The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

The Extractive Industries and Society

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/exis

Original article

The (not-so-free) Chilean water model. The case of the Antofagasta Region,
Atacama Desert, Chile
Manuel Prieto a, *, Matías Calderón-Seguel a, María Christina Fragkou b, Rodrigo Fuster c
a
Departamento de Ciencias Históricas y Geográficas, Universidad de Tarapacá, 18 de septiembre 2222, Arica 1010069, Arica, Chile
b
Departamento de Geografía, Universidad de Chile, Portugal 84, Santiago 8331051, Santiago, Chile
c
Departamento de Ciencias Ambientales y Recursos Naturales Renovables, Laboratorio de Análisis Territorial, Facultad de Ciencias Agronómicas, Universidad de Chile,
Santa Rosa 11315, La Pintana 8820808, Santiago, Chile

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Both supporters and critics of the Chilean water model have described it as a textbook example of deregulation
Chile and the free-market model for water management. In this article, we challenge this characterization and argue
Extractivism that the model has relied on long-term and highly centralized State decisions that have installed and reproduced
Water markets
historical power asymmetries. Based on archival research and historical records of water rights assignments and
Water privatization
Neoliberalism
water-related legal instruments, we develop a comprehensive historical analysis of how water rights have been
distributed over the last 100 years in one of the country’s most paradigmatic cases: the Antofagasta Region.
Starting seven decades before the military regime imposed the 1981 Water Code, our analysis reveals that water
in this geographical area has historically been distributed through distinct State-driven strategies rather than
market instruments, favoring mining companies. We conclude that the Chilean water model, rather than being a
market-driven approach to water management, actually relies on strong regulations, and that the Water Code
merely crystallizes centralized historical decisions regarding water distribution that support an extractivist
development model.

1. Introduction
Chile was the birthplace of the articulation of a comprehensive
neoliberal project during the late 1970s and early 1980s (Harvey, 2007).
In response to President Allende’s socialist program (1970-1973),
Pinochet’s dictatorship (1973-1989) deployed violent and repressive
methods to erase any hints of socialism in society and impose an over­
arching neoliberal economic reform. During the late 1970s, the military
regime, advised by radical neoliberal economists the “Chicago Boys”
(Valdés, 1995), developed a broad economic reform that implemented
the core principles of neoliberalism: privatization of common goods and
economic activities, limited economic regulation, strengthening of pri­
vate property, openness to international markets, free functioning of
markets, and incentives for foreign investments. All of these elements
were codified at the constitutional level in the 1980 Constitution, which
is still in force (Bauer, 1998). The reform included the transformation
and privatization of several sectors (e.g., education, health, social se­
curity) and resources (e.g., energy, minerals, fishery, and forestry).
Among these, the new 1981 Water Code is an iconic example of
free-market model for water management (Bauer, 1998; Budds, 2004).
This status derives from its strong protection of private water rights that
can be traded freely in the market.
The Code established tradable private property rights separated from
land rights and expressed in volume per unit of time (e.g., liters per
second, cubic meters per year). This regime was accompanied by min­
imal state intervention, with the national water agency (Dirección
General de Aguas – hereafter DGA) lacking the power for management,
planning, and conflict resolution. Private property in terms of water
rights was also strengthened by the constitution (Bauer, 1998). Ac­
cording to neoliberal theory, this design would allocate water apoliti­
cally toward the highest economic value uses while maximizing social
welfare (Briscoe, 1996). The rationale for this new system was that
private decisions and their coordination through private trading would
ensure efficient water allocation, conflict resolution, and distribution.
Supporters of the Chilean model have promoted it as a successful
case study for international water reforms (Briscoe, 1996; Hearne and

* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: mprieto@academicos.uta.cl (M. Prieto), mcalderons@academicos.uta.cl (M. Calderón-Seguel), mariac.fragkou@uchilefau.cl (M.C. Fragkou),
rfuster@uchile.cl (R. Fuster).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2022.101081
Received 19 October 2021; Received in revised form 12 April 2022; Accepted 13 April 2022
2214-790X/© 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Manuel Prieto, The Extractive Industries and Society, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2022.101081
M. Prieto et al.
Easter, 1995; Rios and Quiroz, 1995; Thobani, 1995). Libertarian
scholars have presented it as an example showing that the idea of
free-market environmentalism is no longer an oxymoron (Anderson and
Leal, 2001), while other scholars have stressed the socio-environmental
problems of the model (Babidge et al., 2019; Budds, 2004; Yáñez and
Molina, 2011), and social movements have demanded changes to the
Water Code based on discourses of water injustice (Bolados et al., 2018).
These different perceptions all have one thing in common. All of them
agree that the Chilean water model’s radical laissez-faire approach
means that it can be considered a textbook example of deregulation and
the free-market model of water management.
Contrary to the general assumption that the Chilean case is an un­
regulated water market, as part of a broader research agenda we have
problematized this assumption by emphasizing that the model relies on
highly centralized state decisions that, in turn, have reproduced his­
torical power asymmetries ([author(s)]). First, we have described how
the model is not value-neutral, but rather is sustained through the
marginalization of particular water uses (such as in-stream uses) and the
design of specific types of water rights that privilege certain uses over
others (such as hydropower over agriculture; [author(s)]). Second, we
have explored how multiple socio-ecological contradictions within the
model have been solved through extra-market decisions that ensured the
process of capital accumulation. One example is the development of
water desalination that alleviates some of the problems attributed to
Chile’s water market model but creates new ones ([author(s)]). Third,
we have examined the case of the lithium industry, where companies
pump large volumes of brine from aquifers. However, they do not
require water rights for such extraction because the brine is not
considered “water” under Chilean regulations [author(s)]). Fourth, by
studying water rights transactions in the Atacama Desert, we have
shown how, despite the high degree of competition for water use, the
market has not been as active as expected for reallocating water; instead,
water allocation has been highly dependent on hierarchical decisions
([author(s)]).
Continuing with this research agenda, in this article we aim to
deepen the criticism of the idea thatthe Chilean water model isa case of
deregulated water management. To this end, we pursue an empirical
analysis of the relationship between mining, water rights, and the
Chilean State in the Atacama Desert. More specifically, we develop a
historical description and analysis of how water rights have been cen­
trally distributed without using market instruments in a paradigmatic
case: the Antofagasta Region, located at the heart of the driest desert in
the world and where Chile’s richest mineral deposits are found. We
develop a comprehensive analysis of the historical and spatial distri­
bution of water rights in the region for more than 100 years, with a
starting point seven decades before the implementation of the 1981
Water Code.
Our results challenge two types of previous analyses: those that
present the Chilean model as an apolitical and efficient system of water
allocation, and those that have criticized the free-market model as the
primary source of water injustice. Indeed, we stress that the state has
played a central role in water rights allocation by adopting hierarchical
decisions that are far from flexible, market-oriented, and developed
within an unregulated institutional context. This finding leads us to
suggest that the present Water Code is yet another chapter in the series
of regulatory regimes that have managed water in the region since the
establishment of intensive mining activities, favoring extractive in­
dustries and consolidating historical power asymmetries.
In what follows, we first explain the research methods. Second, we
describe the focal region. Third, we develop a historical analysis from
1857 to present, in which distinct institutional models have shaped the
water-mining nexus in the region. Fourth, we present the historical
distribution of water rights in the Antofagasta Region during the study
period. Fifth, we emphasize the centralized state role, and how it has
fossilized historical water allocation, reproduced historical power
asymmetries, and created new asymmetries. Finally, we problematize
2
The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx
the idea of the Chilean model as a paradigmatic case of a market-driven
approach to water management, highlighting its reliance on strong
regulations. This allows us to see the Water Code as another chapter in a
broader historical approach to water management that has favored
extractive interests.
2. Methods
We employed a mixed research design that combined historical
analysis of archives and secondary sources with descriptive statistical
analysis. The historical analysis has allowed us to address the articula­
tion between the state, mining, and water in the region. We used various
secondary sources, mainly government technical studies and scientific
studies. We examined this information along various thematic di­
mensions in order to account for the historical dynamics in the alloca­
tion of water by the state and the role of the mining industry.
We conducted archival research at the DGA. We reviewed the public
records related to the water rights officially recognized and looked for
lacunas and inconsistencies in the data. We filled the gaps based on
technical reports (CADE-IDEPE, 2004; Figueiredo Ferraz Consultoría e
Ingeniería de Proyecto Ltda, 1996) and field validation. We organized
1022 cases of water rights allocation (equivalent to 28,349 liters per
second) granted between 1905 and 2018 into a database with the
following variables: (a) flow granted, (b) year in which the rights were
granted, (c) type of rights (surface water or groundwater rights), (d) type
of use (sanitary, industrial, mining, irrigation, and other uses), and (e)
location.
To characterize the evolution, distribution, and quantity of the water
rights granted, we examined the data throughout the time series 1905 –
2018 represented as line graphs. The study period comprises the years
for which there was data availability in the existing official records. The
results allow us to develop a diachronic analytical perspective on how
the state has been distributing water resources during the study period.
3. The Antofagasta Region
Our research focuses on the Antofagasta Region, which is located in
the Atacama Desert (Northern Chile). This region is known as the
“mining heart of Chile”. It contributes to 51% of the country’s mining
GDP (Banco Central de Chile, 2022), and it represents 30% of total na­
tional exports, 55% of total copper exports (Gobierno de Chile, 2019),
and 100% of lithium production, which corresponds to 26% of world
production (Servicio Nacional de Geología y Minería, 2020).
Multiple factors explain the hyper-dry conditions of the area. The
Andes mountain range separates this area from the tropical continental
climate by obstructing the moist air coming from the Amazon Basin
(Garreaud, 2009). Annual rainfall is mostly concentrated in the austral
summer season, and it responds to an upper-level anticyclone located at
the southeast of the central Andes (Sarricolea and Romero, 2015). The
topographic gradient defines an altitudinal rise in precipitation in the
west-east direction, and below 2500 masl precipitation is virtually ab­
sent all year.
Despite the summer rainfall, waters that feed ground and surface
basins are scarce due to the high evaporation rate. Permanent water­
courses are restricted to the upper part of the Andes because the
Domeyko mountain range contains them. This morphology determines
the existence of endorheic basins with a high rate of evaporation, pro­
ducing salt flats. Other surface water runoff consists of smaller streams,
creeks, lakes, hot springs, and small lakes located in the highland zone.
Additional resources are primarily groundwater, which is located
mainly in the salt flats, uplands, and in the intermediate depression
sector.
This research focused on the region´s two main basins: the Loa River
Basin (hereinafter, LRB) and the Atacama Salt Flat Basin (hereinafter,
ASFB) (Figure 1), which together are responsible for 67% of the water
rights in the region and most of the extractive activities.
M. Prieto et al. The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx

Fig. 1. Study area.

3
M. Prieto et al.
The Loa River is the primary water source and the only one that flows
into the sea after running 440 kilometers from its source in in the Andes
Mountain range. Its main tributaries are the Salado River, the San Pedro
River, and San Salvador River. Water resources from this basin are
mainly exploited for the intense copper extraction. With the exception of
a few small private mines, the state-owned company, Codelco, exploits
these mines: Chuquicamata, Radomiro Tomic, Ministro Hales, and El
Abra (co-owned with Freeport McMoRan). Urban growth has increased
the water demand in the basin. During the 20th century, both state and
private investors built infrastructure to divert water from the upper
section of the basin and toward the main cities (Calama, Antofagasta,
and Tocopilla).
To the south is the ASFB, located between the Andes Mountain range
and the Domeyko range. It is located 55 km south of San Pedro de
Atacama and is surrounded by mountains. Here the only permanent
river runoffs are the San Pedro River and the Vilama River. Many other
small creeks flow into the salt flat from the Andes mountains.
In the area, two private companies, Albemarle and SQM, conduct
large-scale brine exploitation (mainly lithium and potassium). This ac­
tivity demands a high amount of groundwater, which is pumped from
below the flat to evaporating ponds. There are also two private copper
mines that rely on aquifers in the ASFB: Escondida (the highest-
producing copper mine in the world) and Zaldivar.́
Since pre-Hispanic times, Atacameño (or likan-antai) indigenous
people, and to a lesser extent Quechua and Aymara, have developed
agro-pastoral activities in the oases, ravines, and wetlands located
around the above-mentioned basins (Castro and Martinez, 1996).
Following the industrialization of the area, these activities underwent
major transformations due to environmental changes and the proleta­
rization process (Gundermann, 2003).
All these water uses coexist in the region. These users’ conflicting
interests have been a historical source of conflict, mainly associated with
control over water resources and mining impacts (Babidge et al., 2019;
Carrasco, 2015; Prieto, 2015; Yáñez and Molina, 2011).
4. The Antofagasta Region’s hydro(mining)politics
Mining exploitation and the sanitary sector have shaped the region’s
hydropolitics since the second half of the nineteenth century, when the
Chilean economy became dependent on the extraction of nitrates
(Mendez et al., 2020). Ever since, copper and lithium have been the
main mineral resources attracting investors to the region (Bus­
tos-Gallardo and Prieto, 2019; Gundermann and Göbel, 2018; Jerez
et al., 2021; Mendez et al., 2020). The spatial concentration of this in­
dustry and its high-water demand has generated excessive pressure on
the aquifers (Comisión Chilea del Cobre, 2020; Prieto et al. 2019, Yañez
and Molina 2011). These activities have essentially defined how local
water rights are distributed amongst users, assisted by state policies
(Yañez and Molina 2011). In what follows, we narrate the close rela­
tionship between mining and water control, stressing how distinct
institutional frameworks related to both water and mining have his­
torically promoted a regional development model based on extractivism
that has ignored other water uses and actors (i.e., agriculture, indige­
nous communities), revealing the state’s importance and challenging
the results of the mainstream literature.
4.1. Establishment of the mining industry: 1857 – mid-20th century
The 1857 Civil Code of Chile established that waters were a national
good, although the government granted licenses to private parties under
restricted terms. Despite the national character of this legislation, in the
early twentieth century the nitrate mining sector pushed for better
conditions for its interests, including water access. In response, the state
passed special legislation to regulate the distribution of water (Rudolph,
1927), establishing legal priorities among different uses. During the
1920s, the government passed laws that distributed the waters of the
4
The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx
LRB in the interests of industries and mining projects. These regulations
established five uses for which concessions could be granted, and
established priorities and a minimum water flow reserve for the first
three priorities. In order, priorities were:1) Drinking water, industrial
plants, and requirements for locomotives and steam boilers (with a
reserve of 500 L/s); 2) Nitrate refining (with a reserve of 400 L/s); 3)
Industries and mining (with a reserve of 300 L/s); 4) Irrigation (with no
reserve); and 5) Driving force for hydroelectric and other purposes (with
flow reserve) (Lira, 1921; Rudolph, 1927).
These laws allowed the construction of pipelines that brought water
from the Atacameño village of Toconce to the mines and into the cities of
Calama and Antofagasta (Rudolph, 1927). The mining companies,
especially the then American Chile Exploration Company (Chilex,
currently Codelco), directly obtained the state water rights to a signifi­
cant amount of water from the Loa River and its tributaries (Hojalar,
Toconce, San Pedro) and are currently owned by Codelco. Under this
water regime, sulfur mining companies and the British company Anto­
fagasta (Chile) & Bolivia Railway company (FCAB in its Spanish
acronym) also obtained rights to significant amounts of water from the
Siloli River and the San Pedro River.
After the collapse of the nitrate industry, the copper industry became
the main industrial sector to benefit from these laws. Copper production
changed its status from small- to large-scale in the early 20th century,
when the Guggenheim family merged the small mines to create the
Chuquicamata mine in 1912, founding the Chilex company, which was
later bought by the Anaconda Copper Mining Company in 1923 (Millán,
2006). This situation was followed by a rising global demand for copper
that has been maintained to date in the aftermath of the construction
boom following the new deal, the massification of electric power, and
the development of new mining technologies (Millán, 2006).
4.2. The first Water Code
The country’s first Water Code came into force in 1951 as part of a
broader agenda that promoted economic growth. Water rights were tied
to land ownership, blocking a water market, while the law also deter­
mined preferential uses. This Code enabled more state intervention in
water infrastructure development in order to ensure economic devel­
opment through the promotion of high-water-demand projects.
Although these rights were considered private once they were granted,
they were subject to several state regulations (e.g., revocation of rights
when the water was used in a non-declared way).
When this Code entered into effect, Chilex obtained significant water
rights to the Hojalar, San Pedro, and Salado rivers. Indeed, the rights
obtained to the Rió San Pedro (537.5 L/s) are currently the main water
sources for Codelco-owned mines. When Chilex began to pump the
water from this source, they completely dried up the related section of
the river and the lagoon where the river originates, radically affecting
indigenous herders (Prieto et al., 2019). Chilex also obtained water
rights to the ASFB. During this period, many rights were also granted to
sulfur mining companies (Rudolph, 1952).
The urban growth that followed mining development increased
water demand, leading the state to bring water from the highlands to the
cities. In 1958, the then Directorate of Sanitary Works (Dirección de
Obras Sanitarias), located within the Ministry of Public Works—the same
entity that still manages water in Chile today—built an intake in the
upper reaches of the Toconce River and the Hojalar River. This situation
radically diminished the available water for the community of Toconce,
which had already seen its water diminished due to the pipelines built at
the beginning of the century: a fact that led to the progressive aban­
donment of the village.
During the same period, the state began a process of intervention in
the mining sector in 1953. This resulted in the nationalization of the
entire copper industry and its transfer to the state-owned company
Codelco during the presidency of Allende. The reinforcement of a state-
centered water regime also accompanied this process.
M. Prieto et al.
4.3. Centralization, infrastructure, and regulation under radical reforms:
The 1967 Water Code
State control of water achieved its peak in 1967, when a new Water
Code was approved as part of an Agrarian Reform promoted by the
government of Eduardo Frei Montalva. This law strengthened state
control, reinforced the public character of water, and expropriated all
private rights. Under this model, water rights became concessions. As
such, they were regulated under public law, the state could cancel them,
they could not be separated from the land, and they could not be traded
on the market. Finally, under this model, state water management was
based on technical criteria associated with the goals of a centralized
economy. During President Allende’s socialist government, the state’s
role in the economy was strengthened: egalitarian policies were rein­
forced, government participation in the industry became more active,
and the private sector and large private property holdings were weak­
ened (Bauer, 1998).
In the Antofagasta Region, this translated into the development of
state-driven water infrastructure. It was also reflected in an ambitious
agricultural land reform whose implementation required an expansion
of state authority over water use and distribution, and the parallel
weakening of private rights through the state regulatory power (Yáñez
and Molina, 2011).
The state increasingly developed agricultural improvement plans for
Calama and nearby communities. The most important infrastructure
improvement was the Conchi Dam, constructed across the Loa River
between 1969 and 1975 and intended to increase the irrigation capacity
of the Quillagua, Calama, Chiu-Chiu, and Lasana communities (Mon­
salve, 1969).
In the early 1970s, the Salvador Allende radicalized the reformist
regulations begun by Frei’s government and continued to claim more
power for the state to centralize water management, allocate water
rights, and build water infrastructure. This situation produced tensions
in the rural communities, especially those downstream of the Conchi
Dam and for the peasants of Calama, who experienced a decrease in
water availability. As a result, people feared any new development plans
and the possibility that the state would reallocate their waters toward
industries (Yáñez and Molina, 2011).
4.4. Entering the neoliberal era: The infamous 1981 Water Code and the
consolidation of past mining water rights
After the coup d’état in 1973, the military junta maintained Codel­
co’s status of state company, though it implemented several institutional
changes that favored private mining: the 1981 Mining Code and the
Foreign Investment Act of 1974. As a result, private companies (e.g.
Antofagasta Minerals, Freeport-MacMoran, Escondida, Barrick) still
operate today alongside Codelco in the region (Servicio Nacional de
Geología y Minería, 2020).
Significantly, the 1981 Water Code’s regime reinforced water control
by the extractive industries. Indeed, all rights to large amounts of water
that had been acquired under previous legal systems by the extractive
industries were recognized by the new regime as private rights. Like any
new rights, they become governed by private civil law and freely trad­
able on the market. This situation is crucial for our case study because,
as described above, several special 1920 laws regulated water use and
established priorities for human consumption and the mining sector
over irrigation (Rudolph, 1927). Besides, the code established an initial
distribution system of water rights using the “first come, first served”
rule, based on the prior appropriation doctrine. In the focal region, this
system has directly favored extractive industries. According to this rule,
the DGA must award water rights free of charge to the first petitioner if
water is physically available. Initially, applicants for new water rights
5
The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx
did not need to justify their use of the water or make effective use of the
water (i.e., beneficial use doctrine). These new water rights are free of
charge for life, and their owners are free to use them for any purpose. In
addition, to ensure water accessibility for mining projects, both the
Water Code and the Mining Code of 1983 freely granted so-called
“miners’ waters.” These are exclusive water rights automatically gran­
ted to the holder of mining rights over the aquifers within their mining
concession to the extent necessary for mineral exploitation.
Finally, the Code established that the president can directly confer
water rights under “exceptional circumstances and general interest”. In
the few cases in which this specific clause has been invoked, in 1985
Pinochet directly conferred superficial water rights to the public water
supply company Sendos. These water rights correspond to a total of 850
L/s from two uptakes in the Loa River, Lequena (550 L/s) and Quin­
chamale (300 L/s), and are now under the management of the Aguas
Antofagasta company, which has the concession of sanitary services.
This company is considered private under Chilean legislation. However,
paradoxically, it is currently controlled by the EPM Group (Empresas
Públicas de Medellín), a public Colombian company.
All of the above special provisions have determined that significant
volumes of water rights have been granted to mining companies, hy­
drological exploration companies, and water supply companies that
obtained their rights directly from the state authority.
Between 1982 and 1983, the DGA began to standardize water rights
in the region under the new Code. They developed a unique program in
Calama, Quillagua, Chiu-Chiu, and Lasana that was oriented toward the
agricultural sector. The objective of this action was to privatize water
rights in order to facilitate free transactions among the agriculture,
mining, and sanitary sectors. In the process, the DGA ignored traditional
water management practices (e.g., irrigation of wetland, vernacular
units of measurement of water flows, ways of organizing land ownership
concerning irrigation), which led to the privatization of less water than
had previously been the case. This generated a surplus, which was
centrally transferred by the state to the extractive industries (see details
in Prieto 2015, 2017).
Another relevant milestone in the region’s water distribution is the
Indigenous Law of 1993. This law established three main principles
regarding indigenous waters: First, it recognized indigenous commu­
nities as collective legal entities, thus their collective rights to water
were acknowledged. Second, it established that Atacameños’ and Ay­
maras’ water should be specifically protected. It mandated that the DGA
and the The National Corporation for Indigenous Development (Corpo­
ración Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena –CONADI) should sign an agree­
ment for the protection, constitution, and reestablishment of the
ancestral water rights of the indigenous communities (Dirección General
de Aguas and Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena, 1997).
Through this agreement, the state assigned significant water rights to
communities—though it ignored cultural uses, water for herding, and
groundwater, among other things (Cuadra, 2000; [author(s)]). Finally,
the indigenous law established a special subsidy to indigenous people
for the acquisition of water rights in the market ([author(s)]).
It is important to acknowledge that since the early 1980s, there has
been increasing water extraction in the ASFB by the brine mining in­
dustry. Two companies hold the main concession rights to exploit brine.
This industrial process demands the pumping and evaporation of a large
amount of water containing a high-concentration salt solution from
beneath the salt flat to produce the final products (potassium, lithium
carbonate, lithium hydroxide). However, legally this water is considered
brine rather than water regulated by the Water Code (Bustos-Gallardo
et al., 2021). Consequently, these companies are not required to obtain
water rights. In practical terms, this means that the state has given two
companies in the area permits to extract 2442 L/s of water without any
concurrent water rights (Babidge et al., 2019). This situation has
M. Prieto et al.
generated an overexploitation of the aquifers, which has led to envi­
ronmental degradation (Gutiérrez et al. 2022) and conflicts with
indigenous communities (Lorca et al. 2022).
4.5. Drying up the desert: Expanding a technocratic neoliberal water
model in democratic Chile, 1990 - today
The above-mentioned arrangements have resulted in an unprece­
dented accumulation of water rights by the mining sector, favoring its
expansion (Servicio Nacional de Geología y Minería, 2020). By the
1990s, the water needs of the rapidly growing mining sector, facilitated
by the attraction of foreign capital and the subsequent population
growth and urban expansion, brought the region into conditions of
water stress. It is from this point onwards that the regional water utilities
company began to gain power in determining how water was distributed
in the region, introducing new ways of accumulating and distributing
water at the margins of the market.
Water utility companies in Chile cannot make their water rights
available in the market, but they can enter into contracts for water
provision with private parties as long as they can guarantee water pro­
vision for their urban concession areas. Under this scheme, ESSAN
(Empresa Sanitaria de Antofagasta SA), a state-led company created
during the first period of democratic government after the end of the
dictatorship, entered into contracts with mining companies for the
provision of untreated water for industrial use. To secure water provi­
sion and sustain these contracts, ESSAN also directed the construction of
the La Chimba desalination plant, whose water production for the sup­
ply of the region’s main urban consumer, Antofagasta, would “liberate”
the company’s water rights for the direct sale of freshwater to the mining
sector.
In 2003, three months after the desalination plant opened, Aguas
Antofagasta took control of ESSAN through a thirty-year concession
contract. Aguas Antofagasta was part of Antofagasta plc, a major na­
tional conglomeration of mining and transport companies that owns two
of the nine large-scale mines in the region. Since then, desalinated water
production increased from 150 L/s in 2003 to 850 L/s in 2017, and has
gradually been replacing freshwater in the city of Antofagasta. This has
allowed Aguas Antofagasta not only to maintain the existing water
provision contracts but also to add three new ones, including the two
mines affiliated with its conglomerate. By 2016, the total volume of
water sold to the mines, was slightly more than 17 million m3 annually,
while the La Chimba desalination plant produced 19 million m3 in the
same year.
The actions taken by ESSAN had important implications for the
company in undertaking its work following privatization. The new
concessionary company would not only have access to the water rights
of ESSAN; in fact, the contract also included water provision agreements
with the mining sector, plus the complete control of the La Chimba
desalination plant.
Although representatives of the current owners of Aguas Antofagasta
since April 2015, the EPM group (see above), claim that the desalination
plant was constructed in order to satisfy Antofagasta’s expanding pop­
ulation, a 2003 report from the Inter-American Development Bank
clearly states, after recognizing that water availability is critical in the
region and that mining activities require more water, that the water
produced by the plant will gradually replace the freshwater supply.
What is more, “the substituted water will be negotiated with the mining
companies that require it for their new expansion projects” (Inter-­
American Development Bank, 2003). Hence the political-institutional
system favors the flow and accumulation of water toward certain eco­
nomic sectors ([author(s)]).
This section demonstrates the various ways in which water has been
distributed over the last century in the Antofagasta Region (Figure 2).
6
The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx
Our historical review suggests that the distinct Water Codes have been
relevant in defining ownership but not in defining the owners them­
selves. On the contrary, it is political interests, private agreements, and
arbitrary state-centric decisions that have historically shaped water
ownership. All of these strategies have created a waterscape in which
water is accumulated by extractive industries and indigenous peoples
are dispossessed of their waters (Yáñez and Molina, 2011; Prieto et al.
2019). At the same time, sanitary companies have played an enormous
role in water distribution over and above ownership. Human con­
sumption and agriculture are less relevant uses in this setting. In what
follows, we see how the above political, economic, and legal background
has shaped and is reflected in the distribution of water granted in the
Antofagasta Region throughout the 20th century.
5. Distribution of water granted in the Antofagasta Region,
1905-2018
The process of privatizing water rights meant that by 2018 there
were 28,244 L/s allocated in the region. Of this total, 41% was assigned
in the LRB (11,590 L/s) and 26% (7,322 L/s) in the ASFB. Together,
these basins contain 67% (18,912 L/s) of the total regional water
granted in 579 water rights. The current status is a result of the accu­
mulation of water rights granted by the state under the institutional
models described above. Considering the relevance of these two basins,
we focus on them in the following analyses.
The evolution of water rights granted in both basins between 1905
and 2018 (Figure 3) reflects the historical events previously reviewed.
The first increase in water granted occurs around 1915. This coincides
with the start of operations of the Chilex company and reflects a series of
water rights allocations between 1914 and 1921 to Chilex, the saltpeter
industry, and the FCAB, owned by the Luksic Group, in addition to a
series of regulatory provisions regarding the allocation of water for these
large capitals.
The second, notorious increase in water granted in both basins
occurred in 1927. This abrupt change is associated with 1920s regional
regulations in the LRB, which permitted the extraction of water through
the development of infrastructure works, favoring mining. The main
allocations during this episode, as well as in the subsequent period until
the 1950s, were in the LRB for Chilex, explosives companies, and nitrate
companies (Figure 4A). In the ASFB, Chilex and the FCAB stand out
(Figure 4B).
The enactment of the 1951 Water Code enabled a third significant
increase in the water granted to industrial and sulfur mining companies
in the mid-1950s, while the sanitary sector began to emerge in terms of
water property. Water in both basins was assigned principally to Chilex
(with over 500 L/s, still Codelco’s property), SQM, and other mining
companies (saltpeter and others). Alongside the augmentation of mining
operations, the construction of infrastructure to satisfy increasing urban
water needs caused an increase in sanitary water needs in the LRB
(Figure 4A).
This water allocation pattern, characterized by specific peaks fol­
lowed by periods of low dynamism, changed abruptly in the mid-1970s.
Between 1976 and 1989, over 4300 L/s were assigned in the LRB, 3809
of which corresponded to mining companies (e.g., Codelco, Antofagasta
Minerals, and SQM), while 363 L/s were assigned to the FCAB and other
companies for industrial uses. Eighty-six percent of the assigned water
(3,720 L/s) corresponds to only six water rights allocations, revealing
the concentration of water property (Figure 4A).
For the first time, the 1981 Water Code started to recognize
customary water as private rights. After the enforcement of the 1993
Indigenous Law, the state began a narrow implementation of this
recognition among indigenous communities. Several other private ac­
tors also gained rights under this Code.
M. Prieto et al. The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx

Fig. 2. Hydro(mining) politics in the Antofagasta Region.

7
M. Prieto et al. The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx

Fig. 3. Cumulative water rights granted (L/s) in the LRB and ASFB, 1905-2018

Fig. 4A. Cumulative water rights granted (L/s) in the LRB, according to water use (1905-2018)

Water rights for sanitary uses in the LRB (2063 L/s) are mainly
owned by the state, although the sanitary company Aguas Antofagasta is
currently under private management. Along the same lines, irrigation
water rights are primarily owned by the state through the Directorate of
Irrigation (1350 L/s out of 1626 L/s). Non-state irrigation water is up to
278 L/s, and is associated with natural persons and a Atacameño´s
farmers’ organization (65 L/s). The water rights of indigenous organi­
zations total 610 L/s. Despite only 130 L/s are formally allocated for
irrigation, through ethnographic work, we observed that the main use of
these rights is irrigation.
In the case of the ASFB (Figure 4B), during the period from 1985 to
the present, water rights for mining use (1896 L/s) were assigned to
SQM and large private copper mining companies (e.g. Minera Escondida
and Spence, operated by BHP Billiton, and Zaldivar owned by Antofa­
gasta Minerals). The industrial uses (349 L/s) are owned by two smaller
mining companies and one unidentified company. Conversely, water
rights for irrigation present a very different picture from the LRB. In the
ASFB, irrigation water (1927 L/s) is under the control of various
indigenous organizations and accounts for 1600 L/s of the total water
used for irrigation. The main water rights for irrigation belong to the
indigenous communities of San Pedro de Atacama (870 L/s), followed
by a state reserve of the Directorate of Irrigation (270 L/s). The

8
M. Prieto et al. The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx

Fig. 4B. Cumulative water rights granted (L/s) in the ASFB, according to water use (1905-2018)

indigenous organizations of the ASFB have a total of 47 water rights,
totaling 2066 L/s, and declare uses for irrigation (the primary use),
sanitary use, and other uses.
Between 1990 and 2018, the granting of water rights was less dy­
namic than in the previous period. A surge in water rights granted in the
LRB in 1990 was followed by a similar surge in the ASFB a few years
later (mid 1990s). The first sharp increase was between 1983 and 1988,
followed by the period between 1996 and 2001, with a final peak be­
tween 2013 and 2017.
When analyzing the allocation of water rights according to water
source in both basins (Figure 5), it is notable that until the mid-1980s,
virtually all water rights related to surface water sources. The only
exception is a 1914 allocation to the FCAB in the LRB, currently used by
the mining companies owned by the Luksic group (see above).
In the LRB, there was a sharp increase in groundwater allocations
between 1990 and 1995, corresponding to 20 water rights allocations
held by mining companies for a total of 1852 L/s. From 1995 to 2018,
the allocation of groundwater rights followed a slower pace. During this
period, 36 allocations were given for mining and industrial uses. This
represented a total of 1405 L/s.
On the other hand, in the ASFB, groundwater began to be allocated
between 1985 and 1994, during which period 33 allocations equivalent
to 753 L/s were assigned for industrial and mining uses. The most abrupt
increase occurred between 1996 and 2000, when only 35 groundwater

Fig. 5. Cumulative water rights (L/s) in the LRB and ASFB, according to the nature of the water (1905-2018)

9
M. Prieto et al. The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx

allocations—mainly for mining uses—totaled 1460 L/s. Finally, be­
tween 2001 and 2018 there were 66 groundwater rights allocations for a
total of 1673 L/s. Here, in addition to mining uses, there are sanitary and
irrigation uses, several of which are linked to hotels.
In light of these results, we now turn to discuss the state’s historical
role in water allocation, facilitating water accumulation by extractivist
activities.
6. Discussion
Our historical survey of national and regional water management
strategies, summarized in Table 1, questions the perception of the
Chilean water model as unregulated. On the contrary, it shows how the
current model cannot be understood without considering broader his­
torical, political, and economic processes, which have been underpinned
by a strong state role in water distribution ever since the establishment
of mining activities in the Antofagasta Region at the beginning of the
20th century. As shown in Table 1, the most common strategy up until
the 1980s was the centralized allocation of water rights, the principal
beneficiaries of which were mining companies.
To achieve this centralized allocation, many laws, regulations, and
decrees implemented on different institutional scales have favored
extractive activities. These measures, which include the specification of
regional minimum water flows for mining, industrial, and human con­
sumption (unlike anywhere else in the country), reflect the strategic
importance of mining in the region. Mining development in strategic
mining hotspots was also assisted by the construction of the hydraulic
infrastructure necessary to mobilize water across the vast Atacama
Desert and make water assignments feasible; the state promoted and
financed this infrastructure for a large part of the 20th century.
State plans to secure, assign, and mobilize freshwater for mining
activities continued after the neoliberal Water Code came into force in
the 1980s. Following water shortages, these plans were gradually
complemented by the securing of complementary, non-traditional water
sources. First, the state secured water for mining through two types of
water that are not included in the Water Code: brine and seawater. Due
to the lack of regulations regarding brine, mining companies were
granted the right to extract 2442 L/s without needing any water rights
(Babidge et al., 2019). On the other hand, recent developments
demonstrate the importance of desalinated seawater in offering an
alternative water source that compensates for market failures and se­
cures water for mining, even if it is designated for human consumption
(Fragkou and Budds, 2019). Second, the “miners’ waters” regulation
offers a new, free, and perpetual water source to mining companies, as it
grants exclusive water use to the holder of mining rights over the
aquifers within their mining concession.
State strategies for water allocation have evolved alongside the
development of the mining sector in the region, with visible results to
date: many of the water rights assigned throughout the 20th century to
mining companies and other capital-intensive extractive industries are
now property of the state-owned Codelco company. A similar pattern
applies to the regional sanitary company, another relevant actor in the
region that has been beneficiary of centralized assignments of water
rights, including 850 L/s that were directly conferred by the dictatorship
by an exceptional order. The regional sanitary company is now a private
concession, meaning that its accumulated water rights are under private
management but essentially of public ownership. This means that the
water rights of the two most important actors in the region, Codelco and
Aguas Antofagasta, are essentially under state ownership. The fact that
Aguas Antofagasta is actually a foreign public company is yet another
paradox in the Chilean pro-private model.
Another consequence of these strategies has been the accumulation
of water rights by the mining sector and their legitimization through the
1981 Water Code, which legitimized and fossilized the water distribu­
tion taken throughout the 20th century in an unprecedented manner, i.e.
through the assignment of private, free-of-cost, perpetual, and trans­
ferable water rights.
Through this historical lens, we can see how both state- and market-
driven water management models have gradually secured water for
mining, clarifying the government’s role in water property politics as
one of an active, hierarchical, and centralized regulator. Beyond the
Water Code itself, government water politics have directly influenced
the ownership and allocation of water. This in turn has affected regional
development, with the objective of guaranteeing water for mining
resulting in the construction of an distinctive region in terms of both
economic development and environmental injustice.

Table 1
State strategies to control water property and promote extractivism in the Antofagasta Region, and resulting winners and losers.
Historical term State water strategies Main Winners and Losers

Establishment of the mining industry:
1857 – mid-20th century
The first Water Code (1951)
Centralization, infrastructure, and
regulation under radical state reforms:
the 1967 Water Code
Entering the neoliberal era: the 1981 water
code and the consolidation of past
mining water rights
Drying up the desert: expanding a
technocrat neoliberal water model in
democratic Chile: 1990 - today
Specification of minimum guaranteed flows for certain uses,
including industries and mining
Direct assignment of water rights to mining companies
Granting of private rights that are subject to several state
regulations
Expropriation of private water rights
Water rights acquired under previous legal systems by mining
corporations and urban water-supply companies are recognized
by the new regime as private and perpetual rights
Granting the right to mining companies to exclusively exploit the
aquifers within their mining concession even without water
rights, under the concept of miners’ waters
Direct assignment of water rights to the sanitary company by the
dictator’s exceptional order
Institutional arrangements that secure new water sources for
mining activities (seawater, underground brine)
W: nitrate mining companies; FCAB and Chilex
L: Agropastoral Indigenous communities of the upper-middle
section of the Loa River Basin
W: FCAB; Chilex; Directorate of Sanitary Works and sulfur mining
companies
L:Agropastoral Indigenous communities of the upper-middle
section of the Loa River Basin
W: Codelco; Directorate of Sanitary Works
L: Agropastoral Indigenous communities of the upper-middle
section Loa River Basin, and indigenous communities and peasants
from the middle-lower section of the Loa River.
W: Codelco, brine mining companies, private water supply
company
L: Agropastoral Indigenous communities of the upper-middle
section Loa River Basin, indigenous communities and peasants
from the middle-lower section of the Loa River, and Agropastoral
Indigenous communities from the Atacama Salt Flat Basin
W: Codelco, private copper mining companies, brine mining
companies, private water supply company
L: Agropastoral Indigenous communities of the upper-middle
section Loa River Basin, indigenous communities and peasants
from the middle-lower section of the Loa River, Agropastoral
Indigenous communities from the Atacama Salt Flat Basin, and
urban water consumers

10
M. Prieto et al.
7. Conclusion
Chilean post-1980s neoliberal reforms have been framed as a case of
deregulation, in which the idea of the withdrawal of state has become
commonplace among both followers and adversaries. Within the context
of the Chilean neoliberal reforms, this viewpoint has privileged dis­
courses and analyses that present the model as relying on an institu­
tional state retreat. Indeed, there is a consensus in the literature that the
Chilean water model is a textbook example of a free-market water
management system (Bauer, 1998; Budds, 2004). We argue that a
broader historical analysis is needed to comprehensively and empiri­
cally evaluate how the model has operated in practice in the Antofagasta
Region. The results of this analysis invite us to question the model’s
supposedly laissez-faire character and suggest instead that it relies
heavily on several regulations and a centralized institutional design that,
together, have ensured the consolidation and development of extracti­
vism. In sum, the Chilean water model in the Antofagasta Region is not
so “free” as commonly portrayed.
We interrogate the 1981 water model through the Chilean state’s
historical actions, which have shaped the extractive industries-water
nexus in the Antofagasta Region. Our results question the imaginary
of the public sector withdrawal, opening space for a different approach
to the neoliberal state: one that explores how markets are not separate
from statecraft whilst demonstrating the importance of historical anal­
ysis in revealing these links. In relation to water studies, the connection
between the commodification of water and the state’s role is not orig­
inal. Indeed, Bakker (2005) has disputed the thesis of neoliberal
deregulation and instead proposes the alternative notion of reregulation,
understood as the “reconfiguration of the role of the state to ensure the
continued functioning of capitalism” (Bakker, 2005, p. 544). While we
agree with Bakker, our historical analysis in the Antofagasta Region
extends her approach. We propose that the current distribution of water
is based on a hyper-regulatory model. It is hyper-regulatory, in the sense
that all historical regulations have been sedimented in the current
model. In this sense, the Water Code is not a separate chapter from the
historical management of water in the region. This code has fossilized,
under private ownership, historical power asymmetries that are rooted
in colonial and extractive dynamics. Furthermore, the fact that the
model was crafted by a de facto military regime makes it a case for an
“authoritarian neoliberalization” of water governance (Sheng et al.,
2020).
The above conclusion has led us to suggest that a thorough analysis is
essential in developing a more comprehensive examination of the cur­
rent neoliberal Chilean water model and its socio-environmental effects.
Acknowledging the strong prevailing criticism of this model and the
current public debate that aims for its transformation, we suggest that a
thoughtful review of the model should adopt a broader historical
approach that stresses how various institutional arrangements, no
matter whether they are pro-free market or pro-regulation, have his­
torically reproduced power asymmetries. In this sense, a radical change
in the direction of greater water justice must consider the ownership and
management of water by social actors that have historically been sub­
ordinated to the interests of extractive industries.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgements
This research was funded by the Agencia Nacional de Investigación y
Desarrollo, ANID, Chile (Fondecyt 1201527, 1181859; FONDAP
15110006). Thanks to Gino Sandoval for the map. The authors alone are
responsible for the content of the paper.
11
The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx
Supplementary materials
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.exis.2022.101081.
References
Anderson, T., Leal, D., 2001. Free market environmentalism. Pacific Research Institute
for Public Policy / Westview Press, San Francisco /Boulder.
Babidge, S., Kalazich, F., Prieto, M., Yager, K., 2019. That’s the problem with that lake; it
changes sides”: mapping extraction and ecological exhaustion in the Atacama.
J. Polit. Ecol. 26, 738–760. https://doi.org/10.2458/v26i1.23169.
Bakker, K., 2005. Neoliberalizing Nature? Market Environmentalism in Water Supply in
England and Wales. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 95, 542–565. https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1467-8306.2005.00474.x.
Banco Central de Chile, 2022. Boletín Estadístico 90 (1203) [WWW Document]. URL. htt
ps://www.bcentral.cl/documents/33528/133431/BE20220307.pdf/fb1cd9f3-cfc
7-33f3-a3c4-372d7cb7a3f8?t=1646430070440 (accessed 3.14.22).
Bauer, C.J., 1998. Against the Current: Privatization, Water Markets, and the State in
Chile. Springer US, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-6403-4.
Bolados, P., Henríquez, F., Ceruti, C., Sánchez, A., 2018. La eco-geo-política del agua:
una propuesta desde los territorios en las luchas por la recuperación del agua en la
provincia de Petorca (Zona central de Chile). Rev. Rupturas 8, 167–199. https://doi.
org/10.22458/rr.v8i1.1977.
Briscoe, J., 1996. Water as an economic good: The idea and what it means in practice.
World Congress of the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage, Cairo.
The World Bank, Washington DC, p. 25.
Budds, J., 2004. Power, nature, and neoliberalism: The political ecology of water in
Chile. Singap. J. Trop. Geogr. 25, 322–342. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0129-
7619.2004.00189.x.
Bustos-Gallardo, B., Prieto, M., 2019. Nuevas aproximaciones teóricas a las Regiones-
commodity desde la Ecología Política. EURE (Revista de Estudios Urbanos y
Regionales) 45 (135), 153–176. https://doi.org/10.4067/S0250-
71612019000200153.
Bustos-Gallardo, B., Bridge, G., Prieto, M., 2021. Harvesting Lithium: water, brine and
the industrial dynamics of production in the Salar de Atacama. Geoforum 119,
177–189. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2021.01.001.
CADE-IDEPE, 2004. Diagnóstico y clasificación de los cursos y cuerpos de agua según
objetivos de calidad. s.i. Dirección General de Aguas.
Castro, V., Martinez, J., 1996. Poblaciones indígenas de Atacama. In: Hidalgo, J.,
Schiappacasse, V., Niemeyer, H., Aldunate, C., Mege, P. (Eds.), Culturas de Chile.
Etnografía. Sociedades Indígenas Contemporáneas y Su Ideología. Andrés Bello,
Santiago, pp. 69–109.
Carrasco, A., 2015. Jobs and kindness: W.E. Rudolph’s role in the shaping of perceptions
of mining company-indigenous community relations in the Atacama Desert. Chile
Extractive Industries and Society 2 (2), 352–359.
Comisión Chilena del Cobre. 2020. Consumo de agua en la minería del cobre al 2019
[WWW Document]. URL https://www.cochilco.cl/ListadoTemtico/20201030Con
sumodeaguaenlamineriadelcobreal2019_versionfinal.pdf (accessed 3.16.2022).
Cuadra, M., 2000. Teoría y práctica de los derechos ancestrales de agua de las
comunidades atacameñas. Estud. Atacameños 93–112. https://doi.org/10.22199/
s07181043.2000.0019.00005.
Dirección General de Aguas, Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena, 1997.
Covenio marco para la protección, constitución y restablecimiento de los derechos de
agua de propiedad ancestral de las comunidades Aymaras y Atacameñas
(unpublished).
Figueiredo Ferraz Consultoría e Ingeniería de Proyecto Ltda, 1996. Análisis de la oferta y
demanda de recursos hídricos en cuencas críticas de Loa, Rapel y Mataquito.
Volúmen I. Cuenca del río Loa. Dirección General de Aguas, Santiago.
Fragkou, M., Budds, J., 2019. Desalination and the disarticulation of water resources:
Stabilising the neoliberal model in Chile. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 45, 448–463.
https://doi.org/10.1111/tran.12351.
Garreaud, R.D., 2009. The Andes climate and weather. Adv. Geosci. 22, 3–11. https://
doi.org/10.5194/adgeo-22-3-2009.
Gobierno de Chile, 2019. Plan Región Antofagasta 2018-2022. Gobierno de Chile,
Antofagasta.
Gundermann, H., 2003. Sociedades indígenas, municipio y etnicidad: La transformación
de los espacios políticos locales andinos en Chile1. Estud. Atacamenos 55–77.
https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-10432003002500004.
Gundermann, H., Göbel, B., 2018. Comunidades indígenas, empresas del litio y sus
relaciones en el Salar de Atacama. Chungara 50 (3), 471–486.
Gutiérrez, JS., Moore, JN., Donnelly, JP., Dorador, C., Navedo, JG., Senner, NR., 2022.
Climate change and lithium mining influence flamingo abundance in the Lithium
Triangle. Proc. R. Soc. B 289, 20212388. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.2388.
Harvey, D., 2007. Breve historia del neoliberalismo. Akal, Madrid.
Hearne, R., Easter, W., 1995. Water allocation and water markets an analysis of gains-
from-trade in Chile. The World Bank, Washington DC.
Inter-American Development Bank, 2003. Planta desalinizadora de Antofagasta: Informe
de Impacto Ambiental y Social (No. ch-0171).
Jerez, B., Garcés, I., Torres, R., 2021. Lithium extractivism and water injustices in the
Salar de Atacama, Chile: the colonial shadow of green electromobility. Polit. Geogr.
87, 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102382.
Lira, G., 1921. Aguas del río Loa. Instituto Científico e Industrial del Salitre, Santiago.
M. Prieto et al.
Lorca, M., Olivera Andrade, M., Escosteguy, M., Köppel, J., Scoville-Simonds, M., Hufty,
M., 2022. Mining indigenous territories: Consensus, tensions and ambivalences in
the Salar de Atacama (2022) Extractive Industries and Society, art. no. 101047.
10.1016/j.exis.2022.101047.
Mendez, M., Prieto, M., Godoy, M., 2020. Production of subterranean resources in the
Atacama Desert: 19th and early 20th century mining/water extraction in The Taltal
district, northern Chile. Polit. Geogr. 81, 102194 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
polgeo.2020.102194.
Millán, A., 2006. La minería metálica en Chile en el siglo XX. Universitaria, Santiago.
Monsalve, A., 1969. Anteproyecto del Embalse Conchi sobre el río Loa. Corfo.
Prieto, M., 2015. Privatizing Water in the Chilean Andes: The Case of Las Vegas de Chiu-
Chiu. Mt. Res. Dev. 35, 220–229. https://doi.org/10.1659/MRD-JOURNAL-D-14-
00033.1.
Prieto, M., 2017. El Riego que el Mercado no Quiere Ver: Historia del Despojo Hídrico en
las Comunidades de Lasana y Chiu-Chiu (Desierto de Atacama, Chile). Journal of
Latin American Geography 16 (2), 69–91. https://doi.org/10.1353/lag.2017.0022.
Prieto, M., Salazar, D., Valenzuela, M., 2019. The dispossession of the San Pedro de
Inacaliri river: Political Ecology, extractivism and archaeology. Extr. Ind. Soc. 6,
562–572. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2019.02.004.
12
The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx
Rios, M., Quiroz, J., 1995. The market for water rights in Chile, World Bank Technical
Papers. The World Bank, Washington DC. https://doi.org/10.1596/0-8213-3307-0.
Rudolph, W., 1952. Sulphur in Chile. Geogr. Rev. 42, 562–590. https://doi.org/10.2307/
211839.
Rudolph, W., 1927. The Rio Loa of Northern Chile. Geogr. Rev. 17, 553–585. https://doi.
org/10.2307/207998.
Sarricolea, P., Romero, H., 2015. Variabilidad y cambios climáticos observados y
esperados en el Altiplano del norte de. Chile. Rev. Geogr. Norte Gd. 169–183.
https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-34022015000300010.
Servicio Nacional de Geología y Minería, 2020. Anuario de la minería de Chile 2019.
Servicio Nacional de Geología y Minería, Santiago.
Sheng, J., Webber, M., Han, X., 2020. Authoritarian neoliberalization of water
governance: the case of China’s South–North Water Transfer Project. Territ. Polit.
Gov. 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2020.1755891.
Thobani, M., 1995. Tradable Property Rights to Water. How to improve water use and
resolve water conflicts. Public Policy Priv. Sect. 1–4.
Valdés, J.G., 1995. Pinochet’s economists : the Chicago school in Chile. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge /New York.
Yáñez, N., Molina, R., 2011. Las aguas indígenas en Chile. LOM, Santiago.