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Journal of Contemporary Criminal

Justice
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Transnational Crimes Against Culture: Looting at Archaeological Sites and


the ''Grey'' Market in Antiquities
Blythe A. Bowman
Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 2008 24: 225 originally published online 7
May 2008
DOI: 10.1177/1043986208318210

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Journal of Contemporary
Criminal Justice
Volume 24 Number 3
August 2008 225-242

Transnational Crimes Against © 2008 Sage Publications


10.1177/1043986208318210

Culture
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hosted at
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Looting at Archaeological Sites and the
“Grey” Market in Antiquities
Blythe A. Bowman
University of Nebraska, Omaha

Diversified transnational criminal activities coupled with broader geographic capabili-


ties have turned the black and white line between the licit “upperworld” and the illicit
underworld a murky shade of grey, and the illicit antiquities trade is no exception. This
article highlights criminal dynamics of trafficking in looted antiquities from the perspec-
tive of the source end of the problem—that is, theft of antiquities from archaeological
sites and their illicit export. Trafficking in antiquities is a crime of transnational propor-
tions because it involves the illegal removal and export of cultural material from source
countries, which supplies the demand generated from developed, rich, market economies.

Keywords: transnational crime; art; antiquities; looting; archaeological theft

Introduction: The Changing Face of Transnational Crime


The complex web of sociocultural, economic, political, and technological changes
characterizing the 21st century has yielded disparate effects on countries around the
world (Williamson, 1996; Woods, 2000), and transnational crime is but one negative
outcome of the ever-increasing interconnectedness and global character of life. Crime
now traverses both time and space at such an alarming pace that although transna-
tional crime itself may be nothing new, there is still something unprecedented and
particularly minacious about the contemporary threat of transnational crime (Berdal &
Serrano, 2002).
Although transnational crime itself is thus old news,1 the contemporary threat of
transnational crime differs in two important respects. First, processes of globaliza-
tion and changes in international political relations have meant a marked increase in
integrated markets and the transnational movement of people, capital, goods, and
services. Like legitimate businesses, criminal enterprises have had to adjust to the
complexities of this nascent globalized economy and as such have expanded their
geographic sphere of influence beyond national borders (Joyce, 1999; Naylor, 2002;
Passas, 2002). In many respects, then, distance has become a nonissue for crime prob-
lems (Robinson, 2000), and the menace of transnational crime—crime that somehow
exerts an influence on more than one country either directly or indirectly2—has wormed

225

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226 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice

its way into each and every corner of the globe. Transnational crime is a moving
target—where it is today is not where it may be tomorrow. It does not hold still for
its scholarly portrait to be painted.
Second, in addition to exerting a broader geographic influence, the scope of
transnational criminal activities has also steadily diversified (Robinson, 2000). If
transnational crime is a moving target, then it is also a hydra;3 intensified interna-
tional enforcement efforts mean that new forms of transnational criminal activity are
springing up on a regular basis (Passas, 1998). Although traditional transnational
criminal activities remain the same (i.e., drug and human trafficking, corruption,
money laundering, extortion, etc.), criminals have learned to increase their profits
exponentially by broadening their spheres of illicit activity to include cybercrime,
trade in human body parts, trafficking in flora and fauna, and theft of art, to name
just a few (Mueller, 2001; Williams, 1999). Diversified activities coupled with broader
geographic capabilities have further turned the black and white line between the licit
“upperworld” and the illicit “underworld” (van Duyne, von Lampe, & Passas, 2002)
a decidedly murky shade of grey4 (Ruggiero, 1998, 2000).
This article considers but one dynamic of contemporary transnational crime: the
international trade in illicitly obtained antiquities.5 It provides an overview of criminal
dynamics of trafficking in looted antiquities from the perspective of the source end
of the problem—that is, the theft of antiquities from archaeological sites and their
illicit export. In light of this, it offers recommendations for further criminological
analysis. Trafficking in antiquities6 is a crime of transnational proportions in that it
involves the illegal removal and export of cultural material from source countries,
which supplies the demand generated from developed, rich, market economies
(Alder & Polk, 2005).

Looted Antiquities: Not a Black-and-White Problem

The illicit antiquities trade represents a peculiar example of a transnational grey


market. In many ways, in terms of its functioning, differentiation, dramatis personae,
exploitative effects, smuggling networks, and corruptive influence, antiquities smug-
gling is similar to other forms of illicit trafficking (Alder & Polk, 2005). It differs
significantly, however, in a number of important respects: First, on the demand end
of the market, trading in antiquities is altogether legal; second, objects are sold at
remarkably high prices; and last, buyers for such items are usually of prominent
socioeconomic status (Alder & Polk, 2002). Most importantly, unlike other forms of
trafficking, the illicit means by which the licit antiquities trade is supplied must be
disguised to be profitable (Tijhuis, 2006). It is this unique transformation in legal status
through which antiquities must undergo that most notably distinguishes it from other
forms of illicit trafficking and that turns the issue from black and white to an ambigu-
ous shade of grey.

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Bowman / Antiquities Grey Market 227

Figure 1
The Antiquities Market as Conceptualized in Overlapping Shades of Grey

Note: Licit and illicit are purely legal characterizations that are both variable and relative in time and space.

Because there is nothing illegal per se about owning antiquities, the legality of
antiquities thus revolves primarily around the manner in which they have been
acquired or moved. Illicit antiquities are illicit in that they have been illegally removed
from somewhere; that is, they have been looted from some place (Mackenzie, 2005),
smuggled, and laundered (Tijhuis, 2006).7 Following Mackenzie (2005), antiquities
that find their way to the open market generally fall into one of three categories.
These can be placed along a spectrum of legality involved in the trade and its licit-
illicit nexus of activity (see Figure 1).
The first category contains antiquities acquired through authorized excavations
conducted mainly by archaeologists who, having documented the objects and their
findspots, turn over possession of the objects to the rightful owner—the state or the
owner on whose land the object was found. I place these objects closer to the legal,
white end of the market spectrum. “White” antiquities constitute a minute component
of objects on the market because in an effort to preserve their own cultural heritage
and archaeological resources, most countries do not allow much material to circulate
(Mackenzie, 2005).
The second category in which objects in the contemporary market can be grouped
represents a “grey area” (Mackenzie, 2005). This group involves antiquities for which
provenience8 or findspot documentation has long been lost (Brodie, 2002). These
antiquities were acquired and exported before the country of origin had patrimony laws
in place to prohibit their removal, and these objects have been in circulation so long

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228 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice

that they now are considered licit simply through the passage of time (Mackenzie,
2005). Many of these objects were in fact removed during periods of colonial rule or
the “grand tours” that characterized much of the late 19th century.9 Dealers, collectors,
and other key players with vested interests in a legal antiquities market are quick to
highlight the licit status of such antiquities that arrived on the market long ago. In spite
of this, these objects remain a grey area in the antiquities market’s licit-illicit spectrum,
and such ambiguities surrounding their provenience complicate their distinction from
the last category of objects on the contemporary market.
The third group on the market comprises antiquities that recently have been
looted—that is, they have been acquired through recent unauthorized excavation or
illegally removed from some place. These antiquities, which I place on the black end
of the market spectrum, often make their way to the open market under the guise of
“accidental finds” or masquerading as unprovenanced “grey” antiquities whose licit
status is debatable (Mackenzie, 2005, p. 4). “Black” antiquities in this category can
be disguised because they have no documented provenience, and as Brodie (2002)
poignantly observed, herein lies the problem:

In the absence of provenance, how can licit material be distinguished from illicit? “From
an old European Collection” is a common enough auction appellation, but one that
might hide an old family heirloom or a recently looted (or fake) piece. Who is to know?
The only cautious response is to regard all unprovenanced material as looted. (p. 3)

The vast majority of antiquities on the market are sold with no accompanying prove-
nience documentation (Chippindale & Gill, 2000), which is a strong indication that
they have been looted from archaeological sites (Brodie, 2006). To a lesser extent,
antiquities are looted from churches, museums, private collections, and other sites of
cultural significance (Mackenzie, 2005). Until it can be shown otherwise, any
unprovenanced antiquity that surfaces on the market should be suspected of having
been recently looted (Brodie, 2002; Lunden, 2004; Muscarella, 2000). Moreover, the
spectrum of legality as presented in Figure 1 highlights the variability of licit and
illicit as purely legal characterizations that are both variable and relative in time and
space (Carducci, 2006).

Looting at Archaeological Sites: Scope of the Problem


Looting represents a serious threat to the preservation of cultural heritage, the
most egregious of which involves illegal digging at archaeological sites. Yet the
scope and frequency of archaeological plunder is difficult to assess. For one thing,
looting is necessarily a clandestine activity, archaeologists’ encounters with looters
are irregular, and looters themselves are not exactly lining up to be interviewed about
their pillages throughout the countryside. For another, looting involves two types of

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Bowman / Antiquities Grey Market 229

archaeological sites—sites that are known to archaeologists and sites that have not yet
been discovered. Archaeologists do not have a master catalogue of every archaeo-
logical site that might possibly yield significant information (Pendergast & Graham,
1989). Given the sheer volume of archaeological resources, it is as such impossible
to assess just how damaging the effects of looting have been.
Despite these difficulties, there is a substantial body of research that paints a dismal
picture of the scale of on-the-ground damage through archaeological field surveys,
photographic testimony, archival and literature resources such as museum catalogues
and gallery publications, investigations of market trends and modern collecting and
dealing patterns, and informant interviews (cf., for example, Atwood, 2004; Brodie,
Doole, & Renfrew, 2001; Brodie, Doole, & Watson, 2000; Brodie, Kersel, Luke, &
Tubb, 2006; Brodie & Tubb, 2002; Chippindale & Gill, 2000; Chippindale, Gill,
Salter, & Hamilton, 2001; Coggins, 1969; Elia, 2001; Gilgan, 2001; Gill & Chippindale,
1993; Nørskov, 2002; Paredes Maury, 1999; Schick, 1998; Toner, 2002; Watson,
1997, 2006).
In general, the global picture is grim. Roosevelt and Luke (2006), for example,
found that of the nearly 400 burial tombs they inspected in western Turkey, 90%
exhibited indications of looting10 (p. 179). Similarly, of the 106 Belizean archaeo-
logical sites for which he was able to obtain data, Gutchen (1983) concluded that
nearly 60% of them had been looted, and nearly half of those looted sites had been
irretrievably damaged (pp. 223, 225). In Beijing between 1989 and 1990, Chinese
officials estimated that nearly 40,000 tombs had been stripped of their antiquities
(Anderson, 2002; Murphy, 1995; Platthy, 1993), and in 2003, it was reported that an
additional 220,000 tombs had been pillaged in the preceding 5 years (Beech, 2003).
At a 1999 Cambridge symposium on illicit antiquities, an official from Turkey reported
that in 1997 alone, more than 500 looters had been arrested with upwards of 10,000
illicit cultural objects in their possession (Brodie & Watson, 1999). An official with
Italy’s Carabinieri Cultural Heritage Protection Branch reported that since its estab-
lishment in 1969, the unit had recovered more than 326,000 objects looted from
archaeological sites and facilitated the prosecution of thousands of looters (Pastore,
2001, p. 159). In 2003, regarding the number of antiquities looted from archaeological
sites in Ecuador, officials reporting to INTERPOL could be no more specific than in
the “hundreds” (INTERPOL, 2005). These are but a few accounts of widespread
mutilation of archaeological resources, and the laundry list of countries with disem-
boweled archaeological resources is as long as it is depressing.
Despite this wealth of information, we will never know just how much has been
lost both materially and intellectually to pillage and plunder (Meyer, 1973; Roosevelt
& Luke, 2006). This is significant because it is within this uncertainty that some
actors involved in the trade—mainly collectors and dealers who champion a legal,
open antiquities market—insist that the role that looting plays in the antiquities trade
is greatly exaggerated11 (Brodie, 2002; Renfrew, 2002).

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230 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice

The Looting Problem: Cause for Criminological Alarm


The emergent global picture of damage caused by looting is bleak, and the same
technological advances that have characterized processes of globalization have also
influenced looting. Improvements in the means, ease, and speed of travel and commu-
nications have also opened up regions of the world that used to be unreachable (Brodie,
2002). Archaeological sites once buried deep in the jungles, deserts, oceans, and
mountains of the world are no longer so inaccessible. Advancements in technology
have also yielded machinery with unprecedented destructive capabilities (Atwood,
2004; Brodie, 2002). Many looters are now equipped with mechanical digging and
drilling equipment, bulldozers, metal detectors, and in some cases even aerial maps of
the archaeologically rich countryside (Conklin, 1994). The technology available to aid
in the looters’ quest for saleable treasure has thus made illegal digging all the more
injurious, and archaeological sites are gutted at an increasingly accelerated pace.
The looting situation has grown to crisis dimensions because archaeologists are
also sorely outpaced compared to looters in terms of crew size and amount of access
to archaeological resources. Whereas archaeologists typically excavate for a matter
of a few weeks out of the year, looters instead have year-round access to archaeo-
logically rich landscapes. In terms of crew size, archaeologists tend to work in smaller
teams of anywhere from 10 to 50, whereas in some countries, teams of looters have
been estimated in the hundreds (Pendergast & Graham, 1989).
More importantly, not only do looters have greater year-round access to archaeo-
logical resources, but unlike archaeologists, they are not interested in systematically
and carefully excavating an archaeological site in hopes of scientifically accumu-
lating information critical to understanding the diversity of the human experience
through time and space. Theirs is instead a focus on locating saleable objects with
economic potential, and as such, looters work brazenly and unhindered by ethical
preoccupations with site integrity, meticulous documentation, stringent analysis,
and dissemination of findings. For example, Watson (2006) recounted what Italian
police happened on in horror when raiding a Swiss warehouse full of looted classical
antiquities:

On closer examination, one of the boxes in the cupboards was found to contain gold
rings with the finger bones of the dead still attached to them. Clearly, when the tombs
had been looted, the hands and fingers of the long-dead had simply been broken off by
the tombaroli,12 to save time. (p. 184)

But most disturbing among reasons why archaeological resources are facing
unprecedented threat are the numerous reports surfacing in recent years that docu-
ment the connection between antiquities trafficking and other transnational crimes13
(McManamon & Morton, 2000). There is substantial evidence to suggest that orga-
nized criminal groups of all stripes are now not only smuggling illicit drugs and arms

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Bowman / Antiquities Grey Market 231

but also dealing in looted antiquities (Bernick, 1998; Hanley, 1999). Vast quantities
of looted antiquities are being uncovered during drug raids with increasing regularity;
in 1999, for example, Spanish police thwarted efforts of an international smuggling
ring to trade stolen art and antiquities for cocaine (Brodie et al., 2000, p. 16). Among
the objects seized were pre-Columbian antiquities (Reuters, 1999). In 1985, U.S.
Customs tracked a smuggler’s plane from Mexico to Colorado; its cargo included
not only thousands of dollars worth of marijuana but also priceless pre-Columbian
antiquities from western Mexico (McManamon & Morton, 2000). Many of the
world’s greatest archaeological sites are now the nuclei of flourishing drug industries
(McCalister, 2005).
Beyond accounts of overlap with drug trafficking, further reports have surfaced
attesting to organized criminal involvement in antiquities looting and smuggling. In
examining thefts from both a number of Iraqi archaeological sites and Baghdad’s
National Museum in early 2003, McCalister (2005) concluded that the looting
“exhibited levels of knowledge and sophistication indicative of an involvement with
organized crime” (p. 32). And as Watson (2006) suggested, “the reality of life in Sicily
is that the illicit excavation of potentially valuable antiquities cannot take place with-
out at least the tacit permission of organized crime” (p. 291). In interviewing Italian
tombaroli, Hamblin (1970) echoed this:

“Mafiosi did the digging themselves,” says a Sicilian informant, “and since they controlled
everything, including the police, they were able to dig even in the daytime. It was very
funny, really. The men would be digging, and the head Mafioso was a sort of superin-
tendent, watching them from a window, sometimes with field glasses.” (p. 87)

Illicit antiquities must move transnationally to meet international demand, and


their status must be transformed from illicit to licit to be sold (Alder & Polk, 2005).
This necessitates two elements: first, a network of smugglers who are skilled in moving
illicit goods transnationally, and second, some corruption on the part of customs
inspectors, border patrol agents, or law enforcement to facilitate cross-border move-
ment or acquisition of forged ownership and export documentation (Conklin, 1994;
McCalister, 2005; Alder & Polk, 2005). Italy’s Cultural Patrimony Protection squad,
for example, recently exposed an international antiquities smuggling network that,
stretching across Western Europe, involved government officials, teachers, gallery
owners, dealers, and even an Italian carabiniere14 (Drake, 2008). Numerous reports
from around the world have surfaced regarding antiquities secreted across borders in
diplomatic bags (Bailey, 2007; Brodie, Doole, & Watson, 2000).
Beyond moving antiquities transnationally, organized criminal networks can use
the legal end of the antiquities trade as a means of money laundering (Finckenauer
& Voronin, 2001; Watson, 1997). This is done to disguise financial gain from other
illegal activities, such as illicit drug trafficking (Tasker, 1999). As international banking
regulations become increasingly stringent, moving looted antiquities has become a

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232 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice

less suspicious alternative to smuggling large amounts of cash, diamonds, or gold


bars transnationally (Fidler, 2003). As James Emson, a former director of the Art
Loss Register, noted in an interview, organized crime groups use stolen artwork as
collateral in making deals with one another; Emson stated, “It’s a very valuable com-
modity that allows you to launder money very easily” (Lyall, 2000).
Smuggling of looted antiquities has also been connected to terrorism. Hijacker
Mohamed Atta, for example, attempted to peddle stolen antiquities to help finance
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (de la Torre, 2006). Having approached
a German art professor at the University of Göttingen, Atta reportedly offered to sell
him a collection of priceless Afghan antiquities for the purpose of financing the pur-
chase of an airplane (Artnet, 2005; Kaplan, 2005). Similarly, in Afghanistan, British
officials reported that antiquities were being looted and sold to fund resistance to the
Taliban regime (Fidler, 2003). Al Qaeda is also reported to have smuggled Afghan
antiquities to fund its jihadist activities (Kaplan, 2005).
Looting can also turn violent. In 1998, for example, two guards at archaeological
sites in Guatemala were killed while on duty, their bodies eviscerated and hung from
trees at the site (Honan, 1995). In the early 1990s, a guard was murdered while looking
after an antiquities storehouse in Angkor, Cambodia (Brodie et al., 2000). In 2002,
the investigation of an Oregon looter convicted of possessing stolen property and
destruction of archaeological resources revealed that he had also been planning the
murder of several people including the police sergeant who had investigated the looting
case and the judge who had presided over his trial (Powell, 2003). According to
Kaylan (1987), Turkish authorities have concluded that more deaths have occurred
as a result of competition within the illicit antiquities trade than in disputes that arose
during the heroin trade when it was at its height in the 1960s (Conklin, 1994, p. 161).
As one archaeologist has noted, looting is a deadly business: “These people aren’t
kidding around; they regularly engage in threats and physical violence. It’s a sordid
and distasteful trade” (Dorfman, 1998, paragraph 4).
The transnational links between archaeology and crime are thus multifaceted and
can be traced throughout the journey of an antiquity from the ground to the market:
acquisition via looting, movement, export, distribution, and sale (McCalister, 2005).
Clearly, the mechanisms of looting and smuggling coupled with colossal sums of
money to be made on the legal market have made antiquities trafficking a profitable
transnational crime for organized criminal syndicates. Perhaps even more tragically,
however, the dramatic market values of antiquities have meant economic prosperity
only for the criminal middlemen, not for the original finders who are often as much
victims of such exploitation as the denuded archaeological landscapes themselves.15
The uneven economic rewards for looting are noteworthy because many advocates
in favor of a free, open trade in antiquities insist that illicit digging provides eco-
nomic plentitude for developing source nations (Brodie, 2002).

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Bowman / Antiquities Grey Market 233

A Grey Antiquities Market: Obscuring the


Criminal Dynamics of Looting

Whether their spoils make an appearance on the market by means of a dealer’s shop,
a museum gallery, an auction catalogue, or an e-Bay listing, clandestine excavations
yield never-before-seen undocumented antiquities that cannot be identified and
therefore cannot be construed as stolen or illegally exported (Brodie, 2006). Even if
a country recognizes an antiquity and attempts to claim ownership of it, there is little
chance that the country will be able to prove that the object was exported after
national patrimony laws were enacted (Brodie, 2002). Nondisclosure or complete
lack of provenance information and ambiguity surrounding the entrance of an antiquity
onto the market are only two ways that the licit upperworld of the antiquities trade
obscures its criminal beginnings.
Other discordant elements in national laws and the international legal landscape also
facilitate the “greying” of the antiquities market, including legal conceptualizations of
“property,” “ownership,” protection for the good faith purchaser, statutes of limitations
for bringing actions, transferability of title to stolen property, and allocation of the
burden of proof (Hoffman, 2006). Following the Anglo-American nemo dat16 rule, for
example, a thief cannot convey good title nor can someone claim good title through a
thief, even if the property is transferred to a good-faith purchaser (Gerstenblith, 2004).
Unlike common law countries such as the United States, however, good title to a stolen
object can be conveyed in the bulk of European continental civil law countries if the
object was purchased in good faith. This means that even if an antiquity was looted and
illegally exported from its country of origin, if it was subsequently purchased in good
faith in a civil country, then the good-faith purchase is favored, and the object is no
longer legally construed as stolen (Brodie, 2002). For obvious reasons, then, civil
countries—most famously Switzerland—become transit ports in which antiquities
change hands and title is obtained. With a good title secured, an antiquity can now
obtain legal export documentation, be legally imported elsewhere, and thus begin to
circulate freely and legally on the antiquities market (Alder & Polk, 2002, 2005). Legal
loopholes facilitate the illicit-licit status transformation necessary for antiquities,
although such laundering changes them not from black to white but to a distinctive
shade of grey with questionable status. Many buyers are unaware of the criminal ele-
ments that brought the object onto the market, but many more are simply willing to turn
a blind eye to such matters (Brodie, 2002; Conklin, 1994; McCalister, 2005).

Criminological Contributions
A comprehensive examination of all international, national, and domestic
responses to the looting problem is beyond the scope of this article. Given that the

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234 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice

antiquities trade represents a complex example of a transnational grey market with


indistinguishable licit and illicit dynamics, it is no surprise that the spectrum of
solutions is similarly complex. There is no shortage of supply-side reduction
strategies, international cooperative efforts, domestic legal responses, and commit-
tees and bureaucracies in place to govern them. At its core, however, the debate
over how to respond to looting can be framed in discourse similar to the applica-
tion of criminology to policy: whether the problem is articulated as fundamentally
a social one or whether it is best construed as one of individual responsibility
(Schmalleger, 2006).
Effective solutions to the looting problem likely lie somewhere in the middle of
these competing perspectives, which fundamentally differ in where both causation and
subsequent blame are assigned. A social problems perspective on looting acknowl-
edges the importance of socioeconomic forces on behavior. Although people are
certainly free-willed, decision-making agents, it simply is not true that people make
their decisions in a vacuum devoid of socioeconomic and cultural context (Kappeler,
2004), and looters are no exception to this. Even as rational actors, looters do not
find themselves on equal footing with other actors in the illicit antiquities trade. The
disparate effects of a burgeoning global economy have not afforded equal economic
prosperity, and there are clear power differentials among Marxian core and periphery
nations whose economic statuses exert disparate effects on the roles they play in the
illicit antiquities trade and other criminal markets.
To be sure, we have only begun to explore illicit trafficking in antiquities as a
market with criminal undertones. More research is needed particularly through a
criminological lens that examines the role that looting plays in the supply-demand
tug-of-war in the illicit antiquities market. What criminological work has been done
often situates looted antiquities within the broader scope of art crime (cf. Conklin,
1994; Massy, 2001; Tijhuis, 2006) or focuses on the “transit” or “demand” end of
the looting problem (cf. Alder & Polk 2002, 2005; Mackenzie 2005; Tijhuis, 2006).
Archaeological estimates of the scope and frequency of the problem are often limited
either geographically (e.g., case studies of one country, one region of a country, or
one archaeological site in that country) or temporally (e.g., studies on one artistic
period of pottery or sculpture). Further criminological analysis can address some of
these intellectual lacunae in a number of ways.
First, future criminological attention should focus on the source end of the loot-
ing problem within a global perspective. For one thing, it is at the very moment of
illicit digging that the most devastating destruction to finite archaeological resources
occurs (Borodkin, 1995). For another, if it is in fact true that looting increasingly
overlaps with other forms of transnational criminal activity and that transnational
crime moves in tandem with globalizing forces, then a richer assessment of the true
scope and frequency of looting on a global scale is especially critical. At this time,
estimates of the global distribution and nature of looting have been based largely on

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Bowman / Antiquities Grey Market 235

speculative assertion and anecdotal evidence. There is thus a clear need to scientif-
ically accumulate information on the global reach of the looting situation both to
move looting discourse toward a “firmer basis of quantifiable propositions” (Brodie
& Doole, 2001, p. 1) and to lay the empirical groundwork for further criminologi-
cal analysis and policy recommendations. In inciting response to the problem, sen-
sational accounts and personal vignettes tinged with moral fervor cannot provide a
solid foundation on which to base policy and practice. Ultimately, when it is time
to make difficult, politically charged decisions about how best to handle the loot-
ing situation, it is the quantifiable data that make the difference (Brodie & Doole,
2001, p. 1). Without an improved understanding of the global nature of the prob-
lem, it will be difficult to determine whether efforts to curb the problem are in fact
effective.
A second area to which a criminological perspective can be applied has to do with
how looting networks form, collaborate, and bond. As with other areas of transna-
tional research, there is often a macro-level focus on structural-functional patterns in
criminal collaboration and how such collaboration enables criminal activities. Fewer
studies address such relevant micro-level issues as social bonding, social capital, and
trust, which facilitate such cooperation (von Lampe & Johansen, 2004). Future
research should seek to explore these micro-level social bonds that foster criminal
collaboration and transnational networking in the illicit antiquities trade.
In addition, more criminological study needs to be done examining the perspective
of looters as victims lost in a broader web of global commercial forces, transnational
criminal activities, and economic hardship. Wealthier industrialized nations exploit
poorer, dependent nations for illicit goods and services, and looting of and subsequent
trafficking in antiquities is no exception to this. Most looting17 occurs in economically
dependent, developing nations whose rich archaeological heritage is sold off to satiate
demand generated in wealthier market nations (Alder & Polk, 2005). Looting is
arguably but another sad example of “periphery” nations’ economic exploitation by
wealthier, industrialized “core” nations on whom such countries are already economi-
cally dependent (Neapolitan, 1997; Wallerstein, 1974). Organized criminal involve-
ment breeds in the gap between supply and demand in the illicit antiquities trade, but
looting does not generate long-term economic stability and reliable income for impov-
erished looters. At both the micro and the macro levels, antiquities trafficking can be
criminologically studied as a transnational side effect of the unequal distribution of
wealth, privilege, power, and knowledge fostered by global competition (Held &
McGrew, 2000, p. 38). With criminological attention having been drawn to the antiq-
uities trade as an illicit market, future studies should in general examine not only the
broader structural forces that shape opportunities and decisions to loot but also how
individuals interface with each other and how groups interface with the larger politi-
cal, economic, and cultural spheres.

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236 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice

Transnational Crimes Against Culture: Conclusions


What is certain is that the looting problem will not amiably sit on the sidelines
waiting for the experts to reach an agreement about how best to respond. The world’s
archaeological resources are disappearing at an alarming rate, and as criminologists,
it is imperative that we contribute what we have learned through criminological
analysis about the nature of transnational crime, illicit markets, trafficking, globalizing
forces, punishment, the role of the criminal sanction and its limits, and perhaps more
broadly, the human behavioral repertoire and ultimately how these things too can
inform the looting debate. There is no question that the illicit antiquities trade, fueled
by looting at archaeological sites, is a market that operates under the cloud of a crimi-
nal dynamic. There is no question that there is more than the welfare of the archae-
ological landscape at stake. In an age where terrorism and transnational trafficking
in people, drugs, and arms are at the forefront of criminological concerns, transna-
tional crimes against culture are easily forgotten.
Also easily forgotten are the people who, like many who become entangled in
transnational criminal activity, conduct illegal digging out of poverty, desperation,
and lack of economically viable alternatives of livelihood. Hollowell (2006) reminds
us that in any response to the looting question, there is a delicate balance to be struck
between the welfare of archaeological resources and the welfare of living human
beings. The preservation of both human history and human dignity are at stake. We
cannot afford to overlook either.

Notes
1. Clifford (1975) thoughtfully argued that there are very few truly new dimensions of criminality,
including the transnational aspect; rather, forms of criminality are simply updated according to sociocul-
tural milieu and available technology. Albanese (2005) made a similar point in his discussion of fraud as
characteristic of the 21st century, in the same way that larceny characterized much of the 20th century.
2. Although problems of definition continue to bedevil the study of transnational crime—and crime in
general—I have chosen to avoid what Naylor (1997, p. 2) aptly observed to be a “semantic swamp” and
follow Bossard (1990), Mueller (2001), Felsen and Kalaitzidis (2005), United Nations (2000a, 2000b),
and many others with this broad definition of transnational crime, while recognizing that a host of alter-
native terms are arguably applicable.
3. Readers will recall that the hydra, a magnificent beast from Greek mythology, was a many-headed
water serpent. When one of its heads was lopped off, two new heads grew in its place.
4. Many studies on the interfacing of the licit upperworld with the illicit underworld shed light on the
emergence of “dirty” or “grey” markets—markets, in other words, that in this sense are neither defini-
tively “black” nor “white” in terms of their legality (Edwards & Gill, 2002).
5. Although there is some cross-national variation in what constitutes an antiquity, most countries use
the term to refer to objects more than 100 years old and, in this case, generally refer to material from
archaeological sites.
6. Within the criminological literature, antiquities trafficking is frequently discussed as one dynamic
of transnational “art crime” or “art theft.” Indeed, much has been written about glamorous, high-profile

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Bowman / Antiquities Grey Market 237

art heists. Such crimes have in fact captured the public imagination and even carved out a unique niche
within the entertainment industry; there is no shortage of popular films and fiction devoted to art heists
and the debonair Thomas Crown sorts who mastermind them. Yet most crimes against culture are not sexy
“Thomas Crown affairs”; the crimes that are instead most devastating to cultural heritage are looting and
trafficking in illicitly obtained antiquities. This article focuses on the criminal dynamics of looting and its
role in the illicit antiquities trade.
7. A third qualification could be added here under the rubric of illicit to include antiquities that have
been forged or faked (Mackenzie, 2005).
8. Provenance refers to the previous ownership history of an object. The term is most frequently used
in the art community to refer to what has happened to an antiquity since it came out of the ground. Among
archaeologists, on the other hand, provenience refers not to past ownership history but to information
regarding the original findspot of the object (Coggins, 1998). Both provenance and provenience are
important in telling the unique story that accompanies each antiquity into the market and are key in deter-
mining its licit/illicit status. Without such information, antiquities yield very little scientific value (Bator,
1982). Looted objects are “cultural orphans, which, torn from their contexts, remain forever dumb and
virtually useless for scholarly purposes” (Cannon-Brookes, 1994, p. 350). For archaeologists, antiquities
and the contexts in which they are found form a critical component of the archaeological record, and as
Taylor (1948) noted, “a good axiom for archaeologists is that ‘it is not what you find but how you find
it’” (p. 154).
9. During these periods, long before most national patrimony laws, the collecting of antiquities
became synonymous with wealth and cultural sophistication.
10. Signs of looting activity include, but are not limited to, holes, pits, missing objects, or other dam-
age to the site not part of systematic archaeological excavations. As techniques of looting vary from one
illegal digger to the next, so too do indications of looting activity.
11. On the contrary, a number of excellent studies have offered convincing evidence of a strong cor-
relation between looting at archaeological sites and demand for these particular objects on the open mar-
ket (cf. Chippindale, Gill, Salter, & Hamilton, 2001; Elia, 2001; Gill & Chippindale, 1993; Gutchen,
1983; Nørskov, 2002).
12. Italian slang for “tomb robbers.”
13. Illegal acquisition of antiquities at archaeological sites is not limited to theft. These activities
can also include breaking and entering, vandalism, trespassing, human burial disturbance, violation of
protected historic or religious sites, permit violations, and even violation of wildlife protection laws
(Hicks, 2006).
14. Carabinieri are Italian national paramilitary police to whom the responsibility of cultural heritage
protection falls. In this case, the carabiniere admitted to transporting looted antiquities across the Italian
border into Switzerland (Drake, 2008).
15. Studies have shown consistently that original diggers receive less than 1% of an antiquity’s final
sale price (Boylan, 1995; Brodie, 1998; Brodie, Doole, & Watson, 2000). The trifling reward a looter
receives for his or her find may be immediately significant, but as Brodie (1998) observed, it is a short-
term economic gain. When the antiquity becomes a tradable commodity on the international market and
acquires monetary value through circulation, both original diggers and the country of origin are deprived
of long-range economic gain, and original diggers are ultimately twice swindled: “first out of the initial
monetary value of their find, and then out of its long-term economic potential” (Brodie, 1998, p. 15).
16. The nemo dat quod non habet (“no one can give what one does not have”) expression captures the
Anglo-American common law conceptualization of property (Clarke & Kohler, 2005). In the United States,
this principle is codified in Uniform Commercial Code 2-403(1) of 2001, which addresses transferability
of title and bona fide purchase.
17. To a lesser extent, wealthier market nations also have been known to serve as supply countries.
The United States, for example, tops the list of nations fostering the demand for antiquities but also acts
as a supply nation in terms of the illicit trade in Native American material (Alder & Polk, 2002).

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238 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice

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Blythe A. Bowman is a doctoral candidate in the School of Criminology & Criminal Justice at the
University of Nebraska, Omaha. Her research interests include transnational crime, theory integration,
and biosocial criminology.

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