COMMENTARY
business environment, and embrace up
Development of Enterprises
and Services Hub Bill, 2022
India’s Policy Ambivalence
Ram Singh, Surendar Singh
The draft Development of
Enterprises and Services Hub Bill,
2022 reflects significant policy
ambivalence and contributes to
legal ambiguities for business
firms. It is not only incoherent
with other flagship schemes of
the Government of India but
also is oblivious to the evolving
global trade realities, thus
exposing the potential risks of
policy-induced distortion(s).
The infrastructural support provided by the
FORE School of Management, New Delhi in
completing this study is greatly acknowledged.
Views expressed are personal.
Ram Singh (ramsingh@iift.edu) is the head,
Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, New Delhi.
Surendar Singh (drsurendarsingh@gmail.com)
teaches at the FORE School of Management,
New Delhi.
10
U
nder the “self-reliant India” initia-
tive, the Government of India
(GoI) has adopted a recalibrated
strategy for its international economic and
trade engagements (Singh and Banerjee
2022). The Ministry of Commerce and
Industry (MoC&I) has geared up its efforts
by signing the new free trade agreements
(FTAs)/comprehensive economic partner-
ship agreements (CEPAs). It is also replac-
ing the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act,
2006 with a new legislation entitled
Development of Enterprises and Services
Hub (DESH) Bill, 2022. The reasons for
replacing SEZ law are both external and
internal, as the number of global disrup-
tive development(s) around the world,
such as the United States (US)–China
trade war, COVID-19, and Russia–Ukraine
war are contributing to the realignment
in the global supply chain(s) (GSC). New
global and regional alliances such as
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)
and Supply Chain Resilience Initiative
(SCRI) are encouraging firms to shift
from China to market-oriented and dem-
ocratic countries (Wang and Sun 2021;
Xu et al 2020). This phenomenon is known
as “nearshoring and re-shoring” and is
now re-coined as “friend-shoring or ally-
shoring”(Maihold 2022). India, under
such a scenario, is vying for opportune
investment-intensive manufacturing capa-
bilities in the crucial sectors of the Indian
economy. At the policy front, there is a
mounting pressure from the World
Trade Organization (WTO) secretariat to
eliminate all export-related incentives
and subsidies, which are there in India’s
trade policy (Nedumpara et al 2021).
There is an emerging consensus that In-
dia needs to extend an enabling and at-
tractive environment to the industry to
scale up production, reform operational
october 22, 2022
an ecosystem of research and innova-
tion to enhance the domestic manufac-
turing capabilities. This has led to the
introduction of the draft DESH Bill, 2022
with the objective of transforming the
domestic manufacturing and service
ecosystem. The department of com-
merce, under the MoC&I, is a nodal de-
partment to implement the DESH Bill.
The fact of the matter is that India’s
dismal manufacturing and export per-
formance is largely attributed to outdated
and anarchic industrial policy, bureau-
cratic red-tape, lack of vision, lack of
coordination between the state(s) and
centre, and the opportunism by a few in-
dustrialists (Gupta et al 2008; Ahmed
and Alam 2021; Singh and Singh 2022).
Even after the setting up of Asia’s first
export-processing zone (EPZ) in 1965 at
Kandla, Gujarat, India remained a lag-
gard in terms of export success. A mirage
was created by converting the existing
EPZs into SEZs, similar to that of China,
by redressing the infrastructural and
bureaucratic challenges that were at-
tributed to be the limiting factors for the
success of EPZs (Aggarwal 2006, 2012;
Mukherjee et al 2016). An enabling legis-
lation was enacted much later in 2005,
offering fiscal sops to industrialists to
develop industrial estates to grab the lu-
crative land plots, only to be de-notified
and converted as housing and business
estates. Originally dreamt of as large in-
dustrial estates for transforming India’s
manufacturing landscape, generating em-
ployment, accelerating economic devel-
opment, and earning foreign exchange,
the existing SEZs are perceived as an in-
strument of offering fiscal sops to infor-
mation technology (IT) developers, land-
grabbing instruments for housing and
business estates, and a vehicle for import-
dependent export industries (gems and
jewellery, pharma, electronics assem-
bling) (Levien 2013). Similarly, Palit and
Bhattacharjee (2008) also argued that
the Indian SEZs, even if dreamt on Chinese
template, are nowhere close as they are
scattered silos away from the coastal zone.
The DESH Bill is aimed at addressing
many concerns with the hitherto SEZ
vol lVii no 43 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

act. A few sectors such as IT and IT-ena-
bled services, gems and jewellery, and
pharma have benefited from the SEZ Act.
Even if the SEZs have significantly con-
tributed to the growth story of exports,
one cannot miss the point that indus-
tries located in the SEZs are heavily de-
pendent on imports, especially in sectors
such as gems and jewellery as well as
pharma (Khan 2008). Hence, the true
gains of such engines of exports are debat-
able, especially in the context of their con-
tribution to economic growth, employ-
ment generation, and foreign exchange
earnings. Further, the scope of measure-
ment of success of an SEZ is defined as
“net positive foreign exchange” which is
too narrow a definition to comprehend the
actual gains made from the existing SEZs.
Moreover, the SEZs are exclusive zones for
export purposes and have been unable
to capture the nuances of fostering a
business ecosystem for achieving the other
macroeconomic objectives as envisaged.
The DESH Bill is conceived to provide a
relatively better business framework than
that of SEZ Act as it allows domestic tar-
iff area (DTA) sales but subject to duty
equalisation levy in order to ensure par-
ity with the DTA units (Financial Express
2022). In the realm of this, the DESH
seems to be a good move as it aims to
bring scale, scope, system, and synergy
to India’s manufacturing operations. The
DESH Bill presents a forward-looking
agenda and underpins the important re-
search and innovation system which is
critical for export excellence in the in-
dustrial revolution 4.0. Moreover, it will
help in addressing the skewed profile of
India’s existing SEZs and fostering a stable,
predictable, and transparent fiscal regime
to leverage foreign trade as a catalyst for
India’s industrial transformation. The re-
forms under DESH Bill are aimed at widen-
ing the objectives of DESH business units
on the criteria such as: economic growth,
employment generation, research and in-
novation, contribution to environmental
sustainability, among others (Bhattachar-
yya 2022). It is not merely limited to the
earnings of net positive foreign ex-
change as enunciated under the existing
SEZ law but is aimed at boosting the eco-
nomic activity and promoting greater
integration with all the industrial parks
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 22, 2022
across the country. Ensuring ease of doing
business (EODB), it underlines the impor-
tance of streamlined processing of appli-
cations, notification, de-notification, and
other interrelated provisions. The DESH
Bill further proposes to create a dynamic
and robust structure of governance and
compliances through a “single window,”
thereby ensuring EODB.
The scope, coverage, and content of
the draft DESH Bill looks evolutionary
and brings in a ray of hope for excelling
in domestic and export manufacturing.
Simultaneously, it reflects legal ambigui-
ties in its various provisions and seems
conflicting with other schemes/policies,
thus, creating the potential risk of policy-
induced distortions. This article analyses
a number of key provisions of the DESH
bill and also expounds the legal and reg-
ulatory ambiguities highlighting its in-
consistencies with other schemes such as
production-linked-incentives (PLIs), which,
in turn, sabotage the potential benefits
of the proposed DESH Bill.
Legal and Regulatory Ambiguities
The DESH Bill is aimed at addressing the
baggage and barrage of concerns of the
hub developers, unit holder(s), prospective
investors, and the industry in general. The
definition of “export” under Section 2(1)
clause (m) needs clarity on cases of
“deemed export” such as supplies to ex-
port-oriented units (EOUs), supply against
invalidation letter of Advance Authorisa-
tion, and export promotion of capital
goods (EPCG), supplies to embassies, the
United Nations (UN), and other notified
multilateral organisations. The DESH Bill,
paradoxically, does not provide direc-
tion regarding the provisions on treat-
ment of supplies made from various in-
dustrial clusters and parks; for instance,
textile park, apparel park, pharma park,
food-park, lace park, etc. This will un-
necessarily contribute to the develop-
ment of a cluttered industrial landscape.
There also exists a legal ambiguity;
for instance, the notable concern of the
industry is that of Section 47(1: d) which
provides for exemption from payment of
taxes, duties, or cess under all enact-
ments specified in the Fourth Schedule
of the said act; a closer look at the Fourth
Schedule of the act reveals an omission
vol lVii no 43
COMMENTARY
of Income Tax Act, 1961. Hence, does it
mean that the exemption extended to
DESH units of Income Tax @15% as under
Section 115BAB shall continue to be gov-
erned and regulated by the Income Tax
Act, 1961 and the hub developers as well as
the DESH units do not have any legislative
redressal under the DESH Act? Similarly,
in the absence of legislative provisions on
non-inclusion of minimum alternate tax1
(MAT), alternate minimum tax2 (AMT),
and dividend distribution tax3 (DDT) in the
Fourth Schedule of the DESH Bill, a DESH
unit will always be exposed to the impo-
sition of such tax at any time without any
legal relief under the DESH Bill, 2022. Thus,
the new legislation does not offer the sta-
bility in terms of fiscal exemption(s) as
outlined in the DESH Bill. The tax provi-
sions of the DESH Bill expose new units to
the risks associated with the withdrawal
of tax relief or even tax-rate changes,
which will not be under the consulta-
tion, purview, and legal review of the
DESH Bill or the “hub director.”4 Further-
more, Section 115BAB provisions that
no deduction on account of depreciation in
respect of such machinery or plant has been
allowed or is allowable under the provisions
of this Act in computing the total income of
any person for any period prior to the date
of the installation of machinery or plant by
the person5
will be a retrograding step for new invest-
ments to percolate into such zones from
countries like China under “China-plus-
one” strategy. This should further be read
with Manufacturing and Other Opera-
tion in Warehouse Regulation (MOOWR),
which also stipulates similar provisions
on the treatment of depreciation. Hence,
the industry is of the view that it is an-
other policy document without any fis-
cal and non-fiscal benefits to attract in-
vestments to transform the manufactur-
ing ecosystem in the country. Unlike the
SEZ Act, 2005, which legislatively offers
a blanket exemption from almost all tax-
related legislations, the DESH Bill is rath-
er regressive as the Fourth Schedule
does not provide the inclusion of tax law
such as Income Tax Act, 1961, Customs
Act, 1962, and other similarly allied leg-
islations. The tax exemption provisions
are more of a sort of mirage, lacking sub-
stance, and lucidity to that of hitherto
SEZ Act, 2005 and rules therein.
11
COMMENTARY
The DESH Bill also lacks clarity regard-
ing the transitory provisions for units
willing to switch over from SEZ units to
DESH units. This is particularly impor-
tant in the case of treatment of tax ex-
emption to the erstwhile SEZ units when
converted as DESH units; for instance,
how a unit located in an existing SEZ,
availing exemption of 10 years of corpora-
tion tax in a block of 15 years, will be
treated under the DESH, if it has availed
7 years of corporation tax exemption.
Will it have to pay the corporation tax
@15% or will it continue to enjoy the
benefits as stipulated in the SEZ Act. One
of the major compliance issues for India’s
export industry is that of Foreign Exchange
Management Act, and how units located
in DESH area will be facilitated under
single-window, including the facilitative
powers of hub director, are not stipulated
in the circulated draft.
The legal provisions on a sanitised bank
account of the converted DESH units to
monitor the export and DTA operations
are missing, as they will no longer need
to maintain foreign currency account as
mandated in the SEZ Act, 2005.
The conceptual conversion of the DESH
Bill from the enacted SEZ Act which stip-
ulates SEZ as a “foreign territory and
especially delineated duty-free enclave
for exports” to more of a “plug and play
model” with the objective of utilising the
available infrastructure to the maxi-
mum, is a flawed objective of the DESH
Bill. It is aiming to convert SEZs into a
plug-and-play industrial park ecosystem
which can be a suitable model for modu-
lar manufacturing generally anchored
by leading firms with standardised but
unique product portfolio, constantly sup-
ported with strong research and innova-
tion system, thus bringing in new prod-
ucts periodically to tap the high-income
and premium customers. This model can
only be useful for services exports but it
is difficult to ascertain how successful it
shall be, for the IT firms in the context of
government as well as business enterpris-
es encouraging employees “to-work-from-
home.” Projecting “plug and play model”
for DESH units belittles the original ob-
jectives of DESH Bill of leveraging these
hubs as an engine of exports promotion,
generating employment, transforming
12
India’s manufacturing landscape, solicit-
ing enhanced investments, and embrac-
ing an ecosystem of research and inno-
vation, as such platform-based manufac-
turing models are more suitable for the
biggest, fastest-growing, most powerful-
ly disruptive companies such as Google,
eBay, Uber, Amazon, Apple, Microsoft,
and AirBnB (Parker et al 2016). The “plug
and play model” can be an ancillary ob-
jective of these mega-schemes involving
huge tax exemptions, providing exten-
sive infrastructure support and extend-
ing regulatory and operational ease, as it
is not suitable for transforming the man-
ufacturing landscape. The plug and play
model, at best, can help DESH units fac-
ing operational challenges of achieving
a delicate balance between high volume,
cost-competitive manufacturing and
higher turnkey services where a joint de-
velopment and a deeper collaboration
with the client(s) emerges for customer–
services excellence (Kobeda 2016).
Learning from the experience(s) of
some successful economic zones such as
Shenzhen, Xiamen, Hainan in China,
Incheon Free Zone (South Korea), Port
Klang Free Zone (Malaysia), and Jebel
Ali Free Zone Area (UAE), it is distinctly
clear that seamless logistics connectivity
has played a key role. Zeng (2015) explains
that the success factors of Chinese SEZs
include long-term commitment of the
government, a conducive business envi-
ronment in the zones, strategic locations,
technology upgrading and skills train-
ing, and strong supply chain linkages
with the local economy. Empirical stud-
ies (Dhingra et al 2009; Mukhopadhyay
et al 2009) on the “strategic location” of
an SEZ elucidate that strategic locations
with seamless logistical connectivity play
a vital role, which unfortunately is miss-
ing in India, both at the policy level as
well as the operational front. India has
the first six SEZs located in the coastal area
zones (Kandla, Mumbai, Cochin, Chen-
nai, Vizag, and Kolkata); they are, effec-
tively, bureaucratically-run, sort of public
enterprises, lacking the enthusiasm to
tap the evolving global opportunities. The
weak logistical connections of coastal
SEZs with their hinterlands and that of
hinterland with the port(s) should be re-
placed with easy, prompt, and seamless
october 22, 2022
access and connectivity to any mode of
transport to help utilise the full poten-
tial of the DESH units.
Another notable concern is that of
domestic industry as some of the DESH
units may start business operations with
the sole objective of procuring and sourc-
ing internationally but selling domesti-
cally as, in many sectors, it is far more
lucrative to do so; for instance, furni-
ture, leather goods, apparel, textiles,
home décor, processed food, and other
fast-moving consumer goods. “We are
looking at the world for export opportu-
nities, when (the) whole world is looking
at India for business” amplifies the ever-
expanding size of India’s consumer and
retail market, with one of the largest
middle class, only next to China. In this
context, it is evident that the state of art
of infrastructure, prompt regulatory and
bureaucratic support, fiscal and non-fis-
cal incentives, etc, of the proposed DESH
bill can be more effectively utilised for
selling in India, rather than to excel in
export endeavour as originally envis-
aged. To add further, what special fiscal
and non-fiscal benefits and incentives,
does the DESH Bill offers than the exist-
ing MOOWR scheme, is not clearly com-
prehensible from the draft DESH Bill.
Resultantly, it can lead to dichotomy in
India’s export promotion schemes.
Incoherent Framework
The DESH Bill will be an addition to the
four existing schemes promoting domestic
and export manufacturing (Srivastava
2022): SEZs, EOUs, MOOWR, and DTA for
domestic sales and exports. A careful re-
view of these schemes demonstrates that
they differ from each other on various
parameters—location, exemptions, pay-
ment of import duty, goods and services tax
(GST) on exports and imports, domestic
sales, and tax benefits (Table 1, p 13). Fur-
ther, the incentive structure across these
four schemes is skewed and competes
against each other. SEZs provide more
incentives than EOUs/electronic and hard-
ware parks/biotechnology parks while a
MOOWR provides even more than the
SEZs and EOUs (Srivastava 2022). This
means that the DESH Bill has to provide
more than what is being offered in the
other existing schemes, especially more
vol lVii no 43 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 COMMENTARY

than the MOOWR. The competing incen- departments. The MoC&I promotes lib- highlighting a low share in global trade.
tive structure not only creates scope for eral and free trade policies while the On the other hand, India’s imports in
policy distortion(s) but also an unviable MoF, occasionally, opposes such policies these sectors are high from the global
dilemma for firms to decide the scheme, to protect the revenue mobilisation. markets and underline the importance
that they need to anchor upon for their The DESH Bill is emphasising at one side of substituting imports under the Atma-
export business. This particularly poses of the export function that is strengthen- nirbhar Bharat Abhiyaan. These sectors
challenges for micro, small and medium ing India’s business and export ecosys- are also part of PLI scheme which aims
enterprises (MSMEs), which have a limited tem without understanding the fact that at augmenting the competence, capacity,
capacity to comprehend the potential export is purely a demand function. In and capabilities of the domestic manu-
implications of different schemes in their India’s cluttered manufacturing landscape facturing sector. The DESH Bill does not
ever-evolving business models (Mukher- under the DTA/EOU/MOOWR schemes, the expound sectors that need to be incentiv-
jee 2018). Furthermore, the DESH Bill is DESH Bill should not become another ised for manufacturing under the DESH.
to be implemented by the MoC&I while policy document but a torch, shedding This makes the DESH Bill inconsistent
the MOOWR is governed by the Ministry light to leapfrog India’s exports in those with the PLI scheme and “phased-manu-
of Finance (MoF). Although both aim at sectors/goods in which the global de- facturing plan scheme,” thus reflecting
strengthening the domestic manufac- mand is significant. Table 2 shows that the the dichotomy in GOI’s efforts to promote
turing capabilities and achieving export global import demand is concentrated in the domestic manufacturing sector.
excellence, this could potentially lead to electrical and electronics (16.18%), ma- The MoC&I is also implementing the
a tug of war between the two departments chinery and mechanical (11.48%), vehicles “one district-one product” (ODOP) scheme
to make their respective schemes more other than railway (6.76%), pharmaceuti- to support the MSME units located at the
successful. This happens, quite often, cal (3.85%), and medical devices (3.11%), district level and hand-hold them to in-
due to the varying functional mandate respectively. Unfortunately, India’s ex- tegrate into global supply chains. It is
and outcome objectives of two different ports in these sectors are insignificant, nowhere mentioned in the DESH Bill
Table 1: Policy Framework for the Manufacturing Sector in India how the MSME units of the ODOP will be
Schemes Location Direct Tax Exports Sourcing of Inputs Sale of Finished Goods on-boarded within the industrial ecosys-
Benefits to be Domestic GST Customs Duty Domestic Exports–IGST
More Than Payment by and IGST Payment tem of these hubs, thus questioning the
Imports the Supplier Payment heuristic nature of India’s export promo-
DESH Specified Proposed No No IGST No Customs Customs duty No tion legislation(s) to transform domestic
walled duty, No IGST foregone on inputs +
areas IGST on output and export manufacturing.
SEZ Specified Till 2020 Yes No IGST No Customs Customs duty No
walled duty, No IGST foregone on output + Conclusions
areas IGST on output
EOUs Anywhere Till 2012 Yes Pay GST, No Customs Customs duty No
The DESH Bill is part of India’s broader in-
seek duty, No IGST foregone on inputs dustrial strategy that aims at addressing
refund with interest + the shortcomings of the SEZ Act and
GST on output
strengthening the domestic and export
MOOWR Anywhere No No No GST No duty, Customs duty No
(credit) No IGST foregone on inputs + manufacturing capabilities. It emphasises
(deferred) IGST on output on addressing the compatibility and com-
DTA for Anywhere No No Pay GST Pay duty IGST on output NA pliance concerns of export-related benefits
domestic and IGST
sales and subsidies at the WTO. It also aims to
DTA for Anywhere No Yes Pay GST, seek Use advance NA Optional, capitalise upon global geoeconomic devel-
export refund, supply authorisation pay and opments around the world such as the US–
sales against advance –No duty, seek refund
authorisation No IGST or seek
China rivalry, Russia–Ukraine war and
and export exemption global supply disruption(s), and the result-
promotion for ant realignment of supply chain(s). The
capital goods
DTA=domestic tariff area; EOU=export-oriented units; GST=goods and services tax; IGST = Integrated GST; MOOWR= DESH Bill, prima facie, is a promising initi-
Manufacturing and Other Operation in Warehouse Regulation; SEZ=special economic zone. ative with the objective of transforming
Source: Srivastava (2022).
Table 2: Concentration of Global Imports and India’s Position ($ billion) the cluttered landscape of the domestic
HSN and Product Category World Percentage India’s India’s Imports India’s India’s Share manufacturing. Needless to reiterate, the
Imports Share in Total Exports to from the Share in in World current draft of the DESH Bill is full of am-
World Imports the World World World Exports Imports
Chapter 84: Electrical and electronics 3,594.46 16.18 24.17 48.41 1 1.9 bivalence and reflects legal ambiguities
Chapter 85: Machinery, Mechanical Appliances 2,549.87 11.48 18.84 56.73 0.6 1.6 relating to taxation, transitionary provi-
Chapter 87: Vehicles other than Railway 1,502.06 6.76 18.90 6.41 1.3 0.4 sions, and relevance of “plug and play
Chapter 29: Organic chemicals 528.86 2.38 21.18 27.24 4.3 5.2 model.” The DESH Bill, not only competes
Chapter 30: Pharmaceuticals 855.11 3.85 19.46 3.30 2.4 0.4
with the existing schemes such as EOUs
Chapter 90: Medical devices and others 690.71 3.11 3.91 11.32 0.6 1.6
Total world imports 22,211.42 - - - and MOOWR but is also incoherent with PLI
Source: International Trade Map, 2022. and ODOP, the flagship programmes of
Economic & Political Weekly EPW october 22, 2022 vol lVii no 43 13
COMMENTARY
self-reliant India. The concerns of the in-
dustry, if addressed, can help India
achieve the milestone of emerging as an
export champion in the global market.
notes
1 Section 115JB of the Income Tax Act.
2 For non-corporate assessee(s) and the units lo-
cated in International Financial Services Centre.
3 Section 115-O of the Income Tax Act 1961, read
with Section 115BBD.
4 As enshrined vide Section 2(1)(n) of the proposed
DESH Bill 2022.
5 DESH Bill Section 115BAB, Income Tax Act, 1961.
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