Yenga Border Dispute Sierra Leone - Guinea - Awoko Newspaper

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Yenga Border Dispute Sierra

Leone/Guinea
by
—
29/09/2009
in
News
Reading Time: 11 mins read  0
 0  0
Sierra Leone and Guinean officials ponder over map

in 2003
Sierra Leone and Guinean officials ponder over map in 2003
This article seeks to examine the border dispute between Sierra Leone and Guinea and the
problems associated with the demarcation of a section of the boundary between the two West
African countries along the left bank of the Moa/Makona river in the eastern Kailahun district of
Sierra Leone. It highlights the significance of state practice and the jurisprudence of the ICJ
(International Court of Justice) in the peaceful resolution of border disputes, and in the process
explores the origin of uti possidetis as an international doctrine, explaining its primary
justification in minimising threats to peace and stability. The article also evaluates the legal
function and practical application of uti possidetis in the African context and its role in the
respect for the intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonization.
The origin of the border dispute between Sierra Leone and Guinea lies in their colonial past and
is basically one of treaty interpretation. Long before the two countries gained their
independence, the former colonial powers, Britain and France began the process of identifying
and delimiting the boundaries of both countries. This process culminated in the 1912 Protocol
signed by the commissioners appointed by both colonial powers, which finally delimited the
boundary between Sierra Leone and Guinea. In September 1913, Britain and France
exchanged further notes confirming their acceptance of the 1912 Protocol. However, although

https://awokonewspaper.sl/yenga-border-dispute-sierra-leoneguinea/ 1/9
the two West African countries agree that the key instrument defining their common border is 
the 1912 Protocol, Guinea has over the years contended the interpretation of Article 7 of the
Protocol
 and the attached map to the extent that both countries now believe that a different line
on the map represents the boundary.
 Article 7 explains that the frontier follows the left bank of the Moa from cairn No. XV
In essence,
and terminates at cairn No. XV1 on the Dandogbia river at the Liberian border. Cairn No. XV1

is not, however, definitively fixed, except that it is marked by a stack of stones. It has proved
problematic
 to reconstruct this cairn as it is the point where the borders of Sierra Leone, Guinea
and Liberia meet.
 put forward by Guinea over the disputed section of the boundary is that the external
The claim
red line shown on the left bank of the Moa/Makona river of the map attached to the Protocol

represents the frontier. Sierra Leone, however, strictly regards the internal red line shown on
the map from cairn No. XV to cairn No. XV1 along the left bank of the Moa/Makona river as
representing the frontier. Indeed, the 1913 exchange of notes refers to the demarcation of the
boundary between Sierra Leone and Guinea, and there can be no doubt that the boundary
passes through cairn No. XV, which can be located on the left bank of the Moa, but there is no
indication in the 1912 Protocol that the boundary is marked on the map. There is also no clear
definition on the map, which is hand-drawn, to show that a particular line on the left bank of the
Moa represents the boundary. The Protocol and the attached map therefore fail to provide any
concrete geographical evidence of the true boundary line along the disputed section of the
frontier between Sierra Leone and Guinea.
It is this inadvertent failure which now lies at the heart of the boundary dispute.
Considering the rejection by Guinea to the introduction of any other map other than the
attached 1912 map, the dispute becomes even more controversial. However, although in
recent case law, courts have relied to an increasing extent on maps, this form of evidence does
not constitute a territorial title since maps are generally “extrinsic and corroborative evidence” of
varying reliability. As such, their role is not of significant importance, resulting in maps being
used with other evidence of a circumstantial nature in order to establish the real facts.
Given the contentious claims put forward by both countries, from a geographical perspective,
the position taken by Guinea that the external red line delimits the boundary seems very
problematic as this line coincides with the millennium flood line situated well inside Sierra
Leonean territory. Admittedly, my knowledge of the physical geography of the area and the
hydrology of the Moa/Makona river is not up to scratch. But demarcating the boundary at the
level where the Moa river floods once every one thousand years as is being argued by Guinea
represents an extraordinary interpretation of the concept of a river bank boundary, and is hardly
consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term ‘bank’ that international law requires us to
adopt when interpreting treaties. On the other hand, however, the position taken by Sierra
Leone that the internal red line located close to the river channel represents the bank of the
Moa river, and that this line delimits the boundary is more in keeping with the ordinary meaning 
of the terms of the treaty in context, object and purpose.

In 1998, the border dispute between Sierra Leone and Guinea emerged into prominence when
following years of the bloody RUF (Revolutionary United Front) tribal rebel war which seriously
affected
 Kailahun district, Guinean troops occupied the border town of Yenga and its environs.
But the occupation of Yenga by heavily armed Guinean troops was seen in the light of a military
designed to forestall cross-border incursions by RUF rebels into Guinean territory. In
strategy
essence, Guinean troops entered Sierra Leone not as an invasion force but as an ally.

However , since the rebel war officially ended in January 2002, Guinean troops supported by
tanks, 
armoured personnel carriers and heavy support weapons still occupy Yenga, a situation
which has developed into the government of Guinea claiming jurisdiction over Yenga. This sad

and unfortunate episode is reminiscent of the days of empire when land was acquired by states
through the use of force. But the bigger picture that should never be forgotten is that Sierra

Leone and Guinea are two friendly states with strong linguistic ties and a long history stretching
far beyond the era of European colonization.
In spite of the difficulties associated with resolving the Yenga issue, Sierra Leone and Guinea
have made several diplomatic attempts in trying to arrive at a consensual and peaceful
resolution of their border dispute. In 2005, for instance, a memorandum of understanding was
signed between the two countries, with President Kabbah declaring the issue resolved, only for
it to disappointingly resurface again in 2009. But recent talks held in Freetown between the two
countries under the auspices of the skilful leadership of President Ernest Bai Koroma may
provide the basis for a peaceful resolution of the Yenga issue.
However, in international law and relations, ownership of territory is significant as sovereignty

defines what constitutes a state. As such, it is reasonable to suggest that since the border
dispute between Sierra and Guinea is based on treaty interpretation and originates from the
1912 Protocol, which was confirmed by both Britain and France, the International Court of
Justice offers a welcoming opportunity for a peaceful and binding adjudication of the dispute.
No doubt, the ICJ has since its inception acquired extensive knowledge of relevant state
practice and has considerable experience in the peaceful resolution of international boundaries
both on land and at sea. But it is essential that pursuant to a special arrangement by
compromis, both Sierra Leone and Guinea stipulate that the International Court of Justice
resolves the dispute with regard to the principle of uti possidetis, which provides that states
emerging from decolonization shall presumptively inherit the colonial administrative borders that
they held at the time of independence.
The term uti possidetis originated from Roman law during the republican period, as one of a
series of edicts issued by a praetor or administrator of justice at the initial stage of litigation
between two contesting parties claiming ownership over real property. The edict granted
provisional possession of the property to the possessor during the litigation, rather than finally
determining the disposition of the property. This gave an advantage to the possessor, and the
edict was summarised in the phrase Uti possidetis, ita possidetis: “As you possess, so may you
possess”. However, the early scholars of international law critically altered the doctrine of uti 
possidetis by changing the scope of its application from private land claims to the territorial
sovereignty of nation states, and transforming its provisional status into one of permanency.

Given that the dispute should be resolved with regard to the principle of uti possidetis, the
settlement
 by the ICJ must be based in particular on respect for the principle of the intangibility
of frontiers inherited from colonization. The application of this principle emerged during the

decolonization of Latin America, which meant that the new republics of South America and
Central America inherited the administrative boundaries of the Spanish colonial power at the

moment of independence in the 1980s. The doctrine moved from Latin America to Africa where
the political
 and historical situation was different, as unlike Latin America, seven European
powers were involved in the colonization of Africa, beginning from the 18th century. The mode

of establishing boundaries was also different as geometric lines predominated, without regard
for the social and linguistic groupings of the local inhabitants, and with little knowledge of the

local geography. The main purpose of the European powers in the allocation of territories in
Africa was simply to reduce armed conflicts among themselves.
Prior to decolonization, Africa was faced with two clear options: either to undertake a wholesale
restructuring of borders in order to rectify past injustices or accept existing lines of demarcation
as the basis for new states. In spite of strong opposition from the Pan-Africanist Movement, the
European powers together with the indigenous elites decided to maintain extant lines as the
most feasible way of achieving speedy independence. So since the 1950s, European colonies
in Africa, and South Asia had started inheriting the administrative boundaries of their former
colonial powers at the moment of independence. By 1963 when the OAU (Organisation of
African Unity) was formed most of the colonies in the continent had gained independence.
Article 3 of the 1963 OAU Charter contains the principle of uti possidetis juris in an implicit
sense, but the 1964 Cairo Declaration deliberately stresses and affirms the principle of uti
possidetis juris, and all the Member states of the organisation, including Sierra Leone and
Guinea solemnly pledged “to respect the frontiers existing on their achieving of national
independence”. This development achieved two purposes. Firstly, it prevented territorial
claims by states, which could have the potential for armed conflicts. Secondly, it discouraged
secessionists demands from ethnic minorities to further divide states or adjust borders. Thus,
in spite of the apparent contradiction in its application, the principle of uti possidetis has been
able to withstand the new approaches to international law as expressed in Africa.
Although uti possidetis is not a norm of jus cogens, in Latin America, Africa and Asia state
practice has resulted in uti possidetis being regarded as a customary norm. Its meaning in
international law was stated in the 1922 Arbitral Award of the Swiss Federal Council in the
Colombia/Venezuela Boundary Arbitration that each of the disputant parties admitted the
applicability of the principle of uti possidetis juris and that the boundaries between them must
be identical with the boundaries as laid down by Spain prior to their independence. Uti
possidetis has found expression in Europe in Principle 111 on the Inviolability of Frontiers of the
Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975, and has been recognised by international agreements of a
universal character, such as the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The principle 
has also been reaffirmed in the Charter of Paris of 21 November 1990.

In the case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), the Chamber of the 
International Court of Justice emphasised the exceptional importance of the principle of uti
possidetis
 for the African continent, and in its jurisprudential expansion of the principle, stated in
dictum that “the principle is not a special rule which permits solely to one specific system of

international law. It is a general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of
the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs”. The Chamber noted that African countries

have judiciously consented “to the respecting of colonial frontiers” because of the need for
stability
and development, and in order to consolidate their independence. African countries
have therefore decided that maintenance of the territorial status quo is the wisest course, and

have continued to apply the principle of uti possidetis “to prevent the independence and stability
of new states being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers

following the withdrawal of the administrative power”. This is hardly surprising, considering the
fact that the delimitation of political boundaries in Africa took no account of ethnic and tribal
considerations.
According to the Chamber, African states recognised and respected the legality of existing
frontiers, and even reinterpreted the principle of uti possidetis to encompass the principle of
territorial integrity. The Chamber went on to explain that the fact that newly emerging African
countries have respected the administrative boundaries and frontiers established by the
colonial powers should not only be regarded in the light of an emerging practice of a principle of
international customary law that is limited in its impact to Africa, but should also be seen as a
rule of general scope. As such, the acceptance of the colonial borders by African governments
and by the OAU did not in any way create a new rule nor did it extend to Africa any original rule
that had been previously applied in another continent. Instead, this development constitutes
the recognition and confirmation of an existing principle, the application of which resulted in
administrative boundaries being transformed into international frontiers in the full sense of the
term.
Although it has not been possible to unquestionably establish from colonial documentation
which of the two red lines shown on the attached map to the Protocol constitutes the relevant
boundary line, there is still ample evidence of the historic course of the disputed border. This
being the case, it is essential that both Sierra Leone and Guinea agree that territorial claims of
equity based on the unacceptable nature of the border as a result of such issues as ethnic,
geographical or administrative problems should not be applied in the modification of the existing
border, as such claims could be unjustified and unnecessary because of the obvious
deficiencies of many African borders inherited from the colonial period. Moreover, the
application of equity in order to achieve an equitable result, as required by international law, is
not necessarily a method for delimiting a boundary, but rather an aim that should be borne in
mind in effecting the delimitation. It is therefore necessary that Sierra Leone and Guinea
express that the border dispute is not decided ex aequo et bono.
In the Frontier Dispute, The ICJ Chamber observed that it would have regard to equity infra 
legem, which as a legal concept “is a direct emanation of the idea of justice”. But the Chamber
noted the difficulties associated with resorting to the concept of equity in order to modify an 
established frontier in the African context, as explained above. However, the Chamber had
cause 
to resort to equity infra legem in order to divide the frontier pool between Burkina Faso
and Mali as the evidence before the Court lacked any indication of the historic course of the
 line. All the same, the Frontier Dispute is described as the most important
boundary
pronouncement with regard to the role of uti possidetis in Africa.

Within the context of decolonization, however unsatisfactory a frontier may be, it still possesses
the authority
 of uti possidetis, which has no retroactive effect and is in full conformity with
contemporary international law. In essence, what uti possidetis does is “to freeze the territorial
title; it 
stops the clock but does not put back the hands”, that is, it gives the “photograph of the
territory” as it existed at the moment of independence, which is the critical date. The starting

point of examining any claims relating to the boundary line is therefore this photograph, which
provides a prima facie territorial situation at the moment of independence.
According to the ICJ, the obligation to respect pre-existing international frontiers in the event of
a state succession derives from a general rule of international law, whether or not the rule is
expressed in the formula uti possidetis. This explains why, for instance, the majority of the
Chamber in the Libya/Chad case resolved the dispute in a simple and straight-forward manner
through the application of the law of treaties, as Libya was formerly an Italian colony, while
Chad was formerly French. The Chamber concluded that the relevant Franco-Libyan Treaty of
1955 which established the colonial boundary between Chad and Libya determined the
permanent frontier between the two states. The Chamber emphasised that a boundary
established by a treaty achieved a permanency which the treaty itself did not necessarily enjoy.
Thus, a treaty can cease to be in force without in any case affecting the legal authority of the
boundary.
Furthermore, in the absence of an explicit agreement, a newly independent state that chooses
not to object to an existing boundary or expressly declines otherwise by affirming the territorial
status quo, in effect succeeds to a legal situation created and continued by custom. In fact, it
could be argued that in the African context, acquiescence plays a significant role as is
exemplified in the acquiescence of Egypt, for instance, which enabled Sudan to claim territorial
jurisdiction over a region that lay beyond the boundary established along the 22nd parallel by
the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 19 January 1899. It therefore follows that the Cairo Declaration,
for instance, can be regarded not as an affirmation of uti possidetis, but as a waiver of the right
to object to inherited territorial arrangements of the colonial powers. With regard to the
maintenance of the status quo, it should be borne in mind that there are two distinct versions of
uti possidetis, namely, uti possidetis juris, which refers to the new state’s legal title at the time of
independence; and uti possidetis de facto, which refers to its territorial jurisdiction at the time of
independence. From this standpoint, although the border dispute between Sierra Leone and
Guinea concerns the applicability of uti possidetis juris, considering the two versions of the
principle, Guinea’s claim of territorial jurisdiction over Yenga can hardly be justified. In the 
African context, territorial title rests more on substantive, rather than deemed possession. No
doubt, the argument is strongly in favour of Sierra Leone, which possessed not only the legal 
title at the time of independence but also demonstrated factual and effective possession and
territorial
 jurisdiction over Yenga.
Article written by:
 Colonel (Rtd) Sim Turay, HCBS, BA Combined Hons, MA, LLM.
Lieutenant
Former Head of Military Intelligence, Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces.

Contact: Simturay@sky.com

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On assignment: Rice Production –

Kambia Farmer named after rice –
Marie ‘Nerica’
by
—
29/09/2009
in
News
Reading Time: 2 mins read  0
 0  0
     
5 acres farm
5 acres farm
Madam Marie Kamara has become a household name in the Kambia District due to her
successful cultivation of the Nerica variety which other farmers have described as “very hard to
deal with.” Starting in 2004 with four bushels madam Kamara can now boast of a five acre farm
which has thus earned her the coveted name of “Marie Nerica”.
Nerica is the new strain of rice developed by award winning Sierra Leonean born Professor
Monty Jones.
According to Madam Kamara the Nerica strain of rice was given to her by the Agriculture 
Ministry who were testing the suitability of the rice.

She disclosed that it was not too productive in the first year (2004) since it was cultivated during

the dry season.
The rice
 harvested that year “was distributed in three places: Massama, Mogotala and Kanti,
each receiving half a bushel, while she kept the rest.
 Marie explained “I cultivated one and half a bushels, (and) harvested 35 bushels.” In
In 2005,
2006 she said “I harvested 45 bushels.” By 2008, she was able to harvest over 70 bushels. This

year she said she is expecting higher yield in harvest because she worked very hard.
The enterprising
 Madam Kamara revealed that she was now engaged in supplying other
farmers as a form of campaign for the Nerica rice. Also she disclosed “after I have supplied the
is then sold to the government (for their seed bank) and the money I get is used to pay
balance
the other farmers who are working on my farm.”

Questioned about the use of fertilizers Marie Nerica Kamara said “During the first week of
cultivation I do apply 15/15 and when the rice becomes pregnant I then apply urea. I don’t use
cow dung because the area where I farm there are no cows there.”
However Madam Kamara complained that government input has been either low or untimely.
She explained, “I was given a tractor for just one year after pressuring the ministry. By the time
they came with the tractor, I had already hired people to plough, since I was of the opinion that
the tractor was not forthcoming and the rain had already started coming.”
She added that she “was promised a tractor and when the tractors came to the district she was
not given one.” She explained some “few people were selected and given the tractors.”
On the issue of pests, Marie ‘Nerica’ said that rats and other animals do eat the rice and that
she had to pay people to help drive the pests away.
Questioned about allegations of smuggling of rice to Guinea she said that she is not engaged in
smuggling and that she supplies other farmers and only sells to government.
She called for government assistance claiming that the only help she has received from the
government is fertilizer and sometimes cutlasses and hoes.
Marie Nerica said government should help her with a “tractor and store where I will keep the
rice after harvest. I don’t have a thrasher as the farmers as Nerica is difficult to thrash” Post
harvest loss is another of the problems she further highlighted stating that she does not have a
store to keep the rice after harvest.
The Mother of 10 whose husband is a court clerk disclosed that she has built a house with
proceeds from the rice she has been planting.
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21/11/2022, 10:20 Yenga Border Dispute Sierra Leone/Guinea – Awoko Newspaper

Yenga Border Dispute Sierra

Sierra Leone and Guinean officials ponder over map

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However, in international law and relations, ownership of territory is significant as sovereignty

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Article written by:

 Colonel (Rtd) Sim Turay, HCBS, BA Combined Hons, MA, LLM.

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On assignment: Rice Production –

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