TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction…………………………………………………………….. 1

Book One

GENERAL PROVISIONS REGARDING THE DATE OF

ENFORCEMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF
THIS CODE, AND REGARDING THE OFFENSES, THE PERSONS
LIABLE AND THE PENALTIES

Title One

FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL

LIABILITY

Chapter One – Felonies………………………………………………. 11

1. Classification of Felonies…………………………………. 12
2. Incurrence of Criminal Liability ……………………………14
3. Duty of Court When Penalty is Excessive………………. 20
4. Stages of Execution……………………………………… ..21
5. Light Felonies………………………………………………. 24
6. Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Felony……………. 25
7. Offenses not Subject to the Code…………………………26

Chapter Two – Circumstances Affecting Criminal Liability …………27

1. Justifying Circumstances……...………………………….…27
2. Exempting Circumstances…………………………………. 32
3. Mitigating Circumstances……..…………………………… 37
4. Aggravating Circumstances….…………………………….. 43
5. Alternative Circumstances…….……………………………. 62
 Title Two

PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES

1. Who are liable ……………………………………….. …..65

2. Principals…………………………………………………...65
3. Accomplices………………………………………………..68
4. Accessories………………………………………………...69

Title Three

PENALTIES

1. Penalties In General……………………………………...73
2. Classification of Penalties……………………………… .73
3. Duration of Penalties………………….………………….75
4. Preventive and Subsidiary Imprisonment………………76
5. Application of Mitigating and Aggravating………………77
6. Other Effects of Penalty…………………………………..80
7. Complex Crimes and Their Penalties………..………….81
8. Continuing Crime………………………………..…………82
9. Indeteminate Sentence Law………………………………83
10. Probation Law………………………………………………86
11. Conditions of Probation……………………………………88
12. Other Instances When Probation Not Applicable……….88

Title Four

EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY: TOTAL AND PARTIAL

1. Extinction of Criminal Liability (Total and Partial)……….89

2. Reason for Prescription of the Crime
and/or Penalty…………………………………..………94
3. Marriage of the Offended Party with
the Offender…………………………………………..…95
4. Partial Extinction of Criminal Liability……………………..96
 Title Five

CIVIL LIABILITY

1. Person Civilly Liable for Felonies……………………………..97

2. Civil Liability of Parents and/or Guardians…………………..
…………………………………...97
3. Subsidiary Liability of Inn Keepers, Tavern-Keepers,
Employers, Teachers or Persons Engaged in
Industry………………………………………………………98
 INTRODUCTION

CRIMINAL LAW

Definition

Criminal Law is that branch or division of public law

which defines crimes, treats of their nature, and provides for
their punishment.

Crime is defined as an act committed or omitted in

violation of public law forbidding or commanding it. It is a
positive or negative act in violation of penal law; an offense
against the state. (Black’s Law Dictionary)

Accused is a person formally charged in court for having

violated a penal law – either the Revised Penal Code or a
special law; a person whom an accusastion is made. (Black’s
Law Dictionary)

Sources of Philippine Criminal Law

1. The Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) which took effect
on January 1, 1932, and its amendments;

2. Special laws defining acts and providing penalties for them

passed by the legislative department or branch of Philippine
Government known variously in Philippine history as
Philippine Commission, Philippine Assembly, Philippine
Legislature, National Assembly, Batasang Pambansa and
Congress of the Philippines;

3. Presidential Decree of Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos during his

term; and

4. Executive Orders of Former Pres. Corazon C. Aquino

during her incumbency.
 Rights of the Accused

A. Constitutional Rights

1. Right to bail except those charged with offenses punishable by

reclusion perpetua (and/or death) when evidence of guilt is
strong. (Sec. 13, Art. III)

2. To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be

heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial
and public trial, to meet the witness face to face, and the right to
compulsory process to secure attendance of witnesses, and
production of evidence. (Sec. 14, Art. III)

3. Not to be compelled to be a witnessed against himself. (Sec. 17,

Art. III)

4. Right against excessive fines or cruel, degrading or inhuman

punishment. (Sec. 19, Art. III)

5. Right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the

same offense. (Sec. 2, Art. III)

B. Statutory Rights

1. To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond

reasonable doubt.

2. To be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him

3. To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of

the proceedings; to defend himself in person when its sufficiently
appears to the court that he can protect his rights without the
assistance of counsel.

4. To testify as a witness in his own behalf.

5. To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against

himself.

6. To confront and cross-examine the witness against him.

7. To have a compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of

witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf.

8. To have a speedy, impartial and public trial, and

9. To have the right to appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner
prescribed by law. (Sec. 115, Rules of Court)

It must be taken note of that the right to appeal is not a constitutional

right. Congress may therefore pass a law eliminating or taking away
this right.
Cardinal Features or Main Characteristics or
Components of Philippine Criminal Law

There are three (3);

1. General

- meaning that Philippine criminal laws are binding on all persons who
live or sojourn in the Philippines. Whoever you are, whatever be your creed,
religion, sex or nationality, as long as you reside in the Philippine territory,
penal laws of the Philippines shall apply on you. Thus, the contention of the
accused that being an American citizen he can not be prosecuted for, much less
convicted of, Illegal Possession of Firearm because it is a constitutional right
of the citizen of the U.S.A. “to keep and bear arms” without need of securing
government license therefore is untenable since the Philippines, as a sovereign
state, has a right to uphold its law and maintain order within its domain, and
with the general jurisdiction to punish person for offenses committed within its
territory. (People vs. Galacgac, C.A. 54 O.G. 1027)

There are exceptions to this general application of criminal Law:

A. Principles of Public International Law

Thus, sovereigns and other chiefs of state, Ambassadors, Ministers

plenipotentiary, Minister residents, and charges d’affaires even if residing
or sojourning in the Philippines, and committing crimes herein not subject
to our penal laws.

B. Treaties or Treaty Stipulations

The persons who are exempted from the operation or application of

our criminal laws under the provisions of the treaties entered into by the
Philippines with another country are likewise exempted. Under the defunct
Military Base Agreement entered into by Philippines and U.S.A. on March
14, 1947 – any offense committed outside the bases by any member of
armed forces of the United States where the offended party is also a
member of the said armed forces is not cognizable by the Philippine courts.
Under the VFA, an American soldier committing a crime during military
exercises is also exempt from the operation of Philippine criminal law.

C. Laws of Preferential Application

An example is Sec. 11 of Art.VI of the Constitution which provides

that “No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place
for any speech or debate in Congress or in any committee thereof. “Thus, if
a Senator A delivers a libelous speech in Congress against B, he can not be
punished or be held liable even if he is residing in the Philippines.

2. Territorial

- in that our criminal law undertakes to punish crimes committed only

within the Philippine territory. Outside of the parameters of the Philippine
archipelago, Philippine criminal laws can not be enforced.

There are exceptions however. Under Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
there are five (5) instances where the provisions shall be enforced outside of
the jurisdiction of our country against those who:
 A. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship.

B. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippines

or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the
Philippines.
C. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into the
Philippines of the obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding
number.
D. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in
the exercise of their functions; or
E. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law
of nations defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.

3. Prospective

- meaning that a penal law can not make an act punishable when it was not
punishable when committed. In other words, crimes are punished under the
laws in force at the time the same were perpetrated. It is consonance with
the constitutional prohibition against Ex Post Facto Law. It reflects the
maxim: mullum crimen sine poena; nulla poena sine lege - that is, there is
no crime without a penalty and there is no penalty without law.

Exception however is provided for by Article 22. It says:

Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor

the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, as this term
is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code x x x.

The retroactive effect shall benefit the accused even if at the time of the
publication of the law, a final judgement has been pronounced and the convict
is serving sentence.

Even if the law uses the words “felony” and “habitual criminal as this
term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62,” this is applicable to special laws which
provide more favorable conditions to the accused. (People vs. Soliman, 36
Phil. 5; People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 555; People vs. De Lara, 236 SCRA 291)

There is no retroactive effect however, even if the law is favorable to

the accused if he is a habitual delinquent or where the law is expressly made
inapplicable to pending actions. (Tavera vs. Valdez, 1 Phil. 468)

If the repealing law favors the accused by diminishing the penalty, or

doing it away altogether, then the same should be applied to the extent it is
favorable to the offender. (People vs. Soliman, 36 Phil. 5)

If a repealing law contains provisions which are favorable to the

accused and also provisions unfavorable to the accused and also provisions
unfavorable to the accused only those parts which are favorable to the accused
shall be given retroactive effect.

Although R.A. No.8294, took effect on 6 July 1997, or after the crimes
involved in the case at bar were committed in 1994, it is advantageous to the
accused, hence it should be given retrospective application in so far as it spares
the accused from a separate conviction to the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearm. (People vs. Candido, 383 SCRA 296)
 Judicial decisions which are favorable to the accused who is not a
habitual delinquent shall also be accorded retroactive effect.

If the new law fails to penalize the act, then the Court loses jurisdiction,
as in effect, there is no crime existing.

INTERPRETATION IN CASE OF DOUBT

Where doubt exists, the penal law must be interpreted liberally in favor
of the accused and strictly against the state. Thus a boy who killed his
classmate on his ninth (9th) birthday and acting with discernment is not
criminally liable since there is a doubt in the provision of the law. Article 12,
par. 2 provides that a person under (9) years of age is exempt from criminal
liability (even if he acted with discernment) while a person over nine(9) and
under fifteen (15) years old is not exempt if he acted with discernment. So if
the boy will kill his classmate when he was exactly nine(9) years old because it
was his birthday, doubt would exist as to his criminal responsibility. He will be
considered exempt as penal laws are to be interpreted liberally in favor of the
accused. This is the Pro reo doctrine.

Under R.A. No. 9344, a child exactly fifteen years of age or below is
exempt from criminal responsibility, if he is more than fifteen but below
eighteen, he is exempt unless he acted with discernment.

The Supreme Court has always ruled that agrarian laws must be
interpreted in favor of the grantees in order to give full force and effect to the
clear intent of such law. (Estolas vs. Mabalot 381 SCRA 702)

However, when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there
is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation – there is only room
for application. (Cooperative Development Authority vs. Dolefil Agrarian
Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc., 382 SCRA 552)
 BOOK ONE

General Provisions Regarding the Date of Enforcement and Application

of the Provisions of this Code, and Regarding the Offenses, the Person
Liable and the Penalties
 Title One

FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT

CRIMINAL LIABILITY

CHAPTER ONE

FELONIES

Felonies are acts and omissions punishable by law. (Art. 3, par. 1) The
word “felony” has been understood to mean an act or omission punished by the
Code; it does not cover a crime punished by a special law. (Filipinas Life
Assurance Co. vs. Tolentino, SP-5858, October 1, 1976)

They are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) – that is, when
the act is performed with deliberate intent, but also by means of fault (culpa)
meaning, when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill. (Art. 3, pars. 2 and 3)

Felonies take the form of a positive act – like killing a person –

Homicide or Murder, or taking unlawfully personal property – Theft or
Robbery, or an omission or failure to perform an act, like failure to issue a
receipt of a public officer entrusted with collection of taxes (Illegal Exaction)
or failure to deliver within the prescribed time a person arrested (Delay in the
Delivery of Detained Person). In felony by omission however, there must be a
law requiring the doing or the performance of an act. Thus, mere passive
presence at the scene of a crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm,
without evidence of agreement or conspiracy is not punishable. Where
therefore R, about a meter away from M, her live-in partner, did not do
anything despite M’s threat that he would burn the house which he actually put
on fire, she can not be held criminally liable with M, there being no proof of
conspiracy between them. (People vs. Silvestre & Atienza, 56 Phil. 358)

The act or omission however, must be punishable by laws. This is

based on the maxim NULLUM CRIMEN NULLA POENA SINE LEGE – that
is, “there is no crime where there is no law punishing it.”

CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES

A. According to manner or mode of execution (Art. 3)

1. Intentional felonies – committed by means of deceit or malice.

Example: Murder, Estafa

2. Culpable felonies – where the wrongful acts result from

imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill

Example: Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence or Reckless

Imprudence resulting to Homicide.

xxx
B. According to stage of execution (Art.6)

1. Consummated – when all the elements necessary for its execution

and accomplishment are present.

2. Frustrated – when the offender performs all the acts of execution

which would produce the felony as a consequence but which
nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of
the will of the perpetrator.

3. Attempted – when the offender commences the commission of a

felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

C. According to gravity (Art.9)

1. Grave felonies – those to which the law attaches the capital

punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive
in accordance with Art. 25 of the Revised Penal Code.

Example: Rape, Parricide

2. Less Grave felonies – those which the law punishes with penalties
which in their maximum period are correctional.

Example: Attempted Homicide, Illegal Discharge of Firearm

3. Light felonies – those infractions of law for the commission of

which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding two
hundred (P200.00) pesos, or both provided.

Example: Slight Physical Injuries, Alarm and Scandal under

Article 155

While Article 3 classifies the crimes into Intentional and Culpable, a

third class can be grouped with it – that its, those defined and penalized by
special laws which include crimes punished by city or municipal ordinances.
They are generally referred to as mala prohibita. As a rule, intent to commit
the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. The act alone, irrespective of
the motives, constitutes the offense. Good faith is not defense.

Mala in se and Mala prohibita, distinguished

Mala in se are crimes which are wrong from their nature, such as
murder, theft, rape, etc., while those that are mala prohibita are wrong, merely
because they are prohibited by statute, like Illegal Posession of Firearm or
violation of the Ombus Election Law.

Crimes mala in se are those so serious in their effects on society as to

call for the almost unanimous condemnation of its members, while crimes
mala prohibita are violations of mere rules of convenience designed to secure
a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society.
 When the acts however are inherently immoral, they are mala in se,
even if punished under special law and before the actor can be held liable,
there must be malice or criminal intent.

Thus, election inspectors and poll clerks who were tasked to transfer
the names of excess voters in one precinct to a newly created precinct and
because of pressures of work and fatigue, omitted some names of person, who
then were not allowed to vote, when charged with violation of the Election
Code, relied on good faith as a defense.

The CFI, reasoning that the offense is malum prohibitum and good
faith is not a defense, convicted them. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in
acquitting the accused ruled that the failure or omission to include a voter’s
name in the registry list of voters is not only wrong because it is prohibited, it
is wrong per se because it disenfranchises a voter and violated his
constitutional right. To be held liable, the election inspectors and poll clerks,
must act willfully and maliciously. (People vs. Sunico, et. al., C.A. 50 O.G.
5880)

INCURRENCE OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Criminal liability shall be incurred:

(1)By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended, and

(2)By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons
or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or
on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. (Art. 4)

This article does not mean to exclude offenders who are liable even if
they do not fall under any of the situations spoken of in the said article. Thus, a
person who committed a crime which he really intended is no doubt liable for
that offense like, if A, intending to kill his father, shot him, he is liable for the
death of his father. The opening sentence of Article 4 should have been:
“Criminal liability shall also be incurred by.”

No. 1 speaks of a situation where a person was committing a felony

but the consequence was not the one he had intended. He must, however, be
perpetrating or committing an offense otherwise there can be no criminal
liability. Thus, if A, in attempting to commit suicide, jumped out from the
window of a four (4)-story building and fell on another person who was killed,
you cannot hold him criminally liable for Intentional Homicide because he was
not committing any felony at that time since committing suicide is not a
felony.

There are three (3) scenarios under paragraph 1 of Article 4:

A. Error in personae (mistake in the identity of the victim)

- Two (2) peace officers were ordered to arrest Balagtas, an escaped

notorious convict, and proceeding to the latter’s house, saw a man
sleeping with his back towards the door and fired at him but the man
turned out to be Serapio Tecson, the Supreme Court ruled they are
guilty of murder. (People vs. Oanis, et. al., 74 Phil. 257)
 When they fired on the sleeping man without making any inquiry
and believing him to be the notorious escapee, the peace officers were
committing a felony. Their wrongful intent was to hit or kill Balagtas
but the wrongful act that was done was the killing of Serapio Tecson.

B. Aberratio ictus (mistake in the blow) – Thus, if X, intending to kill

Y, fired at the latter but the shot hit Y only superficially and killed
Z, his own father, he (X) is criminally liable for Attempted
Homicide with Parricide. When X shot Y, he was perpetrating a
felony with the wrongful intent to kill Y. the wrongful act
committed was the killing of his own father which he never
intended. In People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil 307, the accused who threw
a hand grenade at Pres. Roxas but killed Simeon Varela and injured
several persons was found guilty of Murder with Assault and
Multiple Attempted Murder.

C. Praeter intentionem (Injurious result is greater than that intended) –

Thus, if A slapped his wife who fell on the ground, her head hitting
a hard pavement rendering her unconscious and thereafter died, A is
liable for Parricide. When he slapped his wife, A was committing a
felony. His wrongful intent is only to cause injury but the wrongful
act done was greater – the killing of the spouse.

In U.S. vs. Marasigan, 27 Phil. 504, where the accused attacked the
offended party with a knife, and in the process of warding off the same, his
left hand was injured, severing the extensor tendon in one of the fingers, the
Supreme Court held that the accused is criminally liable. The fact that the
original condition of the finger could be restored by a surgical operation is
immaterial and the victim is not obliged to submit to a surgical operation to
relieve the accused of the natural and ordinary results of his crime.

The wrong done, however, must be the direct and natural consequence
of the felonies act. Stated otherwise, the felony committed must be the
proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause has been defined as
“that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.” (Vda. De Batacan, et. al. vs. Medina, 102 Phil. 181,
citing Vol. 38 of Am. Jur.)

In Bringas vs. People, et. al., 125 SCRA 687, where the conductor
shouted “Lusacan, Lusacan” knowing that the train would reach the Lucasan
Station full three (3) minutes more and deceased Martina Bool, a passenger,
walked towards the left front door facing the direction of Tiaong, Quezon
carrying a child with one hand and holding her baggage with another, and
when the train that slowed down suddenly picked up speed causing Martina
Bool and the three (3)-year-old child she was carrying to fall from the door
causing their deaths, the Supreme Court said:

“The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the

premature and erroneous announcement of the conductor. This
announcement prompted the two (2) victims to stand and proceed to the
nearest exit. Without said announcement, the victims would have been
safely seated in their respective seats when the train jerked as it picked
up speed. The connection between the premature and erroneous
announcement of the accused and the deaths of the victims is direct and
natural, unbroken by any intervening efficient causes.”
 Even if other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result as long as
the wound inflicted is dangerous, that is, calculated to destroy or endanger life,
the actor is liable. This is true even though the immediate cause of death was
erroneous or unskillful medical or surgical treatment, refusal of the victim to
submit to surgical operation, or that the deceased was suffering from
tuberculosis, heart disease or other internal malady or that the resulting injury
was aggravated by infection. (See The Revised Penal Code, Book I by Luis B.
Reyes, citing U.S. vs. Marasigan, 27 Phil 504; People vs. Illustre, 54 Phil 594;
People vs. Reyes, 61 Phil 341, People vs. Quianson, 62 Phil 162; and People
vs. Red, C.A. 43 O.G. 8072)

There must, however, be no efficient intervening cause. In U.S. vs.

Valdez, it was ruled that if a person against whom a criminal assault is
directed, reasonably believes himself to be in danger of death or great bodily
harm and in order to escape, jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of
self-preservation, from drowning owing to his possible inability to swim or the
strength of the current. The inability to swim and the strong current can be
considered intervening causes but not efficient ones since they are not acts or
facts absolutely foreign from the criminal act. On the other hand, in People vs.
Rockwell, 39 Mich. 503, an American case, the assailant was not held
responsible for the death of a person whom he knocked down with his fist but
who was jumped on by a nearby horse killing him, because the act of the horse
constitutes an efficient intervening cause.

Impossible Crime

An act performed with malice which would have been an offense

against person or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means. This is the only crime provided for in Book I of the Revised Penal
Code. The Court having in mind the social danger and the degree of
criminality shown by the offender shall impose the penalty of arresto mayor or
a fine ranging from two hundred (P200.00) to five hundred (P500.00). (Art. 59,
RPC)

The requisites are:

A. The act performed would be an offense against persons or property like

Parricide, Murder, Homicide, Abortion, Duel or Physical Injuries, or
Robbery, Brigandage, Theft, Usurpation, Culpable Insolvency, Estafa
and Other Deceits, Chattel Mortgage, Arson and Malicious Mischief.

B. That the act was done with evil intent.

C. That its accomplishment is inherently impossible or that the means

employed is either inadequate or ineffectual.

Examples: Inherent Impossibility (Legal and Physical)

A saw B lying down whom he thought was only sleeping. So

with intent to kill, he stabbed B several times on his chest. It turned out
that B had been dead twenty (20) or thirty (30) minutes ago.
Legal Impossibility

X stole the ring which Y inadvertently left on his desk. It turned out
that the said ring was the one X lost two(2) days ago.

Physical Impossibility

A, B, C, D & E, all armed, proceeded to the house of X whereupon A

pointed to the room that X used to occupy and all fired at the said room.
Nobody was hit as no one was inside the room. This is a case of Impossible
Crime to Commit Murder: (Intod vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., 215 SCRA
52)

A saw a beautiful lady lying down already dead, but thinking that she
was only sleeping, undressed and had sex with her. This is an Impossible
Crime to Commit Rape considering that under R.A. No. 8353, the crime rape
has been reclassified as an offense against persons, no longer a crime against
chastity.

Ineffectual means – Giving a person a drink mixed with sugar which

accused believed to be poison

Inadequate means – If it were really poison, the quantity is not

sufficient to kill.

In case of inadequate means, the intended victim should not suffer any
injury, otherwise the crime could be attempted or frustrated homicide or
murder as the case maybe.

Is There A Common Law Crime in the Philippines?

No, as the par. 1 of Art. 5, RPC provides that whenever a court has
knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not
punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, that is, dismiss the case,
and shall report to the Chief Executive through the Department of Justice, the
reasons which induced the court to believe that said act should be made the
subject of penal legislation.

B.P. Blg. 22 is a product of this article, considering the difficulty

securing a conviction for Estafa committed by issuing a postdated check under
Art. 315, par. 2[d] since the defense of having been issued in payment of a pre-
existing obligation has always come out as a ready-made defense. Under this
law, even if the dishonored check was issued in payment of a pre-existing
obligation, and the drawer or maker commits no deceit, he is criminally liable.

The elements of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22 are (a) the making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the
maker, drawer and issuer knows at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and (c) the check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would
have been dishonored for the same reason, had not the drawer without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. (Bautista vs. Court of Appeals,
et. al., 360 SCRA 618)
 DUTY OF COURT WHEN PENALTY IS EXCESSIVE

Courts Are Not Concerned With Wisdom, Efficacy Or Morality Of Laws

The court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department
of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the
execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this
Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense. (Art.
5, par. 2, RPC)

A daughter who killed her father while he was sleeping because the
latter had raped her, resulting in her pregnancy, should be punished with death
by the court since Parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, and
there is an aggravating circumstance of treachery. The ordinary mitigating
circumstance of vindication of a grave offense, or passion or obfuscation will
not affect the imposable penalty as the same is in indivisible penalty. (Art. 63)
However, the Judge may write the President of the Philippines for the granting
of Executive Clemency to the poor daughter on account of the circumstances
of the case.

In People vs. Veneracion, 249 SCRA 244, it was ruled:

“We are aware of the trial judge’s misgivings in imposing the

death sentence because of his religious convictions. While this Court
sympathizes with his predicament, it is its bounden duty to emphasize that
a court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or
propriety of the sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of
death as a penalty in specific and well-defined instances. The discomfort
faced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an ancient one
but it is a matter upon which judges have no choice.”

STAGES OF EXECUTION

Felonies could be attempted, frustrated or consummated. It is

consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present. (Art. 6, par. 1) Thus, if A, intending to kill B,
shoots the latter to death, the crime is consummated Homicide or Murder, as
the case may be.

A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of

execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which
nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
the perpetrator. (Ibid.) In the example above, if A hit B on a vital portion of the
body which injury could cause the death of B but because of timely medical
attention B did not die, this is a case of Frustrated Homicide or Frustrated
Murder.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a

felony directly by overt acts, does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance (par. 3, Ibid.) So, if in the above-cited example, A
shot B but missed or hit B only on a superficial part of his body which would
could not cause B’s death, A is liable only for Attempted Homicide or
Attempted Murder. In the same vein, if A poked a gun at B and squeezed the
trigger but it jammed and no bullet was fired, the attempted stage has been
reached.
How To Properly Determine The Stage Of Execution

In determining whether the felony is attempted, frustrated or

consummated, it is important to consider (1) the nature of the crime; (2) the
elements constituting the offense; (3) the manner of committing the same.

Thus, considering the nature of the crime of Arson when a building is

set on fire, it is not necessary that it should be entirely consumed in order to
constitute the consummated stage, nor is it affected by the prompt extinction of
the fire. (U.S. vs. Po Chengco, 23 Phil. 487)

Where the offender is about to set on fire a building but was

apprehended before any portion gets burned, it would be Attempted Arson.
Where rags and jute sacks soaked in gasoline and placed near the house that
the offender intends to burn, were put on fire before any part of the house
catches fire, the crime would be Frustrated Arson.

With respect to Theft, the same is consummated once the offender

takes or gets hold of the material possession of the property with intent to gain.
It is not necessary that he be able to carry it away. Thus, the accused who
abstracted a leather belt from a Japanese tourist and placed it in the drawer of
his desk, he being an inspector of the Bureau of Customs, is guilty of
Consummated Theft. (U.S. vs. Adiao, 38 Phil. 754) So also, where the accused,
after untying a carabao from a tree near the offended party’s house, was
apprehended after pulling the carabao away by about two (2) or three (3)
meters, the crime is Consummated Qualified Theft. In Valenzuela vs. People
(June 2007), the Supreme Court held that there is no such crime as Frustrated
theft ruling out that before the offender takes hold of the personal property
with intent to gain, it is attempted, once he takes hold of it, it is consummated.
He need not be able to carry it away.

This is to be distinguished from Estafa where damage to the offended

party is one of the elements to consummate it. In U.S. vs. Dominguez, 41 Phil.
408, the accused, a salesman was held liable only for Frustrated Estafa even if
the proceeds of the sale which he failed to turn over to the cashier was found
out to be in his pocket. There was no damage yet to the owner of the store
because of the timely discovery.

In Robbery with force Upon Things (Arts. 299 or 302), where the
accused had entered the building or house, and had removed the property he
intended to steal but was apprehended before he could get out, the crime is
Frustrated Robbery. (People vs. Jose Del Rosario, C.A. 46 O.G. 332) If he was
caught in the act of removing the property, the crime would be Attempted
Robbery. If he was able to bring the property out of the house or building, he
would be guilty of Consummated Robbery.

Anent the manner of committing crime, there are offenses which are
consummated in one instant and the act cannot be split into parts to be
categorized as attempted or frustrated like Slander or Libel. They are called
Formal Crimes.

There are also crimes which are consummated by mere attempt,

proposal or overt act. Thus, the crime of Flight to Enemy’s Country (Art.121)
is consummated by mere attempt. In Abuses Against Chastity (Art. 245), mere
solicitation or proposal consummates the offense. So also, Art. 185
(Machinations in Public Auctions) which punishes any person who shall solicit
any gift or promise as a consideration for refraining from taking part in any
public auction.

In material crimes like Homicide, Rape, Murder, etc., there are three
(3) stages of execution. Thus, if A would stab or shoot B, missing him or
injuring him only superficially, the crime is Attempted Homicide or Murder;
but if he hit B and inflicted injuries which otherwise would have been fatal
were it not for timely medical attention, it is Frustrated; if B dies, the case is
Consummated Homicide or Murder.

In the crime of rape, the accused who placed himself on top of a

woman, raising her skirt and unbuttoning his pants, the endeavor to have sex
with her very apparent, is guilty of Attempted Rape.

Note: (If the effort to have sex is not clear, the crime is only Acts of
Lasciviousness)

On the other hand, entry on the labia or lips of the female organ by the
penis, even without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina,
consummates the crime. (People vs. Tayabas,62 Phil. 559; People vs.
Royeras, 56 SCRA 666; People vs. Amores, 58 SCRA 505)

This brings us to the question of Frustrated Rape. In People vs. Orita,

184 SCRA 105, the Supreme Court said:

Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment
all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished xxx the felony
is consummated. xxx Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is
sufficient. xxx Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the
female organ because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender
merely commended the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking
into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape
and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated
stage in rape can ever be committed.

The court continued that the case of People vs. Erina,50 Phil. 998,
where the accused was found guilty of Frustrated Rape, appears to be a “stray”
decision in as much as it has not been reiterated in their subsequent decisions,
and that the particular provision on Frustrated Rape in Art. 335 as amended by
R.A. No.2632 and R.A. No. 4111 is a dead provision prompted probably by
the Erina case. (NOTE: R.A. No.7659, Sec. 11 also contains the provision that
when the Rape is attempted or frustrated and a Homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death). In People vs. Aca-ac,357 SCRA, it was the ruling of the Supreme Court
that there is no such crime as Frustrated Rape.

LIGHT FELONIES

Light felonies are punishable only when they have been consummated,
with the exception of those committed against person or property. Thus, a
person who, within any town or public place, attempts to fire or to discharge
his gun is not criminally liable even if his acts would fall under Art. 155
punishing Alarms and Scandals in its attempted stage as this light felony is a
crime against public order.
 Likewise, in light felonies, only the principals and accomplices are
liable (Art. 16) so that a policeman who assists in the escape of a person who
slightly injured another (Slight Physical Injuries) is not liable. (NOTE: See
P.D. No. 1829 however)

CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT FELONY

Conspiracy and Proposal to commit felony are punishable only in the

cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefore. (Art. 8. par. 1)

Conspiracy to commit a felony as well as Proposal to commit a felony

is, generally speaking, not crimes. As such, they are not punishable. Thus,
although conspiracy to murder a person is apparent, the conspirators can not be
held criminally liable because there is no law punishing Conspiracy to Commit
Murder.

If what was done however was Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, then

the conspirators are liable because there is a law that punishes Conspiracy to
Commit Rebellion. (Art. 136) The same is true with Proposal to commit a
felony. Unless there is a law that punishes Proposal to commit a crime, the
proponents are not liable.

Art. 115 punishes Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Treason, while

Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6968 penalizes Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Coup
d’etat. On the other hand, Conspiracy to Commit Sedition (not Proposal) is
punishable under Art. 141, while Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 1613 punishes Conspiracy
(not Proposal) to Commit Arson.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. (par. 2, Ibid.)
It could be evidenced by a written agreement among the conspirators or by
their verbal covenant, or it could be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime. People vs. Manuel,234
SCRA 532)

There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony
proposes its execution to some other person or persons. (par. 3, Ibid.) To
constitute proposal, in law, the proponent himself must be determined to
commit the crime so that if he only aired his grievances against the government
and made suggestions on how to fight the authorities, he can not be considered
liable for Proposal to Commit Rebellion.

Under Section 7 of P.D. No. 1613. Conspiracy to commit Arson shall

be punished by prision mayor in its minimum period. It would seem that like in
Sedition there is no crime of Proposal to Commit Arson.

On matters of conspiracy, it is a settled rule that it need not be proved

by direct evidence prior agreement on the commission of the crime as the same
can be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
perpetration of the offense showing that all the accused acted in unison with
each other, evincing a common purpose or design. ( See People vs. Pablo,349
SCRA 79)
 OFFENSES NOT SUBJECT TO THE CODE

Special Laws

Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special

laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary. (Art. 10)

Thus, in case of conflict between the provisions of the special laws and
those of the Revised Penal Code, the former shall prevail. The provisions of
the latter however shall be supplementary to special laws whenever applicable.
In People vs. Simon,234 SCRA 555, citing People vs. Macatanda,109 SCRA
35, it was held:

“While these are special laws, the fact that the penalties thereunder are
those provided for in the Revised Penal Code lucidly reveals the statutory
intent to give the related provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code
the corresponding application to said special laws, in the absence of any
express, or implicit proscription in these special laws.”
 CHAPTER TWO

CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY

There are five (5) circumstances affecting the criminal liability of an

individual. They are justifying, exempting, mitigating, aggravating, and
alternative circumstance. (Arts. 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15)

JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

1. Self-Defense
No. 1 in justifying circumstances is SELF-DEFENSE. Thus, anyone
who acts in defense of his person or rights incurs no criminal liability provided
that the following circumstances concur:

(1) Unlawful Aggression;

(2) Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed

to prevent or repel it; and

(3) Lack of Sufficient Provocation on the part of

the person defending himself.

This includes defense of honor, defense of home as defense of property.

Unlawful aggression on the part of the injured or the victim is the first
element of self-defense. This is and indispensable requisite even in incomplete
self-defense. (People vs. Deopante,G.R. No. 102772, October 30, 1996)
Without this requisite, we can not speak of complete self-defense as a
justifying circumstance, or incomplete self-defense as a mitigating
circumstance. (Art. 13, par. 1)

Unlawful Aggressio means an assault or attack, or a threat in an

imminent and immediate manner which places the defendant’s life in actual
peril. (Philippine Law Dictionary by Moreno, 3rd Ed., 1980) There must be an
actual assault or a threat but in case of the latter, it must be imminent and
positively strong to palpably show the wrongful intent to cause injury. Mere
intimidating attitude is not sufficient. thus, barging on the door of the accused
with shouts of threats to kill can not be considered Unlawful Aggression.
(People vs. Trison, G.R. No. 106345-46, September 16, 1996) Likewise, if the
accused agrees to fight, Unlawful Aggression is wanting because by accepting
the challenge and immediately approaching the victim, the accused places
himself in an unlawful status and himself becomes an unlawful aggressor, as
aggression as an incident of fight is bound to arise. (People vs. Galas,G.R. No.
114007,September 24, 1996)

To give rise to self-defense, the aggression must not be a lawful one

like the attack of a husband against a paramour of his wife whom he surprised
in an uncompromising situation, or a chief of police who threw stones at the
accused who was running away to elude arrest for a crime committed in his
presence. Their aggression was not considered unlawful.

Unlawful Aggression contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected

attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude but when its author does not persist anymore in his purpose or when he
discontinues his attitude to the extent that the object of his attack is no longer
in peril, it ceases to be an unlawful aggression and does not warrant self-
defense. (People vs. Geneblazo,361 SCRA 573)

The second element is Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed to

prevent or repel it. There must be a reasonable necessity of the course taken,
and reasonable necessity of the means used. In People vs. Jaurigue, 76 Phil.
174, while it was ruled that when the deceased placed his hand on the upper
thigh of the lady accused, there was unlawful aggression but when the latter
immediately stabbed him with a knife killing him, there was no reasonable
necessity of her course of action since in the chapel where the killing took
place, there were many people including her father, it was well lighted and
there is no possibility of her being raped. Consequently, she was convicted.

When the deceased laid down his gun, unlawful aggression had already
ceased and it was no longer necessary for accused-appellant to have fired
successfully the way he did at the victim. (People vs. Rabanal, 387 SCRA 685)

The means employed by the person making a defense must be

rationally necessary to prevent or repeal an unlawful aggression. What the law
requires is a rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as
principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person
attacked is exposed, and the instinct more than the reason that moves or impels
the defense.

On the other hand, whether the means employed is reasonable or not

depends upon the nature and quality of the weapon used by the aggressor, his
physical condition, character and size, as well as of the person defending and
the place and occasion of the assault. (See The Revised Penal Code Book 1 by
Luis B. Reyes, 1993 Ed., p. 176)

Self-defense and accidental shooting cannot be both be raised by the

accused as a defense. If accused is acting in self-defense, that he could only
have deliberately used the gun to repel the alleged aggression. On the other
hand, if the shooting was accidental, then it was immaterial whether the
accused employed reasonable means to repel the alleged aggression. (People
vs. Florague, 360 SCRA 587)

The third element – Lack of Sufficient Provocation on the part of the

person defending himself – pictures a situation where there was total lack of
provocation on the part of the accused when he was attacked without any
reason at all, or when the accused gave provocation but is not sufficient for the
offended party to assault him, or where provocation is sufficient but is not
immediate to the act (U.S. vs. Laurel, 22 Phil. 252) or where the sufficient
provocation was given by the companion of the accused of which the latter had
no part.

Under the principle of Battered-Woman Syndrome, while there was an

inkling that this syndrome could be considered as a viable plea within the
concept of self-defense (People vs.Genosa,341 SCRA), the Supreme Court in
an en banc decision has ruled that the same can not be considered a form of
self-defense. It would only imagine the woman accused liability.

However, in Sec. 26 of R.A. No. 9262, it is provided that victim-

survivors of Battered Woman Syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil
liabilities despite the absence of the elements of self-defense provided for in
the Revised Penal Code.

In effect, the same has effectively amended par. 1 of Art. 11 of the

Revised Penal Code.

2. Defense of Relatives

The law speaks only of spouse; ascendants, meaning parents,

grandparents, great grandparents, etc.; descendants, meaning children,
grandchildren, great grandchildren, etc.; brothers and sisters; relatives by
affinity in the same degrees, that is, parents-in-law, children-in-law, and
brothers or sisters-in-law as relatives. Outside of these people, the persons are
considered, in criminal law, as strangers.

There are three (3) requisites – first is unlawful aggression, second is

reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and third is
that the relative being defended gave no provocation. Anent the third requisite
however, the law gives a leeway – that is, even if the relative being defended
gave the provocation, if the relative making the defense had no part therein, he
can successfully invoke defense of relative.

3. Defense of Stranger

Outside of himself, and those relatives mentioned in Art. 11, par. 2, any
person who acts in defense of the person or rights of another can legitimately
claim the defense of stranger. The first two (2) requisites however, that is,
unlawful aggression, and reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it, must be present. The law adds another requisite, which is,
that the person is defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other
evil motive.

Thus, one who, seeing his seventy-eight (78)-year-old neighbor held

down on the ground by a strong and robust young man and in serious danger of
being throttled, furnished the person assaulted with a gaff, as he himself is also
old and may not be able to cope with the assailant, with which his neighbor
used to inflict a mortal wound on the assailant is entitled to the claim of
defense of strangers. (U.S. vs. Subingsubing, 31 Phil. 376)

4. Avoidance of Greater Evil or Injury/State of Necessity

The fourth justifying circumstance speaks of a person who, in order to

avoid an evil or injury, does a act which causes damage to another. The
following however must be present: first, that the evil sought to be avoided
actually exists, second, that the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid
it, and third, that there be no other practical and less harmful means of
preventing it. (Art. 11, par. 4)
 The doctor who had to kill a foetus to save the mother where both
could not be saved, and he is running out of time, may invoke this defense.
This is different however from Euthanasia – the so-called mercy-killing which
is not justified in our jusrisdiction. A captain of a ship caught by storm and
huge waves in his journey, who ordered the jettison of cargoes against the will
of the owners to prevent the ship from sinking and save the passengers, can
shield criminal liability behind this provision.

5. Fulfillment of Duty or Exercise of Right or Office

The fifth justifying circumstances provides that no criminal liability

shall be incurred by any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office.

Thus, a policeman who killed an escaping prisoner after making the

warning shot and shouting to him not to continue with his escape, and who
prior to that even attacked him with a spear, acted in lawful fulfillment of
duty.

A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a

duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.

But we must that there are two (2) requisites for this justifying
circumstance: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in
lawful exercise of a right, and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office.
(People vs.Belbes, 334 SCRA 161)

So also, if A hit B with his fist inside a running passenger jeep because
B was snatching his (A’s) watch, and as a consequence B fell from the jeep,
hi head hitting the hard pavement causing his death, A acted in the lawful
exercise of right. And the executioner of convicts sentenced to die, who
would make the lethal injection in the Bureau of Corrections on the day and
time scheduled by the Court, does so in the lawful exercise of an office.

6. Obedience to an Order of a Superior

It is also a justified act if a person acts in obedience to an order issued

by a superior for some lawful purpose. (Art. 11, par. 6)

This justifying circumstance needs an order issued by a superior officer

of the accused which was for a lawful purpose and the latter obeyed the order.
Where the order of arrest was issued by his superior for the purpose of
delivering the person’s subject of the order to the commanding officer who
made the request that they be apprehended and arrested for a crime they
committed but because they resisted arrest, the accused killed them, this
justifying circumstance is applicable.

The order however of guerilla officer for the killing of a civilian is not lawful.

EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Article 12 enumerates persons who are exempted from criminal

liability. Unlike in justifying circumstances, here there was a crime committed,
there is a criminal but for reasons of public policy, no penal liability shall be
inflicted on him.
 The following are exempt from criminal liability:

1. An Imbecile or an Insane Person Unless the Latter has Acted During a

Lucid Interval.

In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete

deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the
mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused must be “so
insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent.” He must be
deprived of reason and act without the least discernment because there is a
complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of the
freedom of the will.

Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes

insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive
evidence. And the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding
the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. (See
People vs. Estrada, 333 SCRA 699; also People vs. Valledor, 383 SCRA
653)

An imbecile is a person marked by a mental deficiency while an insane

person is one who has unsound mind or who suffers from mental disorder.
An insane person may have suffered from mental disorder. An insane
person may have lucid intervals but an imbecile has none. (People vs.
Ambal, 100 SCRA 325, citing 1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th. Ed.)

Imbecility is defined as a feeble-mindedness or a mental condition

approaching that of one who is insane. It is analogous to childishness and
dotage. An imbecile within the meaning of Article 12 is one completely
deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of
committing the crime. While advanced in age, he has a mental
development of children between two (2) and seven (7) years of age. The
reasoning of the accused that he resorted to cutting grass instead of
guarding his victim could hardly be indicative of imbecility. Rather, it may
be considered negligence. (People vs. Nunez, G.R. No. 412429-30, July 23,
1947)

In People vs. Dungo, 199 SCRA 860, it was held that one who suffers
from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense can not in a legal
sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible
for his acts. In People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil 658, the ruling was that, in
order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of
Art. 12 of the RPC so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be
deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at
the time of committing the crime.

Any deprivation therefore of reason or discernment at the time of the

trial of the case is not an exempting circumstance.

2. A Person Fifteen Years of Age and Below. (R.A. No. 9344)

3. A Person Over Fifteen (15) above and under eighteen (18) Unless He
Has Acted with Discernment (R.A. No. 9344)
 It is clear therefore that even if a person has acted with discernment, if
he is under fifteen (15) years of age, he is free from penal responsibility. On
the other hand, if he is over fifteen (15) years of age but under eighteen
(18), he will be held criminally liable if he acted with discernment.

An accused who knows the morality of his acts, or can fully appreciate
the consequences of his actuation has acted with discernment which can be
shown by the manner the crime was committed or his conduct after its
commission.

4. Any Person Who, While Performing a Lawful Act With Due Care,
Causes an Injury by Mere Accident Without Fault or Intention of
Causing It.

So, one driving car duly licensed to do so, in the proper lane and within the
limits prescribed by law, who hits a boy who suddenly darted into the street
is exempted from criminal liability due to accident.

Problem:

A, armed with a .38 caliber and B, who has no weapon, robbed

a store; but in the course thereof, were seen by P, a policeman who
was armed with .45 caliber gun, and when he demanded for the
surrender of A and B, A shot him but missed, and so P repelled the
attack. In the exchange of shots, A was killed, together with B, and C
the owner of the store. The three were killed by the bullets fired from
a .45 caliber. In such case, P is not liable for the death of A due to
self-defense as all the three (3) elements were present. He is also not
liable for the death of B, not because of self-defense because the latter
being weaponless can not commit unlawful aggression, but because of
performance of duty. For the death of C, the store owner, P, is also not
criminally liable obviously not because of self-defense nor of
fulfillment of duty but because of accident provided for in par. 1 of
Art. 12.

5. Any Person Who Acts Under the Compulsion of an Irresistible Force.

Thus, a person who was compelled to bury the body of one who
was murdered by the killers, striking him with the butts of their guns,
threatening to kill him too, is not criminally liable as an accessory.

6. Any Person Who Acts Under the Impulse of an Uncontrollable Fear of

an Equal or Greater Injury.

If A with a revolver in his hand threw a knife at B, and ordered

him to kill C, a person sleeping nearby otherwise he will shoot B, the latter
can ask exemption from criminal liability if he stabbed C to death.

7. Any Person Who Fails to Perform an Act Required by Law When

Prevented by Some Lawful or Insuperable Cause.

A policeman who arrested a man who had just killed another in his
(policeman’s) presence, at 6:00 p.m. of a Saturday in a small town in the
province, is not liable under Article 125 of the RPC when he filed the
criminal complaint only in the morning of the following Monday [more
than thirty-six (36) hours as required by the said Article] since there was
 no court where to file the complaint. He was prevented by a lawful or
insuperable cause to comply with the requirement of the law.

Absolutory Causes

Absolutory causes are those where the actors are granted freedom from
charge or immunity from burden for reasons of public policy and sentiment
even if their acts constitute a crime.

They are:

1. Accessories with respect to spouse, ascendants, descendants,

brothers, sisters or relatives by affinity within the same degrees
except those falling under par.1 of Art. 19. (Art. 20, RPC)

2. Spouse or parents who inflicted Less Serious or Slight Physical

Injuries on his/her spouse or their daughters living with them,
whom they surprised in the act of sexual intercourse with another.
(Art. 247, RPC)

3. Any person who entered another’s dwelling to prevent serious harm

to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person or
rendered some service to humanity or justice, or entered cafes,
taverns, inns and other public houses while the same were open.
(Art. 280, par. 3)

4. In case of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or

caused mutually by spouses, ascendants and descendants or
relatives by affinity in the same line, and brothers and sisters and
brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law if living together. (Art. 332)

5. Instigation, where the actor otherwise innocent, was induced by a

public officer to commit the crime such that the latter himself
becomes a principal by inducement or by indispensable
cooperation.

[NOTE: Entrapment however is not an absolutory cause. In

Entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the authorities to trap and
capture the actor, already a law-breaker, in the execution of his criminal
activities. Buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment and the accused
entrapped is liable. (People vs. Juma, 220 SCRA 432; People vs. Nicolas, et.
al., G.R. No. 110116, February 1, 1995)

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Mitigating circumstances are those which do not entirely free the actor
from penal responsibility but serve only to lessen or reduce the penalty
imposable. They are two (2) classes – Ordinary Mitigating which can be
offset by aggravating circumstances, and which if present tends to reduce
the penalty by periods, and Privileged Mitigating which can not be offset by
any aggravating circumstance, and which if present tends to reduce the
penalty by degrees.
 The following are mitigating circumstances:

1. Incomplete justifying and incomplete exempting circumstances.

2. When the offender is under eighteen (18) years or over seventy (70)
years of age.

3. When the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as

that committed.

4. When there was sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the

offended party that immediately preceded the act.

5. When the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a

grave offense to the person committing the felony, his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, brothers or sisters or relatives by affinity
within the same degrees.

6. When the accused acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally

to have produced passion or obsfuscation.

7. Voluntary surrender to person in authority or his agents by the

accused, or if he voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court
prior to prosecution’s presentation of evidence.

8. If the offender is deaf and dumb, blind in two eyes, or otherwise

suffering from physical defect which restricts his means of action,
defense or communication with his fellow beings.

9. Such illness on the part of the offender as would diminish the

exercise of his will power without depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts.

10. Any other circumstances of a similar nature or analogous to those

above-mentioned.

1. Incomplete Justifying and Incomplete Exempting Circumstances

In incomplete self-defense, incomplete self-defense of relative and

incomplete self-defense of stranger, the element Unlawful Aggression on
the part of the victim is an indispensable requisite. It is the second (2nd)
or the third (3rd) element that is lacking, otherwise there is no incomplete
justification as a mitigating circumstance under par.1 of Art. 13.

An illustration of incomplete exempting circumstances of

uncontrollable fear is one where the accused, while sleeping, was
awakened by a shot, and because he was expecting an attack by a group
of armed men, shot a man he saw in the dark who turned out to be
unarmed innocent person. (People vs. Magpantay, C.A. 46 O.G. 1655)
He acted under an impulse of a fear which is not uncontrollable although
it promised an equal or greater injury
2. Under eighteen (18) or over seventy (70) Years Old

For purposes of criminal liability, the age of a person may be divided as

follows:

1. nine (9) years or below – exempted from penal responsibility;

2. over nine (9) and below fifteen (15) – conditional – liability –

that is, if he acted without discernment, he is exempted.

3. over nine (9) and below fifteen (15) acting with discernment –
mitigated liability at least by two (2) degrees lower. (Art. 68,
par.1)

4. over fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years of age –

mitigated liability by one degree lower. (Art. 68, par.2)

5. over eighteen (18) and below seventy (70) years of age –

complete criminal liability.

6. over seventy (70) years of age – mitigated liability.

3. Lack of Intent to Commit so Grave a Wrong

Intention partakes of the nature of a mental process, an internal act. It

can be gathered from and determined by the conduct and external acts of
the offender and the results of the act themselves. So, the accused who
was charged with Rape with Homicide, and who admitted that “My only
intention was to abuse her, but when she tried to shout I covered her
mouth and choked her, and later I found that because of that she died,” is
not entitled to this mitigating circumstance, for he knew that the girl was
very tender in age [six (6) years old], weak in body, helpless and
defenseless and he ought to know the natural and inevitable result of the
act of strangulation. (People vs. Yu, 1 SCRA 199)

A husband who slaps his wife who fell down her head hitting a hard
pavement and died as a result can avail of this mitigating circumstance.

But this attenuating circumstance is not applicable in case of several

accused where conspiracy was proven for in conspiracy the act of one is
the act of all. (People vs. Bautista, 38 SCRA 184)

4. Sufficient Provocation or Threat

The sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the victim must

immediately precede the act of the offender. A killed his father-in-law
who warned him to be careful because he would kill him before the end of
the day, after he told said father-in-law that he can not live anymore with
his adulterous wife, the daughter of the deceased, whom he caught in
flagrante with her paramour. He is entitled to this mitigating circumstance.
(People vs. Rivero, 242 SCRA 354) He could have interpreted this warning
as a serious threat which prompted him to decide to eliminate his father-
in-law before he could carry out such threat.
5. Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense

The word “immediate” in par. 5 is not an accurate translation of

the Spanish text which uses the term “proxima” and somehow a lapse
of time is allowed between the grave offense and the vindication
unlike in provocation or threat (par. 4) that should immediately
precede the act.

Thus, in People vs. Parama, 64 Phil. 331, where it was after a

few hours from the time he was slapped by the deceased in the
presence of many people, when he killed said deceased, the Supreme
Court considered this mitigating circumstance in favor since the
influence of said offense ”by reason of its gravity and circumstances
under which it was inflicted, lasted until the moment the crime was
committed.” However, in People vs. Pajares, 210 SCRA 237, where
the brother of the accused was mauled by the victim’s companion and
the victim himself ten (10) hours earlier, the accused who killed the
deceased was adjudged not entitled to the benefits of this
circumstance since such interval of time it was more than sufficient to
enable him to recover his serenity.

It would seem that the rule is that, the court must consider the
lasting effect and influence of the grave offense to the offender when
he resorted to commit the crime to vindicate such grave offense.

6. Passion or Obfuscation

To be considered mitigating, the same must arise from lawful

sentiments provoked by prior to unjust or improper acts of the offended
party.

While watching a TV show, the ballcaster of the swivel chair on

which the accused was seated broke and got detached, and so he called
F, his stepson, to buy one but because it took time for the latter to
awaken, accused started shouting bad words to F who finally got up, got
dressed and went to the comfort room to brush his teeth. This further
angered the accused who boxed him (F), and when F got out of the
house, accused followed him, and because he could not see F at once, he
shot him when finally he saw him returning to the house. Held: No
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation as the anger of the
accused did not arise from lawful sentiments. The delay in obeying his
request to buy the ballcaster is too trivial a matter as to fairly and justly
cause such overreaction on his part. (People vs. Tiongco, 236 SCRA 458)

7. Voluntary Surrender and Plea of Guilty

Accused who went into hiding for two and a half (2 ½) years after killing
the victim cannot claim this mitigating circumstance for in order that
voluntary surrender may be appreciated, it is necessary that the same be
spontaneous in such manner that it shows the intent to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his
guilt or because he wisher to save them the trouble and expense
necessarily incurred in his search and capture. (People vs. Ablao, 183
SCRA 658, citing People vs. Lingatong, G.R. No. L-34019, January 29,
1990)
 So also, it must be surrender of the body of the accused to persons in
authority or their agents. So the surrender of his gun, not himself, by
handing over the weapon through the balustrade of the faculty room, and
the surrender being made to his brother who was not a person in
authority nor an agent can not be considered an attenuating
circumstance. He holed in the faculty room, in effect holding some
teachers and students as hostages, as the faculty room was surrounded by
soldiers and there was no escape open to him. (People vs. Tac-an, 182
SCRA 601)

Voluntary surrender requires that the offender had not been actually
arrested; that he surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the
latter’s agent; and that the surrender was voluntary. (People vs. Callet,
382 SCRA 43) For surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and
show the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities either because (1) he acknowledges his guilt or (2) he wishes
to save them the trouble and expense incidental to his search and capture.
(People vs. Zeta, 382 SCRA 141)

8. Spontaneous Plea of Guilty

To be appreciated as an attenuating circumstance, the plea of guilty

must be made before the prosecution presents its evidence, and it must
be an unconditional plea. (People vs. Serafica, 27 SCRA 123) However,
if it is a plea to a lesser offense – let us say, where the charge is murder
and the offer is a plea of guilty to Homicide, and the court allows the
prosecution to present evidence to prove the qualifying circumstance,
and fails to establish the aggravating circumstance that would qualify the
killing to murder, the accused is entitled to this mitigating circumstance.
The forum however must be the court that has jurisdiction over the
offense.

9. Illness Which Restricts Means of Action

The law says that the offender is deaf and dumb meaning not only deaf
but also dumb, or that he is blind, meaning blind in both eyes, but even if
he is only deaf and not dumb, or dumb only but not deaf, or blind only in
one eye, he still entitled to a mitigating circumstance under this article as
long as his physical defects restrict his means of action, defense or
communication with his fellowmen. The restriction however must relate to
the mode of committing the crime. Thus, even if he is armless or somehow
limping because he was a polio victim in his younger days, if the charge is
libel or oral defamation, his illness does not give him the privilege to
mitigate his criminal liability for the said crime

10. Illness Diminishing Will Power

If the illness not only diminishes the exercise of offender’s will power
but deprives him of the consciousness of his acts, it becomes an
exempting circumstance to be classified as insanity or imbecility.

Feeblemindedness of the accused who, in a fit of jealousy, stabbed his

wife, then carried her up to the house, laid her on the floor and then lay
down beside her, warrants the finding in his favor of this mitigating
circumstance. (People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658)
 11. Mitigating Circumstance of Similar Nature

Return of the property stolen in analogous to voluntary surrender,

testifying for the prosecution by a co-accused divulging the truth of what
really transpired is akin to plea of guilty; esprit de corps is similar to
passion or obfuscation; over sixty (60) years old with failing sight is
analogous to over seventy (70). (See The Revised Penal Code by Reyes
1993 Ed., pp. 312-314, citing People vs. Villamora, 86 Phil. 287; People
vs. Navasca, 76 SCRA 72)

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Those which if present in the commission of the crime serve to increase

the penalty imposable, without however exceeding the maximum period
prescribed for the offense.

Kinds of Aggravating Circumstances

A. Specific - those that apply only to some particular

crimes like disregard of respect due the
offended party on account of rank, sex or
age which are applicable only to crimes
against persons or honor. Ignominy which
applies only to crimes against chastity;
cruelty which applies only to crimes against
person.

B. Generic - those which generally, can be applied to

all offenses like dwelling, recidivism, in
consideration of price, reward or promise.

C. Inherent - those which necessarily accompany or

inhere in the commission of the crime like
evident premeditation in theft or robbery.

D. Qualifying - those which if attendant, alter or change

the nature of the crime necessarily
increasing the penalty, such as by means of
poison, with aid of armed men in killing
persons or grave abuse of confidence which
makes stealing one of qualified theft. These
circumstance however must be alleged in
the information to make them qualifying.

The aggravating circumstances are as follow (Art. 14);

1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position. (Art. 14

par. 1)

Under Sec. 23,1(a) of R.A. No. 7659, when in the commission of the
crime advantage was taken by the offender of his public position, the
penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum regardless mitigating
circumstances.
 It would seem that when this aggravating circumstance is present in the
commission of heinous crimes, it can not offset by any mitigating
circumstance.

For this circumstance to be appreciated as aggravating the accused

must be a public official who used his influence, prestige and ascendancy
which his office gives him in realizing his purpose.

If the accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his
position, then there is no abuse of public position. Since no evidence was
adduced to prove that the killing was in any way facilitated by the public
position of the accused, in fact, it was not even shown whether the accused
wore his uniform or use his service firearm, this aggravating circumstance
is not present. (People vs. Sumaoy,263 SCRA 460)

However, in People vs. Madrid, 88 Phil 1, this circumstance was

considered against the accused, a law officer, as he committed the crime
(Robbery with Homicide) with the aid of a gun which he had been
authorized to carry as a peace officer, and he succeeded in going through
the check point unmolested and unsuspected because of his official
position. Where the public position in an element of the offense like
Bribery (Direct – Article 210, Indirect – 211, or Qualified Bribery – Sec.
4, R.A. No. 7659), this circumstance can not be taken into consideration.

2. That the crime be committed in contempt of or with insult to public

authorities. (par. 2)]

Public authorities are public officers directly vested with jurisdiction

and who have the power to govern and execute the laws. They are also
called persons in authority. So that if X, despite his knowledge of the
presence of the Mayor or Governor or a Judge, who made known of his
presence to him, still continued to assault his opponent, this circumstance
must be taken against him. If it were however, a policeman or an NBI
agent, this aggravating circumstance can not be considered, as a policeman
or an NBI agent is a mere agent of a person in authority.

The public authority however must be engaged in the exercise of his

duties, must not be the person against whom the crime is committed, and
the offender must know that he is a person in authority

3. That the act be committed (a) with insult or in disregard of the respect
due the offended party on account of his rank, age or sex, or that (b) it
be committed in the dwelling of the offended party if the latter has not
given any provocation. (par. 3)

a. Insult or Disregard of Rank, Age or Sex

Considering the fact that the deceased, Silvina Cuyos, was already sixty
(60) years old at the time she was killed by the accused who was then only
twenty-three (23) years old, whom witnesses saw as if wrestling with the
said deceased who sustained fatal injuries at the neck, there is disregard of
the respect due the offended party on account of her age. (People vs. Rubio,
257 SCRA 528)

A clerk in the Cash Section of the Civil Service Commission who

attacked the Assistant Chief of the Personnel Division of the said
government office has committed a crime aggravated by disrespect due the
offended party on account of his rank. (People vs. Benito, 74 SCRA 271)

Where the accused took turns in hitting the victim, a seventy (70)-year
old woman, with pieces of wood they brought in going to the house of the
said victim, the circumstance of disregard of the respect due the offended
party on account of her sex and age is present. (People vs. Lapaz, 171
SCRA 539)

NOTE: While nighttime is absorbed in treachery, the aggravating

circumstances of disregard of sex and age can not be similarly
absorbed, as Treachery refers to the manner of commission of the
crime, while the latter pertains to the relationship of the victim with the
offender. (Ibid.)

It would seem that for this circumstance to be taken against the

accused, there must be a showing of insult or disregard of the age, sex
or rank of the offended party.

b. Dwelling

It must be taken note of, that dwelling is a building or structure

exclusively used and devoted for rest and comfort, and it includes every
dependency of the house which forms an integral part thereof. It may
mean only the room of the bedspacer in a boarding house. Thus, the crime
of Rape against the offended party who was renting a bedspace in a
boarding house is aggravated by dwelling. (People vs. Daniel, 86 SCRA
511)

Dwelling includes every dependency of the house that forms an integral

part thereof including staircase of the house, and much more its terrace.
(People vs. Rios, G.R. No. 132622, June19, 2000)

In People vs. Perreraz, 362 SCRA 202, it was ruled: He who goes to
another’s house to hurt him or do wrong is more guilty than he who
offends him elsewhere. For the circumstance of dwelling to be considered,
it is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered the
dwelling of the victim to commit the offense – it is enough that the victime
who gave no provocation was attacked inside his own house, as the
assailant might have devised means to perpetrate the assault from the
outside.

Where the complainant was forcibly taken from her house, brought to a
nearby Barangay where she was raped, dwelling is an aggravating
circumstance. (People vs. Lacanieta, 330 SCRA 519)

To consider it however, as an aggravating circumstance, the victim

must not have given the provocation. However, even if the attacker was
outside the house, and the victim was inside his dwelling when he was
fired upon, as long as the latter had not provoked the offender, there is
dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. So also, if the assault was
commenced inside the dwelling and terminated outside the same, dwelling
can be considered. The victim should be the owner, occupant or lessee of
the house. However, in People vs. Balansi, 187 SCRA 566, it was held that
the victim need not be the owner or occupant of the dwelling where he
was shot, since “the stranger, as an invited guest, is sheltered by the same
 roof and protected by the same intimacy of life it affords. It may not be his
house, but it is, even for a brief moment, home to him.”

4. That the act be committed with abuse of confidence or obvious

ungratefulness. (par. 4)

Where the accused is the uncle of the victim and who had taken shelter
in the house of the victim’s parents, the rape that he committed against his
niece is attended with Abuse of Confidence and Obvious Ungratefulness.
(People vs. Cabresas, 244 SCRA 362)

5. That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive, or in

his presence, or where authorities are engaged in the discharge of their
duties or in place dedicated to religious worship. (par. 5)

To consider the palace of the President, or a place dedicated to religious

worship, the accused must have the intention to commit the crime in such place
so that if the meeting of the offender and the victim was only casual, this
circumstance cannot be considered.

In a place where authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties,

it is necessary that actual fulfillment of functions be going on, so that if the
Judge declared a recess, and during such recess a crime was committed in his
courtroom, this circumstance is not presence. However, if it is a place
dedicated to religious worship, any offence committed thereat even if no
ceremony is taking place, is aggravated by this circumstance.

6. That the crime be committed in the nighttime or in an uninhabited

place, or a band whenever such circumstances may facilitate the
commission of the offence.

Night has been defined as a period of time from sunset to sunrise. (Art.
13, Civil Code) Viada poetically defines it as the beginning of dusk to the end
of dawn. (See The Revised Penal Code by Reyes, p. 356) It is not however the
period or the time that is material. It is more of the darkness or nocturnity that
enshrouds the situation. Thus, if at 10:30 p.m. a killing occurred in a dance
party where the place was bright or keenly illuminated, there is no nighttime to
speak of.

And even if it was really dark, for nocturnity to be considered as an

aggravating circumstance, it must have been particularly sought for by the
accused, or taken advantage of by him to facilitate the commission of the crime
or to ensure his immunity from capture or otherwise to facilitate his gateway.
(People vs. Pareja, 265 SCRA 429)

So also if the criminal act was commenced while the atmosphere or

environment was still bright, and terminated when it was already dark, this
aggravating circumstance is not present. Contrariwise, if the offender began to
perpetrate the crime while it was still dark, but finished it already at daybreak
where the place is already bright, there is likewise no nighttime as an
aggravating circumstance.

In the case of Forcible Abduction with Rape which was committed at

2:00 a.m., it was held that the aggravating circumstance of nighttime should be
considered. (People vs. Grefiel, 215 SCRA 596)
 In People vs. Cabangcala, 362 SCRA 361, it was ruled that for
nighttime to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the Court must
convinced that the cover of darkness was purposely sought for the purpose of
ensuring the consummation of the crime, or where the accused took advantage
of the blankness of the night.

There is a band whenever more than three (3) armed male-factors shall
have acted together in the commission of the offense. (People vs. Landicho,
258 SCRA 1) Thus, at least four (4) must be the number (People vs. Polones,
230 SCRA 279) and they must be armed although the arms need not to be
limited to firearms. When the two (2) groups are almost similarly armed, like
where the group of the offended party numbered five (5) but only three (3)
were armed so that there is no band, while the offenders were four (4) who
were all armed and therefore constituted a band, there is no band as
aggravating circumstance as it did not facilitate the commission of the crime.
Likewise, if the meeting is casual, the homicide committed by the killers
comprising a band is not aggravated.

The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of the

nearest house to the scene of the crime but whether or not in the place of the
commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some
help. Considering that the killing was done during nighttime and many fruit
trees and shrubs obstructed the view of neighbors and passersby, there was no
reasonable possibility for the victim to receive any assistance. (People vs.
Desalisa, 229 SCRA 35)

7. That the crime be committed on the occasion of conflagration,

shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune.

If the crime coincidentally took place during the occasion of the

misfortune or calamity, this aggravating circumstance is not present because
the offender did not take advantage of the situation. It must be noted that the
reason behind this circumstance is found in the debased form of criminality
met in one who, in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the
afflicted, adds to their suffering by taking advantage of their misfortune to
despoil them. (U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150)

8. That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or persons
who insure or afford impunity.

The law uses the words “men” and “persons” – meaning in the plural
form and so at least two (2) persons are involved.

If the accused relied on the presence of armed men, availing himself of

the aid of the latter, his liability is aggravated. However, where it appeared that
appellants were not merely present at the scene of the crime but were in
conspiracy with the assailant, shooting the victim and leaving the scene
together after apparently accomplishing their purpose clearly evincing
conspiracy, this circumstance can not be appreciated. (People vs. Umbrero,
196 SCRA 821)

If accused, upon assurance of policemen A and B that they would not

patrol the area so that he could commit theft or robbery thereat, the
commission of burglary in the said area where no routine patrolling was done
is aggravated by the aid of persons who insure or afford impunity.
 9. That the accused is a recidivist.

The law defines recidivist as one who, at the time of his trial for one
crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code.

Where accused was convicted of Homicide on September 15, 1983 and

there being no appeal, judgment became final on October 1, 1983 and the
second conviction was rendered on October 26, 1983 for murder, he is a
recidivist. (People vs. Lagarto, 196 SCRA 611)

If accused committed Theft on June 1, 1990 and Robbery on July 1,

1990 but after his apprehension, the trial for the two (2) crimes were
consolidated in one hearing as there was only one victim, and thereafter the
court rendered a Joint Decision finding him guilty of both offenses, there is no
recidivism as there was no previous final judgment of conviction. While he
was convicted of Theft committed on June 1, 1990 when the same was
promulgated, there was no prior or previous final judgment. His conviction for
Theft was not yet final. Another requisite is that the crimes involved must be
embraced in the same title under the Revised Penal Code; so that if the
previous conviction is for Homicide and when it was already final there is a
subsequent conviction for Rape – recidivism exist as Rape is now a crime
against persons. (R.A. No. 8353)

10. That the offender has been previously punished for an offense to which
the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two (2) or more
crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.

The crimes should not be embraced in the same title of the Code for
accused will then be classified as a recidivist. Thus, if A has been convicted of
Murder, and after grant of parole committed Homicide, he labors under this
paragraph (10) known as reiteracion, but he is also suffering from recidivism
(reincidencia). In such a case, he will be considered only as recidivist, and par.
10 will no longer apply to him.

The previous crimes for which accused underwent punishment must be

at least two (2) in number if the law imposes a penalty lower than the crime he
had been currently convicted; but if the penalty is equal or greater, a single
offense is sufficient. Thus, if A had been punished for Slight Physical Injuries
in 1985 and then underwent punishment again for Perjury in 1986, and later on
committed Rape, his liability for the last offense will be aggravated by
reiteracion. On the other hand, if the previous conviction is Homicide, and
later on the conviction is for Falsification (lighter than Homicide), reinteracion
is also present.

11. That the crime be committed in consideration of a price reward or

promise.

To consider this circumstance, the price, reward or promise must be the

primary reason or the primordial motive for the commission of the crime.
Thus, if A approached B and told the latter what he thought of X, and B
answered “he is a bad man” to which A retorted. “you see I am going to kill
him this afternoon,” and so B told him “If you do that, I’ll give you five
thousand (P5,000.00)” and after killing X, A again approached B, told him he
had already killed X, and B, in compliance with his promise, delivered the five
thousand (P5,000.00), this aggravating circumstance is not present.
 Whenever present however, this aggravating circumstance affects not
only the accused who perpetrate the crime because of the money or
consideration but also the accused who offered, as the former becomes a
principal by direct participation while the latter, a principal by inducement.
(People vs. Gerolaga, 263 SCRA 143)

Mere promise, as long as it is the reason why the offense was done, is
sufficient.

12. That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison,

explosion, stranding of a vessel or intentional damage thereto,
derailment of a locomotive or by the use of any other artifice involving
great waste and ruin.

The purpose in employing the means – that is, inundation fire, poison,
etc., must be to kill the offended party to consider it as aggravating. Thus,
where the purpose of the offenders in putting in flames the polo shirt of the
victim was for further merriment because the victim continued to dance even
while his clothes were on fire, to the delight of the crowd, there is no
aggravating circumstance of by means of fire, as obviously the objective of
using fire to kill the victim is not present.

Under R.A. No. 8294 which amends P.D. No. 1866, when a person
commits any crime under the Revised Penal Code or special laws with the use
of explosives including but not limited to pillbox, Molotov cocktail bombs,
detonation agents or incendiary devices resulting in the death of a person, the
same is aggravating. (Sec.2)

13. That the act be committed with evident premeditation.

The following requisites must be proved before this circumstance may

be appreciated: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime;
(2) an act or acts manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination, and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his acts.

So, where A and B had a fistic fight and A found himself at the
receiving end despite his size and threatened to kill B shouting, after they
separated “Hanggang bukas na lang ang buhay mo” and thereafter forgot
everything but when he saw B in the afternoon of that day, he stabbed him,
there is no lacking. However, if after making the threat A went to his friends
borrowing firearm, and when nobody lent him, he brought a bolo, sharpened it
the whole morning of the following day and looked for B whom he killed with
the said bolo, evident premeditation shall be taken against him.

In People vs. Mojica, 10 SCRA 515, the lapse of one (1) hour and
forty-five (45) minutes (4:15 p.m. to 6 p.m.) was considered by the Supreme
Court as sufficient. In People vs. Cabodoc, 263 SCRA 187, where at 1:00 p.m.,
the accused opened his balisong and uttered “I will kill him (referring to the
victim),” and at 4:30 p.m. of the said date accused stabbed the victim, it was
held that the lapse of three and a half hours (3 ½ hours) from the inception of
the plan to the execution of the crime satisfied the last requisite of evident
premeditation.

Where it appears that after the fight was broken up, the accused
returned to kill the victim after four (4) hours, it can not be deduced with
certainly that he clung to his decision to kill the victim. There is no evident
premeditation. (People vs. Nell, et al., G.R. No. 109660, July 1, 1997)

Evident premeditation while inherent in crimes against property, may

be considered in robbery with homicide if there is premeditation to kill besides
stealing. So also, where treachery obtains in this special complex crime, such
treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance although it
will not qualify the killing to murder, robbery with homicide being a case of a
composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised
Penal Code. (People vs. Cando, 344 SCRA 331)

14. That craft, fraud or disguise be employed.

Craft is present since the accused and his cohorts pretended to be

bonafide passengers of the jeep in order not to arouse suspicion; when once
inside the jeep, they robbed the driver and other passengers. (People vs. Lee,
204 SCRA 900)

However, in People vs. Aspile, 191 SCRA 530, appellants are ruled not
to have employed craft since they had already boarded the vessel when they
pretended to buy Tanduay Rum in exchange for the dried fish and chicken they
were carrying. Even without such pretense, they could nonetheless have
carried their unlawful scheme.

While craft is a circumstance characterized by trickery or cunning

resorted to by the accused (People vs. Barrios, 92 SCRA 195), fraud involves
acts, or spoken or written words, by a party to misled another into believing a
fact to be true when it is not so. (Antazo vs. People, 138 SCRA 292) Thus,
where A, armed with a knife and ready to meet B, who was holding a lead
pipe, told the latter that if he (B) would just drop his weapon their differences
would be settled amicably him with his knife fraud is said to be present.

There is only a hairline distinction between craft and fraud and the
Supreme Court in various cases has used them interchangeably. Justice Luis
Reyes in his book, The Revised Penal Code, Book 1, 1993 Ed., p. 399, has
distinguished the two (2) terms, in that when there is a direct inducement by
insidious words or machinations, fraud is present; otherwise, the act of the
accused done in order not to arouse the suspicion of the victims constitutes
craft.

Disguise is the use of any devise or artifice by the accused to conceal

his identity. Thus, where the accused wore masks to cover their faces, even if
the masks subsequently fell down, thus paving the way for their identification,
this aggravating circumstance is present as there could have been no other
purpose but to conceal their identities. (People vs. Cotabato, 160 SCRA 98)

If the offender put charcoal on his entire nakedbody, entered the house
of his neighbors and raped her, the crime of rape is aggravated by this
circumstance.

But the accused must be able to hide his identity during the initial
stage, if not all trough out, the commission of the crime and his identity must
have been discovered only later on, to consider his aggravating circumstance.
If despite the mask worn by the accused, or his putting of charcoal over his
body, the offended party even before the initial stage knew him, he was not
able to hide his identity and this circumstance can not be appreciated.
15. That advantage be taken of superior strength or means employed to
weaken the defense.

The accused who, with sand in his hand, threw the same into eyes of
the offended party when they were about to strike each other causing
momentary blindness on the part of the latter has employed means to weaken
the defense.

The fact however that there were two persons who attacked the victim
does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior
strength. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means available to the person attacked
to defend himself. (People vs. Casingal, 243 SCRA 37)

Where appellant’s group numbered more than five (5), two (2) of
whom were armed with bladed weapons while the victim was unarmed
surrounded by the group, with his hand held by at least one (1), and was
stabbed fatally sustaining two (2) frontal wounds and other injuries, the crime
is aggravated by abuse of superior strength in as much as no alevosia was
proven as the appellant’s did not consciously adopt their mode of attack.
(People vs. Daen, Jr., 244 SCRA 382)

Had treachery or alevosia been proven, it would have absorbed abuse

of superior strength. (People vs. Panganiban, 241 SCRA 91)

The attack of the three (3) men all armed with bladed weapons against
an unarmed woman whose body bore seventeen (17) stab wounds, clearly
shows the presence of this circumstance.

16. That the act be committed with treachery.

There is (alevosia) treachery when the offender commits any of the

crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.

For treachery to be present, two conditions must concur: (a) the

employment of means of execution which would ensure the safety of the
offender from defensive and retaliatory acts of the victim, giving said victim
no opportunity to defend himself, and (b) the means, method and manner of
execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the offender. (People
vs. Malabago, 265 SCRA 198)
Where the accused, suddenly and without any warning, shot the
deceased from behind knowing he was carrying a bolo, there is treachery.
(People vs. Escander, 265 SCRA 444)

Even if the attack is frontal, treachery may also be considered if the

attack on the victim, although preceded by a warning “Tara Sergio,” was
undoubtedly sudden and unexpected and prevented the unsuspecting victim,
who had just stood up, from defending himself. (People vs. Estanislao, 265
SCRA 810)

For treachery to be appreciated however, this circumstance must be

present at the inception of the attack and if absent, and the attack is continues,
treachery at a subsequent stage is not to be considered. (People vs. Escoto, 244
SCRA 382) However, if there is a break in the continuity of the aggression, it is
not necessary that treachery be present in the beginning of the assault; it is
sufficient that when the fatal blow was inflicted, there was treachery. (U.S. vs.
Balagtas, 19 Phil. 164)

As a rule, a sudden attack by the assault, whether frontally or from

behind, is treachery if such mode of attack was coolly and deliberately adopted
by him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight of
retreat. (People vs. Real, 242 SCRA 671) However, mere suddenness of the
attack, or one made from behind, does not necessarily compel a finding of
treachery for the essence of this circumstance lies in the adoption of ways and
means that minimize or neutralize any resistance which may be put up by the
offended party. (People vs. Gonzagan, Jr., 247 SCRA 220)

17. That means be employed or circumstances brought about which add

ignominy to the natural effects of the act.

Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds

disgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime, so that
killing a man in the presence of the wife does not constitute ignominy (U.S.
vs. Abaigar, 2 Phil. 417) but raping her in the presence of the husband shows
ignominy and aggravates the offense.

Where before the victim, a landowner, was killed, he was made to

kneel in front of his house helpers, this aggravating circumstance would be
present. (U.S. vs. De Leon, 1 Phil. 163)

When the victim was raped with the accused forcing her, using the
same position as dogs do, that is, the dog-style position in the sexual act, the
Rape is aggravated by ignominy. (People vs. Saylan, 130 SCRA 159)

The original intent of the accused did not comprehend the commission
of rape. Hence, the crime of Rape cannot be regarded as principal offense. But
since it attended the commission of Robbery with Homicide, the Rape is
deemed to aggravate the crime. Instead of ignominy, it is the Rape itself that
aggravates the crime. (People vs. Aspile, 191 SCRA 530)

There is likewise ignominy when the accused “plastered” with mud the
vagina of the offended party right after raping her. (People vs. Fernandez, 183
SCRA 511)

The ruling that if robbery with homicide was committed with additional
killings and/or rape, the additional killings or the rape shall be considered
aggravating circumstances has been rendered obsolete by the Supreme Court’s
decision in People vs. Regala, 329 SCRA 709, holding that there is no law
providing that additional rape/s homicide/s committed on the occasion of
robbery should be considered as aggravating circumstance. A penal law is
liberally construed in favor of the offender and no person should be brought
within its terms if it is not clearly made so by the statute.

In People vs. Gano, 353 SCRA 126, the Supreme Court citing the
Regala case held:
It should be noted that there is no law providing that additional
rape/s or homicide/s should be considered as aggravating circumstance.
The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in
Article 13 of the same Code regarding mitigating circumstances where
 there is specific paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for analogous
circumstances.

It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of

multiple homicide on the occasion of the robbery) would result in an
“anomalous situation” where from the standpoint of the gravity of the
offense, robbery with one rape would be on the same level as robbery
with multiple rapes. However, the remedy lies with the legislature. A
penal law is liberally construed in favor of the offender x x x.”

18. That the crime committed after an unlawful entry.

In taking away certain valuable articles from the house, accused entered
through the window. The crime committed is Robbery; but because this
circumstance is not alleged in the information, the offence is classified as
Theft. However, the crime is aggravated by Unlawful Entry. (People vs.
Sunga, 43 Phil. 205)

Since the accused entered the second-floor window of the residence of

the accused, a way not intended for ingress, the crime of Robbery with
Homicide is aggravated by Unlawful Entry. (People vs. Baello, 224 SCRA
218)

Where the escaped was done through the window, the crime is not
attended by this circumstance since there was no unlawful entry.

19. That as a means to the commission of a crime, a wall, roof, floor, door
or window be broken.

The breaking of the parts of the house must be made as a means to

commit the offense. So., if A entered the door of his neighbor and after killing
him, escaped by breaking the jalousies of the window or the door, this
aggravating circumstance is absent.

While that law uses the words “wall, roof, floor, door or window,” in
one case, where accused entered a field tent cutting the ropes at the rear of the
tent, and killed the victim soldiers sleeping thereat, the Supreme Court
considered the crime of Murder, attended by the aggravating circumstance of
forcible entry.

20. That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under fifteen (15)
years of age, or by means of motor vehicles, airships or other similar
means.

The minors here could be accessories, accomplices or principals who

aided the accused in the commission of the crime.

Said minors could avail the exempting or mitigating circumstance due

them on account of minority. The law intends to put a stop to the practice of
professional criminals of employing people whom they know could be exempt
from criminal liability or would not be fully punished under the law.

The crime is aggravated by the use of motor vehicle where the accused
deliberately availed themselves of a tricycle in order to consummate their
dastardly act and to use it as a cover to facilitate the commission of Murder.
(People vs. De la Cruz, 190SCRA 328)
 Likewise, the use of motor vehicle by the accused aggravated the
commission of Robbery with Homicide since the vehicle was used to facilitate
their escaped from the scene of the crime. (People vs. Bartulay, 192 SCRA
621)

Other similar means provided for in this article should be understood to

refer to motorized vehicles or other efficient means of transportation similar to
automobile or airplane (See The Revised Penal Code Book 1 by Reyes, 1993
Ed., p. 459) since the purpose of aggravating the penalty is to discourage the
criminals from taking advantage of the great facilities offered by modern
means of transportation and communication.

21. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately
augment by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission.

This is cruelty provided for Art. 248 as a qualifying circumstances.

There is cruelty when the offender deliberately and inhumanly augment the
suffering of the victim.

The fact that the victim’s decapitated body bearing forty-three (43) stab
wounds, twenty-four (24) of which were fatal, was found dumped in the street
is not sufficient for a finding of cruelty where there is no showing that the
accused, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly
and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain.
(People vs. Ilaoa, 233 SCRA 231)

It would seem that there must be proof showing that when the second
and subsequent stab wounds were inflicted, the victim was still alive because
the essence of cruelty is that the culprit fins=ds delight in prolonging the
suffering of the victim.

In People vs. Binondo, 241 SCRA 764. When the victim was
decapitated, the Supreme Court considered the presence of this aggravating
circumstance stating that: “no greater outrage, insult or abuse can a person
commit upon a corpse than to sever the head there from. The head represents
the dignity of the person and any violence directed towards it can not but be
deliberately or inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim or outraging
or scoffing at his person or corpse.”

Aggravating circumstances not provided under Revised Penal Code.

A. Under the influence of Dangerous Drugs

Sec. 17 of B.P. Blg. 179 promulgated on March 2 1982 pro-vides:

“The provision of any law to the contrary notwithstanding,

when a crime is committed by an offender who is under the influence
of dangerous drugs, such state shall be considered as qualifying
aggravating circumstances.”

In People vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601, it was said that “in the absence of
a competent medical or other direct evidence of ingestion of a dangerous drug,
courts must be wary and critical of indirect evidence considering the severe
consequences for the accused of a finding that he acted under the influence of
prohibited drug.”
 However, if the evidence is clear that the accused perpetrated the act
while under the influence of illegal drugs, the crime is aggravated.

B. Use of Unlicensed Firearm

Although the circumstance that human life was destroyed with the used
of an unlicensed firearm is not aggravating under Art. 14, RPC, it may still be
taken into consideration to increase the penalty because of the explicit
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by R.A. No. 8294.
Section 1, par. 3 of said law says that if homicide or murder is committed with
the used of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. Further, under Sec. 3 thereof, when
a person commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code or
special laws with the use of explosives like pill box, Molotov cocktails bombs,
fire bombs or other incendiary devices which result in the death of any person,
such use shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

C. Organized/Syndicated Crime Group

The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed

by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more
persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping helping one another
for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime. (Art. 23, R.A. No. 7659)

ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES (Art. 15)

There are those circumstances which must be taken into consideration

as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime
and the other conditions attending its commission.

The law enumerates them as (1) relationship of the offender and the
offended party (2) intoxication, and (3) degree of instruction and education of
the offender.

1. Relationship

Relationship shall be considered when the offended party is the spouse,

ascendant, brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the
offender, like parents-in-law, children-in-law, or brothers-in-law or sisters-in-
law. The relationship of step-daughter and step-father is included (People vs.
Tan, Jr., 264 SCRA 425) but not that of uncle and niece. (People vs. Cabresos,
244 SCRA 362)

When is relationship a mitigating circumstance? In crimes against

property, it is mitigating, applying by analogy Art. 332 which provides that
there is no criminal but only civil liability in case of theft, swindling or
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses, ascendants,
descendants, brothers and sisters, and relatives by affinity in the same line,
with a proviso that in case of brothers or sisters and brothers-in-law or sisters-
in-law, they must be living together.

In crimes against persons, except serious physical injuries, where

relationship is always aggravating the rule is where the offended party is
relative of a higher degree, or where he is of the same level as the offender,
relationship is aggravating, otherwise it is mitigating. If the results in the death
of the victim even if he is of a lower level, the relationship is aggravating.
However, this rule is subject to the “other conditions attending the commission
of the crime.”

2. Intoxication

The ordinary rule is that, intoxication may be considered either

aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the circumstances attending the
commission of the crime. Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty,
if the intoxication is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the
crime; upon the other hand, when intoxication is habitual or intentional, it is
considered as an aggravating circumstance. The person pleading intoxication
must present proof that he had taken, a quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to
the commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of blurring his
reason; at the same time, he must prove that not only was intoxication not
habitual but also that his imbibing the alcoholic drink was not intended to
fortify his resolve to commit the crime. (People vs. Buenaflor, 211 SCRA 492)

3. Degree of Instruction and Education of the Offender

High degree of education and instruction of the offender is always

aggravating, never mitigating when applicable. In a case for Homicide or
Murder, the liability of the offender is not aggravated even if he is a bar or
board examination topnotcher, and has graduated summa cum laude from his
college degree. On the other hand, the liability of an accountant or a lawyer
who commits Estafa by means of “Kiting” or violation of the Trust Receipts
Law shall be aggravated since he used his high degree education and
knowledge in committing the criminal act.

Low degree of instruction or education, on the other hand is always

mitigating, never aggravating when applicable. Where the accused did not
finish even the first grade in elementary school, the murder he committed is
attenuated by this alternative circumstance (People vs. Limaco, 88 Phil. 35); so
also in perjury where the affidavit is written in English this mitigating
circumstance is present.

The rule however is that not only illiteracy. But also lack of sufficient
intelligence, is necessary to successfully avail of this alternative circumstance
as mitigating.

In Molesa vs. Director of Prisons, 59 Phil. 407, the Supreme Court

ruled:
“This Court has held that the mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction should not be taken into consideration with the crime of
rape. x x x No one is so ignorant as not to knopw that the crime of rape
is wrong and violation of the law.”
 Title Two

PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE

FOR FELONIES

Who are the particeps criminis – that is, those participants in the crime?
They are the principals, accomplices, and accessories. However, for light
felonies, the persons criminally liable are only the principals and the
accomplices. (Art. 16)

By the personal nature of criminal liability, only natural persons can be

the active subject of a crime. However, corporations and juridical persons can
be ordered to pay fine as a punishment under some special laws, like the
Corporation Law, General Banking Act, Omnibus Election Code, etc. In some
cases, the officers of the corporation and/or partnerships are the ones
personally held liable.

1. Principals

There are three (3) Classes of Principals – (a) Principals by Direct

Participation – that is, those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
(b) Principals by Inducement or Induction – those who directly force or induce
others to commit the crime; and (c) Principals by Indispensable Cooperation,
those who cooperate in the execution in the offense by another act without
which the crime would not have been accomplished. (Art. 17)

Principals by Direct Participation are those who, participating in the

criminal resolution, proceed to perpetrate the crime and personally take part in
its realization, executing acts which directly tend to the same end. (People vs.
Guballo, 16401-R, February 19, 1957) To hold liable thus as principals by
direct participation, they must have conspired with each other (and with other
participants of there are any) and went to the scene of the crime to personally
execute what they agreed upon, their acts tending towards the same objective.
Thus, if A, B, C and D conspired with each other to kill X and then proceeded
to the house of X, but before reaching the same, D pretending to answer the
call of nature went out of the way and did not join A, B and C anymore when
the three, he did not proceed to the scene of the crime.

So also, if X, Y, and Z passed by the house of W who was apparently

not in the mood and upon Z’s loud calling, went out of his house with a bolo
whereupon Z tried to wrest possession of said bolo, and while grappling with
W, the latter’s wife came out from nowhere and stabbed Z with her spear, W
can not be classified as a principal by direct participation as he did not conspire
with his wife in killing Z even if he was at the scene of the crime.

The acts of the participants must be towards the same end in carrying
out their plan. So that in the first example above, even if A only acted as look-
out in the yard of X’s house, and B just accompanied C to the room where X
was sleeping, ready to assist C if the need arises, and it was only C who fired
the gun that killed X, all the, three (3), meaning A, B and C are principals by
direct participation.

Where the accused conspired with this three (3) co-accused to kill the
two (2) victims and the role assigned to him was to kill one of the victims
which he did, he is a principal by direct participation in the two (2) murders.
 Where conspiracy has been adequately proven, there is collective
criminal responsibility, for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. On the
other hand, if there is no conspiracy proved, individual criminal liability may
ensue.

Principals by Induction are of two (2) classes: those who directly

induce others to commit the crime, and those who directly force another to
perpetrate the offence. The one forced or induced is the principal by direct
participation.

There are two (2) ways of directly inducing another to commit a crime:

(a) By giving price, reward or promise. To fall under the scenario, the
price, reward or promise must be the primordial consideration
why the principal by direct participation proceeded to commit the
crime. So that if he would commit the offense just the same with
or without the price, promise or reward, the one who gave the
price or reward is not liable. Necessarily, there must be
conspiracy between the giver of the consideration, and the doer of
the act.

(b) By using words of command. To hold the principal by

inducement liable, it is necessary that the inducement be made
directly to secure the commission of the crime, and that such
inducement be the determining cause of the execution of the act
by the principal by direct participation.

Mere suggestion, or a thoughtless expression or a chance word spoken

without any intention or expectation that it would produce the result can not
hold the utterer liable as principal by inducement, thus, if A, in response to B
who was narrating to him his (B’s) bitter experience with X in a chance
conversation, told B, “Kung ako ikaw eh papatayin ko iyang si X,” and later
on, B killed X, A can not be considered a principal by inducement.

Even if the inducement be directly made, with the inducer insistent and
determined to procure the commission of the crime, he still can not be
classified as principal by induction if the inducement is not the determining
cause for committing the crime. Thus, if the actor has reason of his own to
commit the offense, there can be no principal by induction.

Those who directly forced another to commit a crime are also

categorized as Principals by Inducement.

Thus, with a gun in his hand, A gave B a knife and ordered him to kill
X who was sleeping nearby otherwise he (A) would shoot him (B). If B would
stabbed X to death, A is a principal by inducement by directly forcing another
to perpetrate a crime. B, on the other hand, is a principal by direct participation
although he would be exempt from criminal liability under Article 12, par. 6.

Principals by Indispensable Cooperation are those who cooperate in

the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have
been accomplished. Like in the case of Principal by Inducement, it presupposes
the existence of the principal by direct participation otherwise with whom shall
be cooperate with indispensably.

The cooperation here is an assistance knowingly or intentionally

rendered which can not exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act
intended to be executed. (Phil. Law Dictionary by Moreno, 3rd Ed., p. 213) In
other words, before an accused can be tagged as a principal by indispensable
cooperation, he must have conspired with the principal by direct participation
or must have a unity of criminal purpose and intention with him immediately
before the commission of the offense, but his cooperation is in the performance
of another act without which the criminal would have been accomplished.

Where both accused conspired and confederated to commit rape, and

one had sex with the offended party while the other was holding her hands, and
thereafter the latter was the one who raped the victim, both are principals by
direct participation and by indispensable cooperation in the two (2) crimes of
rape committed. (People vs. Fernandez, 183 SCRA 511)

Where A, a municipal treasurer, conspired with B for the latter to

present a false receipt and which receipt was the basis of the reimbursement
approved by A, and both thereafter shared the proceeds, A is the principal by
direct participation and B by indispensable cooperation in the crime of
Malversation.

2. Accomplices

An accomplice is one who, not having participated as principal,

cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous act.
(Art. 18) He is sometimes referred to accessory before the fact.

The existence of an accomplice presupposes the existence of a principal

by direct participation. The accomplice does not conspire with the principal
although he cooperated in the execution of the criminal act.

If A approached B, borrowing the latter’s gun, telling him that he (A)

is going to kill X, and B Knowing A’s criminal design, lent his gun with which
A shot and killed X, B is an accomplice cooperating by previous act.

In the above example, take note that while B did not conspire with A to
kill X, he (B) concurred with A in his purpose. Had he conspired with A, B is a
principal by indispensable cooperation. That act of A however must have a
relation to the participation of B. Thus, if while B, knowing A’s purpose to kill
X, still lent his gun to A, but A used a bolo in killing X, then B can not be
considered an accomplice.

While X was choking Y, W went behind Y without any knowledge of

X and once within striking distance, stabbed Y. even upon seeing the stabbing
made by W, X continued choking Y, who died of stab words. choking
contributed to the death of Y. in this case, W is an accomplice cooperating by
simultaneous act.

If the offender, however, even of performing the acts of an accomplice,

has participated as a principal, he will be punished as a principal, and no longer
as an accomplice.

3. Accessories (Art. 19) (Also accessory after the fact)

They are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime,
and without having participated as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the
effects of the crime.

The most common example is a person who, without

having participated as principal or accomplice in Robbery or
Theft but knowing that the property being offered to him is the
proceeds or subject matter of the said crime, bought or purchased
or dealt in any manner with such property, obtaining benefit from
said transaction or helping the thief or robber to profit therefrom.
If the robber or thief request him to sell the property stolen, and
he does so and thereafter given a share, he is also an accessory.

Under P.D No. 1612, otherwise known as “Anti-fencing

Law,” any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for
another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in
any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or
should have known to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery of theft shall be punished depending on the
value of the property involved. (Sec. 2)

The accessory however should not take the property

without the consent of the principal or accomplice in possession
of the same, otherwise he is a principal in the crime of theft since
a stolen property can also be the subject of theft or robbery.

A person who profits or assist the offender to profit by the

effects of the crime is also illustrated in a kidnapping case where
the kidnappers ask a person who has not participated in the actual
kidnapping, to contact the parents of the victim to negotiate the
delivery of ransom money, and having successfully done so,
receives a share from the same. He is also an accessory.

But if a person being co-conspirator in theft or robbery,

sold some of the property stolen, he should no longer be punished
as an accessory since he will be held already as a principal.

2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects

or instruments thereof to prevent its discovery.

Where A, knowing that B and C had killed X, buried the

corpse to prevent the discovery of the killing, he is an accessory.

The body of the crime however does not only mean the
body of the person killed. This phrase refers to CORPUS
DELICTI – that is, the body or the substance of the offense.
(People vs. Bantagan, 54 Phil. 841). Corpus delicti simply means
the fact that a crime has actually been committed. (People vs.
Madlangbayan, 94 SCRA 685)

Placing a weapon in the hand of the deceased who was

killed by his friend, to make it appear that his friend had killed the
victim in self-defense constitutes an act of an accessory.

Where the wife misled the authorities by informing them

that the person who killed her husband was a theft who has fled,
 when in truth, the killer was her paramour, the wife is liable as an
accessory for concealing the body of the crime.

If A, after killing a person, went to B and told the latter to

hide the gun he used, which B did with the objective of
concealing the crime, B is an accessory by concealing the
instrument of the crime. So also, if X would deliver the car he had
carnapped, to Y, telling the latter of the carnapping he did, and
asking him to conceal the car so that the crime would not be
discovered, and Y did so, he is an accessory by concealing the
effects of the crime.

3. By harboring, concealing or assisting in the escape of the

principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of
public functions, or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder or an attempt to take the life of the
Chief Executive, or is known to be guilty of some other crime.

If the one who harbors or assist in the escape of the

principal is a public officer, whatever be the crime committed by
the said principal provided it is not a light felony, will make him
an accessory. Thus, if A rapes a woman, and he is assisted in his
escape by a public officer, the latter is liable as an accessory.

However, if the one who assist the rapist in his escape is a

private individual, he is not liable as an accessory under the
article because in case of a private individual assisting the escape
of the principal, the crime committed must be treason, parricide,
murder or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive.

Thus, if A and B agreed to fight, and after killing B, A

was assisted by private individual C in his escape, C is not liable
as an accessory because the crime committed by A is only
Homicide there being an agreement to fight.

While accessories’ liability is subordinate to that of the

principal, the acquittal of the latter does not mean acquittal of the
accessory. So that if A, charged as principal in a murder case,
with B indicted as accessory for helping him escape before he
was finally arrested, and A was acquitted because of self-defense
or that the court adjudged the crime to be only Homicide, B is not
liable as an accessory. But if A was acquitted because of insanity,
or the case against him dismissed because he died during the trial,
B can still be held liable as accessory as long as it was proven that
the crime was murder, and he assisted A in his escape.

In connection with this matter, Presidential Decree No.

1829 provides that the penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period, or a fine ranging from one thousand
(P1,000.00) to six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos or both, shall be
imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of subjects and the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by harboring or
concealing, or facilitating the escape of any person whom he
knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has
committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to
 prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction. This is what is
popularly known as Obstruction of Justice.

Title Three

PENALTIES

In General

Penalty is the punishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person

who commits an unlawful, deliberate or negligent act. (People vs. Moran, 44
Phil. 431)

Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony shall be

punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission but
the law can not impose cruel and unusual punishment as the Constitution
prohibits it. In a judgment of conviction for any crime, the court should specify
the appropriate name of the penalty provided for the Revised Penal Code or in
special laws. (People vs. Aquino, 186 SCRA 851)

Classification of Penalties

Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that felony shall be

punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission but
the law can not impose cruel and unusual punishment as the Constitution
prohibits it. In a judgment of conviction for any crime, the court should specify
the appropriate name of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code or
in special laws. (People vs. Aquino, 186 SCRA 851)

Classification of Penalties

Art. 25 categories penalties into Principal penalties which death is the

capital punishment; reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, perpetual or
temporary absolute disqualification, perpetual or temporary special
disqualification and prison mayor which are considered Afflictive penalties;
prision correctional, arresto mayor, suspension and destierro which are
Correccional penalties; aresto menor and public censure which are Light
penalties; and Accessory penalties which are perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification, perpetual or temporary special disqualification, suspencion
from public office, civil interdiction, indemnification, forfeiture or confiscation
of instruments and proceeds of the offense, and the payment of costs.
Principal penalties are those expressly imposed by the court while Accessory
penalties are those that are deemed included in the principal penalties imposed.

In the order of severity and for the purpose of successive service

sentences, the penalties have the following scale:

1. Death
2. Reclusion
3. Reclusion Temporal
4. Prison Mayor
5. Prision Carreccional
6. Arresto Mayor
 7. Arresto Menor
8. Destierro
9. Perpetual Absolute Disqualification
10. Temporary Absolute Disqualification
11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for,
the right to follow profession or calling
12. Public censure
The maximum duration however of the convict’s sentence shall not be
more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties imposed. Said maximum period shall in no case exceed forty (40)
years. (Art. 70)

With respect to Reclusion Perpetua and Life Imprisonment which more

often than not become somehow confusing, the following are their differences:

1. Reclusion Perpetua is imposed by the Revised Penal Code while

Life Imprisonment is by Special Law;

2. Reclusion Perpetua entails imprisonment for only thirty (30)

years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon while
Life Imprisonment does not appear to have any definite extent or
duration; and

3. Reclusion Perpetua carries Accessory penalties, while it is not so

in Life Imprisonment. (People vs. Abapo, 239 SCRA 373)

For the purpose of graduating the penalties in the light of the mitigating
and aggravating circumstances present in the commission of the offense, the
courts shall observe the following graduated scales:

SCALE NO. 1 SCALE NO. 2

1. Death 1. Perpetual absolute

disqualification
2. Reclusion Perpetua 2. Temporary absolute
3. Reclusion Temporal disqualification
4. Prision Mayor 3. Suspension from public
5. Prision Correccional office, the right to vote and
6. Arresto Mayor be voted for, and the right to
7. Destierro follow a profession or calling
8. Arresto Menor 4. Public censure
9. Public censure 5. Fine (Art. 71)
10. Fine
 A fine, however, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, shall be
considered afflictive if it exceeds six thousand (P6,000.00); correctional penalty, if it
does not exceed six thousand (P6,000.00) but not less than two hundred (P200.00), and
light if it be less than two hundred (P200.00).

Duration or Penalties

Article 27 specifies the duration of penalties. This was amended by Section 21 of

R.A. No. 7659 which provides:

Section 21. Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby amended to

read as follows:

Art. 27. Reclusion Perpetua. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be

from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years.

Reclusion Temporal. – The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from

twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years.

Prison Mayor and temporary disqualification. – The duration of the

penalties of prison mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, except when the penalty of
disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration
shall be that of the principal penalty.

Prison correccional, suspension and destierro. – The duration of the

penalties of prision correccional, suspension, and destierro shall be from six (6)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years, except when suspension is imposed as an
accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.

Arresto mayor. – The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be

from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.

Arresto menor. – The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be

from one (1) day to thirty (30) days.

xxx

Reclusion Perpetua, despite its “defined duration” in R.A. No. 7659 – twenty (20)
years and one (1) day to forty (40) years – is still to be classified as an indivisible penalty
(People vs. Lucas, 232 SCRA 537), and should be imposed in its entire duration in
accordance with Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Magallano, 266 SCRA
305)
Preventive and Subsidiary Imprisonment

Preventive imprisonment is the incarceration undergone by a person accused of

a crime which is not bailable, or even if bailable, can not afford to post the bond. During
the trial of his case, he is detained in jail. He is known as detention prisoner.

Subsidiary imprisonment, on the other hand, is the personal penalty prescribed

by law in substitution of the payment of fine embodied in the decision when the same can
not be satisfied because of the culprit’s insolvency. (People vs. Jarumayan, 52 O.G. 248)

Whenever as accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal

to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he
may be sentenced, and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately
without prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal. (Art. 29,
RPC)
So that, if the trial of A for Attempted Homicide is still going on for more than six
(6) years, and he has been detained from the beginning of the trial for failure or inability
to post bail bond, he shall be ordered immediately released, for the crime is punishable by
prision correccional (Art. 249 in relation to Articles 6 and 51), and the range of this
penalty is six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years only. (Art. 27) But the trial shall
proceed so that in case of acquittal, he will have no criminal record. In case of conviction,
he will not be imprisoned anymore.

The preventive imprisonment undergone by the accuse shall be credited fully, to

be subtracted from his sentenced, if he agrees in writing to abide by the disciplinary rules
imposed on convicted prisoners; otherwise, only four-fifths of the time during which he
has undergone preventive imprisonment shall be deducted.

The following are exceptions however:

1. If the convict is a recidivist or has been previous convicted twice or more

of any crime;

2. When upon being summoned for the execution of his sentenced, he shall
have failed to surrender voluntarily. (Art. 29, RPC)

There is no subsidiary imprisonment if the penalty is more thatn six (6) years.
Moreover the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one third (1/3) of the principal
penalty or one (1) year which ever is lesser.

Application of Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances

The court must first consider whether the penalties imposable are Divisible or
Indivisible. Indivisible penalties are those which have no fixed duration like death,
reclusion perpetua, perpetual absolute or special disqualification, and public censure;
while Divisible penalties are those having fixed duration and case be divided into three
(3) periods.

In case the law prescribes two indivisible penalties, like reclusion perpetua
to death (the penalty for Infanticide, Parricide, Murder, etc.), the presence of one
mitigating circumstance would result in the application of the lesser penalty, while the
presence of an aggravating circumstance would mean the application of the greater
penalty. If there is no mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall
be applied. If there be present both mitigating and aggravating circumstance, the court
shall reasonably allow them to offset one another. (Art. 63)

When the penalty is single indivisible, like the penalty for Piracy under Article
122 as amended by Sec. 3, R.A. No. 7659 – which is reclusion perpetua, such penalty
shall be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance such as
minority, in which case, the penalty may be reduced by a degree. Such is also the rule in
case of two (2) indivisible penalties like reclusion perpetua to death. If the mitigating
circumstance in attendance is privilege mitigating, the penalty shall be lowered by one
degree. Thus, when the crime proven is Murder, (the penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code as amended by Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 7659), and
the accused is a minor below sixteen (16) years old, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal.

When the penalty is divisible and there is neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in medium period. If there is one ordinary
mitigating circumstance it shall be applied in it minimum period, and if there is one (1)
aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period. If the
mitigating circumstance present is privileged one, the reduction of the penalty shall be by
degree, not only by period. If there are both mitigating and aggravating circumstance, the
court shall reasonably offset them according to their relative weight. (Art. 64)

If the commission of the crime was attended by both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, the rules (Art. 62) are as follows:

1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially

punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime shall not
be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.

Example: “By means of fire” (Art. 14, par. 12) shall not be considered in the crime of
Arson. That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party (Art. 14,
par. 3) shall not aggravate the liability of the offender convicted of Trespass to
Dwelling.

So also, “by means of poison” (Art. 14, par. 12) will not be considered to increase
the liability in Murder qualified by using poison.
 2. Aggravating circumstances which are inherent in the crime to such a degree that
they must of necessity accompany the crime shall not increase the penalty.

Example: Abuse of confidence (Art. 14, par. 4) shall no longer be considered

Qualified Theft with grave abuse of confidence to increase the penalty.

3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of

the offender or from his private relations with the offended party or from any
personal cause shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the culprit to
whom they are attendant.

Example: X, Y, and Z, conspiring with each other, killed W who is X’s brother-
in-law. Z committed it with evident premeditation while Y is a recidivist. The
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation applies only to Z, the fact that
the victim is X’s brother-in-law would affect the liability only of X while
recidivism which is personal to Y shall increase the liability of Y only.

However, the mitigating circumstance of abandonment by the husband provided

for in adultery under Art. 333 applies to both the wife and her lover because their
act is only one, judicially speaking. (People vs. Avelino, et. al., [C.A.] 40 O.G.
194)

4. The circumstance which consist in the material execution of the act or in the
means employed to accomplish it shall aggravate or mitigate the liability of those
who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act.

Example: A, B, and C agreed to kill X and so armed with guns they proceeded to
the house of the latter whereupon A told B and C that he would just stay in the
yard to prevent any relative of X from helping the victim. When B and C entered
the room of X, and saw him sleeping, it was C who shot him. The treachery that
attended the commission of the crime shall also affect B and not only C
treacherously killed X in his sleep because B had knowledge of the employment
of the treacherous act being present actually during the shooting. A’s liability is
not aggravated by treachery as he had no knowledge of it, being in the yard.

So also, A, B and C agreed to kill X and in a drinking spree, A saw the

opportunity and put poison in the glass of X. B saw (X should be substituted by
A) pouring the poison while C did not see it and was unaware of it. X died after
taking the poisonous drink. The aggravating circumstance of “by means of
poison” affects only A and B.

Other Effects of Penalty

Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the
forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was
committed. Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated in favor of the
Government unless they be property of a third person not liable for the offense; but those
articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed. (Art. 45)

This forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense is

provided for as an accessory penalty under Article 25. If A stole the gun of B who is duly
licensed to possess it, and used it in killing C, the gun will no longer be confiscated in
favor of the government but would be returned to C. if the proceeds or tools can not be
subject of lawful transaction like marijuana or shabu, then they shall be ordered burned or
destroyed.

Complex Crimes and Their Penalties (Delito Compuesto)

When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, to be applied in its maximum period. (Art. 48)

Art. 48 is not applicable in case of special complex crimes specifically provided

for in Revised Penal Code like Robbery with Homicide or Rape or with Arson (Sec. 9,
R.A. No. 7659 amending par. 1 of Article 294), or Rape with Homicide (Sec. 11, R.A.
No. 7659 amending Article 335) and applies only when no specific penalty is stated in
the law.

Art. 48 speaks of two (2) types of complex crimes: (1) when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, otherwise known as compound
crime, and (2) when an offense is a necessary means of committing the other, which is
the complex crime proper.

An example of No. 1 – that is, compound crime, is when A with a revolver shot
B, missing him but the bullet hit X who is A’s father. A committed the crime of
Attempted Homicide with Parricide. Or, when in recklessly driving his car, Y hit the car
of W which in turn hit the car of A, the damages suffered by the two (2) cars resulting in
grave or less grave felonies (not merely light).

An example of No. 2 – that is, complex crime proper, is when the Municipal
Treasurer, who received ten thousand (P10,000.00) from a taxpayer, placed in the
duplicate original of the receipt the amount of one thousand (P1000.00) and then
misappropriated the difference of nine thousand ((P9,000.00) is guilty of Malversation
through Falsification of a Public Document because Falsification is necessary means to
commit Malversation.

It is however, Estafa through Falsification of Public Document, not Malversation

of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Document, when a casual employee of
the Bureau of Lands encashed a treasury warrant by affixing his signature thereon, when
in fact the treasury warrant is not payable to him. He is not an accountable officer.
(Sambiniano vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., 249 SCRA 24)
 The accused, who, through intimidation, brought out the victim from her house to
a nearby school building where he raped her is guilty of the complex crime of Forcible
Abduction with Rape. (People vs. Grefiel, 215 SCRA 596)

In complex crimes, one offense should not be punishable under another law. Both
must be a violation of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, while Illegal Possession of Firearm
could be argued as a necessary means to commit Murder or Homicide, there is no
complex crime committed because one crime is punishable under a special law while the
other is by Revised Penal Code.

While one can be convicted only of rebellion where the murders, robberies and
kidnapping were committed as a means to or in furtherance of the rebellion, offenses
which were not committed in furtherance of the rebellion but for personal reasons or
other motives, are to be punished separately even if committed simultaneously with the
rebellious acts. (People vs. Oliva, 344 SCRA 435)

Continuing Crime (Delito Continuado)

A single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal resolution
or intent not susceptible of division. (Philippine Law Dictionary by Moreno)

In People vs. Encila, 76 O.G. 5824, it was defined as a continuous, unlawful act
or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force
however long a time it may occupy.

When the actor, there being unity of purpose and of right violated, commits
diverse acts, each of which, although of a delictual character, merely constitutes a partial
execution of a single particular delict, such concurrence of delictual acts is called “delito
continuado.” (Gamboa vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 314)

The taking of several cows belonging to different owners while admittedly

committed through several acts was held to be punished only as one crime when done or
perpetrated during the same occasion.

Where, however, in a train, the accused-twins ran amuck killing eight (8) persons
and wounding one during that occasion, it was held that the eight murders and one
attempted murder were committed qualified by treachery. (People vs. Toling, 62 SCRA
17)

Indeterminate Sentence Law

(Act 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225)

Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the

Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which, shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and
the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same.

Since the opening sentence of this law says: “xxx in imposing a prison term xxx”
this Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to destierro. So that if a concubine is
found guilty under Article 334, the court shall impose a straight penalty of not less than
six (6) months and one (1) day nor more than six (6) years as this is the range of
destierro provided for in Article 27. The Judge thus can sentence a concubine to a
straight prison term of six (6) months and one day, or ten (10) months, or one (1) year, or
five (5) years, etc.

How to Apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law

To cite a specific example: If A who is only seventeen (17) years old was found
guilty of Homicide with a mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the court shall
first determine the applicable penalty by applying the mitigating circumstance present.
Since the accused is only seventeen (17) years old, he is entitled to a mitigating
circumstance of minority which is a privileged one. Thus, the penalty of reclusion
temporal prescribed for Homicide (Art. 249) will be reduced to prison mayor, which is
one degree lower. The court will the consider the other mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender so that the maximum period under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
prison mayor which has a range of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years.

The minimum term shall be any range of prision correccional which is the
penalty next lower in degree to prison mayor. The sentence of the court thus is as
follows:

“Accused is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of six (6)

months and one (1) day [or more but not exceeding six (6) years] of prision
correccional as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day [or more but not
exceeding eight (8) years] of prision mayor as maximum.

If in the above example, the seventeen (17)-year-old convict did not voluntarily surrender
but is a recidivist, then the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence is prision mayor
in its maximum period, that is ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) but the
minimum is the same – any range within prision correccional.

This Indterminate Sentence Law is applicable to special laws as it says: “if the offense is
punished by any other law.” Thus, People vs. Viente, 225 SCRA 361, the accused was
found guilty of carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539 and was sentenced by the trial
court to a straight imprisonment of thirty (30) years. The Supreme Court, ruling that the
Indeterminate Sentence Law applies to violation of special laws, modified the penalty to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as minimum to thirty (30) years as maximum
since Section 14 of the said Republic Act provides that, if carnapping is committed by
means of violence or intimidation, the penalty is imprisonment for not less than seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months and not more than thirty (30) years.

There are exceptions to the application of the Indeterminate Sentece Law. Thus,
Section 2 provides that the law shall not apply to person convicted of offenses punished
with death penalty or life imprisonment; to those convicted of treason, conspiracy or
proposal to commit treason, misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage or
piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence; to those who violated the conditional pardon granted by
the Chief Executive; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed
one (1) year; nor to those already sentenced by final judgement at the time of the
approval of the Act.

Accused Mary Rose Ondo, having bee sentenced to life imprisonment for Large
Scale Illegal Recruitment is not entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. (People vs. Ondo, 227 SCRA 562) The Court also refused to grant her the benefits
of P.D. No. 603, otherwise known as the “Child and Youth Welfare Code.”

Although there is a great distinction between reclusion perpetua and Life

Imprisonment, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not mention reclusion perpetua
as an exception, the courts have uniformly refused to apply this law to persons sentenced
to reclusion perpetua, and the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed such ruling.

Recidivists are entitled to the availment of the Indeterminate Sentence Law since
those disqualified are Habitual Delinquents. (People vs. Venus, 63 SCRA 435)

When the accused escaped from jail from his case was on appeal, he is not
entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. (People vs. Martinado, 214
SCRA 712)

A youthful offender whose sentenced is suspended under Sec. 192 of P.D. No.
603 and who escaped from his confinement is still entitled to the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. The same is true with an accused confined in the National
Center for Mental Health (formerly National Mental Hospital) since their confinement
can not be considered punishment but more of administrative matters for their
rehabilitation. (People vs. Soler, 63 Phil. 868; People vs. Co, C.A. 67 O.G. 7451)

A person sentenced to destierro who entered the prohibited area within the
prohibited period has evaded the service of his sentence (People vs. Abilog, 82 Phil. 174)
and when he committed a crime in that area, he will not be entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law for the new crime.

The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is based on the penalty

actually imposed, not on the imposable penalty, and its purpose is to uplift and redeem
valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness.

Probation Law

Probation is a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and sentenced

is released, subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a
probation officer. (Sec. 3[a], P.D. No. 968 as amended by P.D. No. 1275, P.D. No. 1990
and B.P. Blg. 76)

Under Section 4 of the law, the trial court may, after it shall have convinced and
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period of
perfecting as appeal, suspend the execution of the sentenced and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best:
provided that no such application shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.

Probation is a mere privilege, not a right of the accused. It is rather an act of grace
or clemency or immunity conferred by the State which may be granted by the court to a
seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty
imposed by law.

The benefits of the law shall not be extended to those:

1. Sentenced to serve a maximum of imprisonment of more than six (6) years.

2. Convinced of subversion or any crime against national security or the public

order.

3. Who have previously been convinced by final judgment of an offense

punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and one (1) day
and/or a fine of not more than (should be not less than) two hundred
(P200.00).

4. Who have been once on probation.

5. Who are already serving sentenced at the time the substantive provisions of
this Decree became applicable.

If the accused is sentenced to more than six (6) year imprisonment even by a day,
he is no longer entitled to the benefits of the Probation Law.

However, multiple prison terms imposed against the accused found guilty of
several offences in one decision should not be added up, and their sum total should not be
determinative of his eligibility for, nay his disqualification from, probation since the law
uses the word “maximum” not “total” term of imprisonment. (Francisco vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 243 SCRA 384) Thus, if A, having been charged for five (5) cases which
were jointly heard is sentenced in one decision for one (1) year and eight (8) months for
each of the charges so that the totality of the prison term is more than six (6) years, he is
not disqualified to avail of the provisions of the Probation Law.

Conditions of Probation

Every probation order issued by the court shall contain the following conditions:

1. That probationer shall present himself to his designated supervising

probation officer within seventy two (72) hours from receipt of the order.

2. He shall report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time
and place specified in the order.

The trial court may impose other conditions for the probationer to comply.

Other Instances When Probation Not Applicable

1. When the accused is convinced under R.A. No. 9165 – the new Anti-
Dangerous Drugs Law except when he is a first offender minor in which
case he is eligible for probation even if the penalty imposed is more than six
(6) years. However if he is convinced of drug trafficking or pushing he is
disqualified.

2. If accused appeals his conviction irrespective of the purpose of the appeal

even if it is only to question the propriety of the penalty imposed.

3. Conviction of an election offense under the Revised Election Code.

 Title Four

EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY:

TOTAL AND PARTIAL

Criminal liability is totally extinguish by:

1. Death of the convict;

2. Service of the sentenced;
3. Amnesty;
4. Absolute Pardon;
5. Prescription of the crime;
6. Prescription of the penalty; and
7. Marriage of the offended woman as provided for in Art. 344 (Art. 89)
On the other hand, it is partially extinguish by:

1. Conditional Pardon;

2. Commutation of the sentenced; and

3. Good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while serving
sentenced.

The grant of probation may be considered as a form of extinction of criminal

liability which was bestowed while accused who was never been incarcerated, was out on
bail, may thus be categorized as total extinction thereof. However, if it was granted after
the conviction of the accused who was in jail, it can be considered as partial extinction
only. It must be noted however, that unlike in service of sentence, in probation, the
probationer is still required to report to a Probation Officer at a certain period until the
duration of the probation period.

1. Death of the Accused

If the accused dies, at whatever stage of the case, personal penalty is totally
and permanently extinguished. You can not imprison a dead person. With respect
to pecuniary liabilities like fine or costs of the proceedings, they are extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

With respect to civil liability of the accused, if he dies after the judgment
has become final, the same is not extinguished and it can be enforced against the
 estate of the deceased. If he dies however, before promulgation of sentence, or
even after, but the same is not yet final, on account of an appeal or a motion for
reconsideration duly filed, the civil liability is also extinguished. The offended
party nevertheless is allowed to file a separate civil action, this time based on
either contract, quasi-contract, law or quasi-delicts (the other sources of obligation
under Article 1157 of the Civil Code). The statute of limitations on the civil
liability in such a case is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case. (People vs. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239)

2. Service of Sentence

When the accused has fully served his sentence, his personal or criminal
liability is to be considered permanently terminated.

3. Amnesty and Absolute Pardon

Amnesty is a sovereign act of oblivion for past acts, granted by the

Government to a certain class of persons, charged or guilty of crime, usually
political offences, and often conditioned upon their return to obedience and duty
within a prescribed time. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 108)

Pardon is an act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is

bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for the crime he has committed.
(De Leon vs. Dir. Of Prisons, 31 Phil. 60)

It is the Chief Executive who can grant both but in the case of Amnesty, it
needs concurrence of Congress. While pardon looks forward and relieves the
offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted,
Amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself; it
so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed
no offense. (Barrioquinto, et al. vs. Fernandez, et al., 82 Phil. 642). Thus, Art. 89
says “xxx by amnesty which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects.”

Thus, if A was convicted of Homicide and was granted Absolute Pardon,

and later on committed Murder or Homicide, he will be considered a recidivist.
However, if his first offense is Rebellion and was granted amnesty and later on
was found guilty of sedition, recidivism can not be considered against him.

Pardon, to be considered as a mode of extinction of criminal liability should

be pardon by the President of the Philippines and not pardon by the offended
party which only extinguishes civil liability. (Art. 23, RPC) Pardon by the
offended party, however, in cases of Adultery, Concubinage, Rape, Acts of
Lasciviousness, Seduction or Abduction when granted before the institution of the
criminal action also extinguishes criminal liability. (Art. 344, RPC) Under R.A.
 No. 8353, in the crime of rape, if it is the husband who is the offender, the
subsequent forgiveness by the wife shall extinguish the criminal action or the
penalty except when the marriage is void ab initio. (Sec. 2)

4. Prescription of Crime

It is the forfeiture or loss of the right of the State to Prosecute the offender
or file criminal action after the lapse of a certain period of time. (See The Revised
Penal Code, Book I by Luis B. Reyes) Crimes punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribed in twenty (20) years; those
punishable by the other afflictive penalties (like prision major), in fifteen (15)
years; and those by correctional penalty, in ten (10) years except those by arresto
mayor which shall prescribe in five (5) years while grave oral defamation and
grave slander by deed prescribed in six (6) months. Light offences shall prescribe
in two (2) months. When the penalty imposable is a compound one, the highest
penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules on prescription.
(Art. 90)

The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day of discovery
of the crime by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. (Art. 91) Thus,
if A witnessed the killing of X by B, and since A not being related to X, got
scared, and did not report the crime to the authority, the crime (Murder or
Homicide) will never prescribe. But if A is the son of X, or even if not related to
X, he reported to the police authorities what he witnessed, and no complaint is
filed in court within twenty (20) years, then the crime will prescribed, and after
twenty (20) years and one (1) day from the discovery of the crime, no charge can
be filed against B anymore.

The period shall be interrupted by the filling of the complaint or

information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiable stopped for
any reason not imputable to him. (Ibid.)

The filing of the complaint even with the Fiscal’s office only (Francisco vs.
Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 538; Calderon- Bargas vs. RTC-Pasig, Metro
Manila, 227 SCRA 56) or with the court shall interrupt the prescriptive period.
Thus, in the example above, if B was charged before the court or the prosecutor’s
office on the tenth (10th) year from discovery, the prescriptive period is
interrupted. If one (1) year after the filing of the complaint or information, the
proceedings were stopped without fault on the part of B, or was dismissed, the
period shall begin to run again, and after nine (9) years and one (1) day, the crime
of B shall be deemed prescribed since the ten (10)-year period that lapsed without
filing any criminal complaint shall be considered so that only nine (9) years and
one (1) day would be needed to complete the prescriptive period of twenty (20)
years.
 Criminal cases, however, which are covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure under the Rules of Court must be filed with the Court, otherwise, they
shall prescribe even if filed already with the Fiscal’s office, after the lapse of sixty
(60) days. (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, et al., 211 SCRA 277) However, in Cabelic vs.
Geronimo, May 27, 2002, a case of slight physical injury thus covered by the
Rules on Summary Procedure, the Supreme Court ruled that the period by
prescription was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the office of the
Provincial Prosecutor. The Zaldivia case involved a violation of a municipal
ordinance where the applicable law is not Art. Of the Revised Penal Code but Act
No. 3326.

Prescription of Falsification of Public Documents shall begin from

registration of the falsified document with the Register of Deeds since the
registration is the official notice to the whole world; but the crime of Bigamy shall
commence to prescribe from discovery by the offended party or the authorities of
the crime, and not from the time the bigamous marriage was registered with the
Local Civil Registrar since marriage is not property which would be registered in
the place where it is located, and a bigamous marriage is generally entered into a
place where the offender is not known to be a married person, in order to conceal
his legal impediment. (Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 233 SCRA 155)

Even if libel is punishable by prision correccional, it prescribes not in ten

(10) years but in one (1) year as expressly provided for in Article 90. With respect
to offenses punished with a fine, to determine their prescriptive period, such fine
should not be reduced or converted into a prison term and should be considered as
afflictive, correctional or light under Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code.

5. Prescription of Penalty

Prescription of the penalty is that loss or forfeiture of the right of the State to
execute the final sentence of conviction after the lapse of a certain period of time.

The penalties of death and reclusion perpetua prescribe in twenty (20)

years; other afflictive penalties (like reclusion temporal and prision mayor), in
fifteen (15) years while correctional penalties except arresto mayor which
prescribes in five (5) years, prescribe in ten (10) years. Light penalties shall
prescribe in one (1) year. (Art. 92), RPC)

The penalty, to be subject of prescription must have been imposed by final

judgment. Thus, if A after conviction by the trial court, appealed the decision, and
escaped from jail where he has been detained during trial, the penalty will never
prescribe. In prescription of penalty, the offender must be serving sentence, and
must have escaped, committing the crime of Evasion of Service of Sentence.
From the day he escaped, the prescription of penalty commences to run. If the
penalty imposed is death or reclusion perpetua, he must be able to hide from the
authorities for a period of twenty (20) years, or if it is reclusion temporal, for
 fifteen (15) years. If within the prescriptive period he should give himself up, or
be captured, or would go to a foreign country with which the Philippines has no
extradition treaty, or should commit another crime, then the period is interrupted
and the penalty will not prescribed anymore.

Problem:

A was sentenced to reclusion temporal for Homicide and while

serving sentence, escaped on January 1, 1980. He must be able to
elude authorities up to January 2, 1995 to consider the penalty
prescribed. Suppose he was arrested after five (5) years of escape –
that is, on January 1, 1985, and was able to re-escape on January 1,
1986, he must hide for just ten (10) more years. The five (5) – year
period during his escape must have to be considered for purposes of
completing the fifteen (15) – year period for the prescription of the
penalty of Homicide.

Reason for Prescription of the Crime and/or Penalty

During the period that the accused/convict escaped, he lives a life of a hunted
animal, hiding mostly in the mountains and forest in constant mortal fear of being caught.
His life, far from being happy, comfortable and peaceful, is reduced to a mere existence
filled with fear, discomfort, loneliness and misery. As the distinguished penal
commentator Viada said, the convict who evades sentence is sometimes sufficiently
punished by his voluntary and self-imposed punishment, and at times, his voluntarily
exile is more grievous than the sentence he was trying to avoid. And all the tie he has to
utilize every ingenuity and means to outwit the Government agencies bent on recapturing
him. For all this, the Government extends to him a sort of condonation or amnesty. (See
Inflate vs. Provincial Warden, 92 Phil. 310)

Marriage of the Offended Party with the Offender

In cases of Seduction, Abduction, Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness (SARA), the

marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or
remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provision of this paragraph shall also be
applicable to the co-pricipals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-
named crimes. (Art. 344, last par.)

In other crimes, marriage of the complainant and the accused does not extinguish
criminal liability. In the crimes of SARA (Seduction, Abduction, Rape and Acts of
Lasciviousness), the marriage must be entered into in good faith, and if undertaken only
to avoid criminal prosecution, such marriage does not result in the extinction of penal
liability. (People vs. Santiago, 51 Phil. 68) If done in good faith however, the marriage
benefits the accessory or accomplice even if he is already serving sentenced. (Laceste vs.
Santos, 56 Phil. 472) Under R.A. No. 8353, the subsequent valid marriage between the
offender and the offended party in the crime of rape shall extinguish the criminal action
or the penalty imposed. In case of multiple rapes, however, the principle does not apply.
Thus, if A, B and C raped W in that when A was having sex with W, B, and C were
holding the legs and arms of W, and when it was B’s turn, A and C were the ones holding
W’s legs and arms, and when C was the one having sex with W, the ones holding her
arms and legs were A and B. even if later on, A contracted marriage with W, there is no
extinction of penal responsibility because this is a case of multiple rapes.

Even if rape is now a crime against person and no longer a crime against chastity,
the principle of marriage as a form of extinguishment of criminal liabilities applies.

Partial Extinction of Criminal Liability

Conditional Pardon by the Chief Executive partially extinguishes the penal

liability of a convict. It is that pardon granted to a prisoner which is subject to some
conditions, one of which is that he will not commit any crime anymore. Oftenly, this kind
of pardon is delivered to a convict still serving sentence who must accept the condition in
order to effective. Thus, part of his sentence is remitted which he will no longer undergo.

Commutation is the substitution of a lesser penalty for that of a greater

punishment imposed on the convict by the Chief Executive. Thus, instead of pardon, the
President may commute the death penalty to reclusion perpetua, or if the penalty is
reclusion temporal, he may grant a commutation altering or changing the penalty to
prison mayor. There is no doubt a partial extinction of criminal liability occurs. The
commutation of the original sentenced for another of a different length and nature shall
have the legal effect of substituting the latter in the place of the former. (Art. 96) Unlike
in conditional pardon, the commutation of penalty in favor of the convict does not need
his acceptance. (22 R.C.L. 530)

With respect to Good Conduct Allowances, Art. 97 provides for the guidelines
which by its nature may be expanded or supplemented by the prison’s authority. The
prisoner however, to be entitled, must be serving his sentence. If the accused is enjoying
liberty under a conditional pardon, he can not be entitled to the good conduct allowances.
(People vs. Martin, 68 Phil. 122)

The allowances for good conduct granted by the Director of Prisons (now Bureau
of Corrections) shall not have revoked. (Art. 99)
 Title Five

CIVIL LIABILITY

Person Civilly Liable for Felonies

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. (Art. 100) Thus, if
A committed Murder, Theft or Rape, aside from imprisonment, he is obliged to pay the
offended party the civil liability which includes restitution, reparation of the damage
caused, and indemnification for consequential damages. (Art. 104) Of course, if the crime
is one from which no civil liability may arise, like illegal Possession of Firearm (P.D.
No. 1866 as amended by R.A. No. 8294) or illegal Sale, Transport or Possession of
Prohibited or Regulated Drugs (R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A. No. 7659), the convict
incures no civil liability.

If an accused however was not held criminally liable, it does not mean he is not
civilly liable. In fact, under the Rules of Court, in case of acquittal, unless there is a clear
showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment
shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party.
(Rule 120, Sec. 2)

Civil Liability of Parents and/or Guardians

For the crimes committed by minors and insane persons who are exempt from
criminal liability, the civil liability shall devolve upon those having legal authority or
control over them unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part or
that they are insolvent, in which case, the property of the minor or the insane shall be
liable, excepting property exempt from execution. (Art. 101, RPC) This is thus a direct
and primary liability of the parents or guardian.

Subsidiary Liability of Inn Keepers, Tavern-Keepers,

Employers, Teachers or Persons Engaged in Industry

In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern-keepers and any

persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for the crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulations shall have been committed by them or their employees. (Art.
102)
A restaurant or movie house owner who opens his establishment before 9:00
o’clock in the morning despite the existence of an ordinance that they can open only after
9:00 a.m. so as not to coincide with rush-our traffic will be civilly liable if a person is
killed inside their establishments, and the accused-killer is insolvent to satisfy the civil
liability.
 The same rule applies to employers, teachers of persons engaged in any kind of
industry, for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties. (Art. 103)

The civil obligations arising from crimes devolve upon the heirs of the person
criminally liable, and the action demand likewise descends to the hiers of that person
injured. (Art. 108, RPC)

Thus, if A was found guilty of killing B, and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua
and to pay the heirs of B, fifty thousand (P 50,000.00) but died while serving sentenced,
his (A’s) heirs are bound to pay the heirs of B the said amount of fifty thousand (P
50,000.00) if he left properties sufficient to cover the civil liability.

However, if on account of a business transaction between the heirs of A, and the

heirs of B, the latter owe the former thirty thousand (P30,000.00), the heirs of the
convicted man A, can deduct the said indebtedness from the fifty thousand (P 50,000.00)
award provided in the decision, since civil liability arising from the crime shall be
extinguished in the same manner as other obligations in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Code. (Art. 112, RPC)

This is subject however to the provision of Article 1288 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which provides:

Article 1288. Neither shall there be compensation if one of the

debts consist in civil liability arising from a penal offense.

The convict shall be obliged to satisfy the civil liability contained in the judgment
of conviction even if he has served his sentence, or has not been required to serve the
same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason. (Art.
113, RPC)