Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Paper for presentation to Study Group on Productivity and Quality in the Public Sector,
Conference of European Group of Public Administration, Università Bocconi, Milan,
6-9 September 2006
Abstract
Performance management lacks a coherent treatment that analyses its several dimensions
as a working system and that can be used for comparative purposes. This paper develops
a framework for clarifying the diverse uses and combinations of performance,
measurement and management that has three components – performance measurement
without management, management of performance of specific functions and performance
management. Four models are distinguished that can be applied to the historical
development of performance and management, analysing and comparing country
orientations to performance and thinking analytically about performance management
and its components.
Introduction
Performance has become a defining feature of modern government. The age of
performance has produced commitment to, but not necessarily clarity about, the universal
objective of organizational and government improvement. Performance and performance
management continue to be enigmatic concepts. There is a paradox too in that the
adoption rate of performance approaches continues to expand despite the mounting
critique. One limitation has been the failure to integrate performance and measurement
within a broader system of management and within a conception of organisational life
that invests practice with greater meaning.
The most striking feature of performance management is its continuing expansion over
the last two decades making this current period its international apogee. As will be
discussed later, the antecedents of performance management – various approaches to
performance and measurement – have a long lineage. But the high international
commitment goes well beyond a resurgence of interest in measuring performance.
Moreover, performance management is recognised to have evolved, to be different and to
involve more sophisticated measures (Schick, 2001: 40).
International observers agree that something unusual was occurring internationally in the
1990s with ‘the rise and rise of “performance” as an issue in public sector theory and
practice’ (Talbot, 1999). Similarly a US observer reports that ‘if there is a single theme
that characterizes the public sector in the 1990s, it is the demand for performance. A
mantra has emerged in this decade, heard at all levels of government, that calls for
documentation of performance and explicit outcomes of government action’ (Radin,
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2000: 168). The penetration was significant by the mid-1990s: measurement was
becoming ‘more intensive, more extensive and more external’ (Bouckaert 1996); and key
performance management questions were prominent in a ten-country survey by the
OECD but stronger in the Anglo-American compared to the European (OECD, 1997,
Bouckaert, 1997). This trend continues in the 2000s with no indication that it is abating
with ‘performance measurement and reporting becoming ‘even more important within
most governments. “If you can’ t measure it, you can’ t manage it” has become a familiar
refrain’ (Thomas, 2003: 1).
Two big questions in public management during the last fifteen years – markets and
performance – have attracted the most controversy in an era of unprecedented public
sector reform. Both have recent origins in New Public Management (NPM), although
their lineage is much longer, and reflect private sector ideas. Markets are examined in
many other studies, but performance management remains something of an enigma and is
lacking coherent meta-analysis.
One factor has been its centrality to public management. Performance management forms
the core of public management, especially NPM: is it possible to envisage management in
the public sector without due regard to the pursuit of results and the measurement of
performance? This correspondence can readily be established through stock
specifications of New Public Management features (eg Hood 1991). When Behn (1995)
writes about the ‘Big Questions of Public Management’ – micromanagement,
measurement and motivation – he is essentially identifying questions about performance
management. When Hood and Peters (2004) reflect on ‘The Middle Aging of New Public
Management’ are they not writing for the most part about the side effects of performance
management?
The field has become the subject of debates about the value of performance,
measurement and their management. Performance management has become a small
growth area within public administration and management, centred on critiquing aspects
of performance and measurement (eg Forsythe 2001). Three types of argument can be
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mentioned. The first is about the impact of rhetoric on poor implementation (‘What
makes performance management so attractive in theory, yet so difficult in practice?’
Thomas, 2004: 1); and the assumption of the performance management industry that an
agency will be ‘transformed by measuring its performance. This is the logic of GPRA’
(Schick, 2001: 40, 43). A second critique explores the limits of rationality and unintended
consequences. Managers are seen as functioning within the narrow parameters of
performance management and an imperfect model that is rationally defined and deficient.
A third type of argument points to apparent confusion. There is a lack of agreement on
how to measure performance. Moreover, with performance measurement there are an
‘array of buzzwords…: reinventing government, new public management, performance
management, results-driven government, results-based budgeting, performance
contracting etc’ (Thomas, 2004: 1); and authors move casually between one concept and
another (e.g. a discussion of performance management is really about performance
measurement: Bovaird and Gregory, 1996: 239). For all these reasons there is a need to
look at performance management more systematically and to ground it in analysis of its
constituent elements.
The first is performance. A broad conception of performance claims that it has always
‘been an issue in government’ and key goals, such as efficiency, economy and fairness
are ‘“performance” goals as widely defined’ (Talbot, 1999: 2). Performance is commonly
conceived in either individual or organisation terms, and also as a combination of both. It
may also be identified with an activity, program or policy (Talbot 2005), the latter linking
in with the evaluation movement. Talbot (2005) outlines the different dimensions of
performance – as accountability; user choice; customer service; efficiency; results and
effectiveness; resource allocation; and creating public value. ‘Performance’ is also
commonly used as prefatory to other activities such as auditing and budgeting and more
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Performance Management and arises where management and performance have been
linked but the connection between them is underdeveloped and concurrent systems
operate. Managing performances includes performance measurement but goes beyond its
administration. Management of performances implies different types of performances
according to different and unconnected management functions. This results in a diverse
range of managements of performances like performances in personnel management,
financial management (budgets, accounting systems, audits), strategic and operational
management, customer management, communication management.
The relationship between the three performance models and how each is successively
nested within another, are illustrated in Figure 1i.
Measuring
Incorporating
Using
One further question is the relationship between performance and management. What
differentiates more developed systems is the application of management, but this is
insufficient for fully-fledged Performance Management as an ideal type. In Table 2 the
types in the first column are narrowly conceived in terms of either limited conceptions of
performance or measurement or both. Whereas, the two types in the second column are
more comprehensive. The first line is more diffuse/less systematized; the types in the
second line more integrated within their sphere (either measurement or management
system).
Historical application
The framework provides a basis for analysing the development of performance
measurement and management. It requires the identification of the several elements and
stages from concerns with performance measurement in the early decades of the
twentieth century to fully developed performance management at the end of the century.
This is done with reference to two closely-linked countries (Halligan 2003; Pollitt &
Bouckaert 2004): the United States, which pioneered the early experiments and
significant developments up to managing performances, and the United Kingdom, which
illustrates the evolution of a system of performance management over several decades.
For the United Kingdom, there were two decades (1960 and 1970s) of ad hoc
experiments and dabbling in performance measurement during which programs were
piloted but were eventually discontinued. The earliest cases of performance measurement
have been traced to the 1960s and associated with cost benefit analysis, management by
objectives and output budgeting, but only two remained significant in the 1970s. The two
decades of discussing and piloting performance measurement yielded little that was
convincing and durable (Bovaird and Gregory 1996: 239-40).
UK’ s FMI was only partly successful yet it laid the foundation for the next stage. During
the 1980s the fundamental shift occurred from public administration to public
management with the new philosophy and style being more receptive to and influenced
by private sector. Public management had already been identified in the US (Perry and
Kraemer, 1983), although the more fundamental basics of new public management did
not register until the 1990s. This management focus had major implications for the
efficiency agenda, and provided the basis for the active implementation of performance
and measurement. The move to management of performances was to emerge from this
foundation with the management of individual and organisational performance becoming
increasingly common. There were aspirations in both countries to manage individuals in
the respective senior civil services through the use of performance-related pay (Pollitt
1993). Eventually it became possible for the management of performances to assume a
more integrated form as a construction of performance management. New public
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management has an interesting place in these developments and the progression towards
performance management.
The Government Performance Results Act 1993 provided the main US impetus,
eventually becoming mandatory for national agencies and revolutionised the systemic
implementation of outcome-related goals and performance measurement, planning and
reporting. For the UK, the transition from Performance Administration to Managements
of Performances occurred in the 1980s and was arguably the more complete move (of the
two countries) to Performance Management in the 1990s.
A purpose of the ideal types is to use them as a basis for examining the variations in the
orientation of the public administration systems to performance management. Preliminary
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analysis indicates that Germany (at the national level) continues to operate without
commitment to, and application of, performance, measurement and management
principles, while France has made a major commitment to performance management but
the relationship to management is tenuous (Table 3). Three countries in different ways
approximate Managing Performances: Canada, Netherlands and the United States. This
means that while performance management principles and practice may be fairly well
developed they are inclined to be neither integrated nor systemic. For the Performance
Management type two countries, Australia and the United Kingdom, come closest to the
stringent requirements, although there are weaknesses in both cases that make the fit less
than optimal.
The criteria for performance management include an identifiable framework that must be
sustained over time and formally supported by key actors (e.g. central agencies and
cabinet); and the presence of attributes identified with Model 4: performance
management must be comprehensive (systemic), integrated, coherent and consistently
applied across agencies. This requires evidence of practice at the agency level, of how the
‘system’ as a whole is operating and of a capacity to review and absorb lessons. At the
agency level, the prerequisites include a performance focus, measurement systems in
place and a management approach and a coverage that includes individual,
organisational, financial etc. There also needs to be evidence of the use of performance
measurement; taking responsibility for performance and being held to account; and
relationships between the elements (cascades, individual, organisational etc).
One of these cases illustrates the features of the Performance Management type. Australia
has been more committed to performance management than most OECD countries (see
OECD, 1997). Two management frameworks have existed within which two generations
of performance management can be distinguished (Halligan, 2002; McKay, 2003). The
performance management framework encompasses most of the attributes referred to
above, but there remain weaknesses in consistency of approach, reporting of information
externally and meaningful applications of principles in practice.
A strength has been central and external oversight with a series of inquiries reviewing the
principles and their application, but they have revealed a persistent problem: the
credibility of performance management systems (APSC, 2004). The performance aspects
of human resource management have attracted sustained interest because of fundamental
issues raised by the transformation of employment relations under a highly devolved
system. A prominent issue has been the subjectivity of management assessment of
performance, and public servant motivation where remuneration is based on performance
(e.g. O’ Donnell and O’ Brien, 2000).
Comparing the macro level between countries is obviously a challenge. There are
differences in institutions, definitions and registration procedures for data, and there are
longitudinal inconsistencies. Also data are incorrect, preliminary, inconsistent, and
incomplete. All these reasons are insufficient not to look for performance data and
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information, integrating and using this in policy decision-making, results upgrading, and
enhancing accountability.
needs
policy objectives
operational objectives
indicator of effectiveness
measure of effectiveness
indicator of efficiency
measure of efficiency
environment
cost-effectiveness
economy
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But this systemic approach also causes some significant problems affecting performance
measurement and management of ‘substantive’ policies, and therefore requires a
‘performance measurement and management’ policy itself. It is clear that micro (single
organisation), meso (substantive policy), and macro levels (government wide) are not
necessarily harmonious and compatible (Figure 3). There are obvious conflicts between
individual schools or hospitals (which may aim at maximising numbers of students or
patients) and educational and health policies that want to control or even limit (and
definitely audit) numbers of students and patients.
MACRO
I O E
MESO
I O E
MICRO
I O E
Also, well functioning and performing single organisations do not always guarantee a
well functioning and good performing policy. Good performing micro levels are
necessary but insufficient for a well performing meso level. Performance measurement
systems should make this visible and performance management should take this into
account by looking at micro, meso, and macro performance management.
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Third, several and different single organisations may contribute to a general effect (see
Figure 4). Environmental policies are implemented by a whole range of agencies
(inspection, subsidies, direct intervention, communication, etc), which may be
disconnected. Micro performance should be consolidated at the policy level. But defining
the level of attribution of separate well performing agencies to a general policy effect is
impossible. Therefore performance measurement systems should be developed at the
level of a substantive policy field (meso), and at a single organisational level (micro).
Obviously, government wide indicators (macro) are also indispensable and are developed
in several OECD countries (US, Canada, Australia).
From a ‘performance management’ policy point of view this implies that an integrated
micro/meso/macro performance focus is needed. New Public Management has
concentrated more on the need to guarantee an optimal micro level than a meso level,
even up to ignoring the co-ordination of single organisations in a substantive policy field.
This also requires a policy to integrate, to add or to consolidate the micro into the meso,
and the meso into the macro level.
The general assumption of this sequence is that if and when we know what to do and how
to do something we indeed will do it. Performance Management in all its variations (e.g.
the latest generation of evidence-based evaluations) is derived from a rather naive scheme
of thinking which is highly rational and resulted in many publications on how to measure
performance in the public sector (Hatry, 1999; Bouckaert, et al, 2000; Morley, et al 2001;
Liner, et al 2001; Bouckaert & van Dooren, 2002).
At the same time, there is increasing evidence demonstrating the difficulties and perhaps
even the impossibility of measuring performance and integrating this information in a
comprehensive, coherent, consistent, and therefore functional way in policy and
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management cycles (Ammons, 2002; Hatry, 2002; Bouckaert & Peters, 2002). However,
criticism (Radin, 1998) and counter-evidence have not stopped many of the reform
machines. Also, evidence based on comparative data is lacking and evaluations of
reforms are a missing link (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2001; Jones and Kettl, 2003).
One of the most extreme reform positions in managing performance was the so-called
New Public Management (NPM). Although it was restricted in space (mostly Australia,
New Zealand and the UK) and time (mostly the 1990s), it influenced reform agendas of
other countries. Even if NPM was mainly an Anglo-Saxon, partly Westminster featured
phenomenon, it has been described as ‘an international phenomenon’ (Jones and Kettl,
2003: 2) with a generic narrative capacity (Barzelay, 2001), which fits the NPM
normative and rhetorical strategy of a self-fulfilling performance management prophecy.
Other scholars have put NPM in a broader perspective of general public management
reform (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Christensen and Laegreid, 2001) or even governance
reform (König, 1996; Wollman, 2003).
Many countries have followed a more cautious and even a different ‘managing
performance’ strategy. Reform results in four main patterns of practice: maintaining,
modernising, of marketising, and minimising (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). In reality
there are combined and hybrid strategies which change over time, and also depend on the
political context. Ultimately, the choice of a reform agenda includes implicitly an
ideological choice for a state of law or a market state and is not just the integration of
some management techniques as part of a public management policy. Whether country
strategies are to maintain, modernise, marketise, or minimise, all emphasise the
importance of performance measurement and management.
In reality it seems that performance management and its related reform agenda are not so
obvious to realise in practice. The official win/win/win rhetoric seems not to be mirrored
in reality. The picture that politicians win because they steer on strategic lines, that
managers win because they are allowed and able to manage, and that citizens win
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because they get better service seems more complex, definitely conditional and perhaps
even untrue in reality. Many advocates are disappointed about the lack of interest of
parliaments in this reform, even if some countries have made serious efforts to increase
the levels of accountability and have changed the budgetary procedures to facilitate a
contradictory debate between the executive and the legislative, like e.g. in Canada
(Improved Reporting to Parliament Project) or in Sweden (VESTA). Implementation is
difficult and even subject to obstruction. And executive politicians lose interest if the
potential political yield is not obvious.
A major question is therefore what is going on in the practice of the reform agenda in
general, of which the performance issue is a crucial common denominator, and how can
we explain what is going on.
One key change has been the creation of autonomous agencies. These agencies and their
guiding centres use a variety of tools and techniques like, e.g. performance budgeting,
accrual accounting, performance evaluation and value for money auditing, personal and
institutional performance contracts with rewards and sanctions, target setting,
benchmarking and performance monitoring systems.
In any case, the general assumptions seem to be that more information is better than less,
that comparative information is better than non-comparative information, that timely
information is better than untimely information, that output and effect information is
better than single input information, and that clear and quantitative objectives are better
than opaque ones.
of the history of measurement systems in the public sector can be useful for future
strategy.
First, learning from history, e.g. its progress in measuring performance could result in
extrapolating the learning cycle. Could performance measurement become even more
intensive, more extensive, and more external? There is still scope for a more extensive
approach, i.e. an increased coverage rate in organisations and policy fields. The
absorption of performance measures in financial cycles (budgets, accounts, and audits), in
policy cycles (design, strategic plans, monitoring of implementation, and evaluation), in
personnel functions, and in organisational intra- and inter-action still has potential for
intensive expansion. Finally, a growing external dimension is also correlated to a
developing accountability.
Second, just like the accounting adagium ‘different costs for different purposes’ , a system
needs different performance measurement systems for different purposes. Three main
objectives of performance management include (re-)allocation of resources (of which
savings is one specific variant), increase performance of the public sector as such, and
enhance accountability. Performance measurement systems will have to cover all these
objectives.
How to balance costs and benefits of performance measurement and systems of managing
performance? A performance measurement/management Cost Benefit Analysis is always
present, be it more implicitly than explicitly. Listing costs and benefits is not easy.
Quantifying performance measurement/management costs and benefits is even more
difficult. One key problem is that in general costs are more immediate, more tangible,
and less conditional than benefits, which are less immediate, less tangible, and more
conditional. Costs precede benefits because one needs to collect data and process this into
information before one can collect the benefits of it. Also costs seem to be more tangible
than the nature of the benefits which are also and perhaps predominantly intangible. A
focus on transparency, accountability, and trust are clear benefits but difficult to match to
a monetary cost. Finally, costs are incurred almost as a fact of an accounting nature
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whereas benefits depend on the functional use of this information in a policy and
management cycle.
Third, these performance measurement strategies need to put in a broader context, i.e. the
60-year-old Friedrich/Finer debate is relevant. The key question is whether there is a need
for a system based on subjective elements (e.g., personal accountability based on integrity
and trust – Friedrich’ s position) or for a system based on objective elements (e.g., rule-
directed accountability based on compliance and performance measurement systems –
Finer’ s position).
How can this dichotomy be resolved? One option is to upgrade both positions. Balk
proposes two fundamental positions to orthodox practitioner perception. The first raises
subjective agency accountability to a formal level of visibility by providing an applied
theoretical rationale. Then the realm of public administration discourse is extended well
beyond conventional management philosophical domains so as ‘to recognize employees
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as legitimate, proactive actors, citizens with a powerful commitment to the values and
actions essential to democratic political institutions’ (Balk, 1996: 13).
The second option is to choose one position as dominant. Gawthrop contends that there is
a need to expand and implement the ethical imperatives for the 21st century through
education, values and commitment in order to re-establish and rediscover democracy
(Gawthrop, 1998). Education of the citizenry will empower citizens in a governance
context and equilibrate bureaucratic values. Values are crucial and should not be replaced
by facts and figures but balanced with these. Commitment and engagement imply that
public servants know what to do and go beyond what they have to do.
A fourth option - balancing the two positions - seems to be desirable. A fair mix of trust
and measurement, of integrity and compliance, of subjective and objective approaches is
necessary. Upgrading the two positions and combining them seems to be a functional
way to make things work. According to Balk ‘professionals as key actors in the network
of stakeholders in a democratic society, will develop mutually supportive relationships at
the workplace in order to maintain their integrity and strengthen democratic political
institutions. They can take the lead by acknowledging that principles of tentative trust and
contingent loyalty need not threaten the benefits of, nor the necessity to respond to,
appropriate hierarchical direction’ (Balk, 1996: 190-1). This implies that performance
based systems should be combined with trust based systems in a dynamic way.
Fifth, there will remain tensions or contradictions between the responsibility and the
accountability on issues like output vs outcome and organisation vs policy. It is often the
26
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i
An initial representation of models is in Bouckaert and Halligan 2006.
ii
The earliest practices in Britain appear to be the surveys and municipal statistics that
reach back into the nineteenth century (Williams 2004). More considered thinking about
measuring performance existed as indicated by Sidney Webb’ s 1901 call for an annual
municipal competition to investigate municipal efficiency, by calculating ‘statistical
marks for excellence’ (quoted in Cutler and Waine 1994: 27).