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Looting at Archaeological Sites and the
“Grey” Market in Antiquities
Blythe A. Bowman
University of Nebraska, Omaha
225
its way into each and every corner of the globe. Transnational crime is a moving
target—where it is today is not where it may be tomorrow. It does not hold still for
its scholarly portrait to be painted.
Second, in addition to exerting a broader geographic influence, the scope of
transnational criminal activities has also steadily diversified (Robinson, 2000). If
transnational crime is a moving target, then it is also a hydra;3 intensified interna-
tional enforcement efforts mean that new forms of transnational criminal activity are
springing up on a regular basis (Passas, 1998). Although traditional transnational
criminal activities remain the same (i.e., drug and human trafficking, corruption,
money laundering, extortion, etc.), criminals have learned to increase their profits
exponentially by broadening their spheres of illicit activity to include cybercrime,
trade in human body parts, trafficking in flora and fauna, and theft of art, to name
just a few (Mueller, 2001; Williams, 1999). Diversified activities coupled with broader
geographic capabilities have further turned the black and white line between the licit
“upperworld” and the illicit “underworld” (van Duyne, von Lampe, & Passas, 2002)
a decidedly murky shade of grey4 (Ruggiero, 1998, 2000).
This article considers but one dynamic of contemporary transnational crime: the
international trade in illicitly obtained antiquities.5 It provides an overview of criminal
dynamics of trafficking in looted antiquities from the perspective of the source end
of the problem—that is, the theft of antiquities from archaeological sites and their
illicit export. In light of this, it offers recommendations for further criminological
analysis. Trafficking in antiquities6 is a crime of transnational proportions in that it
involves the illegal removal and export of cultural material from source countries,
which supplies the demand generated from developed, rich, market economies
(Alder & Polk, 2005).
Figure 1
The Antiquities Market as Conceptualized in Overlapping Shades of Grey
Note: Licit and illicit are purely legal characterizations that are both variable and relative in time and space.
Because there is nothing illegal per se about owning antiquities, the legality of
antiquities thus revolves primarily around the manner in which they have been
acquired or moved. Illicit antiquities are illicit in that they have been illegally removed
from somewhere; that is, they have been looted from some place (Mackenzie, 2005),
smuggled, and laundered (Tijhuis, 2006).7 Following Mackenzie (2005), antiquities
that find their way to the open market generally fall into one of three categories.
These can be placed along a spectrum of legality involved in the trade and its licit-
illicit nexus of activity (see Figure 1).
The first category contains antiquities acquired through authorized excavations
conducted mainly by archaeologists who, having documented the objects and their
findspots, turn over possession of the objects to the rightful owner—the state or the
owner on whose land the object was found. I place these objects closer to the legal,
white end of the market spectrum. “White” antiquities constitute a minute component
of objects on the market because in an effort to preserve their own cultural heritage
and archaeological resources, most countries do not allow much material to circulate
(Mackenzie, 2005).
The second category in which objects in the contemporary market can be grouped
represents a “grey area” (Mackenzie, 2005). This group involves antiquities for which
provenience8 or findspot documentation has long been lost (Brodie, 2002). These
antiquities were acquired and exported before the country of origin had patrimony laws
in place to prohibit their removal, and these objects have been in circulation so long
that they now are considered licit simply through the passage of time (Mackenzie,
2005). Many of these objects were in fact removed during periods of colonial rule or
the “grand tours” that characterized much of the late 19th century.9 Dealers, collectors,
and other key players with vested interests in a legal antiquities market are quick to
highlight the licit status of such antiquities that arrived on the market long ago. In spite
of this, these objects remain a grey area in the antiquities market’s licit-illicit spectrum,
and such ambiguities surrounding their provenience complicate their distinction from
the last category of objects on the contemporary market.
The third group on the market comprises antiquities that recently have been
looted—that is, they have been acquired through recent unauthorized excavation or
illegally removed from some place. These antiquities, which I place on the black end
of the market spectrum, often make their way to the open market under the guise of
“accidental finds” or masquerading as unprovenanced “grey” antiquities whose licit
status is debatable (Mackenzie, 2005, p. 4). “Black” antiquities in this category can
be disguised because they have no documented provenience, and as Brodie (2002)
poignantly observed, herein lies the problem:
In the absence of provenance, how can licit material be distinguished from illicit? “From
an old European Collection” is a common enough auction appellation, but one that
might hide an old family heirloom or a recently looted (or fake) piece. Who is to know?
The only cautious response is to regard all unprovenanced material as looted. (p. 3)
The vast majority of antiquities on the market are sold with no accompanying prove-
nience documentation (Chippindale & Gill, 2000), which is a strong indication that
they have been looted from archaeological sites (Brodie, 2006). To a lesser extent,
antiquities are looted from churches, museums, private collections, and other sites of
cultural significance (Mackenzie, 2005). Until it can be shown otherwise, any
unprovenanced antiquity that surfaces on the market should be suspected of having
been recently looted (Brodie, 2002; Lunden, 2004; Muscarella, 2000). Moreover, the
spectrum of legality as presented in Figure 1 highlights the variability of licit and
illicit as purely legal characterizations that are both variable and relative in time and
space (Carducci, 2006).
archaeological sites—sites that are known to archaeologists and sites that have not yet
been discovered. Archaeologists do not have a master catalogue of every archaeo-
logical site that might possibly yield significant information (Pendergast & Graham,
1989). Given the sheer volume of archaeological resources, it is as such impossible
to assess just how damaging the effects of looting have been.
Despite these difficulties, there is a substantial body of research that paints a dismal
picture of the scale of on-the-ground damage through archaeological field surveys,
photographic testimony, archival and literature resources such as museum catalogues
and gallery publications, investigations of market trends and modern collecting and
dealing patterns, and informant interviews (cf., for example, Atwood, 2004; Brodie,
Doole, & Renfrew, 2001; Brodie, Doole, & Watson, 2000; Brodie, Kersel, Luke, &
Tubb, 2006; Brodie & Tubb, 2002; Chippindale & Gill, 2000; Chippindale, Gill,
Salter, & Hamilton, 2001; Coggins, 1969; Elia, 2001; Gilgan, 2001; Gill & Chippindale,
1993; Nørskov, 2002; Paredes Maury, 1999; Schick, 1998; Toner, 2002; Watson,
1997, 2006).
In general, the global picture is grim. Roosevelt and Luke (2006), for example,
found that of the nearly 400 burial tombs they inspected in western Turkey, 90%
exhibited indications of looting10 (p. 179). Similarly, of the 106 Belizean archaeo-
logical sites for which he was able to obtain data, Gutchen (1983) concluded that
nearly 60% of them had been looted, and nearly half of those looted sites had been
irretrievably damaged (pp. 223, 225). In Beijing between 1989 and 1990, Chinese
officials estimated that nearly 40,000 tombs had been stripped of their antiquities
(Anderson, 2002; Murphy, 1995; Platthy, 1993), and in 2003, it was reported that an
additional 220,000 tombs had been pillaged in the preceding 5 years (Beech, 2003).
At a 1999 Cambridge symposium on illicit antiquities, an official from Turkey reported
that in 1997 alone, more than 500 looters had been arrested with upwards of 10,000
illicit cultural objects in their possession (Brodie & Watson, 1999). An official with
Italy’s Carabinieri Cultural Heritage Protection Branch reported that since its estab-
lishment in 1969, the unit had recovered more than 326,000 objects looted from
archaeological sites and facilitated the prosecution of thousands of looters (Pastore,
2001, p. 159). In 2003, regarding the number of antiquities looted from archaeological
sites in Ecuador, officials reporting to INTERPOL could be no more specific than in
the “hundreds” (INTERPOL, 2005). These are but a few accounts of widespread
mutilation of archaeological resources, and the laundry list of countries with disem-
boweled archaeological resources is as long as it is depressing.
Despite this wealth of information, we will never know just how much has been
lost both materially and intellectually to pillage and plunder (Meyer, 1973; Roosevelt
& Luke, 2006). This is significant because it is within this uncertainty that some
actors involved in the trade—mainly collectors and dealers who champion a legal,
open antiquities market—insist that the role that looting plays in the antiquities trade
is greatly exaggerated11 (Brodie, 2002; Renfrew, 2002).
On closer examination, one of the boxes in the cupboards was found to contain gold
rings with the finger bones of the dead still attached to them. Clearly, when the tombs
had been looted, the hands and fingers of the long-dead had simply been broken off by
the tombaroli,12 to save time. (p. 184)
But most disturbing among reasons why archaeological resources are facing
unprecedented threat are the numerous reports surfacing in recent years that docu-
ment the connection between antiquities trafficking and other transnational crimes13
(McManamon & Morton, 2000). There is substantial evidence to suggest that orga-
nized criminal groups of all stripes are now not only smuggling illicit drugs and arms
but also dealing in looted antiquities (Bernick, 1998; Hanley, 1999). Vast quantities
of looted antiquities are being uncovered during drug raids with increasing regularity;
in 1999, for example, Spanish police thwarted efforts of an international smuggling
ring to trade stolen art and antiquities for cocaine (Brodie et al., 2000, p. 16). Among
the objects seized were pre-Columbian antiquities (Reuters, 1999). In 1985, U.S.
Customs tracked a smuggler’s plane from Mexico to Colorado; its cargo included
not only thousands of dollars worth of marijuana but also priceless pre-Columbian
antiquities from western Mexico (McManamon & Morton, 2000). Many of the
world’s greatest archaeological sites are now the nuclei of flourishing drug industries
(McCalister, 2005).
Beyond accounts of overlap with drug trafficking, further reports have surfaced
attesting to organized criminal involvement in antiquities looting and smuggling. In
examining thefts from both a number of Iraqi archaeological sites and Baghdad’s
National Museum in early 2003, McCalister (2005) concluded that the looting
“exhibited levels of knowledge and sophistication indicative of an involvement with
organized crime” (p. 32). And as Watson (2006) suggested, “the reality of life in Sicily
is that the illicit excavation of potentially valuable antiquities cannot take place with-
out at least the tacit permission of organized crime” (p. 291). In interviewing Italian
tombaroli, Hamblin (1970) echoed this:
“Mafiosi did the digging themselves,” says a Sicilian informant, “and since they controlled
everything, including the police, they were able to dig even in the daytime. It was very
funny, really. The men would be digging, and the head Mafioso was a sort of superin-
tendent, watching them from a window, sometimes with field glasses.” (p. 87)
Whether their spoils make an appearance on the market by means of a dealer’s shop,
a museum gallery, an auction catalogue, or an e-Bay listing, clandestine excavations
yield never-before-seen undocumented antiquities that cannot be identified and
therefore cannot be construed as stolen or illegally exported (Brodie, 2006). Even if
a country recognizes an antiquity and attempts to claim ownership of it, there is little
chance that the country will be able to prove that the object was exported after
national patrimony laws were enacted (Brodie, 2002). Nondisclosure or complete
lack of provenance information and ambiguity surrounding the entrance of an antiquity
onto the market are only two ways that the licit upperworld of the antiquities trade
obscures its criminal beginnings.
Other discordant elements in national laws and the international legal landscape also
facilitate the “greying” of the antiquities market, including legal conceptualizations of
“property,” “ownership,” protection for the good faith purchaser, statutes of limitations
for bringing actions, transferability of title to stolen property, and allocation of the
burden of proof (Hoffman, 2006). Following the Anglo-American nemo dat16 rule, for
example, a thief cannot convey good title nor can someone claim good title through a
thief, even if the property is transferred to a good-faith purchaser (Gerstenblith, 2004).
Unlike common law countries such as the United States, however, good title to a stolen
object can be conveyed in the bulk of European continental civil law countries if the
object was purchased in good faith. This means that even if an antiquity was looted and
illegally exported from its country of origin, if it was subsequently purchased in good
faith in a civil country, then the good-faith purchase is favored, and the object is no
longer legally construed as stolen (Brodie, 2002). For obvious reasons, then, civil
countries—most famously Switzerland—become transit ports in which antiquities
change hands and title is obtained. With a good title secured, an antiquity can now
obtain legal export documentation, be legally imported elsewhere, and thus begin to
circulate freely and legally on the antiquities market (Alder & Polk, 2002, 2005). Legal
loopholes facilitate the illicit-licit status transformation necessary for antiquities,
although such laundering changes them not from black to white but to a distinctive
shade of grey with questionable status. Many buyers are unaware of the criminal ele-
ments that brought the object onto the market, but many more are simply willing to turn
a blind eye to such matters (Brodie, 2002; Conklin, 1994; McCalister, 2005).
Criminological Contributions
A comprehensive examination of all international, national, and domestic
responses to the looting problem is beyond the scope of this article. Given that the
speculative assertion and anecdotal evidence. There is thus a clear need to scientif-
ically accumulate information on the global reach of the looting situation both to
move looting discourse toward a “firmer basis of quantifiable propositions” (Brodie
& Doole, 2001, p. 1) and to lay the empirical groundwork for further criminologi-
cal analysis and policy recommendations. In inciting response to the problem, sen-
sational accounts and personal vignettes tinged with moral fervor cannot provide a
solid foundation on which to base policy and practice. Ultimately, when it is time
to make difficult, politically charged decisions about how best to handle the loot-
ing situation, it is the quantifiable data that make the difference (Brodie & Doole,
2001, p. 1). Without an improved understanding of the global nature of the prob-
lem, it will be difficult to determine whether efforts to curb the problem are in fact
effective.
A second area to which a criminological perspective can be applied has to do with
how looting networks form, collaborate, and bond. As with other areas of transna-
tional research, there is often a macro-level focus on structural-functional patterns in
criminal collaboration and how such collaboration enables criminal activities. Fewer
studies address such relevant micro-level issues as social bonding, social capital, and
trust, which facilitate such cooperation (von Lampe & Johansen, 2004). Future
research should seek to explore these micro-level social bonds that foster criminal
collaboration and transnational networking in the illicit antiquities trade.
In addition, more criminological study needs to be done examining the perspective
of looters as victims lost in a broader web of global commercial forces, transnational
criminal activities, and economic hardship. Wealthier industrialized nations exploit
poorer, dependent nations for illicit goods and services, and looting of and subsequent
trafficking in antiquities is no exception to this. Most looting17 occurs in economically
dependent, developing nations whose rich archaeological heritage is sold off to satiate
demand generated in wealthier market nations (Alder & Polk, 2005). Looting is
arguably but another sad example of “periphery” nations’ economic exploitation by
wealthier, industrialized “core” nations on whom such countries are already economi-
cally dependent (Neapolitan, 1997; Wallerstein, 1974). Organized criminal involve-
ment breeds in the gap between supply and demand in the illicit antiquities trade, but
looting does not generate long-term economic stability and reliable income for impov-
erished looters. At both the micro and the macro levels, antiquities trafficking can be
criminologically studied as a transnational side effect of the unequal distribution of
wealth, privilege, power, and knowledge fostered by global competition (Held &
McGrew, 2000, p. 38). With criminological attention having been drawn to the antiq-
uities trade as an illicit market, future studies should in general examine not only the
broader structural forces that shape opportunities and decisions to loot but also how
individuals interface with each other and how groups interface with the larger politi-
cal, economic, and cultural spheres.
Notes
1. Clifford (1975) thoughtfully argued that there are very few truly new dimensions of criminality,
including the transnational aspect; rather, forms of criminality are simply updated according to sociocul-
tural milieu and available technology. Albanese (2005) made a similar point in his discussion of fraud as
characteristic of the 21st century, in the same way that larceny characterized much of the 20th century.
2. Although problems of definition continue to bedevil the study of transnational crime—and crime in
general—I have chosen to avoid what Naylor (1997, p. 2) aptly observed to be a “semantic swamp” and
follow Bossard (1990), Mueller (2001), Felsen and Kalaitzidis (2005), United Nations (2000a, 2000b),
and many others with this broad definition of transnational crime, while recognizing that a host of alter-
native terms are arguably applicable.
3. Readers will recall that the hydra, a magnificent beast from Greek mythology, was a many-headed
water serpent. When one of its heads was lopped off, two new heads grew in its place.
4. Many studies on the interfacing of the licit upperworld with the illicit underworld shed light on the
emergence of “dirty” or “grey” markets—markets, in other words, that in this sense are neither defini-
tively “black” nor “white” in terms of their legality (Edwards & Gill, 2002).
5. Although there is some cross-national variation in what constitutes an antiquity, most countries use
the term to refer to objects more than 100 years old and, in this case, generally refer to material from
archaeological sites.
6. Within the criminological literature, antiquities trafficking is frequently discussed as one dynamic
of transnational “art crime” or “art theft.” Indeed, much has been written about glamorous, high-profile
art heists. Such crimes have in fact captured the public imagination and even carved out a unique niche
within the entertainment industry; there is no shortage of popular films and fiction devoted to art heists
and the debonair Thomas Crown sorts who mastermind them. Yet most crimes against culture are not sexy
“Thomas Crown affairs”; the crimes that are instead most devastating to cultural heritage are looting and
trafficking in illicitly obtained antiquities. This article focuses on the criminal dynamics of looting and its
role in the illicit antiquities trade.
7. A third qualification could be added here under the rubric of illicit to include antiquities that have
been forged or faked (Mackenzie, 2005).
8. Provenance refers to the previous ownership history of an object. The term is most frequently used
in the art community to refer to what has happened to an antiquity since it came out of the ground. Among
archaeologists, on the other hand, provenience refers not to past ownership history but to information
regarding the original findspot of the object (Coggins, 1998). Both provenance and provenience are
important in telling the unique story that accompanies each antiquity into the market and are key in deter-
mining its licit/illicit status. Without such information, antiquities yield very little scientific value (Bator,
1982). Looted objects are “cultural orphans, which, torn from their contexts, remain forever dumb and
virtually useless for scholarly purposes” (Cannon-Brookes, 1994, p. 350). For archaeologists, antiquities
and the contexts in which they are found form a critical component of the archaeological record, and as
Taylor (1948) noted, “a good axiom for archaeologists is that ‘it is not what you find but how you find
it’” (p. 154).
9. During these periods, long before most national patrimony laws, the collecting of antiquities
became synonymous with wealth and cultural sophistication.
10. Signs of looting activity include, but are not limited to, holes, pits, missing objects, or other dam-
age to the site not part of systematic archaeological excavations. As techniques of looting vary from one
illegal digger to the next, so too do indications of looting activity.
11. On the contrary, a number of excellent studies have offered convincing evidence of a strong cor-
relation between looting at archaeological sites and demand for these particular objects on the open mar-
ket (cf. Chippindale, Gill, Salter, & Hamilton, 2001; Elia, 2001; Gill & Chippindale, 1993; Gutchen,
1983; Nørskov, 2002).
12. Italian slang for “tomb robbers.”
13. Illegal acquisition of antiquities at archaeological sites is not limited to theft. These activities
can also include breaking and entering, vandalism, trespassing, human burial disturbance, violation of
protected historic or religious sites, permit violations, and even violation of wildlife protection laws
(Hicks, 2006).
14. Carabinieri are Italian national paramilitary police to whom the responsibility of cultural heritage
protection falls. In this case, the carabiniere admitted to transporting looted antiquities across the Italian
border into Switzerland (Drake, 2008).
15. Studies have shown consistently that original diggers receive less than 1% of an antiquity’s final
sale price (Boylan, 1995; Brodie, 1998; Brodie, Doole, & Watson, 2000). The trifling reward a looter
receives for his or her find may be immediately significant, but as Brodie (1998) observed, it is a short-
term economic gain. When the antiquity becomes a tradable commodity on the international market and
acquires monetary value through circulation, both original diggers and the country of origin are deprived
of long-range economic gain, and original diggers are ultimately twice swindled: “first out of the initial
monetary value of their find, and then out of its long-term economic potential” (Brodie, 1998, p. 15).
16. The nemo dat quod non habet (“no one can give what one does not have”) expression captures the
Anglo-American common law conceptualization of property (Clarke & Kohler, 2005). In the United States,
this principle is codified in Uniform Commercial Code 2-403(1) of 2001, which addresses transferability
of title and bona fide purchase.
17. To a lesser extent, wealthier market nations also have been known to serve as supply countries.
The United States, for example, tops the list of nations fostering the demand for antiquities but also acts
as a supply nation in terms of the illicit trade in Native American material (Alder & Polk, 2002).
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Blythe A. Bowman is a doctoral candidate in the School of Criminology & Criminal Justice at the
University of Nebraska, Omaha. Her research interests include transnational crime, theory integration,
and biosocial criminology.