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The psychology of revolution
Fathali M Moghaddam and Margaret J Hendricks
Revolutions are attempts to forcibly overthrow the political and
social order. However, most revolutions fail to generate longer-
term psychological changes to bring about a match between
the behavior of the population and the espoused goals of the
revolution. Attempts by the new ruling ‘revolutionary’ elite to
re-establish order in society often result in a resurgence of
repression and corruption, and imprisonment for those
considered ‘anti-revolutionary’. Recent psychological research
on revolutions explains this failure through limitations in political
plasticity, the speed and extent to which political behavior does
or does not change, which constrain the impact a revolution
can have on individual and collective behavior.
Address
3700 O St. NW, White Gravenor Hall (3rd Floor), Georgetown University,
Washington, DC, 20057, USA
Corresponding author:
Moghaddam, Fathali M (moghaddf@georgetown.edu)
Current Opinion in Psychology 2020, 35:7–11
This review comes from a themed issue on Social change (rallies,
riots and revolutions) (2020)
Edited by Séamus A Power
For a complete overview see the Issue and the Editorial
Available online 20th February 2020
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.02.004
2352-250X/ã 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
There are extensive bodies of psychological research on
themes associated with revolution, including justice [1],
relative deprivation [2], inter-group and inter-cultural
relations [3], inter-group contact [4], poverty and inequal-
ity [5], and inter-group theories [6], but scant psychologi-
cal research directly on revolution, the forced overthrow of
a political and social order [7]. The characteristics of
revolutions explain this neglect: first, revolutions are rare
occurrences; second, they are difficult to study using the
most commonly used methods in psychology, the labora-
tory experiment; third and most importantly, they con-
cern macro-level processes and are conceptually incom-
patible with the reductionist, individualistic approach of
traditional psychology [8].
This discussion is organized to address four main questions:
What is a revolution? What are the key psychological
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characteristics of revolutions? What psychological factors
contribute to the failure of revolutions? And what psycho-
logical research should be conducted toward a better
understanding of revolutions? A theme underlying all four
questions is political plasticity, the speed and extent to which
political behavior does or does not change [9].
What is a revolution?
Revolutions are dramatic or abrupt forced changes in the
system and structure of society [10]. Type 1 revolutions are
by far the most common: they bring about ‘within-system
change,’ a change in rulers without change in the deeper
political system (e.g. the ayatollah takes over from the
Shah, but dictatorship continues after the 1979 Iran revo-
lution). Type 2 revolutions are rare; they involve ‘between-
system change’, for example from monarchy to democ-
racy. Type 1 change is easier to bring about even on a
smaller scale, as evident from discussions of change in
organizations [11]. In her typology of dramatic social
change, de la Sablonniere [12] suggests that even what
we have termed as Type 1 revolutions threaten the cultural
identity of individuals in society so that they must rede-
fine their behavior and adapt to fit within the new
structural system. However, due to constraints in the
malleability of collective and individual behavior, most
revolutions [or attempted revolutions] do not result in this
change in individual behavior [13,14]. Thus, Type 1
revolutions tend to involve surface-level change, simply
leading to a change in leadership, with very little impact
on the normative structure that governs everyday life in
society [15,16]. Important to understanding the limita-
tions of revolution’s psychological impact on society, is
examining the key characteristics of revolutions that
restrict or facilitate social change.
What are the key psychological
characteristics of revolution?
The key psychological characteristics of revolutions can
be conceptualized in four groups: (i) subjective feelings of
inequity and relative deprivation [17], together with
aspirations for an alternative society that lead individuals
to participate in radical collective action [18]; (ii) the
channeling of collective resources by the counter-elite
to overthrow the current ruling elite [19]; (iii) manage-
ment of collective aspirations and demands after the
revolution, so that order is re-established with the new
elite as rulers [20]; and (iv) longer-term psychological
changes to bring about a match between the behavior of
the population and the espoused goals of the revolution.
The first three sets of psychological changes have been
brought about in numerous societies experiencing Type 1
Current Opinion in Psychology 2020, 35:7–11
8 Social change (rallies, riots and revolutions) (2020)
revolutions. A strong sense of unfairness is seen as central
to radicalization both at individual and collective levels
[21,22]. But radicalization does not take place in a vac-
uum; the term ‘mutual radicalization’ has been used to
depict how groups radicalize one another, pushing each
other to greater extremes, often through the use of vio-
lence [21,23]. Aspirations for an alternative, better life
have also been a focus of research, for example, among the
poor [24], although it is clear that frustrated aspirations
alone do not lead individuals to join radical collective
movements. Feelings of unfairness, relative deprivation,
and aspirations for an alternative society can be channeled
by a counter-elite to mobilize the population to overthrow
the existing rulers.
After the ruling elite have been overthrown, the counter-
elite face the challenge of re-establishing order, and in
some cases the counter-elite are forced to retreat, re-
organize, and maneuver to achieve order [25]; they can
do this by manipulating certain psychological factors.
First, before the revolution, the counter-elite emphasize
the rights of the people (e.g. ‘Citizens have a right to rebel
against authority’), but after the revolution, there is a
sudden and drastic shift to the duties of the people
(e.g. ‘Citizens have a duty to obey the ruling authority’).
Second, social comparisons are used to lower expectations
and create feelings of contentment in the population.
This is achieved after the revolution by changing the
criteria and target for social comparison (e.g. ‘Our revolu-
tion is about values, justice, and humanity, it cannot be
judged by crass materialist measures such as how much
money citizens have . . . ’). Third, displacement is used
to direct frustrations and anger at ‘enemies’ who are
intent on destroying the ‘people’s revolution.’ These
enemies can include internal (e.g. religious and ethnic
minorities) and external (e.g. the USA and other foreign)
forces.
While the above-listed changes are often achieved
through Type 1 revolutions, longer-term changes to bring
about psychological transformations to align the charac-
teristics of the population with the espoused values and
goals of the revolution are far more difficult and seldom if
ever achieved. Thus, Type 1 revolution has been achieved
relatively often, but Type 2 revolution has proven to be far
more difficult. To gain a deeper understanding of this
failure, we need to explore the limitations on political
plasticity.
Why do revolutions fail?
Type 2 revolutions generally fail in the sense that after the
ruling regime is overthrown the ideals of the revolution
are not achieved. In short, Type 1 but not Type 2 revolution
is achieved: the regime changes, but this represents
within-system rather than between-system change [26].
The main reasons for this are limitations on political
plasticity. A second, related reason is that as the new
Current Opinion in Psychology 2020, 35:7–11
ruling ‘revolutionary’ elite fail to deliver what was prom-
ised to its mass of supporters before the revolution, there
is [often severe] crackdown on civil liberties and a
renewed repression — which inevitably results in the
resurgence of corruption [27]. As a post-revolution dicta-
torship emerges, people become increasingly afraid to
complain about inefficiencies, bribery by government
officials, and the like.
With respect to limitations on political plasticity, one of
the most important types of behavior to consider is leader-
follower relations. Leadership is a common characteristic
of all major societies [28] and the ‘inevitability’ of lead-
ership is an example of rigid political plasticity. Despite
the availability of technology that could enable routine
and mass involvement in decision-making in many areas,
even in societies that ostensibly are politically very dif-
ferent (e.g. USA, China, Russia) the most important
decisions are often made by individual (almost exclu-
sively male) leaders. Revolutions have failed to change
this centralization of (male) leadership power: for exam-
ple, all the way from Lenin after the 1917 Russian revo-
lution to Putin in the 21st century the tradition of
centralized power in the hands of one ‘strongman’ has
continued in Russia [29]. This continuity is evident in all
major revolutions, from the French Revolution (1789) in
which the executed King Louis XVI (1754–1793) is soon
replaced by Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821),
to Iran where the last Shah is replaced by Ayatollah
Khomeini (1902–1989), to the Arab Spring which (except
in Tunisia) has so far replaced one set of male dictators for
another.
As indicated in the above discussion of leadership, an area
in which political plasticity has been very limited is male
dominance and rigid gender roles in politics [30], partic-
ularly in the defense and security sectors [31,32]. In many
parts of the world women are explicitly forbidden from
national leadership, and even in the United States and
other Western societies there has been extremely slow
and inadequate progress toward gender power parity in
politics and business [33].
After the new ruling elite take over power and Type 1
revolution is complete, typically the non-elite become
frustrated because the promises of the revolutionaries are
not being fulfilled. Support for the new ‘revolutionary’
regime declines, critical attacks increase, and in order to
stay in power the ruling elite crack down on civil liberties
and freedoms. Prisons start filling up with political prison-
ers again, now branded as ‘anti-revolutionary’ or
‘reactionary’ depending on the nature of the new regime.
The closing up of the political system inevitably increases
corruption, as suggested by experimental research on
power and corruption [34,26]. Citizens who complain
about inefficiency and corruption in the government
system are dismissed and/or punished.
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In the final section below, we highlight areas in which
psychological research can increase understanding of the
limitations of political plasticity in revolutions, with par-
ticular focus on the role of women [and gender equality]
in sustaining social change following revolutions.
What psychological research should be
conducted to better understand revolutions?
Psychological research has been heavily focused on why
revolutions begin, but less so on why Type 2 revolutions
invariably fail. An issue that needs more research atten-
tion is the centralized and dominant role of male leader-
ship during and following revolutions; this male domi-
nance imposes considerable limitations on achieving
radical social change.
Little is known about the roles and importance of
women’s participation in revolutions [35,36], but much
less is known about how their involvement influences
long-term success of revolutionary ideals, and improves
gender equality and justice. Recent international stud-
ies examining trends after periods of conflict, including
revolution and civil war, found that most measures to
institutionalize gender equality and increase women’s
power in society were ultimately short-term; eventually
social norms and role shifts that occur during the con-
flict or revolt fade away [37,38]. Likewise, an experi-
mental project to increase gender equality in law
enforcement by incorporating women in Liberian
National Police units did not result in improved opi-
nions of gender equality within the male dominated
police force [39]. These findings follow in line with
psychological research on contact theory [40], suggest-
ing that more is needed than the mere presence of
women to achieve more just gender relations and sus-
tain the new governing system. How else might psy-
chological research and theories help us understand
why gender roles and women’s empowerment are not
sustained in post-revolution society?
Limitations in sustaining gender equality are just one
factor highlighting the inability of revolutions to achieve
between-system change. In order to maintain their hold,
the new regime often resorts to old regime (dictatorial)
tactics. Instead of sustaining the revolutionary ideals,
both leaders and followers seem to abandon them. One
area of research that has resurged in the last decade is a
focus on morality in collective action movements [41].
Recent psychological studies suggest that moral obliga-
tion to act is a key predictor of participating in collective
action protests, beyond mere moral norms or convictions
promoted by the movement [42]. Extending to revolu-
tions, more research is needed to better understand how
limitations on political plasticity lead to failures to sustain
moral obligations to the revolutionary ideals in the post-
revolution period.
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The psychology of revolution Moghaddam and Hendricks 9
Finally, research on pre-conditions for revolutions should
also focus on how people who are happy rather than
unhappy engage with social problems. The assumption,
particularly in relative deprivation [43] and justice [44]
research, has been that discontent leads individuals to
tackle societal problems. However, new research [45] is
suggesting more attention should be given to how con-
tented but engaged people support radical social change.
Conclusion
Limitations in political plasticity constrain the psycho-
logical impact of a revolution on society; most revolutions
only achieve within-system change. The failure of new
revolutionary regimes to establish a new governing sys-
tem often results in a resurgence of dictatorship and
corruption. In this review, we highlighted the need for
psychological research on gender equality and male lead-
ership in revolutions to increase our understanding of this
failure to achieve between-system change. Research on
revolutions should also consider the future direction of
revolutions in the 21st century. Rapidly changing tech-
nologies and social media are transforming the possibili-
ties for radical protests and revolutions [46]. The new
technologies could empower the masses and bring about
Type 2 revolutions, but they might also continue to be
used to create and spread ‘fake news’ and help bring to
power authoritarian strongmen [47]. In some ways, then,
this has the potential to be a revolutionary time.
Funding
This research did not receive any specific grant from
funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-
profit sectors.
Conflict of interest statement
Nothing declared.
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Current Opinion in Psychology 2020, 35:7–11