WWW.NGOSAFETY.

ORG

INSO SYRIA
Q U A R T E R LY R E P O R T
1 April - 30 June | Q2 2019

INSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity
conducted or omitted on the basis of this report.
Stichting International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO)
CONFIDENTIAL - NGO use only
registered 17 January 2019, non-profit Foundation (ANBI)
No copy, forward or sale
in the Netherlands, KvK 73728489 at Hague Humanity
Hub, Fluwelen Burgwal 58, ‘s-Gravenhage, 2511-CJ, © INSO 2019
Netherlands
S U M M A RY & A S S E S S M E N T
A stark escalation in conflict activity in Northern Syria drastically increased the exposure of the humanitarian community to vio-
lence in the second quarter of 2019 (hereafter Q2 2019). A total of 37 security incidents affecting NGO staff were recorded
countrywide. Of these, 26 were concentrated in the North, 20 of which saw NGO staff and facilities struck by airstrikes or artil-
lery fire as the governments of Syria (GoS) and Russia launched a resurgent campaign of often indiscriminate bombardment on
OAG positions in Idleb governorate and adjacent areas in an attempt to provide cover for GoS advances on the ground. The im-
pact was sobering. At least four NGO staff were killed and three wounded and the scale of bombardment resulted in extensive
damage to key humanitarian and civilian infrastructure, including 29 healthcare facilities (some NGO supported, others civilian).

The intensity of the re-escalation in frontline fighting between organised armed groups (OAGs) and GoS in the North drove a
sharp rise in overall conflict activity across Q2, amounting to 7,485 conflict-driven security incidents in all, up from 4,748 in Q1.
The bulk of this activity was accounted for by the volume of GoS and Russian operations, increasing from 2,720 in Q1 to 5,275.
OAG activity also increased, though to a lesser degree. The involvement in the wider Syria conflict of other armed actors mean-
while remained concerted. Despite the official conclusion of the anti-IS ground campaign by Kurdish forces (SDF and YPG) in
March and the collapse of the Islamic States’ (IS) remaining hold on territory east of the Euphrates River, IS activity was fraction-
ally greater than in Q1 and a high tempo of SDF operations continued in a sign of the still acute security challenges facing the
Kurdish Self Administration. Only international military forces (IMF) operations (aside from those of Russia) fell significantly, as
the end of the conventionally fought SDF ground campaign in the previous quarter reduced the need for and utility of Coalition
Forces’ close air support.

While a GoS offensive to begin reasserting control over Idleb – the last governorate held entirely by OAGs – has long been antici-
pated, GoS attempts to advance in Q2 were largely frustrated and ended in a volatile stalemate. Without the ability to entirely
surround and besiege Idleb, frontline fighting with OAGs took a heavier toll on GoS ranks than in other GoS ground offensives to
date and was further complicated by mountainous terrain and the presence of Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). Whether this stale-
mate persists may be shaped by the next round of talks between the Russian, Turkish and Iranian governments, scheduled for
July under the Astana framework. Although past rounds have often ended inconclusively, the events of Q2 will make it increas-
ingly difficult for Russia and Turkey to maintain that the so-called Idleb de-militarised zone agreement struck in September 2018
still holds. Should the talks produce little other than an impasse, it is likely that heightened conflict activity will persist through-
out Q3 as GoS seeks to dispel any perception of weakness.

Although reclaiming Idleb is a key GoS objective, the attempted advances in Q2 were conceivably intended to distract from in-
creasing instability in core GoS territory to the South, where a combination of a worsening economic outlook, poor public service
provision and a fragmented spectrum of armed actors has compounded local grievances. Gaps in GoS authority were especially
evident in Dar’a governorate, which in Q2 saw not only a rising number of armed attacks on GoS personnel, but a series of epi-
sodes in which OAGs visibly contested control of territory – albeit on a small scale.

In the East, IS continued to attack SDF positions in areas – particularly in Deir-Ez-Zor governorate – that it enjoys pre-established
support networks. The legacy of IS territorial control was also apparent in the precarious conditions of the Al-Hole IDP camp,
where incidents of violence increased in Q2 amid a climate of distrust among an IDP and refugee population of a size that the
camp was scarcely designed for.

Events in Q3 will be shaped as much by conflict activity as by the hollowing out over the past eight years of local governance.
Chronic mismanagement of natural resources, the consequences of which include acute fuel shortages and farmland fires, were
evident throughout Syria in Q2. As well as compounding local cycles of grievance and violence in the near term, the damage
done to core economic and governance structures may prove even less tractable than the current intensity of armed violence
and will weigh heavily on the ability of NGOs and the wider international community to aid Syria in any form of early recovery
from its present state of crisis.
Ross Baillie
Director - INSO Syria
July 2019
The views expressed in this report remain the sole responsibility of the author.

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q2 2019 P a g e |2

I . T HE S TAT E O F T H E C O N F L I C T
1.1 CONFLICT ACTIVITY OVERVIEW
INSO, Figure 1: Conflict Activity by Actor and Quarter (Q3 2015 – Q2 2019)

18,942
319
257
1,078
16,226
480
2,795
366
14,245
1,282 14,112
328
13,441
261
341
12,223
393 12,437 12,808
1,058 851
2,606 11,562 1,286 11,288 846
259 907
530 1,647 584
1,340
2,175
1,046
405
541 10,159 1,116 364
628
553
745 897
620 1,030 700
1,844 1,342 685 1,497 1,503
2,311
7,780
1,377
783
296 7,485
14,493 1,125 518 120
625
448 399
5,539
1,527 1,066
11,492
10,343
10,960 267 4,748
643 4,136 234
8,544 8,529 8,421 8,439 387 642
8,007 8,168 416
890 330
6,946 604
401 822
4,991 5,275
731
3,352
2,720
1,984

Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
GOS OAG(s) IS SDF IMF

The Syria conflict escalated sharply in Q2. A total of 7,485 conflict-driven security incidents were recorded in all, up from 4,748 in
Q1 (see Figure 1).

This surge in violence was driven almost entirely by the pace of GoS and Russian operations, which increased from 2,720 in Q1 to
5275 (again, see Figure 1) as GoS sought to advance on OAG positions along frontlines in Northern Syria. While a GoS offensive
on Idleb had seemingly been forestalled by an agreement struck between Russia and Turkey in September 2018 to create a so-
called demilitarised zone along the governorate’s boundaries, the stark escalation in conflict activity across Q2 calls into question
whether it remains viable. In parallel, although to a lesser degree, OAG activity also increased as OAGs attempted to hold ground
and counterattack advancing GoS forces in Northern Hama and Southwest Idleb. As of the close of Q2, a volatile stalemate had
emerged, with GoS struggling to take territory in a scenario in which it is unable to employ the twin tactics of besiegement and
coerced reconciliation that have been key in the conclusion of all GoS offensives on OAG held areas to date. Within the wider
Syria conflict, despite the official conclusion of the SDF’s anti-IS ground campaign in March and the collapse of IS’ remaining ter-
ritory east of the Euphrates, IS activity rose and SDF activity remained broadly unchanged. Only IMF activity fell significantly.

INSO, Figure 2: Conflict Activity by Governorate (Q3 2018 – Q2 2019)

2018 2019 Percentage Change
Governorate/Region Difference Comparison
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q1 vs. Q2 2019
Lattakia NORTH 396 215 189 603 219% 414
Eastern Homs EAST
47 14 19 53 179% 34 More than 100% growth
Idleb NORTH
945 677 1098 2668 143% 1570
Hama NORTH
741 602 1107 1891 71% 784
Between 50% and 75% growth
Al-Hasakeh EAST
376 243 267 437 64% 170
Aleppo NORTH
734 734 848 947 12% 99
Less than 25% growth
Ar-Raqqa EAST
230 198 250 276 10% 26
Rural Damascus SOUTH
249 270 90 90 0% 0
No Change
Homs SOUTH
51 49 51 51 0% 0
Dar'a SOUTH
838 206 254 241 -5% -13
As-Sweida SOUTH
232 150 146 131 -10% -15 Less than 25% negative growth
Deir-Ez-Zor EAST
803 1120 837 748 -11% -89
Damascus SOUTH
28 58 68 40 -41% -28 Between 25% and 50% negative growth
Quneitra SOUTH
208 4 29 32 - 3
Low Conflict Activity
Tartous NORTH
6 1 5 4 - -1
Total 5884 4541 5258 8212 56% 2954

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q2 2019 P a g e |4

INSO, Figure 3: Conflict Activity by Region and Actor (Q1 vs Q2 2019) Geographically, and unsurprisingly, the North saw a greater
level of conflict activity than any other region in Q2 (see Fig-
5976
ure 3). While in Idleb and Hama governorates this was a direct
66
124
8 consequence of the escalation in frontline fighting between
895 GoS and OAGs, GoS did not attempt to advance on Idleb from
Aleppo. Rising insecurity in the governorate (see Figure 2) was
instead concentrated in its northern districts, reflecting the
complex interplay of security dynamics between OAGs, TAF
3127
100 and YPG. Incident volumes in the East saw a slight overall de-
707
4883
crease, but remained high across Deir-Ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqa
governorates in a sign of the continued presence of IS and a
1215 1145 variety of anti-SDF spoiler groups. Conflict activity also fell in
198 2287 42

501
the South, though this belied the significance of events, in-
542 406 364
306 56 389
120
cluding an increase in OAG attacks on GoS in Dar’a and, more
59 323 51
110 162 230
EAST NORTH SOUTH EAST NORTH SOUTH than that, a series of episodes in which OAGs visibly chal-
Q1 2019 Q2 2019
lenged GoS control of population centres in the southwest of
GOS OAG IS SDF IMF
the governorate.

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q2 2019 P a g e |5

1 . 2 OV E R V I E W B Y R E G I O N
1.2.(1) North

Escalation in Idleb

Q2 witnessed a sharp escalation in conflict activity INSO, Figure 5: GoS Activity by Week and Incident Type, Idleb and Northwest Frontlines,
along GoS-OAG frontlines in southwestern Idleb and April to June 2019
800

adjacent territory in Hama and Lattakia governorates.

700

GoS attacks had been largely static for much of April 203
600
(see Figure 5), but surged following the largely incon- 204

clusive twelfth round of talks between Russia, Turkey, 500

148
193
Iran and representatives of Syrian parties to the con- 400 176

flict in the recently renamed capital of Kazakhstan, Nur 138

152 151
300 74

-Sultan (formerly Astana). Despite a re-affirmation in 164 60

135
19

200 91
the official communique released after the talks that 230 381 6
302
268
53
the Russian, Turkish and Iranian governments re- 100
149 139 156
202 189
235

119 20
96
mained committed to the so-called de-militarized zone 0 1
3 3 0
60

W1 W2 W3 W4 W1 W2 W3 W4 W1 W2 W3 W4
agreement struck between Russian and Turkey on 17 APR MAY JUN

Airstrikes Barrel Bombs Direct and Indirect Fire

September 2018, events on the ground in the weeks
that followed were an abrupt contrast. GoS launched a volume of airstrikes consistent only with a large-scale ground offensive
(again, see Figure 5), deployed barrel bombs for the first time since September and under this air cover – which likely also includ-
ed Russian airstrikes – mobilised ground forces in an attempt to advance on OAG positions.

By 9 May, GoS forces had gained ground in Northern Hama, taking control of the towns of Madiq Castle – a key node for cross-
line trade – and Kafr Nabutha (see Figure 6). Although the overarching objective of this mounting GoS offensive was difficult to
discern, it was broadly clear that GoS were attempting to advance on three fronts: from Madiq Castle towards the Al Ghab plain;
from Kafr Nabutha towards Hbit town; and from northern Lattakia frontlines towards the town of Kabani (not to be mistaken
with Kobani, in Northwest Aleppo). Taking Hbit would offer GoS a foothold from which to threaten key OAG supply hubs
(including Khan Shaykun), while advancing on northern Lattakia would deny OAGs the staging ground from which they have
launched several infiltration attacks in 2019 and suspected drone strikes on Russia’s Khmeimim air base.

Despite the scale of GoS attacks in southwestern Idleb in Q2, attempts by GoS forces to advance on all three fronts were largely
frustrated – in particular by a combination of challenging terrain and concerted OAG counterattacks on exposed GoS flanks. A
ceasefire seemingly brokered by Russia and Turkey led to a temporary cessation in violence (see third week of May, Figure 5)
between 18 and 20 May – airstrikes all but ceased – but it quickly fell apart amid a climate of distrust and OAG suspicion that it
was intended to encourage them to withdraw from frontlines. Instead, OAGs launched another counter-offensive, briefly recap-
turing Kafr Nabutha and in turn spurring a resurgence in GoS and Russian airstrikes.

The humanitarian impact of the escalation in frontline fighting was severe, resulting in the displacement of an estimated 300,000
people between late April and June. Heightened conflict activity was also not limited solely to these areas. The volume of GoS
airstrikes across Northwest Syria was the highest of any quarter in the past year and a half (see Figure 7) and GoS activity was
concentrated not only along frontlines, but also on towns and communities that connect OAG supply lines (see Figure 8). Amid
this sustained and often indiscriminate bombardment, there were at least 29 incidents across Q2 in which hospitals were struck
by GoS airstrikes or artillery fire. Other humanitarian and civilian sites were similarly affected (see section 2.1) and the impact on
the safety of humanitarian staff was dire (again, see section 2.1).

As of the close of Q2, while conflict activity remained high (some 400 GoS attacks were recorded in Northwest Syria in the last
week of June), GoS attempts to advance had stalled. GoS had managed a further incremental advance to the north of Madiq
Castle on 10 June, but throughout the course of the offensive gained little to no new territory in Idleb itself. This outcome was
the product of several factors. In the first instance, even with substantial air power, the size of Idleb and its international border
with Turkey prevents GoS from surrounding and besieging the governorate, nor can GoS incrementally pacify individual commu-

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q2 2019 P a g e |6

nities by offering reconciliation. The succession of so-called reconciliation agreements across Southern and Central Syria since
2017 relied on OAGs agreeing to relocate to Idleb in a deliberate GoS strategy of containment. As the only governorate left in
majority OAG control, there is nowhere left for large numbers of OAGs to relocate to and many (if not all) of Idleb’s OAGs are
ideologically opposed to recognising GoS authority. The twin tactics of besiegement and coerced reconciliation have been key in
the conclusion of all GoS offensives on OAG held areas to date. A second factor, is that Idleb’s OAGs are among the most battled
tested in the Syria conflict. They have been buoyed in number by the relocation of OAGs from Southern Syria and despite a re-
cent history of violent inter-group rivalry cooperated closely in Q2 in the face of GoS ground forces. Lastly, GoS attempts to ad-
vance were further complicated by the engagement of Turkey and Turkish Armed Forces. Wary that a GoS offensive would invite
greater insecurity and mass displacement along its border, Turkey continued to maintain a series of observation posts along
Idleb frontlines throughout Q2. The degree to which Turkey would be willing to use these positions to engage GoS with force has
always been unclear, but in at least one instance Turkish forces
INSO, Figure 7: GoS Airstrikes by Quarter, Northwest Syria (Q1 2018 – Q2
returned fire when a Turkish observation post in Murak was hit by 2019)
GoS artillery on 16 June. Even though Turkey has increasingly co- 2000

ordinated its involvement in Syria through the Astana framework, 1800

it retains its own agenda and this somewhat paradoxically also 1600

extends to providing direction and material support to some of 1400

Idleb’s OAGs. 1200

1000

The volatile stalemate that emerged from GoS’ attempts to ad- 800

vance in Idleb is unlikely to change in Q3. Yet it is also not clear 600

whether GoS will be prepared to substantially de-escalate aerial 400

and artillery bombardment. The campaign was likely intended in 200

part to distract from rising resentment in core GoS territory over 0

Q1 2018 Q2 2018 Q3 2018 Q4 2018 Q1 2019 Q2 2019

the worsening economic outlook for large parts of the population

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q2 2019 P a g e |7

and persistent gaps in public service delivery (see 1.2.3). Concluding it without having gained significant ground may cast GoS in
a position of weakness and further enrage communities in the South that it has relied on for fresh recruits amid a heavy casualty
toll in its confrontation with OAGs in the Northwest.

Much may depend on the outcome of the next round of Astana talks, scheduled for July. Despite public statements to contrary,
it will be increasingly difficult for the Astana powers to maintain that they have honoured the terms of the de-militarised zone
agreement. While this could simply result in a protracted impasse in Q3, it is also possible that Russia and Turkey will seek to use
the prospect of renewed violence to extract concessions from their Syrian clients (GoS and OAGs respectively) in an effort to
make the agreement viable. While purely speculative, this could include Turkey compelling OAGs to withdraw from select front-
line positions, or Russia pushing GoS to cooperate in the formation of a constitutional committee to advance a broad consensus
on Syria’s future governance – a key demand of the international community that Damascus has long resisted, including at the
twelfth round of Astana talks in April. That Russia would remain committed to the Astana framework rather than redouble its
support to a GoS offensive reflects its own interests in seeking a political settlement that does not leave it as the predominant
underwriter of Syria’s reconstruction and long-term stability. A full-scale GoS campaign aimed at retaking all of Idleb would be
unprecedented in scale and humanitarian impact and would therefore likely derail this agenda by alienating the wider interna-
tional community. It is possible in this sense, though again only speculative, that Russia may have allowed the GoS offensive in
Q2 to proceed both as a means of pressuring Turkey to extract concessions from OAGs, but also of sobering Damascus’ assess-
ment of its ability to take Idleb by force alone. Whether GoS and OAGs will comply is more doubtful, increasing the likelihood
that the conflict in Northern Syria will continue to be marked by heightened violence in Q3.

Insecurity in Northern Aleppo

As GoS mobilised troops and finally commenced an offensive on OAG positions in Northern Hama and southern Idleb, specula-
tion was rife that GoS would also seek to advance on western Aleppo frontlines. However, as the offensive progressed, this sce-
nario did not materialise. Instead, the most significant shift and source of insecurity in Aleppo governorate in Q2 emanated from
the north of the governorate, in the Euphrates Shield area and Afrin district.

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q2 2019 P a g e |8

INSO, Figure 9: Insecurity in Northern Aleppo by Incident Type (Q1 – Q2 2019) While incident levels in western Aleppo dropped by 9%
250%
between Q1 and Q2 – in a further indication that an esca-
200% lation in GoS activity was unlikely – Northern Aleppo ob-
served an increase of 48% over the same period.
150%

The root of insecurity in Northern Aleppo is complex. All

100%
through the Syrian conflict, control of the area has
50%
changed hands more than anywhere else in the country. In
Euphrates Shield, authority has switched from GoS, to
0%
OAGs, to IS, which was eventually forced to withdraw after
-50%
a seven-month TAF-led military operation between August
Change Over Q2 Proportion of Total (380) Incidents 2016 and March 2017. Two years and three months later,
Turkish forces still struggle to stabilise the area.

The prospects for post-conflict stabilisation were further hindered by another TAF-led military campaign against the YPG in Afrin
district in January 2018 (Operation Olive Branch). Although TAF and affiliated OAGs expelled the YPG from much of the district, a
significant segment of YPG forces remained in Tall Refaat, progressively launching increased attacks against OAG positions under
the implicit protection of Russia and GoS. This 90-kilometre frontline with the YPG in Tall Refaat, parts of which stretch along
difficult terrain, has been a constant source of tension in the region since the conclusion of operation Olive Branch. In Q2, this
dynamic was the biggest contributor to security incidents in Northern Aleppo; 56% of all incidents recorded over the period
were related to YPG-OAG/TAF tensions (see Figure 9).

Pro-YPG initiated attacks ranged from conventional engagements along the frontline, to infiltration and IED attacks. In Q2, 41 IED
attacks in Northern Aleppo were attributed to YPG (primarily a group by the name of Wrath of Olives), while YPG (primarily the
so-called Afrin Liberation Forces) engaged OAGs along the frontlines 72 times. Notably, in Q2, Afrin Liberation Forces used in-
creasingly sophisticated weapons such as Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs), with 11 confirmed incidents recorded across the
period. During the entirety of Operation Olive Branch by contrast, there were only 12 such attacks.

In response, TAF and OAG initiated attacks along the frontline increased significantly (by 214% - see Figure 9), fuelling specula-
tion that Russia had conceded control of the pocket to TAF, potentially in return for Turkey allowing GoS to advance unopposed
in Idleb. This speculation eventually proved unfounded, as no concerted attempts to advance were made by TAF and OAGs on
YPG positions.

This flareup in conflict activity affected movement along the Afrin-A’zaz road throughout Q2, as NGOs and civilians were con-
strained to use secondary roads away from the frontlines. On 11 occasions, IED attacks led to civilian casualties, the most nota-
ble of which was on 02 June in a market in A’zaz town. The attack recorded the highest number of civilian casualties of any in
Northern Aleppo across the quarter, killing at least 21 civilians and wounding 50.

Away from the frontlines, other longstanding internal frictional dynamics continued to contribute to instability in area. Inter-OAG
clashes increased by 27% (see Figure 9 ) in spite of the GoS offensive in Idleb. Crime increased by 41%, while anti-criminal opera-
tions fell by 44%. Perhaps the most revealing trend as to the state of stability in Northern Aleppo was a 94% increase in civilian
demonstrations in Q2. The demonstrations were either directed towards TAF’s inaction against YPG in Tall Refaat or allegations
that local councils (LCs) were either corrupt or had failed to provide services.

In parallel to a highly fragmented OAG presence, a functionally unified regional government has also failed to emerge. Although
the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) claims to oversee governance in Northern Aleppo, their presence is nominal. Each LC oper-
ates independently competing with other LCs to secure services from either NGOs or private businesses. A long-term Turkish
policy for the region remains unclear, as governance strategy has been passively delegated to three governors in adjacent re-
gions of Turkey, each overseeing NGO access, stabilisation projects and capacity building for LCs separately for different sections
of Euphrates Shield and Afrin. While these incoherent and fragmented administrative and military structures prevail, insecurity
in Northern Aleppo is unlikely to decrease in Q3. Conditions may become yet more challenging if GoS escalates its military oper-
ations in Northwest Syria, potentially triggering an IDP influx into Northern Aleppo that would place further strain on local ser-
vices and compound tensions.

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q2 2019 P a g e |9

1.2.(2) East

IS Activity

The announcement by SDF on 23 March that they had captured Baghuz town (Hajin sub-district, Deir-Ez-Zor governorate),
marked the conclusion of a two and a half year long anti-IS ground campaign and with it the end of all IS territorial control east
of the Euphrates River. Despite this, the total volume of recorded IS incidents in Q2 was higher than in Q1 – rising from 306 to
389 – in an indication of the group’s residual presence in Eastern Syria and continued ability to launch attacks.

INSO, Figure 11: IS Activity by District, Eastern Syria, Q1 vs Q2 2019 Although on the surface of it this would appear to con-
firm the anxieties held in some corners of the internation-
al community that the collapse of IS territory would cata-
134
lyse the widespread dispersal of IS cells across Eastern
113
Syria, IS activity in Q2 remained overwhelmingly concen-
93 trated in Deir-Ez-Zor governorate and within much the
75 same districts as in Q1 (see Figure 11). Within this there
66
was some fluctuation, examples of which include a signifi-
50
cantly higher volume of attacks in Deir-Ez-Zor district, as
34
29
26
23
well as in Al-Mayadin district – the latter in part reflecting
19
13
9 7
an increase in attacks on GoS positions west of the Eu-
1 3
phrates following the exfiltration across the river of some
Deir-Ez-Zor Abu Kamal Al Mayadin Ar-Raqqa Ath-Thawrah Al-Hasakeh Tadmor Other Districts
Deir-Ez-Zor Ar-Raqqa Al-Hasakeh Eastern Homs All IS elements. Abu Kamal district by contrast saw a drop in
Q1 2019 Q2 2019
IS activity in a further mark of the conclusion In Q1 of the
battle for territory between IS and SDF in Hajin sub-district. Overall, however, IS activity remained rooted in areas where IS mem-
bers and affiliates have retained pre-existing support networks – built around a combination of fear or favour of IS among local
communities and the difficulty for SDF of maintaining control over disparate rural areas. The same can be said of the more lim-
ited IS activity recorded in governorates elsewhere in Eastern Syria in Q2, with IS activity centred on districts where it has previ-

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q2 2019 P a g e | 10

INSO, Figure 12: IS Activity by Month, Deir-Ez-Zor Governorate, East, North and West Lines (Q1-Q2 2019) ously maintained local sup-
70 port or where SDF struggles
60
to project authority – among
them Ar-Raqqa, Ath-Thawrah
50
and southern Al-Hasakeh dis-
40 tricts.
30
Across Deir-Ez-Zor, IS activity
20 was clustered around the gov-
10 ernorate’s main supply routes
– the so-called East, North
0
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN and West lines (see Figure 10)
East Line (Kassar to Baghoz Highway) North Line (Al-Hasakeh to Basira Highway) West Line (Hama to Dahleh Highway)
– which present some of the
most immediate opportunities to attack SDF checkpoints and vehicles. Given its proximity to frontline fighting in Hajin sub-
district, the East line had typically been the most actively contested. However, after IS lost its foothold in the sub-district and a
series of subsequent SDF clearing operations in late May, the focus of IS activity gradually shifted. This was evident in Q2 both in
a decline in IS attacks along the East line from May to June and a relative spike in attacks along the North line in the same period
(see Figure 12). After SDF widened the scope of its clearing operations in May to include the North line, a parallel increase in IS
attacks along the West line became apparent, seemingly as IS fighters withdrew to escalate activity where SDF was less present.
As key supply routes for the humanitarian community as much as any other actors, rising IS attacks focused on the West line –
although still comparably modest in number across April, May and June – could come to more seriously disrupt access in Q3 if
the trend is sustained.

Tactically, the overall increase in IS activity in Eastern Syria INSO, Figure 13: IS Activity by Tactic, Eastern Syria, Q1 vs Q2 2019
across Q2 relative to Q1 was reflected in higher numbers of Change from Q1 Proportion of Total Q2 IS Activity (389 incidents) as a %
80
direct attacks and IED detonations (see Figure 13). This is not
70
necessarily an indication of greater IS capability, but more likely
60
a change in emphasis, with frequent, quick attacks on SDF prior- 51%
50
itised over larger-scale operations. Suicide attacks by compari-
40
son were far less frequent than in Q1, falling from 12 to five.
30
That this should be the case indicates that while IS maintains a 21%
20
significant residual presence in Eastern Syria and can be ex-
10

pected to remain active in Q3, that its ability to carry out re- 1%
0

source-intensive operations, including suicide attacks, will have -10

Direct and Indirect Fire Attack IEDs Suicide IEDs
been substantially eroded by the cumulative impact of SDF -20

ground operations on IS manpower and supply lines.

Targeted Attacks on SDF

As the continued IS activity in Q2 demonstrated, targeted attacks on SDF remained a key feature of the security environment in
Eastern Syria. They were far from exclusively IS authored, however, with a variety of armed spoiler groups – some driven by local
INSO, Figure 14: Targeted Attacks on SDF Personnel by Governorate and Dis-
grievances, others backed or influenced by external forces –
trict, Eastern Syria (Q2 2019) active in the Eastern region.

69 The concentration of attacks on SDF in Q2 (see Figure 14) mir-

rored wider patterns of insecurity, with attacks most prevalent
in areas where SDF has traditionally struggled to assert control.
Outside of attacks along supply routes in Deir-Ez-Zor (see
40
above), the targeting of SDF continued to be particularly focused
28 in Ar-Raqqa district. The dense, urban environment of Ar-Raqqa
23
City – advantageous for the planning and surveillance required
9
for IED attacks – and its symbolic status as the largest Arab ma-
8
2 1 1
jority population centre under SDF control mean that it will like-
Al-Hasakeh Quamishli Ras Al Ain Al-Malikeyyeh Ar-Raqqa Ath-Thawrah Tell Abiad Deir-Ez-Zor Al Mayadin Abu Kamal ly remain an epicentre for attacks on SDF in Q3 and beyond.
Al-Hasakeh Ar-Raqqa Deir-Ez-Zor

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q2 2019 P a g e | 11

INSO, Figure 15: SDF/YPG Conscription Arrests by Month, Eastern Syria (Q2 2019) In an effort to improve local security in challenging areas, Q3
60 closed with the announcement that SDF was to establish eight
new military councils across Eastern Syria, in areas including
50
Ar-Raqqa, Ath-Thawrah, Quamishli and Al-Malekkiyeh. Military
40
councils have existed in Menbij district and Deir-Ez-Zor since
late 2016 – where they were instrumental in the SDF’s anti-IS
30 ground campaign – and are in essence designed to create
security structures that are led by and formed of local com-
20
munity groups, thus encouraging greater support from the
local population when they see that security forces are repre-
10

sentative of the area in which they are operating. Although

0 potentially bridging the gap between security forces and local
APR MAY JUN
populations, it is yet unclear whether the proliferation of mili-
tary councils may also increase the risk that security structures are co-opted by local elites, embedding a fragmented spectrum
of armed actors across the East.

Persistent Social Tensions

Grievances towards SDF and the wider Self-Administration were fuelled by a variety of factors in Q2, many of which will not be
easily remedied. One of the most obvious was conscription, incidents of which rose sharply across Q2 (see Figure 15) as the SDF
and Asayish launched renewed conscription campaigns in Al-Hasakeh and Ar-Raqqa governorates. Despite the official conclusion
of its anti-IS ground campaign, the Self-Administration continues to face acute security challenges and relies heavily on conscrip-
tion to bolster the security forces. This has long been a source of resentment across local communities and will remain so in Q3.

Wider socio-economic grievances were also exposed in Q2. Most notably, June saw an outbreak of farmland fires across Eastern
Syria (as well as in Syria more broadly and parts of Iraq). Though IS claimed responsibility, the reality was more complex, with
economic competition between GoS and the Self-Administration to procure wheat also a clear contributing factor. In particular,
the reluctant agreement of the Self-Administration to allow farmers to trade directly with GoS for better prices may have
spurred pro-SDF and anti-GoS elements to target their crops in arson attacks. In other instances, IS may well have been responsi-
ble, though some cases of suspected arson conversely appeared to target land that had previously belonged to IS members and
their families. A good number of the fires were likely also accidental, caused by poor farming practices and the availability of only
low-quality fuel amid a countrywide fuel shortage. A lack of fuel is unlikely to be eased in the coming months given that Q2 saw
the collapse of an agreement between the Self-Administration and GoS to cooperate in restarting oil production at the Conoco
Gas Plant (in SDF controlled Deir-Ez-Zor). The Self-Administration’s withdrawal from the agreement was most probably US influ-
enced, coming at a time when the US levied new economic sanctions on Iran and prospective trading partners.

As well as threatening food security and livelihoods in the East and the wider country, the farmland fires and fuel shortages are
also revealing of the weaknesses in Syria’s core economic structures – including effective support to farmers and natural re-
source management. These will persist long beyond Q3, exacerbating community fault lines and the ability of both the Self-
Administration and GoS to govern.

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q2 2019 P a g e | 12

1.2.(3) South

Growing Instability in Dar’a

Building on a trend that has seen anti-GoS sentiment on the rise since late 2018 and following an increase in the number of anti-
GoS attacks and demonstrations in Q1 (see INSO Quarterly Report Q1 2019), Dar’a witnessed a further intensification of anti-GoS
activity during Q2.

While the number of anti-GoS protests decreased overall, anti GoS-attacks reached an all-time high of 86 events. Attacks were
particularly concentrated in the Southwest of the governorate (see Figure 18). The majority of attacks continued to fit with a
pattern of brief hit and run shootings, although some pointed to an emerging trend of increasingly frequent complex attacks. Of
equal significance, a series of until then unprecedented situations emerged in which OAGs visibly contested GoS control.

Areas of Dar’a have retained some degree of self-determination since GoS re-established territorial control – at least nominally –
in a July 2018 ground offensive. The GoS’ Dar’a campaign relied on military force, but also a series of negotiated reconciliation
agreements. However, unlike with the so-called reconciliation of other OAG held areas in the South, most notably Eastern Ghou-
ta, which saw GoS use a pattern of protracted besiegement and bombardment over many months before eventually offering
terms entirely in its favour, reconciliation agreements in Dar’a were concluded in a matter of weeks and with more favourable
conditions for OAGs. These concessions likely reflected a sense of urgency to conclude the campaign as expediently as possible
in anticipation of developments along other frontlines (particularly the Northwest) and the influence of Russia in encouraging
GoS to minimise the level of destruction in the interests of longer-term stability and less burdensome reconstruction. The recon-
ciliation agreements that followed broke with GoS’ established approach of insisting that all OAGs and their families relocate to
Idleb governorate, not only allowing many to remain, but also allowing them to retain some autonomy for local security and
governance provided that they integrated into GoS structures.

While likely intended to lay the groundwork for the slow and incremental restoration of GoS authority, this has yet to be real-
ised. On the contrary, a combination of factors, including worsening economic indicators, poor service delivery and the presence
of foreign armed forces and militias has augmented the feeling of isolation of the population and emboldened anti-GoS ele-

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q2 2019 P a g e | 13

ments to escalate resistance towards the central government. This has translated into a number of communities, in particular in
the southwestern parts of the Governorate, where GoS has little to no meaningful presence.

This dynamic was thrown into even sharper relief by a series of incidents in Q2 in which OAGs visibly and violently contested GoS
control. In the town of As Sanamyn, on 15 May, local OAG members engaged GoS in a protracted armed clash, forcing them to
withdraw. The incident was triggered after GoS arrested one of the group’s commanders. In a similar incident, in the town of
Jleen on 22 May, OAGs overran a GoS intelligence base and seized control of several checkpoints – again after one of its mem-
bers was detained. In Dar’a al-Balad meanwhile, OAGs forced GoS to dismantle two military checkpoints that had been estab-
lished days earlier on a key route into the area. In Jasim town, unknown gunmen fired on a GoS checkpoint, wounding several
GoS personnel. Residents of the town and local OAGs subsequently refused to cooperate with GoS efforts to apprehend the
attackers. In a sign both of the degree to which GoS forces are overstretched on multiple fronts and a desire to avoid local ten-
sions spiralling out of control into a renewed wider conflict with OAGs, Russian representatives in several of these instances
attempted to mediate a peaceful resolution – offering concessions to OAGs that included the release of detainees. How sustain-
able this will be in Q3 is unclear, as while Damascus is constrained in its ability to respond with force, these visible challenges to
its authority may embolden further attacks.

Security Environment in Damascus

Q2 recorded four IED detonations in Damascus city (see Figure 19). The incidents brought the total number of IED detonations in
and around the capital since the start of 2019 to six. By itself, this marks a sharp increase compared to 2018, during which only
one IED detonation was recorded.

The casualty toll in most events was minimal, though there were two exceptions – a UVBIED and a VBIED – which caused multi-
ple casualties. Only three were claimed, one by the Abu Ammarah Battalion and two by Saraya Qasioun. The former was active in
Aleppo prior to December 2016, although it has never been reportedly present in Damascus. In fact, the only attacks backed by
credible claims on social media seem to be those of Saraya Qasioun. The unclaimed attacks were either blamed by GOS on HTS
and other so-called hostile entities or downplayed.

While it is hard to infer any definite pattern, the nature of the incidents – largely targeted and unclaimed – seem to indicate that
none of the attacks recorded in 2019 were the work of a well-organized OAG. With many targeting specific pro-GoS personalities
or members of the security forces, it is possible instead that inter-GoS rivalry (see below) is also driving the rise in attacks in the
Capital. Regardless, these incidents are regularly highlighted by both anti and pro GoS media and contribute to challenge GoS’
narrative that Damascus is secure.

The outlook for Damascus remains stable. On the one hand, competition between different GoS branches, or between GoS and
NDF (see below), over localized disputes or as part of nation-wide fault lines will persist and possibly intensify. With that, small
scale, mostly targeted, attacks will remain a feature of the security environment. At the same time, it cannot be discounted that
smaller anti-GoS groups with residual capabilities will attempt to carry out attacks in the future, especially if they fail to benefit
financially from the dividends of the redevelopment and reconstruction projects underway around the capital. However, larger
OAGs are still assessed not to have the capabilities to breach the security perimeter around Damascus to carry out sizable com-
plex attacks.

INSO, Figure 17: Conflict Activity by Governorate and Actor, Southern Syria (Q1 vs Q2 2019)
2019 Q2 2019 by Actor
Governorate Change
Q1 Q2 GOS CRIMINAL OAG OTHER UNKNOWN LEM IMF IS

QUNEITRA 29 32 3 20 -2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 0 5 -1 0

HOMS 51 51 0 31 -8 12 3 1 0 5 4 0 0 1 1 1 0

RURAL DAMASCUS 90 90 0 72 -2 6 3 4 3 5 3 1 1 0 2 -6 -2

DAR'A 254 241 -13 64 -47 35 11 108 56 20 -41 10 7 0 3 1 1 0

AS-SWEIDA 146 131 -15 10 -8 76 -20 3 2 21 6 5 5 16 5 -4 -1

DAMASCUS 68 40 -28 33 -26 1 -3 2 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 -2

Total 638 585 -53 230 131 120 54 20 16 12 2

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q2 2019 P a g e | 14

 INSO, Figure 18: OAG attacks on GoS by Governorate and District, Southern Syria, Q2 2019
60

50

40

30

20

10

0
Dar'a Izra' As-Sanamayn As-Sweida Duma Rural Damascus Qatana Damascus Quneitra Ar-Rastan
Dar'a As-Sweida Rural Damascus Damascus Quneitra Homs

Q1 2019 Q2 2019

Widening Fault Lines Among GoS Supporters

During Q2, frustration and fatigue among certain segments of the population became more apparent, particularly over the dire
economic situation, poor service delivery and growing criminality. Fuel shortages, and ensuing popular protests, that hit large
swathes of GoS-held Syria during Q2 were just one example. Although a comparative analysis of social media posts and feeds is
not available, the language used by pro-GoS supporters, or in broader terms, by loyalists and the grievances they expressed,
were increasingly similar to those used by anti-GoS protesters at the onset of the Syrian conflict and 2011 and 2012. As such,
harsh critiques against GoS nepotism and corruption, or against poor economic management, increasingly populated GoS activ-
ists’ accounts and GoS-affiliated media. In some cases, well known pro-GoS activists and journalists have been reportedly arrest-
ed by security forces. Although it is hard to ascertain the veracity of these claims, they are reflective of a wider trend of dissatis-
faction and fatigue among the population in GoS areas.

Closely intertwined with the dynamic outlined above, was an increase in Q2 in the number of intra-GoS clashes, with 11 docu-
mented in all, up from four in Q1. While most of these events were short lived skirmishes and clashes between different divi-
sions of units of the regular army, in at least one case a dispute at a checkpoint along the M5 highway to the south west of Da-
mascus turned into a protracted armed clash between 4th Division and GoS military security members. Twelve GoS personnel
were killed. In most cases, clashes involved either directly or indirectly former OAGs now integrated into GoS ranks, thus high-
lighting the complexity and further possible pitfalls of the reconciliation process.

These issues will only be exacerbated in the medium term by competition over progressively scarcer resources and by growing
dissatisfaction among large parts of the security forces over the perceived unfairness of reconciliation agreements with OAGs
and the high volume of casualties sustained by GoS in Idleb governorate (see section 1.2.1)

INSO, Figure 19: IEDs in Damascus City, Q2 2019

An IED detonated as a suspected

OAG member attempted to
attach it to a vehicle. He was A UVIED detonated beneath the vehicle of a
killed in the blast. prominent journalist on the Mazzeh highway. Two
civilians, believed to be journalist’s wife and son,
A UVIED detonated beneath a A VBIED detonated in the vicinity of were wounded. The journalist himself was not
GoS affiliate's vehicle, killing him a mosque, wounding 11 civilians. present in the vehicle. Though ostensibly pro-GoS,
and wounding five civilians. The target was believed to be a the journalist had been increasingly critical of the
passing GoS military convoy. government.

24 April 06 May 11 May 27 June

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q2 2019 P a g e | 15

II. NGO SAFETY AND ACCESS
2.1 KEY TRENDS
INSO, Figure 20: NGO Incidents by Actor (Q3 2017 – Q2 2019)

GOS OAG CRIMINAL OTHER SDF IS IMF UNKNOWN LEM

Q2 2019 21 4 5 6 1 37
Q1 2019 3 5 8 4 1 21
Q4 2018 2 8 6 4 2 22
Q3 2018 5 10 7 2 3 11 29
Q2 2018 10 9 3 6 2 31
Q1 2018 64 10 5 8 3 1 91
Q4 2017 19 6 4 5 2 1 37
Q3 2017 17 12 2 1 2 1 35

Driven by a sharp increase in violence in Northern Syria in Q2, the number of incidents in which NGOs were impacted by insecu-
rity increased significantly compared to Q1 (see Figure 20). A total of 37 incidents were recorded in all, the majority of them, 21,
initiated by GoS and Russia, six by SDF, four by OAGs, five by criminal elements and one by tribal actors.

GoS and Russia: While not a single GoS-initiated NGO incident was recorded in Q1, GoS and Russian military activity re-emerged
in Q2 as the primary source of risk to humanitarian safety. As in periods of previous GoS ground offensives (including the GoS
advance on Abdul Thuhor in Q1 2018), the intense and indiscriminate aerial and artillery bombardment that accompanied GoS
attempts to gain ground in Idleb governorate increased the direct exposure of humanitarian staff and facilities to violence. A
total of 20 incidents were recorded across Q2 in which humanitarian and civilian facilities, most often hospitals (see Figure 23),
were struck by GoS or Russian air and artillery strikes (see Figure 21). Unsurprisingly, these incidents also accounted for the larg-
est proportion of NGO casualties, including the four recorded NGO fatalities of the period (see Figure 22), when an NGO ambu-
lance was hit by an airstrike while transporting patients.

The only GoS incident not related to the escalating conflict along southern Idleb frontlines was in Rural Damascus governorate,
where three NGO staff members were arrested. Despite concerns that the detention of humanitarian staff by GoS would be-
come a common occurrence in Southern Syria, especially where they had previously operated in OAG held areas, this was the
only such incident recorded in Q2. While this could reflect under-reporting of a specifically sensitive type of incident, it is unlikely
that a widespread trend of NGO staff being detained would go entirely undetected.

OAG: All four OAG-initiated NGO incidents occurred in the North, three in Idleb and one in Aleppo in an indication of the contin-
ued risks of exposure to a fragmented spectrum of armed groups. Two incidents involved IED detonations, one a case of deliber-
ate targeting based on a contracted driver’s former affiliation with an OAG, the other of collateral impact when an NGO staff
member was wounded in an IED detention targeting an OAG vehicle. The other two OAG-initiated incidents appeared to be cas-
INSO, Figure 21: NGO Incidents by Type and Actor (Q2 2019) es of direct interference in NGO operations.
In Northern Aleppo (Azaz District), OAG
Incident Type GOS SDF CRIMINAL OAG LEM
Aerial Attacks 18 members assaulted an NGO guard at a hos-
Arrests 1 5 1 pital after he denied one of their members
Assaults and Brawls 3 1 entrance while armed. In Idleb, meanwhile,
Artillery 2 HTS arrested a senior NGO staff member at
IEDs 2 the organisation’s office in Harim district in
Robberies and Abductions 2 what appeared to be a case of HTS inter-
Other 1 1 vening in a staffing dispute. Although no
Total 21 6 5 4 1 other incidents of HTS interference – a key

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q2 2019 P a g e | 17

 INSO, Figure 22: NGO Casualties (Fatalities and Injuries) by Quarter (Q3 concern of the international community – were reported in Q2, the
2018 – Q2 2019)
growth of the HTS-affiliated National Salvation Government (see
2.2.1) presents a continued risk.

SDF: Of the six recorded SDF-initiated incidents, four involved the

5
arrest of NGO staff for conscription amid renewed Asayish con-
scription campaigns in Al-Hasakeh and Ar-Raqqa governorates in
6 Q2. All four arrests occurred on or near to main roads in an indica-
tion of the measures employed by SDF and Asayish to enforce
2 4
mandatory military service. While in three of the incidents the
1 1 1 NGO staff involved were released having provided evidence that
Q3 2018 Q4 2018 Q1 2019 Q2 2019
Killed Wounded
they had either already completed military service or were ex-
empt, the incidents are revealing of the fact that employment in
the humanitarian sector is not in itself grounds for exemption. A fifth incident also involved the arrest of an NGO staff member
by Asayish investigating allegations of corruption, though he too was later released. In the remaining SDF incident of the quarter,
an SDF member threatened a group of NGO staff with violence after confiscating a food basket during a distribution in an IDP
camp in Deir-Ez-Zor governorate. Although an isolated incident in and of itself, it is emblematic of the tensions both with and
among security forces and IDPs that NGOs routinely encounter in camp settings in the East.

INSO, Figure 23: Impacted Humanitarian and Civilian Facilities, Q2 2019 Criminal and tribal: NGOs were affected by crime in five recorded
incidents and in a sixth, similar incident, by a tribal dispute. Along-
side two incidents in which NGO compounds were robbed, and
another in which an NGO vehicle was vandalised for unknown
reasons, there were two incidents in which NGO distributions
were disrupted by criminal violence. In one instance, in Deir-Ez-
Zor, an NGO distribution team were assaulted by a civilian
15
16 attempting to seize a food basket. In the second incident, also in
14
Deir-Ez-Zor, an armed clash broke out at the site of a distribution
10
between two families of a local tribe. The trigger for the second
5 incident is unclear, but both incidents again point to the complexi-
2 ties of operating in Deir-Ez-Zor and the impact of inter-communal
NGO Support No NGO Support tensions on access. The most serious incident of crime was record-
Bakeries Medical Facilities Markets Schools
ed in Aleppo, where an NGO doctor was abducted while in transit,
likely for ransom. Rising predatory crime (see section 1.2.1) remains a key source of risk in Northern Aleppo especially and medi-
cal staff are often perceived to be high-value targets for abduction.

2 . 2 H U M A N I TA R I A N A C C E S S : K E Y I S S U E S
2.2.(1) North

Consolidation of NSG Control

Access challenges across Northern Syria remained numerous and complex throughout Q2. While escalating conflict activity con-
tinued to pose conventional access challenges, the consolidation of HTS-affiliated National Salvation Government (NSG) minis-
tries and the emergence of subsidiary offices was also a major obstacle to humanitarian programming. The structures of NSG are
by no means unique, resembling many other governance structures in the region. It is composed of nine ministries, the division
of which is based on traditional government agencies (see Figure 24). The only outlier perhaps is the Ministry of Endowment,
which is charged with disseminating religious teachings based on strict interpretations of Islam, similar to a ministry of the same
name in Saudi Arabia.

Of primary concern for humanitarian agencies is the fact that NSG is in essence an instrument of HTS, an internationally pro-
scribed group. This means that by extension, NGOs must ensure that any engagement with NSG structures does not contravene

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q2 2019 P a g e | 18

international sanctions. The NSG is aware of this fact. Ever since December 2018, when several donors suspended cross border
shipments from Turkey due to a toll charge imposed on transportation companies by the NSG’s toll office, its leadership has is-
sued several public statements reasserting its commitment to not interfere with humanitarian programming.

While incidents of direct interference were minimal over Q2 (albeit with some notable exceptions – see 2.1), as the nine minis-
tries branch out it is becoming increasingly challenging for NGOs to identify indirect interactions with NSG sub-offices. At the end
of Q2, the NSG had 29 sub-offices and the number may increase in the coming months.

Identifying intersections between humanitarian programming and NSG entities has become a time consuming and resource in-
tensive exercise for NGOs, causing delays in the implementation of programming and the provision of aid to a highly dependent
population. With no signs that NSG’s authority is set to be seriously challenged in Q3, this will remain a persistent challenge.

INSO, Figure 24: NSG Administrative Structure

2.2.(2) East

Access and Security in Al-Hole Camp

As the SDF campaign to deny IS its remaining territory in Deir-Ez-Zor entered its closing stages between December 2018 and late
March, a large influx of refugees and IDPs reached Al-Hasakeh governorate’s Al-Hole Camp. This spurred changes in the access
and security environment of the camp and surrounding areas. This trend continued in Q2, with a rise in incidents of violence
within the camp compared to Q1. There were at least three incidents of IDPs or refugees setting fire to tents, three of assault –
affecting either IDPs or camp management – and two incidents in which Asayish were stabbed by female IDPs while escorting
them from one section of the camp to another. The tensions in part reflect a lack of anticipation of the number of IDPs and refu-
gees that would arrive from Deir-Ez-Zor, which in Q1 amounted to approximately 60,000 to a camp with a population prior to
that of 13,000. Although the size of the camp has been expanded since, tensions between different segments of the camp popu-
lation persist, as well suspicion and distrust towards Asayish. While the presence of family members of IS fighters is undoubtedly
a significant factor in this, it is far from the only factor and has received a disturbing level of sensationalist media attention, com-
pounding protection risks.

Although NGOs were not directly targeted in these incidents in Q2, operations were nonetheless impacted by increased Asayish
security measures and limitations on access to the camp (for several days at one stage). Progressively, Asayish and SDF have also
increased the level of their response to security incidents of any kind in Al-Hole, making access to the camp more unpredictable.
The apparent apprehension of security forces appeared also to be related to an increase in the number of incidents that took
place along the Al-Hasakeh-Al-Hole road or in vicinity to the camp. Whereas four incidents were recorded in 2018, and none in

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q2 2019 P a g e | 19

Q1, there were six across Q2, including three attacks involving SAF and IEDs against SDF/YPG vehicles and several IED discoveries
by SDF EOD teams.

Despite a small number of IDPs leaving the camp to return to their places of origin in June, as well as some repatriation of for-
eign nationals (mainly children), the trend towards increasing incidents of sporadic, low-level violence inside the camp and in the
surrounding area is set to continue in Q3. As elements of the camp population grow more frustrated and potentially willing to
use violence, the imposition of further security measures by SDF and Asayish and access constraints should be expected.

2.2.(3) South

Fragmented Control in Dar’a

While GoS nominally regained complete territorial control of Dar’a governorate with the conclusion of its 2018 ground offensive,
the reality is more nuanced and Q2 saw the crystallization of spheres of influence in which GoS authority remains threatened by
other armed actors. Territorial control resembled a patchwork, divided between different branches of GoS forces and, increas-
ingly, former OAG members who were allowed to remain under the terms of local reconciliation agreements. Low-level attacks
targeting GoS personnel have been a growing trend (see section 1.2.3); however, OAG activity escalated in Q2 to include a series
of episodes – including in Dar’a al-Balad, As Sanamayn and Jasim – in which OAGs actively contested GoS control of territory.
Although small in scale, they nonetheless point to the limits in GoS’ ability to respond with force to these emerging security chal-
lenges – both because of the commitment of its most capable forces to Northwest frontlines and a likely desire to avoid local
tensions spiralling out of control into a renewed wider conflict with OAGs.

Against this backdrop, GoS continued to influence and restrict humanitarian activity in the governorate in Q2. This was evident
primarily in the continued need to seek the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to travel to and access areas of Dar’a, as
well as the requirement for the majority of humanitarian agencies to work through a local organisation broadly affiliated with
GoS. GoS also uses instability in Dar’a to restrict or grant access ‒ citing security concerns ‒ in a bid to indirectly influence the
distribution of aid.

Taken together, these developments suggest that humanitarian access in Dar’a will remain heavily constrained in Q3. The imme-
diate operational implications are two-fold. In the first instance, humanitarian access will continue to be the subject of close GoS
scrutiny and, more than that, GoS may attempt to direct aid away from areas where its authority is challenged. In the second,
these emerging spheres of contested influence mean that NGOs and other humanitarian agencies will have to negotiate with an
increasingly disparate array of armed actors if they are to gain and maintain access.

QUARTERLY REPORT | Q2 2019 P a g e | 20

 COMMON ACRONYMS
BCP Border Crossing Point LEM Local Ethnic Militia

CF Coalition Forces MOC Military Operations Command

FSA Free Syrian Army NDF National Defense Forces

GoI Government of Iraq NGO Non Governmental Organisation

GoJ Government of Jordan OAG Organised Armed Group

GoS Government of Syria PYD Democratic Union Party

GoT Government of Turkey RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade

HMG Heavy Machine Gun SAF Small Arms Fire

IDF Israeli Defense Forces SDF Syria’s Democratic Forces

IED Improvised Explosive Device TAF Turkish Armed Forces

IS Islamic State VCP Vehicle Check Point

JSF Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham YPG The People's Protection Units

KRG Kurdistan Regional Government

X. Report Ends
For further information:
d ire c to r @ sy r. n go s afety. o rg

© INSO, JULY 2019

----- IMPORTANT INFORMATION -----

Stichting International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) registered 17 January 2019, non-profit
Foundation (ANBI) in the Netherlands, KvK 73728489 at Hague Humanity Hub, Fluwelen
Burgwal 58, ‘s-Gravenhage, 2511-CJ, Netherlands
Contact INSO at info@syr.ngosafety.org.