A-Violence is any violent act committed in support of a cause or to further a political goal.

For instance, when we read media accounts of a senseless knife assault on a city street, the

violence seems to be a disruption in the normal flow of daily life. What can be done, and

what kind of response can be formulated, depends on how a problem, danger, or threat is

portrayed. As with the IRA, perhaps a cessation of violence can begin a process of

negotiation and accommodation when violence is inherent in a political campaign. For

example in his testimony to the Iraq Inquiry in January 2010, former UK prime minister Tony

Blair contrasted the acts of terrorism committed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) with

those witnessed on 11 September 2001: I don't want to minimize the impact of the IRA's

terrorism. A group like the IRA was engaged in terrorism for a political purpose, possibly

unjustified, but terrorism, nonetheless. Since they were able to kill even more than 3,000

people in New York, I believed you could not take any risks in dealing with this issue after

that time.

Below are two intertwined forms of violence that exist in one region of the world. Open

visible drones attack the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. And because violence targeting aid

organizations' financial transactions is far less visible, Western countries have been unable to

provide adequate assistance to victims of severe flooding in the same region in 2010. Let's

consider what would occur when a specific location is recognized as a source of risk and

danger, a terrorist threat, but also develops a potential for devastating flooding. The

perception of Pakistan as a country that is both dangerous and vulnerable has significant and

constricting consequences on how the rest of the world reacts.

B-Self-defense is a private, legal type of force that is sanctioned by the government.

However, one would argue that an uncommon act of violence, one that goes outside accepted

political frameworks, could only be answered by an unconventional response.

Phillip Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killing, believes that drone strikes

go beyond a state's legal capacity to use force in self-defense. However, Alston's study notes

that "targeted murders are increasingly being employed far from any war zone," even if

"there are indeed circumstances in which targeted killings are authorized in armed conflict

situations when deployed against combatants or fighters." The UN Charter's ban on the use of

military force is greatly undermined by this expansive and unrestricted interpretation of the

right to self-defense. A violent state response that is arguably beyond the traditional bounds

of justifiable force has required the representation of a world under threat of violence from an

ephemeral and networked source. It is very difficult to draw a distinction between violent and

nonviolent action, between violence and politics, or between the state's ostensibly legitimate

monopoly on violence and the illegitimate violence of terrorism or insurgency. This is true

both in terms of how we think about violence and in practical issues of how violent effects

are produced.

Certain social discourses and representational techniques are violent in and of themselves.

Violence is not just defined by physical harm or force, but also by the ability to oppress

others and to set up the conditions necessary for war or torture. In other words, political

regimes become violent when they lose their credibility and legitimacy. Only a government

without any remaining societal support would need to impose its rule by use of force.

C-

The population along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border finds itself exposed to fresh

interventions in the ongoing war on terror in more ways than just the overt and visible

violence’s of targeted assassination as we mentioned in A section. Global financial

authorities have been growing more concerned about Pakistan's involvement in the effort to

combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism for several years. İn the example of
drone targeting in Pakistan the borderlands between Pakistan and Afghanistan are seen in

modern international politics as a region that is particularly hazardous and unstable. But

AfPak is more than just a perilous region because it is spatially networked to cells and

suspect groups in the West, radiating danger and the threat of violence into the core of

Western societies. US President George W. Bush described the networked global image of

the terrorist threat as extending "from the streets of Western cities to the mountains of

Afghanistan, to the tribal areas of Pakistan, to the islands of South East Asia, to the Horn of

Africa." For instance, hyperbolic but vague terror alerts were issued around Christmas 2010

in Germany, when officials claimed to have specific intelligence indicating a genuine terrorist

threat.

"AfPak mindset" can be defined as a geopolitical network linking Pakistan's frontier regions

with actual but vague threats in Europe's urban centers. These threats were partially linked to

Dawood Ibrahim, an Indian criminal and wanted man who was thought to be hiding in

Pakistan. The US started to develop its own unique form of response - the targeted killing of

militants in the AfPak region using unmanned aerial vehicles or "drones" - in the context of

the widespread political consensus that the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands represent the

spatial origins of future terrorist violence in the West. Since 2009, there have been twice as

many drone strikes, with over 210 occurring in 2010. This took place concurrently with the

departure of standard armed units in Iraq. For instance, given the numerous other unarmed

applications for the drone, such as mapping, remote sensing, and surveillance, it is

challenging to estimate the number of countries that now deploy armed drones. The text

examines two intertwined forms of violence present in one area of our world here to provide

context for our discussion of the complex question of violence and the challenges of

differentiating between different types of violence: the overt and obvious drone attacks on the

Afghanistan-Pakistan border; and the much less obvious violence of targeting the financial
transactions of aid agencies, which led to the West's failure to deliver enough aid. People in

that nation are more susceptible to the more overt types of obvious violence, such as drone

attacks, due to the less overt and barely perceptible violence of blocking money flow and

blacklisting that nation.

D- The political measures of FATF or of military strikes may not be possible without the

representation of a location and a population who pose risks to the rest of the world, as in the

examples we've discussed of the dual targeting of the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands as a

site of drone strikes but also as a population whose links to the world's flows of money and

aid are to be monitored. This would lead us to the conclusion that there is no inherent or pre-

given differentiation when it comes to the question of whether we can distinguish between

various forms of violence. Instead, the lines that are drawn circumstances are profoundly

political; they define the world in which we exist, impacting people's lives and means of

subsistence, evoking some reactions while subtly impeding other acts.

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