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Journal of Urban Affairs

ISSN: 0735-2166 (Print) 1467-9906 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ujua20

Castles in Toronto’s Sky: Condo-Ism as Urban


Transformation

Gillad Rosen & Alan Walks

To cite this article: Gillad Rosen & Alan Walks (2015) Castles in Toronto’s Sky: Condo-Ism as
Urban Transformation, Journal of Urban Affairs, 37:3, 289-310, DOI: 10.1111/juaf.12140

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1111/juaf.12140

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CASTLES IN TORONTO’S SKY: CONDO-ISM AS URBAN
TRANSFORMATION
GILLAD ROSEN
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
ALAN WALKS
University of Toronto

ABSTRACT: This article analyzes the evolution and spatial dynamics of condominium development
in Toronto, the largest housing market in Canada and the site of a rapid take-up of condominium tenure
and construction over the last 40 years. The article probes the most influential policies that fostered
and regulated condominium growth, and explores the implications for the continued restructuring of the
city. A host of factors, including neoliberal state policies, have played a decisive role in fostering what
we term condo-ism, referring to an emerging nexus of economic development, finance, and consump-
tion sector interests that have coalesced around condominium construction and culture. Policies have
redirected growth to the urban core, channeled capital investments and young residents, and promoted
gentrification, ultimately transforming the character of Toronto’s central business district. The article
explores these changes, and discusses their implications for contemporary emerging forms of capitalist
urbanization and restructuring of the city.

T he Greater Toronto Area (GTA) is a global city-region, a gateway of international economic,


cultural and migration flows (Laidley, 2007; Lemon, 1991; Taylor, Walker, Catalano, & Hoyler,
2002). It is Canada’s pivotal urban center, with leading roles in Canada’s financial, business, arts,
and housing construction industries (Boudreau, Keil, & Young, 2009; Kipfer & Keil, 2002; Lehrer
& Laidley, 2008). The largest housing market in Canada, Toronto has experienced a tremendous
surge in condominium development over the last 40 years and especially during the last decade. As
noted by many scholars, this has meant that “condos” are a ripe subject for understanding urban
transformations in the city (see Hulchanski, 1988; Kern, 2007, 2010a, b, c; Lehrer, Keil, & Kipfer,
2010; Lehrer & Wieditz, 2009; Preston, Murdie, & Northrup, 1993; Skaburskis, 1998).
Condominiums make up a fast growing form of housing ownership in cities and suburbs across
the globe. Whereas this form of housing has been present in many countries for decades (Cribbet,
1963; Crot, 2006; Ferrer & Stecher, 1967; Hansmann, 1991; Lee, 1989; Lees, 1994; Van Weesep,
1984, 1987; Vesselinov, Cazessus, & Falk, 2007), in Canada condominiums have only recently
become a salient issue in planning and housing literature (Grant & Curran, 2007; C. D. Harris, 2011;
Kern, 2010a, b; Lehrer & Wieditz, 2009; Rosen & Grant, 2011; Rosen & Walks, 2013; Townshend,
2006). In many North American cities, the “condo” is associated with a particular form or style of
housing, typically a tower-and-podium development with wall-to-wall glass windows. However, the
condominium is technically a form of tenure, rather than a style of housing. Introduced in the late
1960s, first in British Columbia with the Strata Title Act (1966) and then shortly thereafter in many
other provinces, condominiums facilitate a form of “double” ownership, where specific individual

Direct correspondence to: Gillad Rosen, Department of Geography, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 91905,
Israel. E-mail: gillad.rosen@mail.huji.ac.il.

JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Volume 37, Number 3, pages 289–310.


Copyright  C 2014 Urban Affairs Association

All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.


ISSN: 0735-2166. DOI: 10.1111/juaf.12140
290 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 37/No. 3/2015

units are owned and registered in the name of buyers, coupled with shared ownership over residential
common property (C. D. Harris, 2011; Leal, 1968). Common property may vary in scale and scope
from lobbies, hallways, gardens, and elevators to streets and private roads, recreation facilities, and
golf courses (Low, 2003; McCabe & Tao, 2006; McKenzie, 1994; Warner, 2011). Their operation is
made possible through a condominium corporation, a governing institution elected and responsible
to the condo-owners (Low, Donovan, & Gieseking, 2012). In many countries, these local private
governance arrangements enable individuals to own apartments in multi-unit buildings. They in turn
facilitate the transformation of the urban tenure structure, from a city predominantly characterized by
renters (particularly when living in high-density apartments) to a mix of homeowners with varying
levels of responsibility for maintaining collective areas (Cribbet, 1963; Kern, 2007; Lees, 1994;
Webster & Le Goix, 2005). The condominium has thus allowed housing units that exist floating in
space to become the castles to which British homeowners were said to have aspired. Condominiums
are not only a growing driver of the diversification of the housing stock but, because of the higher
“bonus” densities that developers have been allowed in return for providing certain public benefits
(discussed below), they also promote the intensification of land use and the gentrification and
resettlement of the inner city.
In 1968 Henri Lefebvre argued for what he saw as a shift from an industrial form of capitalism
to a form of capitalism based on urbanization, giving primacy to the production and consumption
of urban space as the most important dynamic through which social relations are produced and
reproduced (2003/1968). Lefebvre was customarily vague on how such a shift might play out
concretely in the city. More recently, Allen Scott (2011) has argued for the emergence of a new logic
of city building under “third-wave” urbanization, in which the dynamics of city-building and urban
ways of life shift away from facilitating industrial production and expansion, toward a “cognitive-
cultural” economy dominated by flows (of information, ideas, finance, trade, and people) and the
globalization of interdependence. Third-wave urbanization has likewise involved a spatial shift from
suburbanization and urban dispersion toward concentration, gentrification, and intensification, which
bring with them profound changes in urban social life. We argue that in cities like Toronto such shifts
are tightly intertwined with the rise of what we term condo-ism. The latter refers to a particular
mode of development rooted in a nexus of, on the one hand the economic interests of the private-
sector development industry and the state, and on the other new urbane yet privatized residential
preferences, lifestyles, and consumption interests among consumers. This has resulted in a new
structured coherence of political and economic interests (Harvey, 1989), dependent upon continued
intensification and real estate development in the city, with mortgage credit displacing industrial
expansion as the primary driver of the urban growth machine. In the context of financialization and
globalization, condo-ism has thus usurped the role of industrialization in urban development. Toronto
is an exemplar of this process.
This article explores the role of the condominium and condo-ism in the development of one of
North America’s major housing markets, and the largest housing market in Canada—the city of
Toronto. It examines condo development trends both at the regional and micro scales, explores the
most influential policies that fostered and regulated their growth, and provides insights to the poten-
tial implications of this transformation. It draws on quantitative and qualitative analyses of a number
of primary and secondary data. First, to track the historical and geographic progression of condo-
minium development within the city of Toronto, we compiled a finely detailed data set containing
information on the precise location, number of units, development year, and other characteristics
of the condominium stock for the period 1970 through 2010. Assembling this database involved
combing and cross-referencing several condo inventories from the City of Toronto, market surveys
provided by Urbanation Corporation, building profiles from the developers, real estate reports, hous-
ing market information from the Building Industry and Land Development Association (BILD), data
extracted from the monthly Condolife Magazine, data from the Canada Mortgage and Housing Cor-
poration (CMHC), Toronto City Planning Policy and Research publications, and online information
for buildings in the Toronto region. Secondly, we analyzed condominium development trends in the
Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) and the City of Toronto using custom data purchased from
Statistics Canada (1981, 1991, 2001 and 2006; unfortunately, there is no information about housing
I Condo-ism as Urban Transformation I 291

costs, form, tenure, and most other variables in the 2011 census, due to the elimination of the long
form of the census). Finally, to further understand development trends and the policy framework, we
conducted 33 semistructured interviews with Toronto’s major condo developers as well as with plan-
ners, politicians, residents, and other key stakeholders. Interviews were recorded and transcribed and
their content analyzed. In the case of two major developers, Concord Adex and Daniels, interviews
were supplemented by on-site visits to two major new condominium developments (CityPlace and
Regent Park).
In this article we explore the growth of condominium tenure in the city of Toronto, both histori-
cally and spatially, and shed light on the importance of condominiums for understanding Toronto’s
development trajectory. We demonstrate the rise and spread of this form of tenure over time, and
examine differences in condo and non-condo residential populations. We also explore the range of
policies, practices, and structural factors that together have favored condominium development over
other forms of development, and that support the shift toward condo-ism as an organizing princi-
ple for contemporary urban production and consumption. The article concludes with a discussion
of the potential implications of condo-ism for the shape of the city, the urban social and physical
environment, and urban life.

GROWING PANES? CONDOMINIUM HOUSING IN TORONTO


The Toronto region has experienced several phases of government restructuring and boundary
changes. In 1953 the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto (Metro) was created, forming a metropoli-
tan government for the (old) City of Toronto and twelve other municipalities. In 1965, after further
reorganization and consolidation, the number of lower tier municipalities under Metro was reduced
to six. The 1970s saw the creation of four regional municipal governments bordering the fringes of
Metro Toronto, also modeled on the two-tier system. Then in 1998 Metro Toronto’s upper and lower
tier governments were amalgamated into one (“mega”) City of Toronto, whereas the four two-tier
regional systems outside the boundaries of Metro were left untouched and so remained as two-tier
regional systems of governance. The new mega-city and the four regional municipalities surrounding
it are known locally as the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) (Frisken, 2001; Frisken & Norris, 2001;
Williams, 1999), and often characterized by political differences between residents and politicians
in the new City of Toronto and neighboring suburban municipalities (see R. Harris & Lewis, 1998;
Walks, 2004). In 2011 the new amalgamated City of Toronto had a population of over 2.6 million
people, representing 43% of the GTA’s 6 million people. The GTA is slightly larger than the official
Toronto CMA (Census Metropolitan Area) as defined by Statistics Canada.
The largest housing market in Canada, the GTA has experienced continuous growth since the 1950s.
Its economy has undergone extensive restructuring from a Fordist industrial city largely active within
the Canadian urban system, to a post-Fordist global city linked into both continental production
networks and global networks of finance and immigration (Boudreau et al., 2009; Bourne & Rose,
2001; Ley & Tutchener, 2001; Walks, 2001). Economic restructuring has been accompanied by the
restructuring of Toronto’s social geography, characterized by the growth of sociospatial polarization
and gentrification of the inner city (Catungal, Leslie, & Hii, 2009; Hulchanski, 2010; Kipfer & Keil,
2002; Walks, 2001, 2011; Walks & Maaranen, 2008a, b).
Within this context, condominiums have become a growing and integral ingredient of Toronto’s
housing stock. Condominiums started appearing in Toronto in the very late 1960s, after the introduc-
tion of the Condominium Act in the province of Ontario in 1968 (Hulchanski, 1988; McLaughlin,
1982). In 1981 there were 65,610 condominium units (both owner-occupied and rental) across the
Toronto CMA, representing roughly 2% of the housing stock. Since then, condominiums have in-
creased to 18% of all dwelling units in 2011 (358,938 units, including rental condos) and 20% of
all owner-occupied units (279,253 units). Since 1981 slower population growth in the central city
compared to the rest of the region decreased the city’s (Metro’s) share of total dwellings in the CMA
from 71% to 52%, slightly higher than its share of the CMA’s population (47%). Despite this trend,
the city’s condominium stock has continued growing, maintaining greater than 60% of the entire
region’s condo owner-occupied stock through the period (Table 1). Condo-ization of the housing
292 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 37/No. 3/2015

TABLE 1

Owner-Occupied Condominiums, Toronto, 1981–2011

New City of Toronto* Rest of CMA Total Toronto CMA


Condo Share of Condo Share of Condo Owner-occupied Condos,% of
Years units CMA Stock units CMA Stock units condos% of total stock owner-occupied stock
1981 43,510 66.3% 22,100 33.7% 65,610 6.3% 11.2%
1991 62,925 60.5% 41,075 39.5% 104,000 7.8% 13.1%
2001 96,920 58.5% 68,815 41.5% 165,735 10.1% 16.0%
2006 138,865 61.3% 87,770 38.7% 226,635 12.6% 18.6%
2011 168,721 60.4% 110,532 39.6% 279,253 14.0% 20.0%

∗Post-1998 boundaries.
Source: Statistics Canada, Custom Tabulations E985, Census 1981–2001; Statistics Canada, Topic-based Tabulations, Census
2006, 97–554-XCB2006045. The 2011 numbers were calculated using CMHC’s Rental Market Report (Greater Toronto Area,
2011) and condo data set compiled by authors.
Note: The Canadian census data do not track condominium units occupied by renters (not distinguishing between rented condos
and rented apartments) and only provides the number of owner-occupied condo units. When we refer to condominium units (not
to owner-occupied condos), we provide numbers for the total condo universe including condo dwellings that are either vacant or
rented.

FIGURE 1

A Decade of Condo-ization: Proportion of the New Housing Units in Condominium Tenure in Toronto,
2001–2011

Source: Calculated from CMHC, various years.

stock has increased greatly over the most recent decade, particularly in the central city where a much
greater proportion of new housing built is in condominium tenure than in the suburbs (Figure 1).
Of the 16,850 new units completed in the new City of Toronto in 2011, 86.5% (14,568) were in
condominium tenure. This compares to only 27.8% (4,604 of 16,531 completions) of new housing
units in the suburban municipalities outside the City (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation,
2012).
I Condo-ism as Urban Transformation I 293

FIGURE 2

Aggregated Number of New Condo Units, City of Toronto, by Year, 1970–2010

Note: The aggregated numbers above represent total new condo units per year, by building size (number of dwellings in each
building). Three major waves of condo development are apparent as well as the increasing size of buildings built in the last decade
(buildings with more than 251 condo units). While the figure displays four decades, we have identified 138 condo units as being
built before 1970.
Source: Data set compiled by the authors.

From the inception of condominium housing to the present, three major waves of condominium
development can be identified (Figure 2). The first round of condo development was characterized
by rapid growth in the early 1970s, followed by a slow decline in the wake of the stagflation of the
late 1970s and the recession of the early 1980s. Relatively fast to rebound from the mid-1980s crisis,
the market reached new peaks with around 7,000 total new condo units built in each of 1988, 1989,
and 1990. However, this second condo boom was short, and the slump in the years 1993–1995 was
a result of a deep economic recession that hit Toronto in the early 1990s. The recent and third condo
boom began in the late 1990s, accelerating almost continuously to a record high in 2011. The United
States housing market crisis had little effect on the rate of condo construction in Toronto, partly due
to differences in the structure of mortgage markets between the two countries (see Walks, 2014a).
Examination of the condo data set we have compiled for the City of Toronto indicates that, from 1970
to 2010, the number of new condominium units entering the market each year increased by a factor
of almost seven—from less than 2,000 units in 1970 to over 14,000 units in 2010 for a total of almost
200,000 condominiums over 40 years (both owner-occupied and rental). Another important trend
of these development cycles is toward larger and larger projects. The largest buildings, containing
more than 250 units, have typically been built in peak development years, including 1988–1990
and 2005–2011. Since the mid-2000s, trends are particularly characterized by growing numbers of
buildings with more than 350 units. However, at the same time larger projects are beset by shrinking
average unit sizes (with internal square footage declining by over 5% between 2006 and 2011; see
Regan, 2011). These shifts have dramatically altered the landscape and feel of new condominiums,
with the most recent developments much more like the large rental apartment buildings constructed
during the 1960s and 1970s. The most recent era, during which the most rapid change has occurred,
is also characterized by condominium buildings sporting shiny wall-to-wall glass panes, which are
receiving increasing attention for their lack of energy efficiency, shoddy workmanship and increasing
tendency to explode without warning, producing a safety risk for pedestrians underneath (Brunet,
294 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 37/No. 3/2015

FIGURE 3

Owner-occupied Condo Percentage of Housing by Dissemination Areas, Toronto CMA, 2006

Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Canada, 2006.

2011; Fedio, 2011; Preville, 2012). Yet condo residents have often remained silent in face of poor
quality workmanship, fearing that if they speak up it will affect their property values, their ability to
sell, and potentially even lawsuits on behalf of the developers (Preville, 2012).

FROM SPREAD TO CONCENTRATION: THE GEOGRAPHY OF CONDOMINIUM


DEVELOPMENT
There is a particular geography to the distribution of condominiums, formed incrementally by
each overlapping wave of condo development. Figure 3 provides a snapshot of the distribution of
owner-occupied condominium housing across the entire Toronto CMA in 2006. The (new) City of
Toronto clearly contains the largest condo market in the CMA, and condos make up 25% of total
owner-occupied dwellings. Four additional nearby suburban municipalities have also experienced
extensive growth. Mississauga (with a population of over 700,000) and Brampton (with roughly
500,000 people), are among the fastest growing municipalities in Canada. In 2006, Mississauga had
39,090 owner occupied condo units (18.2% of its housing stock and 20% of its owner-occupied
housing), while Brampton had 10,495 owner-occupied condo units (8.3% of its housing stock,
10% of its owner-occupied housing). Although they are smaller housing markets, the two suburban
municipalities of Markham (with a population of 260,000) and Richmond Hill (with 160,000 people)
have also experienced rapid condominium development. By 2006, Markham held 7,250 owner
occupied condo units (9.4% of its total housing stock and 11% of its owner-occupied housing), while
Richmond Hill had 5,545 owner-occupied condo units (10.9% of its total housing stock and 13% of
its owner-occupied housing).
Table 2 elucidates the spatial variation of condo development within the current City of Toronto
boundaries. These results reflect the city’s boundary changes and its legacy of six lower tier mu-
nicipalities and one upper tier regional municipality, which before the 1998 amalgamation together
I Condo-ism as Urban Transformation I 295

TABLE 2

Distribution of All Condominium Dwellings Within the Boundaries of the (New) City of Toronto

1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–1999 2000–2010 Total


(Old) City of Toronto∗ # projects 74 139 121 335 669
# units 5,435 14,179 10,014 55,149 84,777
Share (%) 14.0% 40.1% 35.9% 56.5% 42.5%
North York # projects 84 50 39 123 296
# units 13,797 8,350 5,251 26,021 53,419
Share (%) 35.5% 23.6% 18.8% 26.7% 26.7%
Scarborough # projects 53 38 32 28 151
# units 7,628 8,390 7,819 6,604 30,441
Share (%) 19.6% 23.7% 28.0% 6.8% 15.2%
Etobicoke # projects 38 22 21 59 140
# units 7,462 3,592 3,430 8,743 23,227
Share (%) 19.2% 10.2% 12.3% 9.0% 11.6%
York # projects 12 7 3 7 29
# units 2,751 647 471 834 4,703
Share (%) 7.1% 1.8% 1.7% 0.9% 2.4%
East York # projects 13 3 8 2 26
# units 1,756 186 917 280 3,139
Share (%) 4.5% 0.5% 3.3% 0.3% 1.6%
Total (new) # projects 274 259 224 554 1,311
City of Toronto # units 38,829 35,344 27,902 97,631 199,706
Share (%) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

∗Pre-1998 borders of the City of Toronto. Totals of condominium units include both owner-occupied and rented units.
Source: Condo data set compiled by authors.

governed the area known as Metro Toronto. As a proportion of all condo units built between 1970
and 2010, condominium development has been particularly concentrated within the pre-1998 City
of Toronto boundaries (about 85,000 units, 42% of all units), where the downtown and older pre-war
neighborhoods are located. In addition to this general trend, each wave of condominium development
is associated with a distinct geography.
The second largest condo cluster is the former municipality of North York, with roughly 53,000
total units (27% of the market), followed by Scarborough (15%) and Etobicoke (12%). These three
former municipalities make up Toronto’s post-war inner suburbs, and were amalgamated into the new
City of Toronto in 1998. Examination of development patterns, by construction period, highlights
internal differences among these former municipalities. Although the inner-city area demarcated by
the old City of Toronto boundaries now contains the largest condo cluster, this was not always the
case. In the first years of condominium development (1970–1979), Toronto’s inner suburbs (North
York, Scarborough, and Etobicoke) were the preferred sites. By the end of the 1990s, central Toronto
and North York, with then 56% of the market (roughly 29,000 and 27,000 condo units respectively),
had established themselves as the major development magnets of the region. Toronto core’s primacy
with condo housing is thus recent, and mostly results from the last decade’s construction activities.
Between 2000 and 2010, the local condo market almost doubled in size, and most of the development
(56%) took place within the old City of Toronto boundaries.
Figure 4 displays the location of condominium development in Toronto in each decade between the
years 1970–2010, revealing several major clusters. Most noticeable are the downtown and waterfront,
which have become attractive locations for residential development, especially high-density condo
towers (Figure 5). This trend is profoundly transforming the downtown from a traditional central
business district (CBD), mainly occupied during the day by office workers, to a mixed-use center
where business, commercial, cultural, and residential activities take place at all hours. As a result,
increased numbers of people are now living in and around the downtown, especially young residents
between the ages of 20 and 44 (City of Toronto, 2007, 2012). In the last four decades, the downtown
added 362 new residential condo buildings, representing about 30% of the condo construction in
296 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 37/No. 3/2015

FIGURE 4

City of Toronto Condominium Construction, 1970–2010

Note: The waterfront and downtown area are highlighted in darker yellow. Four additional growth centers are highlighted in red (left
hand side Etobicoke center, central area – Eglinton-Yonge center, northern center North York and right hand side Scarborough
center) (color in the online version).
Source: Data set compiled by the authors.

the city (Table 3). Most of this development accrued in the last decade, during which approximately
38,000 condo units were built. These represent 39% of the new condo stock and a staggering 30% of
all new construction across the entire city for the years 2000–2010. A city councilor called attention
to the results of this process: “We are building upwards creating a vibrant center. After dusk people do
not leave for the suburbs” (Interview, 2011). Another city councilor expounded on his model for the
downtown and waterfront area with the evocative rhetorical question “Have you been to Manhattan?
Manhattan!” (Interview, 2010).
Development continues to accrue along Yonge street (Toronto’s main north-south street, which also
harbors an underground subway public transit system), both south of Bloor (the downtown) and along
its stretch through North York center. The latter is emerging as a particularly dense condo-magnet,
second only to the downtown and waterfront areas. Growth is spreading from this center along the
east-west Sheppard Avenue, and over to Highway 404 (a major freeway bringing commuters into the
downtown). It is also taking place along major transportation arteries, and around key transportation
nodes. Such is the case with Scarborough center and Etobicoke center, which are served by Toronto’s
subway network and highways, and along key arterials (such as Victoria Park Avenue, running
north-south along the old boundary with Scarborough) and parts of Don Valley Parkway. These
developments are consistent with the new Toronto Official City Plan (2006) that targets about 25%
of the city for new development, particularly at designated growth centers, avenues, employment
districts, and the downtown, while protecting the remaining existing residential neighborhoods, green
ecosystems, and open spaces from intensification (City of Toronto, 2011, 2012) (Figures 3 and 4).
I Condo-ism as Urban Transformation I 297

FIGURE 5

Downtown and Waterfront Toronto Condominiums, 2010

Source: Data set compiled by the authors.

TABLE 3

Condominium Development in the Toronto Downtown, 1970–2010

(New) City of Toronto* Downtown (including Waterfront)


Total New New Condos’ New New Share of Share of
Construction new condo condo share of condo condo total city new total new
period units units projects total new units units projects condo units city units
1970–1979 146,705 38,829 274 26.5% 2,336 25 6.0% 1.6%
1980–1989 86,054 35,344 259 41.1% 10,514 82 29.7% 12.2%
1990–1999 79,276 27,902 224 35.2% 7,405 62 26.5% 9.3%
2000–2010 126,658 97,631 554 77.1% 38,364 193 39.3% 30.3%
Total 438,693 199,706 1,311 45.5% 58,619 362 29.4% 13.4%

∗Post-1998 boundaries. Totals of condominium units include both owner-occupied and rented units.
Source: Condo data set compiled by authors; City of Toronto, Toronto’s Housing 2003; City of Toronto, Rental Housing Supply and
Demand Indicators 2006; CMHC Rental Market Reports, various years.

Condo-ism is not only a key feature of private-sector development, but is also increasingly playing
a central role in the city’s official redevelopment strategies (Lehrer et al., 2010). The two largest
multi-tower condominium developments in the City—at CityPlace and Regent Park—are projects
actually initiated by the City, but built by private developers (Figure 6). When CityPlace, a project of
64 acres redeveloping the former vacant railway lands near Toronto’s CN tower, is completed, it will
be home to more than 20 residential condo towers which will house about 8,000 units. This former
brownfield industrial land, once cut off from the city by expressways, is being rebuilt with mixed-use
but predominantly residential development and linked into the downtown through the extension of
existing roadways. It is one of three mega-projects in Canada this developer (Concord Adex/Pacific)
298 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 37/No. 3/2015

CityPlace Regent Park

FIGURE 6

Downtown Condominium-related Redevelopment Strategies and Forms

Note: Left side—CityPlace neighborhood, brownfield redevelopment on previous rail lands; Right side—Regent Park neighborhood,
redevelopment of public housing as a mixed-tenure mixed-land use development.
Source: Photos by the authors.

is involved in. Concord’s first major residential condo project was in the former Expo 86 World
Fair site in Vancouver, where similarly former brownfield railway lands were redeveloped as part of
the city’s effort to regenerate its inner city and increase the number of people living in and around
the downtown (see C. D. Harris, 2011; Olds, 1998). CityPlace falls under Toronto’s “large sites”
inclusionary zoning policy, in which the developer must provide land to the Toronto Community
Housing Corporation (TCHC) for prospective future affordable housing, although as of yet none
of this affordable stock has actually been built. In the context of a drastic decline in funding and
construction of new social housing (Walks, 2006), the City is compelled to depend on the large sites
policy in the context of new condominium development for meeting even meager policy objectives
related to affordable rental.
Another example of how public policy has come to depend on condo-ism is evident in the Regent
Park neighborhood. Unlike CityPlace, this community has always been a residential neighborhood.
One of Canada’s oldest and largest social housing developments, it was originally planned and built
in the 1940s and 1950s in classic LeCorbusian style, mostly towers in a park, with few through streets.
Labelled an outcast space (James, 2010; Purdy, 2005), the City of Toronto and TCHC developed a
plan to radically transform this 69-acre district by bulldozing and replacing virtually all the structures
with a mixed-income mixed-tenure community combining rebuilt social housing of around 2,000
units with roughly 5,000 new private owner-occupied condominiums. The community is being rebuilt
by Daniels Corporation, a prominent developer of condos in Toronto’s inner city, who will share
I Condo-ism as Urban Transformation I 299

equally in the profits from new private market condo sales with TCHC, while the City also pays them
to rebuild the social housing units. The success of the private market condo sales, coupled with the
mounting liabilities of TCHC in servicing social housing, has encouraged each subsequent phase of
the redevelopment to feature ever greater shares of private market condo units (from 40% of Phase
I, to 74% of Phase II, to an even higher number under current negotiations for Phase III), while
increasing numbers of the rebuilt social housing units are slated to be located off-site (Interview,
2012). Scholars argue that this project represents the colonization and gentrification of valuable
central-city space under the guise of supporting diversity and social mix, while in the process shifting
the balance of political power away from tenants and toward condominium owners (see August,
2008; August & Walks, 2011; Kipfer & Petrunia, 2009).
In both of these projects previously working-class spaces (even if nonresidential, in the case of
the railway lands) are being reconstructed in the image of privatized middle-class urbanity under the
guise of developing walkable high-density socially-mixed development (Davidson & Lees, 2005,
2010), a process of new-build gentrification whose precedent was set earlier in places like Fairview
Slopes in Vancouver (see Ley, 1996; Mills, 1988; Smith, 1996). In Toronto, this is being achieved
almost exclusively through the reproduction of the condominium form. Condo-ism here provides a
unified development ethos linking both private and public sector urban strategies.

CONDO-ISM AS EMERGENT NEXUS OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT


David Harvey (1989, ch. 5) argued that over time in each metropolitan region a structured coherence
will tend to crystallize around the agendas and interests of dominant factions of capital and labor.
The result of years of political negotiation and compromise, not to mention dominant industrial
and economic interests, such a structured coherence influences the direction that urban development
takes in each region, promotes particular growth regimes for local political office, and binds together
different actors toward a shared local development policy agenda (see also Logan & Molotch, 2007;
Strom, 2008). Urban development trends in Toronto over the last 20 years have increasingly been
structured around what we here term condo-ism. The latter refers to an interlocking nexus of political
and economic agendas regarding urban economic development, a planning philosophy that favors
intensification, downtown living, and densification, and the cultural promotion of high-rise living as
both sophisticated and environmentally friendly. Condo-ism has become the overarching strategy for
fulfilling multiple official development objectives. Of course, it is important not to reify condo-ism
here. Condo-ism should be understood as a concept for understanding and delineating the nexus
of interests, financial practices, forms of governance, tenure shifts, and social preferences that have
come together in the current conjuncture to promote condominium development over the alternatives,
and around which public policy is increasingly organized. Condo-ism represents the crystallization
of a set of intersecting factors characterizing the post-Fordist, postindustrial restructuring of the city,
including financialization, deindustrialization, and gentrification.
Importantly, condo-ism involves a shift toward new forms of privatized urban living, private urban
governance, and private property rights (Nelson, 2005; Rosen & Walks, 2013; Webster & Lai, 2003).
Condominium tenure involves the formation of private “club realms” in which those who can pay the
membership (condo, or strata, fee) have a say in the internal governance of the commonly held lands,
while also taking on new responsibilities (instead of landlords, or municipalities) for their upkeep and
the provision of local services. This removes responsibility from private landlords (who own rental
buildings) and from municipalities, and shifts it on to condo unit owners (for more discussion of
the sociopolitical significance of this shift toward private neighborhood governance, see Low et al.,
2012; McKenzie, 1994, 2011; Nelson, 2005; Rosen & Walks, 2013;Webster & Lai, 2003).
There are several key factors that have influenced the crystallization of urban development around
condo-ism in the Toronto region, and its increasing focus on the downtown and other locations
accessible to the downtown. Primary among these has been the economic restructuring of the region,
marked both by deindustrialization and the rise of the service industries, with financial services,
insurance, and real estate (FIRE) the most prominent (Figure 7). Many of the jobs in finance,
insurance, and real estate, as well as related “cultural-cognitive” occupations, including those in
300 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 37/No. 3/2015

FIGURE 7

Employment Shifts in the Toronto CMA (Percent of Total Employment), 1981–2011

Note: The sectors represented above are the only sectors that witnessed rapid growth or decline. All other employment sectors
together grew only slowly (from representing 48.4% of employment in 1996 to 49.5% in 2011). Data for information, culture, and
recreation were only available for the period 1996–2011, and for health care and health service only for the period 1991–2011.
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM database, Table 2820112; Census of Canada 1981, 1986, 1991.

culture, education, and recreation (Scott, 2011) are located in or near the downtown, increasing
demand for housing nearby which has been met through condominium development and gentrification
of the older housing stock. Meanwhile, deindustrialization has particularly negatively impacted the
inner suburbs, where the greatest proportion of manufacturing workers live, and where increasing
poverty is most concentrated, since the 1980s (Hulchanksi, 2010; Walks, 2011; Walks & Maaranen,
2008a, b). Deindustrialization most significantly affected the inner city in the 1960s and 1970s, but
from the 1980s onwards the inner city has been gentrifying alongside growth in the financial sector.
With the decline of manufacturing, blue-collar labor has shifted into the construction of new housing,
which increasingly means condominiums. The relevance of condominium housing construction to
the shifting employment situation in the Toronto region is evident in Figure 8, revealing a clear
relationship between the proportion of total jobs coming from either the construction sector or FIRE—
the two industries which might be expected to depend the most on condominium development, and
the construction of new condominium units. The Toronto region has become ever more dependent
upon both these sectors, which together employed a rising share of the total workforce, from 13.7%
in 1996 to 16.3% in 2010 (Statistics Canada, CANSIM database, Table 2820112). The (Pearson)
correlation between changes in condo completions and change in employment in these industries
across all years is a very high r = .75.
Provincial and municipal legislation has also played a role in promoting intensification, urban
living, and the building of condominiums. Whereas municipal policies in the 1970s, with provincial
support, attempted to slow down and regulate growth in Toronto’s city center and redirect it outwards
to the inner suburbs of Scarborough, North York, and Etobicoke, as well as to nearby Mississauga (see
Desfor, Goldrick, & Merrens, 1989), provincial control over regional planning has increasingly tended
to favor urban containment and contiguous development, and, since the late 1990s, intensification of
land use and residential densification (White, 2003, 2007). This culminated in 2005 in the Greenbelt
Act and the Places to Grow Act, two pieces of legislation that intended to redirect growth toward more
I Condo-ism as Urban Transformation I 301

FIGURE 8

Condominiums Driving Employment Restructuring? New Condos and Proportion Employed in Construc-
tion, Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, Toronto, 1981–2010

Source: Data set compiled by the authors; Statistics Canada, Census of Canada, various years; CANSIM Data Table 2820112.

dense urban centers, and prevent or at least slow down development on rural lands above the important
Oak Ridges moraine aquifer. The philosophical justification for intensification follows what Quastel,
Moos, and Lynch (2012) call the sustainability-as-density model, which is invariably articulated in
higher-density owner-occupied residential development. Indeed, condo developers in particular point
to these latter policies as providing the impetus for shifting towards denser development: “I think
the Places to Grow and the Greenbelt legislation that the province brought in is the most important
legislation that impacted the development industry in the last 30 years. . . . The province of Ontario
said this here is the line, this is agriculture land it shall not be turned into development land. . . . By
virtue of doing that the developers now knew these are the new rules of the game . . . . We have to
look at infill and urban intensification” (Interview, 2010).
However, others with inside knowledge of the industry suggest that provincial and municipal
government policy had little to do with the condo boom, and furthermore that condo developers pay
little attention to the intent of those policies: “What happened in Toronto is very simple. The same
suburban developers who got to be unbelievably rich . . . discovered condos. It wasn’t the planners,
it wasn’t the government, it wasn’t the civil service, it was really old-fashioned free enterprise.
And naturally there is a problem because they don’t give a damn about infrastructure. They are
only interested in making big money. They’re not interested in society one iota” (Gluskin, 2012).
Regardless of which factor might be more important (i.e., planning directives or profit motives),
nonetheless both encourage condo-ization.
Most of all, the condominiums “became a substitute for rental units” (Interview, 2009). Condos
have filled the lack in new purpose-built rental housing construction, which has all but vanished since
the early 1990s (Walks, 2006). The target market for many condominiums has included those working
downtown or close to public transportation routes, empty nesters, and young households who typically
302 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 37/No. 3/2015

TABLE 4

Development Charges for Selected Municipalities in the GTA by Housing Type, 2010

Multiples/ Apartment rates of 2


Municipality Singles/ Semis Rows/ Towns bed rooms and more*
City of Toronto $12,910 $10,385 $8,565
Mississauga/ Regional Municipality of Peel $35,090 $35,090 $26,439
Richmond Hill/ Regional Municipality of York $37,855 $31,440 $24,110
Markham/ Regional Municipality of York $44,521 $36,410 $28,404
Brampton/ Regional Municipality of Peel $43,650 $39,488 $30,746

∗For Mississauga and Brampton, this column represents rates > 750 sq. ft.
Source: Building Industry and Land Development Association (BILD), 2010.
Note: Development charges represent the combined total of the local and regional municipal charges. These two levels of
government were amalgamated into one City of Toronto within the boundaries of the old regional municipality of Metropolitan
Toronto in 1998, and thus there is only one level of government imposing charges within the new City of Toronto.

TABLE 5

Selected Residential Household Characteristics, Owner-occupied Condominiums and Other Dwellings,


Toronto 2006

Toronto CMA City of Toronto Downtown


Tenure Condo Other owned Rented Condo Other owned Rented Condo Other owned Rented
Average household 2.3 3.3 2.3 2.3 1.4 2.8 1.4 1.6 1.7
(HH) Size, #
Families with 18.3 34.1 25.1 15.8 26.5 23.3 6.1 15.6 12.0
children,%
Single person 34.9 10.8 36.8 38.3 15.5 40.6 55.4 26.3 54.1
households,%
Seniors, primary HH 25.0 19.4 15.4 24.6 28.2 15.2 12.4 26.2 11.1
maintainer,%
Immigrated to Canada 36.0 25.6 38.9 38.7 22.9 40.7 21.6 15.0 30.8
since 1981,%
Average household 77,749 60,188 46,296 81,553 79,319 45,214 109,960 151,815 49,924
income ($)
Apartments > 5 63.5 0.0 57.2 77.5 0.0 60.9 88.8 0.0 76.7
stories,%

Source: Calculated by the authors from Statistics Canada, Census of Canada Custom Tabulations EO1790.

would have remained as renters (Table 5). The introduction of condominium legislation, coupled with
structural changes to land taxation and housing programs in the mid-1970s, encouraged developers
to redirect capital away from building rental buildings and toward condominiums. While developers
strive to blame the imposition of rent controls for such a shift, in truth the new condominium legislation
provided developers, who could sell the new condos to the same cohort that had been renting the
new units, with much larger and more immediate profits. This has been particularly true since the
late 1990s, as interest rates declined and credit became increasingly accessible (Walks, 2014a).
However, with the boom of housing prices through the 2000s, and the concomitant rise in household
debt (Walks, 2013), affordability declined among young households and speculator-investors bought
multiple units to take advantage of the capital gains. Many of the resulting condos are then rented out,
often to those in the same demographic as those purchasing for owner-occupation. “Rent controls
took away our ability to built rentals . . . [today] basically we build rental buildings registered as
condos, so . . . we can sell them as condos. We realized that the condo buyer and what we call
the wish-to-rent renter are the same demographics, same income, same person except one makes
the decision that they want to own and one does not want to be tied to a mortgage . . . they want
to rent but they want the condo lifestyle” (Interview, 2010). Such “wish-to-rent” renters include
mobile workers in the FIRE industries, young households, wealthy students, and foreign workers on
I Condo-ism as Urban Transformation I 303

temporary assignments. Interviews with developers suggest that many condos are now built with the
understanding that a significant proportion of units sold will be used for rental. According to CMHC
(2012), 23.6% of Toronto’s existing condo stock was rented in 2011. However, a City of Toronto
(2012) survey pegged the proportion of rental condos in the downtown at 45%, while condo analysts
claim that upwards of 80% of new condo units in the downtown have been bought by investors, with
most of these units geared for the rental market (Pigg, 2011). Indeed, many condos are rented out as
long-term investments by the developers themselves (e.g., the Minto group, which has several rental
condo communities across the GTA).
This raises the issue of a transformation of the organization of rental housing, from one charac-
terized by larger entities and clearly defined roles (landlords, etc.) easily regulated by state policy,
toward a disparate and potentially inexperienced “series of investors that are buying these units and
renting them out . . . essentially what we’re doing is creating a new form of rental housing in a
different form of tenure” (Clewes, 2012). With the shift away from purpose-built rental housing and
toward condo-ism as the primary avenue for new rental supply, the city has reduced its ability to con-
trol and regulate the provision of rental tenure. Condominiums become a factor spatially segregating
those renters who are forced to rent because they can’t afford to be homeowners from those with the
means to rent in high-demand areas, especially the downtown and waterfront areas, intensifying the
spatial polarization and fragmentation of the city (Hulchanski, 2010; Walks, 2011).
The municipal planning and taxation system has played a role in shaping the rise of condo-ism in the
city. Both planners and developers highlight the importance of development charges (also known as lot
levies or development impact fees). These are one-time levies funding a range of infrastructure costs
associated with new development (water, sewer, parks, roads, etc.), and are imposed to shift the burden
of paying for new facilities onto new development (Burge, Nelson, & Matthews, 2007; Lampert,
2002; Nelson, 1988; Tomalty & Skaburskis, 1997). Suburban municipalities pursuing expansive
development need to put in place expensive infrastructure, and therefore end up charging higher
levies. At times, these development charges may reach twice or even four times those imposed by
the central city, which produces additional incentives for developers to build within the central city’s
borders (Table 4). Municipal differences in development charges were exacerbated by amalgamation,
and by the move of the new City of Toronto to adopt per-unit fees much lower than in surrounding
areas. Zoning regulations have also been used to spur densification and the privatization of space
(Bunce, 2004; Desfor et al., 1989; Laidley, 2007). The city has increasingly encouraged private-
sector inner city redevelopment, especially on brownfield lands and in the downtown, through new
innovations in land use regulation. Starting as a pilot project in two downtown locations (the “Two
Kings”) and then subsequently expanded in the 2006 official plan, zoning for key commercial lands
was changed from strictly regulating land use to regulating aspects of building design and forms of
use. Instead of dictating that a building needed to be used for warehousing, industry, or offices, new
regulations allowed for the redevelopment of the site for a host of multiple approved uses (including
mixed commercial and residential use) under the stipulation that the relationship of the old buildings
to the streetscape not be altered so as to maintain the course-grained urbane feel of the pre-war city.
This has facilitated the conversion of a number of older nonresidential buildings into residential use
(lofts, etc.) in condominium tenure (De Sousa, 2002; Heath, 2001).
A key element of the planning system encouraging condominium development in the city is density
bonusing (formally allowed under Section 37 of the Planning Act, RSO 1990), which provides
developers of new high-rise buildings with “bonus” density over and above what is allowed by the
zoning by-law, in return for the developer providing the city with urban infrastructure or space for
local services on site (see Devine, 2008; Moore, 2012). Among other things, the latter might include
a number of amenities that used to be funded out of property taxes, such as parks, rights-of-way
for vehicles, community centers, spaces for a city day care, or, alternatively, cash in lieu of such
amenities. This development instrument, similar to those elsewhere known as “linked development”
or “planning obligations,” fastens planning permission to developer obligations to carry out additional
work attached in some way to the development for which permission was requested (Alterman, 1990;
Ratcliffe, Stubbs, & Keeping, 2009). In Toronto such a system is often criticized as “let’s make a
deal planning,” and has meant that the existing zoning by-laws exist only as a starting point for
304 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 37/No. 3/2015

negotiation, as additional density can effectively be bought by the development industry (Devine,
2008; Moore, 2012). Because the amenities, or money, flowing from Section 37 arrangements
must by law remain within the ward, city councillors (municipal politicians) come to advocate on
behalf of new high-rise development proposals so they can attain benefits for local constituents.
One developer described the change in land development policy that has arisen alongside bonusing:
”The situation dramatically changed from do-nothing to do-anything. From restrictive zoning in the
downtown it became do whatever you want, and at the time the demand was for condos” (Interview,
2009). Another developer further elucidates the city’s current pro-growth approach, “There is relative
acceptance of high-rise development, it’s not a question of will they allow it” (Interview, 2010). The
result is a “two-track” system in which the majority of new public infrastructure and amenities are
dependent upon, and paid for by, new high-density development, while local government austerity
means those neighborhoods not receiving new development have to fight for increasingly scarce tax
dollars. According to 10-year City Councillor Shelley Carroll: “In all my years here, I can think
of only one community center that was built with tax dollars. . . . The rest have all been built with
developer money” (cited in Preville, 2012). Condominium development is increasingly sought out
for the public benefits that have become increasingly dependent on it, providing a direct link between
the rise of condoism and the neoliberalization of city policy, and this has further exacerbated the
spatial dichotomy between those neighborhoods that are experiencing condominium development
and those that are not. Neoliberalism has thus infiltrated planning in Toronto not only through
support for gentrification, global city agendas, and entrepreneurial approaches to service provision
(Boudreau et al., 2009; Kipfer & Keil, 2001), but also through the way that condo-ism interacts
with the mechanisms of planning legislation regarding the distribution of public goods in structuring
political support for private sector development on behalf of local politicians.
While much of the focus thus far has been on local and provincial policy, condo-ism has also been
promoted by federal government policies, including immigration policies that favor educated and
wealthy people willing to invest in Canada’s economy (Ley, 2003; Olds, 1998). Strong immigration
and capital flows into the GTA fostered elevated levels of housing construction which, in conjunc-
tion with more restrictive regional governance and greenfield regulations, stimulated the increasing
concentration of both economic activity and new housing development in existing areas accessible
to the downtown. It has been said that Canada’s immigration policy effectively acts as its urban
population policy (Ley & Hiebert, 2001). Many developers concur: “I think immigration, and that’s
not a municipal or provincial policy, but it’s a federal policy, immigration drives housing, and . . .
people have to live somewhere. In Canada you get 240,000 people a year, that’s essentially the policy;
half of those go to Ontario . . . and two thirds of that goes to Toronto” (Interview, 2010). In addition
to the high number of immigrants, there are also substantial numbers of nonpermanent residents that
settle in the region for work or study purposes. Many immigrants from South Asia, China, South
Korea, and Vietnam are familiar with high-rise living (in their home countries) and are more concen-
trated in condominiums than are the native-born (Table 5). Although there are no data on the extent
of actual flows of foreign (or domestic) capital into Toronto’s condominium sector, developers all
concur that it is significant. With the loosening of credit restrictions, housing became easier to invest
in, and with the rise of transnationalism (i.e., increasing social ties and interactions, and intensifying
flows of capital, people, and information across state borders) fairly easy to maintain as a capital
investment (Castells, 1996; Ley, 2009, 2010; Olds, 1998). And in the absence of new purpose-built
rental housing, condo-ism has been de facto the main method for producing rental housing accessible
to young households and newcomers to the city. In addition to more recent immigrants to Canada
(arriving since 1981), condos are more likely to house young childless singles or couples, as well as
seniors and empty nesters, women, and wealthier households than those living in traditional rental
buildings (Table 5). This supports the research by Kern regarding the relationship between demo-
graphic lifestyle shifts, gender roles and status, and demand for higher density well-secured condo
units (2007, 2010a, b, c).
Finally, as condominium development has grown to dominate economic development patterns in
the city, the vast profits available in this sector, and the access to credit they have afforded condo
developers, have come to distort both the market and the information about it that is available. This
I Condo-ism as Urban Transformation I 305

has given private development companies an immense degree of power. Those knowledgeable about
the financing of condominium development are open about the source of such asymmetric power
relations: “The amount of money made by condo developers, and land developers, is so much greater
than you can imagine. The return on equity because it’s so levered is fantastic. . . . These boys and
girls never put up any of their own money . . . it’s borrowed money” (Gluskin, 2012). However, it is
difficult to measure the extent of the dominance of the condo industry, due to the lack of information
about the condo business, since few of the condo development companies are publicly traded1 : “This
is the amazing thing about the condo business. . . . There are no, and I say no, public companies
operating [in] condos. What that means is that there is no real tangible information. . . . No one really
knows anything. There are no official numbers. The only people who really know what is going on
in condos are condo developers. Unfortunately, they lie” (Gluskin, 2012).
However, condo-ism, as the organizing principle around which a financialized and globalized
Toronto has coalesced, has had to vie for dominance with the structured set of interests undergirding
Toronto’s more traditional and suburban-centered continental industrial economy dependent mainly
upon automobile production. The politics around the 1998 amalgamation (see Keil, 2000; Kipfer
& Keil, 2002), and the recent to-and-fro of mayoral elections (from a suburban-based right-leaning
mayor, to a left-leaning downtown pro-public transit mayor, and back again), reflect the tensions
between these two contrasting and distinctly coherent sets of politico-economic interests (Walks,
2014b). Furthermore, it is by no means clear that condo-ism can continue to count on easy access to
credit promoted by federal government policy in the face of rising housing costs and record household
debt (Walks, 2013). Indeed, the minister of finance explicitly fingered the Toronto condo bubble as
his primary concern in announcing tighter new mortgage lending standards and mortgage insurance
criteria in June of 2012 (Perkins & Morison, 2012). Condo-ism is not only a key emergent feature
of contemporary urban development, but expresses in an archetypical way the tensions attendant on
the “third wave” of urban restructuring of the city (Scott, 2011).

CONCLUSION
Since the introduction of condominiums to Canada roughly 40 years ago, Greater Toronto has been
fast to adopt this housing form. Today home to nearly 360,000 condominium dwellings, it is one of
the top five condo markets in North America, alongside Miami, Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles
(Rosen & Walks, 2013). Condo-ism has, in fact, become one of the dominant organizing principles
around which Toronto’s economic and cultural development has become coherently structured, and
is a key process through which the financialization and gentrification of the city is articulated. The
increasing importance of condominium development for Toronto’s economy has been accompanied
by the growing power of condo developers, increasing dependence on private sector housing devel-
opment for public benefits, and the rise of condominium tenure and hence private governance in
ways of everyday life in the city.
Condo-ism has not grown merely according to “market logic.” Government policies at multiple
scales—federal, provincial and municipal—have had a decisive role in fostering the rise of the condo
within and across the GTA. Provincial legislation, as well as the City of Toronto’s official plan, have
sought to intensify existing built-up areas and support mixed land uses, thus channeling development
to the most accessible locations. A growing divergence in development fees between the City and
suburban municipalities has encouraged a shift in development into the core. Federal immigration
policies, the restructuring of rental housing programs, planning practices such as density bonusing,
and economic development agendas supporting gentrification and redevelopment have all favored
condominium construction. The steep decline of social rental housing construction in particular,
combined with federal programs that facilitate easy access to mortgage credit, have led to a shift in
the delivery of rental housing away from publicly provided purpose-built units to condo units that are
then rented out. Condo-ism thus involves the delivery of rental housing but in a different legal tenure
form. Similarly, the local planning system fosters condo-linked development as a major mechanism
for providing public infrastructure and amenities, giving rise to a two-track redistribution system: a
regular publicly funded track in decline, and a neoliberal oriented path that thrives in a context of
306 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 37/No. 3/2015

limited public resources. With the “let’s make a deal” track in ascendance, local politicians encourage
condo development and have incentives to provide developers with density bonusing in return for
urban infrastructure and amenities that otherwise would have been funded by the City. This is an
important but underacknowledged aspect of the neoliberalization of public policy in Toronto.
Of course, changes in consumer preferences, growing demand for homeownership, increasing
appreciation for living near cultural amenities, and aspiration to live downtown and near public
transit also feature in the social construction and articulation of condo-ism in Toronto. Clearly,
a number of different interests have intersected in the production of a specific local regime of
accumulation coherently structured around a condominium-based consumerist urban vision. One
result is the increasing proliferation of private forms of localized urban governance, as what once
would have been rental apartments become owned and governed through the “club realm” of condo
boards. Condo-ism thus also represents the further incremental privatization of urban life.
For the last 40 years Toronto’s condo market has been steadily growing; growth, however, has
not been linear. While experiencing several cycles of economic development, key centers within the
inner City of Toronto and the former suburb of North York have been the major beneficiaries of
development. Together, they account for approximately 56% of condo development in the last four
decades. Condo-ism is transforming the city’s physical and social landscape, redirecting investment
patterns in the form of capital and people to the most accessible urban nodes, and in the process
restructuring the relationship between city and suburb, as well as their colloquial meanings. Condo-
ism contributes to the diversification of the housing stock, promotes intensification of land use, and
advances new built gentrification expressed in the built form of condos and the resettlement of the
inner city. However, these processes and the degree of their influence are experienced unevenly in
urban space.
From a development perspective the downtown and waterfront districts have been the major
winners in this process. Spatially, condo-ism has enhanced the downtown’s supremacy, radically
transforming it from a traditional CBD dominated by office buildings and active only during daytime
to a diverse mixed residential space. However, the rising condominiums in the downtown also
challenge existing diversity and promote further gentrification, while siphoning development and
capital away from the older suburbs where most blue-collar workers now live. Increasing divisions
between high-end condominium clusters in the downtown and lower price condos in the suburbs
solidify this spatial shift. Condo-ism has thus become one of the factors driving and expressing the
spatial marginalization of the working class and the social polarization of the city. Toronto thus
stands at a crossroads, with condo-ism articulating the tensions befitting the deindustrializing and
financializing city of third wave urbanization.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: The authors are grateful for funding support for the research from the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) and the Halbert Centre for Canadian Studies. Thanks to Richard
Maaranen, Magi Levi, and Elka Gotfryd for their research assistance, and to the journal’s reviewers and editor for
helpful suggestions.

ENDNOTE
1 While there is scant availability of public information, some of the developers operate as part of transnational
corporations that do release some public information. For instance, Monarch, the fourth largest condo developer
operating in Toronto, is part of the Taylor Morrison group which is traded on the London Stock Exchange.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS


Gillad Rosen is a Lecturer in Geography at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His research focuses
on housing policy, gated communities, social justice, and urban redevelopment.

Alan Walks is an Associate Professor of Urban Geography and Planning at the University of Toronto.
His is the author of articles on urban social polarization and inequality, gentrification, suburbanization,
place effects on voting and ideology, gated communities, housing policy, and household debt and
mortgage markets. He is the co-editor/co-author of The Political Ecology of the Metropolis (2013).

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