5yr Prog Case Digests For Succession

INTRODUCTION
URSULINA GANUELAS, METODIO GANUELAS and ANTONIO GANUELAS petitioners,

vs.
HON. ROBERT T. CAWED, Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union (Branch 29),
LEOCADIA G. FLORES, FELICITACION G. AGTARAP, CORAZON G. SIPALAY and ESTATE OF ROMANA
GANUELAS DE LA ROSA, represented by GREGORIO DELA ROSA, Administrator,respondents
GR No. 123968 April 24, 2003
Maria Cristina Morales
Facts:
On April 11, 1958, Celestina Ganuelas executed a Deed of Donation covering 7 parcels of land
in favor of her niece Ursulina. It stated that she donated to Ursulina the properties in consideration
of her love and affection to Ursulina and faithful services. However, in 1967, a month before she
died, Celestina executed a Revocation of Donation.
Ursulina had been sharing the produce of the donated properties with private respondents
Flores, et al. and in 1982, she secured corresponding tax declarations in her name and refused
private respondents any share in the produce. Because of this the private respondents filed a
complaint against Ursula, for the reason that the Dee of Donation is void as it was a disposition of
mortis cause which failed to comply with the formalites of a will.
However, according to Ursulina, the deed is an inter vivos and the Deed of Revocation is null
and void as the ground mentioned is not one of those provided by law
Issue:
Whether or not the donation is mortis causa or inter vivos?
Ruling:
Mortis Causa. The Supreme Court went on to discuss the difference between a donation inter
vivos and mortis causa and the applicable provisions under the Civil Code together with the
necessary formalities required by law. The trial court did not commit any reversible error in
declaring the Deed of Donation to be mortis causa.
The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership(full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor
to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
In this case, the phrase “to become effective upon the death of the donor” admits no other
interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer ownership to Ursulina on her death, not
during her lifetime. Aside from that, the deed stated that in the case the donee should die ahead of
the donor then the donation is rescinded, which confirms that the disposition is mortis causa. There
is also an attestation clause that stated that the donation is mortis causa.
Hence, the petition was denied.
GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his heirs, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172804 January 24, 2011
Angelica M. Jayag
Facts:
Gonzalo Villanueva, here represented by his heirs, sued spouses Froilan and Leonila
Branoco to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of land located in Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte.
Villanueva is claiming ownership over the property which he allegedly purchase in July 1971 from
Casimiro Vere, who, in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo in August 1970.
On the other hand, spouses Branoco similarly claims ownership over the Property through
purchase in July 1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez to whom Alvegia Rodrigo donated the Property in
May 1965. The Deed of Donation provides that:
“…and because of that one EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, one of my nieces who also suffered
with our poverty, obedient as she was to all the works in our house, and because of the love and
affection which I feel [for] her, I have one parcel of land located at Sitio Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte
bearing Tax Decl. No. 1878 declared in the name of Alvegia Rodrigo, I give (devise) said land in
favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, her heirs, successors, and assigns together with all the
improvements existing thereon , which parcel of land is more or less described and bounded as
follows:
1. Bounded North by Amambajag River; East, Benito Picao; South, Teofilo Uyvico; and
West, by Public land; 2. It has an area of 3,492 square meters more or less; 3. It is planted to
coconuts now bearing fruits; 4. Having an assessed value of ₱240.00; 5. It is now in the possession
of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962 in the concept of an owner, but the Deed of Donation
or that ownership be vested on her upon my demise.
That I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate that the land above described, I already devise
in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and that if the herein
Donee predeceases me, the same land will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the
heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ;”
In the same deed, the acceptance of the donee is written as follows:
That I EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, hereby accept the land above described from Inay Alvegia
Rodrigo and I am much grateful to her and praying further for a longer life; however, I will give one
half (1/2) of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime.
Issue:
Is the contract between the parties’ predecessors-in-interest, Rodrigo and Rodriguez, was
a donation or a devise?
Held:
A donation. In this case, the Court laid down six (6) characteristics of a donation mortis
causa, adding three (3) more distinguishing characteristics, to wit:
1. Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full
or naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved
power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
Further –
4. [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the
donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis
causa[;]
5. That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the
effect that the donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor" are not controlling
criteria; such statements are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument,
in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor[;] [and]
6. That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather
than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed.
Thus, in examining the juridical nature of the Deed, the Court opined that it is immediately
apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos. First.
Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to
the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signaling the irrevocability of the
passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate, waiving Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title. This transfer of title
was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez’s acceptance of the disposition which,
being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo’s
acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only
donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient. Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full
title over the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that
"the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties here donated x x
x" or used words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case
Rodriguez predeceases her.
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property,
evident from Rodriguez’s undertaking to "give one [half] x x x of the produce of the land to Apoy
Alve during her lifetime." Thus, the Deed’s stipulation that "the ownership shall be vested on
[Rodriguez] upon my demise," taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to
Rodrigo’s beneficial title. The Court arrived at this same conclusion in Balaqui v. Dongso where, the
donor, while "binding herself to answer to the [donor] and her heirs x x x that none shall question
or disturb [the donee’s] right," also stipulated that the donation "does not pass title to [the donee]
during my lifetime; but when I die, [the donee] shall be the true owner" of the donated parcels of
land. In finding the disposition as a gift inter vivos, the Court reasoned:
“Taking the deed x x x as a whole, x x x x it is noted that in the same deed [the donor]
guaranteed to [the donee] and her heirs and successors, the right to said property thus conferred.
From the moment [the donor] guaranteed the right granted by her to [the donee] to the two parcels
of land by virtue of the deed of gift, she surrendered such right; otherwise there would be no need
to guarantee said right. Therefore, when [the donor] used the words upon which the appellants
base their contention that the gift in question is a donation mortis causa [that the gift "does not
pass title during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned
parcels"] the donor meant nothing else than that she reserved of herself the possession and
usufruct of said two parcels of land until her death, at which time the donee would be able to
dispose of them freely.”
Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor’s death, such as the donor’s
love and affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises,
nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x [inter vivos] transfers."
Thus, Villanueva cannot capitalize on Rodrigo’s post-donation transfer of the Property to

Vere as proof of her retention of ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds of
donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be visited on gratuitous dispositions, this will give
license to rogue property owners to set at naught perfected transfers of titles, which, while founded
on liberality, is a valid mode of passing ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions
counsels against licensing such practice
Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in
1965, Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of
another." Thus, Rodrigo’s post-donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As Vere’s
successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than him. On the other hand, respondents
bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter’s title which they may invoke against
all adverse claimants, including petitioner.
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix,
petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees,
oppositors- appellants.
G.R. No. L-27952; February 15, 1982
Wenna Jane R. Barcebal
Facts:
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino citizen, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his
widow, Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez, as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the
CFI of Manila and Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed as administratrix of the estate.
On June 23, 1966, the project of partition submitted by the administratrix provides that the
property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts: one shall go to the widow in satisfaction
of her legitime, while the other part or “free portion” will go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez.
Furthermore, 1/3 of the free portion is charged with the widow’s usufruct and the remaining 2/3
with a usufruct in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski, an Australian citizen and his companion.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project partition, claiming that the provisions for vulgar
substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of
Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because
the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator and that the grant of a usufruct over real
property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article
III of the Philippine Constitution.
The lower court approved the project of partition in its order.
Hence, Jorge and Roberto appealed to SC.
Issue:
1. Is the partition according to the will is valid?
2. Whether or not the usufruct in favor of Wanda is valid?
Ruling:
1. Yes, since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over
which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever.
Article 900 of the Civil Code provides that “if the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he
shall be entitled to ½ of the hereditary estate.”
No, the will is not valid as to the one-third usufruct over the free portion. To give Marcelle
more than her legitimate will run counter to the testator’s intention for his dispositions even
impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
2. Yes. The court upheld the validity of usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the
Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession. The
Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any
alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in
exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, the court upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a
usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in usufructuary and it is the vesting of
title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
ANTONINA CUEVAS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
CRISPULO CUEVAS, Defendant-Appellee.
G.R. No. L-8327 December 14, 1955
Ankash Sohail Butt
Facts:
On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized conveyance entitled

"Donacion Mortis Causa," ceding to her nephew Crispulo Cuevas the northern half of a parcel of
unregistered land in Nueva Ecija. In the same instrument appears the acceptance of Crispulo
Cuevas.
The controversy revolves around the provisions of the deed of donation which provides:
“Dapat malaman ni Crispulo Cuevas na samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, and lupa na ipinagkakaloob
ko sa kaniya ay ako pa rin and patuloy na mamomosecion, makapagparatrabaho, makikinabang at
ang iba pang karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa akin pa rin hanggang hindi ako binabawian ny buhay
ng Maykapal at ito naman ay hindi ko nga iya-alis pagkat kung ako ay mamatay na ay inilalaan ko
sa kaniya.”
Issue:
Whether the donation is mortis causa or inter vivos?

Held:
The decisive proof that the present donation is operative Inter vivos lies in the final phrase to
the effect that the donor will not dispose or take away (" hindi ko ñga iya-alis" in the priginal) the
land "because I am reserving it to him upon my death." By these words the donor expressly
renounced the right to freely dispose of the property in. favor of another (a right essential to full
ownership) and manifested the irrevocability of the conveyance of the naked, title to the property
in favor of the donee. As stated in our decision in Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, ante, such
irrevocability is characteristic of donations Inter vivos, because it is incompatible with the idea of
a disposition post mortem.
It is apparent from the entire context of the deed of donation that the donor intended that she
should retain-the entire beneficial ownership during her lifetime, but that the naked title should
irrevocably pass to the donee. It is only thus that all the expressions heretofore discussed can be
given full effect; and when the donor stated that she would continue to retain the "possession,
cultivation, harvesting and all other rights and attributes of ownership," she meant only
the dominium utile, not the full ownership.
The words "rights and attributes of ownership" should be construed Ejusdem Generis with
the preceding rights of "possession, cultivation and harvesting" expressly enumerated in the
deed. Had the donor meant to retain full or absolute ownership she had no need to specify
possession, cultivation and harvesting, since all these rights are embodied in full or absolute
ownership.
Hence, the Court ruled that the donation is Inter vivos.
JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO,

vs.
ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR, ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO, JR., all
surnamed G. FERRER, and MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA
G.R. No. 187056 September 20, 2010
Michelle Jude G. Tinio
Facts:
This case pertains to a gift denominated as a donation mortis causa which in reality is a
donation intervivos.
On August 27, 1968 Spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document
entitled "Donation Mortis Causa" in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their
granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their predeceased son, Zoilo) covering the 126-square meter
lot and the house on it in Pandacan, Manila in equal shares. According to the deed, the will is a
Donation Mortis Causa that shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse;
that Jarabini Gonzales-del Rosario and Emiliano Gonzales will continue to occupy the portions now
occupied by them; that the DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall not in any way affect any other
distribution of other properties belonging to any of the donor spouses whether testate or intestate
and where ever situated; that any one surviving spouse reserves the right, ownership, possession
and administration of this property donated and accepted and this Disposition and Donation shall
be operative and effective upon the death of the donors. The deed however had no attestation
clause and was witnessed only by two persons. The named donees signified their acceptance of the
donation on the face of the document.
Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in September 1968. A few months later or on December 19,
1968, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and interests in
subject property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died in June 1972.
In 1998 Jarabini filed a "petition for the probate of the August 27, 1968 deed of donation
mortis causa" before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Asuncion opposed the petition,
invoking his father Leopoldo’s assignment of his rights and interests in the property to her.
RTC rendered a decision finding that the donation was in fact one made inter vivos, the
Spouses’ intention being to transfer title over the property to the donees during their lifetime, given
its irrevocability. Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interest in the property was
void since he had nothing to assign. The RTC directed the registration of the property in the name
of the donees in equal shares.
Asuncion’s appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). CA reversed RTC’s decision. It held that
Jarabini cannot, through her petition for the probate of the deed of donation mortis causa,
collaterally attack Leopoldo’s deed of assignment in Asuncion’s favor. CA also held that the
requirements of a notarial will was not complied with, rendering the donation mortis causa void.
Issues:
1. Is the donation in question a donation mortis causa or a donation intervivos?

2. Is the subsequent assignment by Leopoldo of his rights and interests in the property to
Asuncion valid?
Held:
1. The donation made by the Spouses is a donation intervivos.
In Austria-Magat vs. CA, the court mentioned that a donation mortis causa has the following
characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor
to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
The express "irrevocability" of the donation is the "distinctive standard that identifies the
document as a donation inter vivos." Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida, in case of doubt,
the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid
uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.
In the present case, the caption “Donation Mortis Causa” in the executed document by the
Spouses is not controlling. The intent to make the donation irrevocable was clear in the proviso
that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation . The donor Spouses in this
case reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and administration of the property" and made the
donation operative upon their death. But the Court has consistently held that such reservation
(reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with
their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived.
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, an acceptance clause indicates
that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations.
Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the
donor’s lifetime.
2. No. The subsequent assignment by Leopoldo of his rights and interests in the property to
Asuncion void.
A donation intervivos is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the
donee’s acceptance of the donation made. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of
the property donated.
Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter vivos, Leopoldo’s
subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property to Asuncion should be regarded
as void for, by then, he had no more rights to assign. He could not give what he no longer had. Nemo
dat quod non habet.
CONSUELO SEVILLE JUTIC, JUAN JUTIC, CELESTINO SEVILLE, TIBURCIO SEVILLE, RAVELLO
SEVILLE, SONITA SEVILLE, LUCY SEVILLE, EPIFANIA SEVILLE, NARACY SEVILLE, EMMANUEL
SEVILLE, ORLANDO MANICAN, and PACIFICO MANICAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, VICENTE SULLAN, TRINIDAD SULLAN, TERESITA SULLAN,
ULYSSES SULLAN, ALEJANDRINO SULLAN, BUENAVENTURA SEVILLE, and ZOILO SEVILLE,
respondents
G.R. No. L-44628 August 27, 1987
Kenneth Claire P. Ladera
Facts:
During his lifetime, Arsenio Seville owned Lot No. 170 and Lot No. 172 in Davao del Norte.
On March 4, 1963, Arsenio Seville executed an affidavit in favor of Melquiades Seville where he
manifested his intention and desire to dispose Lot No. 172 and 170 containing an area of 21
hectares. Sometime in 1968, Arsenio Seville mortgaged said properties to the Philippine National
Bank in consideration of a loan. This was done with the knowledge and acquiescence of Melquiades
Seville.
In 1970, Arsenio Seville died intestate which he was survived by his brothers, Buenaventura
Seville and Zoilo Seville who are included as respondents; brother Melquiades Seville; and sisters
Encarnacion Seville and Petra Seville. The children of Melquiades Seville as petitioners are now
claiming exclusive ownership of the properties and improvements thereon on the basis of the
instrument executed by Arsenio Seville in favor of Melquiades Seville where they alleged that even
during the lifetime of the deceased Arsenio Seville it had been his desire, intention and his wish
that Lots 170 and 172 shall be owned by Melquiades Seville, the father of the herein defendants.
RTC held that it is not a donation inter vivos or mortis causa but a mere declaration of an intention
and a desire. Certainly, it is not a concrete and formal act of giving or donating. The form and
contents of said affidavit amply support this conclusion." CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Now, the children of Melquiades Seville filed the petition alleging that the CA committed an
error when they did not consider the affidavit in question a deed or instrument of donation inter
vivos.
Issue:
Was there a valid donation from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville?
Ruling:
NO. It is a donation inter vivos or mortis causa but a mere declaration of an intention and a
desire. Certainly, it is not a concrete and formal act of giving or donating. The form and contents
of said affidavit amply support this conclusion."
In Aldaba v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that mere expression of an intention is not a
promise, because a promise is an undertaking to carry the intention into effect. Thus, the deceased
promised cannot convey the property in question.
In the present case, there clearly was no intention to transfer ownership from Arsenio
Seville to Melquiades Seville at the time of the instrument's execution. It was a mere intention or a
desire on the part of Arsenio Seville that in the event of his death at some future time, his properties
should go to Melquiades Seville.
Therefore, the affidavit could not transmit ownership except in clear and express terms.
MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S. CABATINGAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, namely, LUZ M. BOQUIA, PERLA M. ABELLA, ESTRELLA M.
CAÑETE, LOURDES M. YUSON, and JULIA L. MAYOL, HEIRS OF GENOVIVA C. NATIVIDAD namely,
OSCAR C. NATIVIDAD, OLGA NATIVIDAD, ODETTE NATIVIDAD, OPHELIA NATIVIDAD, RICHARD
NATIVIDAD, RAYMUND NATIVIDAD, RICHIE NATIVIDAD, SONIA NATIVIDAD and ENCARNACION
CABATINGAN VDA. DE TRINIDAD, ALFREDO CABATINGAN and JESUSA C. NAVADA, respondents.
GR G.R. No. 131953, June 5, 2002
Leslie R. Lucas
Facts:
Conchita Cabatingan executed 4 deeds of donation inter vivos for the house and lot covering
one hald portion of the formers house and lot located in Liloan, Cebu. Provisions on the deeds are
as follows: That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x
x the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE
the above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon,
to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that
the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically
rescinded and of no further force and effect.
Upon her death, respondents filed an action for the annulment of the deeds of donation,
contending that they are void for failing to comply with the provision of the code, and for failing to
comply with the provisions of civil code regarding formalities of wills and testaments considering
that they are donation mortis cause. The RTC declared the deeds void for failure to comply with
the formalities under Art. 777 of NCC.
Issue:
What is the nature of the donation?
Held:
It is a donation mortis causa. The deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be
rescinded in case petitioners predecease Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda,20
one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be
considered void if the donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided
for in her donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect during her lifetime
and that the ownership of the properties donated be transferrred to the donee or independently
of, and not by reason of her death, she would have not expressed such proviso in the subject deeds.
Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis causa, the same partake of the nature
of testamentary provisions21 and as such, said deeds must be executed in accordance with the
requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.
ARTICLE 774
ROMULO A. CORONEL, ALARICO A. CORONEL, ANNETTE A. CORONEL, ANNABELLE C. GONZALES

(for herself and on behalf of Floraida C. Tupper, as attorney-in-fact), CIELITO A. CORONEL,
FLORAIDA A. ALMONTE, and CATALINA BALAIS MABANAG, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ and RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ, assisted by GLORIA F.
NOEL as attorney-in-fact, respondents.
G.R. No. 103577 October 7, 1996
Wilbur Chad J. Policarpio
DOCTRINE: Article 774 - Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Facts:
On January 19, 1985, defendants-appellants Romulo Coronel, et al. (hereinafter referred to

as Coronels) executed a document entitled “Receipt of Down Payment” in favor of plaintiff Ramona
Patricia Alcaraz. It is clear from the conditions of the sale that upon paying the down payment of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50, 000), the Coronels would cause the transfer in their names the title of
the property registered in the name of their deceased father. Upon the transfer of the title in their
name (the Coronels), they would then execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of Alcaraz and that
she will pay the Coronels the whole balance of One Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand Pesos.
(P1, 190, 000)
On February 6, 1985, the property originally registered in the name of the Coronel’s father
was transferred in their names under TCT No. 327043. On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold
the property covered by TCT No. 327043 to intervenor-appellant Catalina B. Mabanag (hereinafter
referred to as Catalina) for One Million Five Hundred Eighty Thousand (P1,580,000.00) Pesos after
the latter has paid Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00). For this reason, Coronels canceled and
rescinded the contract with Ramona by depositing the down payment paid by Concepcion in the
bank in trust for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz.
On February 22, 1985, Concepcion, et al., filed a complaint for specific performance against
the Coronels and caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of TCT No. 327403.
On April 2, 1985, Catalina caused the annotation of a notice of adverse claim covering the same
property with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. On April 25, 1985, the Coronels executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property in favor of Catalina. On June 5, 1985, a new title
over the subject property was issued in the name of Catalina under TCT No. 351582.
Issue:
Whether or not the rights of the property were transferred to the Coronels.
Held:
Petitioners argued that there could have been no perfected contract on January 19, 1985
because they were then not yet the absolute owners of the inherited property. Article 774 of the
Civil Code defines Succession as a mode of transferring ownership as follows:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death
to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being the sons and daughters of the decedent Constancio
P. Coronel are compulsory heirs who were called to succession by operation of law. Thus, at the
point their father drew his last breath, petitioners stepped into his shoes insofar as the subject
property is concerned, such that any rights or obligations pertaining thereto became binding and
enforceable upon them. It is expressly provided that rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code; Cuison vs. Villanueva, 90 Phil. 850
[1952]). Be it also noted that petitioners’ claim that succession may not be declared unless the
creditors have been paid is rendered moot by the fact that they were able to effect the transfer of
the title to the property from the decedent’s name to their names on February 6, 1985.
CELESTINO BALUS, petitioner,

vs.
SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD, respondents
G.R. No. 168970, January 15, 2010
Hanna Frusein S. Escobido
DOCTRINE: Article 774 - Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Facts:
Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana
Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Before his death,
Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land. He failed to pay the loan and the land was then sold in a
foreclosure sale to which the Bank is the sole bidder. The property was not redeemed within the
period allowed by law.
On October 10, 1989 herein petitiners and respondents executed an Extrajudicial

Settlement adjudicating to each of them 1/3 portion of the subject property. In the said partition
they admitted knowledge of the loan and foreclosure of the property and intended to redeem it as
soon as possible. Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, respondents
bought the land from the bank but petitioner refused to vacate the said property claiming rights
under the Extrajudicial Settlement as a co-owner of the said property.
Issue:
Whether co-ownership by petitioner and respondents over the subject property exists.
Held:
No. Petitioner claims co-ownership by virtue of the agreement he had with respondents
embodied in the Extrajudicial Settlement. However, the said settlement holds no water since the
said subject property do not form part of the decedent’s estate. Article 774 of the Civil Code defines
Succession as a mode of transferring ownership as follows:
obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death
to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
When Rufo died, he already lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it
only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his
estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never
inherited the subject lot from their father. As such no co-ownership exists between the parties in
the eyes of the law, since the disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents
as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in time.
ARTICLE 776
ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-15499 February 28, 1962
Facts:
Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was a co-owner of (1/6) a house and lot located at Sta.
Cruz, Manila. After his death, his estate was settled, that included the one-sixth (1/6) undivided
share in the aforementioned property. Through his last will and testament, he bequeathed his
estate to his children and grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of the free portion to Angela M. Butte,
the plaintiff in this case.
On December 9, 1958, Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, one of the co-owners of the late Jose V.
Ramirez in the Sta. Cruz property, sold her undivided 1/6 share to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.
defendant-appellant herein for P500,000.
On January 15, 1959, Butte, sent a letter and a Philippine National Bank cashier's. Marie Garnier
Vda. de Ramirez. This was refused and contented that Butte has no right to redeem the property
and the period to file for redemption already lapsed
Issue:
Whether or not Butte, having been bequeathed 1/3 of the free portion of the estate of Jose V.
Ramirez, can exercise the right of legal redemption over the 1/6 share sold by Marie Garnier Vda.
de Ramirez despite the presence of the judicial administrator and pending the final distribution of
her share in the testate proceedings?
Ruling:
Yes. Angela M. Butte is entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption. As testamentary heir
of the estate of J.V. Ramirez, she and her co-heirs acquired an interest in the undivided one-sixth
(1/6) share owned by her predecessor in the property, from the moment of the death of the co-
owner, J.V. Ramirez. By law, the rights to the succession of deceased persons are transmitted to his
heirs from the moment of his death (Art. 777), and the right of succession includes all property
rights and obligations that survive the decedent.
Wherefore, any one of the Ramirez heirs, as such co-owner , became entitled to exercise the right
of legal redemption (retracto de comuneros) as soon as another co-owner (Marie Gamier Vda. de
Ramirez) had sold her undivided share to a stranger, Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. This right of
redemption vested exclusively in consideration of the redemptioner's quality of co-owner.
FRANK N. LIU, deceased, substituted by his surviving spouse Diana Liu, and children, namely:
Walter, Milton, Frank, Jr., Henry and Jockson, all surnamed Liu, Rebecca Liu Shui and Pearl Liu
Rodriguez, petitioners,
vs.
ALFREDO LOY, JR., TERESITA A. LOY and ESTATE OF JOSE VAÑO, respondents.
G.R. No. 145982 July 3, 2003
Angelica M. Jayag
Facts:
In 1950, Jose Vaño sold his seven lots of the Banilad Estate, through Franklin Liu, to Benito
Liu and Cirilo Pangalo. The payment of the said lots were paid through monthly installments. Later,
Jose Vaño passed away.
On October 16, 1954, Frank Liu stopped further payments on the lots, leaving a balance of
₱1,000 for the reason that Teodoro Vaño could not yet transfer the titles to Benito Liu. However,
on January 25, 1964, Frank Liu wrote Teodoro Vaño informing the latter that he was ready to pay
the balance of the purchase price of the lots in which latter did not reply. On April 22, 1966, Benito
Liu sold to Frank Liu all the lots, including Lot Nos. 5 and 6, which Benito Liu purchased from
Teodoro Vaño.
Meanwhile, on 19 August 1968, Teodoro Vaño sold Lot No. 6 to Teresita Loy and on 16
December 1969, he sold Lot No. 5 to Alfredo Loy, Jr. These sales to the Loys were made after Frank
Liu offered to pay the balance of the purchase price of the lots and after he repeatedly requested
for the execution of the deeds of sale in his favor.
The Loys contends that, Teodoro Vaño, as administrator and sole heir to the properties, can
sell the lots to them since the rights of an heir are transmitted from the moment of death of the
testator. Although a property under estate proceedings cannot be sold without judicial approval,
the Loys allege that in their case, the probate court later approved the sales to them, thereby
ratifying the sales.
Issue:
Was the deed of sale made to Benito Liu’s in favor of Frank Liu valid, thus constitutes a valid
charge or claim against the estate of Jose Vaño?
Held:
Yes. The sale of the lots by Teodoro Vaño to Benito Liu was valid. The sale was made by
Teodoro Vaño on 13 January 1950 in his capacity as attorney-in-fact of Jose Vaño. The sale to Benito
Liu was made during the lifetime of Jose Vaño, not after the death of Jose Vaño who died on 28
January 1950. The power of attorney executed by Jose Vaño in favor of Teodoro Vaño remained
valid during the lifetime of Jose Vaño. In his letter dated 16 October 1954, Teodoro Vaño stated
that on 30 June 1954, the Supreme Court allowed the probate of the will of Jose Vaño. Teodoro
Vaño likewise mentioned in the letter that in July 1954, the Supreme Court held that all the sales
made by Teodoro Vaño of the properties of his father were legal. Thus, Benito Liu’s deed of sale in
favor of Frank Liu covering the lots sold to him by Teodoro Vaño constitutes a valid charge or claim
against the estate of Jose Vaño.
A prior contract to sell made by the decedent during his lifetime prevails over a subsequent
contract of sale made by the administrator without probate court approval. It is immaterial if the
prior contract is a mere contract to sell and does not immediately convey ownership. Frank Liu’s
contract to sell became valid and effective upon its execution and bound the estate to convey the
property upon full payment of the consideration.
PAULA CONDE, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROMAN ABAYA, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-4275 March 23, 1909
Facts:
Casiano Abaya died on April 6, 1899. Paula Conde, the mother of the natural children Jose and
Teopista Conde (deceased), whom she states she had by Casiano Abaya, claimed succession to the
hereditary rights of her children with respect to the inheritance of their deceased father. Jose and
Teopista were unacknowledged natural children.
Roman Abaya, brother of Casiano, came forward and opposed the appointment and claimed
it for himself as being the nearest relative of the deceased, which was granted by the court. He was
declared as the sole heir of Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of all other persons, especially of Paula
Conde.
Paula filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the relationship alleged by
Roman, but she considered that her right was superior to his and prayed that she be declared to
have preferential rights to the property left by Casiano.
The court held that Petitioner Paula should succeed to the hereditary rights of her children
with respect to the inheritance of their deceased natural father Casiano, and declared her as the
only heir to the property of the said intestate estate, to the exclusion of the administrator, Roman.
Roman appealed to this court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Paula Conde may enforce an action in the acknowledgment of the
natural child from Casiano Abaya?
Ruling:
No. In order to consider the spirit of the Civil Code nothing is more logical than to establish
a comparison between an action to claim the legitimacy under Article 118, and one to enforce
acknowledgment under Article 137.
The difference between them is that the right of action that devolves upon the child to claim
his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural
child lasts only during the life of his presumed parents. Usually the right of action for legitimacy
devolving upon the child is of a personal character and pertains exclusively to him, only the child
may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As an exception, and in three cases only, it may be
transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit, if he died during his minority, or while insane, or after
action had been already instituted.
An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised

against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death of the latter
during the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some instrument of express
acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother, the existence of which was
unknown during the life of the latter.
But as such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It
cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or to his ascendants.
The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy in all respects superior to
that of the child who claims acknowledgment as a natural child. And it is evident that the right of
action to claim his legitimacy is not one of those rights which the legitimate child may transmit by
inheritance to his heirs; it forms no part of the component rights of his inheritance. If it were so,
there would have been no necessity to establish its transmissibility to heirs as an exception in the
terms and conditions of Article 118 (now 268) of the civil code. So that, in order that it may
constitute a portion of the child’s inheritance, it is necessary that the conditions and the terms
contained in Article 118 shall be present, since without them, the right that the child held during
his lifetime, being personal and exclusive in principle, and therefore, as a general rule not
susceptible of transmission, would and should have been extinguished by death.
Therefore, where no express provision like that in Article 118 exists, the right of action for
the acknowledgment of a natural child is, in principle and without exception, extinguished by his
death, and cannot be transmitted as a portion of the inheritance of the deceased child.
Lao Hu Niu, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
The Insular Collector of Customs, respondent and appellee.
G.R. No. 12379 March 14, 1917
Ankash Sohail Butt
Facts:
This case involves the exclusion from the Philippine Islands of a Chinese woman and her
minor children. She claims to be the wife of a former resident Chinese merchant who, prior to the
attempt of the appellant to enter, died in the Philippine Islands owning property therein and
leaving as his only heirs at law and next of kin his widow, the appellant herein, and her minor
children.
The board of special inquiry refused them permission to enter and that refusal was affirmed
by the Court of First Instance of Manila. This appeal is from the action taken by the Court of First
Instance.
Issue:
Whether such widow, as a merchant and the successor to her husband, has the right to enter
the said islands and to bring her children with her?
Held: No.
It may be said that it does not appear in the record of this case that the applicant is a
merchant. It appears simply that her husband was, at the time of his death, a resident Chinese
merchant doing business in the Philippine Islands, and that he died leaving property including a
mercantile business. The assumption of the appellant is that the mere fact of the death of a
merchant makes his wife and children also merchants, as it leaves to them as heirs and next of kin
a mercantile business as a part of their inheritance. We do not believe that this necessarily follows.
But if it does, the fact remains that she is not a resident merchant. She is still outside of the
Philippine Islands and has never held the status of a resident merchant. She must, therefore,
establish her right to enter as a merchant in the first instance. This she did not do. She did not
present the section six certificate which is the only evidence upon which her right to enter can be
based.
From these observations it necessarily follows that the applicant is not entitled to enter the
Philippine Islands upon the status of her deceased husband; and that when she seeks to enter upon
her own personal status she must produce the evidence which the law requires to establish that
status. Not having done this her application to enter was properly denied.
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORP vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND MEDARDA V. LEUTERIO
G.R. No. 113899. October 13, 1999
Facts:
A contract of group life insurance was executed between Great Pacific Life Assurance
Corporation (Grepalife) and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Grepalife agreed to
insure the lives of eligible housing loan mortgagors of DBP. Dr. Wilfredo Leuterio, a physician and
a housing debtor of DBP applied for membership in the group life insurance plan. In an application
form, Dr. Leuterio averred that to the best of your knowledge he was in good health at that time.
Grepalife issued the insurance coverage of Dr. Leuterio, to the extent of his DBP mortgage
indebtedness amounting to eighty-six thousand, two hundred (P86,200.00) pesos.
On August 6, 1984, Dr. Leuterio died due to "massive cerebral hemorrhage." Consequently,
DBP submitted a death claim to Grepalife. Grepalife denied the claim alleging that Dr. Leuterio was
not physically healthy when he applied for an insurance coverage. Grepalife insisted that Dr.
Leuterio did not disclose he had been suffering from hypertension, which caused his death that
allegedly, such concealment justified the denial of the claim.
Medarda V. Leuterio (Medarda), Dr. Leuterio’s widow, filed a complaint with the RTC
against Grepalife for "Specific Performance with Damages. RTC rendered a decision in favor of
Medarda and against Grepalife. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Grepalife alleges that the widow of Dr. Leuterio is not the real party in interest, hence the
trial court acquired no jurisdiction over the case. In line thereto, he also cannot be held liable to
pay the proceeds of insurance contract in favor of DBP, the indispensable party who was not joined
in the suit.
Issue:
Is Medarda a real party in interest in this case?
Held:
Yes. Medarda, the widow of Dr. Leuterio is a real party in interest in this case.
A policy of insurance upon life or health may pass by transfer, will or succession to any
person, whether he has an insurable interest or not, and such person may recover it whatever the
insured might have recovered. Section 8 of the Insurance Code provides that unless the policy
provides, where a mortgagor of property effects insurance in his own name providing that the loss
shall be payable to the mortgagee, or assigns a policy of insurance to a mortgagee, the insurance is
deemed to be upon the interest of the mortgagor, who does not cease to be a party to the original
contract.
In this case, Dr. Leuterio did not cede to the mortgagee all his rights or interests in the
insurance, the policy stating that: "In the event of the debtor’s death before his indebtedness with
the Creditor [DBP] shall have been fully paid, an amount to pay the outstanding indebtedness shall
first be paid to the creditor and the balance of sum assured, if there is any, shall then be paid to the
beneficiary/ies designated by the debtor." Insured, being the person with whom the contract was
made, is primarily the proper person to bring suit thereon. Subject to some exceptions, insured
may thus sue, although the policy is taken wholly or in part for the benefit of another person named
or unnamed, and although it is expressly made payable to another as his interest may appear or
otherwise. Although a policy issued to a mortgagor is taken out for the benefit of the mortgagee
and is made payable to him, yet the mortgagor may sue thereon in his own name, especially where
the mortgagee’s interest is less than the full amount recoverable under the policy, The Insured may
be regarded as the real party in interest, although he has assigned the policy for the purpose of
collection, or has assigned as collateral security any judgment he may obtain."
A policy of insurance upon life or health may pass by transfer, will or succession to any
person, whether he has an insurable interest or not, and such person may recover it whatever the
insured might have recovered, the widow of Dr. Leuterio may file the suit against the insurer,
Grepalife.
ERNESTO ROBLES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. DELFIN FL. BATACAN, HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, HON. JOSE B. JIMENEZ, ATANACIO
GERONIMO and BENEDICTO GERONIMO, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-46978. October 12, 1987
Facts:
Severino had a land for 20 years until 1969 and died the following year at the age of 86. After
his death, an ejectment suit was filed against his two sons who were Benedicto Geronimo and
Atanacio Geronimo by the petitioner Robles, who claimed they had no right to remain in his land.
Atanacio Geronimo answered and averred that he was entitled to succeed his father pursuant to
R.A. No. 1199 and Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844 on the ground that his father was an agricultural tenant
of Robles during the twenty years where his father worked in the land of Robles Batacan. Hence,
he could remain in Robles' land, under the same terms and conditions of the original tenancy share
arrangement entered into between his father and Robles, as his statutory successor.
Petitioner Robles insists that Severino Geronimo was never an agricultural tenant of his but
worked merely as a watcher in his land.
After trial, the Court of Agrarian Relations rendered judgment recognizing the defendant as
the agricultural tenant of the plaintiff and Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Agrarian Relations
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Anatacio has the right to succeed his father as agricultural tenant?
Ruling:
Yes, as mandated by RA 1199 and RA 3855.
As for the private respondent’s right to succeed his father, the respondent court was correct
in affirming the ruling of the trial court that, as the son of Severino Geronimo, Atanacio had the
right to take over as agricultural tenant in the petitioner’s land in accordance with R.A. No. 1199
and R.A. No. 3844. Obviously, Atanacio was the only heir interested in succeeding his father as his
brother, Benedicto, had not seen fit to claim his right and in fact defaulted in resisting the
petitioner’s claims in the ejectment suit. Significantly, when in his prayer the petitioner asks for
authority to appoint the said Benedicto to succeed his father, it is presumably as his watcher only
and not as agricultural tenant. The petitioner’s consistent claim, it should be noted, is that Severino
Geronimo was not his tenant but only his watcher.
JESUS SAN AGUSTIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO MENEZ, JR
GR No. 121940 December 4, 2001
Leslie R. Lucas
Facts:
On February 11, 1974, GSIS sold to Marioa Caiquep residential land (168 sq m) located in
Rosario, Pasig City denominated as Lot 13, blk 7, on GSIS low cost housing project. It was evidenced
by DOAS. It was stipulated in DOAS that the lot shall not be sold. 5 years from the dates of final and
absolute ownership except in cases of hereditary succession or resale in favor of GSIS.
On February 1974, she sold the land to Maximino MenezJr., evidenced by DOAS. It was
notarized but was not immediately reglistered due to the 5 yr prohibition (1979). In 1979, for
being suspective as subversive, he arrest, search and seizure was issued against him. Military men
ransacked the house in Cainta Rizal, he voluntarily surrendered and was detained for 2 yrs, then
after he was released, he was arrested again for another 4 years until March 1984. He then
discovered that the subject title was missing. He consulted a lawyer but the latter did not act
immediately. His new counsel filed affidavit of loss in ROD Pasig and TCT was issued. He sent
notices to Macaria. Since there was no opposition, RTC ordered ROD Pasig to issue a new owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT. Jesus San Agustin on the other hand, who received the copy of the decision,
filed a motion to reopen reconstitution of title because he, being the sole heir of Macaria, was not
notified of the proceeding.
CA ruled in favor ofprivate respondent Menez.
Issue:
Should Jesus be given notice to the proceeding?
Ruling:
No. He is not an indispensable party. His claim, that he is an heir (nephew) of the original
owner of the lot covered by the disputed lot and the present occupant thereof is not annotated in
the said memorandum of encumbrances. Neither was his claim entered on the Certificate of Titles
in the name of their original/former owners on file with the Register of Deeds at the time of the
filing or pendency of LRC Case No. R-4659. Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to notice.The actual
owners and possessors of the lands involved, are duly served with actual and personal notice of
the petition. As pointed out by the appellate court, his reliance on Alabang is misplaced because
the cause of action in that case is based on Republic Act i No. 26, entitled "An Act Providing A Special
Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title Lost or Destroyed," while the
present case is based on Section 109 of P.D. 1529 as above explained. petitioner contends that
Exhibit "D" is null and void under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, specifically paragraph (7),17
because the deed of sale was executed within the five-year prohibitory period under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as "The Public Land Act."The Court
agree with respondent court that the proscription under Com. Act No. 141 on sale within the 5-
year restrictive period refers to homestead lands only. Here the lot in dispute is not a homestead
land, as found by the trial and appellate courts. Said lot is owned by GSIS, under TCT No. 10028 in
its proprietary capacity.
Moreover, as far as the violation of the 5-year restrictive condition imposed by GSIS in its
contract with petitioner's predecessor-in-interest is concerned, it is the GSIS and not petitioner
who had a cause of action against private respondent.
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA 2
COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000
Doctrine: Article 776 – The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person,
which are not extinguished by his death.
Facts:
In her last will and testament, Belleza left her property, a parcel of land, to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla; which same property shall be inherited by the children and spouse of Rabadilla should
the latter die ahead of Belleza. Belleza however, imposed certain obligations in her codicil, that:
Rabadilla or his heir shall give yearly to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza 75 piculs of export
sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar until the recipient dies;
If the property is later on sold, leased or mortgaged, the buyer, lessee or mortgagee shall also have
the obligation to respect and deliver yearly 100 piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina; If the same is not
observed, Maria Marlina shall seize the land and turn it over to the testatrix’s descendants who
shall then have the same obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar; and
In case the subject property is to be sold, leased or mortgaged, successors cannot negotiate with
others other than the testatrix’s near descendants and sister.
Pursuant to the codicil, the land was transferred to Jorge. When he died in 1983, his wife
and children, Johnny, Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, inherited the property. In 1989, Maria Marlina
filed a complaint against the heirs of Jorge, alleging that the conditions of the codicil have been
violated. Plaintiff prayed for the reconveyance of the land, cancellation of the TCT in the name of
Jorge and issuance of a new title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza. The
Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, while the Court of Appeals reversed the said decision
of the Regional Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether the obligations imposed on Jorge were transmitted to his heirs upon his death?
Held:
The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. It is a general rule under the law on succession
that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory
heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation
to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner,
his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded
the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights
were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his
death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent;
corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were
likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private
respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to
his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent’s) obligation to
deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted
heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment
or performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case
at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court
erred in dismissing the complaint.
LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES,
ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO YANES, respondents.
G.R. No. 68053 , May 7, 1990
Doctrine: Article 776 – The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person,
which are not extinguished by his death.
Facts:
Anecito Yanes left his children lots 773 and 823. Records show that lot 773 was divided
into several lots and eventually fell into the possession of Rosendo Alvarez. The Yaneses then filed
a complaint against Rosendo Alvarez et al for the return of the ownership and possession of the
subject lots. However, during the pendency of said case, Rosendo sold the lots to Dr. Rodolfo Siason.
A decision was rendered by the court in favor of the Yaneses. However, Dr. Siason was adjudged to
be a purchaser in good faith and for value and as such the decision cannot be enforced. Rosendo
Alvarez died but he was adjudged to pay the monetary value of the properties with damages to the
Yaneses.
Issue:
Whether the monetary liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of subject lots
could be transmitted to his heirs herein petitioners?
Held:
Yes. Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights
and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Petitioners being the heirs of the late
Rosendo Alvarez cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave
rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein
is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass
of their father's hereditary estate, and the court have ruled that the hereditary assets are always
liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. It must, however, be made clear
that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance.
CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO PAMPLONA and APOLONIA ONTE, petitioners,

vs.
VIVENCIO MORETO, VICTOR MORETO, ELIGIO MORETO, MARCELO MORETO, PAULINA MORETO,
ROSARIO MORETO, MARTA MORETO, SEVERINA MENDOZA, PABLO MENDOZA, LAZARO
MENDOZA, VICTORIA TUIZA, JOSEFINA MORETO, LEANDRO MORETO and LORENZO MENDOZA,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-33187 March 31, 1980
Facts:
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife with 6 children. During their
marriage, they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496. Monica Maniega died intestate.
more than (6) years after, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased
wife, and before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership, executed a Deed of Sale covering Lot
1495. A new TCT was issued to the Sps. Pamplona and they constructed a house and a piggery on
the lot.
Flaviano Moreto died intestate. The heirs of Monica, filed an action of nullity of the Deed of
Sale as regards to the one-hald of the property because Flaviano had no right to sell the lot
belonging to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and Monica and it was executed without the
consent of the heirs of Monica.
Issue:
Whether or not heirs of Monica are obliged to deliver the property to Sps. Pamplona?
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which the heirs of Monica received
from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property rights and
obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death.
Since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173 sq.
meters as his share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share
to the Pamplona spouses.
Therefore, the sale was valid as to the whole portion occupied by the Sps. Pamplona for the
simple reason that Flaviano, had legal right to more 781 sq. meters of the communal estate, a title
which he could dispose or alienate in favor of the Sps. Pamplona.
Thus, the heirs of Monica are obliged to deliver the property to the Sps. Pamplona
SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-44837, November 23, 1938
Angelica M. Jayag
Facts:
In 1916, the Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco and from which they
had a daughter, Ana Quitco Ledesma. In 1921, the relation between the two ended, but the latter
executed a deed acknowledging Ana as his natural daughter. On January 21, 1922, Lorenzo issued
in favour of Socorro Ledesma a promissory note.
Later, Lorenzo M. Quitco married Conchita McLachlin, with whom he had four children. On
March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died. Subsequently, on December 15, 1932, Lorenzo’s father,
Eusebio Quitco, also died. Eusebio Quitco left real and personal properties upon his death.
On November 14, 1933, the court issued an order of declaration of heirs in the intestate of the
deceased Eusebio Quitco, and as Ana Quitco Ledesma was not included among the declared heirs.
Socorro sought for reconsideration of the order petition which the court denied. Hence, in lieu, she
proceeded file an action to collect the sum payable on the promissory note by Lorenzo in her favour
to be paid out of the properties inherited by the Mclachlins which represents that of the
successional rights of Lorenzo as a compulsory heir of his father Eusebio.
Issue:
Can the properties inherited by the heirs from their deceased grandfather by representation
be subjected to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father Lorenzo Quitco, who
died without leaving any property?
Held:
No. The claim for the payment of an indebtedness contracted by a deceased person cannot be
filed for its collection before the committee on claims and appraisal, appointed in the intestate of
his father, and the properties inherited from the latter by the children of said deceased do not
answer for the payment of the indebtedness contracted during the lifetime of said person.
While it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a children
presents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or
grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the
obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is
received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties
received from their predecessor.
Thus, the defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo M.
Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their said father from whom they did not inherit
anything.
ARTICLE 777
ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY MANUEL VILLANUEVA, TEODORA VILLANUEVA-
FRANCISCO, CAMILO FRANCISCO, ADOLFO FRANCISCO, LUCIMO FRANCISCO, JR., MILAGROS
FRANCISCO,* CELEDONIO FRANCISCO, HERMINIGILDO FRANCISCO; RAMON TRESVALLES,
ROBERTO TAJONERA, NATIVIDAD INING-IBEA (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY EDILBERTO IBEA,
JOSEFA IBEA, MARTHA IBEA, CARMEN IBEA, AMPARO IBEA-FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ, EUGENIO
RUIZ AND PASTOR RUIZ; DOLORES INING-RIMON (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY JESUS RIMON,
CESARIA RIMON GONZALES AND REMEDIOS RIMON CORDERO; AND PEDRO INING (DECEASED)
SURVIVED BY ELISA TAN INING (WIFE) AND PEDRO INING, JR., PETITIONERS,
vs.
LEONARDO R. VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES VEGA, RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO M. VEGA,
MILBUENA VEGA-RESTITUTO, AND LENARD VEGA, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 174727; August 12, 2013
Facts:
Leon Roldan is the owner of a 3, 120 square meter parcel of land (subject property) in
Kalibo, Aklan covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (24071) RO-6305 (OCT RO-630). Leon
died without issue and was survived by his siblings, Romana Roldan and Gregoria Roldan Ining
(who are now both deceased).
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romana’s
surviving heir, Leonardo R. Vega filed with the RTC of Kalibo for partition, recovery of ownership
and possession, with damages against Gregoria’s heirs: Natividad Ining-Ibea, Dolores Ining-Rimon,
Antipolo, Pedro, Jose, Amando, et al.
Leonardo alleged that on several occasions, he demanded the partition of the property, but
Gregoria’s heirs refused to heed his demands; that Gregoria’s heirs claimed sole ownership of the
property, that portions of the property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera which portions must
be collated and included as part of the portion to be awarded to Gregoria’s heirs; that Lucimo
Francisco, Sr., husband of herein petitioner Teodora, illegaly claimed absolute ownership of the
property and transferred in his name the tax declaration covering the property and Leonardo was
deprived of the fruits of the property.
Petitioners Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr., and Herminigildo answered, claiming that
Leonoardo had no cause of action against them since they became the sole owners of the property
through Lucimo Sr. who had acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez, who in
turn acquired the same from Leon; that they were were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious
and exclusive possession of the property with a just title.
In the course of proceedings, Leonardo passed away and substituted by his wife Lourdes
and children.
The RTC dismissed Leonardo’s complaint on the ground that his right of action has long
prescribed under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code.
On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate?
Ruling:
Yes. The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and
had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of Leon’s
estate.
Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, “the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decdent.” Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana
and Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares. In turn, Romana’s and Gregoria’s
heirs – the parties herein – became entitled to the property upon the sisters’ passing.
With this, Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property, having succeeded
to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana, petitioners and respondents became co-owners
thereof.
Hence, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-ownership,
Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time.
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY

EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA
UNGOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA,
NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and ANGELO P.
ORFINADA, respondents.
G.R. No. 129008 January 13, 2004
Ankash Sohail Butt
Facts:
Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will and left several personal and real properties. He
also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he had seven children who are the
herein respondents
The decedent also left his paramour and their children. They were the herein petitioner
Teodora Rioferio and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena, their children. Respondents
Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate children of the deceased) discovered that petitioner
Teodora and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with
Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City.
Respondent Alfonso Clyde Orfinada III filed a Petition for the issuance of Letters of
Administration. Respondents also filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial
Settlement of Estate. Petitioners filed their ANSWER on the said Complaint and interposed that the
property SUBJECT OF THE CONTESTED DEED OF EXTR JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT raised the
affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of
Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings. Petitioners filed
a Motion to Set Affirmative Defense for Hearing but was denied by the lower court stating that the
respondents, as heirs are the real parties-in-interest especially in the absence of an administrator
who is yet to be appointed.
Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied prompting them
to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and averred that RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion. The CA ruled against the petitioners, hence this petition before the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights belonging to the
deceased pending the appointment of an administrator?
Held: YES.
The Court ruled that pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without
doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with
the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the
principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a
person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the
suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total
lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognized two exceptions,

namely:
a) If the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and
b) When the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of and is made
a party defendant.
Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover the property of the
estate is compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an
appointed administrator but he is disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.
Hence, this case provided for the third exception to the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to
sue for the recovery of the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings.
FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA, DOMINADOR CALPATURA and TOMAS CALPATURA, JR., Heirs of
TOMAS CALPATURA, SR.
vs.
ROBERTO, ERLINDA, DANIEL, GLORIA, PATRICIO, JR. and EDNA, all surnamed PRADO and
NARCISA PRADO
G.R. No. 156879 January 20, 2004
Facts:
On December 19, 1959, Patricio Prado, Sr. died. Narcisa, Patricio’s wife, subsequently
married Bonifacio Calpatura. In order to support her minor children with her first husband, she
executed an Agreement of Purchase and Sale with her brother-in-law, Tomas Calapatura. Narcisa
agreed to sell the northern half portion of the property for the sum of P10,500.00. On July 28, 1973,
Narcisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Tomas over the said property.
In 1976, Tomas’ daughter, Flordeliza, built a two-storey duplex with firewall on the northern
half portion of the property. The Prados, who occupied the southern half portion of the land, did
not object to the construction. Flordeliza and her husband Wilfredo declared the property for
taxation purposes and paid the corresponding taxes thereon. Likewise, Maximo Calpatura, the son
of Tomas’ cousin, built a small house on the northern portion of the property.
On April 8, 1991, the Prados filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of sale and delivery
of possession of the northern half portion of the subject property against Flordeliza, Dominador
Calpatura and Tomas Calpatura, Jr., alleging among others that Narcisa, as natural guardian of her
children, had no authority to sell the northern half portion of the property which she and her
children co-owned. The Calpaturas countered that Narcisa owned 9/14 of the property, consisting
of ½ as her share in the conjugal partnership with her first husband and 1/7 as her share in the
estate of her deceased husband.
RTC held that the sale was valid and dismissed the complaint of the Prados. The Court of
Appeals declared that the Calpaturas were co-owners of the subject property, thus the sale was
valid only insofar as Narcisa’s 1/7 undivided share thereon was concerned.
Issue:
Is the sale between Narcisa and Tomas valid?
Held:
Yes. The sale was valid as to the undivided one-half portion of the property.
The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., one-half of the subject
property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Narcisa, as her share in the conjugal
partnership. Particio’s rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted upon his death to his heirs,
which includes his widow Narcisa, who is entitled to the same share as that of each of the legitimate
children. Thus, as a result of the death of Patricio, a regime of co-ownership arose between Narcisa
and the other heirs in relation to the property. The remaining one-half was transmitted to his heirs
by intestate succession. By the law on intestate succession, his six children and Narcisa Prado
inherited the same at one-seventh (1/7) each pro indiviso. Inasmuch as Narcisa inherited one-
seventh (1/7) of her husband's conjugal share in the said property and is the owner of one-half
(1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of 9/14 of the subject property.
Hence, Narcisa could validly convey her total undivided share in the entire property to
Tomas. Narcisa and her children are deemed co-owners of the subject property. However, no
particular portion of the property could be identified as yet and delineated as the object of the sale
considering that the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court.
While Narcisa could validly sell one half of the subject property, her share being 9/14 of the same,
she could not have particularly conveyed the northern portion thereof before the partition, the
terms of which was still to be determined by the parties before the trial court.
EDUARDO FELIPE, HERMOGENA V. FELIPE AND VICENTE V. FELIPE, Petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON, NAMELY: GIMENA ALMOSARA, SOFIA ALDON, SALVADOR ALDON,
AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-60174. February 16, 1983
Facts:
Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936. They bought several pieces of land
sometime between 1948 and 1950.
In 1951, Gimena Almosara sold the lots to the spouses Eduardo Felipe and Hermogena V.
Felipe. The sale was made without the consent of her husband,.
On April 26, 1976, the heirs of Maximo Aldon, namely his widow Gimena and their children
Sofia and Salvador Aldon filed a complaint that alleged that the plaintiffs were the owners of Lots
1370, 1371 and 1415; that they had orally mortgaged the same to the defendants; and an offer to
redeem the mortgage had been refused so they filed the complaint in order to recover the three
parcels of land.
The trial court sustained the claim of the defendants and rendered judgment in favor of
Spouses Felipe as lawful owners. The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of CFI declaring the
parcels ‘were purchased by plaintiff Gimena Almosara and her late husband Maximo Aldon during
their marriage and inferentially, by force of law, could not, be disposed of by a wife without her
husband’s consent. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale made by the wife is valid?
Ruling:
YES. It is a voidable contract.
The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by her husband was subject to
annulment by her husband only during the marriage because he was the victim of the defective
contract. Gimena, who was the party responsible for the defect, could not ask for its annulment.
Their children could not likewise seek the annulment of the contract while the marriage subsisted
because they merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold.
The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership by the death
of Maximo Aldon did not improve the situation of Gimena. What she could not do during the
marriage, she could not do thereafter.
The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different. After the death of Maximo they acquired
the right to question the defective contract insofar as it deprived them of their hereditary rights in
their father’s share in the lands. The father’s share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their share is
two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-third (1/3) pertaining to the widow.
The children’s cause of action accrued from the death of their father in 1959 and they had
thirty (30) years to institute it (Art. 1141, Civil Code.) They filed action in 1976 which is well within
the period.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
JOSEPHINE LUCERO, respondents.
GR L-60101, August 31, 1983
Leslie R. Lucas
Facts:
Captain Julio Lucero Jr., was appointed by Eastern Shipping Lines as master/captain to its
vessel. MV Easter Minicon. Under the contract, his employment was good for one trip only. The
contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Manila, unless
renewed. It was furhter agreed that apart part of the captain’s salary, while abroad, should be paid
to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife in Manila. Thereafter, the vessel was enroute to further continue
its voyage.Thereafter, the Company paid the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew
members, except respondent Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept the same. Mrs. Lucero filed
a complaint with the National Seamen Board, for payment of her accrued monthly allotment since
March 1980 and for continued payment of said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have
returned to the port of Manila. The Board ruled in favor of Mrs. Josephine Lucero and against
petitioner Company. That the presumption of death could not be applied.
Issue:
Whether or not Josephine Lucero may claim death benefits of his husband on his behalf?
Held:
Yes., by virtue of Article 777 of the New Civil Code. The Supreme Court rules that whatever
claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to
respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition
by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance
of a person are transmitted. Respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares
from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment
of an executrix or administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to
sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can commence
any action originally pertaining to the decedent.
EMILIO EMNACE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF VICENTE TABANAO, SHERWIN
TABANAO, VICENTE WILLIAM TABANAO, JANETTE TABANAO DEPOSOY, VICENTA MAY TABANAO
VARELA, ROSELA TABANAO and VINCENT TABANAO, respondents.
G.R. No. 126334 November 23, 2001
DOCTRINE: Article 777 – The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
of the decedent.
Facts:
Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divina-gracia were partners in a
business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they decided
to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the
partnership properties among them, consequent to Jacinto Divinagracia’s withdrawal from the
partnership.1 Among the assets to be distributed were five (5) fishing boats, six (6) vehicles, two
(2) parcels of land located at Sto. Niño and Talisay, Negros Occidental, and cash deposits in the
local branches of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Prudential Bank.
Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanao’s untimely
demise in 1994, petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao’s heirs any statement of assets and liabilities
of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnership’s finances. Petitioner also
reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao’s heirs the deceased’s 1/3 share in the total assets
of the partnership, amounting to P30,000,000.00, or the sum of P10,000,000.00, despite formal
demand for payment thereof. Consequently, Tabanao’s heirs, respondents herein, filed against
petitioner an action for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages.
Issue:
Whether the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no legal capacity to sue?
Held:
The Supreme Court held in the negative. The surviving spouse does not need to be
appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her
children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very
moment of Vicente Tabanao’s death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were
transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of
the decedent.
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner
were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a
mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value
of the inheritance of a person are transmitted.33 Moreover, respondents became owners of their
respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.
A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix
or administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As successors
who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can commence any action
originally pertaining to the decedent.35 From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and
to demand fulfillment of petitioner’s obligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement were
transmitted to respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the court’s
intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.
IN THE MATTER OF GUARDIANSHIP OF THE MINORS CECILIA, REBECCA, FLORIDA, RAPHAEL,
RODOLFO, LUISITO, TEODORO, all surnamed LAVIDES, ALBERTO C. LAVIDES, petitioner,
vs.
CITY COURT OF LUCENA, Branch I, respondent.
G.R. No. L-50261, May 31, 1982
Doctrine: Article 777 – The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
of the decedent.
Facts:
Upon the death of his wife, petitioner Alberto Lavides instituted before respondent City
Court a guardianship proceeding with respect to the person and property of their seven (7) minor
children. Said petition alleged that the estate left by the deceased wife of herein petitioner, mother
of the abovenamed minors, has a total value of thirty-five thousand pesos (P35,000.00) or an
amount of P5,000.00 pertaining to each minor. On June 23, 1971, respondent City Court, then
presided by Honorable Judge Filemon Juntereal, upon motion, authorized petitioner to settle the
estate extrajudicially and to sell a portion thereof consisting of shares of stocks. When petitioner
filed a motion for confirmation and approval of a Deed of Exchange Agreement the respondent
court, now presided by Honorable Judge Jose J. Parentela, Jr., reviewed the records of the case and
finding that the undivided estate left by the deceased was worth at least P35,000.00, dismissed the
case in an Order dated December 5, 1978, for lack of jurisdiction, revoked the appointment of
petitioner as guardian and annulled all proceedings taken prior to the issuance of the said order of
December 5, 1978.
Issue:
Whether the respondent city court's jurisdiction over a petition for general guardianship is
based on the total value of the estate or on the value of the individual share of the minors in the
estate of their deceased mother?
Held:
No. Section 1, Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that the value of the property
of the minor or incompetent sought to be placed in guardianship determines which court has
jurisdiction. And that property referred to is the individual estate of the minor so much so that
when there are more than one minor or in competent sought to be placed under guardianship,
what determines which court has jurisdiction is the value of the individual property of each minor
or incompetent. When their mother died the children immediately became the owner of their
respective portions pursuant to Article 777 of the Civil Code which states that:
The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
As such, each child owns their share of Php 5,000.00 the moment their mother died.
Applying Rule 92, the jurisdiciton will then be determined by each share and that is not to be added
together. Therefore, the case is well within the jurisdiciton of respondent court.
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their
father) who represents the minors, petitioners,
vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA,
AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First
Instance of Abra, respondents.
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
Facts:
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla
and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action, to quiet title over a property in Abra
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Fortunata is dead and has no legal
capacity to sue. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena,
and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the
court dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and
has no legal personality to sue.
Issue:
Whether or not the right over the parcels of land subject of the action passes to the heirs of the
decedent upon her death.
Ruling: YES.
When the mother(Fortunata) filed the case of quieting of title, the Court already acquired
jurisdiction over her person. Under the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party
who died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted. The lower court should have
allowed the substitution since under Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of
the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the
rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except
by the methods provided for by law.
In this case, when Fortunata Barcena died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation
in the civil case was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death.
Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest
in the case.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO BORROMEO-HERRERA,

petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch II, respondents.
G.R. No. L-41171, July 23, 1987
Angelica M. Jayag
Facts:
Vito Borromeo died on March 13, 1952 without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties
in the province of Cebu.
On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed a petition for the probate of a one page document as the
last will and testament left by the said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato
and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating Junquera as
executor thereof. After due trial, the probate court held that will of the deceased was a forgery thus
disallowed.
The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. Several parties filed
claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. On April
10, 1969, the trial court issued an order declaring the following as the intestate heirs:
1. Jose Cuenco Borromeo

2. Judge Crispin Borromeo
3. Vitaliana Borromeo
4. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera
5. Salud Borromeo
6. Asuncion Borromeo
7. Marcial Borromeo
8. Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and
9. The heirs of Canuto Borromeo
The court ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into
4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable shares among the 9 abovenamed
declared intestate heirs.
On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir under
the forged will, filed a motion praying that he be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased Vito
Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the deceased and that in the declaration of heirs
he was omitted, in disregard of the law making him a forced heir entitled to receive a legitime like
all other forced heirs. The court dismissed the motion for the reason that it was already barred by
prior declaration of legal heirs. Fortunato filed a motion for reconsideration but changed the basis
for his claim to a portion of the estate. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights
dated July 31, 1967 signed by five of the nine abovenamed heirs relinquishing to him their shares
in the disputed estate.
Issue:
Was the waiver of hereditary rights valid?
Held:
No. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights in the case of Osorio v. Osorio
and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531 provides that:
"the properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to

third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of
the former. Nor do such properties have the character of future property, because the heirs
acquire a right to succession from the moment of the death of the deceased, by principle
established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code, according to which
the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from
the moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the
hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the death,
in accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned
upon the adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion."
However, in the case of People v. Salvador, (CA) 53 O.G. No. 22, p. 8116, 8120, for the "Waiver
of Hereditary Rights" to be effective, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2)
the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. Further, in
Fernandez v. Sebido, et al., 70 Phil., 151, 159 , the Court also opined that, the intention to waive a
right or advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention
rests in what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent
to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that no other reasonable explanation of
his conduct is possible.
Indubitably, the heirs, in this case, could waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order
to partition the estate was issued only in 1969. However, circumstances show that the purported
"Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be effective for the reason that the
signatories to the waiver document did not have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish
their rights, to wit: (1) On October 27, 1967 proposal for an amicable settlement conceding to all
the eight (8) intestate heirs various properties in consideration for the heirs giving to the
respondent and to Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo the fourteen (14) contested lots was filed inspite
of the fact that on July 31, 1967, some of the heirs had allegedly already waived or sold their
hereditary rights to the respondent; and (2) The agreement on how the estate is to be distributed,
the June 29, 1968 deed of assignment, the deed of reconveyance, and the subsequent cancellation
of the deed of assignment and deed of reconveyance all argue against the purported waiver of
hereditary rights.
BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED, LUISITO E. DELA MERCED, BLANQUTIA M. MACATANGAY, MA.

OLIVIA M. PAREDES, TERESITA P. RUPISAN, RUBEN M. ADRIANO, HERMINIO M. ADRIANO,
JOSELITO M. ADRIANO, ROGELIO M. ADRIANO, WILFREDO M. ADRIANO, VICTOR M. ADRIANO,
CORAZON A. ONGOCO, JASMIN A. MENDOZA and CONSTANTINO M. ADRIANO, petitioners, vs.
JOSELITO P. DELA MERCED, respondent.
G.R. No. 126707 February 25, 1999
Facts:
On March 23, 1987, Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate, without issue. She left five (5)
parcels of land situated in Orambo, Pasig City. At the time of her death, Evarista was survived by
three sets of heirs: (1) Francisco M. dela Merced, her legitimate brother; (2) Teresita P. Rupisan,
her niece who is the only daughter of Rosa de la Merced-Platon (a sister who died in 1943) ; and
(3) the legitimate children of Eugenia dela Merced-Adriano (another sister of Evarista who died
in 1965). Almost a year later, Francisco (Evarista’s brother) died. He was survived by his wife
Blanquita Erreadela Merced and their three legitimate children.
On April 20, 1989, the three sets of heirs of the Evarista executed an extrajudicial settlement,
entitled “Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Evarista M. dela Merced”
adjudicating the properties of Evarista to them, each set with a share of one-third pro-indiviso.
On July 26, 1990, private respondent Joselito P. Dela Merced, illegitimate son of the late
Francisco de la Merced, filed a petition for annulment of the extrajudicial settlement, alleging that
he was fraudulently omitted from the said settlement made by petitioners, who were fully aware
of his relation to the late Francisco. Claiming successional rights, private respondent Joselito
prayed that he be included as one of the beneficiaries, to share in the one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso
share in the estate of the deceased Evarista, corresponding to the heirs of Francisco.
The trial court dismissed the petition filed by Joselito. It ruled that Francisco Dela Merced,
alleged father of the Joselito, is a legitimate child, not an illegitimate. Josselito, on the other hand,
is admittedly an illegitimate child of the late Francisco. Hence, as such, he cannot represent his
alleged father in the succession of the latter in the intestate estate of the late Evarista, because of
the barrier in Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
On appeal to CA, the decision of the trial court was reversed, holding that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777 of the New Civil
Code), so that Francisco dela Merced inherited 1/3 of his sister’s estate at the moment of the latter’s
death. Said 1/3 of Evarista’s estate formed part of Francisco’s estate which was subsequently
transmitted upon his death on March 23, 1987 to his legal heirs, among whom is appellant as his
illegitimate child. Joselito became entitled to his share in Francisco’s estate from the time of the
latter’s death in 1987.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent Joselito is barred from inheriting from Evarista because
of the provision of Article 992?
Ruling:
No. Article 992 of the New Civil Code is not applicable because what involved here is not a
situation where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his father,
which is prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it is a scenario where an illegitimate
child inherits from his father, the latter’s share in or portion of, what the latter already inherited
from the deceased sister, Evarista.
Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that the right to succession are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent.
In this case, since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, the latter inherited a portion
of the estate of the former as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco died, his heirs,
namely: his spouse, legitimate children, and the private respondent, Joselito, an illegitimate child,
inherited his (Francisco’s) share in the estate of Evarista. It bears stressing that Joselito does not
claim to be an heir of Evarista by right of representation but participates in his own right, as an
heir of the late Francisco, in the latter’s share (or portion thereof) in the estate of Evarista. The
present case relates to the rightful and undisputed right of an heir to the share of his late father in
the estate of the decedent Evarista, ownership of which had been transmitted to his father upon
the death of Evarista.
Hence, Joselito is entitled to inherit in his own right as an heir to his father’s estate.
PEDRO GAYON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
SILVESTRE GAYON and GENOVEVA DE GAYON, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-28394 November 26, 1970
Ankash Sohail Butt
Facts:
The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against the spouses
Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially that, on October 1, 1952, said
spouses executed a deed — copy of which was attached to the complaint, as Annex "A" — whereby
they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land therein described,
and located in the barrio of Cabubugan, municipality of Guimbal, province of Iloilo, including the
improvements thereon, subject to redemption within five (5) years or not later than October 1,
1957; that said right of redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon,
or any of their heirs or successors, despite the expiration of the period therefor; that said Pedro
Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of a deed of sale — copy of which was attached
to the complaint, as Annex "B" — dated March 21, 1961, sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff
Pedro Gayon for the sum of P614.00; that plaintiff had, since 1961, introduced thereon
improvements worth P1,000; that he had, moreover, fully paid the taxes on said property up to
1967; and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil Code require a judicial decree for the
consolidation of the title in and to a land acquired through a conditional sale, and, accordingly,
praying that an order be issued in plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of ownership in and to the
aforementioned property.
In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died
on January 6, 1954, long before the institution of this case; that Annex "A" to the complaint is
fictitious, for the signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not hers; that neither she nor
her deceased husband had ever executed "any document of whatever nature in plaintiff's favor";
that the complaint is malicious and had embarrassed her and her children; that the heirs of
Silvestre Gayon had to "employ the services of counsel for a fee of P500.00 and incurred expenses
of at least P200.00"; and that being a brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff "did not
exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case" before filing his complaint. She prayed,
therefore, that the same be dismissed and that plaintiff be sentenced to pay damages.
Issue:
Is a declaration of heirship needed before the heirs can represent defendant Silvestre in the
complaint?
Held:
NO. Mrs. Gayon, as the widow, is one of the compulsory heirs and has an interest in the
property.
In as much as succession takes place, by operation of law, "from the moment of the death of
the decedent" and "(t)he inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person
which are not extinguished by his death," it follows that if his heirs were included as defendants in
this case, they would be sued, not as "representatives" of the decedent, but as owners of an aliquot
interest in the property in question, even if the precise extent of their interest may still be
undetermined and they have derived it from the decent.
Thus, they may be sued without a previous declaration of heirship, provided there is no
pending special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
MATILDE S. PALICTE vs.

HON. JOSE O. RAMOLETE as Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III, and
MARCELO SOTTO, Administrator
G.R. No. L-55076. September 21, 1987
Facts:
In 1979, a sale at public auction was held pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the Judge
Ramolete in the case of Pilar Teves, Et. Al. v. Marcelo Sotto, Administrator, a civil case for the
satisfaction of judgment in the amount of P725,270.00. Eight properties belonging to the late Don
Filemon Sotto and administered by Marcelo Sotto were levied upon.
Within the period for redemption, Matilde S. Palicte (Palicte), as one of the heirs of the late
Don Filemon Sotto, redeemed from purchaser Pilar Teves, four (4) lots for the sum of P60,000.00.
1980, Palicte filed a motion with Judge Ramolete for the transfer to her name of the titles to the
four (4) parcels of land covered by the deed of redemption. This motion was opposed by the
plaintiffs in "Pilar Teves, Et. Al. v. Marcelo Sotto, administrator" civil case on the principal ground
that movant, Palicte, is not one of those authorized to redeem under the provisions of the Rules of
Court.
RTC denied the motion and held that although Palicte is one of the declared heirs she does not
qualify as a successor- in-interest who may redeem the real properties sold. It ruled that the deed
of redemption is null and void.
Issue:
Is Matilde S. Palicte considered as a successor-in-interest and is authorized to redeem the

properties sold at the public auction?
Held:
Yes. Matilde is considered as a successor-in-interest and is authorized to redeem the

properties sold at the public auction.
A real property may be redeemed by (1) the judgment debtor, or his successor in interest in
the whole or any part of the property; or (2) a creditor having a lien by attachment, judgment or
mortgage on the property sold, or on some part thereof, subsequent to the judgment under which
the property was sold. As to the successor in interest of the judgment debtor, Art. 777 of the Civil
Code states that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent.
Applying the foregoing in the case at bar, the lower court, erred in considering that the
administrator was the only "successor- in-interest." The estate of the deceased is the judgment
debtor and the heirs who will eventually acquire that estate should not be prohibited from doing
their share in its preservation. Palicte, being the daughter of the late Don Filemon Sotto is a
legitimate heir and thus, she qualifies as a successor-in-interest. At the moment of the Don
Filemon’s death, his heirs start to own the property, subject to the liabilities. In fact, they may
dispose of the same even while the property is under administration. (Barretto v. Tuason, 59 Phil.
845; Jakosalem v. Rafols, 73 Phil. 628). If the heirs may dispose of their shares in the decedent’s
property even while it is under administration with more reason should the heirs be allowed to
redeem redeemable properties despite the presence of an administrator.
Hence, Matilde, as one of the legitimate heirs of Don Filemon, is considered a successor-in-
interest and is authorized to redeem the properties.
MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B. LOCSIN, MATILDE L. CORDERO,
SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, FLORENTINO JAUCIAN, MERCEDES JAUCIAN
ARBOLEDA, HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS OF EDUARDO JAUCIAN and HEIRS OF VICENTE
JAUCIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992
Facts:
Mariano is married to Catalina Jaucian. Both of them inherited some properties from their
own parents. Spouses Mariano and Catalina’s properties were brought under Torrens system, title
of which was “Mariano Locsin married to Catalina Jaucian”.
On Mariano’s last will and testament:

1. He designated Catalina as his sole heir
1. 2.In case both are dead, properties of both will revert back to their families.
Mariano died of cancer on 09-14-1948; Catalina then declared in the will, that items 1-33 are
properties of Mariano and 34-42 are conjugal properties. She was notably close to Mariano’s
relatives namely Hostillo Cornello - whom she made custodian of all her properties and Atty
Salvador Lorayes - lawyer - nephew, who prepared all documents.
She made 16 transfers and ratified them before her death. After the reading of her will, all the
relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the properties
devised to them under the will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was
still alive, except some legacies which the executor of her will or estate.
Six years after her death, some of Jaucian's nephews and nieces who already received their
legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed an action in RTC Legazpi city to recover
properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances
were inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the loss on succession.
On the other hand, Locsin relatives answered that there was a valid transfer and properties did not
anymore form part of Catalina’s estate since it was transferred since 28 years before her death.
The trial court ruled in favor of Jaucians and against Locsins, declaring plaintiffs as rightful
heir's entitled to the entire share. CA affirmed the trial courts decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the properties transferred by Catalina to her husband’s nephews form part of
the estate after her death?
Ruling:
NO. Those properties did not form part of her estate. The rights of a person succession are
transmitted from the moment of his death and do not vest his heirs until such time. (Article 777).
There is no basis for assuming and intention on the part of Catalina Catalina in transferring
the properties she had received from her late husband to his nephew and nieces, and intent to
circumvent the law in violation of the private respondent’s right to her succession. Respondents
are not her compulsory heirs.
All respondents had was an expectancy that in no wise restricted her freedom to dispose or
even her entire share subject only to the limitations set forth in article 750:
Art. 750 . The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part
thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the
support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation,
are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation
shall be reduced on petition of any person affected .
MAGDALENA LLENARES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and APOLINAR ZABELLA, Respondents
GR 98701, May 13, 1993
Leslie Lucas
Facts:
In 1977, MAGDALENA LLENARES filed a complaint recovery of possession and quieting of
title after she had been allegedly dispossessed of the property in question by private respondent
Apolinar Zabella in 1976, and which Apolinar Zabella annotated in Transfer Certificate of Title, an
affidavit of adverse claim on 17 February 1977. Apolina Zabella alleged that on December 1929,
Anastacio Llenares sold his one-half (1/2) share in the lot to Ariston Zabella, Apolinar’s father.
Magdalenna Llenares countered that in 1937, the cadastral court awarded Lot. No. 5015 to Juan
Zabella and AnastacioLlenares in equal shares.Anastacio Llenares passed away on 27 March 1931
leaving the petitioner, his only child, as his sole heir, Magdalena Llenares. On the other hand, Juan
Zabella and niece Irene Catapat. On 5 February 1960, Rosario and Irene adjudicated to themselves
Juan Zabella's one-half (1/2) share in the lot. Rosario died on 5 June 1962 leaving, as her only heirs,
her children Godofredo, Noemi, Natividad, Olimpio and Numeriana, all surnamed Zaracena. On 22
June 1976, Magdalena Llenares, as the sole heir of AnastacioLlenares, adjudicated to herself, by
way of a SalaysayngPagmamanang Nag-iisangTagapagmana (1/2) share in the property belonging
to AnastacioLlenares. This fact was likewise annotated in OCT No. 43073.
On 16 February 1977, private respondent Zabella filed an adverse claim which was duly
annotated in TCT No. T-27166. As a consequence of a KasunduanngPagsusukat (Exhibit "I")
executed by and between Irene Catapat and the heirs of Rosario ZabellaZaracena, Lot No. 5015 was
subsidivided into Lot. Nos. 5015-A, 5015-B and 5015-C. Lot No. 5015-A, which comprises one-half
(1/2) of Lot No. 5015 corresponding to Anastacio's share, was allotted to the petitioner. TCT No.
T-27166 was thereafter cancelled and separate Transfer Certificate of Title were issued for each of
the subdivided lots. TCT No. 28170 was issued in the petitioner's name for Lot No. 5015-A.
Magdalena claims she is entitled to the property and alleged that she had been in possession of it
since she 1931, and that her cousin had administered the land since she was only 4 years old at the
time, and that she began and has been administering the property since 1959. She also further
proved that she had been paying taxes.
Issue:
Was there a transfer of ownership to Magdalena Llenares when her father died, Anastacio
Llenares?
Held:
YES. There is no law which requires her, as a sole heir, to execute an affidavit of adjudication
and cause both the cancellation of the OCT and the issuance of a new one in her name and in the
names of the heirs of co-owner Juan Zabella in order to transfer the ownership of the property to
her, or protect her rights and interests therein. The transfer in her favor took place, ipso jure, upon
the death of AnastacioLlenares.
BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS, ADELAIDE, ENRIQUITA and CLAUDIO, all surnamed,
GEVERO, petitioners,vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DEL MONTE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 77029 August 30, 1990
of the decedent.
Facts:
The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the Subdivision Plan Psd-37365
containing an area of 20,119 square meters and situated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Said lot was
acquired by purchase from the late Luis Lancero on September 15, 1964 as per Deed of Absolute
Sale executed in favor of plaintiff and by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4320 was
issued to plaintiff (DELCOR for brevity). Luis Lancero, in turn acquired the same parcel from
Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which was duly
annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the mother
lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha — 1/2 share and her children:
Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and Ursula, all surnamed surnamed Gevero, 1/2
undivided share of the whole area containing 48,122 square meters.
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived by her six children
aforementioned. The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October 17,1966 executed an Extra-Judicial
Settlement and Partition of the estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them
was lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition executed by the said heirs of
Teodorica Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450
duly approved by the Land Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D, among others, was adjudicated
to Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the time of extra-judicial settlement and partition in 1966.
Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to
quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same
prejudices the land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476.
Issue:
Whether the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to Luis Lancero is valid.
Held:
The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is
transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of the "causante" or predecessor
in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777). There is no legal bar to a successor (with
requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary share immediately after such death,
even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the
estate (De Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577 [1972]).
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were
transmitted from the moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966,
the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share in the lot as inheritance from
his mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that share which he
inherited from Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded in the deed of sale.
DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ-ANDRES, MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR., EVELYN SUAREZ-DE

LEON and REGINIO I. SUAREZ, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, VALENTE RAYMUNDO,
VIOLETA RAYMUNDO, MA. CONCEPCION VITO and VIRGINIA BANTA, respondents.
G.R. No. 94918 , September 2, 1992
of the decedent.
Facts:
Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his
estate consisting of several valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot been liquidated
or partitioned. In 1977, petitioners’ widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the
consolidated cases for rescission of contract and for damages. As a result, five (5) valuable parcel
of land in Pasig, Metro Manila were levied and sold on execution in favor of the private respondents
as the highest bidder. Before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a
reinvindicatory action against private respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the
annulment of the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the levied pieces of property.
They alleged, among others, that being strangers to the case decided against their mother, they
cannot be held liable therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are co-owners, can
neither be levied nor sold in execution.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners co-own the subject properties.
Held:
Yes. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code “The rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent.” Hence, the moment their father died they became co-
owners of subject lots. Their proprietary interest in the levied and auctioned property is different
from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not
because of their mother but through their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore,
petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect
their own interest.
PABLO LORENZO, as trustee of the estate of Thomas Hanley, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, Defendant-Appellant.
G.R. No. 43082. June 18, 1937
Facts:
On May 27, 1922, Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, leaving a will and considerable amount
of properties. On June 14, 1922, proceedings for the probate of his will and the settlement and
distribution of his estate were begun in the CFI of Zamboanga.
The CFI appointed PJM Moore as considered trustee to administer the real properties. Moore acted
as trustee until 1932 where he resigned and Pablo Lorenzo was appointed in his stead.
Defendant Juan Posadas filed a motion praying that plaintiff Lorenzo, be ordered to pay to the
Government the sum of P2,052.74. The motion was granted. Plaintiff Lorenzo paid this amount
under protest.
Issue:
When does the inheritance accrue?
Ruling:
The tax therefore is upon transmission or the transfer or devolution of property of a decedent,
made effective by his death. It is in reality an excise or privilege tax imposed on the right to succeed
to, receive, or take property by or under a will or the intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift, to become
operative at or after death. According to article 657 of the Civil Code, "the rights to the succession
of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death."
"The heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property
belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death."
ARTICLE 779
ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III,
ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-2199, June 21, 1966
Angelica M. Jayag
Facts:
On February 12, 1963, Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died. Thereafter, on March 4, 1963, Apolonia
Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and
testament of Fr. Rodriguez.
On the other hand, on March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez filed a petition
for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will. However, on March 11, 1963 before
the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn. Subsequently, on March 12, 1963,
aforementioned petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of
Parañaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed
as Special Administratrix of the estate.
On March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It was
stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest
of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963;
that he was buried in Parañaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and
Bulacan.
Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio Rodriguez the filed a motion to dismiss the petition filed
by Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan on the ground that, the CFI of Bulacan "has no
jurisdiction to try the above-entitled case in view of the pendency of another action for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez in the CFI of Rizal, namely, Sp.
Proceedings No. 3907 entitled 'In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Rev. Fr.
Celestino Rodriguez which was filed ahead of the instant case". Also, they contend that since the
intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963
while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on
the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing as
authority in support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja, G.R. No. 7792,
July 27, 1955.
The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the CFI of
Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court
on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in
Rizal on March 12, 1963.
Issue:
Which proceeding should be preferred?
Held:
The testate proceeding should prevail over the intestate proceeding. The Court opined that,
in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since
intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will. Article 960 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines provides that:
ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:

(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its
validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging to the
testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property in
which the testator has not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen or is not
fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being no
substitution, and no right of accretion takes place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases provided in this
Code.
Thus, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307 , "only after final decision as to the
nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-established
action".
In the case at bar, the institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while
the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending. Consequently, Bulacan Court of
First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate in question.
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY, JR.,
petitioner, vs. HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch
VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-39247; June 27, 1975
Facts:
Leodegaria Julian died in Davao City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her
husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B.
Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition for the probate of his mother's notarial
will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In that will Leodegaria declared:
a. that she was the owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II);
b. that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her father
(par. III); and
c. that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her
husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her
properties (Par. IV).
In paragraph V of the will, she stated that after her husband's death, her paraphernal lands
and all the conjugal lands (which she described as "my properties") should be divided and
distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal
lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share of
the conjugal assets.
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of
lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband, and alleged improper
partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain
properties which he had received from the testatrix.
Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix Balanay, Sr. wherein Felix
Balanay, Sr. withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he was interested
in its probate. Avelina contended said affidavit was void.
Subsequently, RTC denied the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave
effect to the affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr.
In the meanwhile, David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer not only of petitioner Felix
Balanay Jr. but also Felix Balanay, Sr. et al., filed a motion for leave of court to withdraw probate of
alleged will of Leodegaria and requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate proceeding.
The lower court acted on the motions of Atty. Montaña and adopted the view of Attys.
Montaña and Guyo that the will was void. In its order dismissed the petition for the probate,
converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding.
Felix Balanay, Jr. through a new counsel, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court’s
order on the ground that Atty. Montaña had no authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance
of the will.
Said motion for reconsideration was denied by the lower court clarifying that it declared the
will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty.
Montaña’s arguments.
Issue:
Whether or not the probate court can pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will before the
ruling on its allowance or formal validity?
Ruling:
Yes. The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its
formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its
face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issues.
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in
the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have
made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil
Code).
In this case, the statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal
lands is contrary to law because, although she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and
proindiviso, but that illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law in the
matter of testaments. Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a
testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a
provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces
an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So compelling is
the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail
that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect.
Hence, the petition for probate was granted.

In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B.
ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975
Ankash Sohail Butt
Facts:
Leodegaria Julian executed a will which she partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all
owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets.
Balanay Sr and Avelina Antonio opposed the probate will by alleging that -lack of testamentary
capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal
estate. In its reply, Petitioner Balanay Jr. attached the affidavit of Balanay SR. wherein it withdrew
his opposition to the probate will. Respondent Avelina contented that the affidavit was void. RTC:
"denied" the opposition and reset for hearing.
Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration and alleged that the testatrix illegally claimed
that she was the owner of the southern half of the conjugal lots and that she could not partition the
conjugal estate by allocating portions of the nine lots to her children. During the hearing, Atty
Montana, claiming to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr., filed a motion for "leave of court
to withdraw probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed by
intestate estate proceeding. Moreover, Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose
B. Guyo manifested their conformity with the motion. RTC adopted the view of Attys. Montaña and
Guyo that the will was void.
Petitioner Balanay Jr. asked for MR and alleged that Atty. Montaña had no authority to
withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will. Respondents Avelina and Lanaban opposed the
MR and alleged that that it declared the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment
of its provisions and not because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.
Issue:
Whether the probate court erred in declaring the will void?
Held:
matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554, 561). Testacy
is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a testamentary disposition operative
takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791,
Civil Code).
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not
produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his
hereditary rights.
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as
contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973.
ARTICLE 779
CELESTINO BALUS vs.

SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD
G.R. No. 168970 January 15, 2010
Facts:
Celestino, Saturnino and Leonarda (all surnamed Balus) are the children of the Spouses Rufo
(deceased) and Sebastiana Balus. On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he
owns, as security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte (Bank).
Rufo failed to pay his loan and the mortgaged property was foreclosed. It was sold to the Bank
as the sole bidder at a public auction. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed
by law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the Deed of Sale was executed
in favor of the bank and a new title was issued in its name.
October 10, 1989, Celestino, Saturnino and Leonarda (all surnamed Balus) executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific 1/3 portion of the subject
property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained
provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the
subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible
time.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, Saturnino and Leonarda
bought the subject property from the Bank. Subsequently, new TCT was issued in the their names.
Meanwhile, Celestino continued possession of the subject lot.
On June 27, 1995, Saturnino and Leonarda filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Damages against Celestino, contending that they had already informed the latter of the fact that
they were the new owners of the disputed property, but Celestino still refused to surrender
possession of the same to them. Saturnino and Leonarda claimed that they had exhausted all
remedies for the amicable settlement of the case, but to no avail.
Celestino posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is, in and by itself, a contract between
him and his siblings (Saturnino and Leonarda), because it contains a provision whereby the parties
agreed to continue their co-ownership of the subject property by "redeeming" or "repurchasing"
the same from the Bank. As a result, Saturnino and Leonarda’s act of buying the disputed property
from the Bank without notifying him inures to his benefit as to give him the right to claim his
rightful portion of the property, comprising 1/3 thereof, by reimbursing Saturnino and Leonarda
the equivalent 1/3 of the sum they paid to the Bank.
Issue:
Is there a co-ownership between the siblings (Celestino, Saturnino and Leonarda) over the
subject property?
Held:
No. There is no co-ownership between the 3 siblings.
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In
addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the
opening of the succession.
In the present case, since Don Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime,
it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his
inherited the subject lot from their father. Any issue arising from the supposed right of Saturnino
as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the
disputed lot did not pass into the hands of the siblings as compulsory heirs of Don Rufo at any given
point in time. Saturnino’s contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed
co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or
partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the
same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property
owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each
of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without
supervision or interference from the other, in other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end
to co-ownership, an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.
Hence, there was no co-ownership between Celestino, Saturnino and Leonarda.
HEIRS OF LEANDRO NATIVIDAD AND JULIANA V. NATIVIDAD, Petitioners,

vs.
JUANA MAURICIO-NATIVIDAD, AND SPOUSES JEAN NATIVIDAD CRUZ AND JERRY CRUZ,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 198434, February 29, 2016
Facts:
Sergio Natividad (Sergio), husband of respondent Juana Mauricio-Natividad (Juana) and

father of respondent Jean Natividad-Cruz (Jean), obtained a loan from the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP) to which he mortgaged his property. However, Sergio died without being
able to pay his obligations with DBP. When the property was nearly foreclosed, Leandro paid
Sergio's loan obligations. Considering that respondents were unable to reimburse Leandro for the
advances he made in Sergio's favor, respondents agreed that Sergio's share in the lot which he co-
owned with his siblings and the other parcel of land in the name of Sergio and Juana, shall be
assigned in favor of Leandro and Juliana. Subsequently, despite demands and several follow-ups
made by petitioners, respondents failed and refused to honor their undertaking.
Respondents filed their Answer denying the allegations in the complaint and alleged that
respondents are not parties to the contract between Sergio and DBP.
Issue:
Are the Heirs of Sergio (Juana and Jean) liable for the amount owed by the Late Sergio
Natividad to his late brother, Leandro Natividad?
Held:
YES. The Heirs of Sergio are liable on the ground that they succeed to rights and obligations
of Sergio.
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through
his death to another or others either by will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which
are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the transmissible
rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, but also those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession.
Applying the foregoing in this case, Juana and Jean, being heirs of Sergio are now liable to
settle Sergio’s transmissible obligations, which include the amount due to petitioners, prior to the
distribution of the remainder of Sergio's estate to them, in accordance with Section I,10 Rule 90 of
the Rules of Court.
TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION
ARTICLE 783
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS, respondents
GR 11375 June 29, 2000
Leslie R. Lucas
Facts:
In a codicil appended to the last will and testament of testatrix ALEJA BELLEZA, DR. JORGE
RABADILLA, predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioner JOHNNY RABADILLA, was instituted as a
devisee of a parcel of land surveyed as lot no. 1392. The Codicil provides that (1) Aleja will give
Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. That should die first, the property and
rights shall be inherited and acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge, and (2) Jorge shall
have the obligation to give Maria Belleza piculs of exported and domestic sugar until Maria dies.
Pursuant to the same codicil, lot no. 1392 was transferred to Jorge. Jorge died and survived by his
wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia, and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
MARIA (respondent) filed a complaint against heirs of Jorge to enforce the provisions of
Codicil and pray that judgment be rendered ordering defendant heirs to return the lot no. 1392
and issue new certificate to the surviving heirs of AlejaBelleza, alleging that said heirs violated the
conditions of codicil:
1. Lot no. 1392 was mortgaged to PNB
2. Heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver piculs to Maria
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that
in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee
shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein
private respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his heirs?
Held:
Yes. It is a general rule that under law on succession that successional rights are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation
of law. Under Article 776 of the NCC, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations
of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had
by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since
obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the
obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted
to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
Testate estate of Carlos Gil, deceased. ISABEL HERREROS VDA. DE GIL, administratrix and appellee,
vs. PlLAR GIL VDA. DE MURCIANO, oppositor and appellant.
G.R. No. L-3392 March 1, 1951
Doctrine: Article 783 – A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities
prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his
death.
Facts:
The Court of First Instance of Manila admitted to probate the alleged last will and testament
of the deceased Carlos Gil. The oppositor, Pilar Gil vda. De Murciano, appealed to the Supreme
Court, raising only questions of law. Her counsel assigns the two following errors:
First error. - The lower court erred by failing to declare that Carlos Gil's alleged will has not been
granted in accordance with the law.
Second Mistake. - I finally failed to legalize the aforementioned will.
The Parties agreed that the said copy is true and correct. If it were otherwise, they would
not have so agreed, considering that the defect is of an essential character and is fatal to the validity
of the attestation clause.
Issue:
Whether there is compliance with the requisites of law on the attestation clause?
Held:
There is no reason why wills should not be executed by complying substantially with the
clear requisites of the law, leaving it to the courts to supply essential elements. The right to dispose
of property by will is not natural but statutory, and statutory requirements should be satisfied.
The right to make a testamentary disposition of one's property is purely of statutory

creation, and is available only upon the compliance with the requirements of the statute. The
formalities which the Legislature has prescribed for the execution of a will are essential to its
validity, and cannot be disregarded. The mode so prescribed is the measure for the exercise of the
right, and the heir can be deprived of his inheritance only by a compliance with this mode. For the
purpose of determining whether a will has been properly executed, the intention of the testator in
executing it is entitled to no consideration. For that purpose only intention of the Legislature, as
expressed in the language of the statute, can be considered by the court, and whether the will as
presented, shows a compliance with the statute.
In interpreting the legislature's thought, courts have rigidly opposed any exception tending
to weaken the basic principle underlying the law, the chief purpose of which is to see that the
testator's wishes are observed. It is possible, in some or many cases, a decedent may have thought
he had made a will, but the statute says he had not. The question is not one of his intention, but of
what he actually did, or . . . failed to do. . . . It may happen . . . that . . . wills . . . truly expressing the
intertions of the testator are made without observations of the required forms; and whenever that
happens, the genuine intention is frustrated. . . . The Legislature . . . has taught of it best and has
therefore determined, to run the risk of frustrating (that intention, . . . in preference to the risk of
giving effect to or facilitating the formation of spurious wills, by the absence of forms. . . . The evil
probably to arise by giving to wills made without any form, . . ." or, in derogation of testator's
wishes, fraudulently imposing spurious wills on his effect on his estate. Churchill's Estate, 260 Pac.
94, 101, 103 Atl. 533.
It has always been the policy of this court to sustain a will if it is legally possible to do so,
but we cannot break down the legislative barriers protecting a man's property after death, even if
a situation may be presented apparently meritorious. (In Re: Maginn, 30 A. L. R., pp. 419, 420.)
ENRIQUE P. MONTINOLA, plaintiff and appellant, vs. ESTANISLAO HERBOSA and MACARIO
OFIANA, defendant and appellee.
Court of Appeals Reports Vol. 3, February 14, 1963
Doctrine: Article 783 – A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities
prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his
death.
Facts:
Montinola filed this action against the heirs of Jose Rizal for the recovery of possession of
personal property allegedly sold to him by Dona Trinidad Rizal. The trial court held that neither
party is entitled to possession of property because it belongs to all the Filipino people relying on
Rizal’s poem Mi Ultimo Adios.
Issue:
Whether the poem Mi Ultimo Adios is a will?
Held:
No. The stanza “To you, I give all of my parents, kindred and friends...” is the source of the
dispute. According to the Court of Appeals, when Rizal wrote the passage, he did not have an intent
to make a will. He was merely composing a poem. Animus testandi is wanting. Furthermore, Rizal
was not leaving anything to anybody for the reason that at he time of his death, he did not have any
property. An instrument which does not dispose of property and was not executed with animus
testandi cannot be considereed a will.
JOSE MERZA, petitioner,

vs.
PEDRO LOPEZ PORRAS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-4888 May 25, 1953
Facts:
This case is an appeal from the Court of Appeals which affirmed an order of the Court of First
Instance of Zambales denying the probate of the last will and testament and so-called codicil,
identified as Exhibits A and B, of Pilar Montealegre, deceased.
Pilar Montealegre died leaving a will and a so-called codicil disinheriting her husband Pedro Porras
and some of her relatives. The two documents were submitted to probate but were denied by the
trial court, upon the grounds such as the defect of the attestation clause on Exh. A and that Exh.
cannot be considered a codicil for it was executed by the testator a day before Exhibit A, thus it
cannot be included in the probate proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the will and codicil are effective despite the disinheritance.
Ruling:
Yes. The codicil (Exhibit B) is a legal and effective vehicle for excluding lawful heirs from
testate or intestate succession. According to the Supreme Court, the will and the codicil should be
admitted to probate, subject of course to the right of the disinherited person under Article 850 to
contest the disinheritance.
Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will as to Article 667 of the Civil Code of Spain. Being
of testamentary character and having been made with all the formalities of law, Exhibit B is entitled
to probate as an independent testementary desposition. In the absence of any legal provision to
the contrary and there is none in this jurisdiction, it is the general, well-established rule that two
separate and distinct wills may be probated if one does not revoke the other and provided that the
statutory requirements relative to the execution of wills have been complied with. As seen, Exhibit
B embodied all the requisites of a will, even free of such formal of literary imperfections as are
found in Exhibit A.
ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA FAUSTINO-CORONA, respondents.
G.R. No. 82027, March 29, 1990
Angelica M. Jayag
Facts:
This case is related to a prior case decided by the Court involving the probate of the two wills
of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug naming private respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona as
executrix. In that decision, Nenita Alonte was also appointed as co-special administrator of Mrs.
Vitug's estate together with widower petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate
court to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate which he claimed
were personal funds. Rowena Corona opposed this said motion on the ground that the same funds
withdrawn were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate, thus, there was allegedly
no ground for reimbursement. She also sought Vitug’s ouster for failure to include the sums in
question for inventory and for "concealment of funds belonging to the estate."
Vitug, on the other hand, insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired
the same through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19,
1970.
Issue:
Was the survivorship agreement one of a donation mortis causa, thus must conform to the
form required of wills?
Held:
No. The conveyance is not one of a donation mortis causa, which should be embodied in a
will. A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated
person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after
his death." Thus, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator.
In the case at bar, since there is no showing that the monies subjects of savings account
exclusively belonged to one of the spouses, then it must be presumed to be in the nature of conjugal
funds, having been acquired during the existence of the marital relations. When spouses Vitug
opened the savings account, they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making
venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably been
sanctionable as a prohibited donation..
On a different view, the survivorship agreement was also not a donation inter vivos because
it was to take effect after the death of one party. The validity of the contract seems only debatable
by reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in reality, that contract just imposed a mere
obligation with a term, the term being death. Thus, Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband,
the latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account of
the Bank of America.
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, petitioners, vs HON. AMOR
A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS,
VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS
and JAMES D. SEANGIO, respondents.
G.R. Nos 140371-72; November 27, 2006
Facts:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents Alfredo Seangio et al. filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio and prayed for the appointment of
respondent Eliso D. Seangio-Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy
Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition,
contending that:
1. Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties;
2. The deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving
her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the
Philippines;
3. Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate
of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and
4. Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of Alfredo
Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara, and Virginia averred that in the event the decedent is found
to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the
proceedings for the probate of the will. They, then, filed a petition for the probate of the holographic
will of Segundo, entitled “Kasulatan ng Pag-aalis ng Mana.”
Private respondents Alfredo Seangio et al. moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo
does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition
of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code, instead the will only shows an alleged act of
disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and his compulsory heirs were not named
nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy.
The RTC dismissed the petition for probate proceedings, holding that a perusal of the
document termed as “will” by Dy Yieng eangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition.
Issue:
Whether or not the document “Kasulatan ng Pag-aalis ng Mana” executed by Segundo can
be considered as a holographic will?
Ruling:
Yes. A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and
may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed
by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words,
the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those
who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the
form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession.
All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when
the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as
illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an
expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the
intention of the testator. In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned
as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and
was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is
probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
Hence, the petition for probate of the holographic will was granted.
ARTICLE 784
ANTONIO CASTAÑEDA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE E. ALEMANY, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 1439 March 19, 1904
Ankash Sohail Butt
Facts:
The evidence in this case shows to the satisfaction of the court that the will of Doña Juana
Moreno was duly signed by herself in the presence of three witnesses, who signed it as witnesses
in the presence of the testratrix and of each other. It was therefore executed in conformity with
law.
Issue:
Whether or not the last will and testament was executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law?
Held: No.
The court held that there is nothing in the language of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which supports the claim of the appellants that the will must be written by the testator
himself or by someone else in his presence and under his express direction. That section requires
(1) that the will be in writing and (2) either that the testator sign it himself or, if he does sign it,
that it be signed by someone in his presence and by his express direction. Who does the mechanical
work of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact that the will was typewritten in the
office of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence.
It is claimed by the appellants that there was no testimony in the court below to show that
the will executed by the deceased was the same will presented to the court and concerning which
this hearing was had. It is true that the evidence does not show that the document in court was
presented to the witnesses and identified by them, as should have been done. But we think that we
are justified in saying that it was assumed by all the parties during the trial in the court below that
the will about which the witnesses were testifying was the document then in court. No suggestion
of any kind was then made by the counsel for the appellants that it was not the same instrument.
In the last question put to the witness Gonzales the phrase "this will" is used by the counsel for the
appellants. In their argument in that court, found on page 15 of the record, they treat the testimony
of the witnesses as referring to the will probate they were then opposing.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, eliminating therefrom, however, the clause "el
cual debera ejecutarse fiel y exactamente en todas sus partes." The costs of this instance will be
charged against the appellants.
ARTICLE 788
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA vs.

ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and
LILIA DIZON
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
Facts:
On January 28, 1961, Agripina J. Valdez (testatrix), a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga,
and was survived by seven compulsory heirs: her six legitimate children named Estela Dizon,
Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon, Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a
legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon
Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Agripina left a last will executed on
February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the
her compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren (Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert
D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon).
Testate proceedings had commenced and by order of the court, the last will and testament of
Agripina was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed
as executrix.
The real and personal properties of Agripina at the time of her death had a total appraised value of
P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to
P129,362.11.3 (¹/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and
descendants). However, in her will, she "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance
with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties
comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren.
The appraised values of the real properties devised by the Agripina to the beneficiaries named in
her will, are as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80
2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
Total Value ................................................... P1,801,960.01
Marina (executrix) filed her projected partition adjudicating the estate as follows:
1. with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina and Tomas are admittedly
considered to have received in the will more than their respective legitime, while the rest
of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less than
their respective legitime;
2. thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them in the will,
plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96;
3. on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in
the will less the cash and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime
mentioned in number 2 above;
4. the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain untouched
The oppositors (Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Angelina Dizon and
Josefina Dizon, and Lilia Dizon) submitted their own counter-project of partition. They proposed
to reduce to the amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs and devisees totalling
one-half thereof as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56
2. Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42
3. Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04
4. Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38
5. Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04
6. Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13
7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50
9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al ...... 36,452.80
T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the legitime of
the legitimate heirs, to be divided among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their
respective legitimes.
Issue:
Is the counter-project partition submitted by the oppositors tenable?
Held:
No. The oppositors’ counter-project partition is untenable since it disregards the intention
and wishes of Agripina as embodied in her last will and testament.
Article 788 and 791 of the Civil Code provides that:

"(I)f a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and
"(T)he words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some
effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy."
In Villanueva vs. Juico, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes stressed that "the intention and wishes of the
testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all
questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance
therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears
that his intention was otherwise."
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments. When expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose
mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and
devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own
criterion for the testator's will.
In this case, the counter-partition submitted by the oppositors disregarded Agripina’s intent
and wishes. Agripina noted in her will after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as
well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for the probate of her last will
and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided
that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions
immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her estate and
designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren
to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition. Oppositors' proposal would amount
substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the Agripina’s will, contrary to
Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the
Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the
property adjudicated to him."
Hence, since the counter-partition disregards the intention and wishes of Agripina as
embodied in her last will and testament, such is untenable.
LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA
NEPOMUCENO, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962
Facts:
Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will bequeathing in favor of his wife, Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno, one-half of all his properties, giving the other half to his brother. Don Nicolas died
on 3 March 1922 childless.
The widow of Don Nicolas, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno instituted Special Proceeding No. 203
of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband’s estate and in that
proceeding where she was appointed as judicial administratix. Fausta, by virtue of an approved
project partition, received the ownership and possession of a considerable amount of estates, and
the use and possession of all properties mentioned in Clause 7th of the will.
In the 8th clause, the will provides that Fausta is bequeathed the “use and possession of all
properties mentioned in clause 7th while she is still alive and does not remarry”, otherwise the
properties will go to Nicolas’ grandniece.
On 1 May 1956, Doña Fausta died childless and still not remarried.
The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be
deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doña Fausta Nepomuceno.
Plaintiff instituted special proceeding in CFI Rizal against defendant Juico, the appointed
administrator of Fausta’s estate admitting to be the Leonor mentioned in the will as ‘grandniece’.
She contends that upon Fausta’s death, plaintiff became vested with ownership of the properties
mentioned in clause 7th pursuant to the 8th clause. Defendant argued that the title to the
properties became vested in Fausta upon her death on account of the fact that she never remarried.
The CFI decided in favor of defendant and ruled that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as
manifested in clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure
in the properties described in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition (admitted by the
appellee) that if the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her own
lifetime.
Issue:
Whether or not plaintiff Leonor Villaflor is entitled to the ownership of the properties upon
the death of Dona Faustina?
Ruling:
YES. The grandniece is entitled to the properties for the plain desire and intent of the testator
was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties described in the
seventh clause, subject to the further condition (admitted by the appellee) that if the widow
remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime.
The testator plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of these particular properties,
but only the right to their possession and use (or enjoyment)during her lifetime. This is in contrast
with the remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir together with the
testator’s brother (clause 6).
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in clause
7 of his testament should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his
plain words, which are ever the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if
the testator had intended to impose as sole condition the nonremarriage of his widow, the words
"uso y posesion mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry
during her own lifetime.
The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly enjoins the
following: "ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense,
unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be
ascertained.
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly
indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by
the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense."
RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner

vs.
JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents
G.R. No. 222541, February 15, 2017
Leslie R. Lucas
Facts:
Don Nicolas del Rosario died in this city on July 14, 1897, leaving a last will, the eighth,
ninth, eleventh, and eighteenth clauses of which are as follows:
8th -P5,000.00 which she brought to his marriage are hereby bequeathes to his nephew
Gloria Rosario and Ramon del Rosario (natural child of his brother, Clemente del Rosario)
notwithstanding the fact that they purport to be the issue of the marriage of Escolastico
Gloria and Rosendo del Rosario, successively.
9th - P5,000.00 to be divided to P3,000 to the Gloria, P2,000 to Clemente, delivery to be

effected by the wife of Don Nicolas, provided that these young men behave themselves as
they have done up to the present time, do not cease to study and take up bachelor of arts
and then take business course, if their health will permit their support to be paid out of
testament Terry estate and they do live in the house of the window.
11th- testator declares, said young man should still be engaged in study at the time of death
of wife, they shall continue to be supported at the expense of the testamentary estate,
without the ducting such expenses from their legacies, if they should desire to continue the
same studies.
18th - even if wife is 55 years old and is not likely to marry again, as she said herself,it is
impossible that the opposite of what she asserts may occur. I also rice Ramon and Enrique
so often referred to, separate from their aunt, in which event they are to be supported by
the testamentary estate on small allowance of 25 pesos /month, provided that they
continue studies or she'd be in poor health, this without any respect reducing the amount
of their shares.
Ramon brought an action in 1902 against Clemente, the executor, asking the latter to pay
him allowance from the death of the widow of the testator at 75/month, and that he be allowed to
live in the house in which the widow was living at that time. Dona Honorata Valdez died on July 7,
1900.
The court order judgment in respect to this allowance, and the right to live in the house
sprayed by Ramon.
Issue:
WON Ramon is entitled to support?
Ruling:
No. But as to the estate of Doña Honorata, he is entitled to be paid a legacy of 1,500 pesos.
Article 907 requires the executor to render accounts to the heir, not to the legatee; and although
by article 789 all of the provisions of Chapter II (in which both articles are found) relating to heirs
are made applicable to legatees, we can not hold that this requires an executor to submit his
accounts to one who has no interest in the estate except to a money legacy when there is no
suggestion that it will not be paid when the right to it is established. In respect to the share of Doña
Luisa, there is reason for saying that a legatee on an aliquot part is entitled to an accounting. But,
inasmuch as in this case there can be no final determination of the rights of the parties interested
in the estate, because they are not all parties to this suit, the executor should not in this suit be
ordered to submit his accounts.
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY, JR.,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B.
ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.
G.R. L-39247 June 27, 1975
Justice Aquino
Doctrine: Article 788 – If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of

doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred.
Facts:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City
at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six
legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B.
Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
In the will, the decedent declared: (a) that she owned the southern half of the conjugal lots;
(b) that it was her desire that her properties not be divided during her husband’s lifetime and that
their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties; and (c) that in par. 5, she stated
that after her husband’s death, her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands be divided and
distributed in the manner set forth in the will.
Avelina Antonio and Felix Balanay Sr. opposed the said petition, but an affidavit was filed
wherein the latter withdrew his opposition and renounced his hereditary rights over the estate of
his wife. Avelina Antonio contended that the affidavit was void.
Issue:
Whether the dispositions made by the deceased in her last will be given effect?
Held:
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition
the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could
dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband,
after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the
conjugal estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated. In the
instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy.
Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights.
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as
contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where the will on
its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the
will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74
Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, L-23638, October 12, 1967, 21 SCRA 428). As
aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament is in itself prima
facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should be distributed in the manner
therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given
effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs.
Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 538, 565).
matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554, 561). Testacy
is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a testamentary disposition operative
takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791,
Civil Code). Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will
evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So
compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the testator
should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it
effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L-23079, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754, 762).
ARTICLE 789
RAMON DEL ROSARIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CLEMENTE DEL ROSARIO, Defendant-Appellant.

G.R. No. 1027 , May 19, 1903
Doctrine: Article 789 – When there is an imperfect description, or when no person or property
eactly answers the description, mistakes and omissions must be corrected, if the error appears
from teh context of the willor from extrinsic evidence, excluding hte oral declarations of the
testator as to his intention; and when uncertainty arises upon the face of the will, as to the
application of any of its provisions, the testator’s intention is to be ascertained from the words of
the will, taking into considerationthe circumstances under which it was made, excluding such oral
declarations.
Facts:
Don Nicolas del Rosario died leaving a last will, which grants support to be taken from his
estate and the right to live in the house where his widow resides to his nephews, Enrique and
Ramon, natural children of his brother Don Clemente del Rosario. The thirteenth clause of his will
which was modified by a codicil is as follows:
"That in the thirteenth clause the testator provided that upon the death of his sister, Luisa del
Rosario, her male children were to inherit from her up to the sum of 1,000 pesos, and this he
rectifies, for better understanding, to the effect that it is his will that the remainder of all her portion
should be divided into equal parts, one-third to go to his brother Don Clemente del Rosario and the
other two thirds to be divided equally among his said nephews, Enrique Gloria and Ramon del
Rosario."
His wife also instituted a will leaving an inheritance to “natural children of her brother-in-
law Don Clemente del Rosario.”
After the wife of Don Nicolas died, Ramon instituted this action claiming inheritance from
both wills and asking for partition. Clemente on the other hand opposed the action stating that the
plaintiff is entitled to nothing under the wills, because the gift to him was conditional, the condition
being that he should be the natural son of Don Clemente, recognized by the latter as such in one of
the ways pointed out by the Civil Code; that he can not prove such recognition, the parol evidence
presented at the trial being prohibited by said Code, and that he has therefore not complied with
the condition.
Issue:
Whether the Ramon’s part in the will is conditional to him being a natural son of Clemente?
Held:
No. In the interpretation and construction of testamentary provisions the intention of the
testator controls. Where legatees are pointed out by name in the will the fact that they are referred
to as the natural sons of a third person does not make the legacy conditional upon proof of such
relationship but is merely descriptive.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE PARISH PRIEST OF
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and JOVITA ESCOBAR DE
FAUSTO, respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979
Facts:
On August 9, 1935, Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died leaving a will
executed on October 29, 1933,which was probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its
order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest relatives,
namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-
Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.
In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest: That it be adjudicated in
favor of the legacy purported to be given to the nearest male relative who shall take the priesthood,
and in the interim to be administered by the actual Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of
Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines, or his successors.
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February 19, 1954,
the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition praying for the
appointment of a new administrator (succeeding the deceased administration Florencia Rigor),
who should deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further praying that the possessors thereof
be ordered to render an accounting of the fruits. The probate court granted the petition. A new
administrator was appointed. On January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed another petition for the
delivery of the ricelands to the church as trustee.
Issue:
How should you interpret the statement in the will? Should it refer only to the nearest male
relative at the time when the testator died or should it be construed to mean all nearest male
relative who would study for priesthood and you have to wait forever until that male relative
occurs?
Ruling:
It should be construed to refer to the nearest male relative living at the moment of death of
the decedent. The will referred to the nearest male relative of the testator who was living at the
time of his death and not to any indefinite thereafter, because in order to be capacitated to inherit,
the devisee must be living at the moment of the succession opens,except in case or representation,
when it is proper. You cannot wait until the nearest male relative who would study for the
priesthood occurs long after the priest died. The most reasonable construction is the nearest male
relative living at the time of death of the testator.
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore,
the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was
likewise inoperative.
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when
the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet
entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two
contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the
testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA2 COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000
Angelica M. Jayag
Facts:
Appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza was a codicil whereby
instituting Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of Johnny S. Rabadilla, as a devisee of a
parcel of land of the Bacolod Cadastre. In the said codicil, following is provided:
“FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall
have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G.
Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year
to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty
Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.”
In 1983, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny,
Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint
against the heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla contending that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions
of the Codicil. One of the allegations of Maria was the failure of the heirs to comply with their
obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs
domestic sugar) to Maria from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint despite
repeated demands. Thus, she prayed for the enforcement of the said provisions in the Codicil.
Thereafter, on November 15, 1998, Maria and son-in-law of Dr. Rabadilla, acting as attorney-
in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar. However, there was still no
compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80
piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
Issue:
What is the correct interpretation of the will?
Held:
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the
application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of
the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made. Such construction
as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted.
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred
(100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell,
lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in
the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall
seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the
said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the
testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only
on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in
case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his
successors-in-interest.
A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property,
to take effect after his death. Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how
his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a
Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose
of making a Will.
ARTICLE 791
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee, vs. ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA

DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
Facts:
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga,
and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon,
Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and
Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child
and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven
compulsory heirs, except Marina Dizon, are the oppositors-appellants.
Agripina left a last will executed and written in Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in
her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate
grandchildren. Testate proceedings commenced and the last will and testament of the decedent
was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and Marina was appointed as executrix.
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death had a total appraised
value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to
P129,362.11. (¹/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and
descendants). In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance
with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties
comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren.
Marina, the executrix, filed her project of partition in substance adjudicating the estate.
Estela Dizon et al. opposed and submitted their own counter-project of partition, where the
testamentary disposition made by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01
were proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs and
devisees totalling one-half thereof. The other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as
constituting the legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided among
them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid partition?
Ruling:
Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentary disposition admits of different
interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative
shall be preferred" and "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and
of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy."
In Villanueva v. Juico, the SC held that "the intentions and wishes of the testator, when clearly
expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial,
relative to its execution and fulfilment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain
and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was
otherwise."
In this case, the decedent noted in her will that after commanding that upon her death all her
obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for the probate
of her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid. She
expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance
with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property
in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other
grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her estate, as
contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC, providing that "Should a
person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a
testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime.
Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro

tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter
to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made confers upon
each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him."
LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA
NEPOMUCENO, Defendant-Appellee.
G.R. No. L-15737. February 28, 1962
Ankash Sohail Butt
Facts:
On 9 October 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, penned a will in Spanish, bequeathing in favor of
his wife, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his properties, giving the other half to his
brother. Don Nicolas died on 3 March 1922 childless. His wife was appointed as judicial
administratix in the settlement proceedings instituted in CFI Zambales. In 24 November 1924,
Fausta, by virtue of an approved project partition, received the ownership and possession of a
considerable amount of estates, and the use and possession of all properties mentioned in Clause
7th of the will.
In the 8th clause, the will provides that Fausta is bequeathed the “use and possession of all
properties mentioned in clause 7th while she is still alive and does not remarry”, otherwise the
properties will go to Nicolas’ grandniece. On 1 May 1956, Doña Fausta died childless and still not
remarried. On 8 February 1958, plaintiff instituted special proceeding in CFI Rizal against
defendant Juico, the appointed administrator of Fausta’s estate admitting to be the Leonor
mentioned in the will as ‘grandniece’.
She contends that upon Fausta’s death, plaintiff became vested with ownership of the
properties mentioned in clause 7th pursuant to the 8th clause. Defendant argued that the title to
the properties became vested in Fausta upon her death on account of the fact that she never
remarried. The CFI decided in favor of defendant. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not plaintiff Leonor Villaflor is entitled to the ownership of the properties upon
the death of Dona Faustina?
Held:
YES. Decision of CFI is Reversed.
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in
clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the
properties described in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition (admitted by the
appellee) that if the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her own
lifetime. That the widow was meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties, even
if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the deceased, "uso y posesion
mientras viva" (use and possession while alive), in which the first half of the phrase ("uso y
posesion"instead of "dominio" or "propriedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The
testator plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of these particular properties, but only
the right to their possession and use (or enjoyment)during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the
remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir together with the testator’s
brother (clause 6).
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee, could
succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the widow
remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras viva", and considered the words
"uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio" (ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated Article
791 of the Civil Code of The Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court:
"ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will
give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render
any of the expression inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will,
that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy."
"SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. —

In the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions
or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will
give effect to all."
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in clause
7 of his testament should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his
plain words, which are ever the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if
the testator had intended to impose as sole condition the nonremarriage of his widow, the words
"uso y posesion mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry
during her own lifetime.
The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly enjoins the
following: "ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense,
unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be
ascertained. Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context
clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn
solely by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense."
In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of
Calderon, 26 Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his
will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its
execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal
meaning of the testator’s words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. The
same rule is adopted by the Supreme Court of Spain.
The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief are inapplicable, because they
involve cases where the only condition imposed on the legatee was that she should remain a
widow. As already shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided
that his widow should have the possession and use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry.
It necessarily follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies should
pass to the testator’s "sobrina-nieta", appellant herein, upon the widow’s death, even if the widow
never remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of the
aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for their return,
unless they had been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent third
parties have intervened.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva
is declared entitled to the ownership and fruits of the properties described in clause 7 of the will
or testament, from the date of the death of Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The records are ordered
remanded to the court of origin for liquidation, accounting, and further proceedings conformably
to this decision. Costs against the administrator-appellee.
DELFIN YAMBAO vs.
ANGELINA GONZALES, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-10763 April 29, 1961
Facts:
Celestino, Saturnino and Leonarda (all surnamed Balus) are the children of the Spouses Rufo
(deceased) and Sebastiana Balus. On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he
owns, as security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte (Bank).
Rufo failed to pay his loan and the mortgaged property was foreclosed. It was sold to the Bank
as the sole bidder at a public auction. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed
by law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the Deed of Sale was executed
in favor of the bank and a new title was issued in its name.
October 10, 1989, Celestino, Saturnino and Leonarda (all surnamed Balus) executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific 1/3 portion of the subject
property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained
provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the
subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible
time.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, Saturnino and Leonarda
bought the subject property from the Bank. Subsequently, new TCT was issued in the their names.
Meanwhile, Celestino continued possession of the subject lot.
On June 27, 1995, Saturnino and Leonarda filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Damages against Celestino, contending that they had already informed the latter of the fact that
they were the new owners of the disputed property, but Celestino still refused to surrender
possession of the same to them. Saturnino and Leonarda claimed that they had exhausted all
remedies for the amicable settlement of the case, but to no avail.
Celestino posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is, in and by itself, a contract between
him and his siblings (Saturnino and Leonarda), because it contains a provision whereby the parties
agreed to continue their co-ownership of the subject property by "redeeming" or "repurchasing"
the same from the Bank. As a result, Saturnino and Leonarda’s act of buying the disputed property
from the Bank without notifying him inures to his benefit as to give him the right to claim his
rightful portion of the property, comprising 1/3 thereof, by reimbursing Saturnino and Leonarda
the equivalent 1/3 of the sum they paid to the Bank.
Issue:
Is there a co-ownership between the siblings (Celestino, Saturnino and Leonarda) over the
subject property?
Held:
No. There is no co-ownership between the 3 siblings.
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In
addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the
opening of the succession.
In the present case, since Don Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime,
it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his
inherited the subject lot from their father. Any issue arising from the supposed right of Saturnino
as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the
disputed lot did not pass into the hands of the siblings as compulsory heirs of Don Rufo at any given
point in time. Saturnino’s contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed
co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or
partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the
same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property
owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each
of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without
supervision or interference from the other, in other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end
to co-ownership, an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.
Hence, there was no co-ownership between Celestino, Saturnino and Leonarda.

Therefore, what this case have is a clear-cut mandate which the heirs cannot fail to carry out.
Angelina and Maria are mandated to place Delfin as tenant to the Riceland.
ARTICLE 795
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE, Petitioner, v.

ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 147145 January 31, 2005
Facts:
Abada executed his will in 1932. Abada died in 1940. The laws in force at that time are the
Civil Code for 1889 or the Code of 1889 or the Old Civil Code and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil
Procedure which govern the execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code.
Petitioner Caponong-Noble asserts that the will of Abada does not indicate that it is written in a
language or dialect known to the testator. Further, she maintains that the will is not acknowledged
before a notary public. She cites in particular Articles 804 and 805 of the Old Civil Code, thus:
Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in [a] language or dialect known to
the testator.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses
Issue:
What laws shall apply to the probate of the last will of Abada?
Held:
The law shall apply to the probate of the last will of Abada is the Civil Code of 1889 or the
Code of 1889 or the Old Civil Code and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure which govern the
execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code.
Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of
1889 or the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure which governed the
execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code.
The matter in dispute in the present case is the attestation clause in the will of Abada. Section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, governs the form of the attestation
clause of Abada’s will.
Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code are new provisions. Article 804 of the New Civil
Code is taken from Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Article 806 of the New Civil Code is
taken from Article 685 of the Old Civil Code which provides:
Art. 685. The notary and two of the witnesses who authenticate the will must be acquainted
with the testator, or, should they not know him, he shall be identified by two witnesses who
are acquainted with him and are known to the notary and to the attesting witnesses. The
notary and the witnesses shall also endeavor to assure themselves that the testator has, in
their judgment, the legal capacity required to make a will.
Witnesses authenticating a will without the attendance of a notary, in cases falling under
Articles 700 and 701, are also required to know the testator.
However, the Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the
Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of any will.
Therefore, Abada’s will does not require acknowledgment before a notary public.
WILL DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS:

Rules of Construction and Interpretation/Law Governing Formal Validity
Article 795
Cases:
ENRIQUEZ VS. ABADIA

G.R. No. L-7188, August 9, 1954
Karol Vincent Cajes
Facts:
Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to be his
Last Will and Testament on September 6, 1923. He died on January 14, 1943. He left properties
estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees, filed a
petition for its probate in the CFI of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate
of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without
contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote
out in longhand in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he signed on he left hand
margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed,
and numbered the same with Arabic Numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing
at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his
last will; and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation
clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any
evidence.
The trial court found and declared it to be a holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of the
testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death,
holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the
case was to be decided the New Civil Code was already in force, said trial court by order dated
January 24, 1952, admitted to probate, as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia.
Issue:
Whether or not the law to be applied to the probate of the will is the old civil code when the will
was executed?
Ruling:
Yes. It should be the old Civil Code. The new Civil Code, which took effect August 30, 1950, provides
in Art. 795: “The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at
the time it is made.” Here, the validity of the holographic will is to be judged not by the law enforced
at the time when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed.
When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements
at the time of its execution, just like in this case, then upon his death he should be regarded and
declared as having died intestate. This is because the general rule is that the Legislature cannot
validate void wills.
An expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to
be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will
is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the
instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon
and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate
among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed,
and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid down
by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should
be followed.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PROBATION OF THE WILL OF JOSE RIOSA

G.R. No. L-14074, 7 November 1918
Rea Lyza C. Corbit
Facts:
In January 1908, Jose Riosa executed a will which was duly executed in accordance with the law
then in force, namely, Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On 1 July 1916 or after the will
was executed, Act No. 2645 took effect. It amended Section 618 and prescribed certain additional
formalities for the signing and attestation of wills.
Riosa’s will was in writing, signed by the testator, and attested and subscribed by three (3)
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; but was not signed by the
testator and the witnesses on the left margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation state
these facts which were all required by Act No. 2645.
On 17 April 1917, Riosa died without having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.
For this reason, the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay disallowed Riosa’s will.
Issue:
Does the validity of the will depend upon the law in force at the time of its execution?
Ruling:
Yes, the validity of the will depends upon the law in force at the time of its execution.
There are three (3) rules that are being observed by courts in other jurisdictions:
1. The first rule states that the statutes in force at the testator's death are controlling, and
that a will not executed in conformity with such statutes is invalid, although its execution
was sufficient at the time it was made.
2. The second rule states that the validity of the execution of a will must be tested by the
statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have
no retrospective effect.
3. The third rule states that statutes relating to the execution of wills, when they increase the
necessary formalities, should be construed so as not to impair the validity of a will already
made and, when they lessen the formalities required, should be construed so as to aid wills
defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of their making.
Based on Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule of statutory construction states, “All statutes
are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the
Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from
the language used.” It was held that every case of doubt should be resolved against the
retrospective effect.
Moreover, Article 3 of the Civil Code corroborates the same by stating that "laws shall not have a
retroactive effect, unless therein otherwise prescribed."
It should be noted that the language of Act No. 2645 gives no indication of retrospective effect.
Lastly, there is a positive rule that the transference of property through a will becomes a completed
act at the time of its execution, so far as the act of the testator is concerned.
As such, the second rule is adopted. The law existing at the date of the execution of a will is
controlling. Riosa’s will is valid and the decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay is reversed.
BIENVENIDO A. IBARLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ESPERANZA, M. PO, Defendant-Appellee

92 Phil., 721, G.R. No. L-5064 February 27, 1953
Brilla Joy D. Cosgafa
Facts:
Leonard J. Winstantley and Catalina Navarro were husband and wife. Leonard died in June 6, 1946
leaving his surviving spouse (Catalina Navarro) and some minor children as heirs of his properties.
He left a parcel of land with TCT No. 2391 (ROD Cebu) which was a conjugal property of the
spouses.
On April 15, 1946, Catalina sold the entire parcel of land (TCT No. 2391) to spouses Maria and
Roberto Canoy alleging that she needed money for the support of her minor children. On May 24,
1947, Sps. Canoy sold the same parcel of land to Bienvenido Ibarle. The two deeds of sale were not
registered and have never been registered up to date.
On January 17, 1948 Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley, after her appointment as guardian of
her children by this court (Special Proceeding No. 212-R) sold one-half of the land mentioned
above to Esperanza M. Po, defendant in the instant case, which portion belongs to the children of
the above named spouses.
Issue:
Was the sale to Esperanza M. Po valid?
Ruling:
Yes. The sale of one-half of the parcel of land to Esperanza M. Po was valid.
Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides, the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted
from the moment of his death. In a slightly different language, this article is incorporated in the
new Civil Code as article 777.
Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, says: "The moment of death is the
determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance, whether such right
be pure or contingent. It is immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses between the
death of the predecessor and the entry into possession of the property of the inheritance because
the right is always deemed to be retroactive from the moment of death."
In the case at bar, when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy
spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the seller’s children. No formal or judicial declaration
being needed to confirm the children’s title, it follows that the first sale was null and void in so far
as it included the children’s share.
Accordingly, the sale to Esperanza Po having been made by authority of the competent court was
undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no consequence. If
registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail to Ibarle because it was due
to no other cause than his own opposition.
Thus, the sale to Esperanza M. Po was valid.

FORMAL VALIDITY RULES:
Law Governing Substantive Validity
Article 16
Cases:
MICIANO VS. BRIMO

G.R. No. L-22595, November 1, 1927
Marlon Louie T. Manalo
Facts:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
In Josephs Brimo’s will, the second clause says:
“I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand,
having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in
acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property
and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the
laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise,
I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or
persons who fail to comply with this request.” Emphasis supplied.
Andre Brimo’s opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality.
Issue:
Whether or not the property of Joseph G. Brimo may be distribute in accordance with the laws in
force in the Philippine islands as stated in his will
Ruling:
No, the properties should be distributed in accordance with the testatotor’s national law.
Article 10 of the Civil Code (OLD CIVIL CODE), such national law of the testator is the one to govern
his testamentary dispositions.
In this case, the Supreme Court held that the second clause in Joseph Brimo’s will is void for being
contrary to law; and It is considered unwritten. And all of the remaining clauses of said will with
all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said
clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
BELLIS VS. BELLIS

G.R. No. L-13678, June 6, 1967
Edrich John A. Labrador
Facts:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had
divorced with his first wifewithhis first wife, Mary E. Mallen and had five legitimate children:
Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who predeceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis
and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis. Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after
all obligations are paid for, his estate should be divided in the following order and manner: (a)
$240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children,
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the
foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by
his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis, and Anna
Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.
On July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died, a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted
to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time accordingly as the lower court approved and
allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on
account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition”. In the project of
partition, the executor—pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and
Testament—divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's
seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court,
on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code,
it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide
for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply —
Texas law or Philippine law.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate
children’s successional rights
Ruling:
Yes. Appellant’s motion did not rely on the Renvoi Doctrine, rather, they argue that their case falls
under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of
the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of
Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As
further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50
Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed
in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national
law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil
Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined
under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System
of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
TESTATE ESTATE OF CHRISTENSEN VS. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963
Jean Marcelo P. Pabres
Facts:
The executor Edward E. Christensen (deceased) devise and bequeath unto his daughter Maria
Lucy Chrsistensen Daney now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California,
USA all the income from the rest and residue of his property and estate, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated during her lifetime. Opposition to the
approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia as it deprives her legitime
as an acknowledged natural child on the ground that the distribution should be governed by the
laws of the Philippines. It was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased
Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof. Edward
was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death. Testate
estate of Christensen argues that Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the
national law in the internal law of California.
Issue:
Whether the intrinsic validity of the testamentary disposition of the distribution of the estate of
Edward Christensen should be governed by the laws of the Philippines?
Ruling:
Yes. It should be governed by the law of the Philippines.
Article 16 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines provides that real property as well as personal
property is subject to the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
In this case, there is no question that Edward was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death. No question also that at the time of his death he was domiciled
in the Philippines. The national law mentioned in Article 16 is the law on conflict of laws in
California Civil Code. The conflict of laws rule in California refers back the case, when the decedent
is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent.
Therefore, as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines,
the validity of the provisions of his will should be governed by the Philippine law.
CAYETANO V. LEONIDAS
G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984
Janica G. Puno
Facts:
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos
and her sisters, private respondent Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez and Marieta Medina as the
surviving heirs. As Hermogenes was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the
Adoracion.
On November 25, 1977, Nenita filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased and for
her appointment as administratrix of the estate. She alleged that Adoracion was an American
citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.;
that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament on July 10, 1975, according
to the laws of Pennsylvania. Adoracion, in her will, allegedly nominated Wilfredo Barzaga of New
Jersey as executor; that after the Adoracion’s death, her last will and testament was probated with
the Registry of Wins at Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement McLaughlin, the administrator who was
appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as executor, is also a
resident of Philadelphia, and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an
administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the
Philippines.
An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by Hermogenes, alleging that the intrinsic
provisions of the will are null and void, and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic
provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and
injury to him. On June 6, 1982, Hermogenes Campos died, Polly Cayetano substituted herself as
petitioner in this case.
The RTC issued an order admitting and allowing probate in the Philippines the Last Will and
Testament of Adoracion. Cayetano maintains that since the judge allowed the reprobate of
Adoracion's will, Hermogenes was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all
the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, Cayetano (in substitution for
Hermogenes) argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound
and established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine law should apply in this case
Ruling:
No. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the
respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the respondents have sufficiently
established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent
resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
Art. 16 par. (2):

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Art. 1039:
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
The law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
national law of the decedent. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law
of the decedent must apply.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system
of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
PCIB VS. ESCOLIN

56 SCRA 265, March 29, 1974
Reynalie Jane N. Remulta
Facts:
Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were originally from Texas, USA. During their
marriage, they had acquired and accumulated considerable assets and properties in the
Philippines and in Oklahoma and Texas in the US. They both lived, worked and were domiciled in
Iloilo City for around 50 years. Before her death, Linnie Jane executed a will leaving her estate, less
her debts and funeral expenses, to her husband Charles. Should Charles die, the will provided that
the remainder of her estate go to her brothers and sisters, share and share alike. Should any of the
brothers and sisters die before the husband, Linnie willed that the heirs of the said sibling be
substituted in the deceased’s sibling’s place.
In 1957 Linnie died, Charles took the will to probate court, and was appointed Executor, then later,
Special Administrator. He moved to be allowed to continue administering the family business, as
per Linnie Jane’s wishes, and to engage in sales, conveyances, leases, mortgages and other
necessary transactions. He also filed the necessary and appurtenant administration/accounting
records, and income tax returns for the estate. Charles named seven brothers and sisters of Linnie
Jane as her heirs (Esta, Emma, Leonard, Aline, David, Sadie, Era and Nimroy), but the order
admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy (Nimroy) Higdon, so
Charles filed a verified motion to have Roy’s name included.
In December 1962 ,Charles died in Iloilo without having liquidated Linnie’s estate, which includes
her share in the conjugal partnership. A longtime employee of the Hodges, Avelina Magno, was
appointed Administratrix (for Linnie’s estate) and a Special Administratrix (for Charles). Magno
was appointed, but later Harold Davies (representative of Charles’ heirs in the US) was designated
Co-Special Administrator, who was then replaced by one Joe Hodges, Charles’ nephew. One Atty.
Mirasol was also appointed as co-administrator, and an order of probate and letters of
administration were issued to Hodges and Mirasol.
At this point, the SC was already very much confused about the gaps in the facts, convinced that
the parties representing both estates had cooked up a modus operandi to settle money matters (a
settlement with records the Court never saw)—which, however, went awry, with more and more
heirs from the US flocking to the Iloilo shores, and lawyers filing their respective claims for retainer
fees. Much much later, PCIB became the administrator of Charles’ estate, asserting a claim to all of
his estate, including those properties/assets that passed to him upon Linnie Jane’s death. Avelina
naturally opposed this, as Linnie Jane’s other heirs (the HIGDONS) would be prejudiced, so she
continued acting in her capacity as administrator (entering into sales and other such
conveyances). For these acts, the PCIB dismissed her as an employee of Charles’ estate, to which
she responded by locking up the premises being used by PCIB as offices, which were among the
estate’s properties.
PCIB claimed that Linnie Jane’s will should be governed by Philippine Law, with respect to the
order of succession, the amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic validity of its testamentary
provisions.
While Avelina claimed that Linnie Jane merely gave Charles a life-estate or a usufruct over all her
estate, and gave a vested remainder estate or the naked title over the same estate, to her relatives.
After Linnie’s death, Charles, as administrator and executor of the will, unequivocably and clearly
through oral and written declarations and sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and
repudiated his life-estate and usufruct.
Since there was no separation or segregation of the interests of Linnie and Charles in the combined
conjugal estate, as there has been no such separation or segregation, and because of Charles’
repudiation, both interests have continually earned exactly the same amount of rents, emoluments
and income.
Issue:
Whether or not the Texas Law should be applied in the settlement of Linnie’s estate
Ruling:
The question of what are the laws of Texas governing the matters in issue is, in the first instance,
one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of
and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with
the rare exception in instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of the
court, such as when they are well and generally known or they have been actually ruled upon in
other cases before it and none of the parties concerned do not claim otherwise.
When, with respect to certain aspects of the foreign laws concerned, the parties in a given case do
not have any controversy or are more or less in agreement, the Court may take it for granted for
the purposes of the particular case before it that the said laws are as such virtual agreement
indicates, without the need of requiring the presentation of what otherwise would be competent
evidence on the point.
The parties were in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code should be applied. On the
one hand, PCIB claimed that inasmuch as Linnie was a resident of the Philippines at the time of her
death, under said Article 16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle
of renvoi, what should be applied here should be the rules of succession under the Civil Code, and,
therefore, her estate could consist of no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the
other fourth being, as already explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900) which she could
not have disposed of nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872).
On the other hand, Avelina denied that Linnie died a resident of the Philippines, since allegedly she
never changed nor intended to change her original residence of birth in Texas, United States of
America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question of her residence, she being
indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the distribution of her estate
is subject to the laws of said State which, according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence,
Linnie’s brothers and sisters are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her share of the conjugal
partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof. Avelina further maintained that, in any
event, Charles had renounced his rights under the will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven
by the documents touching on the point already mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legal
significance of which PCIB questioned.
The Court cannot decide on the claims, though, for neither the evidence submitted by the parties
appeared to be adequate enough for it to render an intelligent comprehensive and just resolution.
No clear and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas are, was
presented.Then also, the genuineness of documents relied upon by Avelina is disputed. In Justice,
therefore, to all the parties concerned, these and all other relevant matters should first be threshed
out fully in the trial court in the proceedings thereafter to be held for the purpose of ascertaining
and adjudicating and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her
duly probated will.
Linnie’s estate is the remainder of 1/4 of the conjugal partnership properties, considering that
even PCIB did not maintain that the application of the laws of Texas would result in the other heirs
of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her will. And since PCIB's representations in regard
to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court
are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take
a position contradictory to or inconsistent with them.
Thus, the Court decided to remand this case for determination of proper application of Art. 16, and
of Charles’ alleged renunciation of his ineritance under Linnie’s will. Avelina remains to be the
administrator of Linnie’s estate. The said estate consists of ¼ of the community properties of the
said spouses, as of the time of Linnie’s death on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had
already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death, provided,
first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part
of the wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the husband,
and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no deductions
whatsoever are to be made from said estate. PCIB and Avelina should act thenceforth always
conjointly, never independently from each other, as administrators.
Thus, in the instant cases wherein it results from the respective contentions of both parties that
even if the pertinent laws of Texas were known and to be applied, the amount of the inheritance
pertaining to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges is as We have fixed above, the absence of evidence to the
effect that, actually and in fact, under said laws, it could be otherwise is of no longer of any
consequence, unless the purpose is to show that it could be more. In other words, since PCIB, the
petitioner-appellant, concedes that upon application of Article 16 of the Civil Code and the
pertinent laws of Texas, the amount of the estate in controversy is just as We have determined it
to be, and respondent-appellee is only claiming, on her part, that it could be more, PCIB may not
now or later pretend differently.
NENG KAGUI KADIGUIA MALANG, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COROCOY MOSON, PRESIDING JUDGE
OF 5TH SHARIA DISTRICT COURT, COTABATO CITY, ET. AL., RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 119064. August 22, 2000
Bai Malyanah A. Salman
Facts:
Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted eight marriages. First wife is Aida (Kenanday) Limba.
They begot three sons named Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis, Hadji Ismael Malindatu and Datulna, and
a daughter named Lawanbai. Hadji Abdula Malang was engaged in farming, tilling the land that
was Aida’s dowry. Thereafter, he bought a parcel of land in Sousa, Cotabato. They were divorced
when she got pregnant with their fourth child. The children are respondent in this case. Second
wife is Jubaida Kado, respondent. They have no child. Third wife is Nayo H. Omar, respondent.
They have no child also. Fourth wife is Hadji Mabai H Adziz. They have a daughter named Fatima
(Kueng). Both respondents. Another wives whom he got divorced are Saaga, Mayumbai, and Sabai.
They have no child. Eight wife in year 1972 is Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang, who is the petitioner
in this case. They have no child.
On December 18, 1993, while the Hadji Abdula was living with Neng Kagui, he died without leaving
a will. It was also found out that deceased has total deposit with eight banks.
Neng asserted in her memorandum that all the properties located in Cotabato City, including the
vehicle and bank deposits, were conjugal properties in accordance with Article 160 of the Civil
Code and Article 116 of the Family Code while properties located outside of Cotabato City were
exclusive properties of the decedent.
The respondents contended in their own Memorandum that all the properties left by Hadji Abdula
were his exclusive properties for various reasons.
The Sharia District Court presided by Judge Corocoy D. Moson held that there was no conjugal
partnership of gains between petitioner and the decedent primarily because the latter married
eight times. The Civil Code provision on conjugal partnership cannot be applied if there is more
than one wife because conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a plural
marriage or a common-law relationship.
Issue:
Whether or not the law should govern in the distribution of the estate is the Muslim Code which
took on February 4, 1977
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that the status and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual parties
who entered into each and every marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in force at the time
of the performance of the marriage rite. While the status and capacity to succeed of the children
will depend upon the law in force at the time of conception or birth of the child. If the child was
conceived or born during the period covered by the governance of the Civil Code, the Civil Code
provisions on the determination of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child would appear to be
in point. If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the governance of the
Muslim Code, from February 4, 1977, the Muslim Code determines the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of the child.
In this case, marriages and birth of the children are prior to the effectivity of the Muslim Code.
Hence, the Muslim Code does not apply.
LLORENTE V. CA
G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000
Robby Jane D. Salveron
Facts:
Lorenzo Llorente, an enlisted serviceman of the United Satates Navy, was married to petitioner
Paula Llorente. In 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to US citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization
was issued in his favor by the US District Court, New York.
In 1945, upon his return to the Philippines, Lorenzo found out that Paula was having an adulterous
relationship with his brother Ceferino. Lorenzo filed a divorce in US and was granted.
When he returned to the Philippines, Lorenzo, then, married Alicia and had three children: Raul,
Luz, and Beverly. Lorenzo left all his property to Alicia and the three children in the last will and
testament he executed in 1981.
In 1983, Lorenzo filed a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament
wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. But the trial
court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.
However, in 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to
probate. On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.
In the same year, Paula filed with court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s
estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the
various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his
property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the
conjugal property.
The trial court held that the divorce decree granted to Lorenzo was void and inapplicable in the
Philippines, thus the marriage he contracted with Alicia is also void. Alicia is not entitled to receive
any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having
gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification declaring Alicia as co-
owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the 25 years of
cohabitation. Hence, this appeal filed by Paula.
Issue:
Whether or not Alicia and her children are entitled to the properties
Ruling:
Yes.
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that:
“Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.”
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice of them.
The CA did not admit the foreign law although its substance was pleaded. The CA and the trial
court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the
decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
While the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath
it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law follows the
‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.
However, the Supreme court explained two points. First, there is no such thing as one American
law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general
American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the
State. Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or
required by New York State law.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated
as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of
the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Therefore, the divorce obtained of Paula and Lorenzo was valid. The Court remands the cases to
the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo’s will and determination
of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions.
TESTATE ESTATE OF SUNTAY

G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088, July 31, 1954
Karol Vincent Cajes
Facts:
Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines, died in Amoy, China. He left real
and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in China. During his lifetime, he married
twice. The first wife was Manuela Cruz, with whom he had several children. The second marriage
was with Maria Natividad Lim Brillian, with whom he had a son, herein petitioner, Silvino Suntay.
Intestate proceeding was instituted by the heirs from the first marriage. While the second wife, the
surviving widow who remained in Amoy, China, filed a petition for the probate of the last will and
testament of the deceased which was claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines
on November 1929. The petition was denied due to the loss of the will before the hearing thereof.
After the Pacific War, Silvino, claimed to have found among the records of his father, a last will and
testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on January 1931 and
probated in the Amoy. He filed a petition in the intestate proceedings for the probate of the will
executed in the Philippines on November 1929 or the will executed in Amoy, China on November
1931.
Issue:
Does the will executed in China can still be validly probated in the Philippines?
Ruling:
No. To have the will execute in Amoy, China be validly probated in the Philippines, the following
must be proved: (a.) the fact that the Municipal District Court of Amoy, China is a probate court;
(b.) the law 246 of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills; (c.) Established
competent evidence of the legal requirements for the execution of the will in China in 1931. Herein
case, there is no proof on these points.
In some cases, in an intestate proceeding that had already been instituted in the Philippines, the
widow and child of the testator are not estopped from asking for the probate of a lost will or of a
foreign will just because of the transfer or assignment of their share, right, title and interest in the
estate of the deceased. The validity and legality of such assignments cannot be threshed out in the
probate proceeding which is concerned only with the probate of the will.
Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the Municipal District Court of Amoy were for
the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the
said court does not purport to probate the will. The order of the Municipal District Court of Amoy,
China does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In
view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in
accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the
probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in
the Municipal District Court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings
leading to the probate of allowance of a will. Therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be
allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court in the Philippines.
ANCHETA VS. GUERSEY-DALAYGON

G.R. No. 139868, June 8, 2006
G.R. No. 139868, 8 June 2006
Rea Lyza C. Corbit
Facts:
Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who
resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They had an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.
In 1979, Audrey died leaving a will. She devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the
following: her conjugal share in the Makati property; and her shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.,
among others.
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (Candelaria) with whom he had two
children.
In 1984, Richard died leaving a will. He bequeathed his entire estate to Candelaria, except for his
rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares which he left to Kyle.
The respective wills of Audrey and Richard were admitted to probate in separate proceedings
before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A. The ancillary administrators named were
Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta for Audrey’s estate and Atty. William Quasha for Richard’s estate.
Thereafter, the wills were reprobated in the Philippines.
In Special Proceedings No. 9265, Atty. Ancheta filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as
Audrey’s heirs along with a project of partition of Audrey’s estate. It was stated in the latter, among
others, that in the Makati property, Richard will be apportioned the ¾ undivided interest while
Kyle the ¼ undivided interest. The motion and project of partition were granted by the trial court.
In Special Proceedings No. M-9884, Atty. Quasha also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of
Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property will be allocated to Candelaria,
while 3/5 thereof will be allocated to his three children. This was opposed by Candelaria on the
ground that the law of the State of Maryland allows a "a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire
interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy." Thereafter, the trial court disapproved
Atty. Quasha’s project of partition and the whole ¾ undivided interest of Richard in the Makati
property was given to Candelaria.
Candelaria then filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals to annul the orders issued in Special
Proceedings No. 9265. She contended that Atty. Ancheta willfully breached his fiduciary duty when
he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s estate in
accordance with her will. She argued that the Makati property should now pertain to her and not
just ¾ thereof since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard then Richard left his entire estate,
except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc,. to her.
Atty. Ancheta admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on
estates and trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the
Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws
and totally disregarded the terms of Audrey’s will.
He further alleged that he believed that it is to the "best interests of the surviving children that
Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just shares."
Issue:
Should Philippine law be applied in the distribution of the estates of Audrey and Richard?
Ruling:
No, the Philippine law should not be applied in the distribution of the estates of Audrey and
Richard.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of their wills, especially with regard as to who are
their heirs, is governed by their national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in
Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where
it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless
of the country wherein said property may be found.
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to pass to
the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy," has been brought
to record before the CA, that the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took
note of the same in disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richard’s estate, and that no
party disputes the existence or validity of said law, then Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be
distributed according to their respective wills. Consequently, the entire Makati property belongs
to Candelaria.
Honorable as it seems, Atty. Ancheta’s motive in equitably distributing Audrey’s estate cannot
prevail over Audrey’s and Richard’s wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:
“…whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it
has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent's national law.”
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND INTENT:

Soundness of Mind; Presumptions
Article 798
Case:
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, FOR

HERSELF AND AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF VICENTE DOROTHEO AND JOSE DOROTHEO,
RESPONDENTS
320 SCRA 12, G.R. No. 108581 December 08, 1999
Facts:
Nilda Dorotheo Quintana, Vicente Dorotheo and Jose Dorotheo were the legitimate children of
Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled.
Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro’s death, Lourdes Dorotheo, who
claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of
the latter’s last will and testament.
In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro’s will to probate. Nilda, Vicente and Jose
did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a “Motion to Declare the Will Intrinsically Void.”
The trial court granted the motion and issued an order declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of
the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as
intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda
Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes.
Lourdes Dorotheo moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation
since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not
married to each other. Upon denial, she appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was
dismissed and the judgment became final and executory.
A writ of execution was issued. Consequently, Private respondents Nilda, Vicente and Jose filed
motions to compel petitioner Lourdes to surrender to them the TCT’s. When Lourdes refused, they
filed motion for cancellation of titles and Lourdes opposed the same. An order was issued by Judge
Angas setting aside the final and executory order and writ of execution on the ground that they are
merely interlocutory. Nilda, Vicente and Jose filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
They then filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the orders.
Aggrieved, Lourdes instituted a petition for review assailing the Order of the Court of Appeals
upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity of
Alejandro’s will that was earlier admitted to probate. Lourdes also filed a motion to reinstate her
as executrix of the estate of the late Alejandro and to maintain the status quo or lease of the
premises thereon to third parties.
Issue:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that
has become final and executory still be given effect?
Ruling:
No. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how
erroneous it may be.
A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how
erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial
court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals.
It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole
world. It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order
of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time.
Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question determined by the court in such
order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The
matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of res
judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions in connection therewith
being for once and forever closed. Such final order makes the will conclusive against the whole
world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution.
It should be noted that, Probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will
sought to be probated. The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same
may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow
that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid.
Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or
impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on
succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially
so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is
intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this
Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid,
but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before
the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated.
Article 799
Cases:
BALTAZAR VS. LAXA

G.R. No. 174489, April 11, 2012
Facts:
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament. Childless and
without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R.
Laxa and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa.
Antonio Baltazar, Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B. Flores,
Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio L. Mangalindan (Petitioners) opposed the will
alleging several reasons, one of which was that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at
the time of its execution. As evidence of their claim, Rosie testified that Paciencia was referred to
as "magulyan" or "forgetful" because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then
start looking for it moments later.
Issue:
Whether or not Paciencia lacks the testamentary capacity to make a will because she is not of
sound mind as evidence by being forgetful
Ruling:
No, Paciencia has the testamentary capacity to make a will, for she was of sound mind.
Under Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession
of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by
disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary
act. (n)
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no
substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind
at the time of the execution of the Will.
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that Paciencia was aware of the nature of the document she
executed. She specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She
was well aware of how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is
bequeathing to Lorenzo, to his wife Corazon and to his two children.
BAGTAS VS. PAGUIO

G.R. No. L-6801 March 14, 1912
Facts:
This case pertains to the probate of an alleged will and testament of Pioquinto Paguio y Pizarro
which purports to have been executed in the pueblo of Pilar, Bataan, on April 19, 1908. Pioquinto
died on September 28, 1909, a year and five months following the date of the execution of the will.
The will was propounded by the executrix, Juliana Bagtas, widow of the decedent.
The CFI-Province of Bataan, admitted to probate the will, hence, this appeal by the opponents,
herein – a son and several grandchildren by a former marriage, the latter being the children of a
deceased daughter.
The basis of the opposition to the probation of the will is that the same was not executed according
to the formalities and requirements of the law touching wills, and further that the testator was not
in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and was without the mental capacity
necessary to execute a valid will.
Records show that for some 14 or 15 years prior to his death, Pioquinto suffered from a paralysis
of the left side of his body. A few years prior to his death, his hearing became impaired and he lost
the power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles, his head fell to one side and saliva
ran from his mouth. He retained the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly
well. Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other
members of his family.
At the time of the execution of the will there were present the four testamentary witnesses:
1. Agustin Paguio
2. AnacletoPaguio
3. Pedro Paguio
4. Attorney Señor Marco,
and one Florentino Ramos (not testamentary witness)
Testimonies
One of the attesting witnesses testified that at the time of the execution of the will the testator was
in his right mind, and that although he was seriously ill, he indicated by movements of his head
what his wishes were. Another of the attesting witnesses stated that he was not able to say whether
decedent had the full use of his mental faculties or not, because he had been ill for some years, and
that he (the witnesses) was not a physician.
Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court as a witness for the opponents. He was unable to state
whether or not the will was the wish of the testator. The only reasons he gave for his statement
were the infirmity and advanced age of the testator and the fact that he was unable to speak. The
witness stated that the testator signed the will, and he verified his own signature as a subscribing
witness.
Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated that he was present when the will was
executed and his testimony was cumulative in corroboration of the manner in which the will was
executed and as to the fact that the testator signed the will. This witness also stated that he had
frequently transacted matters of business for the decedent and had written letters and made
inventories of his property at his request, and that immediately before and after the execution of
the will he had performed offices of his character. He stated that the decedent was able to
communicate his thoughts by writing. The testimony of this witness clearly indicates the presence
of mental capacity on the part of the testator
Among other witnesses for the opponents were two physicians:
Doctor Basa testified that he had attended the testator some four or five years prior to his death
and that the latter had suffered from a cerebral congestion from which the paralysis resulted.
The substance of his testimony is that the testator had suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed
some mental disorder. He does not say that the testator was not in his right mind at the time of the
execution of the will, nor does he give it at his opinion that he was without the necessary mental
capacity to make a valid will. He did not state in what way this mental disorder had manifested
itself other than that he had noticed that the testator did not reply to him on one occasion when
he visited him.
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his answer was in reply to a
hypothetical question as to what be the mental condition of a person who was 79 years old and
who had suffered from a malady such as the testator was supposed to have had according to the
testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony Doctor Viado had heard. He replied and discussed at
some length the symptoms and consequences of the decease from which the testator had suffered;
he read in support of his statements from a work by a German Physician, Dr. Herman Eichost. In
answer, however, to a direct question, he stated that he would be unable to certify to the mental
condition of a person who was suffering from such a disease.
Issue:
Whether or not Pioquinto was of sound mind when he executed the will
Ruling:
Yes. To constitute a sound mind and disposing memory it is not necessary that the mind shall be
wholly unbroken, unimpaired, and unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the testator be in
full possession of all his reasoning faculties. Failure of memory is not sufficient unless it be total or
extends to his immediate family or property.
In this case, the Court is of the opinion that Pioquinto seems to have comprehended clearly what
the nature of the business was in which he was engaged. The evidence show that the writing and
execution of the will occupied a period several hours and that the he was present during all this
time, taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly
reasonable and its dispositions are those of a rational person.
The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine
physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard, few
indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such exacting requirements.
The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any other right which
a person may exercise and this right should not be nullified unless mental incapacity is established
in a positive and conclusive manner. In discussing the question of testamentary capacity, it is
stated in volume 28, 70, of the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, that -
Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect soundness of mind is not essential to
testamentary capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a variety of mental weaknesses, disorders,
or peculiarities and still be capable in law of executing a valid will.
Presumption of mental soundness
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established, and the
testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of competent jurisdiction,
this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to overcome this
legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do.
In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is in favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the
burden is upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack of testamentary capacity.
BUGNAO VS. UBAG

14 Phil 163, September 18, 1909
Facts:
The instrument propounded by Catalina Bugnao for probate purports to be the last will and
testament of Domingo Ubag signed by the latter in the presence of 3 subscribing witnesses, and
appears upon its face to have been duly executed in accordance with the provisions of the of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Francisco Ubag and others contended that at the time the will was
executed, Domingo was not of sound mind and memory and was physically and mentally incapable
of making a will because the latter was seriously ill, and the other fact that for some reason which
is not stated, the testator was unable to see and was a person who was not in the habit of signing
his name every day.
Issue:
Is the testator mentally capable at the time of making the will?
Ruling:
Yes. At the time of the its execution, the testator was of sound mind and memory.
Article 799 of the Civil Code provides that to be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator
be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired,
or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the
time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his
bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
In the case at bar, though it is true that their testimony describes the fact that the deceased was at
that time extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe intermittent
attacks of asthma, that the testator was too sick to rise unaided from his bed, that he needed
assistance even to raise himself to a sitting position and that during the paroxysm of asthma to
which he was subject he could not speak, all these evidence of physical weakness in no wise
establishes his mental capacity or lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of the
subscribing witness as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the will, and his clear
recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various parcels of land set out
therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the will clear
and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property, is strong
evidence of his testamentary capacity.
Therefore, at the time of its execution, the deceased was of sound mind and memory and executed
the instrument of his own free will and accord.
TORRES V. LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-24569, February 26, 1926
Janica G. Puno
Facts:
For a long time prior to October, 1923, Tomas Rodriguez was in feeble health. His breakdown was
undoubtedly due to organic weakness, to advancing years, and to an accident which occurred in
1921. Ultimately, on August 10, 1923, on his own initiative, Rodriguez designated Vicente F. Lopez
as the administrator of his property. Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila on February 25,
1924, leaving a considerable estate. Shortly thereafter, Manuel Torres, one of the executors named
in the will, asked that the will of Rodriguez be allowed.
Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the deceased, on the grounds: (1)
that the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of the execution of the supposed will
he was suffering from senile dementia and was under guardianship; (2) that undue influence had
been exercised by the persons benefited in the document in conjunction with others who acted in
their behalf; and (3) that the signature of Tomas Rodriguez to the document was obtained through
fraud and deceit. After a prolonged trial, judgment was rendered denying the legalization of the
will.
The Trial Court denied legalization of the will on the ground of “lack of mental capacity” at the
signing of the will by the testator.
Issue:
Whether or not the will executed by Tomas who had Senile Dementia was valid
Ruling:
Yes. A will to be valid must, under sections 614 and 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure, be made by
a testator of sound mind. The question of mental capacity is one of degree. There are many
gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased
mentality which are denominated as insanity and idiocy.
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind shall be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the testator should be in
the full possession of his reasoning faculties. The question is not so much, what was the degree of
memory possessed by the testator, as, had he a disposing memory.
An examination of the Philippine cases on testamentary capacity discloses a consistent tendency

to protect the wishes of the deceased whenever it be legally possible. These decisions also show
great tenderness on the part of the court towards the last will and testament of the aged.
On January 3, 1924, when the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, made his will, he was 76 years old,
physically decrepit, weak of intellect, suffering from a loss of memory, had a guardian of his person
and his property, and was eccentric, but he still possessed that spark of reason and of life, that
strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that
intention, which the law terms "testamentary capacity." Two of the subscribing witnesses testified
clearly to the regular manner in which the will was executed, and one did not. The attending
physician and three other doctors who were present at the execution of the will expressed
opinions entirely favorable to the capacity of the testator. Three other members of the medical
profession expressed opinions entirely unfavorable to the capacity of the testator and certified
that he was of unsound mind.
Held, That Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possessed sufficient mentality to make a will
which would meet the legal test regarding testamentary capacity; that the proponents of the will
have carried successfully the burden of proof and have shown him of sound mind on that date; and
that it was reversible error on the part of the trial court not to admit his will to probate.
SANCHO VS. ABELLA

G.R. No. L-39033, November 13, 1933
Facts:
The testatrix, Matea Abella, resident of the municipality of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, had been informed
that Dr. Antonio Querol of San Fernando La Union, was a good physician. On April 13, 1932, she
left her home, accompanied by her niece, Filomena Inay, to consult the said physician in his clinic.
They stopped at the convent of the parish church of the said municipality, in charge of Father
Cordero with whom she was acquainted. During her stay in the said convent, she went to Dr.
Antonio Querol's clinic twice within the period of one week with Filomena where she found that
she was suffering from dyspepsia and cancer of the stomach.
On or about April 26, 1932, Matea Abella ordered a sexton (officer of a church) of the convent to
call Atty. Teodoro Reinoso to whom she expressed her desire to make a will, in the presence of the
Father Cordero's sister, Father Zoilo Aguda, Macario Calug and the fiscal of the convent.
Inasmuch as the aforesaid attorney had to attend to other business, he could not finish his
interview with the testatrix on the first day and had to continue it the following day, also in the
presence of Father Cordero, his sister, Filomena Inay and some children who were then at the
convent. Inasmuch as he did not finish the interview on the second day, the said attorney returned
again on the afternoon of the 28th and continued it in the presence of the same persons who
entered and left the sala.
At the end of the interview, Matea Abella ordered Filomena to bring her some papers which were
in her trunk, which she delivered to the said attorney. After the will had been drafted in Ilocano,
the dialect of the testatrix, Macario Calug read it to her and she approved it. When the will had
been copied clean, it was again read to the testatrix and she express her approval thereof, but
inasmuch as it was rather late at night, she did not care to sign the same suggesting that it be
postponed to the following day, April 29, 1932, which was done.
At about 7:30 o'clock on the morning of April 29, 1932, the signing of the will took place in the
corridor of the convent. The testatrix Matea Abella was the first to sign it on a table in the presence
of each and every one of the instrumental witnesses thereto and of other persons, including Father
Cordero. After the testatrix, each of the instrument witnesses signed in the presence of the testatrix
and of each and every one of the other witnesses. After the will had been signed, Atty. Reinoso
delivered the original and the copies thereof to the testatrix, retaining one for his file.
On July 3, 1932, Matea died of the senile debility in Sinait at the age of 88 years.
Respondent’s contention:
Marciana Abella claims that, inasmuch as the testatrix was 88 years of age when she made her will,
she was already suffering from senile debility and therefore her mental faculties were not
functioning normally anymore and that she was not fully aware of her acts. As an indication of her
senile debility, she attempted to prove that the testatrix had very poor memory in connection with
her properties and interest; that she could not go downstairs without assistance, and that she
could not recall her recent acts (e.g.: that she used to urinate on her clothes without being aware
of it, and particularly a few days previous to her death; that in her will she bequeathed properties
which she had already donated to other person, etc.)
Issue:
Whether or not Matea Abella was in the full enjoyment of her mental faculties and executed the
document (Exhibit A) as a true expression of her last will
Ruling:
Yes. All the data (facts) show that the testatrix was not so physically weak, nor so blind, nor so
deaf, nor so lacking in intelligence that she could not, with full understanding thereof, dispose of
her properties and make a will. Neither senile debility, nor blindness, nor deafness, nor poor
memory, is by itself sufficient to incapacitate a person for making his ill.
The mere fact that in her will Matea Abella disposed of properties, which she had already donated
to other persons at a prior date, is not an indication of mental insanity. At most it constitutes
forgetfulness or a change of mind, due to ignorance of the irrevocability of certain donations.
It is insinuated that the testatrix has been unduly influenced in the execution of her will. There is
nothing in the records establishing such claim either directly or indirectly. The fact of her having
stopped at the convent of the parish church of San Fernando, La Union, is not unusual in the
Philippines where, due to lack of hotels, the town convents are usually given preference by
strangers because they are given better accommodations and allowed more freedom.
In the present case, the testatrix Matea Abella was a stranger in San Fernando, La Union. Inasmuch
as Father Cordero, the parish priest of the said town, was well known to her having served in the
church of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, in the same capacity, she did not have any difficulties in obtaining
accommodations in his convent. The fact that Matea Abella stopped at a convent and enjoyed the
hospitality of a priest who gave her accommodations therein, nor the fact that the will was
executed in the convent in question in the presence of the parish priest and witnessed by another
priest, could certainly not be considered as an influence which placed her under the obligation to
bequeath of her property to the bishop of said diocese.
Neither senile ability, nor deafness, nor blindness, nor poor memory, is by itself sufficient to
establish the presumption that the person suffering therefrom is not in the full enjoyment of his
mental faculties, when there is sufficient evidence of his mental sanity at the time of the execution
of the will; and that neither the fact of her being given accommodations in a convent, nor the
presence of the parish priest, nor a priest acting as a witness, constitutes undue influence sufficient
to justify the annulment of a legacy in favor of the bishop of a diocese made in her will by a testatrix
88 years of age, suffering from defective eyesight and hearing, while she is stopping at a convent
within the aforestated diocese.
ALSUA-BETTS VS. CA
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
Facts:
On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua who was predeceased by her wife and died on May 6,1964
and his wife, FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA, 67 years old, died October 2, 1959, together with all their
living children, entered into a duly notarized agreement, extra judicial partition for the inventory
and partition of all the spouses present and existing properties. In the provision of said extra
judicial partition, each of the four children was allotted with the properties considered as their
share in the estate or as inheritance left by the deceased where they will be the absolute owner of
the properties assigned in case of death of one of the spouses.
On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doña Tinay also separately executed holographic will with
exactly the same terms. On August 14, 1956, subsequently executed separately a codicil of exactly
the same terms and conditions.
When Doña Tinay died, in effect Don Jesus by order of the probate court was name as executor.
Before Don Jesus died he cancelled his holographic will in the presence of his bookkeeper and
secretary and instructed his lawyer to draft a new will. This was a notarial will and testament of 3
essential features as follows: 1. It expressly cancelled revoked and annulled all the provisions of
his holographic will and codicil; 2. It provided for the collation of all his properties donated to his
four living children by virtue of the Escritura de Partition Extra judicial”; 3. It instituted his
children as legatees / devisees of specific properties, and as to the rest of the properties and
whatever may be subsequently acquired in the future, before his death, were to be given to
Francisca and Pablo naming Francisca as executor to serve without a bond.
Oppositions thereto were filed by Pablo, Amparo and Fernando, thru his judicial guardian Clotilde
Samson, on the ground that Don Jesus was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the
execution of the alleged will because he was suffering from senile dementia.
Issue:
Whether or not Don Jesus was not of sound mind during the making of the notarial will
Ruling:
No.
Under Article 799 of the New Civil Code, to be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator
The test of testamentary capacity is at the time of the making of the will. Mere weakness of mind
or partial imbecility from disease of body or from age-does not render a person incapable of
making a will. Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which
unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration
generally known as insanity or Idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or
incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility
from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or
feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient
to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property.
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or
unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity
does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind.
In this case, the Court find that: (a) it was Don Jesus himself who gave detailed instructions to his
lawyer as to how he wanted to divide his properties among his children by means of a list of his
properties should pertain; (b) the semi-final draft of the contested will prepared by his lawyer was
even corrected by Don Jesus; (c) on the day of the signing of the will at his house in Ligao, "Don
Jesus was in bright and lively spirits, leading in the conversation which ran from problems of
farming and the merits of French-made wines"; (d) the signing of the will by Don Jesus and his
attesting witnesses was made after a statement from Don Jesus of the purpose of their meeting or
gathering. Don Jesus knew exactly what his actions were and the fun implications thereof.
Hence, Don Jose was of sound mind upon making the notarial will.
AVELINO VS. DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 6322, February 21, 1912
Facts:
The opponent questions the Order of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila which
legalized the will of the deceased Pascual de la Cruz.
The opponent contends that Pascual was incompetent to make the will in question since during
the making of the latter’s will, he was blind and had been for a number of years.
Contrary, all of the witnesses who signed the will declared that the deceased was of sound mind at
the time said will was made and fully understood its contents, and signed the same in their
presence and that they each signed the will in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence
of the deceased.
Issue:
Whether or not the deceased was of sound mind upon the execution of the will
Ruling:
No. There is absolutely no proof to show that the deceased was incapacitated at the time he
executed his will. No presumption of incapacity can arise from the mere fact that he was blind. The
only requirement of the law as to the capacity to make a will is that the person shall be of age and
of sound mind and memory (Sec. 614, Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.) Section 620 of the same
code prohibits blind persons from acting as witnesses in the execution of wills, but no limitation is
placed upon testamentary capacity, except age and soundness of mind.
The Order of the Court of First Instance is, therefore hereby affirmed.
IN RE WILL OF MARCELO JOCSON: RAFAEL JOCSON VS ROSAURO JOCSCON, ET AL

G.R. No. L-17627, June 8, 1922
Karol Vincent Cajes
Facts:
The last will and testament of the deceased Marcelo Jocson was presented for probate by Rafael
Jocson, Cirilo Manlaque, and Filomena Goza (on June 10, 1920). This petition was opposed by
Rosauro, Asuncion, and Dominga Jocson, alleging that: (a) The supposed will was not the last will
of the deceased, and the signatures appearing thereon, and which are said to be of the testator, are
not authentic; (b) the testator, that is, the deceased, was not of sound mind and was seriously ill
at the time of its execution; and (c) the supposed will was not executed in accordance with the law.
The lower court rendered decision finding, that some hours before, during and one hour after, the
execution of his will, Marcelo Jocson was of sound mind; that he dictated his will in Visaya, his own
dialect; that he signed his will in the presence of three witnesses at the bottom, and on each of the
left margins of the three sheets in which it was written; that said three witnesses signed the will
in the presence of the testator and of each other, all of which requirements make the document a
valid will, in accordance with the provision of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Act No. 2645.
The appellants allege that the trial court erred in holding that the last will and testament of the
deceased Marcelo Jocson, and in ordering and decreeing the probate thereof as his last will. All the
arguments advanced by the appellants tend to show that the testator Marcelo Jocson, at the time
of executing the will, did not have the mental capacity necessary therefor; that said will was not
signed by the witnesses in the presence of the testator; that the witnesses did not sign the will in
the presence of each other, and that the attestation of the supposed will does not state that the
witnesses signed in the presence of the testator.
Issue:
Does Marcelo was of sound mind during the execution of his will
Ruling:
Yes. To constitute a sound mind and disposing memory, it is not necessary that the mind shall be
wholly unbroken and unimpaired by disease or otherwise, or that the testator be in full possession
of all his reasoning faculties. Failure of memory is not sufficient unless it be total or extends to his
immediate family or property.
The Court upheld the ruling of the lower court that as to the mental capacity of the testator at the
time of executing his will, the testator was of sound mind at the time of dictating and signing his
will is supported by the evidence. The Court finds the trial judge, who tried this case and saw and
heard the witnesses while testifying, held that these solemnities were complied with at the
execution of the will in question and find no reason for altering his conclusions. The objection to
the attestation clause was, which, translated from the Visayan dialect, in which the will was
written, into English, says: "We witnesses, do hereby state that the document write on each side
of the three sheets of paper was executed, acknowledged, signed, and published by the testator
abovenamed, Marcelo Jocson, who declared that it was his last will and testament in our presence
and, at his request and all of us being present, we signed our names on the three sheets of paper
as witnesses to this will in the presence of each other." (Translation of Exhibit A, page 18,
documentary evidence.)
CUYUGAN VS. BARON

G.R. No. L-41947, 16 January 1936
Rea Lyza C. Corbit
Facts:
On 17 December 1931, Silvestra Baron, who was around eighty-six (86) years old at the time,
allegedly executed a will consisting of one (1) page in the Pampanga dialect. The original copy of
the will is signed "Silestra On" and the duplicate copy is signed "Silestra Baron". Her nephew,
Vivencio Cuyugan, was her chief beneficiary and executor. The execution of the will was witnessed
by Vicente David, Valeriano Silva, and Zacarias Nuguid. On 30 January 1933 or forty-four (44) days
after the execution of the will, Silvestra died of heart failure.
The siblings of Silvestra, Guillermo Baron and Faustina Baron, opposed the probate of her will.
They alleged that at the date of execution, Silvestra was mentally and physically incapacitated,
among others.
The trial court refused the probate of the will on the ground that it was executed under undue
influence. It also made findings of fact tending to show actual lack of testamentary capacity of
Silvestra.
Evidence shows that in the morning of the date of execution, Silvestra suffered a physical collapse
of such a serious nature that a physician and a nurse were immediately called in. By reason of her
advanced age and the gravity of her illness, she was unable to do anything for herself.
Silvestra’s grandniece, Epifania Sampang, was the first to reach the house about one (1) hour or
so after Silvestra’s collapse. She testified that when she reached the house, she found Silvestra
lying in bed, very pale and unconscious; that she called to her but she did not answer and only
groaned; that her mouth was twisted and her lower lip swollen. Epifiania then went out to call a
doctor but all the doctors in Magalang were out whereupon she telephoned Vivencio who was then
at San Francisco that a doctor should be sent immediately.
Doctor Teopaco and a nurse arrived at about 10:00 AM and treated Silvestra with a hypodermic
injection in the arm, among others. When they were already leaving, Vivencio, with an attorney
and three (3) witnesses, entered the house to obtain Silvestra’s will. Neither the doctor nor the
nurse was presented as witnesses.
The subscribing witnesses stated that it was their belief that Silvestra understood the alleged will
which she signed, but all of them admitted that not one of them exchanged a single word of
conversation with Silvestra. One of the witnesses, however, read the will to Silvestra.
Silvestra never saw the alleged will at any time again prior to her death. It was immediately taken
away by an attorney who kept it in his possession alleging that she had instructed him to keep it
secret. However, there was credible evidence in the record that before her death, Silvestra denied
to several persons that she made any will.
Issue:
Did Silvestra possess testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of her will?
Ruling:
No, Silvestra did not possess testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of her will.
An instrument purporting to be a will executed and witnessed in accordance with the formalities
required by the statute is entitled to the presumption of regularity. But the burden of the evidence
is passed to the proponent when the oppositors submit credible evidence tending to show that the
supposed testator did not possess testamentary capacity at the time or that the document was not
the free and voluntary expression of the alleged testator or that the will, for any other reason, is
void in law. The finding that the will was executed under due influence or by the fraud of another
presupposes testamentary capacity.
Standing at Silvestra’s bedside was the attorney, the three (3) witnesses, and Vivencio and yet
there was no record that a word was exchanged between any of them and Silvestra. There is no
evidence that Silvestra actively participated in the preparation of her will and that she fully
understood the contents thereof.
While the Court does not know the drug administered by the doctor, in her dazed physical and
mental condition, she clearly had no adequate understanding of what she was doing at that time.
She could not even sign her name to the original copy of the will properly or correctly.
The belief on her part that she had not made any will explains her failure to do any act of revocation
in the forty-four (44) days prior her death.
There is a doctrine which states that the courts will weigh heavily against the testimony of undue
influence the fact that the testator, despite opportunity, did not revoke or made changes to his will
following the operation of said undue influence upon him. However, the same has no application
to cases in which there has been an initial lack of testamentary capacity. It has no application,
moreover, where from the day of execution until the death of the testator his mental condition is
such that he cannot judge the propriety of revoking the will. It also obviously does not apply to a
case where the alleged testator harbors the belief that he had not executed the will in question.
JUANA CAGUIOA, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EMIGDIO ZARATE,

PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. MARIA CALDERON, OPPONENT AND APPELLANT
20 Phil. 400, G.R. No. 6625 October 24, 1911
Facts:
On February 17, 1910, Juana Caguioa presented a petition in the CFI of Pangasinan for the probate
of the last will and testament of Emigdio Zarate, deceased. After due notice, the case was heard on
July 16, 1910.
Maria Calderon appeared, by her attorney, and opposed the probation of said will alleging that
said Emigdio Zarate was mentally incapacitated at the time he authorized and signed his will, that
he executed the said will under illegal and undue influence or persuasion on the part of some
persons who acted in behalf of the beneficiaries or heirs, and that the signature of the testator
was obtained by deceit or fraud, for the reason that it was not his intention that all that was
recorded in the said instrument should be his will at the time he signed it.
The trial court overruled the opposition, sustained the petition and admitted to probate the will,
holding that the same is legal in all its parts as the last will and testament of the deceased Emigdio
Zarate. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Was the decedent Emigdio Zarate in the full possession of his mental faculties at the time of the
execution of his will?
Ruling:
Yes. Emigdio Zarate was in the possession of his faculties at the time of the execution of the said
will.
To overcome the positive and direct testimony of the witnesses who were present at the time of
the execution of the will in question that the testator was of sound of mind and memory at the time
he signed the said will, there should be sufficient proof on record against it.
Two of the witnesses who signed the will, as well as others who were present in the house at the
time the said will was executed, testified that in their opinion Emigdio Zarate was of sound mind
and memory at the time he signed the said will.
Maria attempted to show that Emigdio Zarate for some months prior to his death had been
troubled with insomnia, as well as some other physical infirmities. The two doctors who appeared
on behalf of the opponents testified that insomnia tended to destroy the mental capacity, but that
there were times, even during the period while they were suffering from insomnia, when they
would be perfectly rational.
Even admitting that there was some foundation for the supposition that Emigdio Zarate had
suffered from the alleged infirmities, we do not believe that the testimony was sufficiently direct
and positive, based upon the hypothetical questions, to overcome the positive and direct testimony
of the witnesses who were present at the time of the execution of the will in question.
The evidence adduced during the trial of the case, shows a large preponderance of proof in favor
of the fact that Emigdio Zarate was in the full possession of his mental faculties at the time he
executed his last will and testament.
YAP TUA VS. YAP CA KUAN

G.R. No. 6845, September 1, 1914
Facts:
Yap Tua filed a petition to admitted to probate the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong (Tomasa).
This was oppose by Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu for the reason that at the time of the execution of
the will, the said Tomasa was not then mentally capacitated to execute the same, due to her
sickness.
They presented the witness, Rufino R. Papa(Papa), who was the physician of Tomasa. Papa
declared that he had treated her in the month of August; that he visited her first on the 8th day of
August; that he visited her again on the 9th and 10th days of August; that on the first visit he found
the sick woman completely weak — very weak from her sickness, in the third stage of tuberculosis;
that she was lying in bed; that on the first visit he found her with but little sense, the second day
also, and on the third day she had lost all her intelligence; that when he asked her (Tomasa)
whether she was feeling any pain or anything of that kind, she did not answer at all; that she was
in a condition of stupor, induced, as he believed, by the stage of uraemia from which she was
suffering.
Issue:
Whether or not Tomasa lacks the testamentary capacity to make a will because she is not of sound
mind due to her sickness (tuberculosis)
Ruling:
No, Tomasa has the testamentary capacity to make a will, for she was of sound mind.
According to the Supreme Court the testimony of Dr. Papa is very strong relating to the mental
condition of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, yet, nevertheless, his testimony related to a time perhaps
twenty-four hours before the execution of the will in question. Several witnesses testified that at
the time the will was presented to her for her signature, she was of sound mind and memory and
asked for a pen and ink and kept the will in her possession for ten or fifteen minutes and finally
signed it. The lower court found that there was a preponderance of evidence sustaining the
conclusion that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was of sound mind and memory and in the possession
of her faculties at the time she signed this will.
SAMSON VS. CORRALES TAN QUINTIN

G.R. No. L-19142, March 5, 1923 (44 Phil 573)
Facts:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila admitting to probate a
document alleged to be the last will and testament of the deceased Mariano Corrales Tan. There is
no direct evidence as to the interest of the oppositor-appellant in the estate in question, though it
may, perhaps, be inferred from the testimony of his wife Maximina Ong that he is the son of the
deceased.
In his answer to the petition for probate he alleges, in substance, that the will is incomplete and
fraudulent and does not express the true intent of the testator; that the testator acted under duress
and under undue influence, and that at the time of the execution of the will he was not of sound
and disposing mind.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimony of a doctor prevails over five credible witnesses that Mariano
Corrales Tan was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will
Ruling:
No. There is no evidence whatever showing that the testator acted under duress or undue
influence and the only question of fact which we need consider is whether the testator was of
sound and disposing mind when the document in question was executed.
Upon this point the testimony of Dr. Tee Han Kee, the attending physician, as a witness for the
opposition, is to the effect that the deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been in a
comatose condition for several days prior to his death. He died about eight or nine o'clock in the
evening of December 26, 1921, and the will is alleged to have been executed in the forenoon of the
same day. Counsel for the appellant, in his well-prepared brief, argues ably and vigorously that
coma implies complete unconsciousness, and that the testator, therefore, could not at that time
have been in possession of his mental faculties and have executed a will. There are, however,
varying degrees of coma and in its lighter forms the patient may be aroused and have lucid
intervals. Such seems to have been the case here.
Doctor Tee Han Kee, the opponent's principal witness, who visited the deceased in the evening of
December 25th, says he then seemed to be in a state of coma and that in the forenoon of December
26th, when the doctor again visited him, he was in "the same state of coma."
Maximina Ong, the wife of the opponent, the only other witness for the opposition, states that on
December 26th the deceased could not talk and did not recognize anyone. But all the witnesses
presented by the petitioner, five in number, testify that the deceased was conscious, could hear
and understand what was said to him and was able to indicate his desires. Four of these witnesses
state that he could speak distinctly; the fifth, Velhagen, says that the deceased only moved his head
in answer to questions.
That the deceased was in an exceedingly feeble condition at the time the will was executed is
evident, but if the witnesses presented in support of the petition told the truth there can be no
doubt that he was of sound mind and capable of making his will. And we see no reason to discredit
any of these witnesses; the discrepancies found between their respective versions of what took
place at the execution of the document are comparatively unimportant and so far from weakening
their testimony rather lend strength to it by indicating the absence of any conspiracy among them.
As against their testimony we have only the testimony of Maximina Ong and Dr. Tee Han Kee. The
former is not a disinterested witness. As to the testimony of the latter it is sufficient to say that
mere professional speculation cannot prevail over the positive statements of five apparently
credible witnesses whose testimony does not in itself seem unreasonable.
GALVEZ VS. GALVEZ

G.R. No. 6650, December 5, 1913
Facts:
This case deals with the probate of the second will executed by Victor Galvez on August 12, 1910
and signed in his presence by witnesses Juan Dimanlig, Nazaria Galvez, and J. Leoquico, and as the
testator was no longer able to sign on account of his sickness, Lorenzo Galvez at his request affixed
his own signature to the instrument for him and below his written name. Canuta Galvez alleged
that her father, owing to his very serious sickness with cholera, lacked the intellectual capacity and
clear judgment requisite for making a will. Victor Galvez who as witness observed, was of sound
find and in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties. That Victor talked in intelligently and with
perfect knowledge of what was taking place.
Issue:
Is Victor Galvez was of sound mind upon the execution of the will?
Ruling:
Yes. Witness positively affirmed that Victor, on executing his will, showed that he was in full
possession of his mental faculties and perfectly cognizant of his acts.
Article 799 of the Civil Code provides that to be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator
In the case at bar, it may be true that cholera patients do, in majority of cases, become incapacitated
in the manner describes by the witnesses, Victor physical and mental condition must have been an
exception since he demonstrated that he had sufficient energy and clear intelligence to execute his
last will in accordance with the requirements of the law. Besides the attestation of the subscribing
witnesses, the contents of the will and the testator’s positive determination to rectify the error he
incurred in the execution of his first will, show that Victor Galvez was in his sound mind and was
perfectly aware of his duties in respect to the legal inviolable rights of his daughter and sole heir
Canuta Galvez.
Therefore, Victor, in executing his will, did so with a sound mind and the full use of his mental
faculties.
CARRILLO V. JAOJOCO
G.R. No. 21015, March 24, 1924
Janica G. Puno
Facts:
On the evening of December 9, 1918, Adriana Carrillo executed a document of sale of 11 parcels of
land, with one-half of the improvements thereon, in favor of Marcos Jaojoco for the price of P4,000
which the seller admitted having received.
Nine days afterwards, Adriana Carrillo was declared mentally incapacitated by the CFI and later
on died and proceeding having been instituted for the administrator and settlement of her estate,
her sister Miguela Carrillo was appointed judicial administratrix of said estate.
In her capacity as such administratrix, Miguela Carrillo now brings this action for the annulment
of said contract of sale executed by Adriana Carrillo on December 9, 1918, against Marcos Jaojoco,
the purchaser, and his father Justiniano Jaojoco.
Marcos Jaojoco is a nephew of Adriana Carrillo, and Justiniano Jaojoco her brother-in-law, and both
defendants, who are father and son, had Adriana Carrillo in charge, took her to the "Hospital de
San Juan de Dios," and cared for her during the time she was there, and for such acts they may have
won her gratitude.
Adriana Carrillo entered the "Hospital de San Juan de Dios" on November 13, 1918, by reason of
having had an access of cerebral hemorrhage with hemiplegia, and there she was attended by
Doctor Ocampo until she left on the 18th of December of the same year very much better off
although not completely cured.
Miguela has attempted to prove that in 1917, Adriana performed acts which indicated that she was
mentally deranged.
Issue:
Whether or not Adriana was mentally incapacitated upon the execution of the document of sale
Ruling:
No. The Court have made a thorough examination of the character of those acts, and believe that
they do not necessarily show that Adriana Carrillo was mentally insane.
The same thing can be said as to her having entered the "Hospital de San Lazaro" and the "Hospicio
de San Jose," in the absence of an affirmative showing to her motive for entering said institutions,
for while it is true that insane persons are confined in those institutions, yet there also enter
persons who are not insane.
Asked about the mental incapacity of Adriana Carrillo during her treatment, Doctor Ocampo
answered that he did not pay attention to it, but that he could affirm that the answers she gave him
were responsive to the questions put to her, and that the hemiplegia did not affect her head but
only one-half of the body.
The notary, Mr. Salinas, who authorized the document, testified that on that day he has been for
some time with Adriana, and she appeared to him dignified, answering correctly all the questions
he made to her without inconsistencies or failure of memory, for which reason, he was surprised
when afterwards he learned that the mental capacity of Adriana Carrillo was in question.
The principal witness for Miguela, being Miguela herself, was the surety of Adriana Carrillo when
the latter was appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of her husband in 1917. It cannot be
understood, if Adriana Carrillo was in that time mentally incapacitated, why Miguela Carrillo, who
knew it, consented to be a surety for her.
The fact that nine days after the execution of the contract, Adriana Carrillo was declared mentally
incapacitated by the trial court does not prove that she was so when she executed the contract.
After all, this can perfectly be explained by saying that her disease became aggravated
subsequently.
HERNAEZ V. HERNAEZ
G.R. No. 857, Februay 10, 1903
Facts:
On December 5, 1894, Doña Juana Espinosa, widow of Don Pedro Hernaez executed a will,
notarized with three witnesses.
Doña Juana leaves one third of the estate to the eldest Son Rosendo, one third for free disposal and
another one third in six equal parts among her five children and 2 granddaughters (Peregrina and
Victorina, considered as one).
Eulalio Hernandez filed an action for the annulment of the will upon the ground: : (1) of the
incapacity of the testatrix; (2) the incapacity of the notary, attesting witnesses, and the interpreter;
and (3) a substantial formal defect in the will.
On December 5, 1894, it was alleged that Doña Juana, who was 80 yrs old and wa so ill and that
two days afterwards she died; and that prior thereto she walked in a stooping attitude, and gave
contraditory orders, as a result of her senile debility. The incapacity of the attesting witnesses is
supposed to consist in their not having a perfect knowledge of Spanish, and the incapacity of the
interpreter in that he was an amanuensis of the notary and was the person who wrote out the will.
The substantial formal defect of the will is supposed to consist in the fact that two physicians were
not present to certify to the sanity of the testatrix at the time of its execution, and the absence of
two interpreters to translate the will, because executed in a foreign language.
Plaintiff Eulalio then introduced oral testimony and expert evidence. The oral testimony was for
the purpose of the following acts:
a) The testatrix on the 5th day of December, 1894, was so ill that she could not speak.
b) That by reason of her age she walked in a stooping position and gave contradictory orders.
c) The priest was called to testify that the patient was at that time so seriously ill that he
scarcely understood her when she spoke.
Isidora de la Torres, affirmed that three days before her death she was very ill but answered
questions which were addressed her, and only one witness.
Ambrosia Sotsing, testified that four days before the death of the testatrix she had been to see the
latter and that she could not speak then because she was suffering from fainting fits, this witness
being the only one who testified that the testatrix had given contrary orders.
The priest, D. Nicolas Alba, stated that he had administered the sacraments to the testatrix before
the execution of the will but was unable to remember the day; that he understood her then when
she spoke and that the testatrix frequently confessed even when not feeling seriously ill, and that
when sick she was accustomed to confess in her house; that when he confessed her some days
before the execution of the will he had also administered the extreme unction on account of her
advanced age; that at that time she was in the enjoyment of her mental faculties but the witness
could not state whether she preserved them up to the moment of her death, he not being present
when this occurred. Sotsing confirmed the points of D. Nicolas Alba.
Dr. Lope de la Rama gave the following result: That if the organs are intact the physiological
functions are perfectly performed, and that consequently some men before reaching the age of
decrepitude lose their mental faculties by the weakening of the brain, either as the result of illness
or of abuses, while others preserve their understanding to a very advanced age. It is unnecessary
to pass upon the oral evidence introduced by the defendant; the documentary evidence shows that
the testatrix did not die two days after the execution of her will. The will was executed on the 5th
and her death occurred on the 12th of December, 1894.
Issue:
Whether or not the testatrix was deprived of her mental faculties
Ruling:
No.
The Code has adopted the first system as being the most rational, by accepting the principle that
mental soundness is always to be presumed with respect to a person who has not been previously
incapacitated until the contrary is demonstrated and proven by the proper person and the
correctness of this choice is beyond doubt; in the meantime the intervention of the notary and the
witnesses constitutes a true guaranty of the capacity of the testator, by reason of their knowledge
of the matter.
The fact that an old woman gives contradictory orders, that she walks in a stooping position, that
she has fainting fits, that she received the sacraments some days before making her will, are
circumstances which even if fully demonstrated by proof could not lead the court to establish a
conclusion contrary to the mental soundness of a person who is to be presumed to be in the full
enjoyment of the mental faculties until the contrary is conclusively proven. The notary in
compliance with the requirements of article 695 of the Civil Code certifies that in his judgment the
testatrix had the necessary legal capacity and the use of the necessary mental faculties for the
purposes of the execution of the will.
The presence of two physicians, as required in the case covered by article 665, was not necessary.
"This precept refers clearly and expressly to the conditions which must be complied with in order
that a demented person may make a will by availing himself of a lucid interval, and is entirely
distinct from the cases governed by article 685 when the testator has not been declared
demented."
Nor was it necessary that two interpreters be present as required by article 684 of the Civil Code.
This is a requisite for the execution of a will in a foreign language, and neither by the letter nor by
the purpose of this article could it be required with regard to the will in question. Not by the letter,
because neither the testatrix nor the notary expressed themselves in a foreign language.
Neither the Castilian spoken by the notary nor the Visayan spoken by the testatrix are foreign
languages. Nor is the case within the purpose of the law.
TRINIDAD NEYRA VS. ENCARNACION NEYRA

C.A. No. 8075, March 25, 1946
Facts:
Trinidad Neyra filed a complaint against her sister, Encarnacion Neyra, for recovery of one-half
(½) of the property left to them by their deceased father, and one-half (½) of the rents collected
on the said property.
Encarnacion Neyra, who had been sickly for about two years, unexpectedly died, on November 4,
1942 at the age of 48, allegedly from heart attack, as a consequence of Addison's disease.
Trinidad alleged that she had a compromised agreement with Encarnacion, dated November 3,
1942, a day before the death of the latter. In the said agreement, Encarancion was waiving her
right to the property left by their father in favor of Trinidad. And a new will and testament, naming
Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to Encarnacion's express
instructions, and the two documents were prepared, in duplicate was also made and signed by
Encarnacion using her thumbmark. These was affirmed by several disinterested witnesses.
Atty. Lucio Javillonar, claiming to represent Encarnacion Neyra, opposed the validity of the
compromised agreement, contending that the thumbark of Encarnacion was affixed by Trinidad.
That a testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, alleged medical expert, according to medical authorities,
persons suffering from Addison's disease often live as long as ten (10) years, while others die after
a few weeks only, and that as the disease progresses, asthenia sets in, and from 80 per cent to 90
per cent of the patients develop tuberculosis, and complications of the heart also appear.
Issue:
Whether or not Encarnacion was of sound mind upon the making of the compromise agreement
and last will and testament
Ruling:
Yes.
In connection with mental capacity, in several cases, the court has considered the testimony of
witnesses, who had known and talked to the testators, more trustworthy than the testimony of the
alleged medical experts.
In this case, Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination, frankly admitted that, in
the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra
talked to her that they understood each other clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really of
sound mind, at the time of signing and execution of the agreement and will in question. It may,
therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons suffering from Addison's
disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of
the sleep they enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like
patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties
until the moments of their death.
Moreover, the testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, alleged medical expert, as to the nature of effects
of Addison's disease, is absolutely unreliable. He had never seen or talked to the testatrix
Encarnacion Neyra.
Hence, the logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and possessed the
necessary testamentary and mental capacity, at the time of the execution of the agreement and
will, dated November 3, 1942.
ALFONSO ALBORNOZ VS. DOLORES AND JOSE ALBORNOZ
G.R. No. L-47428, April 8, 1941
Facts:
The deceased Perpetua Vda de Soriano died on June 25, 1936, around 8 in the morning, in Laoag,
Ilocos Norte, she was then 68 years old.
The documents in question are the alleged last will and codicil of the deceased.
Alfonso Albornoz was the first instance petitioner of file CS-RG No. 47428 (file No. 4054). While
appellant Dolores Albornoz was the promoter of file CS-RG No. 47429 ((File No. 4017). The two
siblings said that as to the deceased Perpetua, that they are the grantor of the wills and codicil
whose legalization they requested.
The Ilocos Norte Court ordered the legalization of the documents that Dolores had presented,
consequently rejecting the files submitted by Alfonso.
Alfonso and the other siblings (except Jose and Dolores) appealed the decision of the Court in both
cases arguing that they made an error of having declared that Perpetua had no mental capacity on
June 24, 1936, to execute the will of that date, which they presented for legalization in file No.
40504 (CS-RG No. 47428) and that Dolores and Jose did not present conclusive evidence to
support their contention that the indicated will was not from that deceased.
As to Dolores, who was joined by Jose, they did not contest the authenticity of the will and codicil.
Dolores proved that Perpetua made the will and codicil with freedom while she was in full
enjoyment of her mental faculties and in the presence of witnesses whose names and signatures
are appear in the attesting clauses of the said documents.
Issue:
Whether or not Perpetua was of sound mind when she executed both the will and codicil
Ruling:
No.
Perpetua suffered from diarrhea and enteritis with complications of myocarditis, from June 3,
1936 until the moment of her death, which was due only to these causes. Her weakness was
accentuating from day to day from shortly after falling ill, having contributed to this the absolute
liquid diet to which she had been subjected, plus her already quite advanced age.
On June 22, she was delirious and could hardly move and speak; and if she spoke, her words were
then incoherent. On the 23rd, she completely lost her speech, and although her eyes were open,
they no longer moved.
It is clear from the circumstances that it was physically impossible for her to execute both the will
and the codicil.
Additionally, expert calligrapher Arcadio Laperal, opined that both signatures appearing on
Exhibit A in file No. 4054 and Exhibit 1 in file No. 4017 could not have been expressed by the same
person, helped or not by another, because they differ in all respects.
We believe that the opinion of the aforementioned expert is based on the facts, especially taking
into account that the deceased could no longer see well, as one of the witnesses to the will that is
being discussed said, and yet the signatures that are attribute are written with a lot of symmetry,
straight, and keeping the letters between them, almost the same distance. Even if the deceased had
been helped by another to stamp said signatures, they would not have turned out as well as they
appear in the said document.
Article 800
Cases:
TESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO. JOSE JUNQUERA VS. CRISPIN BORROMEO

G.R. No. L-18498, March 30, 1967
Karol Vincent Cajes
Facts:
Vito Borromeo died on March 13, 1952, in Parañaque, Rizal, at the age of 88 years, without forced
heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu. Jose Junquera, filed with the CFI-
Cebu a petition for the probate of a one (1) page document as the last will left by said deceased,
devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and
undivided shares, and designating Jose Junquera as executor thereof. Teofilo Borromeo filed an
opposition to the probate of the will based on several grounds, one of which is that the testator
was mentally incapable of making a will at the time of its execution. Subsequently, the Court
removed Junquera as special administrator and appointed Dr. Patricio Beltran in his place.
On October 1955, the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for leave to intervene and join the
oppositors in contesting the probate of the will, on the ground that, should the estate be
adjudicated the latter by 133 intestacy, it stood to collect a considerable amount by way of estate
and inheritance taxes.
The proponents of the disputed will, mainly with the testimony of the three attesting witnesses,
Cornelio Gandionco, Filiberto Leonardo and Eusebio Cabiluna, sought to prove the following facts:
Vito Borromeo executed first, the document Exhibit "F", witnessed by Gandionco and Cabiluna.
Later, Vito Borromeo, being of sound and disposing mind, and without pressure or influence
exerted on him, dictated the substance of his will to Tomas Borromeo, who in turn typewrote it in
proper legal language. The document was then read by Vito Borromeo, who later signed and thumb
marked it.
The trial court rendered a decision denying the probate of the will. The court refused to believe
the testimony of the attesting witnesses and, as a result, denied the petition for probate, because,
in its opinion, they appeared not to be "wholly disinterested persons" and because of the serious
discrepancies in their testimonies with respect to the number of copies made of the disputed
document. The court also found that the physical condition of the deceased at the time of the
execution of the questioned document was such that it was highly improbable, if not impossible,
for him to have affixed his signatures on the documents in the spontaneous and excellent manner
they appear to have been written. Thus, the court was also led to believe the testimony of the
handwriting experts for oppositors, - adverse to the genuineness of the signatures of Vito
Borromeo on the questioned document - more than that of the handwriting expert presented by
the proponents of the will.
Issue:
Was the evidence of record sufficient to prove the due execution of the will in question?
Ruling:
Yes. While it is true that the subscribing witnesses to contested will are regarded as the best
witnesses in connection with its due execution, their testimony, in order to deserve full credit,
must be reasonable and unbiased, and the same may be overcome by any other competent
evidence.
It has also been held that the condition and physical appearance of a questioned document
constitute a valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in the light of surrounding circumstances,
may help in determining whether it is genuine or forged. Subscribing witnesses may forget or
exaggerate what they really know, saw, heard or did; they may be biased and, therefore, tell only
half truths to mislead the court or favor one party to the prejudice of the other.
This cannot be said of the condition and physical appearance of the questioned document itself.
Both, albeit silently, will reveal the naked truth, hiding nothing, forgetting nothing, and
exaggerating nothing. For this reason, independently of the conflicting opinions expressed by the
handwriting experts called to the witness stand by the parties, we have carefully examined and
considered the physical appearance and condition of the original and two copies of the questioned
will found in the record — particularly the signatures attributed to the testator — and We have
come to the conclusion that the latter could not have been written by him.
TORRES VS. LOPEZ

G.R. No. L-24569, 26 February 1926
Rea Lyza C. Corbit
Facts:
On 25 February 1924, Tomas Rodriguez died leaving a considerable estate. He left a one-paged last
will and testament which he executed on 3 January 1924.
Shortly, Manuel Torres, one of the executors, moved for the probation of the will. Margarita Lopez,
the first cousin of Tomas, opposed it on the ground, among others, that Tomas lacked the mental
capacity to execute the will because he was diagnosed then of senile dementia and was under
guardianship. Senile dementia is childishness. In its first stages, a person may possess reason and
have willpower. The trial court ruled in favor of Margarita.
There were two (2) sets of physicians who examined Tomas. They arrived at contradictory
conclusions regarding Tomas’ mental capacity.
Doctors Calderon, Domingo, and Herrera, certified that the intellectual faculties of Tomas were
"sound, except that his memory is weak." They also certified that in executing the will, Tomas had
full understanding of the act he was performing and had full knowledge of the contents thereof.
On the other hand, Doctors De Los Angeles, Tietze, and Burke certified that Tomas was of unsound
mind and that they diagnosed his case as senile dementia of the simple type approaching the
deteriorated stage.
Since 27 November 1973, Tomas was taken to the Philippine General Hospital where he remained
until his death. It was in his quarters that he prepared and executed his last will and testament.
Santiago Lopez, one of the executors of the will, testified that Tomas expressed his desire to make
a will. As such, Maximino Mina (Judge Mina), a practicing attorney then, conferred with Tomas
twice. He ascertained the wishes of Tomas and prepared his testament.
The execution of the will was witnessed by Dr. Bonoan, Dr. De Asis, and Mr. Legarda. Moreover,
the doctors who testified in favor of the testamentary capacity of Tomas were present as
observers. Mr. Legarda testified that he read the will to Tomas and that the latter allegedly affirmed
its contents then signed. Of those present, only Dr. Bonoan testified against the validity of the will.
Issue:
Did Tomas possess testamentary capacity at the time of execution of his will?
Ruling:
Yes, Tomas possessed testamentary capacity at the time of execution of his will.
Testamentary capacity is defined as:
"…the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at
the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be
supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the
instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.”
The mental capacity of the testator is determined as of the date of the execution of his will.
Neither old age, physical infirmities, feebleness of mind, weakness of the memory, the
appointment of a guardian, nor eccentricities are sufficient singly or jointly to show testamentary
incapacity. Each case rests on its own facts and must be decided by its own facts.
In this case, two of the subscribing witnesses testified clearly to the regular manner in which the
will was executed, as opposed to the one who did not. Moreover, the other doctors present at the
execution of the will expressed opinions entirely favorable to the capacity of the testator.
Likewise, it can be said that Tomas comprehended the nature of the transaction in which he was
engaged because of the following:
• He had two conferences with his lawyer, Judge Mina, and knew what the will was to
contain;
• His conversations with Judge Mina disclosed as insistence on giving all of his property to
the two persons whom he specified; and
• The will was read to him by Mr. Legarda. He signed the will and its two copies in the proper
places.
In conclusion, on 3 January 1924, Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years, may have
been physically decrepit, may have been weak in intellect, may have suffered a loss of memory,
may have had a guardian and may have a been extremely eccentric, but he still possessed the spark
of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to summon his enfeebled
thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms "testamentary capacity”.
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIE GARNIER GARREAU. LIRIO

PFANNENSCHMIDT RAMIREZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. JOSE MA. RAMIREZ, oppositor-appellee.
G.R. No. L-19910 May 31, 1971
Facts:
Maria Gamier Garreau, widow of Ramon Ramirez, was a native of Asnier Paris, France, but a
Filipino citizen residing in Madrid, Spain, where she died childless at the age of 84 on January 11,
1959.
The will in question was an "open" one, executed before a notary public in Madrid on May 24, 1958,
and instituting her niece Lirio (Lily) Pfannenschmidt as sole and universal heir. Lirio is one of the
four children of Jose Ramirez, brother of the testatrix husband Ramon, the other three being Elsa,
Esperanza and Horacio.
Ramon had a half-brother, Jorge P. Ramirez, whose son, Jose Maria Ramirez, now appellee,
opposed the petition for probate filed by Lirio on February 20, 1959, alleging in his opposition,
inter alia, that there was a prior will executed by the testatrix in Manila in 1949.
The trial court denied the probate based in no small part on a number of letters written by the Lily
herself, in which she used quite strong terms to describe the mental infirmity of the testatrix.
Those letters were written by her in 1956 and 1957 to her uncle, Jose Eugenio Ramirez de la
Cavada. Even before then, however, the testatrix' mental condition was already the object of
serious concern among her close relatives.
Issue:
Are the evidences presented in court sufficient to establish the testamentary capacity of the
testatrix?
Ruling:
No. The evidence, cumulatively considered, leads to the definite conclusion that the testatrix Marie
Gamier Garreau was indeed mentally incapacitated to make a will.
Article 800 of the New Civil Code provides, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind,
in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions
is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before
making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will
must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.
As early as 1955, when Marie Garnier was examined by the family physician, Dr. Romero de Arcos
and by a qualified psychiatrist, Dr. Jose Germain, she was already suffering from pre-senile
dementia, a degenerative mental, infirmity that was described by them as "a progressive and
irreversible process." The manifestations of this condition are amply illustrated in the letters
written by appellant herself as well as in the testimony of her uncle, Jose Eugenio Ramirez. In fact,
these two were convinced that the testatrix should be placed under judicial guardianship, and
actually took the initial steps towards that end.
Another evidence in behalf of appellant is the testimony of the notary public before whom the will
in question was executed and the testimony of two of the three instrumental witnesses. The
statements of the notary public were far from satisfactory. They are vague and evasive, and tend
to beg the very issue. Thus the witness could not say, but merely supposed, that the testatrix had
a recollection of her properties or of the relatives who would logically inherit from her and when
asked to explain his answer to the question concerning her mental state, he simply referred to the
certification in the will on that point. It would seem that he was aware that he had no sufficient
basis for a categorical opinion on the subject, and so declined to fully commit himself.
In view of the foregoing testimonies presented, Marie Garnier was indeed mentally incapacitated
to make a will.
SAMSON VS. CORRALES TAN

G.R. No. L-19142, March 5, 1923
Facts:
The dispute in this case is the last will and testament of the deceased Mariano Corrales
Tan(Mariano). It was oppose by Vicente Corrales Tan Quintin(Vicente).
Vicente claimed that at the time of the execution of the will, Mariano was not of sound and
disposing mind.
The testimony of Dr. Tee Han Kee, the attending physician, as a witness for the opposition, is to the
effect that the deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been in a comatose condition for
several days prior to his death. He died about eight or nine o'clock in the evening of December 26,
1921, and the will is alleged to have been executed in the forenoon of the same day. Counsel for
the appellant, in his well-prepared brief, argues ably and vigorously that coma implies complete
unconsciousness, and that the testator, therefore, could not at that time have been in possession
of his mental faculties and have executed a will.
Issue:
Whether or not Mariano lacks the testamentary capacity to make a will because he is not of sound
mind due to his sickness (diabetic and comatose)
Ruling:
No, Mariano has the testamentary capacity to make a will, for he was of sound mind.
According to the Supreme Court, there are varying degrees of coma and in its lighter forms the
patient may be aroused and have lucid intervals. Such seems to have been the case here.
All the witnesses presented by the petitioner, five in number, testify that the deceased was
conscious, could hear and understand what was said to him and was able to indicate his desires.
Four of these witnesses state that he could speak distinctly; the fifth, Velhagen, says that the
deceased only moved his head in answer to questions.
As against their testimony we have only the testimony of Maximina Ong and Dr. Tee Han Kee. The
former is not a disinterested witness. As to the testimony of the latter it is sufficient to say that
mere professional speculation cannot prevail over the positive statements of five apparently
credible witnesses whose testimony does not in itself seem unreasonable.
CUYUGAN VS. BARON
G.R. No. 418947, January 16, 1936(62 Phil 859)
Facts:
Silvestra Baron died on January 30, 1933. The death certificate recites that she was eighty-six (86)
years of age and died of heart failure. The petition recites that she left an estate exceeding in value
the sum of P80,000 which she disposed of by will dated December 17, 1932, and that she died
single without forced heirs.
The will appointed Petitioner VivencioCuyugan, her nephew, as executor.
The petition for probate recites:

9. That on the date of the execution of said will, that is to say, on December 17, 1932, the said
testatrix was about 80 years old, more or less, and was found and disposing mind, and NOT
acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and was in every respect competent to
dispose of her estate by will.
The will states: (translated from google translate)

“After all the expenses that have to be incurred from the moment I fall ill until the death of my
corpse are paid, the goods and properties that I have to leave will be shared out equally and in
equal parts by my brothers named Guillermo Baron, with the exception of all the money in
metal and my house of strong materials built in the neighborhood of Pilar, San Fernando,
Pampanga that my brother Guillermo Baron currently inhabits, because I give them in an
absolute way as inheritance from my nephew VivencioCuyugan.
That on the death of my brothers Guillermo and Faustina Baron, all the land that I leave in
inheritance by virtue of this test, I give inheritance to my nephew VIVENCIO CUYUGAN,
therefore, I order and prohibit my aforementioned brothers Guillermo and Faustina Baron, that
they encumber or put any kind of obligation onthe assets that I leave in inheritance.”
The original of this will is signed "Silestra On" and the copy is signed "Silestra Baron." Both copies
are written in the Pampanga dialect and consist of one sheet and are witnessed in due form by
Vicente David, Valeriano Silva and ZacariasNuguid (known to the testator).
The amended oppositions of Guillermo Baron, and Faustina Baron (Silvestra’s siblings), allege in
substance first, that at the time of the execution of the alleged will, Silvestra Baron was mentally
and physically incapacitated for the execution of a will; and, second, that her signature and alleged
consent to the said will was obtained and the attorney who prepared the document and the
witnesses who affixed their signatures thereto.
CFI Pampanga denied all the petition of VivencioCuyugan for the probate of the will of Silvestra
Baron.
The trial court found that the will was executed under due influence or by the fraud of another
presupposes testamentary capacity. The trial judge refused the probate of the alleged will on the
ground that it was executed under the due influence of other persons and we think the record
warrants his findings in this respect. The trial court also made findings of fact tending to show
actual lack of testamentary capacity of Silvestra Baron.
Portion of its decision states that (translated from google translate):

“..that she did not enjoy complete freedom to dispose of her assets in her will, or with full
knowledge of the scope of its content. This is the only explanation for the fact that she has left
all the property of her property to her nephews, with whom she had been in litigation, with the
preterition of her brothers, especially the opposition Faustina Baron, with whom she had lived
for 40 years.”
Issue:
Whether or not the Silvestra was mentally incapacitated upon the execution of the will
Ruling:
Yes. An instrument purporting to be a will executed and witnessed in accordance with the
formalities required by the statute is entitled to the presumption of regularity. But the burden of
the evidence passed to the proponent when the oppositors submit credible evidence tending to
show that the supposed testator did not possess testamentary capacity at the time or that the
document was not the free and voluntary expression of the alleged testator or that the will, for any
other reason, is void in law.
In the present case, standing at her bedside was the attorney with three witnesses and the chief
beneficiary, VivencioCuyugan, and yet so far as this record shows, not a word was exchanged
between any of them and the suffering old woman. We don't know what drug the doctor
administered but it is clear to us from the evidence that in her dazed physical and mental condition
she had no adequate understanding of what she was doing at that time. She could not even sign
her name to the original will properly or correctly, and when this defect was noted by one of the
astute subscribing witnesses, he suggested that they have her sign another copy which was done.
The evidence shows that the same morning when Silvestra Baron signed the alleged will she
suffered a physical collapse of such a serious nature that a physician and a nurse were immediately
called in. By reason of her advanced age and the gravity of her illness, she was unable to do
anything for herself.
Silvestra’s grandniece, EpifaniaSampang, who reached the house about one hour or so after the
old lady's collapse, telephoned a message to VivencioCuyugan at San Fernando, some fourteen
kilometers distant, that Silvestra had an attack and was in a serious condition and requested that
a doctor be sent immediately (Doctor Teopaco and a nurse arrived at about ten o'clock and treated
the patient with a plaster on her back and ice packs over her heart and the doctor gave her a
hypodermic injection in the arm).
As the doctor and the nurse were leaving, VivencioCuyugan, with an attorney and three witnesses,
entered the house prepared to obtain the will of Silvestra Baron. Neither the doctor nor the nurse
were presented as witnesses by the proponent. EpifaniaSampang, admittedly an intelligent young
woman, who was the first to reach Silvestra Baron and remained throughout the morning attended
to her, testified that when she reached the house she found her grandaunt lying in bed, very pale
and unconscious; that she called to her but she did not answer and only groaned; that her mouth
was twisted and her lower lip swollen. She went out to call a doctor but all the doctors in
Magalangwere out whereupon she telephoned as stated to San Fernando for a doctor.
Furthermore, the subscribing witnesses stated that it was their belief that Silvestra understood
the alleged will which she signed, but all of them admitted that although they were in her house
about two hours not one of them exchanged a single word of conversation with Silvestra.
Also, there is no evidence that Silvestra Baron took any active part in the preparation of the alleged
will except that when she was asked if she wished to include her sister Faustina in the will she said
"Yes" in Pampanga. There is no affirmative evidence that she understood the document when it
was read to her.She never saw the alleged will at any time again prior to her death which occurred
forty-four days later. It was immediately taken away by an attorney who kept it in his possession
alleging that she had instructed him to keep it secret. There is, however, credible evidence in the
record that before her death she had denied to several persons that she made any will.
Doctrine where testator may revoke such will if done under due influence does not apply
This belief on her part that she had not made any will explains her failure to do any act of
revocation in the forty-four days during which she lingered in this life. The doctrine that where
the testator has had an opportunity to revoke his will subsequent to the operation of an alleged
undue influence upon him but makes no change in it, the courts will consider this fact as weighing
heavily against the testimony of undue influence, has no application to cases in which there has
been an initial lack of testamentary capacity. It has no application, moreover, where from the day
of execution until the death of the testator his mental condition is such that he cannot judge the
propriety of revoking the will. Nor obviously does it apply to a case where the alleged testator
harbors the belief that he had not executed the will in question.
GONZALES VS. GONZALES

G.R. No. L-3272-73, November 29, 1951
Facts:
Manuel Gonzales filed a petition for probate of an alleged will executed by the testatrix Manuela
Ibarra Vda de Gonzales devising to Manuel Gonzales the greater portion of the estate without
impairing the legitimes of the other children. Manolita S de Caruncong also filed a petition for the
probate of another alleged will leaving to Manolita the greater bulk of the estate. Alejandro
Gonzales Jr. sought the disallowance of the wills executed on the ground that they had been
revoked by the testatrix. Manolita, like Manuel contends that the testatrix lacked testamentary
capacity when she allegedly executed the instrument of revocation which was sustained by the
trial court that testatrix had allegedly suffered from hypertension and cerebral thrombosis when
the alleged instrument of revocation was executed by her. When the alleged instrument of
revocation was executed by her, the testatrix was in a comatose and unconscious state and could
not talk or understand.
Issue:
Whether the testatrix had sufficient testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the
alleged instrument of revocation?
Ruling:
No. The oppositors did not establish sufficient proof to contradict the attending physician’s
testimony.
Article 800 of the Civil Code provides that the law presumes that every person is of sound mind,
in the absence of proof to the contrary. The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound
mind at the time off making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will,
but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the
person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid
interval.
In this case, it involves a family physician who attended the testatrix during her last illness and
saw her on the day when the alleged instrument of revocation was executed. Dr. Leveriza’s
testimony remains uncontradicted. The fact that the testimony of the attesting witness tends to
imply that the testatrix was of sound mind at the time the alleged instrument of revocation as
executed, cannot prevail over the findings of the attending physician that her case appeared to be
serious. That he had a hunch that they were taking advantage of the last moment of the deceased
and they were trying to make an instrument in the accomplishment of their aims, and that he has
the idea that the testatrix was in doubtful condition because he could only judge from the people
going there.
Therefore, the opinion of an expert witness was given more credence that of the testimony of the
attesting witness and thus the latter did not establish the burden of proof required to prove that
the testator was not of sound mind.
Article 801
Cases:
ORTEGA V. VALMONTE
G.R. No. 157451, December 16, 2005
Janica G. Puno
Facts:
Placido Valmonte toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached
retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house
and lot, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte.
Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80, he wed Josefina Valmonte
who was then 28 years old on February 5, 1982. But in a little more than two years, Placido died
on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down as Cor Pulmonale.
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2)
pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains
the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the end
or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental
witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again
on the left hand margin.
The allowance to probate was opposed by petitioner Leticia Valmonte Ortega on the following
grounds:
1. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially those found in the USA;
2. Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and residences of the heirs of the testator; or to
give them proper notice pursuant to law;
3. Will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal solemnities and formalities
were not complied with;
4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the alleged execution he being
in an advance sate of senility;
5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats;
6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence and pressure on the part of the
petitioner and/or her agents and/or assistants; and/or
7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that the
instrument should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto;
According to Josefina, after her marriage with the testator, they lived in her parents’ house in La
Union but they came to Manila every month to get his $366 monthly pension and stayed at the said
Makati residence. There were times though that the testator would travel alone. And it was in one
of his travels by his lonesome self when the notarial will was made. The will was witnessed by the
spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez, who were their wedding sponsors, and by Josie Collado.
Josefina said she had no knowledge of the existence of the last will and testament of her husband,
but just serendipitously found it in his attache case after his death. It was only then that she learned
that the testator bequeathed to her his properties and she was named the executrix in the said
will. Josefina declared too that the testator never suffered mental infirmity. Josefina also asserts
that her husband was in good health and that he was hospitalized only because of a cold but which
eventually resulted in his death.
Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, who notarized the testator’s will, testified that it was in the first
week of June 1983 when the testator together with the three witnesses of the will went to his
house cum law office and requested him to prepare his last will and testament. After the testator
instructed him on the terms and dispositions, the notary public told them to come back on June
15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it. The testator and his witnesses returned on the said date
but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come back on August
9, 1983, and which they did. He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was signed
by the testator and his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had
he not gone out of town, the formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he
no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like the document to
appear dirty. The notary public also testified that to his observation the testator was physically
and mentally capable at the time he affixed his signature on the will.
Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside from her, there are other
children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the
mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will, the
testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind.
The RTC disallowed the probate and held that the mental incapacity of the testator at the time of
the execution of the will is questionable as he was then in an advanced state of senility. The CA
admitted the will of Placido to probate. It upheld the credibility of the notary public and the
subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. It added that his
"sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways" did not make him a person of
unsound mind.
Issue:
Whether or not Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the will
Ruling:
Yes. It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of
a will. That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that
he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and
disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken "the cudgels of taking
care of [the testator] in his twilight years."
Moreover, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document,
"because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged
on the same occasion."
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of
property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper
objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have
stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There
being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with
it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or
idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has
been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will
not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid
will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about
to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing
mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or
otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person
shall actually be insane or of unsound mind.
BALTAZAR VS. LAXA

G.R. No. 174489, April 11, 2012
Facts:
Paciencia Regala was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled
"Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala" in the Pampango dialect on September 13,
1981.
The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice.
After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document
is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document
on page 38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Judge Limpin’s daughter), Francisco
Garcia and Faustino Mercado who attested to the Will’s due execution by affixing their signatures
in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to
respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laxa and their children Luna Lorella and Katherine
Ross.
Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son. Lorenzo treated Paciencia as his
own mother. Paciencia lived with Lorenzo’s family in Pampanga and it was she who raised and
cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981), Paciencia
left for the USA. There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on January 4, 1996.
In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
More than four years after the death of Paciencia (Apr 27, 2000), Lorenzo filed a petition with the
RTC for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his
favor.
The RTC allowed Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22, 2000. Dra. Limpin testified that she was
a witness in the execution of the Will and identified the Will and her signatures on all its four pages
as well as her father’s.
Questioned by the prosecutor regarding Judge Limpin’s present mental fitness, Dra. Limpin
testified that her father had a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. The judge can walk
but can no longer talk and remember her name. Because of this, Dra. Limpin stated that her father
can no longer testify in court.
On June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition, contending
that that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his
predecessor-in-interest.
On July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners Sebastian Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita
Pacheco, Felix Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio Mangalindan filed a
Supplemental Opposition contending that Paciencia’s Will was null and void because ownership
of the properties had not been titled to Paciencia before her death pursuant to Article 1049.
Petitioners also opposed the Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo
was disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the USA.
Antonio, et. al. filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will
on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the
requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its
execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that
the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by
Lorenzo for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the
signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not
intend the document to be her Will.
They also opposed the appointment of Lorenzo as administrator and requested for the
appointment of Antonio instead.
The RTC denied the requests of both parties to be appointed administrator since Lorenzo is a
citizen and resident of the USA while the Antonio’s claim as a co-owner of the properties has not
yet been established.
Respondents’ contentions:
Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued. Dra. Limpin was
recalled for cross-examination by the petitioners.
Lorenzo testified that Pacienca did not suffer from any mental disorder and was of sound mind,
was not blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in the custody of Judge Limpin and was only given to him
after Paciencia’s death through Faustino. Lorenzo denied having used force, intimidation, violence,
coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the Philippines when the
same was executed.
Petitioners’ contention:
Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins. She claimed to have helped in the
household chores in the house of Paciencia. She testified that Paciencia was referred to as
"magulyan" or "forgetful" because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start
looking for it moments later, based on her personal assessment.
Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt. He alleged that when the documents were shown to
him, the same were still unsigned and that Paciencia thought that the documents pertained to a
lease of one of her rice lands. Upon hearing this, Paciencia allegedly uttered the following words:
"Why will I never [return], why will I sell all my properties?" Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only [son]
of God? I have other relatives [who should] benefit from my properties. Why should I die already?"
Thereafter, Antonio advised Paciencia not to sign the documents if she does not want to, to which
the latter purportedly replied, "I know nothing about those, throw them away or it is up to you.
The more I will not sign them." After which, Paciencia left the documents with Antonio. Antonio
kept the unsigned documents
The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time
Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to
have testamentary capacity.
The CA reversed the decision holding that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the
Will. It ratiocinated that "the state of being ‘magulyan’ does not make a person mentally unsound
so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will."
Petitioners claimed in their MR filed with the CA that Paciencia was not only "magulyan" but was
actually suffering from paranoia.
Issue:
Whether or not the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently established
to warrant its allowance for probate
Ruling:
Yes. Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the face of the Will.
Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will in probate
proceedings.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law (Arts. 805-
806)
Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities
laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the
notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly
states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in
the presence of one another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the
presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature
of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question her state of mind when she signed
the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid
down by law. The signatures of Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are
all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical
requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence of
one another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will
lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a
person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not
equivalent to being of unsound mind.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no
substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind
at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra.
Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge
Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a
Will concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful
and intelligent." More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the
execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor (Art. 800).
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less
before the making of the Will.
An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or testatrix to
execute the document that will distribute his/her earthly possessions upon his/her death.
We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as her
own son and that love even extended to Lorenzo’s wife and children. This kind of relationship is
not unusual.
FORM:
Common Requirements
Article 804
Cases:
TESTATE OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE,
PETITIONR, VS. ALIPIO ABAJA AND NOEL ABELLAR, RESPONDENTS
G.R. No. 147145, January 31, 2005
Facts:
Alipio Abada (Abada) died sometime in May 1940. His widow Paula Toray (Toray) died sometime
in September 1943. Both died without legitimate children.
Alipio C. Abaja (Alipio), the son of Eulogio Abaja, filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of Abada, dated June 4, 1932,
written in Spanish. The testamentary heirs in the said will are natural children of Abada Eulogio
Abaja ("Eulogio") and Rosario Cordova.
Nicanor Caponong, niece of Abada, opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left no will when
he died in 1940 and that the will of Abada for probate does not indicate that it is written in a
language or dialect known to the testator and that the will is not acknowledged before a notary
public, citing Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code being violated. Nicanor points out that
nowhere in the will can one discern that Abada knew the Spanish language. He alleges that such
defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance of the will.
The RTC rendered a Resolution dated 22 June 1994, that there having been sufficient notice to the
heirs as required by law; that there is substantial compliance with the formalities of a Will as the
law directs and that the petitioner through his testimony and the deposition of Felix Gallinero was
able to establish the regularity of the execution of the said Will and further, there being no evidence
of bad faith and fraud, or substitution of the said Will, the Last Will and Testament of Alipio Abada
dated June 4, 1932 is admitted and allowed probate.
Issue:
Whether or not the Article 804 and 805 of the New Civil Code will apply to probate the last will of
Abada
Ruling:
No.
The law provides that the validity of the will depends on the law enforced at the time it was
executed.
Article 804 of the New Civil Code is taken from Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, provides that “No will, except as
provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or
affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator and signed by
him, or by the testator’s name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of each other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the
left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other
person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the
latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
each other.
There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or
dialect used in the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde. Caponong-
Noble further argues that Alipio, in his testimony, has failed, among others, to show that Abada
knew or understood the contents of the will and the Spanish language used in the will. However,
Alipio testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these
gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish language. Hence, it sufficiently
proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language.
In this case, the will was executed on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are the Civil Code
of 1889 or the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure which governed the
execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code. Hence, the Civil Code of 1889 shall
be applied to probate the will of Abada.
LOPEZ VS. LIBORO

G.R. No. L-1787, August 27, 1948
Facts:
In CFI-Batangas the appellant Agustin Liboro unsuccessfully opposed the probate of what purports
to be the last will and testament (Exhibit A) of Don Sixto Lopez, who died at the age of 83 in
Balayan, Batangas, on March 3, 1947, almost six months after the document in question was
executed.
Liboro, among other objections, impugns the will for its silence on the testator's understanding of
the language used (Spanish) in the testament.
Issue:
Whether or not the will is invalid absent the stipulation that the testator understood the language
used therein
Ruling:
No.
There is no statutory requirement that such knowledge be expressly stated in the will itself. It is a
matter that may be established by proof aliunde. This Court so impliedly ruled in Gonzales vs.
Laurel, 46 Phil., 781, in which the probate of a will written in Tagalog was ordered although it did
not say that the testator knew that idiom. In fact, there was not even extraneous proof on the
subject other than the fact that the testator resided in a Tagalog region, from which the court said
"a presumption arises that said Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect.
IN RE WILL OF ANA ABANGAN. GERTRUDIS ABANGAN VS. ANASTACIA ABANGAN

G.R. No. L-13431, November 12, 1919
Karol Vincent Cajes
Facts:
On September 19, 1917, the CFI-CEBU admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916.
From this decision the opponent's appealed. Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will,
consists of two sheets, the first of which contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed
at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by
three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom
by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the
testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these omissions, according to
appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied.
Issue:
Is it required that both pages are signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses?
Ruling:
No. In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed
on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether
any sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on
one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet,
although unnumbered, cannot be hidden. In requiring this signature on the margin, the statute
took into consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will written on several sheets and must have
referred to the sheets which the testator and the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom. A
different interpretation would assume that the statute requires that this sheet, already signed at
the bottom, be signed twice.
The Court cannot attribute to the statute such an intention. As these signatures must be written by
the testator and the witnesses in the presence of each other, it appears that, if the signatures at the
bottom of the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another signature on its left margin would be
unnecessary; and if they do not guaranty, same signatures, affixed on another part of same sheet,
would add nothing.
The Court cannot assume that the statute regards of such importance the place where the testator
and the witnesses must sign on the sheet that it would consider that their signatures written on
the bottom do not guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if repeated on the margin, give
sufficient security.
In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and
is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the
attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that
both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
ACOP VS. PIRASO

G.R. No. L-28946, 16 January 1929
Rea Lyza C. Corbit
Facts:
Piraso’s last will and testament was written in the English language. The records show that Piraso
lived in the City of Baguio and knew no other language than the Igorrote dialect, with a smattering
of Ilocano.
Issue:
Is Piraso’s will valid?
Ruling:
No, Piraso’s will is not valid.
The applicable law at the time was Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure which strictly
provides, in part, that no will shall be valid unless it be written in the language or dialect known
by the testator.
There was positive proof that Piraso only knew the Igorrote dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano.
In other words, he did not know the English language in which his last will and testament is
written.
The presumption in Abangan vs. Abangan, to the effect that the testator is presumed to know the
dialect of the locality where he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary, does not also find
application. It was not proven that English is the language of the City of Baguio where Piraso lived.
Even if such a presumption could have been raised in this case it would have been wholly
contradicted and destroyed.
TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIA ZUÑIGA VDA. DE PANDO, deceased. JUAN REYES, petitioner-
administrator-appellant, vs. DOLORES ZUÑIGA VDA. DE VIDAL, oppositor-appellee.
91 Phil., 126; G.R. No. L-2862, April 21, 1952
Facts:
This concerns the admission to probate of a document claimed to be the last will and testament of
Maria Zuñiga Vda. de Pando who died in the City of Manila on October 29, 1945. On November 6,
1945, a petition for the probate of said will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. On
December 21, 1945, Dolores Zuñiga Vda. de Vidal, sister of the deceased, filed an opposition based
on several grounds.
And, after several days of trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court
rendered its decision disallowing the will on the ground that the signatures of the deceased
appearing therein are not genuine, that it was not proven that the deceased knew the Spanish
language in which it was written, and that even if the signatures are genuine, the same reveal that
the deceased was not of sound mind when she signed the will. From this decision Juan Reyes
appealed to this Court.
Issue:
Is there enough evidence to show that the testatrix knew the language in which the will was
written?
Ruling:
Yes. It appearing that there is enough evidence on record which shows that the testatrix knew the
language in which the will was written.
Article 804 of the New Civil Code provides that, every will must be in writing and executed in a
language or dialect known to the testator.
There is indeed nothing in the testimony of the witnesses presented by the petitioner which would
indicate that the testatrix knew and spoke the Spanish language used in the preparation of the will
in question. But this failure alone does not in itself suffice to conclude that this important
requirement of the law has not been complied with, it appearing that there is enough evidence on
record which supplies this technical omission.
In the first place, we have the undisputed fact that the deceased was a mestiza española, was
married to a Spaniard, Recaredo Pando, and made several trips to Spain. In the second place, we
have the very letters submitted as evidence by the oppositor written in Spanish by the deceased
possessed the Spanish language, oppositor cannot now be allowed to allege the contrary. These
facts give rise to the presumption that the testatrix knew the language in which the testament has
been written, which presumption should stand unless the contrary is proven (Abangan vs.
Abangan, 40 Phil., 476; Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil. 750). And this presumption has not been
overcome.
And finally, we have the very attestation clause of the will which states that the testatrix knew and
possessed the Spanish language. It is true that this matter is not required to be stated in the
attestation clause, but its inclusion can only mean that the instrumental witnesses wanted to make
it of record that the deceased knew the language in which the will was written.
TESTATE ESTATE OF JAVELLANA VS. JAVELLANA

G.R. No. L-13781, January 30, 1960
Facts:
A petition to probate the alleged last will and testament of Jose J. Javellana by Crsiteta Jimenea Vda.
de Javellana and Benjamin Javellana (petitioner).
Jose Javellana y Azaola and Jose Javellana, Jr. (oppositor) filed separate oppositions, both claiming
that the alleged will of Jose J. Javellana deposited by petitioners with the clerk of court was null
and void, the same not having been executed "in accordance with the formalities required by law"
and that "the legal requirements necessary for its validity" had not been complied with.
Specifically, the requirement that the will must be in the language or dialect know to the testator.
Petitioner insist that the burden is on the oppositors to allege and prove that the testator did not
know the Spanish language in the face of the legal presumption that "the law has been obeyed.”
Issue:
Whether or not there is a presumption that the language use in the will is known to the testator
Ruling:
No, there is no presumption that the language use in the will is known to the testator. It must be
proven by evidence aliunde.
The Supreme court held that there was no indication in the body of the will itself or in its
attestation clause that the testator knew Spanish, the language in which it is written. It is true that
there is no statutory provision requiring this and that proof thereof may be established by
evidence aliunde. But here, there is absolutely no such evidence presented.
On the contrary, there is evidence that the testator is a Visayan although residing in San Juan, Rizal
at the time of his death. The will was executed in the City of Manila. There is no evidence, that
Spaniards is the language currently used either in San Juan, Rizal, or Manila. It follows that no
presumption can rise that the testator knew the Spanish Language.
If the argument of counsel that there is a legal presumption that the language is known to the
testator, then every unopposed will may be probated upon its mere presentation in court, without
need of producing evidence regarding its execution.
SUROZA VS. HONRADO

A.M. No. 2026-CFI, December 19, 1981(110 SCRA 388)
Facts:
Mauro Suroza married Marcelina Salvador in 1923, they were childless. They reared a boy named
Agapito who used the surname Suroza and who considered them as his parents as shown in his
1945 marriage contract with Nenita de Vera. Mauro died in 1942. Marcelina, as a veteran’s widow,
became a pensioner of the Federal Government.
Agapito and Nenita begot a child. Agapito also became a soldier. He was disabled and his wife
Nenita was appointed as his guardian in 1953 when he was declared an incompetent. However, a
woman named Arsenia de la Cruz wanted also to be his guardian in another proceeding. Arsenia
tried to prove that Nenita was living separately from Agapito and that she (Nenita) admitted to
Marcelina that she was unfaithful to Agapito. Judge Bienvenido A. Tan dismissed the second
guardianship proceeding and confirmed Nenita’s appointment as guardian of Agapito.
On a date not indicated in the record, the spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child
named Marilyn Sy, who, when a few days old, was entrusted to Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a
girl friend of Agapito) and who was later delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought her
up as a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter. Marilyn used the surname Suroza.
She stayed with Marcelina but was not legally adopted by Agapito. She married Oscar Medrano.
Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on July 23, 1973, when she was 73 years
old. That will, which is in English, was thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. Her letters in
English to the Veterans Administration were also thumbmarked by her. In that will, Marcelina
bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.
Marcelina died on November 15, 1974. At the time of her death, she was a resident of Makati, Rizal.
She owned a 150-square meter lot and house in that place.
On January 13, 1975, Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundry woman of Marcelina and the executrix
in her will (the alternate executrix was Juanita Macaraeg, mother of Oscar, Marilyn’s husband),
filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, a petition for the probate of Marcelina’s alleged
will. The case was assigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado.
In an order dated March 31, 1975, Judge Honrado appointed Marina as administratrix. On the
following day, April 1, Judge Honrado issued two orders directing the Merchants Banking
Corporation and the Bank of America to allow Marina to withdraw the sum of P10,000 from the
savings accounts of Marcelina S. Suroza and Marilyn Suroza and requiring Corazon Castro, the
custodian of the passbooks, to deliver them to Marina.
Upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado issued another order dated April 11, 1975, instructing a
deputy sheriff to eject the occupants of the testatrix’s house, among whom was Nenita V. Suroza,
and to place Marina in possession thereof.
That order alerted Nenita to the existence of the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of
Marcelina’s estate. They alleged that the decedent’s son Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased,
that he has a daughter named Lilia, that Nenita was Agapito’s guardian and that Marilyn was not
Agapito’s daughter nor the decedent’s granddaughter. Later, they questioned the probate court’s
jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order.
Judge Honrado in his order dated December 22, 1977, after noting that the executrix had delivered
the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax had been paid, closed the testamentary proceeding.
About ten months later, Nenita charged Judge Honrado with having probated the fraudulent will
of Marcelina. The complainant reiterated her contention that the testatrix was illiterate as shown
by the fact that she affixed her thumbmark to the will and that she did not know English, the
language in which the will was written.
Issue:
Whether or not the will is on its face void because it is written in English, a language not known to
the illiterate testatrix
Ruling:
Yes. We hold that disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper
disposition of the testate case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the
decedent’s legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in the void will should have inherited the
decedent’s estate.
A judge may be criminally liable or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order
or rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or interlocutory order by reason of inexcusable
negligence or ignorance (Arts. 204 to 206, Revised Penal Code).
In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and
was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is
void.
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language “understood and
known” to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the
testatrix “and translated into Filipino language”. (p. 16, Record of testate case). That could only
mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it
is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be
executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English, which was
not known to the Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed (Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil. 660).
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment
where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the “testator” instead of “testatrix.”
NOTARIAL WILLS
Articles 805-806
Cases:
ABANGAN VS. ABANGAN

G.R. No. L-13431, November 12, 1919
Facts:
The document duly probated as Ana Abangan’s will, consists of two (2) sheets, the first of which
contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in
the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. Neither of these sheets
is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters, and
these omissions, according to Anastacia Abangan’s, these are defects whereby the probate of the
will should have been denied.
Issue:
Is the signatures of the testatrix and of the three witnesses on the margin and the numbering of
pages of the sheet are formalities required by the statute?
Ruling:
No. It is not required by the statute.
In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and
is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the
attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that
both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses or be paged.
Moreover, referring specially to the signature of the testatrix, the same is not necessary in the
attestation clause because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the
testator since the latter does not attest, but executes the will.
In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by the
testator and the three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 the law applicable in
this case evidently has for its object to avoid the substitution of any of the said sheets, thereby
changing the testator’s dispositions. But these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet
signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses, the signatures on the left margin of said
sheet would be completely purposeless. As these signatures must be written by the testator and
the witnesses in the presence of each other, it appears that, if the signatures at the bottom of the
sheet guarantees its authenticity, if it does not guaranty, same signatures, affixed on another part
of the same sheet, would add nothing.
ICASIANO V. ICASIANO
G.R. No. L-18979, June 30, 1964
Janica G. Puno
Facts:
This special proceeding was begun by a petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the
original, Exhibit A as the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte and for the appointment of petitioner Celso
Icasiano as executor thereof.
On October 31, 1958, Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the testatrix, filed her opposition; and on
November 10, 1958, she petitioned to have herself appointed as a special administrator, to which
proponent objected. Hence, on November 18, 1958, the court issued an order appointing the
Philippine Trust Company as special administrator. On February 18, 1959, Enrique Icasiano, a son
of the testatrix, also filed a manifestation adopting as his own Natividad's opposition to the probate
of the alleged will. Celso alleged that the decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal
requirements, and that he was, on that date, submitting the signed duplicate.
The court issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate to probate. From this order, the
Natividad and Enrique appealed directly to this Court.
For Petitioner (Celso Icasiano)

The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa Villacorte died in Manila City
on September 12, 1958; that on June 2, 1956, the Josefa executed a last will and testament in
duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa Icasiano published before and attested by three
instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio
B. Diy; that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said three instrumental
witnesses on the same date before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in and for the City of
Manila; that the will was actually prepared by Atty. Fermin Samson, who was also present during
the execution and signing of the decedent's last will and testament, together with former Gov.
Emilio Rustia of Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano and a little girl.
The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously with the
filing of the petition and marked as Exhibit A consists of five pages, and while signed at the end
and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V.
Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the is signed by the
testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.
The original of the will and its duplicate were subscribed at the end and on the left margin of each
and every page thereof by the testatrix herself and attested and subscribed by the three mentioned
witnesses in the testatrix's presence and in that of one another as witnesses (except for the missing
signature of attorney Natividad on page three (3) of the original); both the original and the
duplicate copies were duly acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Oyengco of Manila on the
same date June 2, 1956.
Atty. Jose V. Natividad (Witness) testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original, admits
that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page
three (3) was signed in his presence.
For Oppositors
Natividad and Enrique aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed
through mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into
adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the
provisions of the will – whereby proponents-appellees stand to profit from properties held by
them as attorneys-in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while
oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not mentioned in the will, and
not to oppose the probate of it, on penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.
Issue:
Whether or not Josefa Villacorte’s will satisfied the requirements for it to be valid
Ruling:
Yes. We have examined the record and are satisfied, as the trial court was, that the testatrix signed
both original and duplicate copies of the will spontaneously, on the same in the presence of the
three attesting witnesses, the notary public who acknowledged the will; and Atty. Samson, who
actually prepared the documents; that the will and its duplicate were executed in Tagalog, a
language known to and spoken by both the testator and the witnesses, and read to and by the
testatrix and Atty. Fermin Samson, together before they were actually signed; that the attestation
clause is also in a language known to and spoken by the testatrix and the witnesses.
The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the
simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial
of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix
and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint
of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three
witnesses.
The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of
the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of
the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained,
no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full
observance of the statutory requisites.
That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is
shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete
set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before
the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time. This would
not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory
requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied.
The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the
duplicate (Exh. A-1) is not entitled to probate. If the original is defective and invalid, then in law
there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate (Exh. A-1), and the same is probatable.
At any rate, said duplicate, Exhibit A-1, serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the
third page of the original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.
CALDE VS. CA
G.R. No. 93980, June 27, 1994
Facts:
On March 20, 1976, Decedent (Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang) left behind nine thousand pesos
(P9,000.00) worth of property. She also left a Last Will and Testament, dated October 30, 1972,
and a Codicil thereto, dated July 24, 1973. Both documents contained the thumbmarks of decedent.
They were also signed by three (3) attesting witnesses each, and acknowledged before Tomas A.
Tolete, then the Municipal Judge and Notary Public Ex-Officio of Bauko, Mt. Province.
Nicasio Calde, the executor named in the will, filed a Petition for its allowance before the RTC of
Bontoc, Mt. Province.
Calde died during the pendency of the proceedings, and was duly substituted by petitioner,
Clemente Calde. Private respondents, relatives of decedent, opposed the Petitioner filed by Calde,
on the following grounds: that the will and codicil were written in Ilocano, a dialect that decedent
did not know; that decedent was mentally incapacitated to execute the two documents because of
her advanced age, illness and deafness; that decedent’s thumbmarks were procured through fraud
and undue influence; and that the codicil was not executed in accordance with law.
On June 23, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment on the case, approving and allowing
decedent’s will and its codicil. The decision was appealed to and reversed by the respondent Court
of Appeals. It held:
The will and codicil could pass the safeguards under Article 805 of the New Civil Code but for
one crucial factor of discrepancy in the color of ink when the instrumental witnesses affixed
their respective signatures.
Two (2) of the six (6) witnesses testified that only one ballpen was used in signing the two
testamentary documents and were subscribed and attested by the instrumental witnesses during
a single occasion. However, on the face of the document, the signatures of some of the attesting
witnesses in the decedent’s will and its codicil were written in blue ink while the others were in
black.
In addition, Judge Tomas A. Tolete testified in narration as to how the documents in question were
subscribed and attested, starting from decedent’s thumb-marking thereof, to the alleged signing
of the instrumental witnesses thereto in consecutive order.
Issue:
Whether or not the decedent’s Last Will and Testament was subscribed by the instrumental
witnesses on separate occasions
Ruling:
Yes.
A review of the facts and circumstances upon which respondent Court of Appeals based its
impugned finding, however, fails to convince us that the testamentary documents in question were
subscribed and attested by the instrumental witnesses during a single occasion.
As sharply noted by respondent appellate court, the signatures of some attesting witnesses in
decedent’s will and its codicil were written in blue ink, while the others were in black. This
discrepancy was not explained by petitioner. Nobody of his six (6) witnesses testified that two
pens were used by the signatories on the two documents. In fact, two (2) of petitioner’s witnesses
even testified that only one (1) ballpen was used in signing the two testamentary documents.
In the case at bench, the autoptic proference contradicts the testimonial evidence produced by
petitioner. The will and its codicil, upon inspection by the respondent court, show in black and
white — or more accurately, in black and blue — that more than one pen was used by the
signatories thereto. Thus, it was not erroneous nor baseless for respondent court to disbelieve
petitioner’s claim that both testamentary documents in question were subscribed to in accordance
with the provisions of Art. 805 of the Civil Code.
Neither did respondent court err when it did not accord great weight to the testimony of Judge
Tomas A. Tolete. It is true that his testimony contains a narration of how the two testamentary
documents were subscribed and attested to, starting from decedent’s thumbmarking thereof, to
the alleged signing of the instrumental witnesses thereto in consecutive order. Nonetheless,
nowhere in Judge Tolete’s testimony is there any kind of explanation for the different-colored
signatures on the testaments.
PEDRO BARUT VS. FAUSTINO CAGACUNGAN, ET AL
G.R. No. L-6285, February 15, 1912
Facts:
The petitioner, Pedro Barut, filed a petition to probate the last will and testament of Maria
Salomon, deceased, who died on November 7, 1908. The last will and testament is dated March 2,
1907. The original will appears on page 3 of the record and is in the Ilocano dialect. Its translation
into Spanish appears at page 11. Severo Agayan, Timotea Inoselda, Catalino Ragasa, and A. M.
Jimenez are alleged to have been witnesses to the execution thereof. By the terms of said will Pedro
Barut received the larger part of decedent's property.
After disposing of her property the testatrix revoked all former wills by her made. She also stated
in said will that being unable to read or write, the same had been read to her by Ciriaco Concepcion
and Timotea Inoselda and that she had instructed Severo Agayan to sign her name to it as testatrix.
The probate of the will was contested and opposed by a number of the relatives on the ground that
the handwriting of the person who it is alleged signed the name of the testatrix to the will for and
on her behalf looked more like the handwriting of one of the other witnesses to the will than that
of the person whose handwriting it was alleged to be.
The court seems , by inference at least, to have had in mind that under the law relating to the
execution of a will it is necessary that the person who signs the name of the testatrix must
afterwards sign his own name; and that, in view of the fact that, in the case at bar, the name signed
below that of the testatrix as the person who signed her name, being, from its appearance, not the
same handwriting as that constituting the name of the testatrix, the will is accordingly invalid, such
fact indicating that the person who signed the name of the testatrix failed to sign his own.
Issue:
Whether or not a will is invalid on the ground that the person who signed in behalf of the testatrix
failed to sign his own name
Ruling:
No.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure is entirely clear that, with respect to the validity of the
will. It is unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or
not. The important thing is that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her
express direction in the presence of three witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her
presence and in the presence of each other. That is all the statute requires. It may be wise as a
practical matter that the one who signs the testator's name signs also his own; but that it is not
essential to the validity of the will. Whether one person or another signed the name of the testatrix
in this case is absolutely unimportant so far as the validity of her will is concerned. The plain
wording of the statute shows that the requirement laid down by the trial court, if it did lay down,
is absolutely unnecessary under the law; and the reasons underlying the provisions of the statute
relating to the execution of wills do not in any sense require such a provision.
From the standpoint of language it is an impossibility to draw from the words of the law the
inference that the persons who signs the name of the testator must sign his own name also. The
law requires only three witnesses to a will, not four. Nor is such requirement found in any other
branch of the law. The name of a person who is unable to write may be signed by another by
express direction to any instrument known to the law. There is no necessity whatever, so far as
the validity of the instrument is concerned, for the person who writes the name of the principal in
the document to sign his own name also. As a matter of policy it may be wise that he do so in as
much as it would give such intimation as would enable a person proving the document to
demonstrate more readily the execution by the principal. But as a matter of essential validity of
the document, it is unnecessary. The main thing to be established in the execution of the will is the
signature of the testator. If that signature is proved, whether it be written by himself or by another
at his request, it is none the less valid, and the fact of such signature can be proved as perfectly and
as completely when the person signing for the principal omits to sign his own name as it can when
he actually signs.
In this case, the dissimilarity in writing thus mentioned by the court is sufficient to overcome the
uncontradicted testimony of all the witnesses to the will that the signature of the testatrix was
written by Severo Agayan at her request and in her presence and in the presence of all the
witnesses to the will. It is immaterial who writes the name of the testatrix provided it is written at
her request and in her presence and in the presence of all the witnesses to the execution of the
will.
To hold a will invalid for the lack of the signature of the person signing the name of the principal
is a complete abrogation of the law of wills, as it rejects and destroys a will which the statute
expressly declares is valid.
IN RE WILL OF TAN DUICO, DECEASED. MAMERTA BASE

G.R. No. L-20475, March 19, 1924
Facts:
On March 3, 1921, Mamerta Base instituted a petition for the probate of the will of Chinaman Tan
Diuco in the Court of First Instance of Leyte. However, the court denied the probate of the will on
November 2, 1922, on the ground that it was not signed by three instrumental witnesses beside
the signature of the testator and before the attestation clause. Hence, this proceeding.
The will appears to have been signed by Simplicio Sala by order of testator Tan Duico, whose name
is before the said signature, by reason of the latter's incapacity due to his weakness and trembling
hands, Tan Duico directed Simplicio Sala to sign it in his name and in the presence of three
witnesses who also signed with him at the bottom of said document, and on the left margin of each
of its three pages correlatively numbered in letters. After the signature of the testator, Tan Diuco
by Simplicio Sala, the following paragraph appears:
We, the undersigned witnesses to the forgoing will, do hereby state that the testator signed this
will and each of its sheets in the presence of all and each of us, and we and each of us likewise
did sign this will and all of its sheets in the presence of the testator and each of us, witnesses.
"TAN DIUCO
By "SIMPLICIO SALA
"LADISLAO FENOMENO
"PABLO MATURAN
"ENRIQUE PEÑAREDONDO"
Issues:
1. Whether or not was proper to for the name of the testator (Tan Duico) to be written before
the name of the signer (Simplicio Sala)
2. Whether or not the will is valid despite the failure of the instrumental witnesses to sign in
the attestation clause
Ruling:
1. Yes.
It is well-settled that where the will having been signed by the testator or the person acting in his
stead, or the one directed by him to sign it in his name, in which case the name of the testator is
written before that of the signer in order that said document may have the character of a valid will.
2. Yes.
The instrumental witnesses referred to in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended
by Act No. 2645, being the same witnesses required by said section to attest the will, it is not
necessary that said witnesses should sign beside the signature of the testator and before said
attestation clause.
In dealing with attestation, said section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No.
2645, does not say that said witnesses must be different from those who signed the attestation
clause, for in the first part of said section, after speaking of the signature of the testator or the
person signing in his place, it adds, "and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other," from which it clearly follows that the
same witnesses who signed on the left margin of each page of the document presented by the
testator to them as his will, must be the ones who should sign the attestation clause, inasmuch as
they alone can certify the facts to be stated in said clause, for having taken a direct part therein, as
they saw the testator sign the will, or the person requested by him to sign all the sheets of the will,
that is, the document constituting his last will and testament, and affirm that it was signed under
his express direction in the presence of said witnesses and that all the sheets thereof had also been
signed by them in the presence of said testator and of each of them, as stated in the attestation
clause of the will of the deceased Tan Diuco, with the other details appropriate in said clause.
Instrumental witness, as defined by Escriche is one who takes part in the execution of an
instrument or writing.
Therefore, the decision of the trial court is reversed and the will of Tan Duico is ordered admitted
for probate.
MARIANO LEANO VS. ARCADIO LEANO

G.R. No. 9150, March 31, 1915
Karol Vincent Cajes
Facts:
Cristina Valdes (deceased) placed a cross (+) against her name attached by some other person to
the instrument offered for probate which purports to be her last will and testament, in the
presence of the three witnesses whose names are attached to the attesting clause, and that they
attested and subscribed the instrument in her presence and in the presence of each other.
Issue:
Does placing of the cross opposite her name a sufficient compliance with the requirements of
section 618 of the Code of Civil?
Ruling:
Yes. The placing of the cross opposite her name at the conclusion of the instrument was a sufficient
compliance with the requirements of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which prescribes
that except where wills are signed by some other person than the testator in the manner and form
therein indicated, a valid will must be signed by the testator. The right of a testator to sign his will
by mark, executed animo testandi, has been uniformly sustained by the courts of last resort of the
United States in construing statutory provisions prescribing the mode of execution of wills in
language identical with, or substantially similar to that found in section 618 of our code, which
was taken from Section 2349 of the Code of Vermont.
GARCIA VS. LACUESTA

G.R. No. L-4067, 29 November 1951
Rea Lyza C. Corbit
Facts:
The will of Antero Mercado was dated 3 January 1943 and was written in the Ilocano dialect. The
will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of Mercado,
followed below by "A reugo del testator" or “At the request of the testator” and the name of Atty.
Javier. Mercado is alleged to have written a cross immediately after his name.
The Court of Appeals disallowed the will of Mercado on the ground that the attestation clause
thereof failed to state, among others, that Mercado caused Atty. Javier to write the testator's name
under his express direction.
The herein petitioner argues that there is no need for such recital because the cross written by the
testator after his name is a sufficient signature and the signature of Atty. Javier is a surplusage.
Issue:
Will the failure to state in the attestation clause that the testator expressly directed another to sign
his name make the will fatally defective?
Ruling:
Yes, the failure to state in the attestation clause that the testator expressly directed another to sign
his name will make the will fatally defective.
Moreover, where the cross appearing on a will is not the usual signature of the testator or even
one of the ways by which he signed his name, that cross cannot be considered a valid signature.
IN THE MATTER OF THE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED

ANACLETA ABELLANA. LUCIO BALONAN, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, V. EUSEBIA ABELLANA, ET AL.,
OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS.
109 Phil., 359, G.R. No. L-15153; August 31, 1960
Facts:
It appears on record that the last Will and Testament (Exhibit ‘A’), which is sought to be probated,
is written in the Spanish language and consists of two (2) typewritten pages (pages 4 and 5 of the
record) double space.
The first page is signed by Juan Bello and under his name appears typewritten ‘Por la testadora
Anacleta Abellana, residence Certificate A-1167629, Enero 20, 1951, Ciudad de Zamboanga’, and
on the second page appears the signature of the three (3) instrumental witnesses Blas Sebastian,
Faustino Macaso and Rafael Ignacio, at the bottom of which appears the signature of T. de los
Santos and below his signature is his official designation as the notary public who notarized the
said testament.
On the first page on the left margin of the said instrument also appear the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses. On the second page, which is the last page of the said last Will and
Testament, also appears the signature of the three (3) instrumental witnesses and on that second
page on the left margin appears the signature of Juan Bello under whose name appears
handwritten the following phrase, ‘Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana’. The will is duly
acknowledged before Notary Public, Attorney Timoteo de los Santos."
The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City admitted to probate the will of one Anacleta
Abellana. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Does the signature of Dr. Juan A. Abello above the typewritten statement "Por la Testadora
Anacleta Abellana . . ., Ciudad de Zamboanga," comply with the requirements of the law prescribing
the manner in which a will shall be executed?
Ruling:
No. It is not compliant with the requirements of the law. Petition for probate of will should be
denied.
The present law, Article 805 of the Civil Code, in part provides:
"Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator’s name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another."
The clause "must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator’s name
written by some other person in his presence and by his express direction," is practically the same
as the provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) which reads as
follows:
"No will, except as provided in the preceding section shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the
testator’s name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of
each other. . . ."
In the case at bar the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear written under the
will by said Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Abello. There is, therefore, a failure to comply with the
express requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be
affixed thereto by Some other person in his presence and by his express direction.
Thus, it appearing that the above provision of the law has not been complied with, the will of the
deceased Anacleta Abellana may not be admitted to probate.
ABAYA VS. ZALAMERO

G.R. No. L-3907, March 12, 1908
Facts:
Roman Abaya filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of La Laguna, for the allowance of the
will executed by Juan Zalamero (Juan).
It is shown by the evidence, and by the will itself, that for the reasons set forth by the testator and
at his own request, one of the witnesses to the will, Mariano Zaguirre(Mariano), wrote with his
own hand the name and surname of Juan, the testator, and his presence, and that the latter put a
cross between them and a note stating that what had been written before the name and surname
of the said Juan, with the cross placed at the foot thereof, was his testament and contained his last
will as stated by him when he directed the execution thereof in the presence of the three witnesses
who subscribed it in his presence, and in the presence of each other.
Donata Zalamero opposed the petition, alleging that the will had not been executed and signed in
accordance with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The flaw in the said will was that the witness Mariano, who was requested by the testator to write
his name and surname at the end of his will, did not affix his own signature immediately below the
name and surname of Juan.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of Mariano, who wrote the name and surname of Juan, to sign
immediately below the name and surname of Juan is fatal
Ruling:
No, the failure of Mariano to sign immediately below the name and surname of Juan is not fatal.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or
by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of each other. The attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed the
will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the presence
of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the presence
of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it
is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.
The essential requisites prescribed by the above-mentioned section 618 of the law have been
complied with, namely, that three witnesses were present at the execution of the will of Juan
Zalamero at the date mentioned therein; that they heard his statement that the said instrument,
written and drawn up under his direction, contained his last will; that they saw and witnessed
when, at the express request of the testator, and under his direction, the witness, Mariano Zaguirre,
wrote at the foot of the will the name and surname of Juan Zalamero, and when the latter put the
cross between his written name and surname, each of the witnesses subscribing it at the time and
in the presence of each other.
JABONETA VS. GUSTILO

G.R. No. 1641, January 19, 1906 (5 Phil 541)
Facts:
On the 26th day of December, 1901, Macario Jaboneta executed under the following circumstances
the document in question, which has been presented for probate as his will:
Being in the house of Arcadio Jarandilla, in Jaro, Iloilo, he ordered that the document in question
be written, and calling Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses, executed
the said document as his will. They were all together, and were in the room where Jaboneta was,
and were present when he signed the document, Isabelo Jena signing afterwards as a witness, at
his request, and in his presence and in the presence of the other two witnesses. Aniceto Jalbuena
then signed as a witness in the presence of the testator, and in the presence of the other two
persons who signed as witnesses. At that moment Isabelo Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took his
hat and left the room. As he was leaving the house Julio Javellana took the pen in his hand and put
himself in position to sign the will as a witness, but did not sign in the presence of Isabelo Jena; but
nevertheless, after Jena had left the said room, Julio Javellana signed as a witness in the presence
of the testator and of the witness Aniceto Jalbuena.
Part of the testimony of the said Isabelo Jena:
Q: Who first signed the will?

A: I signed it first, and afterwards Aniceto and the others.
Q: Who were those others to whom you have just referred?

A: After the witness Aniceto signed the will I left the house, because I was in a hurry, and at the
moment when I was leaving I saw Julio Javellana with the pen in his hand in position ready to
sign (enactitud de firmar). I believe he signed, because he was at the table. . . .
Q: State positively whether Julio Javellana did or did not sign as a witness to the will.
A: I can't say certainly, because as I was leaving the house I saw Julio Javellana with the pen in
his hand, in position ready to sign. I believe he signed.
Q: Why do you believe Julio Javellana signed?

A: Because he had the pen in his hand, which was resting on the paper, though I did not actually
see him sign.
Q: Explain this contradictory statement.

A: After I signed I asked permission to leave, because I was in a hurry, and while I was leaving
Julio had already taken the pen in his hand, as it appeared, for the purpose of signing, and when
I was near the door I happened to turn my face and I saw that he had his hand with the pen
resting on the will, moving it as if for the purpose of signing.
Q: State positively whether Julio moved his hand with the pen as if for the purpose of signing,
or whether he was signing
A: I believe he was signing.
The lower court was of the opinion from the evidence adduced at the hearing that Julio Javellana,
one of the witnesses, did not attach his signature thereto in the presence of Isabelo Jena, another
of the witnesses, as required by the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Issue:
Whether or not the will is valid despite the fact that Jena (a witness) did not actually see Javellana
(another witness) sign the will as witness
Ruling:
Yes. The purpose of a statutory requirement that the witness sign in the presence of the testator
is said to be that the testator may have ocular evidence of the identity of the instrument subscribed
by the witness and himself, and the generally accepted tests of presence are vision and mental
apprehension.
In the instant case, the signature of Javellana was not signed in the presence of Jena, in compliance
with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The fact that Jena was still in the
room when he saw Javellana moving his hand and pen in the act of affixing his signature to the will,
taken together with the testimony of the remaining witnesses which shows that Javellana did in
fact there and then sign his name to the will, convinces us that the signature was affixed in the
presence of Jena.
Furthermore, Javellana was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of
the name of the witness was being written, is of no importance. He, with the other witnesses and
the testator, had assembled for the purpose of executing the testament, and were together in the
same room for that purpose, and at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document
he was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Javellana that he could
see everything which took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and without
any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the document
was in fact signed before he finally left the room.
In the matter of Bedell (2 Connoly (N.Y.), 328) it was held that it is sufficient if the witnesses are
together for the purpose of witnessing the execution of the will, and in a position to actually see
the testator write, if they choose to do so; and there are many cases which lay down the rule that
the true test of vision is not whether the testator actually saw the witness sign, but whether he
might have seen him sign, considering his mental and physical condition and position at the time
of the subscription.
The principles on which these cases rest and the tests of presence as between the testator and the
witnesses are equally applicable in determining whether the witnesses signed the instrument in
the presence of each other, as required by the statute, and applying them to the facts proven in
these proceedings we are of opinion that the statutory requisites as to the execution of the
instrument were complied with, and that the lower court erred in denying probate to the will on
the ground stated in the ruling appealed from.
The Supreme Court give weight to the evidence of record that the instrument propounded in these
proceedings was satisfactorily proven to be the last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta,
deceased, and that it should therefore be admitted to probate.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, without especial condemnation of costs, and after
twenty days the record will be returned to the court from whence it came, where the proper orders
will be entered in conformance herewith.
NERA VS. RIMANDO

G.R. No. L-5971, February 27, 1911
Facts:
The subscribing witness was in the small room with the testator and the other subscribing
witnesses at the time when they attached their signatures to the instrument, and this finding, of
course, disposes of the appeal and necessitates the affirmance of the degree admitting the
document to probate as the last will and testament of the deceased. The trial judge does not appear
to have considered the determination of such question, that the alleged fact that one of the
subscribing witnesses was in the other room when the testator and the other describing witnesses
signed the instrument in the other room, would not be sufficient in itself to invalidate the execution
of the will.
Issue:
Whether at the time one of the subscribing witness was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a
large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain made
it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses
in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument?
Ruling:
Yes. It made impossible to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses.
Article 805 provides that every will, other than a holographic will must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator’s name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
In this case, the subscribing witness been proven to have been in the outer room at the time when
the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures to the instrument in the
inner room it would have been invalid as a will, the attaching of those signatures under such
circumstances not being done in the presence of the witness in the outer room. This is because the
line of vision from this witness to the testator and the other subscribing witnesses would
necessarily have been impeded by the curtain separating the inner room from the outer one at the
moment of the inscription of each signature.
Therefore, the position of the testator and of the other witnesses to a will in this case made it
impossible for them to see each other.
MARAVILLA V. MARAVILLA
37 SCRA 672, February 27, 1971
Janica G. Puno
Facts:
Digna Maravilla died in Manapla, Negros Occidental, on 12 August 1958, leaving an extensive
estate. Prior to her death, she was a resident of Saravia, same province. At the time of the probate
proceedings, only one (1) (Aquilino Mansueto) of the three (3) attesting witnesses to the will had
survived, the two (2) others (Timoteo Hernaez and Mariano Buenaflor) having died previously.
The will submitted for probate, which is typewritten in the Spanish language, purports to have
been executed in Manila on the 7th day of October, 1944; it consists of five pages, including the
page on which the attestation clause was completed. The purported signatures of the testatrix
appear at the logical end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the other pages.
At the bottom thereof appear the purported signatures of Timoteo Hernaez, Aquilino Mansueto
and Mariano Buenaflor, attesting witnesses. Their signatures appear also on the left margin of all
the five (5) pages. The paging of the will is by handwritten words, such as “Pagina Primera,”
“Pagina Segunda,” etc., written at the top of each page. On the lower half of the third page, before
the name “CONCEPCION P. MARAVILLA,” is the typewritten word “hermana,” which was crossed
out, and over it was handwritten the word “cuñada,” bearing, at the left hereof, the initials “D. M.”
After the legacies in favor Adelina Sajo, a niece of Digna Maravilla, the latter’s sister-in-law,
Concepcion P. Maravilla de Kohlhaas, and Concepcion’s daughter, Rose Mary Kohlhaas, the will
named appellant Herminio Maravilla as universal heir and executor. In case of the heir’s death, or
if he should not become heir for any reason, he is to be substituted by the legatee Adelina Sajo in
one-half of the properties bequeathed, the other half to pass collectively to legatees Concepcion P.
Maravilla and the daughter of the latter, Rose Mary Kohlhaas. All previous wills are declared
revoked.
In view of the trial court’s decision refusing probate of the will, the instituted heir, Herminio
Maravilla, and the legatee, Adelina Sajo, perfected their appeal, assigning as errors the findings of
the trial court that (a) instrumental witness Aquilino Mansueto did not actually see Digna
Maravilla sign the will; (b) that Digna Maravilla was not present when Mansueto signed the will as
witness; (c) that Mansueto “most probably” did not see Mariano Buenaflor sign as witness to the
will; (d) the testimony of attorney Manuel Villanueva on the due execution of Digna Maravilla’s
testament was biased and not deserving of credit; and (e) in refusing probate to the alleged will
for not having been executed with the requisites prescribed by Section 618 of Act 190.
At the hearing before the court a quo, only one of the three instrumental witnesses, Col. (ret.)
Aquilino Mansueto, appeared and testified, inasmuch as the other two witnesses (Timoteo
Hernaez and Mariano Buenaflor) concededly died prior to the trial of the case. Col. Mansueto
identified his own signature and those of Dr. Timoteo Hernaez and of Digna Maravilla, and asserted
that the latter did sign in the presence of all three witnesses and attorney Villanueva; that Hernaez
signed in his presence and in the presence of the other witnesses and of Digna Maravilla; and that
present at the signing were “Dr. Timoteo Hernaez, Mr. Mariano Buenaflor, attorney Manuel
Villanueva, and both Herminio Maravilla and Mrs. Digna Maravilla” (the testatrix) and identified
his signature and those of Digna and Hernaez although, subsequently, the witness admitted that
he could not remember very well whether Mr. Maravilla was there at the time he signed the will.
The witness explained that he could not remember some details because fourteen years had
elapsed, and when he signed as a witness, he did not give it any importance, and because of the
time he (Col. Mansueto) was very worried because of rumours that the Japanese Kempeitai would
arrest officers of the USAFFE who did not want to collaborate.
Colonel Mansueto’s testimony was supported by that of the husband of the testatrix, Herminio
Maravilla, and of attorney Manuel Villanueva. Herminio’s evidence is that a week before 7 October
1944 his wife, Digna, told him of her desire to “renew” her will because of the critical period in
Manila before the liberation; he invited Buenaflor, Hernaez and Mansueto to attest to the will; sent
his messenger, Mariano Buenaflor, to ask attorney Manuel Villanueva to come to his house, in
order to prepare the will; at his wife’s request, he gave the list of properties to Villanueva; he knew
that the will was executed in the dining room while he remained in the sala; and Villanueva,
Mansueto, Hernaez and Buenaflor were in his house in the morning of 7 October 1944 and sat with
his wife around the table in the dining room, with Villanueva at one end, Digna beside him and the
witnesses facing each other; and after the signing they had lunch, at his invitation, and when they
were eating, petitioner Maravilla saw the three (3) copies of the will on the dining table. However,
he did not see them sign.
Issue:
Whether or not the fact that the witness could not identify the signature of the testator is indicative
that the signature was signed without his presence
Ruling:
No. A will may be allowed even if some witnesses do not remember having attested it, if other
evidence satisfactorily show due execution, and that failure of witness to identify his signature
does not bar probate.
That Mansueto, Hernaez and Buenaflor, together with the testatrix and the lawyer, sat next to one
another around one table when the will was signed is clearly established by the uncontradicted
testimony of both attorney Villanueva and Herminio Maravilla; and that detail proves beyond
doubt that each one of the parties concerned did sign in the presence of all the others.
It should be remembered, in this connection, that the test is not whether a witness did see the
signing of the will but whether he was in a position to see if he chose to do so.
GABRIEL VS. MATEO

51 Phil 216, G.R. No. 26545, December 16, 1927
Facts:
The judgment appealed from allowed the will of Florencia Mateo dated February 6, 1923,
composed of two used sheets to probate. The will appears to be signed by the testatrix and three
witnesses on the left margin of each of the sheets, by the testatrix alone at the bottom, and by the
three witnesses after the attestation clause.
The testatrix died on August 13, 1925. Opposition to such probate was filed by Rita Mateo, the
testatrix's sister, and by other relatives.
The three attesting witnesses to this will, testifying in this case, declared that the signature of the
testatrix were written in their presence and that they signed their names in the presence of the
testatrix and of each other.
The testatrix from girlhood knew how to sign her name and did so with her right hand; but as the
right side of her body later became paralyzed, she learned to sign with her left hand and for many
years thereafter, up to the time of her death, she used to sign with that hand. Opponents (Rita and
other relatives) allege that Florencia Mateo did not sign this will.
Rita and other relatives adduced three salient arguments in support of their opposition.
First: The attesting witnesses testified that the testratrix signed before they did. The signatures of
the testatrix on the left margin of the two sheets of the will are between the signatures of the two
witnesses Vidal Rañoa and Julio Gabriel, and below her surname is the signature of the other
witness Felicisimo Gabriel. The testatrix's signatures start on the line with Felicisimo Gabriel's
signature, but tend to rise and her surname reaches a level with Julio Gabriel's signature.
It is said that this direction of the testatrix's signature was due to the fact that when it was written
Felicisimo Gabriel's signature was already there, and so she had to write her surname upwards in
order to avoid interfering with that Felicisimo Gabriel. From this detail it is pretended to draw the
inference that the attesting witnesses signed before testatrix, contrary to their testimony that she
singed before they did.
Second: Different kinds of ink used by the testatrix in her signature and by the attesting witnesses.
An examination of these signature reveals a somewhat deeper intensity of ink in the signature of
the testatrix than in those of the attesting witnesses. It is alleged that this circumstance cannot be
reconciled with the declaration of the attesting witnesses that they used the same pen and ink as
the testatrix.
To bring out this irregularity, the opposition presented the expert Del Rosario who asserted that
the signature of the testatrix is more recent than that of the attesting witnesses. The opposition
also presented Doctor Banks as expert. He testified that the signatures of the testatrix in the will
are not genuine.
The petitioner, on the other hand, presented another expert, Pedro Serrano Laktao, who affirmed
that these signatures are genuine.
Third, the unreasonableness of the testatrix in not leaving anything to the principal opponent, her
sister Rita Mateo, and to her nephews and nieces, to whom she had been so affectionate during life
and that Florencia used to give her a sack or some gantas of rice, and, a times, a little money and
held all her nephews and nieces in equal regard.
Issue:
Whether or not the signatures of Florencia Mateo both to the body of the will and on the margin of
the pages are true and genuine
Ruling:
Yes.
Logic dictates that the testatrix signed before him, and when it came to the witness Gabriel's turn,
he, finding the space below the testatrix signature free, signed his name there. On the other hand,
it may be noted that the testatrix's other signature at the bottom of the will also shows a more or
less marked tendency to rise, notwithstanding the fact that there was no signature with which she
might interfere if she continued to write in a straight horizontal line.
Furthermore, if, as the opposition alleges, the testatrix's signature is not genuine and was placed
there by another person, it is strange that the latter should have done so in such a way as to write
it above Gabriel's signature while following the horizontal line, when this could have been avoided
by simply putting it a little higher. And this may be attributed to carelessness in the first case, but
it cannot be so explained in the second.
This apparent difference in ink may be merely due — supposing that the same ink and pen were
used — to the difference in pressure employed in writing these signatures, as is reasonable to
suppose when we consider that the testatrix was a paralytic and wrote with her left hand; or it
may have been due to the fact that the attesting witnesses dipped lightly in the ink while the
testatrix dipped the pen.
At all events, even admitting that there is a certain question as to whether the attesting witnesses
signed before or after the testatrix, or whether or not they signed with the same pen and ink, these
are details of such trivial importance, considering that this will was signed two years before the
date on which these witnesses gave their testimony, that it is not proper to set aside the will for
this reason alone.
The attesting witnesses to this will, who testified also as witnesses at the trial showed themselves
to be intelligent and honest, one of them being a lawyer of twelve year's practice, and there is no
reason to reject their testimony.
There is nothing strange in the testatrix having left nothing to the opponents, or in her having left
all of her estate to the only heir instituted in her will, Tomas Mateo, who is also one of her nieces.
And not only is it not strange, but it seems reasonable, since, according to the evidence of the
testatrix when the former was but 3 years old, and from then on up to the time of her death had
never been separated from her.
Dissenting Opinion by Johns, J.
We are not prepared to say as to whether all of the signatures of Florencia R. Mateo as they appear
on the will are forgeries, but we are clearly of the opinion that her signatures as they appear on
the margin of the pages of the will are not true and genuine, and that they were not made at the
same time or place or by the same person as her signature which appears to the body of the will.
In either event the will in question was never legally executed by Florencia R. Mateo, and is
therefore, null and void.
Much evidence was introduced to show that neither one of the signatures of Florencia appearing
on the will were true and genuine, and both Drs. Charles Banks and Jose del Rosario so testified
and gave their reasons why.
It appears from an ocular inspection and without the aid of even a magnifying glass that there is a
very marked difference between the signature of Florencia R. Mateo to the body of the will and as
it appears on the margin of the pages of the will, both as to the character and the height, length and
slant of the signatures, all of which can be seen and detected with the naked eye without the aid of
an expert or a photographic enlargement of the letters. It is also apparent to the naked eye that the
three respective signatures of Florencia R. Mateo appearing on the will were each made with
different ink, and that they were all made with different ink than that used by the witnesses to the
will. It is also apparent to the naked eye that each of her signatures as they appear on the margin
of the will were made over and above and, hence, appear the signature of the witness J. Gabriel.
Atty. Perfecto Gabriel having prepared the will which was executed in his own office, it is strange,
indeed, and to say the least very suspicious, that he was not called as a witness to testify about the
questioned signatures and as to whether or not they were true and genuine.
RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES VS. CA AND LUTGARDA

G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
Facts:
Lutgarda Santiago and petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that
Lutgarda, with her husband and children, lived with the deceased at the latters residence prior
and up to the time of her death.
It appears that on June 24, 1961, Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition for the probate of 5 pages last
will and testament, including the attestation clause. It was written in tagalog, alleged to have been
executed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel, who died on June 7, 1961, at the age of
85, and designating therein Lutgarda as the principal beneficiary and executrix. The signatures of
the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all
the pages.The attestation clause at the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written
the signatures of Matilde D. Orobia (a piano teacher to a grandchild of the testatrix), Spouses Celso
D. Gimpaya and Maria R. Gimpaya, who were driver and housekeeper of Isabel, respectively.
Opposite the same, under the heading "Tirahan", are their respective places of residence, 961
Highway 54, Philamlife, for Miss Orobia, and 12 Dagala St., Navotas, Rizal, for the two Gimpayas.
Their signatures also appear on the left margin of all the other pages. The WW is paged by
typewritten words as follows: "Unang Dahon" and underneath "(Page One)", "Ikalawang Dahon"
and underneath "(Page Two)", etc., appearing at the top of each page.
The petition to probate was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein petitioner, assailing that
the witnesses lack credibility as witness, and arguing the rule that witnesses must be credible is
an absolute requirement which must be complied with before an alleged last will and testament
may be admitted to probate and that to be a credible witness, there must be evidence on record
that the witness has a good standing in his community, or that he is honest and upright, or reputed
to be trustworthy and reliable.
Issue:
Whether or not the credibility of witness in a will needs to be proved for its validity for probate
Ruling:
No.
Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at
the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in
his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another, while the petitioner
submits that Article 820 and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of the competency of a witness due
to his qualifications under the first Article and none of the disqualifications under the second
Article, whereas Article 805 requires the attestation of three or more credible witnesses,
petitioner concludes that the term credible requires something more than just being competent
and, therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under Articles 820 and 821 must also be
a credible witness under Article 805.
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time
during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and
reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted
by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code
are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his
answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his
appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind,
deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has
none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. In probate proceedings, the
instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a will
or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution.
In the case at bar, the Court reject petitioner's contention that it must first be established in the
record the good standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and
reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the witness
unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party. While it is true that three
instrumental witnesses are employees of the deceased, the relation of employer and employee
much less the humble or financial position of a person do not disqualify him to be a competent
testamentary witness. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the
said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of
unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
Therefore, it was not fatal for respondent not to have introduced prior and independent proof of
the fact that the witnesses were credible witnesses that is, that they have a good standing in the
community and reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.
NAYVE VS. MOJAL AND AGUILAR
G.R. No. L-21755, December 29, 1924
Facts:
A proceeding for the probate of the will of the deceased Antonio Mojal was instituted by his
surviving spouse, Filomena Nayve. The probate is opposed by Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar,
sister and niece, respectively, of Antonio.
The Court of First Instance of Albay ordered the probate of the will holding that the document in
controversy was the last will and testament of Antonio Mojal, executed in accordance with law.
Hence, this appeal.
The oppositors posit the following defects:

a) The fact of not having been signed by the testator and the witnesses on each and every sheet
on the left margin;
b) the fact of the sheets of the document not being paged with letters;
c) the fact that the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages actually used
of the will; and
d) the fact that the testator does not appear to have signed all the sheets in the presence of the
three witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed all the sheets in the presence of
the testator and of each other.
As to the signatures on the margin, the third page actually used was signed by the testator, not on
the left margin, as it was by the witnesses, but about the middle of the page and the end of the will;
and that the fourth page was signed by the witnesses, not on the left margin, as it was by the
testator, but about the middle of the page and at the end of the attestation clause.
Issue:
Whether or not the will is valid
Ruling:
Yes.
As to the first defect (Signatures not on the left margin)

The Court applied the ruling in the case of Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez, wherein the validity of
the will was sustained despite the fact that the will was signed by the testator and the witnesses,
not on the left, but right, margin.
Hence, in this case, as each and every page used of the will bears the signatures of the testator and
the witnesses, the fact that said signatures do not all appear on the left margin of each page does
not detract from the validity of the will.
As to the second defect (Paging in Arabic Numerals)

Here, the Court reiterated the ruling in Unson vs. Abella that where paging with Arabic numerals
and not with letters, as in the case before us, is within the spirit of the law and is just as valid as
paging with letters. Simply put, the fact that the sheets of the document are not paged with letters
does not invalidate the will.
As to the third defect (Pages not stated in the attestation clause)

It must be noted that the last paragraph of the will states that:
“In witness whereof, I set my hand unto this will here in the town of Camalig, Albay, Philippine
Islands, this 26th day of November, nineteen hundred and eighteen, composed of four sheets,
including the next:.. xxx”
While the number of sheets or pages composing the will was not stated in the attestation clause,
the same, however, was stated in said last paragraph of the will proper. Then there can be no doubt
that it complies with the intention of the law that the number of sheets of which the will is
composed be shown by the document itself, to prevent the number of the sheets of the will from
being unduly increased or decreased.
As to the fourth defect (Testator and Witnesses do not appear to have signed on all the sheets of the
will in the presence of each other)
It must be noted the attestation clause states that the testator signed the will "in the presence of
each of the witnesses" and the latter signed "in the presence of each other and of the testator."
The act of the testator and the witnesses seeing reciprocally the signing of the will is one which
cannot be proven by the mere exhibition of the will unless it is stated in the document. And this
fact is expressly stated in the attestation clause now before us.
The fact of the testator and the witnesses having signed all the sheets of the will may be proven by
the mere examination of the document, although it does not say anything about this, and if that is
the fact, as it is in the instant case, the danger of fraud in this respect, which is what the law tries
to avoid, does not exist. The omission to expressly state such evident fact does not invalidate the
will nor prevent its probate.
The order of the Court of First Instance is affirmed.
Art. 805-806
In Re Estate of Saguinsin
G.R. No. L-15025, March 15, 1920
Terry Louise P. Boligor
Facts: The will of Remigia Saguinsin was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila for allowance. It is a manuscript signed by the alleged testatrix and three witnesses on
October 3, 1918, the conclusion of which says: "I, the testatrix, sign in the presence of the witnesses
this will written by D. Lino Mendoza at my request and under my direction." Then follows a
signature and then these expressions: "The testatrix signed in our presence and each of us signed
in the presence of the others." "Witness who wrote this will at the request and under the free and
voluntary personal direction of the testatrix herself." (Sgd.) Lino Mendoza - "Attesting witnesses."
Then come three signatures.
These three signatures together with that of the alleged testatrix are written also on the left margin
of the first page or folio and on the third page or second folio, but not on the second page or reverse
side of the first page where, as is seen, the manuscript is continued, the second folio not containing
anything but the date of the manuscript. The instrument was impugned by a sister of the alleged
testatrix and after the taking of the declaration of the authors of the signatures which appear three
times and in different parts of the manuscript, the court declared that the document attached to
the record could not be allowed as a will.
Issue: Did the will satisfy the requirements of the law?
Ruling: No. The will cannot be allowed probate for failure to follow the requirements under the
Code of Civil Procedure.
In conformity with Act No. 2645, amendatory to section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
concluding part of the will does not express what that law, under pain of nullity, requires. Section
618, as amended, says: "The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used upon which
the will is written . . ." None of these requirements appear in the attesting clause at the end of the
document presented. The second page, i.e., what is written on the reverse side of the first,
engenders the doubt whether what is written thereon was ordered written by the alleged testatrix
or was subsequently added by the same hand that drew the first page and the date that appears on
the third. With this non-fulfillment alone of Act No. 2645 it is impossible to allow the so-called will
which violates said law.
It is not enough that the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or
leaves; three pages having been written, the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed
with the signature of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses. The English text which requires the
signing of pages and not merely leaves or folios should prevail.
Avera v. Garcia
G.R. No. 15566, September 14, 1921
Facts: Eutiquia Avera instituted the probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia, contest was made by
Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia
and Cesar Garcia. Upon the date appointed for the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced
one of the three attesting witnesses who testified that the will was executed with all necessary
external formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties.
The will was then admitted to probate. The will was contested by reason of the fact that the
signature of the testator and of the three attesting witnesses were written on the right margin of
each page of the will instead of the left margin.
Issue: Was the requirement of the law satisfied?
Ruling: Yes. Under section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, it is
essential to the validity of a will in this jurisdiction that the names of the testator and the
instrumental witnesses should be written on the left margin of each page, as required in said Act,
and not upon the right margin, as in the will now before us; and upon this we are of the opinion
that the will in question is valid. It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental
witnesses shall sign their names on the left margin of each and every page; and it is undeniable that
the general doctrine is to the effect that all statutory requirements as to the execution of wills must
be fully complied with.
The instrument now before us contains the necessary signatures on every page, and the only point
of deviation from the requirement of the statute is that these signatures appear in the right margin
instead of the left. By the mode of signing adopted every page and provision of the will is
authenticated and guarded from possible alteration in exactly the same degree that it would have
been protected by being signed in the left margin; and the resources of casuistry could be
exhausted without discovering the slightest difference between the consequences of affixing the
signatures in one margin or the other.
Unson v. Abella
G.R. No. 17857, June 12, 1922
Facts: On July 19, 1918, Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella, single, 60 years old, who was residing in the
municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, executed her last will and testament with an
attached inventory of her properties, Exhibits A and A-1, in the presence of three witnesses, who
signed with her all the pages of said documents. The testatrix died on the 6th of January, 1921, and,
as the record shows, the executor appointed in the will, Pedro Unson, filed in the court of First
Instance of Laguna on the 19th of January of the same year an application for the probate of the
will and the issuance of the proper letters of administration in his favor.
An opposition was raised by Antonio Abella, Ignacia Abella, Avicencia Abella, and Santiago Vito,
alleging that the supposed will of the deceased Zalamea was not executed in conformity with the
provinces of the law, inasmuch as it was not paged correlatively in letters, nor was there any
attestation clause in it, nor was it signed by the testatrix and the witnesses in the presence of each
other. The judge overRulingd the opposition and the will was admitted for probate to which the
contestants appealed.
Issue: Should the will be admitted to probate despite the fact that this exhibit has no attestation
clause in it, and its paging is made in Arabic numerals and not in letters?
Ruling: Yes. In view of the fact that the inventory is referred to in the will as an integral part of it,
we find that the foregoing attestation clause is in compliance with section 1 of Act No. 2645, which
requires this solemnity for the validity of a will, and makes unnecessary any other attestation
clause at the end of the inventory.
As to the paging of the will in Arabic numerals, instead of in letters, we adhere to the doctrine
announced in the case of Aldaba vs. Roque, recently decided by this court. In that case the validity
of the will was assailed on the ground that its folios were paged with the letters A, B, C, etc., instead
of with the letters "one," two," "three," etc. It was held that this way of numbering the pages of a
will is in compliance with the spirit of the law, inasmuch as either one of these methods indicates
the correlation of the pages and serves to prevent the abstraction of any of them. In the course of
the decision, we said: "It might be said that the object of the law in requiring that the paging be
made in letters is to make falsification more difficult, but it should be noted that since all the pages
of the testament are signed at the margin by the testatrix and the witnesses, the difficulty of forging
the signatures in either case remains the same. In other words, the more or less degree of facility
to imitate the writing of the letters A, B, C, etc., does not make for the easiness to forge the
signatures. And as in the present case there exists the guarantee of the authenticity of the
testament, consisting in the signatures on the left margins of the testament and the paging thereof
as declared in the attestation clause.
Aldaba v. Roque
G.R. No. L-17304, May 22, 1922
Facts: On July 9, 1918, Maria Roque y Paraiso, the widow of Bruno Valenzuela, resident of the barrio
of Mambog, municipality of Malolos, Province of Bulacan, executed her last will and testament in
the Tagalog dialect with the help of Vicente Platon and in the presence of three witnesses who
signed the attestation clause and each of the four pages of the testament. Maria Roque died on
December 3, 1919, and when her will was filed in court for probate, it was contested by Ludovico
Roque on the ground that it had not been prepared nor executed in conformity with the
requirements and solemnities prescribed by law. After due proceedings, the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan by its decision rendered on February 27th of the following year, pronounced the
testament in question valid, and ordered its probate, appointing Ceferino Aldaba as the
administrator of the estate.
Issue: Should the will be admitted to probate despite that each and every folio of the said testament
is not paged correlatively in letter," and "that the said will lacks the attestation clause required by
law?
Ruling: Yes, there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 1 of Act No. 2645.
Section 1 of Act No. 2645 which provides that:
The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and
the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to
write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each
other.
In regard to the other assignment of error, to wit, that each of the folios of the said testament is not
paged correlatively in letters "one." "two," "three," etc., but only with the letters A, B, C, etc., we are
of the opinion that this method of indicating the paging of the testament is a compliance with the
spirit of the law, since either one of the two ways above-mentioned indicates the correlation of the
pages and serves to prevent the loss of any of them. It might be said that the object of the law in
requiring that the paging be made in letters is to make falsification more difficult, but it should be
noted that since all the pages of the testament are signed at the margin by the testatrix and the
witnesses, the difficulty of forging the signatures in either case remains the same. In other words,
the more or less degree of facility to imitate the writing of the letters A, B, C, etc., does not make for
the easiness to forge the signature. And as in the present case there exists the guaranty of the
authenticity of the testament, consisting in the signatures on the left margin of the testament and
the paging thereof as declared in the attestation clause.
In Re: Pilapil
G.R. No. L-4603, October 25, 1952
Facts: On January 13, 1948, Leona Singson died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur leaving a will. In said will the
deceased instituted as heirs her brothers Evaristo, Dionisio and Manuel, her nieces Rosario F. de
Donateo, Emilia Florentino and Trinidad Florentino de Paz, her grandniece Consolacion Florentino,
and some servants. She named her brothers Evaristo and Manuel as executors of the will. On
February 2, l948, Manuel Dingson filed a petition for the probate of said will.
On March 6, 1948, Emilia Florentino, Trinidad Florentino de Paz and Josefina Florentino Vda. de
Lim, daughters of a sister of the deceased, opposed the petition alleging among other grounds that
the signatures appearing in the will are not the genuine signatures of the deceased, and that the
will has not been executed in accordance with the formalities of the law.
After due trial, the court found that the will has been executed in accordance and admitted the
same to probate. The oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the case was later certified
to this court for the reason that it involves purely questions of law.
Issue: Should the will be allowed despite the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of
the sheets or pages in which the will is written?
Ruling: Yes. The will should be allowed since there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of the law.
Article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, requires that the attestation
clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the will is written, which requirement
has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or
omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is
intended to be bequeathed. The attestation clause must contain a statement of the number of
sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of
invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a
consideration or examination of the will itself.
But here the situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets
or pages upon which the will is written, however, the last part of the body of the will contains a
statement that it is composed of eight pages, which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out
of the rigid Ruling of construction and places it within the realm of similar case where a broad and
more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by
purely technical considerations.
Considering the form in which the will in question is written in the light of the liberal Ruling above
adverted to, the conclusion is inescapable that the will has been drafted in substantial compliance
with the law. This opinion is bolstered up when we examine the will itself which shows on its face
that it is really and actually composed of eight pages duly signed by the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses.
Fernandez v. De Dios
G.R. No. L-21151, February 25, 1924
Facts: Antonio Vergel de Dios died leaving behind a notarial will which was submitted to probate
by Ramon Fernandez. Fernando and Francisco Vergel de Dios along with Ricardo and Virgilio
Rustia oppose the validity of the will (Exhibit A).
The defects attributed to the will by the contestants are as follows, to wit:
(a) It was not sufficiently proven that the testator knew the contents of the will.
(b) The testator did not sign all the pages of the will.
(c) He did not request anybody to attest the document as his last will.
(d) He did not sign it in the presence of any witness.
(e) The witnesses did not sign it in the presence of the testator, or of each other, nor with
knowledge on the part of the testator that they were signing his will.
(f ) The witnesses did not sign the attestation clause before the death of the testator.
(g) This clause was written after the execution of the dispositive part of the will and was attached
to the will after the death of the testator.
(h) The signatures of the testator on page 3 of Exhibit A are not authentic.
Issue: Should the will be allowed probate despite the sheet on which it is written is not numbered,
and it is not stated there that the testator signed on the margin of each sheet of the will in the
presence of the three witnesses, or that the latter signed it is the presence of the testator and of
each other, and especially because said attestation clause is not signed by the testator either at the
margin or the bottom thereof?
Ruling: Yes. The document Exhibit A, as the last will and testament of the deceased Antonio Vergel
de Dios, meets all the requirements prescribed by the law now in force and therefore it must be
allowed to probate as prayed for by the petitioner.
The law does not require that the testator precisely be the person to request the witnesses to attest
his will. It was also sufficiently established in the record, besides being stated in the attestation
clause, that the testator signed the will in the presence of the three witnesses and that the latter, in
turn, signed it in the presence of the testator and of each other, the testator knowing that the
witnesses were signing his will; that the witnesses signed the attestation clause before the death
of the testator; that this clause, with the names of the witnesses in blank, was prepared before the
testator signed the will, and that the sheet containing said clause, just as those of the will proper,
was a loose sheet, and that all the four sheets of which the will Exhibit A was actually composed
were kept together and are the very ones presented in this case; and finally, that the signatures of
the testator on page 3 of said exhibit are authentic.
As to the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation clause – the law does not require that
the sheet containing nothing but the attestation clause, wholly or in part, be numbered or paged.
Consequently, this lack of paging on the attestation sheet does not take anything from the validity
of the will.
Concerning the absolute absence of the signature of the testator from the sheet containing the
attestation clause - this point was already decided in the above cited case of Abangan vs. Abangan,
where this court held that “the testator's signature is not necessary in the attestation clause
because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator.”
In that case of Abangan vs. Abangan it was held that the signature of the testator is not necessary
in the attestation clause, but the theory is not announced that such a clause is unnecessary to the
validity to the will. The fact that in said clause the signature of the testator does not appear does
not affect its validity, for, as above stated, the law does not require that it be signed by the testator.
Lopez v. Liboro
81 Phil 429, G.R. No. L-1787, August 27, 1948
Migrio Vina O. Cagampang
Facts: Don Sixto Lopez executed a will in Spanish. The will in question comprises two pages, each
of which is written on one side of a separate sheet. The first sheet is not paged either in letters or
in Arabic numerals. This, the appellant believes, is a fatal defect.
Issue: Is failure to mark the first page either by letters of numbers a fatal defect?
Ruling: No. Failure to mark the first page either by letters of numbers is not a fatal defect. The
purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is to guard against fraud, and to afford means
of preventing the substitution or of defecting the loss of any of its pages. In the present case, the
omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other forms of
identification more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or characters.
The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents
considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first
and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the
testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page.
Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the
Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, — all of which,
in the logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the marker's property.
As page 2 contains only the 2 lines above mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark of the testator
and the signatures of the witnesses, the other sheet cannot by any possibility be taken for other
than page one.
Abangan v. Abangan
40 Phil 476, G.R. No. L-13431, November 12, 1919
Facts: Ana Abangan’s will was admitted to probate. The will consists of two sheets:
1. The first contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin,
in the name and under the direction of the testatrix, and by 3 other witnesses.
2. The second contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the 3
Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and 3 witnesses, nor numbered
by letters; and these omissions, according to the oppositors’ contention, are defects whereby the
probate of the will should be denied.
Issue: Is a will consisting of two sheets, the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions
and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the
attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, still a valid will?
Ruling: Yes, it is still a valid will despite such lack of signature and numbering. In requiring that
each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by the testator and three
witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 (which is the one applicable in the case)
evidently has for its object (referring to the body of the will itself) to avoid the substitution of any
of said sheets, thereby changing the testator's dispositions. But when these dispositions are wholly
written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses (as the instant
case), their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless. In
requiring this signature on the margin, the statute took into consideration, undoubtedly, the case
of a will written on several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which the testator and the
witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom. A different interpretation would assume that the
statute requires that this sheet, already signed at the bottom, be signed twice. We cannot attribute
to the statute such an intention. As these signatures must be written by the testator and the
witnesses in the presence of each other, it appears that, if the signatures at the bottom of the sheet
guaranties its authenticity, another signature on its left margin would be unnecessary; and if they
do not guaranty, same signatures, affixed on another part of same sheet, would add nothing.
In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on
the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether
any sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on
one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet,
although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.
This is also applicable to the attestation clause. Wherefore, without considering whether or not this
clause is an essential part of the will, we hold that in the one accompanying the will in question, the
signatures of the testatrix and of the three witnesses on the margin and the numbering of the pages
of the sheet are formalities not required by the statute. Moreover, referring specially to the
signature of the testatrix, we can add that the same is not necessary in the attestation clause
because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator since the
latter does not attest, but executes, the will.
We hold that in a will consisting of two sheets, the first of which contains all the testamentary
dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second
contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not
necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or
be paged.
Taboada v. Rosal
G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982
Facts: The will in question of Dorotea Perez consist of two pages. The 1st page of the will contains
the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix
alone and at the left hand margin by the 3 instrumental witnesses. The 2nd page which contains
the attestation clause and the acknowledgement is signed at the end of the attestation clause by
the 3 attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix. The trial court denied the
probate of the will because it is not enough that only the testatrix signs at the “end” but all the 3
subscribing witnesses must also sign at the same place or at the end, in the presence of the
testatrix.
Issue: For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article 805 of the Civil Code require that the
testatrix and all the three instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of the will and in
the presence of the testatrix and of one another?
Ruling: No. There is no requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code. It is enough that only the
testator signs in the end.
It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed. Attestation consists in
witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those
things are, done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the
testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon
the same paper for the purpose of Identification of such paper as the will which was executed by
the testator. Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that
the will in this case was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of identification.
The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when
the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the
testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was properly Identified by subscribing
witness Vicente Timkang to be the same will executed by the testatrix. There was no question of
fraud or substitution behind the questioned order.
The SC noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing the
will. Such is not a fatal defect because the number of pages is easily discernible for there are only
2 pages. The acknowledgement itself states that “This Last Will and Testament consists of 2 pages
including this page.” There is substantial compliance.
Payad v. Tolentino
62 Phil 848, G.R. No. 42258, January 15, 1936
Facts: The probate of the will of Leoncia Tolentino was denied on the ground that the attestation
clause was not in conformity with the requirements of law in that it is not stated therein that the
testatrix caused Atty. Almario to write her name at her express direction. The evidence establishes
the fact that Leoncia, the decedent, assisted by Atty. Almario placed her thumb mark on each and
every page of the questioned will and that said attorney merely wrote her name to indicate the
place where she placed said thumb mark. In other words Attorney Almario did not sign for the
testatrix. She signed by placing her thumb mark on each and every page thereof.
Issue: Is it necessary that the attestation clause state that the testatrix caused Atty. Almario to write
her name at her express direction?
Ruling: Probate of the will must be allowed. "A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if
the signature is made by the testator's mark." It is clear, therefore, that it was not necessary that
the attestation clause in question should state that the testatrix requested Attorney Almario to sign
her name inasmuch as the testratrix signed the will in question in accordance with law.
Gumban v. Gorecho
50 Phil 30, G.R. No. 26135, March 3, 1927
Facts: The will of Eustaquio Hagoriles was presented for probate by Petronilo Gumban. Inocencia
Gorecho and other eighteen opponents opposed on the ground that the said will did not contain an
attestation clause stating that the testator and the witnesses signed all the pages of the will. In
support of their argument on the assignment of error above mentioned, the oppositors relied on a
series of cases of this court to include the case of Saño vs. Quintana and Nayve vs. Mojal.
Issue: Will an absence of an attestation clause stating that the testator and the witnesses signed all
the pages of the will nullify the will?
Ruling: Yes. An absence of an attestation clause stating that the testator and the witnesses signed
all the pages of the will nullify the will.
In the case of Saño vs. Quintana (citing Uy Coque vs. Sioca), it was decided that an attestation clause
which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left
margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such a defect annuls the will.
In the case of Nayve vs. Mojal, it was held that the fact that the testator and the witnesses signed
each and every page of the will can be proved also by the mere examination of the signatures
appearing on the document itself, and the omission to state such evident fact does not invalidate
the will.
SC adopted and reaffirmed the decision in the case of Saño vs. Quintana, and to the extent
necessary, modified the decision in Nayve vs. Mojal for the following reasons:
1. Nayve was concurred yet Saño only had 1 formal dissent
2. Saño is subsequent in point of time since it was promulgated in 1925, while Nayve was in
1924
3. The Saño decision is believed more nearly to conform to the applicable provisions of the
law.
Hence, following the case of Saño vs. Quintana, the absence of attestation clause stating that the
testator and the witnesses signed all the pages of the will nullifies the will.
Caneda v. Court of Appeals

222 SCRA 781, G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993
Facts: Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight years of his life,
executed a last will and testament before three attesting witnesses, namely, Cipriano Labuca,
Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano Toregosa. He was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad,
and a notary public, Atty. Filoteo Manigos, in the preparation of that last will. The will provide
among other things that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and
personal properties to Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo,
Benoni G. Cabrera and Marcosa Alcantara, all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator.
The last will and testament of Mateo Caballero shows that it is comprised of three sheets all of
which have been numbered correlatively, with the left margin of each page thereof bearing the
respective signatures of the testator and the three attesting witnesses. The part of the will
containing the testamentary dispositions is expressed in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect and is signed
at the foot thereof by the testator. The attestation clause in question, on the other hand, is recited
in the English language and is likewise signed at the end thereof by the three attesting witnesses
hereto. The attestation clause provides:
We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and postal addresses appear
on the Opposite of our respective names, we do hereby certify that the Testament was read
by him and the testator, MATEO CABALLERO; has published unto us the foregoing Will
consisting of THREE PAGES, including the Acknowledgment, each page numbered
correlatively in the letters on the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and Testament
and he has the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and
on the left hand margin, in the presence of the said testator and in the presence of each and
all of us.
Oppositors of the will asserted that the will in question is null and void for the reason that its
attestation clause is fatally defective since it failed to specifically state that the instrumental
witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Issue: Is the attestation clause fatally defective for failing to specifically state that the instrumental
witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another?
Ruling: Yes. What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein assailed
is the fact that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the
presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were used,
the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their
respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
It is our considered view that the absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or
imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be
admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the aforestated defect in the
attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the
language used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance Ruling.
While it may be true that the attestation clause is indeed subscribed at the end thereof and at the
left margin of each page by the three attesting witnesses, it certainly cannot be conclusively
inferred therefrom that the said witness affixed their respective signatures in the presence of the
testator and of each other since, as petitioners correctly observed, the presence of said signatures
only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed, but it does not prove that the attesting witnesses
did subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The execution of a will is
supposed to be one act so that where the testator and the witnesses sign on various days or
occasions and in various combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of
effectivity.
The Ruling, as it now stands, is that omissions which can be supplied by an examination of the will
itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly,
would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions
which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the
attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.
Testate estate of the late Vicente Cagro. Jesusa Cagro v. Pelagio Cagro, et al
G.R. No. L-5826, April 29, 1953
Janice L. Dahiroc
Facts: The case is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the CFI of Samar which
admitted to probate a will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Pambujan, Samar on Feb.
14, 1949. The appellants insisted that the will is defective because the attestation was not signed by
the witnesses at the bottom although the page containing the same was signed by the witnesses on
the left hand margin.
Petitioner contended that the signatures of the 3 witnesses on the left-hand margin conform
substantially to law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause.
Issue: Is the will valid?
Ruling: The will is not valid. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the Facts attending the
execution of the will. It is required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses and it must
necessarily bear their signatures.An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the
witnesses since the omission of their signatures at the bottom negates their participation.
Moreover, the signatures affixed on the left-hand margin is not substantial conformance to the law.
The said signatures were merely in conformance with the requirement that the will must be signed
on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If the attestation clause is unsigned by the 3 witnesses at the
bottom, it would be easier to add clauses to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the
testator and any or all of the witnesses.
The probate of the will is denied.

Felix Azuela v. Court of Appeals, Geralda Aida Castillo substituted by Ernesto G. Castillo
G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006
Janice L. Dahiroc
Facts: Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo. However, this was
opposed by Geralda Castillo, who was the attorney-in-fact of “the 12 legitimate heirs” of the decedent.
According to her, the will was forged, and imbued with several fatal defects. The three named
witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will, but not
at the bottom of the attestation clause. She pointed out also that decedent’s signature did not appear
on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. The notary public,
Petronio Y. Bautista, only wrote “Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981
dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.”
Issue: Does the will comply with the requirements and should be admitted to probate?
Ruling: No, A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is
written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses
is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment,
but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate.
While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they
do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause. Art. 805 particularly segregates the
requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the
will be attested and subscribed by them. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify
that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand,
the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements
contained in the attestation clause itself. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will.
Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned
attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in the clause,
since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
Further, the notary public who notarized the subject will wrote, “Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko
ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.” By no manner of contemplation
can these words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed.
The express requirement of Art. 806 is that the will be “acknowledged”, and not merely subscribed
and sworn to. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal
prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without
the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of
certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in
the will.
In the matter of the petition for the probate of the last will and testament of Enrique S. Lopez Richard
B. Lopez v. Diana Jeanne Lopez, Marybeth de Leon and Victoria L. Tuazon
G.R. No. 189984, November 12, 2012
Janice L. Dahiroc
Facts: On June 21, 1999, Enrique S. Lopez died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez, and their four
legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard B. Lopez and the respondents Diana Jeanne Lopez,
Marybeth de Leon and Victoria L. Tuazon as compulsory heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a
Last Will and Testament on August 10, 1996 and constituted Richard as his executor and
administrator.
Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and Testament. However, it was
opposed by his siblings contending that the purported last will and testament was not executed and
attested as required by law, and that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence
on the part of Richard. After submitting proofs of compliance with jurisdictional requirements,
Richard presented the attesting witnesses and the notary public who notarized the will. On the other
hand, the oppositors presented its lone witness.
The RTC disallowed the probate of the will. It held that while Article 809 of the same Code requires
mere substantial compliance of the form laid down in Article 805, the Ruling only applies if the
number of pages is reflected somewhere else in the will with no evidence aliunde or extrinsic
evidence required. While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages
including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC observed that
it has 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion. As such, it disallowed the will for not having
been executed and attested in accordance with law. CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, the
instant petition assailing the propriety of the CA's decision.
Issue: Does the will complied with the formalities set forth by law.
Ruling: No, the SC sustained the CA’s decision in the disallowance of the will. The law is clear that the
attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the
law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent
any increase or decrease in the pages. While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in
the form of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the
Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including
the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed substantial
compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy
cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence
aliunde.
Manual A. Echavez v.
Dozen Construction and Development Corp. and The Register of Deeds of CEBU CITY
G.R. No. 192916, October 11, 2010
Janice L. Dahiroc
Facts: Vicente Echavez was the absolute owner of several lots in Cebu City, which includes Lot No.
1956-A and Lot No. 1959. On September 7, 1985, Vicente donated the subject lots to petitioner
Manuel Echavez through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. Manuel accepted the donation.
In March 1986, Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor of Dozen Construction
and Development Corporation. In October 1986, they executed two Deeds of Absolute Sale over the
same properties covered by the previous Contract to Sell.
On November 6, 1986, Vicente died. Manuel filed a petition to approve Vicente’s donation mortis
causa in his favor and an action to annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed in favor of Dozen
Corporation. These cases were jointly heard.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed Manuel’s petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s
decision. The CA held that since the donation in favor of Manuel was a donation mortis causa,
compliance with the formalities for the validity of wills should have been observed. The CA found
that the deed of donation did not contain an attestation clause and was therefore void.
Issue: Was the CA correct in declaring that a donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities
prescribed by law for the validity of wills?
Ruling: Yes. Donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities prescribed by law for the
validity of wills, “otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect.”
As the CA correctly found, the purported attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion
does not contain the number of pages on which the deed was written. The requirements of attestation
and acknowledgment are embodied in two separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and
806, respectively) indicating that the law contemplates two distinct acts that serve different
purposes. Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged the execution of the Deed of
Donation Mortis Causa before the notary public, this is not the avowal the law requires from the
instrumental witnesses to the execution of a decedent’s will. An attestation must state all the details
the third paragraph of Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses
themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed of
Donation Mortis Causa.
Tanchanco v. Garcia Santos

G.R. No. 204793, June 8, 2020
Janine Louise Mae E. Nenaria
Facts: Consuelo was married to Anastacio Garcia who passed away on August 14, 1985. They had
two daughters Remedios Garcia Tanchanco (Remedios) and Natividad Garcia Santos (Natividad).
Remedios predeceased Consuelo and left behind her children, which included Catalino Tanchanco
(Catalino) and Ronaldo Tanchanco.
Consuelo died on April 4, 1997. Catalino filed a petition to settle the intestate estate of Consuelo.
Natividad filed a motion to dismiss stating that she already filed a petition for the probate of the Last
Will and Testament of Consuelo.
The Tanchancos filed an opposition alleging that the will’s attestation clause did not state the
number of pages and that the will was written in Tagalog, and not in English language usually used
by Consuelo in most of her legal documents.
Natividad, on the other hand, insists that the will conforms to the formalities required under Article
805 of the Civil Code. The acknowledgement portion specifically mentioned that the necessary
signatures were affixed on every page of the will and referred to the number of pages the will was
written.
Issue: Did the will faithfully complied with the formalities required by law?
Ruling: Yes, an examination of Consuelo’s will show that it complied with the formalities required by
law.
In the instant case, the attestation clause indisputably omitted to mention the number of pages
comprising the will. Nevertheless, the acknowledgement portion of the will supplied the omission
by stating that the will has five (5) pages. Undoubtedly, such substantially complied with the
directives of Article 805 of the Civil Code.
When the number of pages provided in the acknowledgement portion instead of the attestation
clause, “the spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be
strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of
the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and
which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator’s will.”
Art. 806
Felix Azuela v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006
Facts: Petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo.
However, this was opposed by Geralda Castillo, who was the attorney-in-fact of the12 legitimate
heirs of the decedent. According to her, the will was forged and was not properly acknowledged. The
notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, only wrote “Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo
10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.”
Issue: Was the will fatally defective as it was not properly acknowledged before a notary public by
the testator and the witnesses as required by Article 806 of the Civil Code?
Ruling: Yes, the will is fatally defective. An acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a
deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves
an extra step undertaken whereby the signore actually declares to the notary that the executor of a
document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual
language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her,
the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless
remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be “acknowledged,” and not
merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one under
oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free
act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard
against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator.
Garcia v. Gatchalian
G.R. No. L-20357, November 25, 1967
Facts: Gregorio Gatchalian, a widower of 71 years of age, died in Pasig, Province of Rizal, leaving no
forced heirs. On the same year, appellant Pedro Reyes Garcia filed a petition for the probate of said
alleged will of the late Gregorio Gatchalian, wherein he was instituted as sole heir. Appellees Felipe
Gatchalian, Aurora G. Camins, Angeles G. Cosca, Federico G. Tubog, Virginia G. Talanay and Angeles
G. Talanay opposed the petition on the ground, that the will was procured by fraud. They also alleged
that the deceased did not intend the instrument signed by him to be his will and that the deceased
was physically and mentally incapable of making a will at the time of the alleged execution of said
will.
After due trial, the court rendered the appealed decision finding the document to be the authentic
last will of the deceased but disallowing it for failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of
Article 806 of the New Civil Code — that the will must be acknowledged before a notary public by
the testator and the witnesses. An examination of the document shows that the same was
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator but not by the instrumental witnesses.
Issue: Can the will be admitted to probate?
Ruling: No, Article 806 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with
the office of the Clerk of Court.”
The court held that compliance with the requirement contained in the above legal provision to the
effect that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and also by the
witnesses is indispensable for its validity. As the document under consideration does not comply
with this requirement, the same may not be probated.
Javellana v. Ledesma
G.R. No. L-7179, June 30, 1955
Facts: The Court of First Instance of Iloilo admitted to probate the documents in the Visayan dialect,
as the testament and codicil duly executed by the deceased Da. Apolinaria Ledesma Vda. de Javellana,
with Ramon Tabiana, Gloria Montinola de Tabiana and Vicente Yap as witnesses. The contestant, Da.
Matea Ledesma, sister and nearest surviving relative of said deceased, appealed from the decision,
insisting that the said exhibits were not executed in conformity with law.
The contestant argues that the Court erred in refusing credence to her witnesses Maria Paderogao
and Vidal Allado, cook and driver, respectively, of the Apolinaria Ledesma. Both testified that they
saw and heard Vicente Yap (one of the witnesses to the will) inform Apolinaria that he had brought
the "testamento" and urge her to go to attorney Tabiana's office to sign it; that Da. Apolinaria
manifested that she could not go, because she was not feeling well; and that upon Yap's insistence
that the will had to be signed in the attorney's office and not elsewhere, the deceased took the paper
and signed it in the presence of Yap alone, and returned it with the statement that no one would
question it because the property involved was exclusively hers.
Issue: Will the signing of the codicil by the testator in the absence of the notary public affects the
validity of the will?
Ruling: No, as observed by the Court below, whether or not the notary signed the certification of
acknowledgment in the presence of the testatrix and the witnesses, does not affect the validity of the
codicil. Unlike the Code of 1889 (Art. 699), the new Civil Code does not require that the signing of
the testator, witnesses and notary should be accomplished in one single act. A comparison of Articles
805 and 806 of the new Civil Code reveals that while testator and witnesses sign in the presence of
each other, all that is thereafter required is that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses" (Art. 806); that the latter should avow to the certifying
officer the authenticity of their signatures and the voluntariness of their actions in executing the
testamentary disposition.
Cruz v. Judge Villasor
G.R. No. L-32213, November 26, 1973
Facts: A Petition to review on certiorari for the judgment of the Court First Instance of Cebu allowing
the probate of the last will a testament of the late Valente Z. Cruz. Petitioner-appellant Agapita N.
Cruz, the surviving spouse of the said decease opposed the allowance of the will, alleging the will
was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said
instrument was executed without the testator having been fully informed of the content thereof,
particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the supposed last will and testament
was not executed in accordance with law. One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary
public before whom the will was acknowledged.
Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is
substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses notwithstanding
the fact that the notary public was one of them.
Ruling: No. The last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance with law. The
notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will.
Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or
admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his
personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the
making of the will.
Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangement. That function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting
instrumental witnesses. For them he would be interested sustaining the validity of the will as it
directly involves him and the validity of his own act. It would place him in inconsistent position and
the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted.
Article 806 of the Civil Code:

Article 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will or file another
with the office of the Clerk of Court.
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one the attesting and acknowledging witnesses,
would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in
contravention of the provisions of Article 80 be requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as
such and of Article 806 which requires that the testator and the required number of witnesses must
appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result would be, as has been said, that
only two witnesses appeared before the notary public for or that purpose.
Gonzales v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-37453, May 25, 1979
Facts: Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago (Private respondent) are the nieces of the
deceased Isabel Gabriel who died a widow. A will was thereafter submitted to probate. The said will
was typewritten, in Tagalog and appeared to have been executed in April 1961 or two months prior
to the death of Isabel. It consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and acknowledgment, with the
signature of testatrix on page 4 and the left margin of all the pages.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of Isabel. She argues that
the requirement in Article 806, Civil Code, that the witnesses must be credible is an absolute
requirement which must be complied with before an alleged last will and testament may be admitted
to probate and that to be a credible witness, there must be evidence on record that the witness has
a good standing in his community, or that he is honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and
reliable. According to petitioner, unless the qualifications of the witness are first established, his
testimony may not be favorably considered.
Issue: Was the will executed and attested as required by law?
Ruling: Yes, under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at
any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for
trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may
be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article
820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or
deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is
shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he
is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and
that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code.
We reject petitioner's contention that it must first be established in the record the good standing of
the witness in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and
uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved
otherwise by the opposing party.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and every one of the three instrumental witnesses, namely,
Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily
supported by the evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals. Moreover, petitioner has
not pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that
anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
Gabucan v. Hon. Judge Manta

G.R. No. L-51546, January 28, 1980
Jose Luis P. Pacquiao
Facts: This case is about the dismissal of a petition for the probate of a notarial will on the ground
that it does not bear a thirty-centavo documentary stamp. The proceeding was dismissed because
the requisite documentary stamp was not affixed to the notarial acknowledgment in the will and,
hence, according to respondent Judge, it was not admissible in evidence, citing section 238 of the
Tax Code, now section 250 of the 1977 Tax Code.
Respondent Judge refused to reconsider the dismissal despite petitioner's manifestation that he had
already attached the documentary stamp to the original of the will.
Issue: Can a notarial will be probated on the ground that it does not bear a thirty-centavo
documentary stamp?
Ruling: Yes. What the probate court should have done was to require the petitioner or proponent to
affix the requisite thirty-centavo documentary stamp to the notarial acknowledgment of the will
which is the taxable portion of that document.
Under Article 806 of the New Civil Code, every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by
the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or
file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
The documentary stamp may be affixed at the time the taxable document is presented in evidence.
If the promissory note does not bear a documentary stamp, the court should have allowed plaintiff's
tender of a stamp to supply the deficiency. The lack of the documentary stamp on a document does
not invalidate such document.
Art. 807-808
Lucio V. Garcia v. Hon. Conrado M. Vasquez

G.R. No. L-26615, April 30 1970
Janice L. Dahiroc
Facts: Gliceria Avelino del Rosario, more or less 90 years old, died unmarried in Manila leaving no
descendants, ascendants, brother or sister. Her estate consisted mostly of real properties. Gliceria
executed 2 wills: one on 9 June 1956 consisting of 12 pages, written in Spanish, a language she knew
and spoke; and another dated 29 December 1960 consisting of 1 page written in Tagalog.
Consuelo, the niece of the deceased, petitioned the CFI Manila for probate of the alleged last will and
testament of Gliceria executed in 29 December 1960 and for her appointment as special administratix
of the latter's estate pending the appointment of a regular administrator thereof. The petition was
opposed by several groups alleging to be heirs of Gliceria. CFI granted the probate of the 1960 will
and appointed Consuelo as special administratix of the estate of Gliceria since she was managing the
properties of the estate during the latter's lifetime.
Witnesses to the 1960 will testified that they were individually requested by Alfonso Precilla
(husband of Consuelo) to witness the execution of the will; that Gliceria was apparently of clear and
sound mind at the time although she was being aided by Alfonso when she walked; that the will which
was already prepared, was first read "silently" by Gliceria herself before she signed it.
Herein oppositors-appellants challenge the correctness of the probate court's Ruling and maintain
that at the time the 1960 will was executed, the eyesight of Gliceria was so poor and defective that
she could not have read the provisions of the will, contrary to the testimonies of witnesses to the
1960 will.
Dr. Jesus Tamesis, an ophthalmologist testified that the eyesight condition of Gliceria was limited for
distance vision due to a possible glaucoma, a disease that leads to blindness. Records also show that
Dr. Tamesis operated on the left eye of Gliceria to remove her cataract which enabled her to only see
forms but not read.
Issue: Are the Facts established pertaining to Gliceria's eyesight condition requires the observance of
Article 808?
Ruling: Yes. The due execution of the will would have required the observance of the provisions of
Article 808. The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or
incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof
known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes.
That the aim of the law is to insure that the dispositions of the will are properly communicated to
and understood by the handicapped testator, thus making them truly reflective of his desire, is
evidenced by the requirement that the will should be read to the latter, not only once but twice, by
two different persons, and that the witnesses have to act within the range of the testator's other
senses.
The foregoing testimony of the ophthalmologist who treated the deceased and, therefore, has first-
hand knowledge of the actual condition of her eyesight from August, 1960 up to 1963, fully establish
the fact that notwithstanding the operation and removal of the cataract in her left eye and her being
fitted with aphakic lens (used by cataract patients), her vision remained mainly for viewing distant
objects and not for reading print. Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that with the condition of her
eyesight in August, 1960, and there is no evidence that it had improved by 29 December 1960,
Gliceria del Rosario was incapable of reading, and could not have read the provisions of the will
supposedly signed by her on 29 December 1960.
Thus, for all intents and purpose of the Rulings on probate, the deceased Gliceria del Rosario was, not
unlike a blind testator, and the due execution of her will would have required observance of the
provisions of Article 808 of the Civil Code which provides that if the testator is blind, the will shall be
read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before
whom the will is acknowledged.
In connection with the will here in question, there is nothing in the records to show that the above
requisites have been complied with. Clearly, as already stated, the 1960 will sought to be probated
suffers from infirmity that affects its due execution, thus, should be disallowed.
Alvarado v. Gaviola
G.R. No. 74695, September 14, 1993
Facts: 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein he
disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously executed
holographic will at the time awaiting probate before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of sta. Cruz,
Laguna.
Alvarado did not read the final draft of the will himself as he was suffering from glaucoma. Instead,
Atty. Rino, who drafted the 8-page document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the
3 instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter 4 followed the reading with their own
respective copies previously furnished them.
Thereafter, a codicil was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash
for the testator’s eye operation. It was likewise not read by Alvarado and was read in the same
manner as with the previously executed will.
Cesar Alvarado filed his opposition as he said that the will was not executed and attested as required
by law; that the testator was insane or mentally incapacitated due to senility and old age; that the
will was executed under duress, or influence of fear or threats; that it was procured by undue
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary; and that the signature of the testator was
procured by fraud or trick.
Issue: Was there substantial compliance to the reading of the will?
Ruling: Yes. Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the
reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the
testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to
destroy the testamentary privilege.
In this case, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the
testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the
testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only
then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and Cesar Alvarado did
not allege that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and
communicated to the testator.
The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict
compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the
will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which,
when taken into account, may only defeat the testator's will.
Caneda v. CA
G.R. 103554, May 28, 1993
Facts: Mateo Caballero executed a last will and testament at his residence before 3 witnesses. He was
assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Lumontad. In the will, it was declared that the testator was leaving by
way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to several people all of whom do not
appear to be related to the testator.
Four months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case seeking the probate of his last will and
testament, but it was not pushed through because of numerous postponements. Subsequently,
Caballero died before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court.
Benoni Cabrera, as one of the legatees, sought his appointment as special administrator of the
testator’s estate. The former died and was replaced by William Cabrera as special administrator and
gave an order that the testate proceedings for the probate of the will had to be heard and resolved
first. In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the allowance of the testator’s will on
the ground that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the
instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that
they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the notary public testified that the testator
executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that
the testator was in good health and was not unduly influenced in any way in the execution of his will.
The probate court rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and testament of
the late Mateo Caballero. In the CA, the court affirmed the trial court Ruling, stating that the
attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero substantially complies with Article 805 of the
Civil Code.
Issue: Is the attestation clause in the will of testator Mateo Caballero fatally defective or can be cured
under Article 809?
Ruling: No. It cannot be cured under Article 809 of the New Civil Code. It does not comply with the
provisions of the law. Ordinary or attested wills are governed by Articles 804 to 809. The will must
be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the attesting witnesses.
Article 809 does not apply in this case because the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the
attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other. In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but
the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the
attestation clause of a will.
The defects and imperfections must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or the language
employed therein. Such defects or imperfections would not render a will invalid should it be proved
that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805.
Cagro v. Cagro
G.R. No. L-5826, April 29, 1953
Facts: The oppositors Pelagio Cagro, et. al. in this case filed an appeal from a decision of the CFI of
Samar, admitting to probate the will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Laoangan,
Pambujan, Samar, on February 14, 1949.
The main objection insisted upon by the appellant Pelagioo Cagro in that the will is fatally defective
because its attestation clause is not signed by the attesting witnesses. There is no question that the
signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause,
although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
Issue: Are the signatures of the witnesses necessary in the attestation clause?
Ruling: Yes. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will
required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses and it must necessarily bear their signatures.
An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of
their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
Here, petitioner Jesusa Cagro contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin
conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause.
This is untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be
signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages.
If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as
sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence
of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.
Taboada v. Rosal
G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982
Facts: Dorotea Perez left a will written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect consisting of two pages.
Taboada petitioned for the admission to probate of the said will. On the first page, it contains the
entire testamentary dispositions including the signatures of the three instrumental witnesses and
that of Dorotea Perez. The signatures of the three instrumental witnesses were on the left margin
while Perez’ signature was on the bottom. The second page contains the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement, were the signatures of the three attesting witnesses and that of Dorotea Perez.
However, the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will.
Issue: Is there substantial compliance of the requirement that the attestation clause must state the
total number of pages used in the will?
Ruling: Yes. The attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will. This
would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire
wig that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her
As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed
by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin.
The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "This Last Will and Testament consists of
two pages including this page".
Villaflor v. Tobias
G.R. No. L-27440, December 24, 1927
Facts: This case presents a denial of the petition for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed
by Gregoria Villaflor who died in the municipality of Santo Domingo, Province of Ilocos Sur on
October 7, 1925. The petition was presented by Jose Villaflor, one of the testamentary heirs of the
deceased.
Pilar Villaflor, Deogracias Tobias, and several others whose names do not appear in the record,
contested the will upon the following grounds: (1) That it was not signed by the alleged testatrix
personally though she was able to do so at the time of the execution of the document; (2) that said
testatrix did not authorize any one to sign the alleged will in her name; (3) that both before and after
the execution of the document, Gregoria Villaflor signed various documents by thumb marks; (4) that
although it is true that the testatrix requested that the will be prepared, she nevertheless refused to
sign it because it was contrary to her desires and instructions; (5) that subsequent to the date upon
which the alleged will was executed, Gregoria Villaflor on several occasions stated that it was not her
testament; (6) that the alleged will was not executed or signed in conformity of the law.
Moreover, the court finds that the will in question, marked Exhibit B of the applicant, was typewritten
on eight catalan sheets, one separated from the others; that the attestation clause was written on a
separate sheet, marked page 9, when said clause could not have been written totally or partially on
page 8, since one-half of this latter page is blank.
All these circumstances tend to make the authenticity and due execution of the will in question very
doubtful and suspicious. On the day in which it is alleged that said will was executed, the testatrix
was, in good and sound health, although she could not walk on her own feet inasmuch as she was
then suffering from rheumatism or partial paralysis of the lower extremities.
Issue: Will an attestation clause written on a separate page make a will false?
Ruling: No. That the attestation clause of the will is written on a separate page and not on the last
page of the body of the document is, in our opinion, a matter of minor importance and is explained
by the fact that if the clause had been written on the eight page of the will in direction continuation
of the body thereof, there would have been sufficient space on that page for the signatures of the
witnesses to the clause.
It is also to be observed that all of the pages, including that upon which the attestation clause is
written, bear the signatures of all the witnesses and that there is no question whatever as to the
genuineness of said signatures.
The fact that the name of the testatrix was written by another person, and that she did not sign by
thumb mark, is easily explained and is evidently due to an attempt on the part of the lawyer Gallardo
to comply strictly with the clause in the Spanish text of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Azuela v. CA
G.R. No. 122880, April12, 2006
Jose Paolo P. Pacquiao
Facts: Petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which
was notarized on 10 June 1981. The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo, who represented
herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent. Geralda Castillo claimed
that the will is a forgery and contained several defects. She also argued that the will was not executed
and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that decedent’s signature did not appear on
the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. These twin arguments are
among the central matters to this petition.
Issue: Did the defects render the will invalid?
Ruling: Yes. The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was
written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to
state the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation
or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. The
failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on the part of the
instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution of which they had
ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. There is substantial compliance with this requirement
if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of. However, in this case, there could
have been no substantial compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since there is no
statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which
comprise the will.
At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with the formal
requirements as enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of the members of the
Code Commission in incorporating Article 805, the fact remains that they saw fit to prescribe
substantially the same formal requisites as enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
convinced that these remained effective safeguards against the forgery or intercalation of notarial
wills.
G.R. No. 204793, June 8, 2020
Facts: Consuelo was married to Anastacio Garcia who passed away on August 14, 1985. They had two
daughters Remedios Garcia Tanchanco (Remedios) and Natividad Garcia Santos (Natividad).
Remedios predeceased Consuelo and left behind her children, which included Catalino Tanchanco
(Catalino) and Ronaldo Tanchanco.
Consuelo died on April 4, 1997. Catalino filed a petition to settle the intestate estate of Consuelo. He
further alleged that the properties of Consuelo are in the possession of Natividan and her son, Alberto
G. Santos, who have been dissipating and misappropriating the said properties. Natividad filed a
motion to dismiss stating that she already filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and
Testament of Consuelo.
The Tanchancos filed an opposition alleging that the will’s attestation clause did not state the number
of pages and that the will was written in Tagalog, and not in English language usually used by
Consuelo in most of her legal documents.
RULING: Yes. The substantial compliance Rulings is embodied in the Civil Code as Article 809 thereof,
which provides that:
Article 809: In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure
and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein
shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of article 805.
In the instant case, the attestation clause indisputably omitted to mention the number of pages
comprising the will. Nevertheless, the acknowledgment portion of the will supplied the omission by
stating that the will has five pages, to wit: “ Ang HULING HABILING ito ay binubuo ng lima (5) na
dahon, kasama ang dahong kinaroroonan ng Pagpapatunay at Pagpapatotoong ito.” Undoubtedly,
such substantially complied with article 809 of the Civil Code. Mere reading and observation of the
will, without resorting to other extrinsic evidence, yields the conclusion that there are actually five
pages even if the said information was not provided in the attestation clause. In any case, the CA
declared that there was substantial compliance with the directives of Article 805 of the Civil Code.
Labrador v. CA
180 SCRA 120
Facts: Melecio Labrador died in the Municipality of Iba, province of Zambales, leaving behind a parcel
of land to the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana,
Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will.
The heirs of Sagrado Labrador, Enrica Labrador and Cristobal Labrador, filed in the court a quo a
petition for the probate of the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador. Subsequently,
Jesus Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), and Gaudencio Labrador filed an
opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by implication
of law, alleging that Melecio, sold it to them. Jesus Labrador eventually sold said parcel of land to
Navat for only Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos.
Issue: Was the will validly dated?
Ruling: Yes. The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with
Article 810.
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only
requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These
requirements are present in the subject will.
Roxas v. De Jesus Jr.
G.R. No. L-38338, January 28, 1985
Facts: Special Proceeding No. 81503 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. de
Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus" was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the deceased
Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.
Petitioner delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the holographic Will of the
deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. He testified that he found a notebook belonging to the deceased
Bibiana R. de Jesus and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-win addressed to her children
and entirely written and signed in the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found.
The will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my win which I want to be respected although it is
not written by a lawyer. Respondent Luz R. Henson alleged that the holographic Will of the deceased
Bibiana R. de Jesus was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code. She contends that the
law requires that the Will should contain the day, month and year of its execution and that this should
be strictly complied with.
Issue: Is the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus
is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code?
Ruling: Yes. As a general Ruling, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and
year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith,
undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only Issue is
whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with
Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle
of substantial compliance.
This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the
statutory requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. We should not overlook the liberal
trend of the Civil Code in the manner of execution of Wills, the purpose of which, in case of doubt, is
to prevent intestacy.
Rivera v. CA
182 SCRA 322
Facts: On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera died.
Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's estate. This petition was opposed by Adelaido J.
Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his
father and did not die intestate but in fact left two holographic wills.
The trial court found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the decedent but of a different Venancio
Rivera who was married to Maria Vital. The Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question was
married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had seven children, including Adelaido. Jose Rivera had no
claim to this estate because the decedent was not his father.
Issue: Can a stranger contest the validity of a will?
Ruling: No. There was no necessity of presenting the three witnesses required under Article 811
because the authenticity of the wills had not been questioned.
The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by Jose
Rivera. In his own petition, he declared that Venancio Rivera died intestate; and he denied the
existence of the holographic wills presented by Adelaido Rivera for probate. In both proceedings, Jose
Rivera opposed the holographic wills submitted by Adelaido Rivera and claimed that they were
spurious. Consequently, it may be argued, the respondent court should have applied Article 811 of
the Civil Code, providing as follows:
In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.
The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is not the son of the
deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no
personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring
the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills
as having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.
Icasiano vs Icasiano
11 SCRA 472
Facts: Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for his
appointment as executor thereof. The testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She left a will in Tagalog,
and through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in duplicates, an original and a carbon copy.
On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy of the will
while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of
the pages in the original copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when
he signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the testator and other
witnesses in his presence.
Ruling: Yes. The failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure
oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a
complete set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment
before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time.
The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of
the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of
the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained,
no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full
observance of the statutory requisites.
Codoy v. Calugay
G.R. No. 123486, August 12, 1999
Faith Imee D. Roble
Facts: On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and
legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a petition for probate of the holographic will of the
deceased, who died on January 16, 1990. In the petition, they claimed that the deceased Matilde Seño
Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will on August 30, 1978,
that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the person of the testator, and will
was written voluntarily.
On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to the petition
for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This
gives an impression that a "third hand" of an interested party other than the "true hand" of Matilde
Seño Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will. They argued that the repeated dates
incorporated or appearing on the will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased
was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature should appear at
the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every disposition. And assuming
that the holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery.
Issue: Are all the witnesses presented credible to testify that the date, text, and signature on the
holographic will are written entirely in the hand of the testatrix?
Ruling: No. The witnesses presented are not competent to testify for the genuineness of the
handwriting of the testator.
Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. The
Supreme Court has Rulingd that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and
is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when
used in a statute is mandatory.
Here, not all the witnesses presented testified explicitly that they were familiar with the handwriting
of the testator. In the case of Augusto Neri, clerk of court, Court of First Instance, Misamis Oriental,
he merely identified the record of Special Proceedings No. 427 before said court. He was not
presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic was that of the
deceased. Generosa E. Senon, the election registrar of Cagayan de Oro City, was presented to identify
the signature of the deceased in the voter's affidavit, which was not even produced as it was no longer
available. Matilde Ramonal Binanay, on the other hand, testified that she saw the deceased sign a
document or write a note.
In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that "the object of the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws
on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But on the
other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and
curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.
However, the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator cannot be
eliminated, which is why if the holographic will is contested, the law requires three witnesses to
declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased. The will was found not in the personal
belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who kept it even before the death of the
deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early
as 1985, or five years before the death of the deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the
deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at
comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked
Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature of the deceased with that of
the holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased
expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince the Court that the strokes are different when
compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the
disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, and the signatures in several
documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, and a letter
dated June 16, 1978, the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes,
evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will.
Therefore, it cannot be certain to Ruling that the holographic will was in the handwriting by the
deceased.
Azaola v. Singson
G.R. No. L-14003, August 5, 1960
Faith Imee D. Roble
Facts: On September 9, 1957, Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died at 13 Luskot, Quezon City, known to be
the last residence of said testatrix. Francisco Azaola, submitted the said holographic will (Exh. C) for
probate whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made the sole heir as against the nephew of deceased
Cesario Singson.
Witness Francisco Azaola testified that the penmanship appearing in the aforesaid documentary
evidence is in the handwriting of the testatrix as well as the signatures appearing in the aforesaid
documentary evidence is in the handwriting of the testatrix as well as the signatures appearing
therein are the signatures of the testatrix; that said witness, in answer to a question of his counsel
admitted that the holographic will was handed to him by the testatrix, then "apparently it must have
been written by her". However, on page 16 on the same transcript of the stenographic notes, when
the same witness was asked by counsel if he was familiar with the penmanship and handwriting of
the deceased Fortunata Vda. de Yance, he answered positively in the affirmative and when he was
asked again whether the penmanship referred to in the previous answer as appearing in the
holographic will (Exh. C) was hers (testatrix'), he answered, "I would definitely say it is hers".
The opposition to the probate by Cesario Singson was on the ground that (1) the execution of the will
was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his
wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the
same was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956
as appears on the will.
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must
present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the
testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness presented by the proponent "did
not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix."
The proponent appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one witness
because the will's authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily
require the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic
will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse party.
Issue: Does Article 811 mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting and signature of a holographic will?
Ruling: No. Article 811 of our present Civil Code cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory
presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having
the probate denied.
Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required
by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the
requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. Under Article 811, the resort
to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the Court deem it necessary", which reveal that
what the law deems essential is that the Court should be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where
the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that
the will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence.
On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the
Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is
to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the
true intention of the testator be carried into effect.
And because the law leaves it to the trial court if experts are still needed, no unfavourable inference
can be drawn from a party's failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses
dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses. Our conclusion is that the Ruling of the first
paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is merely directory and is not mandatory.
Gan v. Yap
G.R. No. L-12190, August 30, 1958
Faith Imee D. Roble
Facts: On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the University of
Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila. On March 17,
1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated proceedings in the Manila court of first instance with a petition for the
probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left
any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime. During trial, the will itself was not
presented. Fausto Gan tried to establish its contents and due execution by the statements in open
court of Felina Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan Jimenez.
Issue: May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen
it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?
Ruling: No. The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved
by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
Before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain why, unlike holographic wills, ordinary
wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature
of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the
testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the
holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the
subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate. In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to
convince three witnesses (four with the notary) deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be
checked and exposed, their whereabouts and acts on the particular day, the likelihood that they
would be called by the testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc. And if they were intimates or
trusted friends of the testator they are not likely to end themselves to any fraudulent scheme to
distort his wishes. Last but not least, they cannot receive anything on account of the will. Whereas in
the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible only one man could engineer the fraud
this way: after making a clever or passable imitation of the handwriting and signature of the
deceased, he may contrive to let three honest and credible witnesses see and read the forgery; and
the latter, having no interest, could easily fall for it, and in court they would in all good faith affirm its
genuineness and authenticity. The will having been lost — the forger may have purposely destroyed
it in an "accident" — the oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the error, because the
document itself is not at hand. And considering that the holographic will may consist of two or three
pages, and only one of them need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be the
most important ones, may go undetected.
If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable feature —
feasibility of forgery — would be added to the several objections to this kind of wills listed by Castan,
Sanchez Roman and Valverde and other well-known Spanish Commentators and teachers of Civil
Law.
One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses would be
testifying to a fact which they saw, namely the act of the testator of subscribing the will; whereas in
the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their opinion of the handwriting
which they allegedly saw, an opinion which cannot be tested in court, nor directly contradicted by
the oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at hand.
The circumstances in this case appear to be dubious, it is hard to believe that the deceased should
show her will precisely to relatives who had received nothing from it: Socorro Olarte and Primitivo
Reyes. These could pester her into amending her will to give them a share, or threaten to reveal its
execution to her husband Ildefonso Yap. And this leads to another point: if she wanted so much to
conceal the will from her husband, why did she not entrust it to her beneficiaries?
Thus, the rejection of the alleged will must be sustained.

Rodelas v. Aranza
G.R. No. L-58509, December 7, 1982
Faith Imee D. Roble
Facts: On January 11, 1977, Marcela Rodelas filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal
for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary
in her favor. However, only a copy of the alleged holographic will was presented.
The petition was opposed by Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias
and Ephraim Bonilla who alleged that the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise,
executed and attested as required by law; and that a lost holographic will may be proved by its copy.
Issue: Can a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found be proved by means of a photostatic
copy?
Ruling: Yes. A photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator.
Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by
the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If
uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may
be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the
holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated
because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will.
It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator
and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed
because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gan vs.
Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court Rulingd that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed
holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read
such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that
"Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon
copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased
may be exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the
lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting
of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.
Kalaw v. Relova
G.R. No. L-40207, September 28, 1984
Faith Imee D. Roble
Facts: On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be the sole heir
of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the probate of her holographic Will executed on December 24,
1968.
The holographic Will reads in full as follows:
My Last will and Testament
In the name of God, Amen.
I Natividad K. Kalaw Filipino 63years of age, single, and a resident of Lipa City, being of sound
and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare thus to be my last will and testament.
1. It is my will that I'll be burried in the cemetery of the catholic church of Lipa City. In accordance
with the rights of said Church, and that my executrix hereinafter named provide and erect at the
expose of my state a suitable monument to perpetuate my memory.
xxx xxx xxx
The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir.
Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in substance, that
the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code.
The document Exhibit "C" was submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination.
The NBI reported that the handwriting, the signature, the insertions and/or additions and the initial
were made by one and the same person. Consequently, Exhibit "C" was the handwriting of the
decedent, Natividad K. Kalaw.
Issue: Can the will be admitted to probate although the alterations and/or insertions or additions
were not authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix pursuant to Art. 814 of the Civil Code?
Ruling: No. A holographic will which only had one substantial provision which was later on altered
but did not carry the requisite of full authentication of the testatrix is voided.
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, the Will is not thereby invalidated as a
whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision,
which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry
the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the
entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that
which could remain valid.
To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of
mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to
authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature, itself. As it is, with the
erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be
determined with certitude.
Ajero v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994
Faith Imee D. Roble
Facts: Submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on November
25, 1982. In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma
Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe
Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
On January 20, 1983, Roberto and Thelma Ajero instituted for allowance of decedent's holographic
will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting
under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate
by will.
Sand, et.al. opposed the petition on the ground that it contained alterations and corrections which
were not duly signed by the decedent; and that the Cabadbaran property which was subjected to
disposition by the will is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand which cannot be conveyed in its
full entirety.
Issue: Is the will executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law?
Ruling: Yes. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may be made in or out of
the Philippines and need not be witnessed. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result
in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the
dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date
some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure,
however, does not render the whole testament void.
A holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the
provisions of Article 814. Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions
were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not
invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
Ernesto M. Guevara v. Rosario Guevara and her husband Pedro Buison
74 Phil 479, December 29, 1943
Shirley Kris M. Romblon
Facts: In August 26, 1931, Victorino Guevara executed a will wherein he made various bequests to
his wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and an acknowledged
natural daughter Rosario. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate
nor was there any settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernesto possessed
the land which he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing
to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.
Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a
large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption
that the decedent died intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition
in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained
Rosario's theory.
Issue: Is probate necessary for Rosario to be able to claim her legitime as an acknowledged natural
daughter?
Ruling: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent
the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is
mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. Suppression of the will is
contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of a person to dispose of his property
by will may be rendered nugatory.
In the instant case, there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present litigants had
received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of the provisions
of the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on
account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court for probate. Even
if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and due execution
of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that will
without first securing its allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law expressly provides
that “no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper
court” and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed
with the substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against
public policy designed to effectuate the testator’s right to dispose of his property by will in
accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means
provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said
heirs and legatees. Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an
action for partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the registration under
the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action for reivindicacion or partition.
Antonia Ventura v. Maura Ventura, Et. Al.
G.R. No. L-11609, September 24, 1959
Facts: Antonia Ventura is the widow of Agustine del Valle. She instituted Special Proceedings No.
912 if said court, with a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the Agustine.
Petitioner filed a motion stating that the heirs instituted in the will had agreed to partition, among
themselves, the estate of the deceased , in accordance with the provisions of said instrument, and
praying that an order be Issued "terminating and closing" the aforementioned proceedings. The
court Issued an order declaring that said motion was well taken and would, accordingly, be
granted, upon submission of a signed copy of the corresponding deed of extra-judicial partition.
Petitioner complied with this requirement and said Special Proceedings No. 912 was "terminated,
closed and archived".
However, Antonia Ventura filed another partition for the probate of the probate of the
aforementioned last will and testament. Appellees Maura, Milagros, Deogracias and Jacinta, all
surnamed Ventura, moved for the dismissal of the case upon the ground that it amounted to an
attempt to reopen Special Proceedings No. 912, which had already been finally and definitely
closed, terminated and archived; that the present proceedings is unnecessary and superfluous;
and that the provisions of the will in question had " already been carried out" in the
aforementioned deed of extra-judicial partition. The lower court granted this motion upon the
theory that it " no longer" had "jurisdiction to entertain" the case, "because to do so would be for
the court to reopen Special Proceedings No. 912", notwithstanding the fact that it had been
"definitely declared terminated, closed and archived" by an order which has already "become final
and executory", no appeal having been taken therefrom.
Issue: Did the dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 912 bars the consideration of the petition
herein.
Ruling: No. The aforementioned conclusion of the lower court is untenable. Although final and
executory; said order of dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 912 does not bar the consideration
of the petition herein.
The order Issue in Special Proceedings No. 912, directing that the same be closed, terminated and
archived, had filed a pleading or raised an Issue, is deemed, therefore, to be "without prejudice",
the contrary not being stated either in said order or in the motion that prompted its issuance.
Needless to say, the aforementioned order may not be regarded as a judgment, barring a
subsequent action upon the ground of "res judicata", said order not being an adjudication on the
merits. In other words, the lower court had, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty to entertain
appellant's petition for probate of the alleged will of Agustin de Valle. Antonia Ventura moved for
the dismissal of the complaint therein, upon the ground that is was barred by the action taken in
the aforementioned Special Proceedings No. 912. This motion was denied, on April 12, 1956, upon
the ground that no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is probated and allowed
in the proper court and that the probate of such will cannot be dispensed with. Hence, Antonia
Ventura felt constrained to institute the present proceedings. At any rate, under the circumstance,
public policy and public interest demand a determination of the question whether Agustin de Valle
died testate or intestate.
In re: Testate Estate of the deceased Jose B. Suntay
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088, July 31, 1954
Facts: Sometime in 1934, Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines, died in
Amoy, China. He left real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy. During
his lifetime, he married twice, the first wife was Manuela Cruz, with whom he had several children.
The second marriage was with Maria Natividad Lim Brillian, with whom he had a son, herein
petitioner, Silvino Suntay. An intestate proceeding was instituted by the heirs from the first
marriage. While the second wife, the surviving widow who remained in Amoy China, filed a
petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased which was claimed to have
been executed and signed in the Philippines on November 1929. The petition was denied due to
the loss of the will before the hearing thereof.
After the Pacific War, Silvino claimed to have found among the records of his father, a last will and
testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on January 1931 and
probated in the Amoy District Court. He filed a petition in the intestate proceedings for the probate
of the will executed in the Philippines in November 1929 or the will executed in Amoy China in
November 1931.
Issue: Is the will executed in Amoy, China can still be validly probated in the Philippines?
Ruling: No. To have the will executed in Amoy, China be validly probated in the Philippines, the
following must be proven: (a.) the fact that the Municipal District Court of Amoy, China is a probate
court; (b.) the law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills; (c.) Established
competent evidence of the legal requirements for the execution of the will in China in 1931. Herein
case, there is no proof on these points.
Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the Municipal District Court of Amoy were for
the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the
said court does not purport to probate the will. The order of the Municipal District Court of Amoy,
China does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In
view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in
accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the
probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in
the Municipal District Court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings
leading to the probate of allowance of a will. Therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be
allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court in the Philippines.
Miciano v. Brimo
50 Phil 867, November 1, 1927
Facts: Juan Miciano was the judicial administrator of the estate of Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen.
Miciano filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph
Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance and that said scheme of partition was
not in accordance in the Turkish laws. However, in the second part of the will of Joseph Brimo, he
specifically indicated that the distribution of his properties shall be in accordance with the
Philippine laws and not his national law, which is Turkish.
Issue: Is the Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s estates and not
the Turkish law?
Ruling: No. Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described
as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible
conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the
testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
Further, Andre Brimo failed to prove that the scheme of partition being filed violated the Turkish
law. Hence, the court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in
such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
Dela Cerna v. Potot
12 Scra 576, December 23, 1964
Facts: The spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and
testament where they willed that their two(2) parcels of land be given to Manuela Rebaca, their
niece and that while each of them are living, he/she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the lands
mentioned. When Bernabe died, Gervasia submitted the will for probated. By order, the Court
admitted for probate of the said will but only for the part of Bernabe in Oct. 31, 1939.
When Gervasia died, another petition for probate was instituted by Manuela, but because she and
her attorney failed to appear in court, the petition was dismissed. When the same was heard, the
CFI declared the will void for being executed contrary to the prohibition on joint wills. But on
appeal, the order was reversed.
Issue: Is the second petition for probate on the will valid?
Ruling: No. The court admitted that the probate of the will in 1939 was erroneous.
However, because it was probated by a court of competent jurisdiction, it has conclusive effect and
a final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world.
But this is only with respect to the estate of the husband and cannot affect the estate of the wife;
considering that a joint will is a separate will of each testator.
The joint will being prohibited by law, its validity, in so far as the estate of the wife is concerned,
must be reexamine and adjudicated de novo. The undivided interest of the wife should pass upon
her death to her intestate heirs and not to the testamentary heir. Thus, as to the disposition of the
wife, the will cannot be given effect.
Gonzales v. Ca
G.R. No. L-37453, May 25, 1979
Facts: Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 without Issue. Lutgarda Santiago (respondent), niece
of Isabel, filed a petition for probate of Isabel’s will designating her as the principal beneficiary
and executrix. The will was typewritten in Tagalog and was executed 2 months prior to death
of Isabel.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of Isabel, on the
following grounds:
1. The will is not genuine;
2. The will was not executed and attested as required by law;
3. The decedent at the time of the making of the will did not have testamentary capacity due to
her age and sickness; and
4. The will was procured through undue influence.
The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of Appeals Reversed the said
decision of the trial court. The petitioner filed a petition for review with SC claiming that the CA
erred in holding that the will of the decedent was executed and attested as required by law
when there was absolutely no proof that the 3 instrumental witnesses are credible.
Issue: Is it required that there must be evidence on record that the witness to a will has good
standing in his/her community or that he/she is honest or upright?
Ruling: No. There is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time
during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness
and for being reliable, his honesty and uprightness (such attributes are presumed of the witness
unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party) in order that his testimony may
be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in
Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be
shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18
years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as
well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the
satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the
Civil Code.
G.R. No. 204793, June 8, 2020
Zusmitha D. Salcedo
Facts: Consuelo was married to Anastacio Garcia who was already died. They had two daughters,
Remedios Tanchanco and Natividad Santos. Remedios predeceased Consuelo in 1985 and left
behid her children, whic included Catalino and Ronaldo. On April 4, 1997, Consuelo Garcia died
leaving behind an estate consisting of several personal and real properties. On August 11, 1997,
Catalino filed a petition before the RTC of Pasay to settle the estate of Consuelo. Natividad then file
a Motion to Dismiss stating that she already filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and
Testament of Consuelo entitled “Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya ni Consuel Santiago Garcia.”
The Tanchancos filed an opposition to Natividad’s petition alleging that the will was a total
fabrication. One of their bases was the had doubts as to the law firm, the Quasha Law Offices, that
drafted the will which is the same counsel of Natividad. The lawyers also in the said law firm were
the witnesses to the said will. Moreover, they aver that none of Consuelo’s relatives witnessed the
execution of the will.
Issue: Are the lawyers disqualified from being a witness to a will?
Ruling: No, lawyers are not disqualified from being witnesses to a will. Article 820 of the Civil Code
provides that, “Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not bind,
deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in
Article 805 of this Code.” Here, the attesting witnesses to the will in question are all lawyers
equipped with the aforementioned qualifications. In addition, they are not disqualified from being
witnesses under Article 821 of the Civil Code, even if they all worked at the same law firm at the
time. As pointed out by Natividad, these lawyers would not risk their professional licenses by
knowingly signing a document which they knew was forged or executed under duress; moreover,
they did not have anything to gain from the estate when they signed as witnesses. All the same,
petitioners did not present controverting proof to discredit them or to show that they were
disqualified from being witnesses to Consuelo’s will at the time of its execution.
Since the will in this case is contested, Section 11, Ruling 76 of the Rulings of Court applies, to wit:
If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills executed
under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not insane, must be
produced and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily
shown to the court. If all or some of such witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside the
province where the will has been filed, their deposition must be taken. x x x
The lawyer-witnesses unanimously confirmed that the will was duly executed by Consuelo who
was of sound mind and body at the time of signing. The Tanchancos failed to dispute the
competency and credibility of these witnesses; thus, the Court is disposed to give credence to their
testimonies that Consuelo executed the will in accordance with the formalities of the law and with
full mental faculties and willingness to do so.
Agapitan Cruz v. Hon. Guillermo Villasor

G.R. No. L-32213, November 26, 1973
Zusmitha D. Salcedo
Facts: Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving spouse of VALENTE Z. CRUZ opposed the allowance of the will
alleging that it was was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence;
that it was execute without the testator having been fully informed of the content thereof,
particularly as to what properties he was disposing; and that it was not executed in accordance
with law.
Of the 3 instrumental witnesses thereto, Atty. Teves, Jr. is at the same time the Notary Public before
whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. As the 3rd witness is the notary public
himself, Cruz argues that the result is that only 2 witnesses appeared before the notary public to
acknowledge the will.On the other hand, Manuel B. Lugay, who is the supposed executor of the will
maintains that there is substantial compliance with the legal requirement of having at least three
attesting witnesses even if the notary public acted as one of them
Issue: Is the last will and testament of Valente Cruz executed in accordance with Articles 805 and
806 of the New Civil Code?
Ruling: No, the last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance with law. The
notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. If the
third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow, assent, or admit his having
signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into
two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the
will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.n Re Estate of
Saguinsin
Art. 824
Caluya v. Domingo
G.R. No. 7647, March 27, 1914
Zusmitha D. Salcedo
Facts: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos
Norte denying the probate of a will. One of the grounds for the denial of the probate of the will is
that as to the witness Segundino, the will mentioned and confirmed a sale of land to him by the
testator, and he being thereby an interested party his testimony could not be believed.
Issue: Does the fact that the testator in his will mentioned a sale of real estate which he had made
to one of the witnesses of the will make such person an incompetent witness?
Ruling: No, the judgment refusing its probate must be reversed. The fact that the testator in his will
mentioned a sale of real estate, fully consummated before his death, which he had made to one of
the witnesses to his will, does not make such person an incompetent witness; nor does the fact that
he signed the will as one of the attesting witnesses render the will invalid under section 622 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.As will readily be seen on reading this section, nothing in the will before us
relative to the sale of land to Segundino Asis creates such an interest therein as falls within the
provisions thereof. Indeed, no interest of any kind was created by the will in favor of Segundino
Asis, nor did it convey or transfer any interest to him. It simply mentioned a fact already
consummated, a sale already made. Even if, however, the will had conveyed an interest to
Segundino Asis, it would not have been for that reason void. Only that clause of the will conveying
an interest to him would have been void; the remainder could have stood and would have stood as
a valid testament.
Art. 828
Testate Estate of Maloto

G.R. No. 76464, February 29, 1988
Zusmitha D. Salcedo
Facts: Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-
Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto.
Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, the four heirs
commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate. They executed an
agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate dividing it into four equal parts among
themselves.
Three years later, Adriana’s purported will was discovered. It was alleged that such was not
Adriana’s will since a will was allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto
Vda. de Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix.
Issue: Was the will validly revoked?
Ruling: No, there is no sufficient basis for the conclusion that Adriana Maloto's will had been
effectively revoked.
The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an
effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the
testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may
be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the
testator.
In this case, while animus revocandi, or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state
of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary
elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be
accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will
carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction.
There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document
or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be the will of
Adriana Maloto. The burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of
Adriana. The burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, stated that
they were the only ones present at the place where the stove was located in which the papers
proffered as a will were burned. The testimony of such witnesses appears inconclusive.
Art. 832
Molo v. Molo
G. R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951
Zusmitha D. Salcedo
Facts: Mariano Molo y Legaspi, who died on January 24, 1941, executed two wills, one executed on
June 20, 1939 and another in 1918. He was survived by his wife, Juana Juan Vda de Molo and his
nieces and nephew, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio Molo. On February 7, 1941, Juana filed a petition for
the probate of the 1939 Will. In view of the disallowance of the said will, the widow filed another
petition for the probate of the 1918 will. Luz and Cornelio then filed an opposition alleging that the
said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. Hence, the revocatory clause is valid and
still has the effect of nullifying the prior of 1918. Luz and Cornelio also contend that the testator,
after executing the 1939 will and with full knowledge of the recovatory clause contained in the said
will, deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will. For that reason, the will submitted by
Juana for probate is only a duplicate of the said original.
Issue: Can the 1918 Will still be valid despite the revocatory clause in the 1939 will which was
disallowed for probate?
Ruling: Yes. A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been
disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the
previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.
There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator deliberately destroyed the
original of the 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will he
executed in 1939. The earlier will can still be probated under doctrine of dependent relative
revocation. The said doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an
instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as
substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails to effect for some reason.
Therefore, even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the testator could be
presumed from the failure of the Juana to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the
effect of defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief
that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and would be given due effect. The theory on which
this principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die intestate. This intention is
clearly manifest when he executed two wills on two different occasion and instituted his wife as
his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate.
Naval v. Naval
G.R. No. L-11823, February 11, 1918
Zusmitha D. Salcedo
Facts: Simeona Naval, executed a will on February 13, 1915 where he appointed Atty. Perfecto
Gabriel as executor. After the death Simeona, Atty. Gabriel filed a petition for probation of the said
will on September 20, 1915. However, the petition was denied. Thereafter the nieces and legatees
filed in the same court for allowance of will, another document purporting to be a will executed by
Simeona on October 31, 1914. It was opposed by Monica, Rosa and Cristina Naval on the ground
that the will could not be allowed due to the existence of another will executed by Simeona during
her lifetime. Thus, said will has been revoked by the subsequent will.
Issue: Did the February 1915 Will validly revoked the October 1914 Will?
Ruling: No, the February 1915 Will validly revoked the October 1914 Will. Article 739 of the Civil
Code provides that a former will is by operation of law revoked by another valid subsequent will,
if the testator does not state in the later will his desire that the former should subsist wholly or
partly. In harmony with this provision of substantive law, we find section 623 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which provides that no will shall be revoked, except by implication of law, otherwise
than by some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills.
A subsequent will containing a clause revoking an earlier will must, as a general Ruling, be admitted
to probate before the clause of revocation can have any effect, and the same kind, quality, and
method of proof is required for the establishment of the subsequent will as was required for the
establishment of the former will.
There can be no doubt whatever that this applies when the revocation had been made to appear in
a writing or document susceptible of presentation for allowance, like the so-called will of the
deceased Simeona F. Naval, dated February 13, 1915, and considered by said respondent and
appellant as a mere document of revocation, for, as already seen in said decision invoked by her,
the requisite as to signing, attesting, and subscribing in the form, required by law for the execution
of wills in order that it may revoke a previous will, is also required in a will as well as in a codicil,
or in a writing, and in referring to a document of revocation, it is also expressed that its validity
should be proved in a direct proceeding, instituted for the purpose in a probate court. In the case
at bar, the document, executed by the deceased, Simeona F. Naval, as her last will and testament,
dated February 13, 1915, has been presented for allowance; it validity has been proved by means
of said procedure in the Court of Probate of Manila, and that court denied its allowance, on the
ground that the document in question had not been duly executed by the deceased, as her last will
and testament, because she did not sign in the presence of three witnesses, and two of these
witnesses did not sign in the presence of each other, or what is the same thing, that said document
has not be attested and subscribed in the manner established by law for the execution of will, or,
in other words, as provided by law in case of wills, as stated by section 623 of said procedural law,
and this resolution was acquiesced in, as already stated, by the respondents in this case, and is,
therefore, final and executory.
Art. 830
Testate Estate of the late Adriana Maloto, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Purificacion
Miraflor, Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Asilo De Molo v. Court of Appeals, Panfilo Maloto and
Felino Maloto
G.R. No. 76464, February 29, 1988
Nor-Aiza R. Unas
Facts: On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the
petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo
Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and
testament, these four heirs commenced on November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for the
settlement of their aunt's estate. However, while the case was still in progress, the parties — Aldina,
Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino — executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's
estate. The agreement provided for the division of the estate into four equal parts among the
parties.
The Malotos then presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval.
Three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana's counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo
Hervas, discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento),"
dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma
claimed to have found the testament, the original copy, while he was going through some materials
inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas.
Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio
are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they
received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed. The will
likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners Asilo de
Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.
Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in the will, filed in Special
Proceeding No. 1736 a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and
for the allowance of the will.
Issue: Was there a valid revocation of the will?
Ruling: No. Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
(1) By implication of law; or
(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills: or
(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the
testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned,
torn cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the testator,
the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents,
and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are
established according to the Rulings of Court . (Emphasis Supplied.)
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se
constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the
part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator
himself. It may be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the
presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the
will itself.
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state
of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary
elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be
accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will
carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction.
There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document
or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at
all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been
done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both
witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the
place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a
will were burned.
Nowhere in the records before us does it appear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral
and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably positive that the document burned was
indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think, believed that the papers she destroyed was the will
only because, according to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his
information that the burned document was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his
testimony on this point is double hearsay.
Francisco Gago v. Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac
G.R. No. L-26317, January 29, 1927
Nor-Aiza R. Unas
Facts: Miguel Mamuyac died on January 2, 1922. On or about the 27th day of July, 1918, he executed
a last will and testament. Francisco Gago presented a petition for the probation of that will. The
probation of the same was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon,
and Catalina Mamuyac. The said petition was denied upon the ground that the deceased had on the
16th day of April, 1919, executed a new will and testament. On the 21st day of February, 1925, the
present action was commenced. Its purpose was to secure the probation of the said will of the 16th
day of April, 1919. To said petition Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and
Catalina Mamuyac presented their oppositions, alleging (a) that the said will is a copy of the second
will and testament executed by the said Miguel Mamuyac; ( b) that the same had been cancelled
and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac and ( c) that the said will was not the last will
and testament of the deceased Miguel Mamuyac. The probation of the April 16, 1919 will was
denied upon the ground that the same had been cancelled and revoked in the year 1920.
Issue: Was there a cancellation and revocation of the will?
Ruling: Yes. The 1918 will is a mere carbon of its original which remained in the possession of the
deceased testator Miguel Mamuyac, who revoked it before his death as per testimony of witness
Jose Fenoy, who typed the will of the testator on April 16, 1919, and Carlos Bejar, who saw on
December 30, 1920, the original will of 1919 actually cancelled by the testator Miguel Mamuyac,
who assured Carlos Bejar that inasmuch as he had sold him a house and the land where the house
was built, he had to cancel it (the will of 1919), executing thereby a new testament. Narcisa Gago
in a way corroborates the testimony of Jose Fenoy, admitting that the will executed by the deceased
(Miguel Mamuyac) in 1919 was found in the possession of father Miguel Mamuyac. The opponents
have successfully established the fact that father Miguel Mamuyac had executed in 1920 another
will. The same Narcisa Gago, the sister of the deceased, who was living in the house with him, when
cross-examined by attorney for the opponents, testified that the original Exhibit A could not be
found.
With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof, not denied,
which was accepted by the lower court, that will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The law
does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It
therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills. The fact that
such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved of be inferred from
evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot
be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption
is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same
presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot
be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other
person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of
cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to
the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not
destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.
Art. 832
Testate Estate of the Deceased Mariano Molo y Legaspi. Juana Juan Vda. De Molo v. Luz, Gliceria and
Cornelio Molo
G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951
Nor-Aiza R. Unas
Facts: Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941 without leaving any forced heir either in
the descending or ascending line. He was survived, however, by his wife, the herein petitioner
Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and
Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased
brother of Mariano. He left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918 and another executed on
June 20, 1939. The later will executed in 1918.
Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed a petition seeking the probate of the will executed by Mariano on
June 20, 1939. It was probated. However, upon petition filed by the herein oppositors, the order of
the court admitting the will to probate was set aside and the case was reopened. After hearing, the
court rendered decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that Juana failed to prove
that the same was executed in accordance with law.
In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, Juana filed another petition for
the probate of the will executed by the deceased on August 17, 1918. It was opposed again based
on three grounds: (1) that petitioner is now estopped from seeking the probate of the will of 1918;
(2) that said will has not been executed in the manner required by law and (3) that the will has
been subsequently revoked.
Issue: Was Mariano’s 1918 will subsequently revoked by his 1939 will?
Ruling: No. In the case of Samson vs. Naval, the court said that: A subsequent will, containing a
clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in
conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of
wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause
is void. (41 Phil., 838.)
It is true that our law on the matter (sec. 623, Code Civil Procedure) provides that a will may be
some will, codicil, or other writing executed as proved in case of wills" but it cannot be said that
the 1939 will should be regarded, not as a will within the meaning of said word, but as "other
writing executed as provided in the case of wills", simply because it was denied probate. And even
if it be regarded as any other writing within the meaning of said clause, there is authority for
holding that unless said writing is admitted to probate, it cannot have the effect of revocation. (See
57 Am. Jur. pp. 329-330).
There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator deliberately destroyed the
original of the 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will he
executed in 1939. The only evidence we have is that when the first will was executed in 1918, Juan
Salcedo, who prepared it, gave the original and copies to the testator himself and apparently they
remained in his possession until he executed his second will in 1939. And when the 1939 will was
denied probate on November 29, 1943, and Juana was asked by her attorney to look for another
will, she found the duplicate copy among the papers or files of the testator. She did not find the
original.
If it can be inferred that the testator deliberately destroyed the 1918 will because of his knowledge
of the revocatory clause of the 1939 will, and it is true that he gave a duplicate copy thereof to his
wife, Juana, the most logical step for the testator to take is to recall said duplicate copy in order that
it may likewise be destroyed. But this was not done as shown by the fact that said duplicate copy
remained in the possession of Juana. It is possible that because of the long lapse of twenty-one (21)
years since the first will was executed, the original of the will had been misplaced or lost, and
forgetting that there was a copy, the testator deemed it wise to execute another will containing
exactly the same testamentary dispositions. Whatever may be the conclusion we may draw from
this chain of circumstances, the stubborn fact is that there is no direct evidence of voluntary or
deliberate destruction of the first will by the testator. This matter cannot be inference or conjectur.
In the Matter of the Estate of Jesus De Leon. Ignacia Diaz v. Ana De Leon
G.R. No. 17714, May 31, 1922
Nor-Aiza R. Unas
Facts: The only question raised in this case is whether the will executed by Jesus de Leon, now, was
revoked by him. He denies such revocation, while the contestant affirms the same by alleging that
Jesus de Leon revoked his will by destroying it, and by executing another will expressly revoking
the former.
Issue: Was Jesus de Leon’s will revoked by him?
Ruling: No, we find that the second will executed by Jesus de Leon is not cloth with all the necessary
requisites to constitute a sufficient revocation. But according to the statute governing the subject
in this jurisdiction, the destruction of a will animo revocandi constitutes, in itself, a sufficient
revocation. (Sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure.)
From the evidence submitted in this case, it appears that the Jesus, shortly after the execution of
the first will in question, asked that the same be returned to him. The instrument was returned to
the testator who ordered his servant to tear the document. This was done in his presence and
before a nurse who testified to this effect. After some time, he, being asked by Dr. Cornelio Mapa
about the will, said that it had been destroyed. The intention of revoking the will is manifest from
the established fact that the testator was anxious to withdraw or change the provisions he had
made in his first will. This fact is disclosed by the testator's own statements to the witnesses Canto
and the Mother Superior of the Hospital where he was confined. The original will herein presented
for probate having been destroyed with animo revocandi, cannot now be probated as the will and
last testament of Jesus de Leon.
Art. 838
Ernesto M. Guevara v. Rosario Guevara and her husband Pedro Buison

G.R. No. L-48840, December 29, 1943
Nor-Aiza R. Unas
Facts: On August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will wherein he made the following
bequests: To his stepdaughter Candida Guevara, a pair of earrings worth P150 and a gold chain
worth P40; to his son Ernesto M. Guevara, a gold ring worth P180 and all the furniture, pictures,
statues, and other religious objects found in the residence of the testator in Poblacion Sur,
Bayambang, Pangasinan; "a mi hija Rosario Guevara," a pair of earrings worth P120; to his stepson
Piuo Guevara, a ring worth P120; and to his wife by second marriage, Angustia Posadas, various
pieces of jewelry worth P1,020. He also made devices.
On September 27, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra died. His last will and testament, however, was never
presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted for
the settlement of his estate. In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's
last will and testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary
dispositions made therein in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural
daughter and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of 21.6171
hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will. But a little over four years after the testor's
demise, she (assisted by her husband) commenced the present action against Ernesto M. Guevara
alone for the purpose hereinbefore indicated; and it was only during the trial of this case that she
presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to prove that the
deceased Victirino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of
acknowledgment she claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory or
assumption that he died intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which reason, she
asserted, the betterment therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M.
Guevara should be disregarded. Both the trial court and the Court of appeals sustained that theory.
Issue: Is it mandatory to present a will to the court for probate?
Ruling: Yes. The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the
whole world and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator (section 630, C. c. P., and sections 3 and 4, Ruling 77). Altho not contested (section 5, Ruling
77), the due execution of the will and the fact that the testator at the time of its execution was of
sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace, and undue influence or fraud,
must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, and only then may the will be legalized and given
effect by means of a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and attested by the seal of the
court; and when the will devises real property, attested copies thereof and of the certificate of
allowance must be recorded in the register of deeds of the province in which the land lies. (Section
12, Ruling 77, and section 624, C. C. P.)
It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the presentation of a will to the
court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its
efficacy. To assure and compel the probate of will, the law punishes a person who neglects his duty
to present it to the court with a fine not exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not presenting
it, he may be committed to prision and kept there until he delivers the will.
The Court of Appeals took express notice of these requirements of the law and held that a will,
unless probated, is ineffective. Nevertheless it sanctioned the procedure adopted by the
respondent for the following reasons:
The majority of the Court is of the opinion that if this case is dismissed ordering the filing
of testate proceedings, it would cause injustice, incovenience, delay, and much expense to
the parties, and that therefore, it is preferable to leave them in the very status which they
themselves have chosen, and to decide their controversy once and for all, since, in a similar
case, the Supreme Court applied that same criterion (Leaño vs. Leaño, supra), which is now
sanctioned by section 1 of Ruling 74 of the Rulings of Court. Besides, section 6 of Ruling 124
provides that, if the procedure which the court ought to follow in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by the Rulings of Court, any suitable process or
mode of procedure may be adopted which appears most consistent to the spirit of the said
Rulings. Hence, we declare the action instituted by the plaintiff to be in accordance with
law.
In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present litigants
had received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of the
provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be
obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court
for probate.
Paula de la Cerna, et al., v. Manuela Rebaca Potot, et al., and the Honorable Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-20234, December 23, 1964
Nor-Aiza R. Unas
Facts: On May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last
will and testament in the local dialect whereby they willed that "our two parcels of land acquired
during our marriage together with all improvements thereon shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, our
niece, whom we have nurtured since childhood, because God did not give us any child in our union,
Manuela Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot", and that "while each of the testators is yet living,
he or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the two lands aforementioned." Bernabe dela Serna
died on August 30, 1939, and the aforesaid will was submitted to probate by said Gervasia and
Manuela.
Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca on October 14, 1952, another petition for the probate of the
same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed. The testament was declared null and void,
for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Code of
1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of the Philippines); but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court
of Appeals reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was Issued by a court of
probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the testament.
Issue: Was the 1939 final decree of probate had a conclusive effect as to Bernabe’s last will and
testament?
Ruling: Yes. The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939
by the Court of First Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive
effect as to his last will and testament despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed
the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third
party (Art. 669, old Civil Code). The error thus committed by the probate court was an error of law,
that should have been corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate
court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision, however erroneous. A final judgment rendered
on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world (Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil.
938; In re Estates of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156); and public policy and sound practice demand that at
the risk of occasional errors judgment of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by
law. Interest rei publicae ut finis set litium (Dy Cay vs. Crossfield, 38 Phil, 521, and other cases cited
in 2 Moran, Comments on the Rulings of Court (1963 Ed., p. 322).
The heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna are concluded by the 1939 decree
admitting his will to probate. The contention that being void the will cannot be validated, overlooks
that the ultimate decision on whether an act is valid or void rests with the courts, and here they
have spoken with finality when the will was probated in 1939. On this court, the dismissal of their
action for partition was correct.
But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account also, to avoid future misunderstanding,
that the probate decree in 1989 could only affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la
Cerna. It could not include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then
still alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no
jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then be in Issue. Be it remembered that prior
to the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated during the testator's lifetime.
It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must
be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate
will of each testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the court of First Instance of Cebu that the joint
will is one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased Gervasia Rebaca in
the properties in question, for the reasons extensively discussed in our decision in Bilbao vs. Bilbao,
87 Phil. 144, that explained the previous holding in Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267.
Gallanosa v. Arcangel
G.R. No. L-29300 June 21, 1978
Jules Andre B. Vosotros
Facts: Florentino Hitosis executed a will in 1938 when he was 80 years old. He owned 61 parcels
of land at that time. He died in 1939 childless and survived by his brother Leon. In his will, he
bequeathed his 1/2 share of the conjugal estate to his second wife Tecla and if she predecease him
(as what occurred), the said share shall be assigned to the spouses Pedro Gallanosa and Corzaon
Grecia, the reason being that Pedro, Tecla's son by her first marriage, grew up under the care of
Florentino; he had treated Pedro as his foster child, and Pedro has rendered services to Florentino
and Tecla. Florentino likewise bequeathed his separate properties consisting of three parcels of
abaca land and parcel of riceland to his protege (sasacuyang ataman), Adolfo Fortajada, a minor.
In 1939, the said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa as executor. In 1952, the legal heirs
filed an action for the recovery of said 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissed on the ground
of res judicata. Then, 28 years after probate, another action against Gallanosa for annulment of the
will, recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As a result, the lower court set aside
the 1939 decree of probate.
Issue: Can the will which has been probated may still be annulled?
Ruling: No. The probated will can no longer be annulled. Our procedural law does not sanction an
action for the "annulment" of a will. In order that a will may take effect, it has to be probated,
legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory
(Art. 838, Civil Code)
Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that a final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due
execution of the will.
Due execution means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution
and that he was not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence. Finally, it was executed
in accordance with the formalities provided by law.
The period for seeking relief under Ruling 38 has already expired, hence the judgment may only be
set aside on the grounds of:
1) Lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, and;
2) The judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic collateral fraud (which must be filed within 4
years from the discovery).
Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-62952, October 9, 1985
Facts: Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the
sole and only executor. It was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with
whom he had 3 children.
Petitioner Sofia filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed alleging
that the will was procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an admission
of concubinage with the petitioner (Sofia).
The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation,
hence making the will invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is
valid except the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and
1028.
Issue: Can the Court pass on the intrinsic validity of a will?
Ruling: Yes, As an exception, the Court may pass upon the intrinsic validity of a will. As a general
ruling is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the examination and resolution of the extrinsic
validity of the will. This general Ruling is however not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and
may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself admitted on its face the relationship
between the testator and the petitioner Sofia.
The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical
purpose to remand the nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the
probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the petitioner as
universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter
how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to
determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be superfluous.
Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in Balanay .Jr. v. Martinez (64
SCRA 452) passed upon the validity of its intrinsic provisions.
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal
validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity
of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the Issue (Nuguid v.
Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa L-23135, December 26,
1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).
The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty of
adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art. 1028 it is also prohibited.
Baltazar v. Laxa
669 SCRA 249, G.R. No. 174489, April 11, 2012
Facts: Paciencia was a 78 years old spinster when she made her last will and testament in the
Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin, was
read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at
the end of the said document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to
respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their children Luna and Katherine.
Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to
know and treated Paciencia as his own mother. Six days after the execution of the Will, Paciencia
left for USA. There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death.
Four years after the death of Paciencia, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga
for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor.
Antonio Baltazar, petitioner filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition and averred that the
properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-
interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins and that that
Paciencia was referred to as magulyan or forgetful because she would sometimes leave her wallet
in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later. On cross examination, it was established that
Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was magulyan was
based on her personal assessment.
Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencias Will on
the grounds that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution, that
she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threat and that the execution
of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo.
Lorenzo testified that at the time of Paciencias death, she did not suffer from any mental disorder
and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute. Lorenzo belied and denied having used force,
intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the
Philippines when the same was executed.
RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when Paciencia signed the will,
she was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason or strength of mind to have the testamentary
capacity. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC and granted the probate of the will. The
petitioner went up to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari.
Issue: Was the authenticity and due execution of the will sufficiently established to warrant its
allowance for probate?
Held: Yes. Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the face of
the Will.
As a Ruling, courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will in
probate proceedings. This is expressly provided for in Ruling 75, Section 1 of the Rulings of Court,
which states:
Ruling 75. Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.

Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. – No will shall pass either real
or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal,
such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all
present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical
requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will
in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the
signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question her state of mind when
she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will
lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The Supreme Court agreed with the position of the Court
of Appeals that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound
so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound
mind. Besides, Art. 799 of the NCC states: “To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the
testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator
was able at the time of making the Will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the
proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she
executed. She specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She
was well aware of how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is
bequeathing to Lorenzo, to his wife Corazon and to his two (2) children. A third child was born
after the execution of the will and was not included therein as devisee.
Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and
pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a will.
An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or testatrix to
execute the document that will distribute his/her earthly possessions upon his/her death. The very
existence of the Will is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testatrix has willed that her
estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if
legally tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected
thereby. This, coupled with Lorenzo’s established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the
testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by
petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the
authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.
It is an established Ruling that "a testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting
witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just
because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the
court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they
must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law."
In re: Eleuterio Pilapil.

Adriano Mendoza v. Calixto Pilapil, et al.
G.R. NO. L-47931, June 27, 1941
Facts: Father Eleuterio Pilapil, died on December 6, 1935. No testament was submitted after his
death, at least until the beginning of February 1939, his brother Calixto Pilapil promoted to file
intestacy No. 399 to request that he be appointed administrator of the relict assets of him.
The will contains the following provisions:
I, Eleuterio Pilapil, Priest of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, sixty-eight years old, a
native of Liloan, currently Cura Parroco de la Parroquia de Mualboal, Province of Cebu, IF,
enjoying health and in FULL USE OF MY MENTAL FACULTIES, I hereby publish, declare and
grant the following as MY TESTAMENT AND LAST WILL:
ART. FIRST: I institute and appoint Mr. Adriano Mendoza, my political nephew, married, of
legal age and neighbor of theMunicipality of Liloan, Province of Cebu, IF, ALBACEA
EXECUTOR of this My Testament and Last Will: Understanding , That in case of
impossibility, negligence or other cause with which it is prohibited to enforce this my
Willand Last Will, by bail, I have and order that it be replaced in the office of executor-
executor of this my Will and Last Will, by my Cousin, Jose Cabatingan, Married, of legal age,
resident of the Municipality of Mualboal, Province of Cebu, IF, who will bein charge and will
have these following provisions met:
xxx xxx xxx
2. I provide and order that this my Will and Last Will not be aired in the Court, since this
Testament and Last Willsimply confirms, affirms and assures the legitimacy of the
documents of sale of my goods;
xxx xxx xxx ART. SECOND: I hereby state that this MyTestament and Last Will, which
corroborates, affirms and assures the legitimacy of documents granted to me by buyers
consists of two articles; It contains sixteen provisions and is written on three pages;
xxx xxx xxxx
Issue: Can the probate of the will be waived by express provision of the testator contained in his
will?
Ruling: No. The disposition of the testator that his "last will and testament not be heard by the
court" cannot strip courts of their authority to determine whether the will is valid or not.
Probate of wills is mandatory. It is not the parties interested in one way or another in a matter,
who can confer or remove jurisdiction and authority to the Tribunals to resolve and decide what
the same law wants to be resolved and decided.
The law requires, under penalty, that wills made by a testator should be delivered to the Court,
after the person dies, by the person to whom custody has been entrusted, so that the court can
determine whether the will is valid and at the same time determine the disposition of the testator
to dispose of their property as instructed on the same if the contract be declared that the testator
died intestate, the will not being capable of legalization.
Maninang v. CA
G.R. No. L-57848, June 19, 1982
FACTS: On May 21, 1977, ClemenciaAseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age
81. She left a holographic will, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
xxx
"It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi
City and all my personal properties shall be inherited upon my death by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang
with whose family I have lived continuously for around the last 30 years now. Dra. Maninang and
her husband Pamping have been kind to me. x xx I have found peace and happiness with them even
during the time when my sisters were still alive and especially now when I am now being troubled
by my nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as Nonoy would like me to
appear. I know what is right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I do not consider Nonoy as my
adopted son. He has made me do things against my will."
Xxx
On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the
decedent. Respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of
decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings.
Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the
holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and,
therefore, intestacy should ensue. In her opposition, Soledad averred in that the court’s area of
inquiry is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, and Bernardo was effectively disinherited
and not preterited.
CFI Dismissed the Testate Case and appointed Bernardo as administrator of the estate.
Issue: Is the dismissal of the testate proceeding valid?
Ruling: No. The probate of a Will is mandatory.
Article 838 of the Civil Code provides:

"No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
with the Rulings of Court."
The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by Will may be rendered nugatory. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its
intrinsic validity. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot
be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will
has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law.
The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the Ruling. The intrinsic
validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before probate because "practical
considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the
controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside
the question of whether or not the Will should be allowed probate." Not so in the case before us
now where the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic
validity of the Will demanded.
Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court Rulingd that the Will was intrinsically invalid as it
completely preterited the parents of the testator. In the instant case, a crucial Issue that calls for
resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been
preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and
disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
The effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different. Preterition under Article 854
of the New Civil Code 'shall annul the institution of heir.' This annulment is in toto, unless in the
will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In
ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also 'annul
the institution of heirs', but only 'insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited', which last
phrase was omitted in the case of preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961
Edition, p. 172). Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate
of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived."
By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that controversial Issue has not
been thoroughly considered. We gather from the assailed Order of the trial Court that its conclusion
was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited. We are of opinion, however, that from the face
of the Will, that conclusion is not indubitable.
As held in the case of Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso: "xxx it is as important a matter of public interest
that a purported will is not denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution
of testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation. xxx"
Coming now to the procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in view of our finding that the Judge
had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate Case.
Pascual v. CA
G.R. No. 115925, August 15, 2003
Facts: Petitioner Consolacion Sioson ("Consolacion") and respondent Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino

("Remedios") are the niece and granddaughter, respectively, of the late Canuto Sioson ("Canuto").
Canuto and 11 other individuals, including his sister Catalina Sioson ("Catalina”) were co-owners
of a parcel of land. Canuto had the lot 2 surveyed and subdivided into and were placed under
Canuto's name.
Canuto And Consolacion executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan. Under the Kasulatan, Canuto
sold his 10/70 share in Lot 2 in favor of Consolacion for P2,250.00. The Kasulatan, notarized.
Consolacion immediately took possession. She later declared the land for taxation purposes and
paid the corresponding real estate taxes.
On 1968, the surviving children of Canuto, namely Felicidad and Beatriz, executed a joint affidavit
affirming the said sale. On 1988, Remedios filed a complaint against Consolacion and her spouse
Ricardo Pascual for "Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer Certificate [of Title] and Damages."
Remedios claimed that she is the owner of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E because Catalina devised these lots
to her in Catalina's last will and testament.
Issue: Does Remedios have a right over the subject property?
Ruling: No. Remedios has no right of claim over the property.
Remedios anchored her claim over the lots on the devise of these lots to her under Catalina's Last
Will. However, the court found that the probate court did not Issue any order admitting the Last
Will to probate.
Remedios does not contest this finding. Indeed, during the trial, Remedios admitted that Special
Proceedings Case No. C-208 is still pending.
Article 838 of the Civil Code states that "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless
it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rulings of Court." This Court has interpreted this
provision to mean, "until admitted to probate, [a will] has no effect whatever and no right can be
claimed thereunder."
Thus, Remedios is without any cause of action either to seek reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E
or to enforce an implied trust over these lots.
Allowance and Disallowance of Will
a. Probate Requirement
NCC. 838
Cases:
ATILANO MERCADO vs. SANTOS

GR No. 45629 September 22, 1938
By: Shaileen Reyes-Macalino
The probate of the will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is considered as conclusive as
to its due execution and validity, and that the will is genuine and not a forgery.
FACTS: Three years after the will was admitted to probate, intervenors filed a petition to re-open the
proceedings. Rosario filed a complaint against Atilano for falsification or forgery of the will probated.
Atilano claimed that the will had already been probated and that the order probating the will is
conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate of the will of his deceased wife is a bar to his criminal prosecution for the
alleged forgery of the said will.
HELD: Yes. The law creates CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION as to the due execution of the will after it is
admitted into probate. The criminal action will not lie. The ruling of the probate court is binding upon
the complainant even if that person was not actually a party to the probate proceeding. Probate
proceedings are proceedings in rem. Because there is publication, there is constructive notice to the
whole world and judgment or a decree in a probate proceeding is binding upon the entire world, even
the state.
LIM vs. CA
G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000
The issue on the exclusion and inclusion of property from the inventory is within the competence of
the probate court
FACTS: In the inventory of the estate of Pastor, it included some properties belonging to some business
entities. The said corporations filed a motion for the exclusion of their property form the inventory.
Rufina argued that Pastor owned the said business entities. It follows that he also own the properties
of the corporations.
ISSUE: May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in the inventory
of the estate of a deceased person?
HELD: No . The determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends
upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent. However, the court‘s determination is only
provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which
may be instituted by the parties. In this case, the real properties sought to be excluded from the
inventory were duly registered under the Torrens system in the name of the private corporations, and
as such were to be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title. The probate court in denying the
motion for exclusion acted in utter disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of
private respondents. It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct
from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons
composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the
entities connected with it.
ALSUA-BETTS vs. CA
GR L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings
FACTS: Pablo, Fernando and Francisca agreed in writing that their father, Don Jesus, be appointed by
the court executor of the will of their mother. Thereafter, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will and
executed a new. After his death, Francisca filed a petition for the probate of the new will. It was opposed
by his sons, Pablo and Fernando, on the ground that Don Jesus was not of sound mind at the time of the
execution of the will. The will was disallowed. The daughter argued that the other children, Pablo and
Fernando, are in estoppel to question the competence of Don Jesus by virtue of the agreement
previously entered.
ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings.
HELD:Yes.
Probate proceedings involve public interest, and the application therein of the rule of estoppel, when
it will block the ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances, surrounding the execution of a
testament, would seem inimical to public policy.
The controversy as to the competency of Don Jesus to execute his will cannot be determined by the acts
of his sons to the will in formally agreeing in writing with Francisca that their father be appointed by
the court executor of the will of their mother.
The SC allowed the probate of the will upon finding that Don Jesus complied with the requirements of
law as to the execution of the will.
IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHNSON
GR L-12767 November 16, 1918
Although the time allowed for the making of such application was inconveniently short, the remedy
existed and the possibility of its use is proved in this case by the circumstance that on June 12, 1916,
she in fact appeared in court by her attorneys and excepted to the order admitting the will to probate.
FACTS: After 3 months from the time the will was allowed probate, the decedent‘s daughter from the
first marriage, claiming to be the sole legitimate heir, noted an exception to the order admitting the will
to probate. No petition was filed but her attorneys merely entered an appearance on her behalf. 7
months after the probate order was issued, the same attorneys moved the court to vacate the order
admitting the will to probate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the application to vacate the order admitting the will to probate must be denied.
HELD: Yes. The application to set aside must be denied because it was filed out of time. Under the Code
of Civil Procedure, the application for relief must be made within a reasonable time, but in no case
exceeding 6 months after such judgment, order or other proceeding was taken. Such judgment, order
or other proceedings extends to all sorts of judicial proceedings like probate proceedings.
The law supplied a remedy by which the petitioner might have gotten a hearing and have obtained
relief from the order by which she is supposed to have been injured; and though the period within
which the application should have been made was short, the remedy was both possible and
practicable.
LEVISTE vs. CA
GR No. L-29184January 30, 1989
One who is only indirectly interested in a will may not interfere in its probate
FACTS: On September 7, 1963, the petitioner, a practicing attorney, entered into a written agreement
with the private respondent Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition for probate of the
holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselv. Leviste received a letter form a client terminating his
services in connection with a probate proceeding. Leviste filed a ―Motion to Intervene to Protect his
Rights to Fees for Professional Services. Although the order denying his motion to intervene had
become final, petitioner continued to receive copies of the court's orders, as well as the pleadings of
the other parties in the case. He also continued to file pleadings. The case was submitted for decision
without the respondents' evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Leviste can intervene to protect his right to fees for Professional Service
HELD: Leviste cannot intervene. Leviste was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court.
He had no direct interest in the probate of the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect interest
as former counsel for a prospective heir.
Dorotheo v. CA
320 SCRA 12, December 8, 1999
Jayward Z. Baco
FACTS: Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter.
Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro’s death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro
before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter’s last will and testament. In
1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro’s will to probate. Private respondents did not
appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a “Motion to declare the Will Intrinsically Void.” The
trial court granted the motion and issued an order.
The RTC ruled that Lourdes being not the wife of Alejandro the will is intrinsically void; the
oppositors are the only heirs entitled to the estate. Lourdes filed a Motion for consideration
arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his
death although they were not legally married to each other. This was denied by the trial court. The
CA dismissed her appeal for her failure to file the same within the extended period.
ISSUE: May the last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an
order that has become final and executory still be given effect?
RULING: No. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no
matter how erroneous it may be.
The Supreme Court ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but
the intrinsic provisions thereof are void. Alejandro gave all the property to the concubine. Such
is invalid because one cannot dispose what he does not own. In this case, the whole property is
the conjugal property of Alejandro and Aniceta. Such has become final and executory. The only
instance where a party interested in probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is
when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence with circumstances do not concur herein.
A probated will cannot be given effect if it was later on declared intrinsically void. There is nothing
to execute where the testamentary provision has been declared void in an order that has become
final and executory. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions
that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the
laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. The
intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after
the will has been authenticated. A final judgment on probated will, however erroneous, is binding
on the whole world.
Maloles v. Philips
G.R. No. 129505, January 31, 2000
Jayward Z. Baco
FACTS: In 1995, Dr. Arturo De Los Santos filed a petition for probate of his will. He declared that
he has no compulsory heirs and that he is naming as sole devisee and legatee the Arturo de Santos
Foundation, Inc. (ASF). The named executrix is Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips. The petition was filed
in RTC Makati Branch 61. Judge Fernando Gorospe of said court determined that Arturo is of sound
mind and was not acting in duress when he signed his last will and testament and so Branch 61
allowed the last will and testament on February 16, 1996.
Ten days from the allowance, Arturo died. Thereafter, Pacita, as executrix, filed a motion for the
issuance of letters of testamentary with Branch 61. She however withdrew the motion but later
on refilled it with RTC Makati Branch 65.
Meanwhile, a certain Octavio Maloles II filed a motion for intervention with Branch 61 claiming
that as a next of kin (him being the full-blooded nephew of Arturo) he should be appointed as the
administrator of the estate and that he is an heir.
Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order transferring the motion filed by Pacita to Branch
61. Judge Santos ratiocinated that since the probate proceeding started in Branch 61, then it
should be the same court which should hear Pacita’s motion. Branch 61 however refused to
consolidate and referred the case back to Branch 65. Branch 65 subsequently consolidated the
case per refusal of Branch 61. Eventually, Branch 65 allowed the motion for intervention filed by
Octavio.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right
to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the respondent.
RULING: No. In order for a person to be allowed to intervene in a proceeding, he must have an
interest in the estate or in the will or in the property to be affected by it. He must be an interested
party or one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against
the estate like a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct. Octavio is not an heir or legatee
under the will of the decedent. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the decedent. As the only and
nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy.
He can only inherit if the will is annulled. His interest is therefore not direct or immediate. His
claim to being a creditor is belated as it has been raised for the first time only in his reply to the
opposition to his motion to intervene and is not supported by evidence. A probate proceeding is
terminated upon the issuance of the order allowing the probate of a will. In cases for the probate
of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic
validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted
only after the death of the testator. However, Article 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of
a petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in
the testator’s will. Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on
his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named
an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator. Only if
the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the court
appoint other persons to administer the estate. None of these circumstances is present in this case.
Nuguid v. Nuguid
G.R. No. 23445, June 23, 1966
Jayward Z. Baco
FACTS: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her
legitimate parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.
Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario
instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be
admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her.
Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios
as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending
line – were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.
Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir.
Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.
ISSUE: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited
the compulsory heirs.
RULING: Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced
heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly
disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the
parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.
Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited”. Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law”.
Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the
parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution
of petitioner, by itself, is void. Intestate succession ensues.
The case is for the probate of the will and the court’s area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic
validity of the will comes after the will has been duly authenticated. However if the case is to be
remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. The practical conditions: time, effort,
expenses and added anxiety, induced us to a belief that we might as well meat head-on the issue
of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.
The court's area of inquiry is limited - to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity
of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance
with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be represented,
and to be acted upon, by the court. However, if it is alleged that the will is void because of
preterition, a probate would be useless, if indeed there was preterition. Since the will provides for
the institution of the testatrix‘ sister as universal heir and nothing more, the result is the same.
The entire will is null and void.
Pastor Jr. vs. CA

G.R. No. 56340, June 24, 1983
Jayward Z. Baco
FACTS: Alvaro Pastor, Sr. died in Cebu City survived by his two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor,
Jr. and Sofia Pastor de Midgely and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn Barlito Quemada. She filed a
petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor, Sr. with the Court
of First Instance of Cebu. The will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor
of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor, Sr.'s 42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated
Mining and Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu.
Quemada as special administrator, instituted against Pastor, Jr. and his wife an action for
reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of the
legacy and which were in the names of the spouses Pastor, Jr. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de
Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance. Pastor,
Jr. and his sister Sofia filed their opposition to the petition for probate and the order appointing
Quemada as special administrator. The Probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate.
CA affirmed the decision of the probate court and ruled that that the legacy to Quemada was not
inofficious.
ISSUE: Whether the probate order resolved the questions of intrinsic validity and ownership.
RULING: In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the
extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76,
Section 9.)
As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter, which the Probate Court cannot
resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the
title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action to resolve title.
The Order sought to be executed by the assailed order of execution is the Probate Order allegedly
resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. However, nowhere in the
dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is
manifested therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of
extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator.
Thus it allowed and approved the holographic will “with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same
having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.” It
declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed subject to the outcome of
the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties.
In probate proceedings extrinsic validity only. As a general rule, no jurisdiction on the other
matters beyond the due execution of the will and testamentary capacity of the testator. When
Pastor, Sr. died in 1966, he was survived by his wife, aside from his two legitimate children and
one illegitimate son. There is therefore a need to liquidate the conjugal partnership and set apart
the share of Pastor, Sr.'s wife in the conjugal partnership preparatory to the administration and
liquidation of the estate of Pastor, Sr. which will include, among others, the determination of the
extent of the statutory usufructuary right of his wife until her death.
So, also, as of the same date, there had been no prior definitive determination of the assets of the
estate of Pastor, Sr. There was an inventory of his properties presumably prepared by the special
administrator, but it does not appear that it was ever the subject of a hearing or that it was
judicially approved. The reconveyance or recovery of properties allegedly owned but not in the
name of Pastor, Sr. was still being litigated in another court. Finally, there actually was no
determination of the intrinsic validity of the will in other respects.
Cayetano v. Leonidas
G.R. No. 54919, May 30, 1984
Jayward Z. Baco
FACTS: Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her
sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the
surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the
deceased Adoracion Campos. Eleven months after, Nenita filed a petition for the reprobate of a
will of the deceased, which was allegedly executed and probated in accordance with US laws, and
for her appointment as administratrix of the local estate of the deceased testatrix.
Petitioner filed opposition alleging that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic
provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic
provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and
injury to him. But petitioner through his counsel later filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With
Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the
will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion."
Respondent judge issued an order allowing probate of the will with Nenita appointed as
administratrix.
Meanwhile, petitioner Hermogenes died and left a will, which, incidentally has been questioned
by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null and void, and a
fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament. Cayetano,
therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the instant case which was granted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobation of the will is invalid for it divested the father of his
legitime which was reserved by the law for him and the same would work injustice and injury to
him.
RULING: No, the reprobation of the will is valid. Although on its face, the will appeared to have
preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright,
the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death,
an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
The order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration. It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals.
As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will,
the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity normally comes only after the
court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issues.
In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion was an American citizen and the law
which governs her will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the decedent.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, the national law
of the decedent must apply.
Petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition
for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction.
CORONADO VS CA
G.R. No. 78778 December 3, 1990
Gerardo T. Jamero Jr.
FACTS: The property subject in this case is a 277 square meters parcel of land situated in Nagcarlan,
Laguna. Juana Albovias claims that the said parcel of land is a portion of a bigger lot which she
inherited in the last will and testament executed in 1918 by Melecio Artiaga, grandfather of Juana.
Leonida Coronado and her co-petitioners claim that the property in question was bequeathed to her
under a Will executed by Dr. Dalmacio Monterola, who was allegedly in possession thereof even
before the outbreak of World War II. The said will was probated entitled "Testate Estate of the
Deceased Monterola Leonida F. Coronado, petitioner. Despite Juana’s opposition, the Will was
allowed by the Court of First Instance of Laguna. As a result of the conflicting claims over the property
in question, Juana filed an action for quieting of title against Coronado in the Regional Trial Court of
Laguna. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Juana. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed RTC’s
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer for ownership was ineffectual since the will under which Juana
inherited the property in question from her grandfather, Melecio Artiaga, was never probated.
HELD: No. While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
and allowed in the proper court (Art. 838, Civil Code), the questioned will, however, may be sustained
on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time said document
was executed by Melecio Artiaga in 1918. The said article read as follows:
"Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos, or by will,
such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heir."
In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado is entitled to legitime from
Melecio Artiaga. The truth of the matter is that the record is bereft of any showing that Leonida
Coronado and the late Melecio Artiaga were related to each other.
AJERO VS CA
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
FACTS: Spouses Roberto and Thelma Ajero instituted a proceeding for allowance of Annie Sand's
holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind,
not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of
her estate by will. Clemente Sand opposed the petition on the grounds that neither the testament's
body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting, that the will contained alterations and
corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners
through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero.
He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte.
He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its
sole owner. Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will
to probate. On appeal, said decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was
dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for
its validity." It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decedent could validly dispose of the house and lot located in Cabadbaran,
Agusan del Norte, in it’s entirety.
HELD: No. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless
to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. In the
case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran
property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question
her conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot
validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.
SOLIVIO VS CA
G.R. No. 83484. February 12, 1990
FACTS: Salustia Solivio died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house
and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City. During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had expressed to his aunt Celedonia
Solivio his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving
students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died (a bachelor, without descendants,
ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces) of a heart attack without having set up the
foundation. Celedonia filed a proceeding for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate
of Esteban Javellana, Jr. and prayed that she be declared the sole heir of the deceased. Branch 23 of
the Regional Trial Court declared her the sole heir of the decedent. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva
filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban,
Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion,
Concordia filed for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The suit was initiated
while the probate proceedings still pending. Branch 26 of the same court rendered judgment in favor
of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva
ISSUE: Whether or not Branch 26 of the RTC had jurisdiction to entertain a case for partition and
recovery of share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings were still
pending in the same court.
HELD: No. Branch 26 of the RTC lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva’s action for
partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate
proceedings for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court.
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled
thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus
far relieves the administrator from his duties. The assailed order declaring Celedonia as the sole heir
of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a
decedent’s estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court.
Thus, we ruled in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26696, January 31,
1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of partition
executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her mother:
"The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all
the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of
the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding. As
long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings
cannot be deemed closed and terminated because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and
does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive
period therefore has not elapsed. The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his
share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration
proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been
closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which
may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and executed and
re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26 setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23
on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to
the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring the administratrix,
Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say
the least, for these matters lie within the exclusive competence of the probate court.
VDA DE KILAYKO VS TENGCO

G.R. No. L-45425. March 27, 1992
FACTS: Maria Lizares y Alunan executed a "Testamento". She died without any issue leaving said
"testamento" in the possession and custody of her niece, Eustaquia Lizares. The latter filed a petition
for the settlement of the testate estate of Maria Lizares, before the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental. The probate court issued an order declaring the will probated and appointing Estaquia
as the executrix of the estate of Maria Lizares. Eustaquia filed a project of partition which was granted
by the probate court. Eustaquia Lizares died single without any descendant. On the strength of the
testamentary provisions contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the will of Maria Lizares, which were
allegedly in the nature of a simple substitution, Celsa Vda. de Kilayko et. al filed a motion to reopen
once again the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares. They prayed that the order granting the
project partition be reconsidered and amended by declaring them as heirs to 1/3 of 1/14 of Hda.
Minuluan and to 1/6 of Hda. Matab-ang and that the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, after
such amendment, be ordered to register at the back of their respective certificates of title, the order
of probate and a "declaration" that movants are the heirs of said properties, and correspondingly
issue new certificates of title in their names.
The court denied the motion to reopen the testate proceedings. They then filed a motion for
reconsideration denying the motion to reopen the testate proceeding which the same was denied.
Hence, the said movants filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of real property
against the joint administrators of the estate of Eustaquia Lizares, Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares. On the
same date, they availed of their rights under Rule 14, Section 24 of Rules of Court by filing a notice of
lis pendens with the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid partition and whether or not there is a need to reopen the
testate proceeding.
HELD: In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has
been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will
is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.
The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute the estate, has the power to
determine the proportion or parts to which each distributee is entitled . . . A project of partition is
merely a proposal for the distribution of the hereditary estate which the court may accept or reject.
It is the court that makes that distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto.
In the instant case, the records will show that in the settlement of the testate estate of Maria Lizares,
the executrix, Eustaquia Lizares submitted a project of partition in which the parcels of land, subject
matters of the complaint for reconveyance, were included as property of the estate and assigned
exclusively to Eustaquia as a devisee of Maria Lizares. In accordance with said project of partition
which was approved by the probate court. They executed an Agreement of Partition and Subdivision
whereby they agreed to terminate their co-ownership over the said parcels of land. These facts taken
altogether show that the Lizares sisters recognized the decree of partition sanctioned by the probate
court and in fact reaped the fruits thereof.
Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of it in the guise
of a complaint for reconveyance. A party cannot, in law and in good conscience be allowed to reap
the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him. Thus, where
a piece of land has been included in a partition and there is no allegation that the inclusion was
effected through improper means or without petitioner’s knowledge, the partition barred any further
litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the
court for its proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition. The question of private
respondents’ title over the lots in question has been concluded by the partition and became a closed
matter.
BALANAY VS MARTINEZ
G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975
FACTS: Felix J. Balanay Jr. filed for the probate of the will of his mother, Leodegaria Julian. The latter
in her will stated that after her husband's death, her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands
should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in the will. She devised and partitioned the
conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half
share of the conjugal assets. This was opposed by her husband and daughter on the grounds of lack
of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition
of the conjugal estate. Later, the opposition to the probate of the will was withdrew and the husband
signed an instrument wherein he manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and
renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children. The probate court declared
that the will was void and it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his
renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal
estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before
ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
HELD: No. In view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because
of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed
with the petitioner’s authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic
validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an
idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand
that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet
the issue.
But the probate court erred when it declared that the will was void. The rule is that "the invalidity of
one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other
dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other
dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of
the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be
separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the
general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half” of the conjugal lands is contrary to
law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso. But that
illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the
creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the
death of her husband. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the
children and the surviving spouse.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will and his
renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's
estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in the will without prejudice, of
course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
There is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the conjugal estate in the
manner set forth in her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal
estate but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her
testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the will
may be probated.
NATCHER vs. CA
G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001
By: Alpher Caingles
It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went
beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person.
FACTS: An ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title was filed by the respondents
before the RTC.
After trial, the RTC, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996 holding: …
"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be
regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the
deceased."
ISSUE: May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for
reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made
by the decedent to any of the heirs?
HELD: NO. Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special
proceeding.
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a
civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding,
which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall
within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is
devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real
property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to
thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch
55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of
advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
CAMAYA vs. PATULANDONG
423 SCRA 480 February 23, 2004
By: Alpher Caingles
It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and
which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as regards
said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory
or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and
good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort
to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so.
FACTS:
Rufina executed a notarized will where she devised a parcel of land to her grandson Anselmo.
Later, she executed a codicil which stated that her 4 children and Anselmo would inherit
the above parcel of land. Anselmo filed an action for partition against the Patulandongs. It was
granted, subject to the result of the probate of the codicil. Anselmo then sold the land to the
Camayas. The probate court then issued an order wherein the title issued to the Camayas were
declared void and it voided the sale as well. The Camayas contended that the probate court has
no power to declare null and void the sale and their title.
ISSUE:
WON the probate court has the power to annul the title to land subject of the estate proceeding
before it.
HELD: NO.
The probate court does not have the power to annul the title to lands subject of a testate
proceeding pending before it. The probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further
declared the deed of sale and the titles of the Camayas null and void, it having had the effect
of depriving them possession and ownership of the property.
A probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said court could
do as regards such properties is to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory.
Heirs of Lasam v. Umengan
G.R. No. 168156, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 496
By: Alpher Caingles
Without having been probated, the last will and testament could not be the source of any right.
FACTS: The subject lots denominated as Lot 5427 and Lot 992 situated in Tugegarao City
belonged to the spouses Pedro Cuntapay and Leona Bunagan. The spouses sold the said lots to
their children Isabel and Irene Cuntapay. It was agreed that the disputed eastern portion shall
belong to Isabel Cuntapay as evidenced by a notarized partition agreement. Isabel was first
married to Domingo Turingan, they had four children named Abdon, Sado, Rufo and Maria.
When the first husband died, Isabel married Rosendo Lasam. She had two children by him
named Trinidad and Rosendo.
In 2001 Rosendo Lasam filed a case against the respondent Vicenta Umengan who is the
daughter of Abdon Turingan, a son of Isabel Cuntapay, for unlawful detainer. The petitioner
anchored their claim on the disputed property on the purported will of Isabel Cuntapay
whereby she bequeathed the said property to Rosendo Lasam. The last will and testament relied
upon was not probated. The MTCC and RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner on the ground that
they are the owners of the property based on the alleged will of Isabel Cuntapay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will of Isabel Cuntapay could be relied upon to establish the
petitioner‘s right to possess the subject lot.
RULING: No. The purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay could not properly be
relied upon to establish petitioners‘ right to possess the subject lot because, without having
been probated, the said last will and testament could not be the source of any right.
Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:
“No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court…..”
In Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that: “[a] will is essentially ambulatory; at any time
prior to the testator‘s death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has
no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: No will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court.”
MORALES vs. OLONDRIZ
G.R. No. 198994, February 3, 2016
By: Alpher Caingles
The RTC may pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will during probate proceedings.
FACTS: Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. (the decedent) died on June 9, 2003. Believing that the
decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petition for the partition of the decedent’s
estate and the appointment of a special administrator. The RTC appointed Alfonso Juan O.
Olondriz, Jr. one of the heirs as special administrator.
Iris Morales, however, filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging that the decedent left a will
which omitted Francisco Javier Maria Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the decedent. She moved
for the suspension the intestate proceedings in order to give way to the probate of the said will.
This was opposed by the respondent heirs and moved to dismiss the probate proceedings
because Francisco was preterited from the will.
The RTC suspended the intestate proceedings and set the case or probate. It reasoned that
probate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings.
ISSUES: Whether it was proper for the RTC to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will during
probate proceedings.
RULING: Yes. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court's inquiry is
limited to questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court will only determine
the will's formal validity and due execution. However, this rule is not inflexible and absolute. It
is not beyond the probate court's jurisdiction to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will when
so warranted by exceptional circumstances. When practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon even before it is probated, the probate court should
meet the issue.
ARANAS vs. MERCADO
G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014
By: Alpher Caingles
The probate court may provisionally determine the issue of ownership.

FACTS: Emigdio S. Mercado owned shares in Mervir Realty Corp. and Cebu Emerson
Transportation Corp. He assigned his real properties in exchange for stocks in Mervir Realty and
sold his real property in Badian, Cebu to Mervir Realty. Emigdio died intestate, survived by his
second wife, Teresita and their five children, and his children from his first wife, Thelma Aranas.
Teresita was appointed as administrator. Teresita indicated in her inventory that at the time of
his death, Emigdio had “left no real properties but only personal properties.” Thelma claimed
that Emigdio owned properties that were not included in the inventory. The parties agreed to
submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties should be
included in or excluded from the inventory. Thereafter, the RTC ruled that Teresita should have
included in the Badian Property in the inventory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court may provisionally determine the issue of ownership.
HELD: YES.
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but
such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes
of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its
determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the
decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired.
Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of
the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in
the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS
WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL
PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent
G.R. No. 169144 January 26, 2011
Digest By: MARK ANTHONY B. MULIT
FACTS:
Ruperta Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized U.S. citizen, died single and childless. In
the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio, as the
executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S. Ernesto, another
brother of Ruperta, filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s
will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. Manuel and Benjamin,
nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be
probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. They added that, assuming
Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been
executed under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the consequences of such
act. They also claimed that Ernesto is not qualified to act as administrator of the estate. The RTC
admitted to probate Ruperta’s last will and appointed Ernesto as special administrator at the
request of Sergio. The Letters of Special Administration was issued to Ernesto. Manuel and
Benjamin appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
May an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. be probated for the first
time in the Philippines?
RULING:
Yes. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the
same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will
can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an
alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in
his country.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take
cognizance of the settlement of such estate.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known
to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the
property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will
has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional
facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province
where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left
in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed
and probated in the country of its execution.
RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
. HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS,
substituted by her son, EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA, Respondents
G.R. No. 192828 November 28, 2011
FACTS:
Cheng et al filed a Complaint against the petitioners, Ramon Ching et. al, and Stronghold
Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia
Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all persons
claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon). The Complaint was captioned as one for
"Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial
Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for the Issuance of
[a] Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.". The RTC denied the
Ramon’s Motion to Dismiss and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
On January 18, 2007, the Ramon filed a Motion to Dismiss18 the Cheng et al's Amended Complaint
on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint.
Ramon argued that since the Amended Complaint sought the release of the CPPA to Cheng et al,
the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, the suit
partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for declaration of nullity.
Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the RTC acting as an
ordinary court.
The CA upheld the RTC’s denial of the Motion to Dismiss.
ISSUE:
Should the complaint be filed in a probate court?
RULING:
No. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the Cheng et al in their Complaint and
Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly
effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for
Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a special
proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made
by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. A special proceeding is a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is distinguished from
an ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong. To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a
complaint should be filed.
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM,
EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and LINDA GRIMM, respondents.
G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
FACTS:
Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died in 1977. He was survived by his second wife
(Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his two children by a first marriage (Juanita
and Ethel) which ended by divorce.
Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California on January 23, 1959. One will disposed of
his Philippine estate described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second
will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. The two wills and a codicil were presented for
probate in Utah by Maxine on March 1978. Maxine admitted that she received notice of the
intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January 1978. The Utah Court admitted the two wills
and codicil to probate on April 1978 and was issued upon consideration of the stipulation
between the attorneys for Maxine and Ethel. Also in April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with
knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah
regarding the estate.
On September 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of Maxine, Pete and
Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two
wills (already probated in Utah).
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his order
of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying
that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or alternatively that the two proceedings be
consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah
compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate.
The CA upheld the RTC’s denial of the Motion to Dismiss.
ISSUE:
May a will be probated after the estate has undergone intestate proceeding and consequent
partition had been effected?
RULING:
Yes. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed".
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot
vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who
died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should
continue hearing the two cases.
The Incompetent, CARMEN CAÑIZA, represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO EVANGELISTA,
petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his wife, LEONORA
ESTRADA, respondents.
G.R. No. 110427 February 24, 1997
FACTS:
Being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Caniza was declared incompetent by judgment
in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. Caniza was the
owner of a house and lot. Her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit to eject the
spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. The complaint was later amended to
identify the incompetent Caniza as plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian, Amparo
Evangelista. The amended Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caniza was the absolute
owner of the property in question; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses,
their children, grandchildren, and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that
Caniza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health,
“so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;”
among others. The Estrada Spouses declared that they had been living in Caniza’s house since the
1960’s; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Caniza as her
own family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will by which she “bequeathed” to
the Estradas the house and lot in question. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to
them by Caiza clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally
incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since
their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward’s will. Such will has not been submitted for
probate.
The CA upheld the RTC’s reversal of the METC’s decision in favor of Caniza.
ISSUE:
May a holographic be legally effective even such was not submitted for probate?
RULING:
No.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or
revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed
thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.). An owner's
intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not
inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed
sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of
possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical
infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
Institurion of Heirs
NCC. 847
Cases:
NABLE vs. UNSON
GR No. L-8927 March 10, 1914
By: Golda V. Vergara-Pocon
When the Testatrix’s intention is so clear, it is unnecessary to bring in extraneous arguments to

reach a conclusion as to what she intended.
FACTS: The codicil to the will of the late FilomenaUson provides first, that all property which
belongs to Filomena as conjugal property, referred to in her said testament, shall be the property
of her husband, Don Rafael Sison; in case all or part of said property exists at her husband’s death,
it her will that at her husband’s death that her sisters and nieces hereinafter named succeed him
as heirs. In the second declaration of the codicil, Filomena named her sisters and nieces and added
on the last part the provision stating, “ so that they have and enjoy in equal parts as good sisters
and relatives.
The court below ruled that the children of the deceased sisters should only take that portion
which their respective mothers would have taken if they been alive at the time the will was made;
that the property should be divided into six equal parts corresponding to the number of sisters;
that each living sister should take one-sixth, and the children of each sister should also take one-
sixth, each one-sixth to be divided among said children equally.
Asuncion Nable Jose, et al., appellants on this case asserted that under a proper construction of
the paragraphs of the codicil, above-quoted property should be divided equally between the living
sisters and the children of the deceased sisters, share and share alike, a niece taking the same
share that a sister received
ISSUE: Whether or not the codicil provides for equal division and sharing of the property
HELD: Yes, the Court held that the appellant’s contention is well founded. It find expressions
which seems to indicate with fair clearness that it was the intention of the testatrix to divide
her property equally between her sisters and nieces. The Court note that nieces are referred to
in no way different from the sisters. Each one stands out in the second paragraph of the codicil
as clearly as the other and under exactly the same conditions. The Court notes in the last
clause, Filomena named all of the persons whom she desires to take under her will be name “
so that they must take and enjoy the property in equal parts as good sisters and relatives.
The Court held that in the first paragraph a declaration as to who the testatrix desires shall
become the owners of her property on the death of her husband. Among them, the Court find the
names of the nieces as well as the sisters. The Court also notes the final declaration of the
testatrix that she desires that the sisters and the nieces shall take and enjoy the property in equal
parts. That being so, it appears to the Court that the Testatrix’s intention is fairly clear, so clear in
fact it is unnecessary to bring in extraneous arguments to reach a conclusion as to what she
intended.
NCC. 850
Cases:
Austria vs. Reyes
G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970
By: Golda Vargas Vergara-Pocon
The institution of heir of a testator may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an
examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had
known the cause for it to be false.
FACTS:On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Special Proceedings 2457) a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament.
The probate was opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and
Lauro Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioner, are nephews and nieces of Basilia.
This opposition was, however, dismissed and the probate of the will allowed after due hearing.
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, under the will was to pass on to the respondents Perfecto Cruz,
Benita Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been
assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children.
On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia died. The
respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor without bond by the same court in accordance
with the provisions of the decedent's will.
On November 5, 1959, Ruben Austria et, al petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in
intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that
the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers to the decedent and
without any right to succeed as heirs.
The court a quo allowed the petitioners' intervention by its order of December 22, 1959.
On February 6, 1963, more than three years after they were allowed to intervene, the petitioners
Ruben Austria, let al., moved the lower court to set for hearing the matter of the genuineness of
the adoption of the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., by the late Basilia.
ISSUE: Whether or not proof on the falsity of an adoption would cause a nullity of the
institution of heirs and the opening of the estate wide to intestacy.
HELD: No, the Court held that before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of
the Civil Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs
must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear
from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known
the falsity of the cause.
Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause
the testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution may be
annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator clearly
would not have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be false.
The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on this point or at best is
vague and uncertain. The phrases, "mgasapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana," were
borrowed from the language of the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the
class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no absolute
indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had
known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free
portion of her estate (libredisposicion) which largely favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the
latter's children, and the children of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination
on her part to give to the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give
to them. Compare this with the relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for her
blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and LauroMozo and the children
of the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the
inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of
the testate by intestacy — a result which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.
Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by these explicit injunctions
in the Civil Code: "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and
of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." 1
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate,2 as was done in this
case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of
the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of
giving it effect.3 A probate court has found, by final judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de
Cruz was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will executed free from falsification,
fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it becomes our duty to give full expression to
her will.4
At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be assailed only
in a separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.5
Preterition – Definition, Requisites and Effects

NCC. 854
Cases:
Maloles vs. Phillips

GR No. 129505 January 31, 2020
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to
dispose of his property in the manner he wishes.
FACTS:On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for
probate of his will1 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In
his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole
legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with
an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of
the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will2 was annexed to
the petition for probate.
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61 issued an order granting
the petition and allowing the will.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.On April 3, 1996, petitioner
Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos
(testator's sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of
Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Maloles thus prayed for the
reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration in his name.
It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became final, herein Petitioner Pacita de los Reyes
Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently
withdrawn after this Court, during the hearing, already ruled that the motion could not be admitted as
the subject matter involves a separate case under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and movant withdrew
her motion and filed this case (No. 4343).
ISSUE: Whether or not a pretirited next of kin may validly oppose the issuance of letters testamentary
after the will has become final.
HELD: No, the Court held that even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be
considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has
no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code
provides:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any
person having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions
of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator's —

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.18
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the
testator's will.
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to
dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint
one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The
curtailment of this right may be considered a curtailment of the right to dispose.
ACAIN vs. IAC
GR No. 72706 October 27, 1987
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited
FACTS: On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII,
a petition for the probate of the will of the late NemesioAcain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of
letters testamentary on the premise that NemesioAcain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers
Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will
allegedly executed by NemesioAcain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya with a translation in English
submitted by petitioner without objection raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on
burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of
the testament. On the disposition of the testator's property, the will provided:
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and money which I earned jointly
with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal
age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-
deceased me, all the money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute
my share shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores,
Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with
Constantino as the petitioner. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the
oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased and the
latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner
has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the
adopted daughter have been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court, respondents filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently
referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985 . Respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the
petition for the probate of the will of NemesioAcain. His motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner filed this present petition for the review of respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985. On
August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition
ISSUE: Whether or not the adopted daughter and the widow of the testator had been pretirited.
HELD: Yes, the Court held that Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution
of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall he effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]).
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend
from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct
line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A.
Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the
Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption
gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes
the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited
in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime.
Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of
the legally adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire
inheritance including "la porcionlibre (que) no hubiesedispuestoen virtual de legadomejora o donacion "
Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only
provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand
valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the
testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-
without any other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation
(Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole property of the
deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the
"Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943])
except that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute
the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
preterited. It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for the reason that "the grounds
for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the
trial on the merits of the case. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on
February 15, 1985.
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when on its
face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as
universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would
have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The
trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra;
Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private
respondents.
MORALES vs. OLONDRIZ
GR No. 198994 February 3, 2016
Preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the testator's inheritance
without the heir's express disinheritance.
FACTS: Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. (the decedent) died on June 9, 2003. He was survived by his widow, Ana
Maria Ortigas de Olondriz, and his children: Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro Marino O. Olondriz,
Isabel Rosa O. Olondriz, Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz. His widow
and children are collectively referred to as the respondent heirs.
Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petition with the Las Piñas RTC for
the partition of the decedent's estate and the appointment of a special administrator on July 4, 2003.
On July 11, 2003, the RTC appointed Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. as special administrator.
However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging that the decedent left
a will dated July 23, 1991. Morales prayed for the probate of the will and for hex appointment as special
administratrix.
The will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the decedent.
On September 1, 2003, Morales filed a manifestation and moved to suspend the intestate proceedings in
order to give way to the probate proceedings. The respondent heirs opposed Morales' motion for
suspension and her petition for allowance of the will.
On January 6, 2004, the respondent heirs moved to dismiss the probate proceedings because Francisco was
preterited from the will.
On June 23, 2006, the RTC, through Judge Gloria ButayAglugub, suspended the intestate proceedings in Sp.
Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060 and set the case for probate. The RTC reasoned that probate proceedings take
precedence over intestate proceedings.
The respondent heirs moved for reconsideration of the suspension order but the RTC denied the motion on
September 1, 2006. The RTC also summarily revoked the Letters of Administration previously issued to
Alfonso. The respondent heirs moved for reconsideration of the summary revocation of the Letters of
Administration.
On July 12, 2007, the RTC resolved (1) the respondent heirs' motion for reconsideration of the revocation of
the Letters of Administration and (2) Morales' motion to be appointed Special Administratrix of the estate.
The RTC noted that while testacy is preferred over intestacy, courts will not hesitate to set aside probate
proceedings if it appears that the probate of the will might become an idle ceremony because the will is
intrinsically void.
The RTC observed: (1) that Morales expressly admitted that Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz is an
heir of the decedent; (2) that Francisco was clearly omitted from the will; and (3) that based on the
evidentiary hearings, Francisco was clearly preterited. Thus, the RTC reinstated Alfonso Jr. as administrator
of the estate and ordered the case to proceed in intestacy.
Morales moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied on October 30, 2007, for lack of merit.
On February 7, 2008, Morales filed a petition for certiorari against the orders of the RTC. Morales alleged
that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding intestate despite the existence of the will.
The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 102358.
On May 27, 2011, the CA dismissed Morales' petition for certiorari. The CA reasoned that while probate
proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct
line annuls the institution of heirs in the will and opens the entire inheritance into intestate
succession.4 Thus, the continuation of the probate proceedings would be superfluous and impractical
because the inheritance will be adjudicated intestate. The CA concluded that the RTC did not act with grave
abuse of discretion.
Morales moved for reconsideration which the CA denied on October 12, 2011. Hence, she filed the present
petition for review on certiorari on December 5, 2011.
ISSUE: Whether or not Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz
HELD: Yes, the Court held that preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either
because he is not named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor
assigned any part of the estate without expressly being disinherited - tacitly depriving the heir of his
legitime.5 Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also receive any legacies,
devises, or advances on his legitime.6
In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the testator's
inheritance without the heir's express disinheritance.
Article 854 of the Civil Code states the legal effects of preterition:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution
of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation, (emphasis supplied)Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a
compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall
remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees
or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy. 7
In the present case, the decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee.
As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless Morales could
show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to the conclusion of his preterition.
The decedent's will does not contain specific legacies or devices and Francisco's preterition annulled the
institution of heirs. The annulment effectively caused the total abrogation of the will, resulting in total
intestacy of the inheritance.12 The decedent's will, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, is null
and void. The conduct of separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of its testamentary
provisions would be superfluous. Thus, we cannot attribute error - much less grave abuse of discretion - on
the RTC for ordering the case to proceed intestate.
J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L. TEVES, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO BALANSAG
and HILARIA CADAYDAY, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 141882 : March 11, 2005
B.H. Guinzon
FACTS:
Don Julian contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena, and after her death, with Milagros
Donio Teves. Don Julian had two children with Antonia, namely: Josefa and Emilio. He had also
four (4) children with Milagros Donio.
A parcel of land, Lot No. 63, was originally registered in the name of the conjugal partnership of
Don Julian and Antonia. When Antonia died, the land was among the properties involved in an
action for partition. Milagros Donio, the second wife of Don Julian, participated as an intervenor.
The parties to the case entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all
the properties of Don Julian.
The CFI, on the basis of the compromise agreement, declared a tract of land known as Hacienda
Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don Julian and his two (2) children of the
first marriage. The remainder of the properties was retained by Don Julian, including Lot No. 63.
In 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumption
of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. they also executed a Supplemental Deed transferring
ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of JLT.
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the subject
lot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement. They entered into a yearly lease agreement
with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday. Unaware that the subject lot was already
registered in the name of JLT, the Catalinos bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros Donio. They tried to
register the deed of sale but the title was already named.
The Catalinos averred that the Supplemental Deed was tantamount to a preterition of his heirs
from the second marriage.
Issue:
Was there preterition?
Ruling:
NO, there was no preterition.
Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs
in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar
as they are not inofficious.
Preterition is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance. But there
is no preterition where the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the legitime, since
there was no total omission of a forced heir.
Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his
properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if
not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will
depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from the
second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in
the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julian's desire along this line. 48
Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julian's heirs from the second marriage, a
requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners, v. HON. AMOR
A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS,
VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS
and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
G.R. NOS. 140371-72 : November 27, 2006
B.H. Guinzon
FACTS:
Segundo Seangio left a holographic will which only contained disinheritance of his eldest son,
Alfredo Seangio, for cause.
Oppositors averred that the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his
eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor
instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy.
Proponents claim that the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundo's will does not
constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs, but rather,
as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a
compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent's will and the holographic will on
its face is not intrinsically void.
ISSUE:
Whether there is preterition?
RULING:
NO, the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will.
Segundo's last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole
exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other
compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of Virginia in the document did not
operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the
altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
HEIRS OF URETA VS. HEIRS OF URETA

G.R. No. 165748 : September 14, 2011
B.H. Guinzon
FACTS:
In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta begot 14 children. Policronio, the eldest, was the only child of Alfonso
who failed to finish schooling and instead worked on his father's lands.
Francisco, one of Alfonso’s children and who was then a municipal judge, suggested that in order
to reduce the inheritance taxes, their father should make it appear that he had sold some of his
lands to his children. Accordingly, among others, a Deed of Sale was executed in favor of Policronio,
covered six parcels of land, which are the properties in dispute in this case.
Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was given,
Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce.
Except for a portion of parcel 5, the rest of the parcels transferred to Policronio were tenanted by
the Fernandez Family. These tenants never turned over the produce of the lands to Policronio or
any of his heirs, but to Alfonso and, later, to the administrators of his estate.
Alfonso's heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the lands that were
covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation
purposes. Conrado, Policronio's eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs.
Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late father, and as such, excluded from the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of Policronio sought to amicably settle the matter with
the Heirs of Alfonso. Earnest efforts proving futile, the Heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of Documents, Partition, and
Damages against the Heirs of Alfonso.
The Heirs of Alfonso were of the position that the absence of the Heirs of Policronio in the partition
or the lack of authority of their representative results, at the very least, in their preterition and not
in the invalidity of the entire deed of partition.
ISSUE:
Was there a preterition?
RULING:
NO.
Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code is as follows:
Art. 854.The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual,
without prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition has been defined as the total omission of a compulsory heir from the inheritance. It
consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the
testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary
property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter
case. Preterition is thus a concept of testamentary succession and requires a will. In the case at
bench, there is no will involved but only an extra-judicial partition by the heirs of Alfonso.
Therefore, preterition cannot apply.
TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors, Azucena, Flordelis and Tirso, Jr. all surnamed Reyes y
Barretto, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUCILA MILAGROS BARRETTO DATU, Defendant-Appellant.
G.R. No. L-17818. January 20, 1967
B.H. Guinzon
FACTS:
Bibiano Barretto died leaving his share of these properties in a will to Salud Barretto, mother of
Tirso Reyes’ wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters
Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and nieces.
Apparently, there was a court decision declaring that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent
Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto.
Milagros now avers that Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in
the estate of Bibiano Barretto.
ISSUE:
Shall the institution of heirs be invalidated?
RULING:
NO.
ALLOTMENT OF SMALLER SHARE THAN LEGITIME DOES NOT INVALIDATE INSTITUTION OF
HEIR. — While the share (1/2) assigned to S.B. impinged on the legitime of M.B., S. B. did not for
that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of B.B. Nor does the fact that M.B. was allotted in her
father’s will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of S.B. as heir, since there
was here no preterition, or total omission of a forced heir.
There is no evidence that when the estate of Bibiano Barretto was judicially settled and distributed
appellants’ predecessor, Salud Lim Boco Barretto, knew that she was not Bibiano’s child; so that if
fraud was committed, it was the widow, Maria Gerardo, who was solely responsible, and neither
Salud nor her minor children, appellants herein, can be held liable therefor.
The fact that Milagros was allotted in her father’s will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate
the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total omission, of a forced
heir.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, deceased. ADOLFO

C. AZNAR, executor-appellee, v. MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN, Oppositor-Appellant.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, Oppositor-Appellee.
G.R. No. L-24365. June 30, 1966
B.H. Guinzon
FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died leaving a will.
The will provided Lucy Duncan as the sole heir and Helen Grcia as a legatee.
A court order was issued right after his death declaring that Helen Garcia was a natural child of
the deceased. In the will of the deceased Edward E. Christensen Helen Garcia is not mentioned as
an heir — indeed her status as such is denied — but is given a legacy of P3,600.00
The CFI issued an order wherein the properties of the estate were divided equally between Lucy
Duncan, whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his daughter (natural) and
Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his death.
Since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was
annulled, and hence the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate,
saving only the legacies left in favor of certain other persons, which legacies have been duly
approved by the lower court and distributed to the legatees.
Lucy Duncan maintains that this is not a case of preterition, but is governed by Article 906 of the
Civil Code, which says: "Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less the
legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied," She also suggests that
considering the provisions of the will whereby the testator expressly denied his relationship with
Helen Garcia, but left to her a legacy nevertheless, although less than the amount of her legitime,
she was in effect defectively disinherited within the meaning of Article 918.
ISSUE:
Whether there is preterition or defective disinheritance.
RULING:
THERE IS DEFECTIVE DISINHERITANCE AND NOT PRETERITION.
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all
or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting
him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties.
Edward Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and limited her
share to a legacy of P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to possess
such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come during his lifetime his
subjective attitude towards her would have undergone any change and that he would have willed
his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized by him.
Here, he did not entirely omit Helen Garcia, but left her a legacy of P3,600.00. Therefore, Maria
Helen Christensen Garcia shall be given no more than the portion corresponding to her as
legitime, equivalent to one-fourth (1/4) of the hereditary estate, after deduction all debts and
charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will of the decedent, in accordance with
Article 908 of the Civil Code.
REMEDIOS NUGUID, Petitioner-Appellant, v. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA

NUGUID, Oppositors-Appellees.
G.R. No. L-23445. June 23, 1966
B.H. Guinzon
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid died single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were
her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and 6 brothers and sisters. One of
the sisters is Remedios Nuguid.
The parents of Rosario opposed the probate of her holographic will on the ground that by the
institution of Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, the parents, who are compulsory
heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line, were illegally preterited and that in consequence
the institution is void.
Remedios’ mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition." 15 From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the
case at bar." This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between preterition and
disinheritance.
ISSUE:
Was there a preterition rendering the will void?
RULING:
YES.
The deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct
ascending time — her parents. Her will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their
names altogether. Said will rather than he labelled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in
which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition. The one- sentence will here institutes
petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein
provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid
died intestate.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance; in turn, "is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir of heir share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law."
Disinheritance is always "voluntary"; preterition upon the other hand, is presumed to be
"involuntary."
The effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition
under Article 854 of the Civil Code "shall annul the institution of heir. "This annulment is in toto,
unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or
legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall
also "annul the institution of heirs," but only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited,"
which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. Better stated yet, in disinheritance the
nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally
deprived.
Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will.
Nothing in Article 854 of the Civil Code suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a
will — void because of preterition — would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance.
As to him, the will is inexistent. There must he, in addition to such institution, a testamentary
disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of
heir.
Substitution of Heirs
NCC. 857
Cases:
PCIB v ESCOLIN
GR No. l-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974
Enna B Alilian
FACTS: Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas, died in Iloilo City leaving a will
executed. In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. It was
also stated in her will her that if Charles die, the subject estate shall be turned over to her brother
and sister.
Later on, Charles did die while domiciled in the Philippines. The lawyer of Charles filed a motion
before the probate court while there was an ongoing probate on the will of Linnie so that a certain
Avelina Magno may be appointed as the administratrix of the estate. Magno was the most trusted
employee of the Hodges when they were alive and who had been employed for around thirty (30)
years. It was manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in
Charles’ office. The judge approved the appointment of Magno as administratrix.
Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Magno
opposed the said petition. The probate of Charles’ will was granted. The Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank was appointed the administrator. Magno refused to turn over the estate.
Magno argued that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother
and sister.
ISSUE: WoN there was substitution.
HELD:
NO.
SC: “We overrule PCIB’s contention that the provision in Mrs. Hodges’ will in favor of her brothers
and sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. But neither are We sustaining, on the
other hand, Magno’s pose that it gave Hodges only a lifetime usufruct. We hold that by said
provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her
husband, with the condition, however, that the latter would have complete rights of dominion over
the whole estate during his lifetime and what would go to the former would be only the remainder
thereof at the time of Hodges’ death. In other words, whereas they are not to inherit only in case
of default of Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for them.
Clearly then, the essential elements of testamentary substitution are absent; the provision in
question is a simple case of conditional simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby the institution
of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition the operative contingency of which is
coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of the institution of his brothers and sisters-in-
law, which manner of institution is not prohibited by law.
Substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will "so that he may enter into
inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857, id.) and, in the present case,
no such possible default is contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not
substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would
not or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore,
they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions,
partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with
reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law.”
Simple Substitution
NCC. 859
Cases:
RABADILLA V. CA
No. 113725 June 29, 2000
Enna B Alilian
FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix AlejaBelleza, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a
devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod
Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046
before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
“That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the rights which I
shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the children and spouse of
Jorge Rabadilla”
a)….It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito
G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every
year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and
Twenty-Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria MarlinaCoscolluela y Belleza dies.
Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give
yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.
If Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs decide to sell, lease or transfer, the buyer, lessee or transferee shall
also have the same obligation to the testator’s sister. Failure to do so will forfeit the property to
the sister and nearest relatives.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny
(petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
ISSUE: Is there a substitution under Article 859?
RULING:
NO.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir
or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the
designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die
before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution,
or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted
subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason
of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of
subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity
or renunciation, the testatrix’s near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides
is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the
property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix near descendants.
RAMIREZ VS VDA DE RAMIREZ

No. L-27952. FEBRUARY 15, 1982
Enna B Alilian
FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only
his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of
the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow “en plenodominio” in
satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or “free portion” shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez
“en nudapropriedad.” Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the
widow‟s usufruct and the remaining two-third (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino national, died in
Spain on December 11, 1964) among principal beneficiaries:
MarcelleDemoron de Ramirez
- Widow
- French who lives in Paris
- received ½ (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free portion
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez
- two grandnephews
- lives in Malate
- received the ½ (free portion)
Wanda de Wrobleski
- companion
- Austrian who lives in Spain
- Received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion
- vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez
Maria Luisa Palacios
- administratix
Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because first
heirs not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree as provided in Art 863
CC, among others
ISSUE: Is the vulgar substitution under Article 859 valid?
RULING: YES. They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect is void because Wanda survived
the testator or stated differently because she did not predecease the testator. But dying before the
testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to
accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar
substitution is valid.
Fideicommissary Substitution
NCC. 863-866, 869
Cases:
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ vs. MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-27952, February 15, 1982
Enna B Alilian
FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only
his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of
Manila on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of
the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow (Marcelle Demoron de
Ramirez) in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and
Roberto Ramirez (grandnephews). Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged
with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wandade
Wrobleski (his companion).
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition among other grounds: (b) that the provisions
for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the
second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Was the fideicommissary substitution valid?
RULING: NO, the fideicommissary substitution was not valid.
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is
entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of
inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one
degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and
the second heir are living at time of the death of the testator.
It was void due to the following reasons:

(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the
heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution
"provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
Fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives
who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary.
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as
required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator
contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties
subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked
owners."
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000
Enna B Alilian
FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge
devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod
Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046
before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
“That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the rights which I
shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the children and spouse of
Jorge Rabadilla”
a)….It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito
G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every
year to give to Maria MarlinaCoscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and
TwentyFive (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria MarlinaCoscolluela y Belleza dies.
Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give
yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria
MarlinaCoscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year. If Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs
decide to sell, lease or transfer, the buyer, lessee or transferee shall also have the same obligation
to the testator’s sister. Failure to do so will forfeit the property to the sister and nearest relatives.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny
(petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
ISSUE: Whether there was a fideicommissary substitution
HELD:
NO.
In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and
to transmit the same later to the second heir. In the case under consideration, the instituted heir
is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the
near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a
fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the
preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to
preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution." Also,
the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass
to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the
usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article
863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be
beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is
therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir.In the case under
scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
PCIB VS. ESCOLIN

No. L-27860 & L-27896. MARCH 29, 1974
Digested: Jan-Lawrence Olaco
FACTS: Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas. She made a will in 1952.
Unfortunately, she passed away in 1957 while she was domiciled in Iloilo City. It was stated in her
will that all her estate will be in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie, however,
also stated in her will that should her husband later die, said estate shall be turned over to her
brother and sister. Thereafter, Charles who was also domiciled in the Philippines died in 1962 .
While the probate proceeding on the will of Linnie was pending, Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of
Charles, filed a motion before the probate court so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed
as the administratrix of the estate. The latter was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they
were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was in an iron
trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he would like to have Magno appointed as
administratrix. The said motion was approved by Judge Venicio Escolin. Thereafter, Charles’ will
was found and a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since said will basically covers
the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition.
Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was granted. Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(PCIB) was appointed as administrator of Charles’ estate. But Magno refused to turn over the
estate. Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to
Linnie’s brother and sister and since that it is her will, the same must be respected.
With the appointment of the PCIB as the sole administrator of the estate of Charles, PCIB claims
the right to the immediate exclusive possession and control of all of the properties in substitution
of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the PCIB legally became the only party entitled to the sole
and exclusive possession of all of the assets of the estate of Charles. PCIB's claimed that, viewed as
a substitution, the testamentary disposition in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters may not
be given effect.
ISSUE: Is there a substitution under Article 857 and 859 or a fideicommissary substitution?
RULING: NONE. In the instant case, Mrs. Hodges' will provides neither for a simple or vulgar
substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under
Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution therein because there is no provision for either
(1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter
to accept the inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is there a fideicommissary
substitution therein because no obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate
or any part thereof for anyone else. But from these premises, it is not correct to jump to the
conclusion, that the testamentary dispositions in question are therefore inoperative and invalid.
The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges because, under her will,
they are not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not
dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously
with Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was
concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is
partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned and
enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during his
lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion
thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his
rights to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that
contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although
vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the
occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder of her estate
then. It is clear that the essential elements of testamentary substitution are absent; the provision
in question is a simple case of conditional simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby the
institution of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition the operative contingency of
which is coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of the institution of his brothers and
sisters-in-law, which manner of institution is not prohibited by law.
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ , MARIA LUISA PALACIOS vs. MARCELLE D.
VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-27952, February 15, 1982
FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with
only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First
Instance of Manila on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the
estate.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property
of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow (Marcelle
Demoron de Ramirez) in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go
to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (grandnephews). Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free
portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a
usufruct in favor of Wandade Wrobleski (his companion).
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition among other grounds: (b) that the
provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not
related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of
the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Was the fideicommissary substitution valid?
RULING: No, the fideicommissary substitution was not valid. Under ART. 863. A
fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is
entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of
inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond
one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first
heir and the second heir are living at time of the death of the testator. Scaevola Maura, and
Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or transmission. Manresa, Morell
and Sanchez Roman construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present Code has
obviously followed this interpretation by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond
one degree "from the heir originally instituted. The Code indicates that the second heir must
be related to and be one generation from the first heir. From this, it follows that the
fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only
relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary.
Applying the rules in the instant case, it was void due to the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda,
the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary
substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted."
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as
required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator
contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the
properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and
the naked owners." Hence, the fideicommissary substitution was not valid.
NCC. 882
Cases:
RABADILLA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

No. 113725. JUNE 29, 2000
FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge
devisee of the Bacolod Cadastre. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife
Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
Thereafter, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint against the heirs
of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The plaintiff then prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return the subject lot to the
surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of the title in the name of the deceased,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs
of the late Aleja Belleza. The RTC dismissed the complaint of Villacarlos. However, the CA reversed
the decision of the trial court stating that the evidence established the defendants-appellee's
obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such
amount of sugar to Villacarlos.
Rabadilla contends that Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution
and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to deliver the
fruits to herein private respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and
without issue, there can be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given
any effect. He theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the
substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near
descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who are the "near descendants" and
therefore, under Articles 843 and 845 of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed as
not written.
ISSUE: Was there a substitution or a modal institution?
RULING: Modal Institution. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for
the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should
die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple
substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be
transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. In simple
substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of
incapacity, predecease or renunciation. However, the institution of an heir in the manner
prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or
a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2)
the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the
testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not
affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory
condition.
In the present case, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix near descendants would
substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill
the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to
the testatrix near descendants. It can be gleaned that the testatrix intended that subject property
be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on
the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the
herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However,
the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as
a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear that should the
obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently
modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting
the efficacy of such institution. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to
deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it
over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with
the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants.
Compulsory Heirs and Various Combinations

NCC. 887
Cases:
ILANO v. CA
G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994
FACTS: Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty.
Mariano Virata. Later, Artemio courted her more than four years. Their relationship became
intimate and with his promise of marriage, they eloped. While they were living at Makati, private
respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born. Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos
Ilano, child of Leoncia de los Santos and Artemio Ilano. In the signing of he birth certificate of
Merceditas, Artemio left an instruction to give birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he
was leaving early the following morning. During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as
husband and wife, he showed concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade
I at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading
periods. The case involves an abandoned illegitimate offspring, Merceditas, to sue his father,
Artemio, for recognition and support. The RTC dismissed the petition for support and recognition.
However, CA reversed RTC’s judgment declaring Mercedita as the duly acknowledged and
recognized illegitimate child.
Artemio argues that since the complaint against him has been dismissed by the trial court,
therefore was absolutely no obligation on his part to give support to Merceditas. It would have
been only from the date of the judgment of the trial court that support should have commenced, if
so granted. Under the law in force when the complaint was filed, an adulterous child cannot
maintain an action for compulsory recognition. In order that the birth certificate may constitute a
voluntary recognition, it must be signed by the father. Equivocal act, such as signing under the
caption "parent" in the report card, is not sufficient. Merceditas has never been to the family home
of petitioner at Imus, Cavite; nor introduced to his family; nor brought around town by him,
treated as his child, introduced to other people as his child, led people to believe that she was part
of his family.
ISSUE: Is Merceditas a duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child?
HELD: YES. Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those
who are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into: (1) Natural, whether
actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of
conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (2) Spurious,
whether incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal
impediments. Article 287 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other than natural
in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to
support and such successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code. The Civil Code has given
these rights to them because the transgressions of social conventions committed by the parents
should not be visited upon them. They were born with a social handicap and the law should help
them to surmount the disadvantages facing them through the misdeeds of their parents. However,
before Article 287 can be availed of, there must first be a recognition of paternity either voluntarily
or by court action. In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the
true or real child of his parents but because under the law, he had been recognized or
acknowledged as such a child.
In the instant case, since Artemio had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas was
conceived, she is a spurious child. A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be
withdrawn. A mere change of mind would be incompatible with the stability of the civil status of
person, the permanence of which affects public interest. The mere denial by defendant of his
signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the
signature thereon belongs to him. The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the
genesis of the relationship between Leoncia and Artemio, their living together as circumstances of
plaintiff's birth, the acts of appellee in recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find ample support
from the testimonial and documentary evidence which leaves no room to reasonably doubt his
paternity which may not be infirmed by his belated denials. As a necessary consequence of the
finding that Merceditas is the spurious child of petitioner, she is entitled to support.
FRANCISCO A. TONGOY vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-45645 June 28, 1983
FACTS: In this case, there is an action for reconveyance respecting two (2) parcels of land in
Bacolod City. The first is Lot is known as Hacienda Pulo, originally registered under the names of
Francisco Tongoy, Jose Tongoy, Ana Tongoy, Teresa Tongoy and Jovita Tongoy in pro-indiviso
equal shares. Said co-owners were all children of the late Juan Aniceto Tongoy. The second is
referred to as Cuaycong property registered in the name of Basilisa Cuaycong. Francisco had six
children; Patricio and Luis by the first marriage; Amado, Ricardo; Cresenciano and Norberto by
his second wife Antonina Pabello whom he subsequently married sometime after the birth of their
children. By the time this case was commenced, the late Francisco Tongoy's aforesaid two children
by his first marriage, Patricio and Luis, have themselves died. On the other hand, Luis left behind
a son, Francisco A. Tongoy, and a surviving spouse, Ma. Rosario Araneta Vda. de Tongoy.
Patricio and Luis executed a Declaration of Inheritance wherein they declared themselves as the
only heirs of the late Francisco Tongoy. Both properties were turned over in favor of Luis Tongoy
by virtue of an instrument "Escritura de Venta" executed by the heirs. Luis paid off all his
obligations, including the mortgage obligations on the Cuaycong property and Hacienda Pulo. A
release of real estate mortgage was executed by the bank in favor of Luis. On February 5, 1966,
Luis D. Tongoy died leaving as heirs his wife Maria Rosario Araneta and his son Francisco A.
Tongoy. Just before his death, Luis received a letter from Jesus T. Sonora, demanding the return of
the shares in the properties to the co-owners. Alleging in sum that plaintiffs and/or their
predecessors transferred their interests on the two lots in question to Luis D. Tongoy by means of
simulated sales, pursuant to a trust arrangement whereby the latter would return such interests
after the mortgage obligations thereon had been settled.
The RTC and CA granted the reconveyance of the shares of the subject properties to the entitled
heirs among the orders is that Ricardo, Cresenciano, Amado and Norberto as substituted and
represented by his heirs each have a 14/135th portion of both Hacienda Pulo and the Cuaycong
property. Maria and Francisco opposed stating that the respondents Tongoy are not the
legitimated children of Francisco Tongoy and granting arguendo that respondents Tongoy are the
legitimated children of Francisco Tongoy, the respondent court erred in not finding that their
action against petitioners has prescribed. Petitioners maintain that since the said respondents
were never acknowledged by their father, they could not have been legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of their parents, much less could they inherit from the estate of their father, the
predecessor-in-interest of Luis D. Tongoy, who is admittedly the half brother of the said
respondents.
ISSUE: Are the respondents Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano and Norberto, all surnamed Tongoy,
may be considered legitimated?
RULING: YES, the Court in this case adopted a liberal view in favor of the natural children.
In the instant case, the facts show an overwhelming evidence which conclusively shows that
respondents Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano and Norberto have been in continuous possession of
the status of natural, or even legitimated, children. Still, it recognizes the fact that such
continuous possession of status is not, per se, a sufficient acknowledgment but only a ground to
compel recognition. However, the Court agreed with the view of the respondent court when it
said - “It does seem equally manifest, however, that defendants-appellants stand on a purely
technical point in the light of the overwhelming evidence that appellees were natural children of
Francisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabello, and were treated as legitimate children not only by
their parents but also by the entire clan. Indeed, it does not make much sense that appellees
should be deprived of their hereditary rights as undoubted natural children of their father, when
the only plausible reason that the latter could have had in mind when he married his second wife
Antonina Pabello just over a month before his death was to give legitimate status to their
children.
It is not in keeping with the more liberal attitude taken by the New Civil Code towards illegitimate
children and the more compassionate trend of the New Society to insist on a very literal
application of the law in requiring the formalities of compulsory acknowledgment, when the only
result is to unjustly deprive children who are otherwise entitled to hereditary rights. From the
very nature of things, it is hardly to be expected of appellees, having been reared as legitimate
children by their parents and treated as such by everybody, to bring an action to compel their
parents to acknowledge them.”
Estoppel should also operate in this case in favor of appellees, considering, that they have always
been treated as acknowledged and legitimated children of the second marriage of Francisco
Tongoy, not only by their presumed parents who raised them as their children, but also by the
entire Tongoy-Sonora clan, including Luis D. Tongoy himself. Estoppel, as already indicated,
precludes defendants-appellants from attacking appellees' status as acknowledged natural or
legitimated children of Francisco Tongoy. In addition to estoppel, this is decidedly one instance
when technicality should give way to conscience, equity and justice.
Hence, a liberal view in favor of natural children who, because they enjoy the blessings and
privileges of an acknowledged natural child and even of a legitimated child, found it rather
awkward, if not unnecessary, to institute an action for recognition against their natural parents,
who, without their asking, have been showering them with the same love, care and material
support as are accorded to legitimate children. The right to participate in their father's inheritance
should necessarily follow.
INGRID V. HILARIO v. THELMA V. MIRANDA and IRENEA BELLOC

G.R. No. 196499. November 28, 2018
Paulo Jose S. Villarin
FACTS:
On May 31, 2000 [Civil case No. AV-929], the Regional Trial Court declared in its decision the
following pertinent conclusions:
a) That Antonio Belloc died single, survived by his two illegitimate children, plaintiff Magdalena
Varian, Dolores Retiza and his grandson Teresito Flamor. Accordingly, he died intestate and his
intestate estate will pass on and will be inherited by his intestate heirs upon his death; and
b) That evidence disclosed further that at the time of Dolores Retiza’s death sometime in 1995,
being without issue, her only surviving heir is her half-sister, the plaintiff Magdalena and her
nephew, Teresito Flamor who, under the law on intestate succession will be the ones entitled to
inherit her properties.
On July 2, 2001, Petitioner Ingrid V. Hilario (Ingrid) filed two petitions for the issuance of letters
of administration with urgent application for appointment of a special administratrix, both dated
June 22, 2001, involving the properties of Antonio and Dolores, respectively. She alleged that she
is the daughter of Magdalena Varian (Magdalena). On June 9, 2003, Magdalena died
On August 25, 2004, Irenea filed a motion for leave to intervene and opposition-in-intervention.
She claimed that she is the niece both of Antonio on the father side and Silveria on the mother side
of Dolores, and the latter was her first cousin. She claimed that Magdalena cannot inherit from
Dolores because she (Magdalena) is not a daughter of Antonio. Irenea also alleged that since she
is the nearest surviving relative of both Antonio and Dolores, she is entitled to be appointed as
sole administrator of their estate.
The RTC, finding that Irenea’s claims were unsubstantiated, ruled in favour of Ingrid, declaring
that Magdalena had established sufficient proof to be declared an heir of Antonio as his illegitimate
daughter, and an heir of Dolores, as her half sister.
On Appeal to the Court of Appeals, reversed and set aside said ruling. It held that although
Magdalena was Antonio's spurious daughter, she nevertheless cannot inherit from his estate
because she was not recognized by him either voluntarily or by court action. That her right to
inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or recognition of her continuous enjoyment and
possession of the status of child of her supposed father.
ISSUE: Is Magdalena an intestate heir of both Antonio and Dolores?
HELD:
NO.
The law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth. Proof of filiation is
necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned. This rule also applies to
illegitimate children. In her Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code and Family Code Committees, discussed that like legitimate children,
illegitimate children are already given by the Family Code their status as such from the moment
of birth. There is, therefore, no need for an illegitimate child to file an action against his parent for
recognition if he has in fact already been recognized by the latter by any of the evidences
mentioned in Article 172 of the Family Code. If, however, the status of the illegitimate child is
impugned, or he is required by circumstances to establish his illegitimate filiation, then he can do
so in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children as provided in Article 172.
It is settled that Magdalena was an illegitimate child of Antonio. Since the law gave her that status
from birth, she had no need to file an action to establish her filiation. Looking at the circumstances
of the case, she was only compelled by the CA to present a "higher standard of proof" to establish
her filiation as a result of an unsubstantiated claim of a better status raised by Irenea. We hold,
however, that such unsubstantiated claim is no claim at all. It is not an effective impugnation that
shifts to Magdalena the onus to establish her filiation. To rule otherwise will only embolden and
encourage unscrupulous lawsuits against illegitimate children, especially those who enjoyed
recognition under paragraph 2, Article 172 of the Family Code, as they can no longer defend their
rights after the prescriptive period has set in.
We have held that it is the policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of
the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children.
Significantly, the evils that the law seeks to prevent in placing a time limit to prove filiation if the
grounds fall under paragraph 2, Article 172 of the Family Code, namely, to protect the legitimate
family, does not exist in this case. Antonio had no legitimate family and Dolores died without issue.
For more than 20 years since Dolores' death, there had been no claimants to her and Antonio's
estates but Magdalena, Thelma, and Irenea. As discussed, Thelma does not even claim to be an
heir, and Irenea's claim of legitimate relationship with the decedents remained unsubstantiated.
The Court is also compelled to rule in favor of petitioner on the basis of the final judgment
rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. AV-929 which established Magdalena's filiation. Under
paragraph 1, Article 172 of the Family Code, "final judgment" is a means of establishing filiation. It
refers to a decision of a competent court finding the child legitimate or illegitimate. We find no
need to disturb the RTC's findings which are based on the evidence presented for its consideration
in the course of the proceeding. While the subject of Civil Case No. AV-929 is the declaration of
nullity of certain documents, the ruling on Magdalena's filiation cannot be considered obiter
dictum since the RTC determinedly discussed and settled that issue as a means to decide the main
issue brought for its disposition. Being a final judgment, the Decision in Civil Case No. AV-929
constitutes res judicata.
ERNESTINA BERNABE v. CAROLINA ALEJO

G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002
FACTS:
The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with Carolina Alejo. The son was born on
September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993
leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. Therafter, Carolina in behalf of Adrian filed the
aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared as acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe. The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that under the provision of the Family Code, the
death of the putative father had barred the action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that in
the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe since the boy was born in 1981; his rights are governed by Article 283 of the Civil Code.
Hence, appeal was interposed in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Does Adrian Bernabe have the right to be recognized?
HELD:
Yes.
Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for
recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot
impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested
prior to its enactment.
illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose
putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under
Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This
vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
NICANOR TOMBOKON v. APOLONIA LEGASPI

G.R. No. 153736 August 12, 2010
FACTS:
The parcel of land subject in this case was originally owned by the late Alejandra Sespeñe, who
had had two marriages. The first marriage was with Gaudencio Franco, by whom she bore
Ciriaca Franco, whose husband was Victor Miralles. The second marriage was with Jose Garcia, by
whom she bore respondent Apolonia Garcia, who married Primo Legaspi. Alejandra died without
a will in 1935, and was survived by Apolonia and Crisanto Miralles, the son of Ciriaca (who had
predeceased Alejandra in 1924) and Victor Miralles.
A case was filed by the petitioners for the recovery of ownership and possession of real property
with damages against the respondents. The former alleged that petitioner Rosario
SespeñeTumbokon purchased the land in question from Cresenciana Inog. Cresenciana Inog, in
turn, acquired the land by purchase from Victor Miralles, son-in-law of decedent Alejandra, who
had represented that he inherited the land from his mother-in-law. The RTC rendered a decision
in favor of the petitioners, holding that the spouses were able to establish the purchase of the land.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the complaint
ISSUE:Was the sale made by Victor Miralles valid?
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals that Victor’s claim of being the
sole heir was false and erroneous for Alejandra had more than one intestate heir, and Victor
Miralles as a mere son-in-law could not be one of them. A decedent’s compulsory heirs in whose
favor the law reserves a part of the decedent’s estate are exclusively the persons enumerated in
Article 887 of the Civil Code.
Here, only two forced heirs survived Alejandra upon her death, namely: respondent Apolonia, her
daughter, and Crisanto Miralles, her grandson. The latter succeeded Alejandra by right of
representation because his mother, Ciriaca, had predeceased Alejandra.
NCC. 888
Case:
REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL v AIDA FRANCISCO-ALFONSO

G.R. No. 138774 March 8, 2001
FACTS:
Aida, respondent, is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are
now both deceased.
Regina and Zenaida, the petitioners, are the illegitimate daughters of Gregorio who have the
possession of the certificates of title of Gregorio’s property.
After Gregorio died, Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her half sisters and was told
that their father had sold the land to them. After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a
deed of absolute sale. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCTs
Aida filed with the RTC a complaint for annulment of sale with damages.She alleged that the
signature of her late father was a forged.In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied
the alleged forgery or simulation of the deed of sale.
RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint and sustaining the validity of the
“KasulatanSaGanap Na Bilihan".
CA reversed the trial court’s decision declaring the kasulatan as null and void and ordered the
cancellartion of the transfer certificates of title. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a
simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate children?
HELD:
No, the legitimate daughter as the compulsory heir, cannot be deprived of her share in the estate
save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If
indeed the parcels of land involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact
would deprive respondent of her share in her father's estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the
estate of her father as his only legitimate child.
According to Article 888, Civil Code:
"The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate
of the father and of the mother.
"The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate children
and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."
The kasulatan was also simulated hence, null and void, as there was no consideration for the
contract of sale. A friend testified that respondents did not have any source of incomewhen they
bought the property. Though they may have been earning, the Court find it incredible that
engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of P10,000.00, or that earnings in selling goto
could save enough to pay P15,000.00, in cash for the land.
But even if the even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code provisions
insofar as the transaction affected respondent's legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when the
applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code.
Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at the
expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from
claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a change
of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property.
Reserva Troncal
NCC. 891
Cases:
IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA v. CFI of Negros Occidental

G.R. L-29901 August 31, 1977
FACTS:
In the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias SyQuio he sired three children,
namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel. When Patricia died, Jose contracted a second marriage with
Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias.
Josedied intestate. In the Intestate Proceeding, lower court issued an orderadjudicating, among
others, the½ portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 to Consolacion as the widow, the
other half of Lotin favor of Juanitoson in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenzo; and
P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio.
Juanitoof the second marriage died intestate without any issue.his mother Consolacionsucceeded
to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399.Consolacion later executed a declaration of heirship
adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son but then she died intestate leaving no
direct heir except her brothers & sisters.
The petitioners, as heirs of the Gregorio on the first marriage, filed the complaintpraying that the
one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanitobut which passed to
Consolacionbe declaredas a reservable property for the reason that the lot in question was subject
to reservaltroncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil Code.
CFI dismissed the complaint of the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Was the property in question acquired by Juanito from his father Jose gratuitously in order to
subject it to a reservatroncal?
RULING:
Yes, the lot in question is subject to reservatroncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.It is
evident from the record that the transmission of the property in question to Juanito upon the death
of his father was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous.
After his death his mother Consolation succeeded to his one-half pro-indiviso share of Lot 399.
This was, however, subject to the condition that the property was reservable in character under
Art. 891 of the Civil Code in favor of relatives within the third degree of Jose from whom the
property came. These relatives are the petitioners herein.
The pertinent provision of reservatroncal under the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any property which the latter
may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendat, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who
are within the third degree and belong to the line from which said property came.
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a reservable
character the following requisites must exist, to wit:
(1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or from a brother or sister
by gratuitous title;
(2) that said descendant died without an issue;
(3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and
(4) that there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property
came.
In this case, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanito
of the second marriage died intestate without leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of
Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacionwho later died.Juanito had relatives within
the third degree. These relatives are Ignacio,Dominador and Remidios, the suppose legitimate
children of the deceased Lorenzo, who are the petitioners herein. They are declared owners of 1/2
undivided portion of Lot 399;and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is hereby ordered to
cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name of
Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a new Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la
Torre, 1/2 undivided portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua
and Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said lot.
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES v. CFI OF MANILA

G.R. No. L-34395, May 19,1981
Alexand Rhea M. Villahermosa
FACTS: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died and was survived by
his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: 3 sons and four daughters including
petitioner. The real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal
portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y
De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
FilomenaLegarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress
was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. De Legarda. Mrs.Legarda executedan affidavit adjudicating
extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter,
FilomenaLegarda.As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her
deceased daughter FilomenaLegarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other
six children. Later, Mrs Legardaexecuted two handwritten Identical documents wherein she
disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her
sons and partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito
Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y
De la Paz.
Mrs.Legarda died and her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will. In the testate
proceeding, Beatriz Legarda, a daughter of the testatrix filed a motion to exclude from the
inventory of her mother’s estate the properties, which she inherited from her deceased daughter
on the ground that said properties are reservable properties, which should be inherited by
FilomenaLegarda. Without awaiting the resolution on the motion, Beatriz filed an ordinary civil
action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother’s estate for the purpose
of serving a declaration that said properties are reservable properties which Mrs.Legarda could
not bequeath in her will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her sons and daughters.
ISSUE: Are the properties in question be subjected to reserva troncal?
RULING: Yes, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of
Mrs.Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the
time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the
prepositusFilomenaLegarda were living or they survived Mrs.Legarda. So, the ultimate issue in
this case is whether Mrs.Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will or
mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion
of the reservees in the second degree, her three daughters and three sons. As indicated at the
outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosajuzgada.
We hold that Mrs.Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren
the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the
reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191).
The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the
reservees survived the reservor. Thereservees inherit the reservable properties from the
prepositus, not from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest
relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of
Mrs.Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given
and deprive the other reservees of their share therein. To allow the reservor in this case to make
a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third
degree and, consequently, to ignore the reserves in the second degree would be a glaring violation
of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed. Applying that doctrine to this
case, it results that Mrs.Legarda could not dispose of in her will the properties in question even if
the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from FilomenaLegarda. The said
properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs.Legarda's six children as reservees within
the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
DE PAPA ET. AL v. CAMACHO ET. AL
G.R. NO. L-28032, September 24, 1986
FACTS: Romana donated four parcels of land to Toribia. When Toribia died in 1915, she left the
said property to Faustino and Trinidad, her children. When Balbino died in 1928, three parcels
of land were adjudicated to Toribia and since she predeceased her father, the same was given to
her children Faustino and Trinidad. Faustino died in 1937 and left his ½ pro-indiviso share in the
seven lands to his father Eustacio Dizon, subject to reserve troncal. When Trinidad died in 1939,
all her ½ pro-indiviso share were inherited by Dalisay, subject to usufruct of Primo Tongko.
Eustacio died in 1965, survived by his only granddaughter Dalisay. Dalisay claims the ½ by virtue
of the reserva troncal implied by law upon the death of Faustino. Plaintiffs, as uncles and aunts,
also claim ¾ of the ½ pro-indiviso share, being a third relative of Faustino.
The lower court ruled that both plaintiffs and defendants are all entitled as reservatarios.
ISSUE: Are all relatives of the prepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed
without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista?
RULING: No. Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are
relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called
reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation)
should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot
be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among
the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came,
inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal
and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the person
from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding
degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging
his rights as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is
right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned
by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property
came. x x x
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate
succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double
that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter
se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of
double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should likewise be operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to
whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property
should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does
not specify otherwise. x x x Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on
intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as
aunts and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the prepositus), they are excluded from the
succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the
same degree as the latter. x x x Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited,
the defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary
property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
SIENES, ET AL. v. ESPARCIA, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-12957, March 24, 1961
FACTS: Saturnino Yaeso originally owes Lot 3368. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four
children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea
Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco. When
Francisco died, without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public
instrument entitled extra-judicial settlement and sale whereby, among other things, for and in
consideration of the sum of P800.00, she sold the property in question to Sienes. Thereafter,
Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared
the property in their name executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Esparcia. Andrea
Gutang died later with Cipriana Yaeso (child from the first wife) surviving her.
Sienes then filed an action asking for the nullification of the sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana,
the reconveyance of the lot and damages and cost of suit.Fidel Esparcia countered that they did
not know any information regarding the sale by Andrea Gutang in favor of the Sps. Sienes, and
that if such sale was made, the same was void since Andrea had no right to dispose of the
property.
The lower court declared that both the sale made by Andrea Gutang to Sps. Sienes was and that
of Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso to the Sps. Esparcia were void. The land in question was reservable
property and therefore, the reservista Andrea Gutang, was under obligation to reserve it for the
benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came,
if any, survived her. Record shows that lone reserve surviving was Cipriana Yaeso.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reservoir or the reserve alienate the subject lot
RULING: Yes. The lot is a reservable property, and the reservoir may alienate the property subject
to a resolutory condition. In reserva troncal the reservor has the legal title and dominion over the
reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition. He may alienate the same but subject
to the reservation, i.e., the rights acquired by the transferee are revoked upon the survival of
reservees at the time of death of the reservor. The reserva instituted by law in favor of the heirs
within the third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came
constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, although conditionally,
the condition being that the alienation would transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when
the reservee survives the reservor.
Upon the death of the reservor, there being a surviving reservee, the reservable property passes
in exclusive ownership to the latter. In the present case, inasmuch as when the reservista, Andrea
Gutang died, CiprianaYaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous
sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable
property passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, the sale executed by the sisters, Paulina and CiprianaYaeso, in favor of the Sps.
Esparcia was subject to a similar resolutory condition. While it may be true that the sale was
made by Cipriana and her sister prior to the death of Andrea, it became effective because of the
occurrence of the resolutory condition.
MARIA MENDOZA et.al. v. JULIA POLlCARPIO DELOS SANTOS
G.R. No. 176422, March 20, 2013
FACTS: The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land.Two of the said lots
are in the name of respondent Julia Delos Santos. The other lot is also in the name of Julia but co-
owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought 1/2 of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza
and her siblings. Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of their grandparent’s
properties that were subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel, one
of the children.After Exequiel’s death, it passed on to his spouse Leonor and daughter, Gregoria.
Gregoria later died intestate and without issue. After Gregoria’s death, respondent, who is
Leonor’s sister,adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor
and Gregoria.
Petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf
and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reservatroncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as these did not originate
from petitioners’ familial line and were not originally owned by Placido and Dominga. According
to respondent, the properties were bought by Exequiel and Antonio from a certain Alfonso Ramos
in 1931. It appears, however, that it was only Exequiel who was in possession of the properties.
RTC granted theaction for Recovery of Possession by ReservaTroncal of petitioners. CA reversed
and set aside the decision stating that petitioners failed to establish that Placido and Dominga
owned the properties in dispute.10 The CA also ruled that even assuming that Placido and
Dominga previously owned the properties, it still cannot be subject to reservatroncal as neither
Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga nor did Gregoria predecease Exequiel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioners have the right to the properties by virtue of the law on
reserva truncal
RULING: NO, Article 891 on reserve troncal is not applicable. Petitioners cannot be considered
reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the 3rd degree of Gregoria from whom
the properties came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon
whom the property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case.
Petitioners are Gregoria’s fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the
prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.While it may appear
that the properties are reservable in character, petitioners cannot benefit from reservatroncal.
First, because Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant within
the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code and second, because petitioners are not Gregoria’s
relatives within the third degree.
NCC. 898
Case:
DEL ROSARIO v. CONANAN

G.R. No. L-37903, March 30, 1977
FACTS: On November 13, 1972, petitioner, legitimate mother of the deceased, filed for the
settlement and partition of her late son Felix del Rosario who died on a plane crash. While
oppositor Dorotea del Rosario is the legitimate surviving wife of Felix. Dorotea and Felix had a
legally adopted child named Marilou del Rosario. The court dismissed the petitioner’s petition
based on the law on intestate succession that an adopted child concurring with the surviving
spouse of the adopter excludes the legitimate ascendants from succession, ...therefore, the
petitioner not being included as intestate heir of the deceased cannot be considered as a co-
owner of or have any right over the properties sought to be partitioned.
ISSUE: Is petitioner, as the legitimate mother of the deceased, entitled to an inheritance?
RULING: YES. The court opined that the governing provision is article 343 of the New Civil Code.
Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving with legitimate parents of the deceased adopter,
has the same successional rights as an acknowledged natural child, which is comprehended in
the term "illegitimate children". Consequently, the respective shares of the surviving spouse,
ascendant and adopted child should be determined by Article 1000 of the New Civil Code. It is
most unfair to accord more successional rights to the adopted, who is only related artificially by
fiction of law to the deceased, than those who are naturally related to him by blood in the direct
ascending line. The applicability of Article 343 does not exclude the surviving parent of the
deceased adopter, not only because a contrary view would defeat the intent of the framers of the
law, but also because in intestate succession, where legitimate parents or ascendants concur with
the surviving spouse of the deceased, the latter does not necessarily exclude the former from the
inheritance.
NCC. 912
Case:
MARIA DIZON-RIVERA VS. ESTELA DIZON, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
Elton John S. Bonsucan
FACTS:
In 1961, Agripina Valdez, widow, died and was survived by 7 compulsory heirs composed of 6
legitimate children namely, Estela Dizon, Tomas Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon, Angelina
Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and legitimate grandchild namely, Lilia Dizon.
Before Agripina Valdez died, she executed a will disposing and distributing her properties with an
aggregate value of PhP1,801,960.00, including real and personal properties and shares of stocks in a
sugar central, to her 7 above-named compulsory heirs and 6 grandchildren.
In her will, Agripina Valdez partitioned and distributed her estate by devising and bequeathing
specific real properties, comprising of almost her entire estate, among her heirs. In said partition,
Marina Dizon and Tomas Dizon were to receive more than the other heirs.
During the probate proceedings, Marina Dizon was named as the executor of the testatrix’s estate.
Subsequently, Marina Dizon filed her project of partition adjudicating the testatrix’s estate as follows:
a. The legitime computed for each compulsory heir was P129,254.96, which was
comprised of cash and/or properties specifically given to them based on the will; and
b. Marina Dizon and Tomas Dizon were adjudicated the properties that they would receive
based on the will, less the cash/properties to complete the respective legitimes of other
heirs.
The other heirs opposed the project of partition as proposed by Marina Dizon and proposed counter-
project of partition, whereby Marina Dizon and Tomas Dizon would receive considerably less. The
other heirs proposed that the testatrix’s estate be partitioned and distributed among the heirs as
follows:
a. All the testamentary dispositions would be proportionally reduced to the value of one-
half (½) of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half (½) would be P905,534.78
(The other half of the value of the entire estate would consist the aggregate value of
the legitime which would be divided among the heirs.);
b. The shares of the opposing heirs would consist their legitime (from the other half of
the value of the entire estate), plus the devises constituted in their favor based on the
will which would now be proportionally reduced;
c. The shares of Marina Dizon would consist her legitime (from the other half of the
value of the entire estate), plus the devise constituted in her favor based on the will
which would now be proportionally reduced. (The devise constituted in favor of
Marina Dizon based on the will was more than those of the other heirs, but would now
be considerably reduced as a result of “proportional reduction.”); and
d. The grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs would receive the properties
respectively devised to them based on the will, subject to reimbursement of the sums
by which the devise in their favor would be proportionally reduced
ISSUE:
Whether or not the last will of Agripina Dizon is controlling in the partition and distribution of her
estate among her heirs
RULING:
Yes, the last will of Agripina Dizon is controlling in the partition and distribution of her estate among
her heirs.
Articles 788 and 791 of the New Civil Code are rules of interpretation on the matter which provide,
respectively that "if a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt,
that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "The words of
a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one
which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is
to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva v. Juico, it was held that "the intentions
and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of
interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be
settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless
it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise."
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments,
and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when expressed clearly and
precisely in his last will, amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully
obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these
interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Hence, the
counter-project of partition as proposed by the opposing heirs cannot be given effect.
Nevertheless, to protect the legitimes of the compulsory heirs, Article 912 of the Civil Code provides
that “if the devise subject to reduction should consist of real property, which cannot be
conveniently divided, it shall go to the devisee if the reduction does not absorb one-half of its value;
and in a contrary case, to the compulsory heirs; but the former and the latter shall reimburse each
other in cash for what respectively belongs to them.”
“The devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided its value does
not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as legitime.
NCC. 914
Cases:
MAURICIO SAYSON, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND DELIA SAYSON, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1992
FACTS:
Spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson had 5 children namely: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios
and Teodoro (married to Isabela).
Upon the death of Teodoro and Isabela, the properties of the decedents were in
the possession of their children namely: Delia, Edmundo and Doribel. Delia and Edmundo were
adopted children of Teodoro and Isabela.
Mauricio, among others, sought for the partition of the intestate estate of his deceased brother
Teodoro and the latter’s spouses Isabela.
This was opposed by the deceased spouses’ children Delia, Edmundo and Doribel claiming that
they have successional rights to the estate as the lawful descendants.
Subsequently, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel sought for a partition of intestate estate of their
deceased grandparents Eleno and Rafaela claiming that they are entitled to inherit from their
father’s (Teodoro’s) share in his parents’ estate by right of representation because Delia and
Edmundo were adopted children and Doribel was a legitimate daughter of Teodoro.
The RTC held that Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson qualified to inherit from their deceased
grandparents Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation. On the other hand, the CA found Delia
and Edmundo Sayson disqualified from inheriting from Eleno and Rafaela.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Delia, Edmundo and Doribel may inherit from the estate of Eleno and Rafaela by
right of representation
RULING:
As to Doribel, YES, she may inherit from the estate of Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation
as she was a legitimate child of Teodoro and hence, a granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela. She has
right to represent her deceased father Teodoro in the distribution of intestate estate of her
grandparents Eleno and Rafaela. Doribel was entitled to the share that her father Teodoro would
have directly inherited from her grandparents Eleno and Rafaela had he survived, which would be
equal to the shares of her grandparents’ other children.
As to Delia and Edmundo, NO, they cannot inherit from the estate of Eleno and Rafaela by right of
representation as Eleno and Rafaela were total strangers to them. While it is true that the adopted
child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same rights as those of a legitimate
child, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by adoption
is between the adopting parents and the adopted child, and does not extend to the blood relative
of either party.
ISABEL DE LA PUERTA VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND CARMELITA DE LA PUERTA

G.R. No. 77867, February 6, 1990
FACTS:
Dominga Revuelta died testate leaving her properties to her three surviving children namely
Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed “de la Puerta.” Isabel was given the free portion in
addition to her legitime and was appointed executrix of the will.
Isabel filed a petition for probate of the will. This was opposed to by her brothers who averred
that their mother was already senile at the time of the execution of the will and did not fully
comprehend its meaning. Further, some of the properties listed in the inventory of their mother’s
estate belonged to the brothers exclusively. Alfredo died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor.
Meanwhile, Vicente filed a petition to adopt Carmelita which was granted by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Carmelita may inherit from the estate of Dominga by right of representation
RULING:
No, Carmelita cannot inherit from the estate of Dominga by right of representation.
It is settled that in testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only in the
following cases: first, when the person represented dies before the testator; second, when the
person represented is incapable of succeeding the testator; and third, when the person
represented is disinherited by the testator. In all of these cases, since there is a vacancy in the
inheritance, the law calls the children or descendants of the person represented to succeed by
right of representation.
In this case, the right of representation cannot take place as Vicente, the adoptive father of
Carmelita, did not predecease his mother Dominga.
Further, if the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the latter cannot represent the
former in the inheritance from the parents or ascendants of the adopter. The adopted child is not
related to the deceased in that case, because the filiation created by fiction of law is exclusively
between the adopter and the adopted. By adoption, the adopters can make for themselves an heir,
but they cannot thus make one for their kindred.
Intestate Succession
Causes of Intestate Succession
NCC. 960
Case:
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REV. FR. PASCUAL RIGOR VS. BELINA RIGOR, ET AL.
G.R. L-22036, April 30, 1979
FACTS:
Fr. Rigor, a parish priest left a will which was probated. The testator named his three sisters as
devisees. Further, the testator commanded in the will that a legacy will be given to the nearest
male relative will enter the priesthood.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject bequest may be declared as inoperative
RULING:
Yes, the subject bequest may be declared as inoperative.
Article 1025 of the Civil Code provides that “in order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee
or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation,
when it is proper." Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest,
the subject bequest may be declared as ineffectual or inoperative.
NCC. 962
Cases:
OFELIA BAGUNU VS. PASTORA PIEDAD

G.R. No. 140975. December 8, 2000
FACTS:
Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Pastora Piedad is
a maternal aunt or a third-degree relative of the decedent, while Ofelia Bagunu is a daughter of a
first cousin or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent. Ofelia Bagunu moved to intervene in the
settlement of the estate of the decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ofelia Bagunu, as a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree, has legal
interests in the intestate estate proceeding of Augusto Piedad which would justify
her intervention.
RULING:
No, Ofelia Bagunu, as a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree, has no legal interests in the
intestate estate proceeding of Augusto Piedad which would justify her intervention.
By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law,
“raised to the same place and degree” of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same
decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and
succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would
have succeeded. In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never
in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor
of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles
or aunts. The right of representation does not apply to “other collateral relatives within the fifth
civil degree” (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order
of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate
parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving
spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent.
Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962 of the Civil
Code, is an absolute rule.

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INTRODUCTION

URSULINA GANUELAS, METODIO GANUELAS and ANTONIO GANUELAS petitioners,

Whether or not the donation is mortis causa or inter vivos?

The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:

Hence, the petition was denied.

GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his heirs, Petitioner,

In the same deed, the acceptance of the donee is written as follows:

Thus, Villanueva cannot capitalize on Rodrigo’s post-donation transfer of the Property to

ANTONINA CUEVAS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized conveyance entitled

Whether the donation is mortis causa or inter vivos?

JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO,

1. Is the donation in question a donation mortis causa or a donation intervivos?

1. The donation made by the Spouses is a donation intervivos.

Was there a valid donation from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville?

What is the nature of the donation?

ROMULO A. CORONEL, ALARICO A. CORONEL, ANNETTE A. CORONEL, ANNABELLE C. GONZALES

On January 19, 1985, defendants-appellants Romulo Coronel, et al. (hereinafter referred to

CELESTINO BALUS, petitioner,

On October 10, 1989 herein petitiners and respondents executed an Extrajudicial

ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant,

PAULA CONDE, plaintiff-appellee,

Roman appealed to this court.

An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised

Lao Hu Niu, petitioner and appellant,

GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORP vs.

Is Medarda a real party in interest in this case?

ERNESTO ROBLES, Petitioner,

Yes, as mandated by RA 1199 and RA 3855.

JESUS SAN AGUSTIN, petitioner,

CA ruled in favor ofprivate respondent Menez.

Should Jesus be given notice to the proceeding?

LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners,

CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO PAMPLONA and APOLONIA ONTE, petitioners,

SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiffs-appellees,

TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY

Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognized two exceptions,

EDUARDO FELIPE, HERMOGENA V. FELIPE AND VICENTE V. FELIPE, Petitioners,

Whether or not the sale made by the wife is valid?

YES. It is a voidable contract.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO BORROMEO-HERRERA,

1. Jose Cuenco Borromeo

Was the waiver of hereditary rights valid?

"the properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to

BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED, LUISITO E. DELA MERCED, BLANQUTIA M. MACATANGAY, MA.

PEDRO GAYON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

MATILDE S. PALICTE vs.

Is Matilde S. Palicte considered as a successor-in-interest and is authorized to redeem the

Yes. Matilde is considered as a successor-in-interest and is authorized to redeem the

On Mariano’s last will and testament:

MAGDALENA LLENARES, Petitioner,

DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ-ANDRES, MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR., EVELYN SUAREZ-DE

Whether the petitioners co-own the subject properties.

PABLO LORENZO, as trustee of the estate of Thomas Hanley, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant,

When does the inheritance accrue?

ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners,

Which proceeding should be preferred?

ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:

Hence, the petition for probate was granted.

Whether the probate court erred in declaring the will void?

CELESTINO BALUS vs.

No. There is no co-ownership between the 3 siblings.