
Syria for the most part remained insu-
81 98 6
32 33 84
72 12 28
64 5 lated from OAG activity in Q3, signifi- 43
4
3 6
31 33
10
20
cant conflict activity was nonetheless
7
19 19

Dar'a As-Sweida Rural Damascus Homs Damascus Quneitra Dar'a As-Sweida Rural Damascus Homs Quneitra Damascus
Q2 present in the form of a resurgence in Q3

GOS Criminal OAG Other Druze Unknown IMF IS

Israeli airstrikes. There were nine Is-
raeli airstrikes in southern Syria across the quarter (see Figure 16), eight of which struck targets in Rural Damascus and one in
Homs. A further nine strikes were launched in Eastern Syria, all in areas of Deir Ez Zor bordering Iraq (principally Abu Kamal dis-
trict).

Although the strikes were consistent with established trends in targeting predominantly Hezbollah or Iranian militia facilities and
personnel, and were not unprecedented in volume (again, see Figure 16), they nonetheless marked a sharp increase over Q2. In
the space of the last week of August alone, Israel conducted five strikes across Southern and Eastern Syria. Suspected Israeli
strikes were also reported across the same period in Iraq and Lebanon in what appeared to be a potentially significant regional
escalation.

Israel was quick to take responsibility for several of the

INSO, Figure 15: OAG vs GoS targeted Attacks by Month, Dar’a Governorate (2019)
strikes, including one on 24 August on the outskirts of Da-
8

mascus that it claimed had killed several Iranian militia 7

members who had been planning to use Southern Syria as 6

a base from which to launch advance drone attacks on Is- 5

raeli targets. While Israel has often sought to signal its will- 4

ingness to protect its interests in the region through force – 3

2
most notably targeted airstrikes – the strikes across Q3
1
should also be viewed in the context of a closely contested
0

Israeli election year and may have been in part intended by Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep
GoS OAGs

the government to emphasise its security credentials to a

domestic audience.

INSO, Figure 16: IDF Airstrikes by Month and Region (2019) While none of the parties to the wider regional conflict between
18 Israel, Iran and Lebanon appeared intent on triggering a return to
16

14
military confrontation on the scale witnessed between Israel and
12 Hezbollah in 2006, the risk of miscalculation was substantially in-
13
10

8
creased.
2
6
1
4

1
Israeli airstrikes are not expected to dramatically increase in volume
5
7
5
2 4 4
3
0
Jan Feb
2

Mar
2

Apr May
in Q4. However, tensions between Israel and Iran will continue to
Jun Jul Aug Sep
Q1

EAST
Q2

NORTH
play out in Syria, with both sides seemingly assessing that the risks
SOUTH
Q3

of further escalation from military strikes on their opposing interests

can be contained within a context in which regionalised, conventional conflict on a starkly violent scale is already the status quo.

GoS Consolidates Control in Rural Damascus

Rural Damascus was the only governorate in Southern Syria that saw a notable, albeit still modest, increase in incident volumes

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q3 2019 P a g e | 14

overall in Q3 (see Figure 14). In addition to Israeli airstrikes, this was driven by a significant increase in GoS arrest operations,
rising from 35 in Q2 to 53 (see Figure 17). Most notably, while the focus of the arrests largely varied in nature – between crimi-
nality, conscription and security – they included three mass operations in Eastern Ghouta of individuals believed to have been
formerly affiliated with OAGs. Across Duma, Harasta and Ein Terma – all former OAG strongholds – some 120 people were de-
tained.

The arrests, in mid-September, coincided with large-scale property seizures. A total of 236 properties, all belong formerly be-
longing to OAGs, were seized in locations including At Tall, Kafr Batna and Harasta.

Taken together, the combination of arrests and the seizure of properties can be understood as an effort to consolidate control in
the environs surrounding Damascus City and prevent any future resurgence of OAG activity by reshaping local demographics.
Many of the properties seized in formerly OAG held areas were reportedly either repurposed as military installations or awarded
to GoS personnel. Despite an almost complete absence of OAG activity in Rural Damascus, incidents of this kind can be expected
to continue intermittently in future quarters, particularly as GoS pursues a series of re-development projects that have been
announced for the capital and surrounding areas.

INSO, Figure 17: GoS Arrest Operations by Governorate, Southern Syria (Q2 vs Q3 2019)

60
54

50

40
35 34
31 32
30

21
20
15
12
8 9
10
5
3
0
Rural Damascus Dar'a Homs Quneitra Damascus As-Sweida

Q2 2019 Q3 2019

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q3 2019 P a g e | 15

II. NGO SAFETY AND ACCESS
2.1 KEY TRENDS
INSO, Figure 18: NGO Incidents by Actor (Q3 2017 – Q3 2019)
GOS OAG IS SDF IMF LEM OTHER CRIMINAL UNKNOWN

Q3 2019 12 2 7 6 6 33

Q2 2019 21 4 6 1 5 37

Q1 2019 3 4 1 8 5 21

Q4 2018 2 8 2 4 6 22

Q3 2018 5 10 3 1 2 7 1 29

Q2 2018 10 9 2 6 3 1 31

Q1 2018 64 10 3 1 8 5 91

Q4 2017 19 6 1 2 5 4 37

Q3 2017 17 12 2 1 1 2 35

A total of 33 incidents in which NGOs were adversely affected by insecurity were recorded in Q3, down fractionally from 37 in
Q2 (see Figure 18). Of these, 12 were initiated by GoS and Russia, two by OAGs, seven by SDF or Kurdish aligned OAGs and a
further 12 by a combination of criminal and other elements.

The impact was severe, with at least four NGO staff killed, six wounded and one abducted.

GoS/Russia: The overwhelming majority of GoS or Russian initiated NGO incidents continued to take the form of NGO staff or
facilities being struck in indiscriminate aerial or artillery bombardment (see Figure 19). The incidents were exclusively concen-
trated in Northern Syria, reflecting the risk to humanitarian safety amid an ongoing GoS military offensive. Three of the four NGO
fatalities of the quarter were caused by incidents of this kind.

The one exception to this trend was recorded in Rural Damascus, where GoS arrested an NGO staff member after he was ac-
cused by a local community member of excluding him from a distribution in favour of the families of OAG members. The incident
appeared to be an outlier, resulting from specific circumstances and not evidence of a shift towards an increased risk of GoS
detention for NGO staff in GoS controlled territory.

OAG: OAGs were responsible for two NGO incidents across Q3, both interlinked and instigated by HTS. In the first incident, HTS
opened fire on the vehicle of an NGO doctor in Idleb, wounding him, and then detained him. After transporting the doctor to a
hospital for treatment, HTS returned a short time later and again arrested him, threatening hospital staff in the process. The
doctor was released the following day and, under pressure from the hospital’s management, HTS issued a public apology –
claiming that the doctor had been mistaken for a member of an armed criminal group at the time that he was intercepted by
HTS security forces. Although the incident underscores the risks of exposure to HTS presence and control, it also demonstrates
HTS’ sensitivity to popular opinion and desire to be viewed as a legitimate governing entity.

SDF/YPG: Of the seven NGO incidents attributed to SDF or Kurdish aligned forces in Q3, four were the result of arrest operations
INSO, Figure 19: NGO Incidents by Type and Actor (Q3 2019) in which NGO staff were detained. None of
Attack Type GOS SDF CRIMINAL OTHER OAG the incidents were directly related to the
Aerial Attack 10 staff’s NGO employment, with one the result
Arrests and Abductions 1 4 1 2 the result of a verbal dispute between SDF
Demonstration 4
and a group of LNGO staff, two involving staff
Assault 2 1
suspected of affiliation with IS amid increased
Intimidation 2 1
2
SDF arrest operations in Ar-Raqqa City and
IED Attacks
Other 1 the fourth an arrest for conscription. A further
Direct and Indirect Fire Attack 1 1 two incidents saw NGOs impacted by VBIEDs
Total 12 7 6 6 2 detonated indiscriminately by pro-YPG groups

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q3 2019 P a g e | 17

INSO, Figure 20: NGO Casualties (Fatalities and Injuries) by Quarter (Q3 in Aleppo, killing one NGO staff member in one incident (among
2018 – Q3 2019)
other civilians) and damaging an NGO medical facility in another. In
the final SDF/YPG initiated incident of the quarter, an LNGO convoy
was temporarily refused access to Al Hole camp, underscoring the
impact of security restrictions in the camp on access.
4 6

Criminal and Other: Of the incidents initiated by criminal actors, two

6
5 in particular stood, both in Idleb. In the first, an NGO staff member
2 4
1 1 1
was abducted by a group of armed criminals and only released once
Q3 2018 Q4 2018 Q1 2019 Q2 2019 Q3 2019 a ransom had been paid. In the second incident, a UVBIED (later
Killed Wounded
revealed to be a dud) was attached to an NGO member’s vehicle in
an attempt an extortion. The seven incidents authored by other elements were all incidents of unrest among NGO beneficiaries
or local community members dissatisfied with prevailing humanitarian conditions and provision. Three of the incidents, in Al
Hole camp, Rukban camp and Basira district (Deir Ez Zor) turned violent in a reflection of the challenges of maintaining commu-
nity acceptance in these inherently volatile contexts.

2 . 2 H U M A N I TA R I A N A C C E S S : K E Y I S S U E S
2.2.(1) North

Access in Northern Aleppo

Among the populations displaced in Q3, only a fraction of IDPs sought shelter in Northern Aleppo. While there was no denial of
access barring IDPs from moving from Idleb to Aleppo, it seems that many were discouraged by a perception that the humani-
tarian assistance that would be available to them would be inadequate.

Access to Northern Aleppo for NGOs operating in Northern Syria has been challenging, both because of a deteriorating security
environment, but also because of a more stringent vetting process related to NGO registrations and regulations in Turkey.

The GoS offensive in Idleb prompted authorities in Northern Aleppo to allow several organisations to establish new offices. How-
ever, even NGOs granted access continue to face administrative impediments in the absence of centralised administrative struc-
tures.

Two developments in Q3 highlighted this in particular. Major LCs issued directives requiring NGOs to seek formal registration
with them, which would entail: submission of registration documents from Turkey, a list of all staff names and a concept note of
planned projects. This directive was not tethered to a central administration, which meant that NGOs were required to negotiate
access bilaterally with multiple LCs in a given area. In a separate episode, several NGO officers were visited by local anti-terror
police, enquiring about the names and composition of their staff. Once again without a central humanitarian affairs office, NGOs
were left to raise this issue with multiple stakeholders in order to ascertain the nature of these enquiries.

As of the end of Q3, there was no indication that these trends were changing and in Q4 NGOs will likely face further administra-
tive impediments that could be arbitrarily introduced with little to no notice.

2.2.(2) East

Worsening Security in Al Hole Camp

Recorded security incidents in Al Hole camp increased significantly in Q3 in a sign of worsening conditions. A total of 45 incidents
were recorded in the camp across the quarter, up from seven in Q2 (see Figure 22). This included 11 incidents of violent physical
assault among and between the camp population and security forces, as well as 25 SDF search and arrest operations – focused
predominantly on detaining individuals suspected of fomenting violence or attempts to smuggle out IDPs or refugees.

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q3 2019 P a g e | 18

INSO, Figure 21: Security Incidents in Al Hole IDP Camp by Type and Month (Q2 – Q3 2019) Much of the precariousness of the situation in Al
Hole links to an annex of the camp in which fami-
21
1 lies of IS fighters have been located. While irre-
2
sponsible, sensationalist media reporting has
4

12 12
compounded the protection risks of those living in
2 1 the annex and overshadowed humanitarian
3
3
14
needs, it is nonetheless the case that SDF has
4 4
- 8 viewed the annex largely from a security perspec-
2
- 1 4
2 -
1
3 tive given the IS connection. The climate of suspi-
Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep
Q2 2019 Q3 2019
cion permeating the camp as a result was illustrat-
Security Forces Arrests Assault Direct Fire (Security Forces) Other
ed in one particularly volatile episode on 30 Sep-
tember. Asayish conducted search and arrest operations across the annex after discovering the body of a female refugee the day
prior who had been stabbed and killed. The operation was met with a violent demonstration by other refugees in the annex. In
an apparent attempt to disrupt it, Asayish fired several bursts of SAF, but one refugee was killed and six wounded, catalysing in
turn an even larger, more violent demonstration. Amid the incident, an NGO vehicle was set on fire by demonstrators and the
team to who it belonged had to be evacuated by SDF. The annex and subsequently the camp itself were subsequently placed on
a temporary security lockdown.

While the possibility cannot be discounted that some of the violence in the camp reflects IS influence, the level of frustration
and alienation created by camp conditions and security measures are an equally if not more significant factor. With neither
showing any sign of abating, continued security incidents can be expected in Al-Hole in Q4.

2.2.(3) South

Convoys to Rukban Camp

Two inter-agency convoys reached Rukban camp from Damascus in September, the first since February 2019. While much need-
ed given increasingly dire humanitarian need, they highlighted the degree to which access to the camp and to services by the
camp population has been frustrated by the interplay of humanitarian and political agendas.

The convoys served both to distribute assistance and provide transportation out of the camp to GoS-held areas for those willing
to leave. Only a limited number of IDPs left the area with the first convoy and even fewer with the second, prompting GoS and
Russia to cancel a third planned convoy.

An intention survey, conducted in August in advance of the convoys, highlighted the dilemma facing the camp population. Of the
12,714 IDPs estimated to be remaining, just 37% indicated a desire to leave the camp and of this proportion a fifth wanted to
leave to areas of Syria not under GoS control – an option not offered by the Damascus inter-agency convoys. A significant pro-
portion – though by no means all – are OAG members who fear detention if they leave for GoS territory.

With the Damascus convoys seemingly predicated on evacuating the camp, they are unlikely to substantially improve access for
the remaining population. Access is also set to remain impeded in Q4 by the fact that the camp is situated within the 55 kilome-
tre security perimeter that surrounds the US’ nearby Al-Tanf military base, meaning that any convoys are subject to negotiation
between the US and GoS (most likely with Russia as an intermediary). Though situated on the border with Jordan, the Jordanian
government has not allowed access since 2016 following a suicide attack outside the camp.

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q3 2019 P a g e | 19

 COMMON ACRONYMS
BCP Border Crossing Point LEM Local Ethnic Militia

CF Coalition Forces MOC Military Operations Command

FSA Free Syrian Army NDF National Defense Forces

GoI Government of Iraq NGO Non Governmental Organisation

GoJ Government of Jordan OAG Organised Armed Group

GoS Government of Syria PYD Democratic Union Party

GoT Government of Turkey RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade

HMG Heavy Machine Gun SAF Small Arms Fire

IDF Israeli Defense Forces SDF Syria’s Democratic Forces

IED Improvised Explosive Device TAF Turkish Armed Forces

IS Islamic State VCP Vehicle Check Point

JSF Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham YPG The People's Protection Units

KRG Kurdistan Regional Government

X. Report Ends
For further information:
d ire c to r @ sy r. n go s afety. o rg

© INSO, OCTOBER 2019

----- IMPORTANT INFORMATION -----

Stichting International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) registered 17 January 2019, non-profit
Foundation (ANBI) in the Netherlands, KvK 73728489 at Hague Humanity Hub, Fluwelen
Burgwal 58, ‘s-Gravenhage, 2511-CJ, Netherlands
Contact INSO at info@syr.ngosafety.org.