An Exceptional Espionage Operation

Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky

Barry a Royden
Editors Note: This unclassified In October 1985, The Washing
article draws extensively on ton Post ran a story that
Directorate of Operations files, described Tolkachev as one of
which, of necessity, remain classi CIAs most valuable human

fied. Because Tolkachevs story assets in the Soviet Union.

serves as an important case study According to FBI affidavits

of Cold War intelligence opera related to the Howard espionage

tions, it is being made available case that were made public,
to scholars and to the public in as Tolkachev had provided informa
much detail as possible, despite tion on Soviet avionics, cruise

minimal source citations. missiles, and other technologies.

The story of a brave
and dedicated man
who for over seven
years provided the CIA
with volume of
a huge
The Soviets subsequently pub
licly confirmed that they had
Barry Royden researched and executed Tolkachev in 1986 for
wrote this article while teaching
high treason.
as a CIA Officer-in-Residence at
the Joint Military Intelligence
Despite the fact that than
College. He recently retired after
more

15 years have passed, little addi

extremely sensitive
and valuable
intelligence on Soviet
military research and
development.
four decades in the CIA, last serv tional information has surfaced
ing as Associate Deputy Director about Adolf Tolkachev and his
of Operations for Counterintelli work for the CIA. The following
gence- He is currently teaching is the story of a brave and dedi
Counterintelligence at a Director cated man who for over seven

ate of Operations training facility. the CIA with

years provided a

huge extremely sensi

volume of
tive and valuable intelligence on
Soviet military research and
development (R&D) activities. It
On 20 September 1985, interna
is also the story of a well-con
tional wire service reports ceived and executed CIA
carried a statement distributed
intelligence operation run in
by the official Soviet news agency Moscow under the nose of the
TASS that one A. G. Tolkachev, KGB.
whom it described as a staff
member at one of Moscows
research institutes, had been The Beginning
arrested the previous June try
ing to pass secret materials of a In January 1977, on a typically
defensive nature to the United depressing winter evening in
States- Subsequent news stories Moscow, the local CIA chief left
said Tolkachev was an electron his office and drove to a nearby
ics expert at a military aviation gas station used by diplomats.
institute in Moscow who was While waiting for gas, he was
Barry G. Royden served in the compromised by former CIA surprised when a middle-aged
CIAs Directorate of Operations. officer Edward Lee Howard. Russian approached him and

5
Tolkachev

66
CIA headquarters was
loath to complicate

asked him in
other activities] by the
English if he was valuable information on Soviet
an American. When the CIA possibility of getting political and military plans and
chief answered affirmatively, the caught in a KGB intentions. He also passed data
Russian placed a folded piece of dangle operation. on Soviet missile deployment
paper on the car seat and
methods and operations that
departed.
noted that his
The CIA chief later
was the only
99 proved critical to the United
States during the Cuban missile
American-plated car at the gas
crisis. All substantivemeetings
station, and it appeared obvious
that the man was waiting for an with Penkovsky, however, were
Agency personnel so that they
American to appear. The man could be expelled from the coun held in the West, taking advan
was calm and clearly had thought try and to obtain important tage of his travel abroad with
out his approach. information the CIAs meth Soviet
on delegations.
ods of operation.
The note, written in Russian, was
The point in time when
short and to the point. The On the other hand, many of the
Tolkachev chose to try to estab
writer said that he wanted to CIAs best agents through the
lish contact with the CIA in
discuss matters on a strictly years have been intelligence vol
confidential Moscow particularly sensi
was a
basis with an unteers. One of the Agencys
tive one. CIA personnel in
appropriate American official. most famous Soviet agents, Col.
He then suggested a discreet Oleg Penkovsky of the Soviet mil Moscow had several operational

meeting at a given time and itary intelligence service (GRU), activities scheduled to take place
place in the car of an American volunteered to the CIA in Mos over the next several months
official or at a Metro station in 1960. He also
experienced that and CIA
cow
they headquarters
entrance. The writer also sug great difficulty in establishing loath to
were complicate by the
gested a signala parked car at contact with Western intelli
possibility of getting caught in a
a certain place and time, facing gence. Penkovsky passed letters KGB dangle operation. In addi
either one direction or the to two American students, a Brit
otherto indicate which meet
tion, Cyrus Vance, the Secretary
ish husinessman, and a
of State-designate in the admin
ing arrangement was preferred. Canadian businessman over a

The note contained sketches of istration of newly elected

period of several months before
the ~xact locations of the two he succeeded in using British President Jimmy Carter, was

optional sites and where the car businessman Greville Wynne to scheduled to visit the USSR soon

should be parked to trigger a open a channel to US and Brit to lay the basis for bilateral rela
meeting. ish intelligence.1 tions, and it was clear that the
new US administration did not
It would be a long and tortuous The CIA Penkovsky jointly
ran want anything untoward to roil
process before secure contact with the British for a little over a the waters between the two coun
would be established between the year, and he provided immensely tries. As a result, given the
CIA and this intelligence volun
absence of any identifying data
teen The KGB had established
i The basic facts of the on this prospective volunteer, the
a pattern in the Soviet Union of Penkovsky case

are set forth in Jerrold L. Schecter and lack of any indication of his
running dangles (ostensible
Peter S. Ijeriabins The Spy Who Saved
intelligence volunteers actually access to sensitive information,
the World (New York; Charles Scribners
controlled by the KGBj, which and the difficult counterintelli
Sons, 19921. The authors were given ac
made it risky to respond to any cess to the CIA files on the case and con
gence (CI) environment, CIA
potential volunteer. Dangles ducted inter-views with many of the headquarters decided against
were aimed at flushing out people involved. replying to,the note.

6
 Tolkachev

The CIA chief was

impressed with the
mans tenacity.
More Approaches he wanted to do what Belenko
did.2 Again, he
provided some
On 3 February 1977, the volun contact scenarios. Hathaway

teeragain approached the local sent a message to Washington,

CIA chief, this time as he got into urging that he be allowed to fol
his (Although the chiefs car
car. had been indicated in the note, so low up and contact the volunteer.
was parked near the US that the writer could pass him a This time CIA headquarters ten
Embassy, it was blocked from the letter with more details about tatively concurred, pending an

view of the Soviet militiamen who he was and what informa evaluation of the intelligence
guarding the Embassy by high tion he wanted to share. sample.
snow banks, a fact that Headquarters, however, contin
Tolkachev later said he had ued to demur, citing overriding In early January 1978, however,
taken into account.) He again CI concerns, and forbade any pos headquarters again disapproved
spoke briefly, dropped a short itive response. contact. It cited the fact that an

note into the car, and departed. American official had been
The note reiterated the writers In May, the volunteer approached declared persona non grata by
desire to establish contact with the CIA chief for the fourth time, the Soviet government just one

an American officiaL Based on banging on his car to get his week previously, as well as the
the previous CIA headquarters attention. The chief ignored him. fact that the CIA had had to send
decision, no action was taken to home two case officers the previ
respond to the note. More than six months passed ous year, when cases they had
before the volunteer appeared been handling were compro
Two weeks later, the CIA chief again. In December 1977, he mised. Headquarters concluded
was approached after work by the spotted an individual who had that they could not afford to lose
same individual, who dropped gotten out of an American-plated another officer in Moscow, should
another note into the car. This car and was shopping in a local the latest contact prove to be a

note said that the writer under
stood the concern about a possible
provocation. He claimed that he
was an engineer who worked in a
closed enterprise and was not
knowledgeable about secret mat
ters, so he might not be going
about this the right way. He said
that he had not included specific
information about himself
because he worried about how his
letters would be handled. He
repeated his request that he be
contacted, and he provided new
instructions for establishing
contact.
By now, the CIA chief was
impressed with the mans tenac
market. The volunteer gave a let Soviet provocation attempt.
ter to this individual and pleaded Meanwhile, the evaluation of the
that the letter be hand delivered information provided by the vol
to responsible US official. The
a unteer showed it to be highly
was passed unopened to the
letter interesting but not likely to do
US Embassys assistant security grave damage to the USSRa
officer, who in turn gave it to the criterion that apparently had to
local CIA chief. be met in headquarters view
before it would approve taking
In the letter, the volunteer again the risk to meet the volunteer.
provided instructions and accom
panying drawings for an initial By fortuitous chance, in Febru
contact with an American offi
ary 1978, the Pentagon sent a
cial. He went further this time, memo to the CIA citing the US
however, and included two type militarys high interest in any
written pages of intelligence intelligence that could be pro
regarding the electronic systems vided on Soviet aircraft
for a Soviet aircraft, which con electronics and weapons control
vinced the newly arrived local

ity and asked headquarters for CIA chief, Gardner Gus Hatha
permission to respond positively way, that a serious effort should 2 Viktor Belenko was a Soviet pilot who flew

He said that his MiG-25 in 1976.

by parking his car in a spot that be made to respond. LoJapan

7
Toikachev

The volunteers wife answered

the call, however, forcing
Guilsher to break off the conver

sation. Guilsher repeated this

exercise on 28 February, with the
same lack of success.

On 1 March 1978, Tolkachev

again approached Hathaway and
his wife on the street after work.
This time, he passed 11 pages of
handwritten materials, the bulk
of which was detailed intelli

gence on Soviet R&D efforts in

the military aircraft field. In this
note, Tolkachev finally identified
himself fully, providing his name,
-~ address, exact employment, and
Construction workers glove used as a cleaddrop container. a great deal of personal back

ground information. He noted

systems. As it turned out, this instructed the recipient of the
that he had spent hours and
was precisely the type of informa note that at a certain time at a
hours roaming the streets in
tion, albeit in limited quantity, certain bus stop he would be
that the volunteer had passed in standing in line holding two
search of US] diplomatic cars,
December 1977. pieces of plywood, each with a
and, having found one, had
returned tens of times without
single number on it. These
would be the last two digits in his passing anything, because of
Persistence Pays Off phone number. At the indicated unfavorable conditions. He said

time, Hathaways wife drove past that he was now almost desper
On 16 February 1978, the volun the bus stop in question, recog ate for positive response to his
a

teer approached Hathaway and nized the volunteer holding the efforts, and, if he did not get one
his wife at their car on the street two pieces of plywood, and this time, he would give up.
after work and passed another recorded the numbers.
note containing additional intelli Tolkachev had clearly gone above
gence information. He wrote Hathaway immediately sent a and beyond what could be
that he seemed to be caught in a cable to CIA headquarters push
vicious circle: Im afraid for
expected of anyone trying to vol
ing for a positive response to the
unteer to help the United States.
security reasons to put down on volunteer. This time, headquar
The CIA, on the other hand, for a
paper much about myself, and, ters concurred. On 26 February,
without this information, for after careful planning, John variety of good reasons had had
to be cautious about accepting
security reasons you are afraid to Guilsher, a case officer fluent in
contact with him. Fortunately,
contact me, fearing a provoca Russian, conducted a lengthy
tion. He then suggested a surveillance-detection to
after much soul searching, it had
run

secure way to pass key identify determine that he was free of any been decided to meet him. Once
ing data on himself. In his note, Soviet surveillance and then that decision was made, a spec

he provided all but two of the dig called the volunteers home tacular intelligence success story
its in his phone number. He phone from a public phone booth. began.

8
 Tolkachev

On New Years Day

1979, the first personal
Making Contact
meeting was held while The SW messages contained use
walking the streets of ful intelligence on such subjects
At about 10 p.m. on 5 March Moscow in bitterly cold as a new Soviet airborne radar
1978, Guilsher, after determin weather. reconnaissance and guidance sys
ing that he was free of surveil tem, the results of performance
lance, called Tolkachev at home tests ofnew Soviet aircraft radar

from a public phone at the systems, and the status of work

Bolshoi Theater and spoke to him on the weapons-aiming systems
for the first time. Guilsher iden for various Soviet aircraft under
tified himself as Nikolay, as Tolkachevs protection, he also development. Tolkachev also
Tolkachev had suggested in his would be passed a one-time pad indicated that he had 91 pages of
1 March note, and confirmed that (OTP). The one-time pad (a handwritten notes that he
the proper people had received series of numbers randomly wanted to pass. The intelligence
all the materials Tolkachev had keyed letters that can be put
to contained in these letters finally
provided. The purpose of the call into clear text only by someone tipped the balance, convincing
was to assure Tolkachev that his having an identical OTP) would senior CIA managers that
security was intact and that US be used to encipher his secret Tolkachev should be considered a

intelligence was interested in writing messages. valid volunteer. As a result,

learning more about him and his Hathaway was given the go-
work. He was told that he would On 24 August, Guilsher con ahead to arrange a personal
be calledagain with further tacted Tolkachev by phone and meeting with him in order to
instructions regarding future directed him to a deaddrop site construct an in-country commu

contacts. located next to a phone booth nications system between him

near Tolkachevs apartment. The and the CIA.
It was not until August, how materials for Tolkachev, hidden
ever, that the details finally were in a dirty construction workers On New Years Day 1979, the
worked out on how the case mitten, consisted of an opera CIA took advantage of Soviet hol
was to be
pursued. Despite tional message, a series of iday laxness to arrange its first
Hathaways desire that personal intelligence requirements, an SW personal meeting with Tolkachev.
contact be established with carbon paper with instructions After insuring that he was free
Tolkachev in the USSR, CIA for its use, three pre-written from surveillance, Guilsher used
headquarters optedas cover letters (apparently inno a public phone to call Tolkachev

safestto have the necessary cent letters, on the reverse side of at his apartment, triggering con
materials and directionspassed which the SW was to be con tact at a predetermined meeting

to Tolkachev via deaddrop (an

a cealed), and an OTP with site. He reminded Tolkachev to
impersonal exchange of informa accompanying instructions. The bring the 91 pages of notes with
tion) that he could prepare a
so CIA later determined that him. A 40-minute meeting was
series of letters with additional Tolkachev had retrieved the held while walking the streets of
information about his access and materials. Moscow in bitterly cold weather.
his work. These letters were to
be prepared in secret writing In September, all three cover let Tolkachev was well prepared. He
(SW), instructions for which were ters from Tolkachev were delivered the voluminous notes,
contained in the deaddrop, and received, and their SW contents which contained a detailed
were to be sent to various accom successfully broken out. All description of the highly sensitive
modation addresses (apparently three letters showed signs of hav work in which he was involved, as
innocuous addresses actually ing been opened, presumably by well as exact formulas, diagrams,
controlled by the CIA). At Hath the Soviet authorities, but the drawings of oscilloscope presenta
aways insistence, to enhance SW had gone undetected. tions, precise weapon and

9
Tolkachev

The data that the agent

provided saved the
United States] up to
electronic systems specifications, The writer is intelligent, pur
five years of R&D time.
charts, and quotes from official poseful, and generally self-
documents. He had carefully confident. He is self-disci
drawn various diagrams and plined but not overly rigid.
charts on oversize graph paper. He has well above average
Guilsher passed Tolkachev addi intelligence and has good
tionalintelligence requirements organizing ability. He is
and operational questions, as well observant and conscientious
tion sources for many years, if
as a payment of good faith and pays meticulous atten
ever. The complete documenta
money. He was impressed with tion to details. He is quite
tionon these systems, which the
Tolkachevs calm manner. He also self-assured and may plow
agent provided even before the
noted that Tolkachev was proba ahead at times in a way
systems were fully operational,
bly one of the few sober Russians which is not discreet or sub
was described as of incalculable
in Moscow on this major national tle. All in all, he is a
value.
holiday. reasonably well-adjusted
individual and appears intel
In May 1979, the CIA hosted a
lectually and psychologically
three-day seminar for a small
Impressive Production equipped to become a useful,
group of senior customers of
versatile asset.
Tolkachevs product. Representa
The information that Tolkachev
tives included senior analysts
provided in his first meeting was from both civilian and military
After his early reluctance to iden
quickly disseminated to a lim tify himself to the US officials he
intelligence agencies. This
ited number of senior civilian and was trying to contact, Tolkachev
groups consensus was that
military customers. It had an over time provided a great deal of
Tolkachevs information was
immediate impact, as reflected in information about himself. He
impressive. Military representa
a March 1979 memorandum sent wrote that he was born in 1927 in
tives attending the seminar
to the Director of Central Intelli Aktyubinsk (in what is now
stated that the data he provided
gence (DCI) by a high-ranking had saved them up to five years Kazakhstan), but moved to Mos
military recipient of the of R&D time.
cow two years later and had lived
Tolkachev information. This there ever since. He did not pro
memo stated that all the infor vide any information about his
Tolkachev was on his way to
mation provided by the special becoming one of the most valu parents. The only sibling men
source had correlated fully with
able and productive agents in the
tioned was a brother, Yuri, who
existing holdings from photo and history of the CIA.
was born in 1938 and described
communications intelligence col as a train mechanic.
lection. Regarding the new data
reported, the memo concluded Assessment and Background Tolkachev identified his wife as

that the Soviets would judge it Natalia Ivanova nØe Kuzmina.

quite damaging to their interests Before the first personal meeting She was born in 1935 and worked
for Washington to be in posses with Tolkachev, one of his hand as an electronics engineer at the
sion of this information. written notes had been passed to same institute where he
the CIAs Office of Technical Ser workedhe described her as an

The memocontinued by stipulat vice (OTS) handwriting experts antenna specialist. He wrote
ing that the primary value of the for analysis. The analysis, done that his wifes mother had been
sources reporting was that it pro in May 1978, was positive, accu executed in 1938, but he said
vided detailed data on new Soviet rate, and even prophetic. The nothing about the reasons for her
weapon systems that would not report made the following execution. He noted that his
be available from technical collec observations: wifes father had spent many

10
 Tolkachev

years in a labor camp, typically In detailing his technical creden by Moscow standards. These
the fate of enemies of the Soviet tials, Tolkachev wrote that he cramped quarters, however, were
state. Freed in 1955, he had had completed optical-mechani to limit his ability to carry out

returned to Moscow, but died cal radar training in 1948 and his clandestine role for the CIA.

shortly thereafter. Tolkachev graduated from the Kharkov

commented a number of times to Polytechnical Institute in 1954. Various health problems bothered
at least one of his case officers Since then, he had worked at Tolkachev during his collabora
that the brutal treatment that NIIR (Scientific Research Insti
tion with the CIA. At one time or
his wifes parents had suffered tute of Radio Building). He
another, he indicated that he had
was a key factor in his motiva described himself as a leading high blood pressure, peritonitis,
tion to work against the Soviet systems designer at this insti and gastritis. He also had trou
regime. He never shed any light tute and said that he worked in a
ble breathing at night due to a
on why the authorities had taken large open office with 24 other broken nose that he had suffered
these actions against his wifes people. (In writing this, he as a youth playing hockey. None
parents, but once suggested that seemed to recognize that there he described active
theless, an
his wife and her parents were would be interest in knowing how life. His hobbies were jogging,
Jewish. Given the Stalinists much privacy he had in his office,
skiing, reading, listening to Voice
anti-Semitism, this factor may in terms of his ability to steal
of America and West German
have played a role in their secrets.)
news broadcasts, and watching
persecution. TV. He also said that he and his
Tolkachev led a relatively com
family enjoyed camping out in the
Tolkachev apparently waa fortable life. He said that he summer.

devoted to his family and took earned 250 rubles per month,
their interests into account in plus a 40 percent secrecy bonus,
everything that he did. He wrote which would give him a normal
Motivation
that he helped his wife with the salary of some 350 rubles (about
housework and liked to go shop $110 at the official exchange rate
Tolkachev was not a member of
at that time). His wifes salary
ping with her. He said that she
would not question where he got would have doubled this amount. the Communist Party. He said
reasonable of money. He
sums He later added that he occasion
that he had lost his early inter
ally received monetary awards
est in politics because it had
explained: I got married at 30
become enmeshed in such an
and have lived with my wife for inventions in his field. An
I 52 and average Soviet salary at that impassable hypocritical dema
already 22 years. am

time estimated at 120 rubles gogy. His theater going had

my wife is 44. Apparently, I was
declined, he wrote, because all
belong to those who love only per month.
the plays had become too
once. I consider that I have the
normal attachment to the Tolkachev and his family lived ideological.
family on

that exists in mankind. The the 9th floor of an apartment

couple had one child, a son building only some 400 meters When asked during his first per
named Oleg, born in 1966. In from the US Embassy. He noted sonal meeting about his
1979, Oleg was described as that this location had allowed motivation for approaching US

going to art school; by 1982, he him to walk unobtrusively near intelligence, Tolkachev said that
was studying at an architectural the Embassy when he was seek he was a dissident at heart,
institute. Tolkachev made it ing to establish contact. The who could best contribute to the

clear from the beginning that he apartment consisted of two cause by taking advantage of his
had not told, and would not tell, rooms, plus a kitchen, bath, and access unique information of
to

his wife or son about his work for toilet. Although modest by US value to the West. In April 1979,
US intelligence. standards, it was quite luxurious he explained his motivation in a

11
ToIkaciiev

Tolkachev wrote:
Some inner worm
started to torment me.
written note, of which the follow the car he chose to approach had
ing is an excerpt: Something has to be to be an American and not a Rus
done. sian chauffeur due to his bright
.
I can only s~v that a and beggarly clothingtrousers
significant role in this was ,, which had never seen an irOn

played by Solzhenitsyn and no Russian chauffeur of a diplo

Sakharov, even though I do matic vehicle would ever dress
not know them and have only like that.
unseen I do not have enough
read Solzhenitsyns works
fantasy or romanticism.
which were published in
However, based on some facts,
Noviy Mir. Some inner worm The Operation Takes Off
Igot the impression that I
sta fled to torment me; some
would prefer to live in Anier
thing has to be done. I The first meeting with Tolkachev
ica. It is for this very reason
started to write shortleaflets in January 1979 was a water
that I decided to offer you my
that Iplanned to mail out. shed event. The information that
collaboration. But lam not
But, later, having thought it he passed convinced all but the
an altruist alone. Remunera.
out properly, I understood most diehard skeptics that the
tion for me is not just money. CIA in contact with volun
that this was a useless under was a
It is, greater extent,
even to a
taking. To establish contact teer with immense potential.
the evaluation of the signifi
with dissident circles which The Agency now moved into high
canceand the importance of
have contact with foreign gear to put the operation on a
my work.
journalists seemed senseless sound footing.
to due to the nature of my
me

work. (I have a top secret Tolkachev further explained that The CIA was breaking new

clearance.) Based on the he had decided five or six years ground in several ways.
slightest suspicion, I would be ago cooperate, but that he
to Tolkachev provided access to
totally isolated or liqui. waited until my son grew up. information of a sort never before
dated. Thus was born my He wrote, I understand that in seen in its Soviet
operations, in
plan of action to which I have case of a flap my family would terms of both its huge value to
resorted. face a severe ordeal. At first he US military planners and its
thought about trying to establish highly technical nature. In
I have chosen a course contact at a US exhibit, but addition, Tolkachev was to be
which does not permit one to decided this would not be secure. handled extensively via face-to-
move backward, and I have He then started taking long face meetings in Moscow rather
no intention of veering from walks around the Embassy area. than by deaddrops, which were
this course. My actions in the Having spotted cars with diplo normally used for Russian assets
future depend on my] health, matic license plates, he looked for handled in country.
and changes in the nature of an opportunity to approach an

my] work. Concerning remu American getting in or out of his The January meeting started a
neration, I would not begin to car. He observed that some of pattern of successful encounters
establish contact for any sum these cars had Russian drivers with Tolkachev held every two or

of money with, for example, and realized that he would have three months over the next 18
the Chinese Embassy. But to be careful which car he chose. months of the operation. The
how about America? Maybe (Tolkachev clearly had no idea first meetings were dedicated not
it has bewitched me, and Jam that he had stumbled on the local only to receiving Tolkachevs
madly in love with it? I have CIA chief as the target for his ini immensely valuable intelligence,
not seen your country with my tial approaches. He noted that but also to working out the criti
own eyes, and to love it he had decided that the driver of cally important operational

12
 Tolkachev

details that would ensure that he ;__ ..~.._.

-r?-~ a~n~r .-~~w.~r-c,s~ ~

could be handled securely and

productively over the long term.
This meant constructing a viable

agent communication system,

coming to agreement with the
agent over a compensation pack
age and a way to deliver it, and
working out the means by which
he could best take advantage of
his access to obtain Soviet secrets
for delivery to the CIA in a

secure manner. Tolkachev con

tinued to deliverlarge quantities

of highly valuable intelligence
while the details of the arrange
ment were being worked out.

Agent Communications
~
-

,,~tthnk~s4~~- a at...~,

Considerable Subminiature camera, not much larger than its film cassette, in for document
planning was use

copying or cite casing photography.

needed to establish a contact rou

tine for the Tolkachev operation.

In this case, the CiA did not have Tolkachev could photograph docu which would trigger a personal

the luxury of being able to pro ments clandestinely at his office. meeting at a prearranged site
vide the agent with any external one hour from the time of the
training in the use of deaddrops The note passed to Tolkachev in call.
before the initiation of his agent the same deaddrop contained a
role. Since painstaking efforts communications plan that pro Once a month, on the date that
had already led to a personal vided for avariety of methods of corresponded to the number of
meeting with Tolkachev, the door contact. For example, the month plus 15 days18
was opened to the possibility of Tolkachev could be called at March, 19 April, 20 May, etc.
using face-to-face encounters on home once a month, on the date Tolkachev was directed to appear
an ongoing basis. that corresponded to the num at one of several
prearranged
ber of the month, that is, 1 sites, at a specified time accord
InFebruary 1979, after several January, 2 February, 3 March, ing to the month, and to wait for
exchanges of messages with CIA and so forth. Tolkachev would five minutesa password and

headquarters regarding the type of cover the phone between 6p.m. recognition signal were incorpo
communications to be used in this and 8 p.m. on those dates to rated into the plan in case

case, deaddrop
a put down for
was await wrong-number
a call. someone other than the regular

Tolkachev containing a small spy Depending upon the name case officer should make the
camera, light meter,
a camera asked for by the caller, meeting.
instructions, and an operational Tolkachev would be directed to
note, all concealed in another one of three prearranged dead- Once every three months, on the
dirty mitten. The spy camera drop sites: Olga, Anna, or last weekend of the month,
was matchbox-sized and had been Nina. The caller also had the Tolkachev would have the oppor
fabricated by OTS so that option of asking for Valeriy, tunity to pass materials via

13
To!kachev

In than 20
more

encounters, Tolkachev
handed over hundreds
deaddrop. Tolkachev would look manpower pool, it could not
of rolls of exposed film
to see whether a ready to maintain surveillance on all for
receive signal had been made; if and hundreds of pages eigners all the
time, so was it

so, he was to put down a package of written notes. important try to convince sur
to
in a prearranged site. A recov veillance teams, when they were
ery signal would be put up the covering a given case officer, that
next day so that he could check to the officer was not involved in
ensure that his package had been any operational activities when
received. He was also given they were moving about the city.

instructions on how to package documents he provided could be

and conceal any drop of materi traced back to him. As part of this process, every
als for passage to the CIA. He case officer went to great lengths
also could trigger a deaddrop Hathaway agreed with to establish a routine that took

delivery by making marked sig

a Tolkachevs reasoning, as ulti him to various parts of the city
nal on any Monday; a case officer mately did CIA headquarters. As on a regular basis, to do shop

in turn would signal readiness to a result, beginning in April 1979, ping, run errands, take part in
receive his package, using a personal meetings with recreational activities, go sight
parked-car signal the following Tolkachev were used almost seeing, take the children out,
Wednesday, and that night exclusively. Several were held walk the dog, and so forth.
Tolkachev could put down his with him in the second half of These routines were carefully
deaddrop package. A recovery 1979, and more than 20 took constructed to try to bore the
signal would then be put up the place over the next five years. KGB surveillance teams, to the
following day to signal the suc These personal encounters point where they would be
cessful recovery of his drop. allowed Tolkachev to hand over moved to other, presumably
to his CIA case officer hundreds more productive, targets. If and

Tolkachev, however, resisted of rolls of exposed film and hun when the officers did find them
using deaddrops. In an April dreds of pages of written notes selves free of surveillance while
1979 written message, he said containing an enormous amount on these personal travels around
that he did not understand why of valuable intelligence. the city, they would take advan
the CIA wanted to use dead- tage of this situation to look for
drops to communicate. He said prospective new deaddrop sites,
that personal meetings would be Surveillance Detection Runs to service such sites, or to carry

no more risky than using dead- out other operational activities.

drop passes, because in both To ensure that the case officer
cases a CIA officer had to be free was free from KGB surveillance This method of action meant that
of surveillance to carry out the before carrying out any element a series of alternative contacts
communications plan. Given this of the communications plan, the had to be built into every agent
fact, Tolkachev said that it officer would conduct a surveil communication system, because
seemed to him that personal lance detection run. This a case officer could never know
meetings were to be preferred, involved case officers moving ahead of time whether he would
because they would be much about the city in an apparently be free of surveillance on any
more productive. He also noted innocent fashion, while unobtru given day. Because of the heavy
that psychologically he pre sively checking to determine surveillance normally used
ferred to exchange materials via whether they were under surveil against CIA case officers, another
personal meeting, because he lance. Although the 17th part of any agent communica
worried that a drop could acci Department of the KGB, respon tions system required that
dentally fall
into the wrong sible for counterintelligence several case officers be read in on

hands and that in such a case the inside the USSR, had a large the case, so that any one of them

14
 Tolkachev

LThe case officer] put

on a Russian hat and

who able to determine that

working-class clothes, that stage had been
was one completed
he surveillance-free
took a heavy dose of with the passage of the extensive
was on a

given day would be capable of garlic, and splashed materials that he had delivered in
communicating with the agent. some vodka on himself. January, added to what he had
been able to pass before that time
Another technique that was used via his SW messages and written
to defeat KGB surveillance was notes. He went on to say that he
to disguise the identity of the did not feel that he had been ade
caseofficer being sent out to qua tely compensated for his first
meet with Tolkachev. This tech Tolkachevs case officers success year and a half of lonely efforts to
nique was first used in this fully used this technique, with break down the wall of distrust
operation in June 1980. John some variations, for a number of and for the significant information
Guilsher drove to the US meetings with the agent over the that he had provided to date. He
Embassy building at about 7:20 course of this operation. provided a range of figures in the
p.m., ostensibly having been tens of thousands of rubles, which
invited to dinner at the apart he said he believed would be fair
ment of an Embassy officer who Agent Compensation compensation for the information
lived there. Once inside, he dis that he had provided so far.
guised himself so that when he As is the case with most agents,
later left the compound in remuneration was a subject of Tolkachev stated that he could
another vehicle, he would not be great importance to Tolkachev either just pass information as he
recognized by KGB surveillants and an operationally difficult had outlined in his seven-stage
waiting outside. Checking to matter to resolve. As the details plan, and ask for a sum of money
ensure that he was free of sur were worked out over time, it in six figures equal to what
veillance, Guilsher, while still in became evident that he was pri Belenko got, or he could go
the vehicle, changed out of his madly interested in obtaining a
western clothes and made him salary as a demonstration that
self look much as possible like
as the CIA highly valued his work,
a typical, working-class Russian rather than as a means to enrich

by putting on a Russian hat and himself

working-class clothes, taking a
heavy dose of garlic, and splash The dialogue regarding compensa
ing some vodka on himself tionbegan with the second
Guilsher then left his vehicle and personal meeting in April 1979.
proceeded on foot and by local During a 15-minute walking con
public transportation to a public tact, Tolkachev turned over five
phone booth, where he called the rolls of film that he had taken with
agent out for a meeting at a pre his miniature camera and more

arranged site. than 50 pages of handwritten

After the meeting, Guilsher
returned to his vehicle, put on
normal Western clothes, and
drove back to the Embassy
notes containing intelligence of
both a substantive and opera
tional nature. In the notes, he
proposed to pass information over
a 12-year period, divided into

There he resumed his own iden seven stages; he wanted to be paid

tity and then left the compound a set amount at the end of each Case officer in disguise as a Russian
and returned to his apartment. stage. He said that he considered worker for meeting with Tolkachev.

15
Tolkachev

He was told that he was

to be paid an annual
beyond this and
keep passing
salary equivalent to
realized that his salary demands
information as it developed
the salary of the US
new were unrealistic. He said he had
and he got access to it.a President. made them because he wanted to
Tolkachev wrote that, if he were ensure that he got appropriate

cooperating just for the money, he recognition for his work. On

probably would follow the first accepting the over 100,000 rubles
course, but, because he had that he was passed at this meet
tasked himself with passing the ink, Tolkachev commented that
In Tolkachevs first meeting with
maximum amount of informa this was much better than the
Guilsher in January 1979, the
tion to the United States, he did few thousand rubles that he had
latter had told him that his supe
not intend to stop halfway, and previously been paid. He went
riors were worried that, if the
only the second course of action on to say that he did not really
agent were given a substantial
is viable. need the money and that he
amount of money, he would start
would just store it; he added that
throwing it around. Returning to
he did not want any money at the
In October 1979, Tolkachev this topic, Tolkachev wrote in his
returned to the subject of his
next meeting. He said he just
April note that the subject of
wanted the money as proof that
reimbursement. Subsequent to reckless handling of sums of
the CIA really valued his work.
the April letter outlining his sal money can never arise. He
ary demands, he had been told stated that he already had the
that the DCI had approved the By May 1980, Tolkachevs salary
means to buy a car and an expen
had finally been agreed on. He
passage to him of an amount of sive dacha. Although he said
was told that he was to be paid
rubles equivalent to almost that he never wanted a car, he
an annual salary equivalent to
$100,000 for the information that planned buy one when his son
to
the salary of the US President
he had provided to date. In turned 15 or 16depending on
for his work in 1979 and an even
response to this, Tolkachev now how his relations develop with
wrote that, when he said he his growing son. He also said higher salary for each year there
after that he was in place and
wanted compensation in the six that neither he nor his wife had
productive. The bulk of these
figures, he meant six zeroes! any inclination to be saddled
funds would be held in escrow, to
He went on to say that he had with a dacha, although they were
be available to him at some
heard on the Voice of America considering eventually buying a
future date when he determined
that American specialists esti small house and some land.
that he wanted to be exfiltrated
mated that the Soviets would
to the United States with his
have to spend $3 billion to
Perhaps realizing that his salary family. Meanwhile, these funds
reequip the MiG-25 as a result of demands might seem exorbitant, would earn 8.75 percent interest,
the Belenko defection. If that Tolkachev went in his
on April and he would be able to draw on
were the case, he reasoned, sev note to emphasize that his basic them at his discretion.
eral million dollars is not too
goal in working with the CIA]
fantastic a price for the informa consists of passing the maximum
Tolkachev suggested in one of his
tion that he hadprovided to the amount of information in the
notes that he wanted to consider
CIA on the new technology with shortest time. He wrote that he
donating some of his salary to the
which the Soviets would reequip knew that the end may come at
Russian dissident movement. He
this aircraft.
any moment, but it does not said that previously he had not
frighten me and I will work to raised this possibility because he
the end.
In his note, Tolkachev claimed thrn he had had not yet worked out the mat
learned how much Belenko was paid from Se ter of his CIA compensation and
corny personnel who periodically briefed the In the next meeting in December that, I would not like to divide
scienhlsts at his institute.
1979, Tolkachev said that he up the hide of an unkilled bear.

16
 Tolkachev

The only secure

manner was to
photograph documents
Now that agreement had been changing the film, Tolkachev was
in the mens toilet.
reached to pay him certain funds, to return the entire camera each
however, he said that he wanted time that he completed a roll.
to consider how some of these
funds might be made available to
the families of dissidents who New Security Practices at
had been repressed by the Soviet photographing sensitive insti Work
authorities. The hard part would tute documents would be for him
be to find a way to do this to take them home over the lunch The forethought in issuing
securely, and he asked for the hour, while his wife would still be Tolkachev the new spy cameras

CIAs ideas. As it turned out, no at the office and his son would be proved worthwhile. Tolkachevs
such arrangement was ever at school. As
result of this sug
a institute initiated new security
made, presumably because no gestion, in June 1979 he was procedures in December 1979. In

way could be found to do this passed a Pentax ME 35-mm cam the past, institute staffers could
without possibly compromising era and clamp to hold the camera check out an unlimited number of
Tolkachev. steady by attaching it to the back sensitive documents from the
of a chair. institute library, as long as they
were returned before the close of
Dealing With a Camera The results immediately justi business that same day. Now,
Problem fied the change in cameras. In such documents could only be
the April and June 1979 meet checked out by leaving ones
Another vitally important issue ings, Tolkachev had passed over building pass at the library.
that took some time to work out a dozen rolls of film taken with Tolkachev was no longer able to
concerned how Tolkachev could the miniature camera, but almost take the documents to his apart
best collect the large quantities of all were unreadable. in meet ment to photograph, because he

highly technical data to which he ings held in October and could not leave the building with
had access. The miniature cam December 1979, after the receipt out showing his pass.
era passed to him in February of the Pentax, he provided more
1979 had a number of limita than 150 rolls of film shot at For several months, Tolkachev
tions. Although it allowed for home, all of excellent
quality. was reduced to photographing
70 to 80 exposures per roll, it Accompanying notes included documents at his institute using
required more light than was new intelligence and explana the new spy cameras. He
normally available for the pho tions of the documents he had informed the CIA that the only
tography done by Tolkachev at photographed. secure manner of doing so was to

his office. More important, its photograph documents in the

small size made it almost impos CIA headquarters continued, mens toilet. Despite the danger
sible to hold steady, frequently meanwhile, to work on giving and the difficulty, he exposed all
resulting in blurred photos. Tolkachev the capability to pho the frames of four of his six min
Tolkachev also complained that it tograph documents at his office, iature cameras during this
clicked too loudly, and that he should that prove necessary. In period, which he passed to his
had to stack several books in October 1979, the agent was CIA case officer in a personal
order to get the camera at the passed updated spy cameras
two meeting in February 1980.
right 13-inch height to take fabricated by 0Th; in December,
photos. he received four more. The cam Nonetheless, Tolkachev pre
eras, disguised in a suitable ferred to do his photography at
Tolkachev suggested that he be concealment device, had a capac home with his 35-mm Pentax.
given a regular 35-mm camera. ity of some 100 shots per roll of He continued to be dissatisfied
He said that the best method for film. Given the intricacy of with the CIAs miniature

17
Tolkachev

cameras, saying that the low amount he was ever able to turn no action was taken on such an

light conditions were difficult to over in one meeting. initiative.)

overcome and that he had a hard
time trying to hold the camera An April 1980 internal CIA mem
still while
shooting. In addition, orandum called Tolkachevs
Rave Reviews
the cameras periodically information on jam-proofing tests

malfunctioned. for Sovietfighter aircraft radar

Meanwhile, customer satisfac
systems uniquesuch data,
tion with Tolkachevs
reporting
To deal with the new security sought for many years, was not
remainedextremely high. A
restrictions, Tolkachev suggested obtainable by national technical
December 1979 Defense Depart
that the CIA fabricate a copy of means. In June 1980, Tolkachev
ment memorandum to the DCI
his building pass. He could then was credited with providing
said that, as a result of
leave the fakebuilding pass at unique information on a new
Tolkachevs information, the Air
the library when checking out Soviet aircraft design, extensive
Force had completely reversed its
documents, while using his real information on modifications to
direction on a multi-million dol
pass to exit and reenter the another Soviet fighter aircraft,
lar electronics package for one of
building over the lunch hour. He and documents on several new
its latest fighter aircraft. Fur
suggested that he could lose his models of airborne missile sys
thermore, in March 1980, a
pass so that he could turn it over tems. The next month, another
to hiscase officer to be copied.
preliminary internal CIA evalua internal memorandum stated
tion highly praised Tolkachevs
Instead, for his protection, he that, even if Tolkachevs spying
information the latest genera
on
was asked to take color photos were discovered, the value of the
tion of Soviet surface-to-air
and provide a physical descrip information that he had pro
missile systems, stating: We
tion of the pass, which OTS could vided would not diminish for at
never before obtained such detail
use to try to make a duplicate. least eight yearsit would
to 10
and understanding of such sys
take the Soviets that long to
tems until years after they were
Meanwhile, by good fortune the design, test, and deploy new tech
actually deployed. The evalua
new security restrictions were nology to replace that which the
tion also noted that the
canceled in February 1980. The agent had compromised to the
information jibed with data pro CIA.
change in procedures had worked
duced by national technical
a hardship on the women who
worked at the institute, who con
means, but that it added impor The kudos continued. In Septem
tant details that other collection
stituted a majority of the staff. ber 1980, a memorandum from
The systems could not provide. the Defense Department stated:
women complained that they
needed to leave the institute dur The impact of TolkachevsJ
ing the lunch hour to do their Also in March 1980, consider reporting is limitless in terms of
shopping, but they could not ation was given to having cleared enhancing US military systems
return any sensitive documents Defense Department personnel effectiveness, and in the poten
that they might have checked out work on the translation of back tial to save lives and equipment.
from the library and retrieve their logged materials provided by It also called the information
building passes, because the Tolkachev, due to the inability of instrumental in shaping the
library was closed for lunch. This CIA translators to keep up with course of billions of dollars of US
enabled Tolkachev to resume pho this task. It was estimated that R&D activities, and described the
tographing documents at home. it would take eight clerks and value of Tolkachevs information
The benefits to the operation were three Russian-language transla to these programs as immense.
immediately visible: In June tors, working full time for seven
1980, Tolkachev passed almost to eight weeks, to process these From January 1979 until June
200 rolls of
film, the largest materials! (In the end, however, 1980, Tolkachev had provided an

18
 Tolkachev

Tolkachev reiterated
his request. but the . .

DCI refused to
extremely high volume of incredi thing the KGB would do would be
authorize the issuance
bly valuable intelligence to the to search his apartment, and
US military. This information of a poison p111. athings that I can hide from my
could have meant the difference family I can never hide from the
between victory and defeat, KGB. Given this situation, he
should a military confrontation said that it should be easier to
with the USSR have occurred. understand his efforts to obtain
the means of defense as soon as
Alter being told of this decision,
Tolkachev wrote letter to the
possible. By having a means to
a
Plans for Contingencies commit suicide, Tolkachev said
DCI pleading his case; he gave
that he would be able to keep
the letter to his case officer dur
In the early stages of the opera secret the volume of his activity
ing his June 1980 meeting. In it,
tion, the CIA had to consider how and the methods by which he was
he detailed the risks he was run
and when ultimately to end it. able to carry out this activity.
ning and insisted that he be
This included potential exfiltra Incredibly, Tolkachev was not
given the means to commit sui
tion arrangements, given the only thinking about his personal
cide, if necessary, because of his
tremendous value of Tolkachevs situation, but he was pointing
information and the high risks
precarious security situation. out the importance of preventing
Because of the large number of
that he was running. Headquar the Soviets from finding out
intelligence requirements he had he had passed to
ters had quickly concurred in exactly what
been given, he said that he could
offering exfiltration to Tolkachev the Americans, which would
not answer many of them with
and his family, but it wanted to greatly complicate their efforts to
out obtaining documents to
delay any actual departure from carry out a damage assessment,
which he did not normally have
the USSR for several years, if when and if he were
access. To satisfy these require
possible, to take maximum compromised.
ments, he had to check out
advantage of his access.
quantities of sensitive docu
In this June 1980 note, Tolkachev
ments from the institute library.
Tolkachev had also been think also responded to the CIAs sug
Each time he did so, he had to
ing about the eventual end of his gestion that a dialogue begin on
sign out the documents which
relationship with the CIA, but in the subject of his eventual exfil
had originated with his institute
somewhat different terms. In the tration to the United States with
but which were outside of the
note that he passed in April his wife and son. He specifically
purview of his own work. Worse,
1979, he had requested that he requested that these exfiltration
he had to obtain prior written
be issued a poison pill, writing, I preparations be made as soon as
permission from any other Soviet
would not like to carry on a con possible, and he asked to be noti
research institutes or agencies
versation with organs of the fied of what he had to do to
whose documents he wanted to
KGB. He reiterated this request support this planning.
obtain.
in his October 1979 note and
made it a steady theme in his

messages to the CIA from that Tolkachev emphasized that, if the Turnover
point onward. The CIA officers KGB ever for any reason sus
handling this case at first pected that information was The handing over of an agent
resisted these requests, but grad being leaked on the research from his first case officer to a suc

ually concluded that Tolkachev activities on which he was work cessor always a signal event in
is
would not be put off. The matter ing, a review of the document any agent operation. Although
was then referred to the DCI, sign-out permission cards would John Guilsher had not actually
who refused to authorize the quickly finger him as the leading recruited Tolkachev, he had
issuance of a poison pill. suspect. He said that the next been the agents first handler and

19
Tolkacttev

Headquarters
proposed the use of the
latest and best Short-
he had moved the operation from tive unit one letter at a time.
its initial, halting steps into a Range Agent The messages were automati
smooth relationship. He had Communication cally enciphered as they were

made Tolkachev feel confident System. keyed into the units. The units
that he could be depended on to had a capacity of several thou
protect his security, and the two sand characters. With no major
had become comfortable with physical obstructions between
each other in the dangerous them, the units had a range in
endeavor in which they were the hundreds of meters. They
involved. It was time, however, out walking. Gradually, meet were programmed to exchange

for Guilsher to leave Moscow, and ings in Tolkachevs parked car messages in a burst transmis
the CIA had some concern that were incorporated into the meet sion that lasted only seconds.
Tolkachev might react nega ing plan and used throughout the The messages could then be read
tively to the introduction of a duration of the operation. by scrolling the deciphered text
new case officer. Nonetheless, on across the units small screen.

14 October 1980, Tolkachev met

for the first time with his new Alternate Communications The use of this communications
case officer and showed no hesi method was highly structured.
tation in accepting him. An In September 1980, CIA head In this operation, it would be up
important milestone had been quarters suggested that planning to the agent to initiate any SRAC

passed. begin for the possible use of exchange. To start the process,
Short-Range Agent Communica Tolkachev would be directed to
Tolkachev told his new case tions (SRAC) with Tolkachev, as mark predetermined signal site
a

officer at their first meeting that an emergency backup communi (a chalkmark on a utility pole) in
he had purchased a new car, a cations system. It could be used accordance with a periodic (nor
Russian Zhiguli; and he insisted if Tolkachev wanted an emer mally monthly) timetable. A case
that the meeting be held in the gency meeting or there were a officer would monitor this site,
car, which was parked nearby. need for a briefexchange of data which would be on a street regu
He suggested that, in the future. without the risk of a personal larly used by the officer.
other meetings could be held in meeting.
the car. If the agent marked the signal,
Headquarters proposed the use of this would initiate a sequence of
The CIA ultimately agreed that the latest and best SRAC system events leading up to a SRAC

personal meetings in Tolkachevs available at the time. It con exchange. Both the agent and a

parked car were a sensible com sisted of two identical units, one caseofficer would go to prear
plement to walking meetings. for the case officers use and one ranged electronic letter drop
Although the cars license plates for the agents use. These units (ELD) sites at a predetermined
were traceable to the agent, there were about the size of two ciga time. These sites would be close
was no reason for the KGB to pay rette packs laid end to end. Each enough to allow a SRAC
particular attention to these unit came with detachable anten exchange while being far enough
plates, should they see the car nas, Russian English keyboard
or apart so that there could be no

parked with two people sitting in plates, battery packs and batter apparent visual connection
it. The CIA caseofficers meeting ies, chargers, and instructions. between the case officer and the
with Tolkachev always dressed agent. Primary alternate sites
like working class Russians. In Before any planned transmis and times for ELD exchanges
cold weather, it would appear sion, both the agent and the case were built into the communica
more natural for two people to be officer entered their messages by tions system. There were also
seated in a warm car than to be keying them into their respec prearranged signals for the agent

20
 Tolkachev

to convey that he did or did not an unscheduledpersonal meet this system, Tolkachev could
receive the message transmitted ing days after a
just three receive over 400 five-digit groups

to him. In the Tolkachev opera regular meeting. The purpose of in any one message.
tion, these signals were to be this unscheduled meeting was to
parked car signals (PCS)that allow him to provide a critique of Tolkachev tried to use this IOWL
is, the agent would park his car a the first cut of the fake building system, but he later informed his
certain way at a certain place at pass that OTS had made. Anx case officer that he was unable to

a given time to indicate that he ious to obtain this pass so that he securely monitor these broad
did or did not successfully receive could safely check out sensitive casts at the times indicated
the SRAC transmission. In documents, Tolkachev resorted to (evening hours) because he had
return, the CIA would use a PCS using the SRAC system. no privacy in his apartment. He

to convey the same information also said that he could not adhere
to the agent. SRAC the only alternate
was not to a different evening broadcast
communications method intro schedule by waiting until his wife
The idea of using SRAC was duced into thisoperation. In and son went to bed, because he
broached with Tolkachev in a November 1981, Tolkachev was always went to bed before they
note passed to him in the Octo passed a commercially pur did.
ber 1980 meeting. He responded chased short wave radio and two
positively in December 1980, one-time pads, with accompany As a result, the broadcasts were

and, in March 1981, a SRAC unit ing instructions, as part of an changed to the morning hours of
and the accompanying parapher Interim-One-Way Link (IOWL) certain workdays, during which
nalia and communications plan base-to-agent alternate commu Tolkachev would come home from
were passed to him. nication system. He was also work using a suitable pretext.
passed a demodulator unit, which This system also ran afoul of bad
Some technical bugs had to be was to be connected to the short luck and Soviet security.
worked out before this system wave radio when a message was Tolkachevs institute initiated
could be used successfully. As it to be received. new security procedures that
developed, it was decided not to made it virtually impossible for
meet To]kachev for an extended Tolkachev was directed to tune him to leave the office during
period after his March 1981 into a certain short wave fre work hours without written per
meeting to decrease the fre quency at specific times and days mission. In December 1982,
quency of contact with him and with his demodulator unit con Tolkachev returned his IOWL
thus reduce the chance that the nected to his radio to capture the equipment, broadcast schedule,
KGB might stumble onto his message being sent. Each broad instructions, and one-time pad to
activities. Consequently, the cast lasted 10 minutes, which his case officer. The CIA was

agent was not met again until included the transmission of any never able to usethis system to
November 1981, at which time he live message as well as dummy set up an unscheduled meeting
returned his SRAC unit, saying messages. The agent could later with him.
that he could not get it to work. break out the message by scroll
The unit was repaired and ing it out on the screen of the Excellent tradecraft and good
returned to him later. demodulator unit. The first luck conspired to allow the CIA
three digits of the message would to continue its pattern of unde
In March 1982, the agent sig indicate whether alive message tected personal encounters with
naled for SRAC exchange, and
a was included for him, in which Tolkachev. Over 10 such meet
a successful exchange of SRAC case he would scroll out the mes ings were held between October
messages was carried out on 13 sage, contained in five-digit 1980 and November 1983. There
March. Tolkachev had asked for groups, and decode the message were someinstances where heavy
the exchange because he wanted using his one-time pad. Using KGB surveillance on CIA officers

21
Tolkachev

Defeating the phonel

forced
a given meeting
aborted, but for the most part
they were held as scheduled.
The periodically heavy KGB sur
habits of a typical
to be
teenager was more
suspected CIA personnel in gen
than either the CIA or
eral would be increased
the agent could temporarily. Nonetheless, at
manage! times the use of this technique
was the only way that a case

veillance on various case officers, officer could get free to meet with
often without any apparent logic, Tolkachev.
did, however, force the CIA to
become more creative in its per The communications plan with
sonal-meeting tradecraft. A new the car. The JIB, again con Tolkachev had to be adjusted in
countersurveillance technique cealed in a large package, would other ways as well. In Novem
that was used for this operation then be removed from the car. At ber 1983, Tolkachev asked that
involved what was called a Jack thatpoint, the case officer would he not be called at home to set up
in-the-Box (JIB). A JIB (a almost certainly be missed by the unscheduled meetings, because
popup device made to look like KBG surveillants, because he the phone was now located in his
the upper half of a person) would not get out of the car, but sons room and it was his son who
allowed a case officer to make a they would have no hope of locat always answered the phone.
meeting with an agent even ing him until he returned to a Although the CIA could defeat
while under vehicular known site. KGB surveillance, defeating the
surveillance. habits of a typical teenager was
Meanwhile, the case officer, hav more than either it or the agent
Typically, a JIB would be smug ing exited the car wearing a could manage!
gled into a car disguised as a Russian-style coat and hat,
large package or the like. Sub would proceed by foot and public

sequently Tolkachevs case officer transportation to the meeting Favors for Oleg
and other station personnel site, after assuring himself that
would set out in the car many he indeed was free of surveil Tolkachevs desire to satisfy some

hours before a planned meeting lance. After conducting the of the needs of his high
son was

with the agent. Following a pre
planned route, the driver at some
point would make a series of
turns designed to provide a brief
period when the trailing surveil
lance car would lose sight of the
car containing the case officer
and other CIA personnel. After
meeting, he would use public
transportation to return to the
Embassy or to his home. This
method of avoiding surveillance
was used successfully several
times for meetings with
Tolkachev.
on the
agents list of reasons for
maintaining his relationship
with US intelligence. Oleg liked
Western rock-and-roll music. In
the note that Tolkachev passed to
the case officer at his October
1980 meeting, he asked to be pro
vided with some popular records

one of these turns, Tolkachevs It was preferable not to overuse for passage to his son. He also
case officer would
jump from the this technique because the KGB requested Western stereo equip
slowly moving vehicle, at which would be well aware that the ment. Finally, he asked for
tine the driver would activate case officer had eluded surveil advice on how he could depend

the JIB. The JIB would give the lance and that almost certainly ably receive Western radio
appearance to any trailing sur some operational act had been broadcasts, which were fre
veillance team of being the carried out. Typically iii such sit quently jammed by Soviet
missing case officer. The car uations, some KGB retaliation authorities.
would then continue its route, could be expectedsuch as air let

eventually arriving at a given out of the case officers tires, cars In response, the CIA provided
destination, usually the home of blocked the street, or other
on seven cassettes of taped rock
one of the other CIA personnel in harassmentand surveillance of and-roll music during a March

22
 Tolkachev

Consideration was
given to the possibility
of compensating him in
1981 meeting, despite concerns black-market rate (which in his
that having such cassettes could part with expensive mind was the real rate of

pose a security threat. Tolkachev jewelry or gold coins. exchange) rather than the offi
said that the CIA should not cial rate. By his calculations, he

worry, because such music was should have received more than
available in the Russian black four times the amount of rubles
market, but he himself did not that he had been given.
want to be bothered trying to
books on architecture for Oleg, as
track it down there. He then
well as other Western books, CIA officials managing this case
requested stereo headphones for that Tolkachevs informa
which apparently were for both agreed
his son, some albums, and the tion well worth the he
him and his son. The books was sums
words of the songs in these
included Hitlers Mein Kampf a was seeking, and it was decided
albums in English. He also
copy of the Bible (in Russian), the to meet his request starting the
asked that he be given the words There was, how
hA publication Soviet Military following year.
to the songs on the seven cas
Power, the memoirs of Golda ever, great concern about the
settes that had been previously
Meir, and a Solzhenitsyn book. large amounts of funds that he
taped for his son.
He also asked for biographies of would be receiving. Any unusual
famous world figures and a selec spending by Tolkachev or his
This effort to do favors for Oleg tion of popular Western fiction. family could easily be noticed by
continued. In March 1982,
Although all indications are that the Soviet authorities and lead to
Tolkachev reluctantly asked his son was never made witting a security investigation. Because
more personal favors. He
of Tolkachevs CIA role, he of the fears that such large
requested a Walkman for his son, clearly was a beneficiary. amounts of rubles could cause
as well as a set of pencils of vari
security problems, consideration
ous degrees of hardness for Oleg
was given to the possibility of
to use for mechanical drawing. More Money Matters compensating him in part with
He also asked for some non-
expensive jewelry or gold coins.
Soviet razor blades, writing that Tolkachevs remuneration contin
shaving with Soviet razor blades ued to be a subject of negotiation.
is an unpleasant operation. He In later written exchanges,
In December 1980, he asked that
apologized for asking for such the 8.75 percent interest that his Tolkachev agreed that he might
trivial things, noting that, unfor accumulating be partially compensated with
escrow salary was

tunately our personal life
consists also of all types of small
things which sometimes exert an
influence general mood of
the
on
life. CIA personnel in Eastern
Europe were ultimately tasked
with purchasing a local razor and
a years supply of razor blades for
be paid to him in rubles at the
end of each calendar year.
Despite the obvious security
cerns, this request was granted.
In November 1981, Tolkachev
was passed an amount of rubles
equivalent to over $40,000, which
was the amount of interest to
very fine gold Russian-made
jewelry from the late 19th or
con early 20th century. He noted
that such jewelry could be rea
sonably explained as having been
left to him by his mother. CIA
headquarters subsequently con
ducted a search of antique shops

passage to Tolkachev. which he would be entitled as of and other possible sources in

In February 1983, Tolkachev
asked for various drafting mate
rials for his son, including
specialized drafting pens, inks,
erasers, and pen tips. In April
31 December of that year. Even London, Rome, Paris, Helsinki,
this, however, did not satisfy him. Munich, New York, and Washing
ton, to locate and purchase such
In February 1982, Tolkachev pieces. This proved to be quite
wrote the CIA that the conver difficult, but eventually some
sion of his interest from dollars items were found and passed to

1983, he asked for some Western to rubles should be done at the Tolkachev.

23
Tolkacbev

In December 1982, Tolkachev sonnel in the Soviet Union were cially constructed hiding cavity
again raised thesubject of his tasked to devise workable exfil in the vehicle. The secondary
remuneration, but with a differ tration scenarios, including the option would be a vehicle pickup
ent twist. He said that he would casing of signal sites and agent on the outskirts of Moscow, the
like to create a relatively large pickup sites, while CIA head smuggling of Tolkachev and fam
reserve of money in case of quarters took on the task of ily into a secure holding area,
unforeseen events. He noted manufacturing containers in and their subsequent removal
that, if a full breakdown which the agent and his family from the country by controlled
occurred in his activity, no could be smuggled out of the aircraft or overland by specially
amount of money would help. If, USSR. modified vehicle.
however, a partial breakdown
occurredsuch as a co-worker Tolkachev appeared highly inter There was some discussion of
catching him hiding materials or ested in this subject, once it had actually issuing an exfiltration
taking classified materials been broached. One of plan with suitable alternatives to
homehe might be able to bribe Tolkachevs former case officers Tolkachev at his next meeting, in
his way out. CIA headquarters recalls that Tolkachev would March 1983, but it was decided to
never liked this idea, and ulti discuss the subject with him in
periodically brainstorm on the
mately it was discarded. subject, suggesting wildly depth at that time to ensure that
improbable scenarios, such as the CIAs tentative plans made
having the CIA fly a specially sense to him and to seek more
Exfiltration Planning made light aircraft into a rural information from him to aid in
area of the Soviet Union, where the planning for this eventual
The CIA was also focused on the Tolkachev and his family could ity. This was done in a written
need to construct a viable plan be picked up. When discussing note, which was passed to
for removing Tolkachev and his that particular possibility, he Tolkachev at the March meet
family from the USSR in the noted that the only problem ing. In this note, it
was proposed

event of a perceived threat of might be that such an aircraft to meet again with Tolkachev in
arrest. This subject had first designed to evade Soviet aircraft April to get feedback from him
been raised with Tolkachev in detection systems might have and to allow for in-depth discus
December 1979. He responded in trouble accommodating his wife, sions of an exfiltration plan.
February 1980 that he had never due to her weight!
considered leaving the USSR, but Tolkachev was met in
April 1983
that, if the CIA could get him and The subject of exfiltration came as planned. He
refused, how
his family out of the country, he again in January 1983, follow ever, to accept an envelope that
up
would like to pursue planning for ing the initiation of new security had been prepared for him out
such an eventuality. At this regulations at Tolkachevs insti lining an exfiltration plan with
point, however, he informed the tute, which suggested at least the various alternatives. He said
CIA that his wife and son were possibility that the Soviets might that because of his current fam
totally unwitting of his intelli have become aware of the leak ily situation, he did not want to
gence work, and thus the whole age of sensitive information from consider exfiltration at that time.
question of their possible exfiltra that institute. It agreed
was that
tion would take some a Leningrad option would be In a written note, Tolkachev
deliberation. preferable if Tolkachev and his explained further his unwilling
family were able to get out of ness to accept an exfiltration
After the June 1980 meeting, Moscow. This would involve a plan. He wrote that he and his
planning for the possible exfiltra vehicular pick Leningrad
up in wife had some acquaintances
tion of Tolkachev and his family and subsequent smuggling across who had left the Soviet Union for
proceeded sporadically. CIA per- the border into Finland in a spe Israel, and eventually ended up

24

in the United States. The
in this family had subsequently
written to Tolkachevs
how much she missed her home
land. Tolkachev said that his
wife had commented that she
could never leave Moscow, let
alone the Soviet Union, because
she would suffer too much nos
talgia. Similarly, Tolkachev
wrote that his son had
mented (presumably in response
to elicitation effort by his
an
father) that, It would not be too
bad to travel to the West for two
or three years, but he could
never leave the Soviet Union for
good because all his friends
there.
Tolkachev said that, given this
situation, I cannot think about
exfiltration since I would
leave my family. Nonetheless,
he provided written answers to
the questions that had been
posed, so that exfiltration plan
ning could continue, against the
day that his family situation
somehow changed.
Protecting Production
By mid-1980, the
operation
settled into a regular routine,
with Tolkachev taking docu
ments home during his luncheon
break for photographing. The
main limiting factor at this time
was the weather. In winter,
Tolkachev was able to smuggle
large quantities of documents out
of the institute under his heavy
clothing. In summer, lighter
clothing restricted how much he
could sneak out.
Tolkachev
I cannot think about
exfiltration since I
would never leave my
woman OTS was given the task of repro
family. ducing this sign-out card as well
wife about as his building pass. Both were
completed by early 1981 and
passed to Tolkachev. He substi
tuted the fake sign-out card for
his real card in March 1981,
greatly relieving the pressure he
Meanwhile, CIA headquarters
felt, at least for the immediate
continued to work on a fake
future. He had returned his fake
building pass for Tolkachev that
com building pass, however, because
he could use to check out docu
the color of the outside cover was
ments, should tighter security
not quite right. Fortunately at
restrictions be re-imposed. In
the time, the institute was still
October 1980, headquarters
under somewhat relaxed secu
reported that OTS hoped to have
rity procedures, and Tolkachev
a final version of the fake pass in
was able to sign out documents
November.
were without leaving his building pass.
That same month, Tolkachev In November 1981, however, he
passed to the CIA a document reported that his institute had
sign-out permission card from his reinitiated the procedure by
institutes document library. He which the
never building pass had to be
asked that the Agencys techni left at the document library when
cal experts also try to duplicate signing out documents. By then,
this card. He wanted to use it to OTS had completed the fake
replace the real one surrepti building pass and it was included
tiously, because the card in the materials passed to the
contained a full listing of the agent during a meeting held that
large volume of sensitive docu month. The following month,
ments that Tolkachev had signed however, Tolkachev called for an
out, most of which he had unscheduled meeting to return
obtained to photograph for the the fake pass againthe color
CIA. The agent had long wor was still not right. He noted that
ried that, if and when any leak he would not need his original
had occurred in the United States pass while on extended vacation
that indicated that sensitive in January and February and
information from his institute could lend it for use in fabricat
had been compromised, the ing the fake pass. He stressed
KGBs first recourse would be to his concern that his production
check the document sign-out would fall off if this problem were
cards, and, indoing, they
so not solved. The case officer
would quickly finger Tolkachev resisted the temptation to take
as a likely culprit. If, however, he his pass at the meeting, reason
could substitute a clean sign- ing that there was no guarantee
out card, there would be nothing that a case officer could make a
on the record to point to him as a subsequent meeting with the
possible suspect. agent within a given time frame
25
Tolkachev
to return the pass, which made
givingup his pass too risky.
Tolkachev was told that a fall off
in production would be prefera
ble to his doing something that
could dramatically increase the
chance of his being compromised.
Despite the increased security
restrictions at his institute and
the difficulties in fabricating an
exact replica of his building pass,
Tolkachev continued to produce
documentary intelligence, albeit
at a reduced rate. In December
1981, he
passed several rolls of
35-mm film; in February 1982, he
provided more than a dozen rolls.
Asked how he had managed to
continue to do this photography,
given the security restrictions in
place. Tolkachev said he was
able to resort to various ruses,
too complicated to explain in
their entirety.
Subsequently, Tolkachev pro
vided another story that he had
concocted to bypass these secu
rity regulations. He noted that
sometimes, after leaving his
building pass and checking out a
document, he would return to get
his pass so that he could go home
for lunch, explaining that he
could not return the documents
he had checked out because his
boss was currently reviewing
them. He would then take the
documents home and photo
graph them. When the case
officer commented that this
dangerous, Tolkachev laughed
and said, Everything is
dangerous.
Tolkachev called for an unsched
uled meeting in March 1982 to
26
Tolkachev gave the
case officer a piece
torn off his pass so that
OTS could work with
the exact colors to
make a duplicate].
provide additional feedback on
the fake building pass that OTS
had produced. This time, he gave
the case officer a piece that he
had torn off his pass so that OTS
could work with the exact colors.
A number of meetings had been
held between November 1981
and May 1982, primarily insti
gated by Tolkachev in an effort to
solve his building pass problem.
It was decided in May that, for
security reasons, these personal
contacts should be halted for
eral months. Later, heavy, but
apparently routine, KGB surveil
lance of CIA case officers in the
latter half of 1982 forced several
planned meetings to be aborted.
It was only through the CLNs
first use of its JIB technique that
they were able to reestablish per
sonal contact with Tolkachev in
December 1982.
At this December meeting, the
agent said that for the first time
he had successfully used the
OTS-fabricated building pass
smuggle sensitive documents
to photograph at his home.
was Nonetheless, Tolkachev was
depressed because his produc
tion was down, as a result of a
new, two-tiered building pass sys
tem set up at the institute. Now,
he and all but a few of the most
senior officers had to turn in
their building pass anytime they
left the building. To reenter, they
needed to go to the main desk
and give their pass number to
the guard to reclaim their pass.
Even worse, because the new
passes were different from their
predecessors, the fake OTS pass
was now useless.
In addition, Tolkachev and all
other staffers at the institute
now needed to get signed permis
sion slips from their bosses to
leave the institute during work
ing hours, except for going home
for lunch. This meant that it was
virtually impossible for
Tolkachev to go to his apartment
on the indicated mornings to lis
ten to his short wave radio for
possible IOWL messages. He
requested a camera that he could
sev use to photograph documents at
his office, despite his past diffi
culties in doing so.
CIA headquarters speculated
that the Soviets might have
learned that sensitive informa
tion on the projects being worked
on in this institute had leaked to
the United States. It recom
mended that Tolkachev be
directed to stand down for six
months (later modified to sev
eral months). Headquarters
also opposed issuing Tolkachev a
to special camera for use in his
out office as being too risky, but said
that the agent should be
informed that he would bekept
on full
salary during any stand
down in his operational
activities.
At meetings held in February
and March 1983, the CIA case
 Tolkachev

officer continued his discussions reduced the agents productivity requested. All the physical signs
with Tolkachev regarding how to until his arrest at some still- from this meeting were positive,
keep the operation productive in undetermined date in the first except for the agents inability to
the face of the heightened secu half of 1985. photograph any documents.
rity restrictions. At the March
meeting, Tolkachev provided a Between September and Novem
strip from his new building pass ber 1983, five attempts to hold a Security Threat
and a photograph of it so that meeting with Tolkachev failed.
OTS could try to duplicate it. He On three occasions, the agent sig When Tolkachevs written notes
said that he had smuggled his naled a readiness to meet but did from this meeting were pro
35-mm camera into his office on not appear at the meeting site at cessed, however, the CIA officers
three consecutive days until he the appointed time. On two involved in the case were

could photograph it clandes other occasions, the agent sig stunned to read that a serious
tinely at his desk! naled a readiness to meet, but no security threat to the agent had
appropriate CIA case officer was occurred the previous spring
Tolkachev continued to do some able to shake surveillance and one that had frightened him to
document photography in spite of show up at the meeting site. the point where he had been con

the security restrictions. He Tolkachev later said that he had vinced that he would be arrested
turned over more than a dozen been unable to make the three at any moment.

rolls of 35-mm film at the March meetings he missed due to minor

meeting with his case officer and but unavoidable problems, but he In his note, Tolkachev said that a

another dozen-plus rolls at an had gone to the meeting site for major security investigation had
April meeting. the two meetings that the case been conducted in his office in
officer had had to abort. April 1983, apparently regarding
To deal with these restrictions possible leaks of classified infor
while at the same time heeding Finally, in mid-November, mation about a particular Soviet
the agents desire to remain pro Tolkachev and his case officer fighter aircraft target-recogni
ductive, CIA headquarters met. The agent appeared relaxed tion system. Tolkachev said that
decided in May to issue him at and happy to be back in touch. security personnel in his insti
the next opportunity the latest He provided 16 pages of hand tute had requested on a priority
miniature camera in its inven written notes but no film, noting basis a list of all personnel hav
tory, which was the third that for security reasons he had ing access to information on this
generation of such cameras. been unable to photograph any subject. Because Tolkachev had
Meanwhile, for security reasons documents. The case officer gave passed information on this sys
Tolkachev would be directed to Tolkachev a note discussing secu tem to the CIA the previous
stand down completely from tak rity matters, some new month, he was convinced that
ing any documents home to requirements, two new concealed any leak would almost certainly
photograph. mini cameras with accompany be traced back to him.
ing instructions, a light meter,

some additional
questions Tolkachev wrote that, after hav
The Beginning of the End regarding the efforts to duplicate ing been informed of this
his document sign-out card, a investigation, he had asked for
The summer and
early autumn proposed meeting schedule for the next day off. He had driven
months of 1983 were harbingers the future, some pieces of gold to a dacha, taking all of his espio
that the best days of the jewelry of the type he had speci nage paraphernaliaincluding
Tolkachev operation were over. fied, and some books of fiction his SEAC unit, Pentax camera,
From then on, various problems and architecture that he had and deaddrop and signal site

27
Tolkachev

He drove to a dacha,
taking all of his spy
instructionsas well the
paraphernalia... Land] the
as Agency itself could have
books and money that had been
burned everything.
taken placesomething that was

passed to him.1 At the dacha, he unthinkable in CIA eyes, until

had burned everything that the treason of CIA officer Aldrich
would burn. He had thrown the Ames.~
remaining charred metal parts
out of the car on the drive back
Over the next several months,
into Moscow.
mation about sensitive intense discussions took place
documents. inside the CIA regarding how
At that point, Tolkachev said best to protect Tolkachev, while
that he had started carrying still trying to keep the operation
Tolkachev had prepared his writ
everywhere with him a poison ten account of these
going. It was agreed that meet
April events
pill that he had obtained. He in the expectation of a meeting
ings in the future should be held
reasoned that the most likely to a minimum, probably only
with the CIA in September. With
scenario for his arrest would be a twice yearly, with a possible re
each missed meeting, he added a
call to his bosss
office, at which issuance of a SRAC capability. In
few pages, each time showing
point he would be seized. As a
increased confidence that he had
addition, a revised communica
result, for the next several days, tions system was planned. There
weathered the storm and would
also great deal of discus
any time he called to this
was was a
be able to continue his work for
office, he first
placed poison the sion about the problem of trying
the CIA. Meanwhile, as noted
pill under his tongue, so that if to get the funds to Tolkachev that
above, Tolkachev had acted quite
seized he could immediately bite were owed him (the yearly inter
calmly at his 16 November meet
it. Given these circumstances, est onhis escrow account), in
ing, giving no sign at that time
wrote Tolkachev, he would have that he had suffered this tremen
light of the physical difficulties of
to stand down on any document dous A passing large sums of money to
scare. subsequent CIA
for the time him and the possible security
photography being. message from Moscow to head
He threat posed by his having such
said, however, that he would quarters commented that
sums in his possession. Finally,
continue to provide written infor Tolkachevs continued sang froid,
it was agreed that a complete
despite the events of April, dem
exfiltration plan should be pre
onstrated that this is indeed a
4 This was the first information on
driven man who is determined to
pared and passed to the agent at
record to indicate that Tolkachev had the next meeting.
purchased a dachapresumably at
continue to produce, by whatever
least partly with the funds that he had means he deems necessary, right
earned from the CIA. Such a purchase up to the end, even if that end is Headquarters directed that
tended to belie his earlier assertions his death. Tolkachev be advised to exercise
that he would not spend money rashly extreme caution in his intelli
and had no real desire to have a dacha
CIA headquarters in turn noted gence-gathering activities. He
of his own The new car that he showed
was not to take any more docu
off when he met with his case officer in in a message sent to Moscow that
ments home to photograph. The
October 1980 presumably also was pur the information provided by
chased at least partly with CIA funds.
CIA decided that he should be
Tolkachev in March on the Soviet
Despite his protestations that his told to limit his activities for the
fighter aircraft target recogni
spending habits would not compromise tion system had not been
his CIA role, Tolkachev apparently did
disseminated outside of the CIA
want, at least to some degree, to enjoy Ames was arrested in March 1994. He
the fruits of his CIA labors. There is
until June, and thus no leak of
no ultimately pleaded guilty to committing
indication, however, that these purchas this information could have espionage for the Soviet Union over a
es played any part in his eventual com occurred. This ignored, of course, long period and was sentenced to life in
promise. the possibility that a leak from prison.

28
 Tolkachev

Headquarters
reaffinned that it was
too dangerous for
most part to writing down at erasall 90 frames came out
home notes sensitive docu
him to be given
on clearlyand turned over another
ments that he had read in the another 35-mm 22 pages of written notes. The
office that day. It was decided to camera. agent in turn was passed three
continue the practice of passing new miniature cameras, a note,
miniature CIA cameras to the various medicines, architects
agent, but to tell him to use them drawing ink for his son, and some
only if he felt completely secure intelligence requirements.
in doing so. Tolkachev said that everything
twice a year, and he asked for was normal at work and that his
In April 1984, Tolkachev again several new mini-cameras and health had improved. He again
signaled his readiness to meet. for the re-issuance of his Pentax insisted that he be given a Pen-
At the meeting, the agent gave 35-mm camera. The only nega tax; when told that it was too
the case officer the miniature tive note appeared to be his dangerous, he
replied hal
that he
cameras he had beengiven, hav healthhe wrote that he had requirements to meet and that he
ing shot full rolls of film with been diagnosed as having was anxious to get on with his

both, and 39 pages of hand

some chronic gastritis and that his work.
written notes, 26 of which peritonitis had worsened. He
contained detailed intelligence. asked for medicines for both Despite Tolkachevs insistence,
He also handed over some sche problems. Tolkachevs case CIA headquarters reaffirmed
matics on Soviet radar systems. officer wrote that, as far as that it was too dangerous for him
All but a handful of the 96 Tolkachev was concerned, it to be given another 35-mm cam
frames that he had taken with appeared that the operation was era. CIA personnel in Moscow
his spy cameras were of excel back to normal. agreed, but they worried that he
lent quality. just might go out and buy a cam
era himself It was agreed that
Tolkachev, in turn, was passed Weighing Risks and Gains he should be passed more than
two new spy cameras, a revised two miniature cameras at future
communications plan, note, a Between April and October 1984, meetings to
try keep to him
some medicines and books that the internal CIA debate contin happy and to discourage any
he had requested, and over ued regarding the appropriate effort to obtain another 35-mm
100,000 rubles. He again refused balance between productivity and camera.

to accept the exfiltration plan, security for this case. The

insisting that he would not be agents security was deemed to be There was also a continued dis
able to use it. the primary consideration. As a cussion of what should be done to
result, Tolkachev was not to be pay Tolkachev the funds he
At this meeting, Tolkachevs reissued a Pentax camera, would be owed as of 31 Decem
morale seemed to be high. He because it would be too danger ber. Based on his escrow account
said that everything appeared ous for him to try to carry holding of over a million dollars,
calm at his office, with no fur documents home to be photo which represented salary that
ther developments relating to the graphed in the future. The agent had been accumulated as of
sudden security investigation of could be met more than twice a December 1983, Tolkachev would
the previous year. In his note to year, but only if he insisted that be owed several hundred thou
the CIA, he wrote that he was it was safe. sand rubles, just in interest
sorry to have overreacted and alone.His ruble interest pay
destroyed his spy gear. He also Another meeting with Tolkachev ment was based on the amount of
said that he thought that he took place in October 1984. He his accumulated salary at the
could be met safely more than returned the two miniature cam- end of the previous year.

29
 Tolkachev

Business as Usual satisfy all these requests, and he sistent with what he had
proposed that someone be hired previously provided in terms of
In January 1985, another seem full-time, to be paid out of his subject matter, quality, and quan
ingly routine meeting was held escrow funds, just to take care of tity. In addition, the case officer
with Tolkachev. He returned his these requests. had not seen any change in KGB
three used miniature cameras surveillance habits or patterns.
and passed 16 pages of handwrit Tolkachev also explained how he Although it is still not known
ten notes containing both was currently doing his docu exactly when Tolkachev was com
intelligence and operational ment photography. He said that promised, it almost certainly was
information. The case officer he usually took the documents to at some point after this meeting.

gave him five new miniature the toilet of an office building in

cameras, intelligence require the institute complex that was
ments, new communications adjacent to his office building. Missed Meetings
sfgnalsites, some 100,000 rubles, He did this because the light was
and three Russian-language better there (a bigger window) As a result of the failed photogra

books that he had asked for. Per and it was used less often. He phy from the January meeting, it
Tolkachevs request, the case said that he usually arranged to was decided to signal for an

officer also returned some techni make a cover stop at someones unscheduled meeting with
cal notes that the agent had office in the other building to Tolkachev in March to ask him to
passed to the CIA earlier. explain his presence there. Nor try to rephotograph the docu
mally, the whole process took no ments on the frontline
fighter. In
Tolkachev again said that aH was more than 20 to 25 minutes. addition, OTS had recently tested
calm at his office, and he immedi a new film that could function in
-

ately asked whether his Pentax When the film that Tolkachev low-light conditions, which could
had been included in his pack had returned in January was be used in the miniature cam

age. When he was told why this developed, was unreadable,

it eras; this film was to be given to
had not been done, he said that almost certainly due to the lack him at this next meeting.
he disagreed but would abideby of lighthe had written in his
the decision. Although he said note that he had done the photog In early March, Tolkachevs case
that his overall health was bet raphy on a cloudy day, and he officer put upa visual signal that

ter, his teeth were still bothering worried that he had not had suf he wanted a meeting. Tolkachev,
him. He suggested that the next ficient light. This was however, failed to signal that he
meeting be held in June, and that particularly unfortunate because could make a meeting. In mid-
plans be made for an average of he had noted that the photo March, he appeared to signal his
three meetings per year. graphed papers had included readiness to meetthis was the
very important documents con second option for apossible meet
At this meeting, Tolkachev had a cerning frontline fighters for the ing in Marchby opening one of

long list of personal requests;
including medicines, transcripts
of official statements made by
Soviet leaders as reported in the
Western press; books, albums,
and soft-tipped pens for his son;
and English-language materials
(written and cassette) for his
and one of his sons female
friends. Tolkachev recognized
that it would take a lot of work to
1990s. Tolkachev did, however, the transom windows in his
provide some useful information apartment between 12:15 p.m.
on this subject in his notes. and 12:30 p.m.
Nothing happened at the Janu In retrospect, it may be notewor
ary meeting that indicated that thy that he opened a transom
the operation at that point had window that he normally did not
son been compromised. Tolkachevs use and which was less visible
demeanor was consistent with from the street. Tolkachev may
that of previous meetings, and have been trying to indicate that
the written information was con- he was in trouble, although there

30
 Tolkachev

At the exact time set

for the meeting, the
case officer was
is other evidence to support
no medicine; a book concealment
this hypothesis. In any event, he suddenly jumped by device that contained 250 pages
did not appear for the meeting. more than a dozen of Western newspaper and maga
The third alternate meeting was KGB personnel. zine articles
requested by
set for late March, but he failed Tolkachev; and an envelope with
to signal a readiness to meet so thousands of rubles.
no meeting was attempted. For
security reasons, it was decided An accompanying note thanked
not to try again to signal for an
the agent for the very impor
unscheduled meeting but to wait some nearby bushes. Several
tant written information that he
for the next scheduled meeting, well-dressed men, apparently
had provided at the last meeting,
which was set for June. senior security personnel, quickly
but stated that it had not been
appeared to direct the seizure.
possible to recover the docu
The case officer was bundled into
ments that he had photographed.
Disaster a van and taken off to Lubyanka
It discussed a new low-light film
Prison. Tolkachev was not seen
that it was hoped would be ready
On 5 June, which was the first at the meeting site nor later at
for passage to him soon, and
option for a meeting in that the prison.
described his photography from
month, Tolkachev signaled his
the previous summer as excel
readiness to meet. During the The treatment of the case officer
lent. The message raised the
indicated time frame, he opened during his arrest followed stan
the middle transom window in dard KGB
possibility of providing him with
procedures for such
a new document sign-out card so
hisapartment, which was the situations. He was physically
that he could use it to replace the
window he normally used. How restrained and thoroughly
original as we did in 1980. It
ever, the case officer who planned searched but not physically
cited the CIAs reluctance to pro
to make the meeting was forced abused. At Lubyanka, he was
vide English-language materials
to abort when he encountered accused of being a spy. In front of
for his son and his female friend
heavy surveillance before the him, and while being videotaped,
because of concern about how he
meeting, and it was not possible the package that he had planned
would explain these to his unwit
to send an alternate case officer to pass to Tolkachev was opened
this occasion.
ting son. And, finally, the note
on piece by piece, with some run
stated that the enclosed pay
ning commentary from the KGB
ment of thousands of rubles was
On 13 June, the second alternate questioners. Getting no reac
partial payment of the interest
meeting date, Tolkachevs readi tion, the KGB ultimately notified
due to you in 1985.
ness-to-meet signal was again the US Embassy of his arrest.

seen. The case officer had not Detained at 9:40 p.m., the case
detected any surveillance in pro officer was finally released at The arrest of the CIA case officer

ceeding to the meeting site. As 12:20 am. was highly publicized in Moscow,
he approached the site, the only but no mention was made of
unusual thing he noted was a The case officer had been carry Tolkachev by name or position.
woman talking loudly on a radio ing five miniature concealed As expected, the case officer and
taxi phone in the area. At the cameras; four pages of handwrit his family were forced to leave
exact time set for themeeting, ten materials that were being the country the week following
however, the case officer was sud returned to Tolkachev at his the arrest. It was not until Sep
denly jumped by more than a request; two architectural books; tember that Tolkachev was

dozen KGB security personnel 20 French and 20 German draw publicly named having been
as

dressed in military camouflage ing pens for Tolkachevsson; a arrested in June

for complicity
uniforms who had been hiding in large quantity of periodontal in this intelligence operation.

31
Tolkachev

Taking dismissal from

the CIA] badly,
Edward Lee Howard
Behind the Compromise The KGB is known to investigate
placed phone calls to carefully and systematically any
According reporting,
to overt Moscow. allegations of treason so that
Edward Lee Howard, a disgrun they can build an airtight case
tied former CIA officer, is before they make an arrest.
strongly suspected of having com Thus, it is possible that Howard
promised Tolkachev to the KGB. betrayed Tolkachev at his first
Howard had been made aware of meeting with the Soviets, result
the Tolkachev
as possible indicators that
operation early in ing in the initiation of a time-
Howard might ultimately betray
1983 as part of his preparation consuming KGB investigation.
CIA secrets in retaliation for his
for a planned assignment to Mos Howard also may not have
dismissal.
cow that summer. Although this recalled the exact name and posi
would have been his first over tion of the agent, which could
CIA According to articles in the US
seas tour as a officer, his have made it initially difficult for
clean backgroundhe had press, erstwhile Soviet defector the KGB to zero in on Tolkachev.
served overseas with both the Vitaliy Yurchenko told American On the other hand, Howard could
and the officials that a former CIA offi
Peace Corps Agency for have held back on providing the

International Development prior

cial (quickly determined to be
most important information that
him Howard) contacted the KGB in
tojoining the CIAmade a he had at his disposal, which
Austria inSeptember 1984 and
good candidate to handle the would include his knowledge of
Tolkachev operation in Moscow. provided information regarding the Tolkachev case. He might
CIA operations.~ According to
have wanted to probe the Soviets
these accounts, Howard traveled
Howard, however, had problems at his first meeting to confirm
to Europe again in April 1985
their willingness to pay him what
during a routine security reinves
and met with the KGB in Vienna,
tigation in early 1983, prior to he thought he was worth.
where he provided additional
his planned departure for Mos
information on clandestine
cow. He reportedly made some As it turned out, Tolkachevs
admissions of operations.7
inappropriate days would have been num
behavior, and still failed to sat bered, even if Howard had not
isfy security investigators that he There is little doubt that Howard
betrayed him. According to overt
was being fully honest with betrayed Tolkachev, but it is not
accounts, Aldrich Ames also
them. Based these problems, clear whether this was done dur
on passed Tolkachevs name to the
it was decided to terminate his ing his September 1984 or Aprii KGB when he volunteered to
employment, which was done in 1985 meeting with the Soviets. work for them in 1985. Ames
April 1983. claims that he did not provide a
full dump regarding all the sen
6
Yurchenko was a KGB security officer
Taking dismissal badly, Howard sitive CIA cases of which he was
who defected in August 1985. He subse
reportedly started drinking quently re-defected to the Soviet Union aware June; however, he
until
heavilyhe apparently had been in November 1985, leading to an intense could have provided this informa
a periodic binge drinker for some debate as to whether or not he had been tion to them in April 1985, when
time, a fact that CIA managers a valid defector in the first place. None he first passed classified informa
were unaware of. He placed theless, all the evidence that has tion to the Soviets.
emerged since then strongly supports
phone calls to Moscow in the
the supposition that he was a legitimate
summer of 1983 on more than
defector.
one occasion, asking to speak Howard subsequently fled to the Soviet ugh Marks from the KGB
with the CIA chief These evi Union. According to press reports, he
dently were harassment calls, died in an accidental fall in Moscow in An article in the Soviet newspa
and the chief correctly saw them 2002.
per Sovetskaya Rossiya in

32
 Tolkachev

Tolkachevs
information was so
voluminous and so
February 1990 discussing the 1981, commented in retrospect on
valuable that, even
Tolkachev case was clearly the the value of Tolkachevs produc
work of KGB officials. It con though he was arrested tion. The analyst noted that
tained a number of comments in 1985, the task force Tolkachevs information was so

that only be taken

can as grudg continued to exploit voluminous and so valuable that,
ing praise for the CIA: his information until even though the agent was

1990. arrested in 1985, the task force

CIA provided Tolkachev with continued to exploit his informa
a cleverly compiled meeting tion until approximately 1990.
schedule. CIA instructors
made provisions for even the
Fortunately, no indication has
tiniest of details . . .
the
surfaced that either Tolkachevs
miniature camera came with out his assignment, they
wife or his son was ever impris
detailed instructions and a checked up on his health and
oned suffered any long-term
or
light meter . . .
Let us give went to great pains to stress
effects from his treason.
CIA experts the credit due how much they valued him
and how concerned
Tolkachev clearly took into
themthey worked really they were
account the need to shield them
hard to find poorly illumi for his well-being.
nated and deserted places in fully from his CIA activities, so
that they would survive any com
Moscow for meetings with
Tolkachev. Anyone unfa
. . .
A Final Accounting promise. At least one report
miliar with CIAS tricks indicates that Oleg Tolkachev is
would now a prominent Russian archi
never imagine that, if A senior CIA analyst who had
to burn behind been member of the small, tect. To the degree that his son
a light were a a

certain window in the US highly compartmented Depart and his wife survived his arrest,

Embassy, this could be a ment of Defense task force Adolf Tolkachev would have been
coded message for a spy. . -.
formed in 1979 to review content that he had accom

Langley provided touching Tolkachevs product and make plished his

goal of
seriously
care for its agentif he recommendations on the best damaging the Soviet system
needed medicine, everything ways to exploit it, and who had while protecting his family and
was provided. In every . . .
continued to work on these mate allowing them to lead normal
instruction efficiently setting rials after he came to the CIA in lives.

33