AKBAR’S RELATIONS WITH THE LANDED ELITE

Q: Examine Akbar’s relations with the landed elite and its significance
for the Mughal Empire.

The evolution of Akbar’s policy towards the local landed elite can be seen
within more than one historical context. It can be seen in terms of the need for
expandind Mughal territorial control and state power; the evolution of
Akbar’s religious policy and the mansabdari system and the mutual need for
some kind of a political accommodation on the part of both the landed elite
and the Mughals. Akbar’s policy towards these landed elites is often mistaken
for his policy towards the Rajputs. However, it is important to note that Akbar
did not have any general policy towards the Rajputs but dealt with the various
Rajput states individually. In fact, it should be kept in mind that these Rajputs
also formed a part of the landed elite and hence, Akbar’s policy towards the
Rajputs should be seen within this broader context.

The Study of the Mughal relations with the landed elite is particularly
important because it illustrates, among other things, the incorporation of
distinct- though not homogenous- cultural group within the larger matrix of
Mughal state power, and this involved many different levels of control and
accommodation.

Nurul Hasan has spoken about the various kinds of landed interests during
the time of the Mughal period, which can be broadly divided into three
categories: (1) the autonomous chieftains; (2) the intermediary zamindars
and (3) primary zamindars .These categories were by no means mutually
exclusive as the same locality could see the existence of two or all of the above
mentioned category of landed elites. The last two categories of zamindars had
become an integral part of the Mughal land revenue system and were thus
under the control and purview of the Imperial Administration and were
treated as mere subjects of the Emperor. While, their relation with the Mughal
Empire was not always smooth it was easier oppressing and controlling these
elements as compared to the autonomous chiefs, who had been and were
rulers in their own right. This category was a diverse one, which included
powerful rulers like that of Kangra, Mewar, Kumaon, Amber, Cooch, Bihar,
Bhatta and some of the lesser chiefs like that of Kashmir, Afghan chiefs of Jalor
in suba Ajmer etc. For the purpose of this discussion, it is the first category of
zamindars that we would be concentrating on and analyze their relations with
the Mughal Empire.

The autonomous chieftains were the hereditary rulers of their territories, who
had been ousted from power but still virtually retained their sovereign
powers and autonomous control over these territories. The need to control
the indigenous ruling classes had existed even during the time of the Delhi
Sultanate. The Sultans demanded from them formal submission, a promise to
provide military help when they demanded and payment of peshkash. It was
believed that the establishment of a stable, strong and efficient administrative
system could not be achieved without winning over these indigenous rulers.
Such an attitude seems to have stemmed down to the Mughals as well.
According to Shaikh Fakhruddin Bhakkari, Humayun, while at the court of the
Shah of Iran was advised to “rear the Rajputs since without gaining control
over the zamindars it was not possible to rule in Hind”. The author goes on to
say that this advice was passed on to Akbar as well.

By the time Akbar had come to power such autonomous chieftains had been
able to take advantage of the growing weakness of the Delhi Sultanate and
asserted their independence. Many of who had accepted the overlordship of
Surs had also declared their freedom. Such autonomous chieftains had held
sway over the major portions of the Mughal Empire.

A number of reasons have been forwarded to explain the need for this policy
to be adopted by Akbar towards the landed elite. As can be seen from the
influence that these chieftains were exerting at the time of Akbar’s accession
to the throne, it was imperative for him to control them in order to ensure his
own stability and increase his own strength. For instance, the Rajputs had
become extremely powerful and the presence of a strong enemy in the
neighbourhood- especially Mewar- would have caused serious problems for
the Empire. Thus, it was not only necessary to win these elements over in
order to protect the Empire from their potential attack but also to enlist their
support, who could provide obedience service. Moreover, it was believed that
these indigenous rulers could act as a link between them and the indigenous
population, majority of which was Hindu and thus, looked upon the Mughals
as foreigners. Thus, according to Satish Chandra it was the need to conciliate
the indigenous ruling classes and and the reputation of certain classes like the
Rajputs for their loyalty and service that made it important for Akbar to enter
into an alliance with them.

There were a number of internal factors as well which pushed the emperor
into adopting this policy. Akbar soon after ascending the throne faced about 5
rebellions from different factions. Faced with such opposition Akbar realized
the need to create an effective bulwark and a class of efficient bureaucracy to
balance out and negate such rebellious elements.

Finally, it was economic factors that motivated Akbar’s policy as well. As these
local chieftains were well versed with the existing conditions in their locality,
with the culture and language of the people and would be more acceptable in
their eyes, they could serve to be important arms of the Mughal Revenue
Administration and ensure the efficient and full collection of revenue. In some
cases like the Rajputana states it was their strategic location that encouraged
Akbar as well. The region formed a crucial link between the Gangetic Valley
and the rich and flourishing sea ports on the west coast of India on one hand,
and with the prosperous tract of Malwa in Central India on the other, which
was important for trade and also access to both Gujarat and the Deccan
region. If not controlled from the center it could have made the Mughal state
vulnerable to attacks both from the North-West Frontier and from Malwa. The
fact that the Rajputana contanined a number of formidable forts, legendary for
their capacity to withstand sieges, such as Chittor and Ranthambore further
enhanced their strategic importance.

It is for all these reasons that Akbar continued the policy of the Sultans of
demanding from the chieftains a recognition of their overlordship, the
payment of tribute, and the rendering of military assistance. But at the same
time he also introduced a number of new elements into his treatment towards
the chieftains. This was done through both conciliation as well as through the
use of coercion depending upon the nature of resistance put up by the
indigenous rulers. Although, he knew that the peaceful submission of the
states was important for the stability of the empire, he was ready to resort to
military means as well in order to secure his own interests. This was also,
after all, a period of rapid expansion of Mughal State authority, a process that
exacted significant human costs, and exacted them brutally. Among the more
violent and conflictual narratives of Mughal-Rajput relations is Akbar’s
campaign against Udai Singh of Mewar, the siege of Chittor in 1567 and
Ranthambhor in 1569, and the prolonged campaign against Rana Pratap.
However, it should be kept in mind that all these instances took place in the
early years of Akbar’s reign, when he had just about embarked upon a policy
of military expansion. In most cases, Akbar resorted to various peaceful and
diplomatic means to win over the landed elite.

Akbar had realized the importance of integrating these chieftains into the
Mughal governing class, which was achieved through the Mansabdari system.
The autonomous chiefs after submitting to the Mughals were granted a
mansab. In return for this rank, which also fixed their personal income they
were expected to provide services to the Mughal Empire. The most important
of these was the military obligation as they had to render military service to
the Mughal Empire as and when it was required by him. For this purpose the
mansabdars were also expected to maintain and raise a cavalry, with good
quality horses. Apart from military service they were also associated with
administration in various capacities. For instance, it was the Kachhawas and
the Rathors that were often entrusted the important administrative
assignments. Raja Bharmal Kachhawa was given control over Agra, when the
Emperor had left for Gujarat. Moreover, in the 31st year (1586-87), with the
introduction of the post of amirs in each suba, six people belonging to the
ruling houses of the chief were appointed as amirs in four subas
simultaneously and by the 40th year, even diwans began to be appointed from
the ruling families of the chiefs.

AR Khan has argued that there were about 61 people belonging to different
ruling houses that held mansabs of 200 and above under Akbar. It is
significant that out of these 61 mansabs, 40 came from the Suba of Ajmer
alone and even from there it was the Kachhawas, who dominated such
appointments. Similarly, outside of the Ajmer suba, such appointments were
dominated by the Gakkhars. Khan believes that such preferential treatment
towards these groups was borne out of the fact that they had submitted
willingly to the Mughals without putting up much of a resistance. Moreover,
these groups were known for their bravery and warrior skills, something that
was required in the early years of Akbar’s reign. Fazl had categorically stated
that “bravery and perseverance was inherent among the Gakkhars”.

However, it is important to note that despite such obligations, the mansabdari

system was mutually beneficial. Firstly, such appointments came with
enormous economic benefits. They were granted important jagirs in lieu for
their income. The revenue from this jagir far exceeded the revenue from the
chieftain’s hereditary dominion. Hasan has argued that such lucrative
appointments were considered to be a way of checking the hostility of the
chieftains to the Mughal Empire. The imperial service also provided the
retainers and clansmen of the chieftains lucrative employment as well as a
share in the plunder while conducting campaigns on behalf of the empire.
Service in the Mughal state had also become an important means through
which the social status of many of the chieftains could increase. The rise in the
prominence of the Kachhawas during the reign of Akbar is one such instance.

S. Inayat A. Zaidi has also spoken about the importance of the mansabdari
system and spoke about how Akbar was able to integrate the chieftains into
the Mughal empire through the jagirdari system. She has focused mainly on
the Rajput clans and emphasized on their conversion into jagirdars during this
period. The patrimonial property of the Rajputs was recognized as their
watan-jagir or non-transferable hereditary property. Thus, the rights and
privileges of Rajput chiefs were substantially continued, with the difference
that privileges that were earlier independent now became imperial
endowments and they would return an income only in return for some service
provided to the empire and not by the virtue of being hereditary rights.
Moreover, Akbar also started the practice of granting jagirs to Rajputs in areas
other than their watan. He probably realized that the creation of jagirs far
away from their patrimonies would compel a merger of the chiefs’ own
interests with those of the Empire. Thus, by his policy of ‘give and take’ Akbar
was able to link the interests of the chiefs with the central power and created
a strong bond at a higher level; both worked hand in hand to exploit the
subjects through imperial assignments of jagirs to the chiefs and the latter’s
assistance, in return, led to the expansion of imperial territories.

Another category of chieftains were the peshkashi or tributary chieftains.

They were not granted mansabs but were expected to render military service
to the Mughals but usually in their respective regions or in the bordering
subas. The tributary chiefs included the chiefs of Rajauri, Kangra, Jammu,
Guler, Kharagpur, Nawanagar, Guler etc Refusal to render military service
amounted to defiance of the Mughal authority and was treated by the latter as
rebellion. Hence, severe action was taken against these chiefs in such
situations. For instance, in the 37th regnal year when the Raja of Jammu
refrained from joining military operations in Kashmir an expedition was sent
to Jammu to punish the Raja and he was forced to surrender.

Besides military service, which was required only when the need arose these
chiefs were also required to send peshkash (tribute) to the Emperor as a
symbol of their subservience to him and this included a wage range of things
like precious diamonds, jewels, hunting animals, horses, war elephants. In the
absence of military service, peshkash had become the only symbol for judging
loyalty.

An important way through which Akbar ensured his control over these chiefs
was by not letting them have a say in the amount of tribute that was to be paid
to the Emperor. The amount was fixed by emperor and had to be paid in full
by these chiefs. However, AR Khan has argued that once should not over
emphasise the role of this peshkash in keeping the chiefs under control as
there were a large number of chiefs, who seldom paid this tribute. Thus, there
were a substantial number of chieftains, who were only semi-subdued and
paid nothing more than nominal allegiance to the Emperor.

Another way through which the superiority of the Mughal Emperor was
established was through the system of paying personal homage to the
Emperor or a Mughal prince. Such homage was usually required at the time of
the chief’s submission. But even otherwise, whenever the emperor, a prince,
or a Mughal commander passed through the environs of the territory of a
chief, personal homage by the chief to the Mughals was greatly insisted upon
by Akbar. However, this was something that was considered derogatory by
certain chiefs and hence, became a major source of conflict between them and
the Mughals. The most prominent example in this case is that of Rana Pratap
of Mewar, the only Rajput state to have not submitted to the Mughal
suzerainty. According to some scholars, the Rana would have probably
accepted the Mughal overlordship had it not been for Akbar’s insistence on
personal homage from the Rana himself, something that the latter was
vehemently opposed to. Similarly, the insistence on homage seems to have
severed the Mughal relations with a number of other chiefs like that of Bhatta
and Adam Khan Gakkhar. In fact, scholars have argued that it was Jahangir,
who was able to establish cordial relations with Mewar by dropping the
requirement of personal homage.

Akbar usually left the watan or ‘home principality’ in the possession of the
chief, offered him protection against external aggression and gave him
autonomy in internal administration. They were also assigned the hereditary
title of Rao or Raja to every succeeding chief, which was considered his
hereditary right but needed the emperor’s confirmation. However, it was
important for the Emperor to assert his supremacy over these chieftains and
this was done by asserting the the principle of paramountcy. This essentially
meant that a chieftain depended for his position on the goodwill of the
Emperor rather than on his inherent rights. This included interference in
matters succession to a chieftaincy, resuming the territories of some of the
chiefs for a period of time and in some cases completely overthrowing the
ruling chiefs. For instance, When Rao Maldeo died, Akbar did not accept his
nominee, Chandrasen, his younger son as the ruler of Marwar but instead gave
it to his younger brother, Rao Ram. After his death it was given to his younger
brother, Mota Raja Udai Singh. Another example of imperial interference in
case of disputed successions came up in Amarkot when the claim of Kishan
Das, the son of the former chief was rejected in favour of the latter’s younger
brother, Man Singh.
There were several other such instances when the Emperor intervened
directly in the affairs of the chieftains. For instance, taking advantage of the
war of succession in Jodhpur, he kept that province under direct imperial
control for nearly twenty years (1563-83). Similarly, in 1592-3, Akbar
attempted to keep Bhatta under direct imperial control and subsequently it
was assigned to Prince Daniyal. Following the flight of the chief of Kashmir his
suba was handed over to an imperial noble by the emperor, while, in Suba
Lahore Akbar deposed and executed the incumbent chief and raised his
brother to the gaddi. A device adopted by Akbar to curb the power of the
Rajput chiefs was to annex parts of the erstwhile principalities of the chiefs to
the khalisa or to assign them to other nobles as jagirs. In 1572, Sanganir, a
mahal of Pargana Amber was given in Jagir to Ram Das Udawat by the
emperor and in the 1570s, some part of Nagarkot was seized and included in
the khalisa. Khan has argued that as a result of all these measures, Akbar had
succeeded in asserting that sovereign power lay with him and also managed
to reduce the powerful chiefs to the position of Mughal jagirdars. Moreover,
Nurul Hasan has argued that the insistence by the Mughal Emperor to
determine the ruler of a principality not only strengthened central control
over the principalities but also strengthened the sense of attachment of the
chief to the Emperor.

One final device that was used to integrate these chieftains was that of
matrimonial alliances. However, this was not a unique device but had been in
existence since the time of the Delhi Sultans. During the period of the Delhi
Sultanate a number of such marriages took places but they were on account of
special circumstances such as an invasion or procuring help against an enemy.
Moreover, such marriages had not lead to any stable relationship between the
two sides. Akbar sought to use these matrimonial alliances to cultivate close
personal relations with the chiefs, which would ensure the stability of the
Mughal Empire in the long run. It gave him an opportunity to understand the
local chieftains better and to form a coherent strategy towards them.
According to Abu’l Fazl “His majesty forms matrimonial alliances with the
princes of Hindustan and other countries and through such alliances, he seeks
the peace of the world. However, Akbar never forced such matrimonial
alliances over anyone and entered into such alliances only with those families,
who were willing to do so. Akbar also didn’t look upon these alliances as a
mark of submission and loyalty. Thus, no matrimonial relations were
established with the Hadas of Ranthambore neither with the rulers of Sirohi
and Banswara once they had submitted to Mughal supremacy.

Moreover, it was the indigenous states themselves, who wished to draw

benefits from such alliances. As Abu’l Fazl says, the rajas entering into such
alliances were considered “distinguished among other zamindars”. The rise of
the Kachhwahas (Amer) was on account of such an alliance, when Raja
Bharmal’s daughter Bai Haraka was married to Akbar. They not only received
jagirs, mansabs and positions in the Mughal court but were able to develop
close relations with the Mughal state.

However, it would be wrong to think that all the chiefs had easily accepted the
Mughal suzerainty. Khan has argued that a large number of rebellions by the
non-mansabdar elites to overthrow the Mughal authority. The chiefs of
Punjab, Sirohi, Banswara, Kutch, Junagarh and Nawanagar among others had
been mostly lukewarm in their loyalty to the emperor. In some cases like that
of Punjab, the geographical distance between the seat of the Mughal throne
and the center of the chiefs power encouraged the latter to frequently defy the
imperial authority. It is important to note that in most cases it was the
successors of the rulers, who had already submitted to Akbar, who rose up in
rebellion. Thus, as AR Khan has pointed out, the submission by a chief of a
particular territory to the Mughals did not necessary guarantee the loyalty
and fidelity of his successors. The terms accepted by the chiefs may not have
been accepted by his successors and in many cases the Emperor had to win
over the loyalty of these rulers afresh. However, it should be noted that during
Akbar’s time most of the landed elite in North India had submitted to his
suzerainty and it was during the later Mughals that such uprisings had
become more frequent and were an important factor in the decline of the
Empire.

Akbar was, however, able to gain a lot through these alliances. As a result of
these measures, Akbar and subsequently his successors had been able to bring
the various chieftains within the pale of the Empire and claim to be the
paramount power in North India. The alliance with the landed elite had
enabled Akbar to consolidate his own position and that of the Mughal Empire.
By suppressing the landed elite or by winning them over he was able to put a
check on potential threat to the empire. Moreover, the alliance had
guaranteed to the Mughals, the services of brave warriors and their steadfast
loyalty. Thus, most of these local chieftains played a significant role in the
military campaigns undertaken by the Mughals. For instance, Rajputs were
employed in operations against other Rajput states like Mertha, Jodhour etc
and during other campaigns as well such as during campaigns in the frontier
regions. Moreover, the chiefs of Bihar served in operations in Bihar, Bengal
and Orissa, the chiefs of Punjab served either in Punjab or Kashmir and so on.
In this way, Akbar was not only able to prevent his empire from coming under
attack but was also able to ensure its territorial expansion with the assistance
of such forces.

Moreover, through the Mansabdari system and the jagirdari system Akbar had
been able to make these chieftains an integral part of the administrative
system something that had not been done by the Delhi Sultans. However,
Akbar by giving them a stake in the administrative system was able to
broaden the regional interests of these chieftains into broader interests that
concerned the Empire as a whole. Moreover, the enhanced financial
opportunities and prospects of increased social status that were attached with
this employment ensured that the chieftains could become a part of the
Mughal Empire not as inferiors or in a humiliating manner but as an integral
part of the system.

Nurul Hasan has also argued that by bringing the various chieftains under his
control Akbar was able to ensure the political and administrative unification
of the country. It was this centralized Empire, which by establishing
comparatively greater peace and security, by enabling trade and commerce to
expand, and by increasing and diversifying the purchasing power of the
consuming classes that led to the development of industries was able to create
conditions that were conducive for the growth of a money economy to take
place. Moreover, the Mughal Empire was able to ensure that greater area was
brought under agriculture (as this area was also under their jurisdiction),
which in turn led to a rapid expansion of cultivation especially of cash crops.

It has also been argued that the integration of the Hindu chiefs into the
Mughal administrative system had led to the evolution of a composite ruling
class. This in turn had a profound impact on Akbar’s beliefs and consequently
on his religious policy. Nurul Hasan has argued that the close links of this
chieftains with the imperial court contributed significantly to the process of
cultural synthesis between the distinctive traditions of the various
communities and different regions, and between the urban and rural cultures.

Thus, to conclude one can see that the development of cordial and friendly
relations with the Rajputs was part of a conscious and deliberate policy of
Akbar. Although, his policy towards the all the chieftains was not uniform and
differed from case to case, on the whole, it would be suffice to say that, with a
few exception Akbar was able to develop working relations with all of them.
While, the methods adopted by Akbar to reconcile the landed elite may not
have been revolutionary in nature it still marked an important landmark
change from the policies adopted by the earlier rulers vis-a-vis the indigenous
rulers. Instead of just giving them autonomy over their estates in return for
some tribute, Akbar brought these rulers to the center stage by giving them a
stake in the administration of the empire thereby linking their regional
interests with that of the empire. The benefits derived of such a policy lead
some scholars to suggest that it was one of Akbar’s greatest achievements.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 Chieftains during the reign of Akbar- AR Khan

 Akbar and His India---Irfan Habib (ed)
 Akbar and the Rajput Principalities: Integration into Empire---S. Inayat
A. Zaidi
 The Mughal State---Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (ed.)
 Zamindars under the Mughals----Nurul Hasan
 The Agrarian System of Mughal India- Irfan Habib
 Class notes