This is an Author’s Accepted Manuscript of an article published in International Journal of Public Sector

Management, 2021.
Citation:

Hajnal, G. and Staronova, K. (2021), "Changing patterns of individual performance

appraisal systems for civil service in European Union countries: toward a
developmental or an incentivizing model", International Journal of Public Sector
Management, Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-print. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPSM-
02-2021-0051. Available at:
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/IJPSM-02-2021-0051/full/html

Changing Patterns of Individual Performance Appraisal Systems for

Civil Service in EU countries: Towards a Developmental or an
Incentivizing Model?

Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this article is to examine whether the incentivizing type of performance
appraisal (typical of New Public Management) has indeed been superseded by a post-
NPM, developmental type of performance appraisal in European civil services.
Design/methodology/approach
The literature review lead to a unidimensional, twofold typology: incentivizing (NPM)
and developmental (post-NPM) performance appraisal. The empirical basis of the
research is two surveys conducted among top civil servants in 18 European countries.
Findings
Firstly, there are crucial discrepancies between performance appraisal systems in
contemporary European central government administrations, and current theorizing on
performance appraisal. Contrary to our expectations developed on the basis of the latter,
“developmental” and “incentivizing” do not seem to be two distinct types of
performance appraisal; rather, they are two independent dimensions, defining altogether
four different types of performance appraisal systems.
Social Implication
Citizens and communities are direct stakeholders in the development of public service
performance appraisal both as possible or actual employees of public service
organizations and as recipients of public services.
Practical Implications
Our results give orientation to policy makers and public service managers to engaged in
designing or applying performance appraisal systems, in particular by identifying
assailable presumptions underlying many present-time reform trends.
Originality
The paper proposes a new fourfold typology of performance appraisal systems:
incentivizing, developmental, symbolic, and want-it-all.

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Introduction
Over the past three decades, a range of economic, political, and institutional challenges
drove the public sector to incorporate various reforms by adapting managerial tools from
the private sector – a movement frequently described as New Public Management
(NPM) reforms (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Pollitt, 2006; Lapsley, 2008; Moynihan and
Panday, 2010). Most of the NPM-related administrative “trajectory of modernization and
reforms” (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, p. 65) refer to institutional, structural, and
procedural changes at the macro level aimed at making them more effective and efficient.
At the micro and individual levels, a closely related development is the overall focus on
performance management (Poister, 2010; Fryer et al, 2009), including individual
performance appraisal, which became one of the most widespread international trends in
public management (Pollitt, 2006).
Since the second half of the 2000s, however, accumulated experience, changing
ideational forces and fashions, as well as dramatic external shocks (most of all, the
economic and fiscal crisis unfolding in 2008) seem to have put NPM-spirited
performance management reforms in reverse. This turning point – frequently denoted as
post-NPM (Christensen and Laegreid, 2011; Drechsler and Randma-Liiv, 2015) – is
clearly indicated in many areas of public management practice, ranging from de-
agencification and structural centralization (van Thiel, 2011; Verhoest et al., 2012a;
2012b) to increased government involvement in business regulation and oversight
(Kickert and Randma-Liiv, 2015). However, when it comes to individual performance
appraisal, the institutionalization and utilization of individual performance appraisal
seems to have not only remained, but peculiarly even increased (OECD, 2017). Today,
almost all EU countries rely upon some form of individual performance appraisal system
(OECD, 2017; Staronova, 2017). Their use affects the distribution of rewards,
promotions, dismissals, training programs, development opportunities, etc. (DeNisi and
Pritchard, 2006). At the same time, however, performance appraisal became one of the
most controversial instruments of administrative reform. Both academics and
practitioners are divided on whether it has a positive or a negative effect on civil servants’
overall performance, motivation, and morale.
How can we account for this paradox? This article seeks to contribute to the scholarly
discourse in three ways. First, we wish to suggest a typology of individual performance
appraisal systems. There is an enormous body of empirical literature that studies the
effects of performance appraisal systems’ design features on organizational-level
performance (e.g., Murphy and Cleveland, 1991; Roberts, 2003; Weibel et al., 2009;
Spekle and Verbeeten, 2014), employee reactions and perceptions (Moussavi and
Ashbaugh 1995; Roberts, 2003; Kim and Holzer, 2016; Wenzel et al., 2019), as well as on
the actual use of information from performance appraisals (Moynihan and Pandey, 2010;
Kroll, 2015; Bosswell and Boundreau, 2002). Nonetheless, despite the fact that the
diversity of real-life performance appraisal systems is well recognized, we lack a
systematization that reflects these differences.
The system-level typology we advance distinguishes between two types: incentivizing and
developmental. In the literature, various other terms are used to denote similar or related
concepts. For example, incentivizing performance appraisal is often called traditional
(Roberts 2003), summative (Reinke, 2003), incentive schemes (Burgess et al., 2017),
performance measurement (Speklé and Verbeeten, 2014), performance evaluation
(Murphy, 2020), results-oriented (Moynihan, 2005), or external accountability
performance appraisal (Jakobsen et al., 2017). Performance appraisal resembling our
second type is most often called developmental (Roberts, 1995), but also participatory

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(Roberts, 2003), learning (Moynihan, 2005; Jakobsen et al., 2017), exploratory (Speklé
and Verbeeten, 2014), and real-time, depending which feature is accentuated. Thus, our
first contribution builds on previous descriptions of performance appraisal (see, in
particular, the four schools of research in performance appraisal suggested by Wood and
Marshall, 1993: measurement, appraisal interview, social cognitive processes, and
performance management schools).
Our second intended contribution is to create a conceptual as well as an empirical link
between the suggested typology and the two most influential doctrines of administrative
reform: NPM and post-NPM. Incentivizing performance appraisal system stands out
perhaps as the most recognized NPM tool because of its economic view of rational,
utility-maximizing behavior seen instrumental to achieve efficiency. Nevertheless, as a
result of criticisms, the past two decades witnessed governments and public
organizations experimenting with various new designs of performance appraisal to
overcome the alleged shortcomings of earlier systems (Roberts, 2003; Perry et al., 2006;
Waxin and Bateman, 2009; Wenzel et al., 2019). We argue that these alternative
approaches emphasizing participative elements, continuous improvement of the
individual, and iterative communication can be interpreted as part of the overarching
turn from NPM to post-NPM. Our third aim is to compare European performance
appraisal systems to explore alleged movement towards post-NPM as foreseen in much
of the public management literature (Dunleavy et al., 2006; Christensen and Lægreid,
2011; Torfin et al., 2020).
To sum up, our main ambition is to determine whether the general shift from NPM-
spirited systems of performance appraisal towards an alternative, post-NPM type has
indeed appeared in the European context. In view of the preliminary evidence about pay-
for-performance proliferation, our expectation is that it has not. Thus, the core puzzle is
whether this is indeed the case; and if so, to what extent and in what patterns the two
major types of performance appraisal characterize European civil service systems.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. First, we review the relevant literature to
identify the differences between the two major types of individual performance appraisal.
The third section specifies our analytical framework, data, and method. The empirical
analysis is presented in the fourth section; then, the article concludes with an assessment
of the framework for individual performance appraisal and discusses the contribution of
the new typology.

One performance management tool, two facets of individual

performance appraisal?
In the field of human resource management (HRM) within the public sector, the earlier
“personnel” perspective emphasized screening of, and administrative case work related
to, employees. The first traces of performance appraisal ratings appeared before the
WWII (particularly in the U.S. Army), these were used for administrative decisions such
as promotions (Wood and Marshall 1993). The evolution of performance appraisal as a
managerial tool was linked with the idea of higher control (van Helden and Reichard
2019), particularly in public service organizations of Westminster countries, following the
financial crisis of the 70s and 80s. By the 1990s, performance appraisal system for
improved efficiency became widespread in the public sector throughout the developed
countries.

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Over the past three decades, under the influence of NPM, public organizations have
undergone substantial changes that emphasize individual performance, making it easier
to dismiss or discipline those who fail to meet required performance standards (Pollitt
and Bouckaert, 2004). Civil servants found themselves increasingly compared to each
other and assessed for their performance based on the achievement of previously
established goals. Literature suggests (Hood, 2005; Dunleavy et al., 2006; Christensen and
Laegreid, 2011) that NPM is characterized precisely by explicit performance standards,
competition, results orientation (often quantified), and material/financial incentivizing
such as performance related pay. Hereinafter, we will refer to this approach as the
incentivizing variant of performance appraisal.
The introduction of individual performance appraisal in the public sector, however, has
frequently led to controversial results (Wood and Marshall, 1993; Bellé, 2015; Berman et
al., 2016), ranging from inflated ratings, gaming, and perceptions of inferior measurement
accuracy to lack of support due to perceived injustice (Hammerschmid et al., 2016;
Roberts, 2003; Kim and Holzer, 2016). Various factors have been proposed to explain
these problems. Burges et al. (2017) proposed that implementation problems stem from
poor technical design of systems that overly rely on private sector experience. Others
refer to an irreconcilable mismatch between NPM-oriented performance appraisal and
the public sector (Jakobsen et al., 2017) resulting from the difficulty of measuring
performance in contexts where results are often impossible to define or attribute to one
public organization or one individual (Adcroft and Willis, 2005; Pery et al., 2009), which
leads to gaming the system (Berman et al., 2016). Some research suggests low support
and acceptance among public employees (Moynihan and Pandey, 2010; Kim and Holzer
2016), reflecting perceptions of unfairness (Roberts, 1995, 2003; Reinke, 2003; Wenzel et
al., 2019).
Recently, studies have looked at the role of motivation in HRM, including individual
performance appraisal. Performance appraisal of the incentivizing type makes certain
assumptions regarding the motivation of civil servants – i.e., that it obeys the individual
and rational utility maximizing (“homo economicus”) logic (Kaboolian, 1998; Burgess
and Rato, 2003). Further, it assumes that civil servants’ motivations can be directed,
insofar as extrinsic rewards and sanctions drive them to achieve externally imposed
performance goals. Such extrinsic motivation overwhelmingly takes the form of material
incentives such as pay raises, opportunities for advancement, and job security (or their
opposite, in the case of negative incentives). Nonetheless, there is ample empirical
evidence that private and public employees differ, in particular with respect to their
motivation. Perry and Wise (1990) popularized the concept of public service motivation
(PSM), the main argument being that public servants identify with an internal motivation
to contribute to society in contrast to private sector employees (Perry et al., 2010; Ryan
and Deci, 2000; Seong and Lewis, 2009).
It is these motivational differences between public and private sector employees that may
lead to the unintended effects of extrinsic rewards in public sector performance
appraisal. These are commonly alluded to as “crowding out effects” (Deci et al., 1999):
external rewards can reduce intrinsic motivation by threatening employees’ feeling of
autonomy, competence, and relatedness (Ryan and Deci, 2000). This argument tends to
suggest that the two types of individual performance appraisal are mutually exclusive (cf.
Boswell and Boudreau, 2002).
The developmental variant of individual performance appraisal recognizes the above
specificities of public servants; i.e., that they are more internally motivated to learn and
perform (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Thus, developmental performance appraisal endows civil

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servants with a voice (Roberts, 1995; 2003) in all phases of the appraisal process,
empowering them to collaborate on their own learning and overall development. In this
system, the quality of communication is a key to personal development (Wood and
Marshall, 1993). It is more about intrapersonal examination (when devising an
individual’s development plans) than interpersonal comparisons (Cleveland et al., 1989).
Clearly, developmental performance appraisal became an alternative to the incentivizing
type by addressing and largely overcoming the perceived weaknesses of the latter.
According to some public management authors (Lodge and Gill, 2011) any response or a
counter-measure to NPM would qualify as post-NPM instrument. In addition, according
to Christensen and Laegreid (2011), strengthening collaborative capacity (often called
whole-of-government or joined-up government) signifies a new era of interaction typical
of post-NPM. Thus, from this perspective, a key dividing line between NPM and post-
NPM performance appraisal is the system’s inclusivity – not only among appraiser and
appraisee, but within the overall organizational setting – in addition to its potential to
engage public employees in the creation of public value. Therefore, we consider
developmental performance appraisal as post-NPM reform.
A vast majority of the literature focuses on actual – and typically micro level – practices
of performance appraisal. In contrast, our focal analytical concept is the systemic design
features of civil service performance appraisal. By this we mean the key characteristics of
the macro – typically country – level rules defining performance appraisal (frequently
taking the form of legal norms). Theorists and practitioners alike have addressed the role
of specific design features, such as 1) the format of appraisal data, 2) the scope of
established goals, 3) the timing, 4) the source of data, 5) the communication style, and 6)
the incentives established. In the remainder of this section, we review how our two types
of performance appraisal differ along these dimensions.
As noted earlier, the core assumption of the incentivizing performance appraisal is that
individual performance can be controlled by externally imposing goals, monitoring result
achievement, and tying incentives to goal achievement (Wood and Marshall, 1993). Thus,
an elaborate system of control and monitoring is exercised by a politico-bureaucratic
principal who imposes goals without any input from civil servants. Moreover, these goals
are operationalized through measurements (often quantitative) and tied to extrinsic
incentives, often in a form of a reward structures (Cardona, 2006; Hasnain et al., 2012;
Weibel et al., 2009) reflecting “higher pay for better performance” slogan of NPM-
inspired civil service reforms.
In terms of the appraisal data format, incentivizing systems have a rather mechanistic
view of explicit, measurable, and multi-component performance targets (Adcroft and
Willis, 2005; Burgess et al., 2017). These are derived from externally set, organizational
level goals, and are operationalized through various ex ante and ex post indicators and
performance metrics (Martin and Bartol, 1998; Sotirakou and Zeppou, 2006) and serve
for reporting. The primary source for evaluations in this type of performance appraisal is
the immediate supervisor. Peers, team members, or even self-appraisals play no formal
role. Thus, incentivizing performance appraisals often involve a uni-directional, top-
down communication pattern between the appraiser and appraisee (Pälli and Lehtinen,
2014, Roberts, 2003).
The developmental type of individual performance appraisal is conceptually and directly
linked to motivational research. This type of individual performance appraisal can
increase the motivation of public employees through individual development (training,
coaching, job rotation, recognition, etc.) rather than through providing incentives to

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increase work efforts. Indeed, it is a tool for guiding such development rather than one
measuring its results. Developmental performance appraisal focuses on the future rather
than on the past, discussing ways to improve and providing recommendations on
achieving future goals. This is in accordance with vast literature on organizational
learning (Moynihan and Pandey, 2010) that sees employee empowerment, participation,
and discretion (Roberts, 2003) as conductive to learning. Under developmental
performance appraisal, employees are provided with clear and detailed qualitative
feedback (Roberts, 2003).
In terms of communication, developmental performance appraisal entails increased and
multi-way communication conveying values, strategic visions, and goals to civil servants
(Roberts, 2003; Levy and William, 2004). Employee participation becomes a key element
that facilitates civil servants’ growth and development (Moussavi and Ashbaugh 1995;
Levy and Williams, 2004; Roberts, 2003) and consequently intrinsic motivation and
performance. In particular, participatory interviews (Pälli and Lehtinen, 2014) and self-
appraisals (Roberts, 2003) serve as cornerstones and outlines for communication. This
perspective follows the view of Murphy and Clevelend (1991) that performance appraisal
is not a singular assessment, but rather a continuous process of social interaction that
inherently enhances learning and development. The ultimate benefit of developmental
performance appraisal is deeper understanding which is conducive not only to the
employees’ development (in the form of training, counselling, and honing skills and
competencies) (Roberts, 2003), but also to organization-wide learning (Moynihan and
Pandey, 2010).
These differences are summarized in the below table.

Table I: A conceptual typology of performance appraisal systems

Features Incentivizing Developmental

Purpose Efficiency, effectiveness Learning, development, coaching,

mentoring
Underlying causal Standard economic view of rational, Public service motivation (PSM or
mechanism individual utility maximizer principals intrinsic motivation) and organization-
and agents control; extrinsic wide learning
motivation
Appraisal data Metrics, typically quantitative (or at Textual (qualitative)
format least separate ranking categories)
Scope Past oriented: Future oriented; focus on needs,
externally imposed goals and targets); competencies, and change
focus on performance (behavior and
results)
Source of Primarily the immediate supervisor Diverse sources of assessment
appraisal information (e.g., self-assessment,
information 180º/360º)

Communication Top-down with little or no Multiple directions with the participation

substantive input from the employee,
typically written, standardized
Consequences Direct monetary (performance-
(Incentives for related pay),
improvement) indirect monetary (career),
both positive and negative (such as
dismissal or disciplinary measures)
of employees, regular dialogue and
feedback (typically in the form of a
performance interview)
Individual development plan,
training, coaching, mentoring,
recognition, etc.

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Timing Formal periods Iterative, often informal
(usually annual) (real-time)
Source: authors

Analytical Framework and Methodology

Studies typically focus on how individual design features actually function, at the
organizational or individual level, and based on stakeholder perceptions (e.g., Moynihan
and Pandey, 2010; Kim and Holzer, 2016; Burgess et al., 2017). As already noted, the
current research, in contrast, focuses on the systemic design features of performance
appraisal systems – that is, the formal rules and procedures in effect over the entire scope
of civil service. This choice is justified by our research ambition. Our interest is in the
effects of doctrinal shifts – in this case, from NPM to post-NPM – on performance
appraisal practices. Therefore, the relevant focus of our inquiry is the policy intention,
embodied by the systemic design features of performance appraisal, rather than the
actual operations.

Sources of data
Performance appraisal systems vary both between and within countries – frequently even
between organizations in one country, or even within organizations (see, e.g., the
separate appraisal systems for senior civil servants). In this research, our primary unit of
analysis is the country level. Within that, we focus on the core of government (ministerial
departments, agencies, and other central state administrative bodies), because it is narrow
enough to enable comparisons across different national public administrations.
The empirical investigation utilizes two datasets. The first one is an expert survey carried
out by the EU Public Administration Network (composed of representatives of public
administration institutions of all EU members, the European Commission, as well as
Norway, Switzerland, and Serbia; hereinafter “EUPAN”). The purpose of the survey
(conducted from July to December 2016) was to provide an overview of individual
performance appraisal systems of civil servants on the central/federal level of
government. This was followed by a second survey (from January to April 2018)
developed and administered by the authors, targeting the same set of respondents: senior
officials delegated to EUPAN working group by the individual member states. These
officials, one per country, were officials in charge of civil service in central governments,
with unique insights into the systemic design features of performance appraisal in their
respective countries. Imperfections frequently attributed to single-respondent surveys
such as ours (for an in-depth discussion in a different but similar field see Krause et al
2018) are nevertheless limited by the fact that the survey results were discussed and
approved both at an EUPAN Working Level Meeting and by EUPAN Directors General
meeting overseeing public administration in the member states. Thus, the survey can be
assumed to reflect performance appraisal systems in functional rather than legalistic
terms with reasonable accuracy.
The data collection instruments used differed in the two surveys. The 2016 survey
reflected the data needs of the ongoing EUPAN project. The nine-page-long instrument
contained approximately 130 items, frequently open-ended, exploring a broad range of
performance appraisal systems’ design features. In contrast, the 2018 follow-up survey
focused more directly on our key ambition here: describing the performance appraisal
systems in place in terms of their incentivizing and developmental features. The design of
the second, follow-up survey reflected our recognition, based on the results of the 2016
survey, that real-life performance appraisal systems are oftentimes either a mixture of

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more or less inconsistent components or are incomplete and lacking elements that are
indispensable for their proper functioning. The instrument contained 38 items, 12 of
which elicited open-ended, narrative responses.
In the end, we had usable information on 18 performance appraisal systems representing
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Serbia,
and the European Commission. In countries where there was a separate performance
appraisal system for senior civil servants, we focused on the one covering the regular civil
servants.

Analytical framework
In order to classify performance appraisal systems into our two-cluster typology, we first
developed, on the basis of conceptual considerations, an analytical framework consisting
of a set of classification criteria. The seven classification criteria enabled us to
differentiate between NPM spirited incentivizing ideal type (hereinafter called “Type I”)
and post-NPM spirited developmental ideal type (hereinafter called “Type II”
performance appraisal systems. The proposed criteria do not constitute a set of sufficient
conditions for designation as Type I or Type II, let alone ensuring that they will actually
operate as Type I or Type II performance appraisal systems. Rather, meeting the given
set of criteria means that a system may reasonably be expected to operate as a Type I or
Type II system (i.e., each one is a necessary but – either individually or jointly -
insufficient conditions). Therefore, failing to meet even a single one of the criteria means
that the given performance appraisal system cannot reasonably be expected to operate as
a Type I or Type II system.
A further consequence of the above methodological approach is that the criteria are not
meant to provide an exhaustive characterization of the respective performance appraisal
system types. Nor can the criteria be interpreted as statistical variables possibly subject to
conventional statistical analytical procedures (such as cluster analysis). Rather, their
purpose is no more (but also no less) than to enable the distinction between the two
types, as well as the classification of existing – oftentimes somewhat inconsistent or
incomplete – performance appraisal systems into our twofold typology. Note that
although, for the sake of brevity, we use numbers (1’s and 0’s) to present our findings,
the analytical approach is entirely qualitative in nature.
Let us now explain and justify the individual criteria.
The main purpose of Type I systems is to increase work performance through providing
external incentives for individuals to increase their efforts. This implies the fulfillment of
the following design features.
[C1:] Work performance has to be evaluated on the basis of a set of well-defined
standards and indicators. Moreover, it needs to be assessed, often expressed in numeric
form (that is, quantitatively) or as a minimum using an ordinal scale. The actual
performance measurement is often conducted in fixed (annual or bi-annual) periods.
[C2:] The system entails monitoring and evaluation of results and past behavior (rather
than, say, focusing on present or future needs or plans alone).
[C3:] Whereas some performance appraisal systems entail a broad range of possible
assessors and sources of assessment data (cf. self-assessment, group assessment, 360-
degree-assessment, and the like), in Type I appraisals, the critical element is the
supervisor’s judgment of performance. Other assessors may contribute to the appraisal
result, but the bulk of the assessment results must be tied to how supervisors judge the

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individual’s performance. The object of appraisal is the individual (rather than, say, a
team of employees).
[C4:] Fourthly, the most important instrument of providing incentives is different forms
of monetary incentives, be they performance-related pay, bonuses, or promotions to
higher pay categories.
We now turn to the classification criteria for Type II systems. Depending on their design
and the interrelations between different system components, the presence of the above
features, set forth as necessary conditions of a Type I performance appraisal system, may
or may not affect the functioning a Type II system. However, here again, there are some
necessary design features that should be present in any Type II system if there is to be
any realistic possibility of the performance appraisal system operating in a truly
developmental fashion. We suggest three such necessary conditions as follows.
[C5:] The essence of developmental performance appraisal is a systematized and
elaborate, yet constant flow of communication. Therefore, feedback on past and present
performance and discussions of personal development plans and training (Levy and
Williams, 2004) – in addition to an increased focus on teamwork, self-evaluations, and
360-degree appraisals – are key to identify ways for further learning and development.
[C6:] In Type II Systems, the most important component of appraisal data is the
individual’s developmental needs. Other elements such as actual or past performance
may figure, too. Yet, without covering individual developmental needs, it is not
reasonable to expect any appraisal system to function in a developmental manner.
[C7] Thirdly and finally – and, again, unlike Type I systems – Type II systems have to
include detailed and qualitative feedback from the organization to the individual
regarding their developmental needs and the ways to address them.

The classification process

A key difficulty of classification stems from the tension between the complex and
nuanced nature of performance appraisal systems on the one hand, and the limitations
inherent in our expert survey method, on the other. This tension results inevitably in
somewhat fragmented, incomplete, and inconsistent data. Therefore, our next task was to
decide, for each country and for each classification criterion, the qualifications for
compliance. This process involved four steps as follows.
1) For each of the seven classification criteria, we selected the survey items
containing relevant information. Typically, these included four to eight partly
close-ended and partly open-ended items.
2) For each criterion, we established decision rules as to what (pattern of) responses
implied compliance (or lack thereof) with the given criterion.
3) If the above compliance decisions made on the basis of the 2016 and the 2018
data were unequivocal, then we accepted the decision as final. Also, we did so if
either the 2016 or the 2018 data were missing or incomplete, in which case we
decided on the basis of the available data. Approximately, 75% of compliance
decisions could be made this way.
4) The remaining compliance decisions – involving some extent of contradiction
between different items – were made on a case-by-case basis, considering
qualitative, narrative survey information, as well as – in a limited number of cases
– additional, contextual information about the given country and criterion.

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Findings: Patterns of performance appraisal system types
The first findings
The first, indeed surprising finding of our analysis was that barely more than half of our
18 cases fit into our typology, whereas eight countries could not be classified as either
Type I or Type II, since key and critical prerequisites of either type were not met. The
results of the first classification exercise are displayed below.

Table II: Findings of the first analysis

Type I cases: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Italy,
Slovakia, Serbia
Type II cases: European Commission, Ireland
Source: the authors

The remaining cases fall into two categories: they either do not meet the minimum
criteria for either the incentivizing or the developmental model, or they meet both. This
finding created a clear need to revise and extend our initial typology, in order to include
most or all of the cases covered in the study.
A central initial assumption of the study – informed by a wealth of authoritative literature
on the topic reviewed earlier – was that, based on pre-existing scholarship and theoretical
considerations, performance appraisal systems (i) can be characterized along a single
conceptual continuum ranging from the “developmental” to the “incentivizing” pole,
and that (ii) these two modes of performance appraisal contradict one another.
Therefore, actual performance appraisal systems were likely to be located close to one
end of the spectrum or the other.
In the light of our above findings, however, both assumptions had to be relaxed. Instead,
we had to admit that “being developmental” and “being incentivizing” did not constitute
two poles of a single dimension, but rather they are two independent dimensions
themselves. Actual systems can feature essential characteristics of both of them, or even
none of them. This empirical finding runs counter existing theorizing and typologies.
The resulting conceptual typology is displayed below.

Table III: A typology of performance appraisal systems

Developmental features
weak strong
Incentivizing strong Type 1 (NPM / Type 4 (“want-it-all”)
features incentivizing)
weak Type 3 (“symbolic”) Type 2 (post-NPM /
developmental)
Source: the authors

10

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The results of the analysis, when repeated on the basis of our extended typology, are
displayed in the table below. An explanation and an interpretation of the extended
typology, as well as the resulting types, are offered in conjunction with the presentation
of our findings.

11

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Table IV: Findings of the analysis

e L
tiv t ce is r ary ces le tal ive k TA S G )
try t ita as an urc vis e o
n
t
e en lt p
i ces / en
d
t
s lita ac F E REF ISIN RES type
N
n n p m so er o u u r 6 m e a b O M UO V U (
Co
u
qua C2 / rfor / u p / m seq / m sou C lop ne Qu eed N. LOP EATN. NTI EAT sult
s n e / f E F E F
/ pe C3 C4 co C5 de
v
C7 V C Re
C1 DE IN
Belgium 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 I.
Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 4 I.
Croatia 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 III.
Czech Republic1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 4 I.
EU (Commission)
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 3 2 II.
Finland 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 4 I.
France 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 2 2 III.
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 4 IV.
Hungary 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 4 I.
Ireland 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 3 2 II.
Italy 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 I.
Luxemburg 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 III.
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 4 IV.
Norway 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 1 III.
Poland 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 2 3 III.
Romania 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 III.
Slovakia 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 I.
Serbia 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 4 I.
Source: the authors

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Findings of the extended analysis
Five of our eight Central and Eastern European countries are found to be Type I. In
addition, Belgium, Italy, and Finland are in this quadrant of our typology. Most of these
countries were late-comers in the field of NPM-spirited public sector reforms. In
particular, the new EU member states embraced many of them only superficially, being
under pressure to do so during the pre-accession period (Drechsler and Randma-Liiv,
2015). Italy and Belgium, in a similar vein, started their NPM reforms only in a delayed
and incomplete manner. A peculiar pattern in this country group is that CEE systems
exhibit a markedly higher discretionary power of the immediate supervisor. Firstly, the
performance related pay component in these countries theoretically constitutes a
significant share (in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia even more than 50%) of
the overall salary. Secondly, the decision on the size of the performance related
component is frequently at the full discretion of the immediate supervisor. This extent of
“letting managers manage” is however definitely unknown in other European Type I.
systems where decisions (and responsibility) are typically shared among multiple actors
and the possible weight of the performance related pay component is much smaller (less
than 10%).
In line with our expectations, there are only two cases exhibiting all necessary design
features for the developmental (II.) type: the European Commission and Ireland. In both
cases these changes are quite recent. It is instructive that the Irish system entails
developmental measures to constructively deal with individual underperformance rather
than simply sanctioning it. Both systems fall substantially far from the incentivizing ideal
as not only one, but two essential design features of Type I systems are absent in both of
them. An additional remarkable element of our findings here is that developmental
systems – despite decades-long critiques of the incentivizing systems by both academics
and practitioners (Wood and Marshall, 1993) – remain so limited.
Spectacularly, six cases lack one or more indispensable design features of both the
incentivizing and the developmental model thus fall in the Type III., or “symbolic”,
category. In other words, based on their legally defined design features, these systems
cannot reasonably be expected to operate either as a developmental or as an incentivizing
performance appraisal system. Croatia, France, Luxemburg, Poland, Romania, and
Norway fall into this category. These countries are career rather than position-based, and
all lack the most visible incentivizing feature: performance related pay. Also, one would
expect career systems to incorporate most of the developmental features, nevertheless,
only Norway and Poland approximate the developmental ideal.
Finally, Type IV systems are hybrids that contain all essential design features of both the
incentivizing and the developmental types. Note that these systems – just like Type I and
Type II systems – do not necessarily deliver the expected results. Rather, their design –
and, presumably, their creators’ intention – was to achieve both sets of objectives.
Two cases possess this characteristic, thus falling in the upper-right cell of our above
typology: Germany and the Netherlands. These (Type IV.) systems – provisionally
termed “want-it-all” – seem to build on the presumption that it is possible to harness the
effects of incentivizing and developmental mechanisms simultaneously. We note
nevertheless that the strength of the incentivizing features in these two countries –
measured by the relative size of the performance related pay component – is, in
comparison with the “pure” Type I. countries, modest.

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Discussion and Conclusions
The ambition of this study was, while focusing on European central government
administrations, to develop and empirically test a conceptual typology of performance
appraisal systems as applied to civil service. The particular typology we set out to develop
and apply was intimately associated with two key public administration reform doctrines
of the past decade: the NPM and the post-NPM doctrines. Thus, our endeavor joins the
broad academic discourse on the shifting landscape of administrative reform doctrines,
our findings promising to contribute to a better understanding of how and why one
doctrine happens to replace – or not replace – earlier ones. The macro level (typically,
national civil service) perspective of our study is relatively unique in that most of the
literature dealing with performance appraisal takes an organizational perspective and
focuses on organizational (or even individual) factors influencing design choices and
operational features of performance appraisal.
The first findings of our analysis confirmed some of our key expectations: the NPM-
spirited Type I performance appraisal still prevails in a number of countries. Contrary to
what could be expected based on a wide array of literature (Drechsler and Kattel, 2009;
Dunleavy et al., 2006) NPM is – at least in the field of performance appraisal – far from
being dead. The continued appeal of the incentivizing model might (at least, in the
Eastern and Southern European context) be partly attributed to administrative policy
makers’ quest for control over government bureaucracy. Type I models promise exactly
the type of control sought by aspiring or actual illiberal and populist reformers of
Eastern and Southern Europe. (See the relevant country chapters in Bauer et al., 2021)
At the same time, its main alternative, the developmental (or Type II) model is still rare.
This finding, yet again, runs counter much of the recent literature (Christensen and
Laegreid, 2011; Drechsler and Kattel, 2009) on the change of administrative fashions –
and, in particular, on the increasing presence of post-NPM. Apparently, whereas the
caveats of Type I systems are much discussed, at the level of national performance
appraisal systems, designers are not yet ready to switch to the non-incentivizing model in
all its complexity. Nevertheless, it is understandable that the EC is among the first ones
to introduce a developmental system, since it is the EC that must accommodate the most
due to the extreme diversity of its employees, thus creating a stronger-than-usual need
for individual learning and development to foster professional socialization (Meyer-
Sahling et al., 2016).
In addition to the above results, another set of – in our view theoretically highly relevant
– findings emerged out of our analysis. We came to realize that the two features typically
treated in the literature as mutually exclusive – developmental and incentivizing – are in
fact not endpoints of a single dimension or continuum, but rather they form two
independent dimensions. Performance appraisal systems, at least in terms of their
system-level designs, can have not only one or the other, but both, as well as neither of
the incentivizing and the developmental features. This recognition led us to propose a
new, extended conceptual typology of performance appraisal systems (Table IV above).
In the remainder of this section, we attempt to interpret, in a broader theoretical
framework, this extended typology. In order to avoid the (indeed tempting) route to
over-interpret our results, however, we have to keep firmly in mind that our research
relates not to how performance appraisal actually operates in one or the other context.
Rather, our focus is on how they are designed to operate, which is only one of several
factors influencing the actual operation and outcomes of performance appraisal.

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At the time of data collection, instances of the “want-it-all” (or Type IV) systems could
be found in Germany and the Netherlands. The existence of such want-it-all systems is,
in our view, a spectacular finding, since it runs contrary to the call of numerous
academics and practitioners to separate different information uses in performance
appraisal policy systems (e.g., Boswell and Boudreau, 2002; Cardona, 2006; Cleveland et
al., 1989), claiming that they constitute an inherent conflict leading to inefficiencies.
The two civil services’ similarities – in terms of their high administrative capacity and
abundance of resources – coupled with their geographical proximity and the traditionally
apparent Dutch influence on German administrative reform practices (such as in the case
of the so-called Tilburg model of NPM-oriented local government reforms; Reichard,
2003) – offer some clues for interpretation. Research conducted on the micro (or
organizational) level shows that performance appraisal systems combining certain
incentivizing and developmental features exist in practice – at least, in terms of
information use (Boswell and Boudreau, 2002; Moynihan and Pandey, 2010; Cleveland et
al., 1989) rather than in terms of their very design. The significance of our findings on
Type IV systems is that such ambitions are getting institutionalized and appear on the
macro (or country) levels, too. The idea that the simultaneous achievement of
developmental and incentivizing objectives is feasible is surely appealing for
administrative policy makers. To what extent this ambition is feasible in reality is,
however, up to further empirical research to determine.
Another plausible development path leading to Type IV systems may have started with
having, first, a classical Type I system in place, presumably having been introduced
during the heydays of NPM. It is reasonable to expect that certain elements of
dissatisfaction – well-documented in the literature we reviewed earlier – as well as needs
for a developmental mode of operation gradually gained influence among administrative
policy makers. Given the extent of administrative inertia and the ‘sticky’ nature of
institutions, it was easier to build the new developmental features on top of the existing,
incentivizing ones. Such layering (rather than replacing) of administrative reform
practices is in line with some of the recent literature (Hajnal and Rosta, 2017; Lodge and
Gill, 2011). Whatever the designers’ intentions and the development path of the resulting
performance appraisal systems were, we should not neglect to point out that, based on
the mutually exclusive nature of several design criteria, it seems unlikely that these Type
IV. systems are actually able to realize both their incentivizing and their developmental
objectives. The fact that such systems still exist, even if in a limited number of countries
only, triggers a need for explanation and thus additional research.
Also, in need of further research and interpretation are our findings regarding the
“symbolic” (or Type III) systems of performance appraisal. The most pressing question
triggered by this finding is why do certain countries create and maintain performance
appraisal systems that cannot reasonably be expected to perform either the functions of
an incentivizing or those of a developmental type? Whereas the current research is not
designed to answer such explanatory questions, the mere interpretation of this finding
requires some rationale for the creation and persistence of these systems.
Frequently, administrative reforms are driven by a logic of appropriateness (March and
Olsen, 2004), and a resulting mimetic isomorphism. In our view, these “neither-nor”
systems can best be viewed as a result of such isomorphic processes. Given the
numerous practical and conceptual difficulties related to performance appraisal, it is
reasonable to assume that some countries – either consciously or unconsciously – drifted
towards some system of performance appraisal, the main function of the system being to
merely exist rather than being instrumental to some higher-order purpose. Thus, it

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provides an appearance (internal as well as external) of legitimacy to the given civil
service. Following the long-standing academic discourse on symbolic law making
(Edelman 1985; Gusfield 1968; see also Alibigesetzgebung and Symbolische Gesetzgebung in the
German language literature, Kindermann 1989). we coin Type III systems “symbolic”.
Symbolic features are not new from an empirical point of view, either. Research into a
variety of other administrative design features show that the post-Communist region in
particular tends to design policies simply to signal to the broader community (domestic
or international) that the government is taking appropriate action. For example, Falkner
& Trieb (2008) describe CEE countries’ laws as the “world of dead letters”. Similarly,
Dimitrova (2010) finds laws to be “empty shells” without any real force. Note however
that whereas this line of research emphasizes the gap between formal (legislated) policies
and actual implementation, the symbolism of Type III. systems appears already in the
formal, design features of performance appraisal.
In terms of the “genealogy” of Type III systems a possible starting point might have
been situations where the supposed movement toward NPM-style incentivizing did not
occur in the first place due to an “unsupportive environment” (Drechsler and Randma-
Liiv, 2016, p 1563) for NPM reforms. In the CEE context, this may manifest as a lack of
respect for the rule of law, political and administrative instability, and over-politicization.
An unsupportive environment for NPM could also apply to countries that do not
necessarily struggle with the abovementioned problems, but lag behind in terms of
managerial reforms. Their administrative systems and culture may simply not support
managerial tools.
Nevertheless, this “legitimizing” mode of performance appraisal may have a geographical
scope much broader than Central and Eastern Europe. Different administrative reform
priorities – possibly coupled with a bottleneck in key reform resources such as time,
money, political support, attention, and expertise – might explain, together or in various
combinations, why certain countries seem to have chosen this path of least resistance.
Yet again, whether these “symbolic” systems actually form a homogeneous group – or,
rather, are composed of subgroups characterized by fundamentally different, as yet
unobserved, design features –are matters for further research.
Finally, our results imply intriguing questions about how the new performance appraisal
types we put forward operate in reality. Whether want-it-all systems are actually able to
deliver both the incentivizing and the developmental outcomes, and whether symbolic
systems actually produce some tangible outcomes not considered in our research remain
to be answered by future research into performance appraisal practices.

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