Lanning - Tipología de Los Sistemas Políticos Latinoamericanos

A Typology of Latin American Political Systems
Author(s): Eldon Lanning

Source: Comparative Politics , Apr., 1974, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Apr., 1974), pp. 367-394
Published by: Comparative Politics, Ph.D. Programs in Political Science, City University
of New York
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/421520
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A Typology of
Latin American Political Systems
Eldon Lanning
I
"[A] hobby of Latin Americanists, their hands forced by the variety
of their area of study, is to develop sets of social categories within
which to squeeze all twenty republics," according to an observation
made by Kalman Silvert.1 The purpose of such sets of categories, or
classifications, may be seen by considering three different levels of
generalization about political systems. At one extreme are statements
generalizing about a single system; such statements are limited to
some specific spacio-temporal location and cannot be applied beyond
that limit. At the other extreme are generalizations applicable to all
political systems; these are universal generalizations since they hold
for all cases within a particular unit of analysis regardless of time and
location. Between these extremes are generalizations that apply to
some specific subset of cases.2
It is in the last instance that classification is utilized. This brings
together a set of related classes, each of which specifies the domain
of applicability of one or more generalizations. A classification must
meet the logical requirements that its classes be collectively exhaus-
tive and mutually exclusive.3 Beyond this, the test of a good classi-
fication is whether it divides phenomena into classes that are theoreti-
cally useful in that meaningful generalizations can be made about
each class.4 Classifications, therefore, are not ordinarily judged to be
right or wrong, but to be more or less useful. The more they make
distinctions which enhance explanation, the more useful they are.
' Kalman H. Silvert, The Conf7ict Society, Reaction and Revolution in Latin America, rev.
ed. (New York, 1966), p. 14,
2These distinctions are similar to Giovanni Sartori's levels of abstraction in "Concept
Misformation in Comparative Politics," American Political Science Review, LXIV (December
1970), 1033-53.
3 Carl G. Hempel, "Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science,"
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. 2, no. 7 (Chicago, 1952), p. 51.
4 Arend Lijphart suggests that typologies should facilitate the discovery of characteristics
associated with the defining characteristics of the type as well as comparisons within types by
367

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Comparative Politics April 1974
While, as Silvert notes, there have been several attempts to classify

Latin American societies,5 relatively few efforts have been made to
make distinctions between political systems. Instead, most studies
have been limited to a single system or have attempted to generalize
about all systems. There is, of course, no reason why one should not
work at the level of a particular system,6 since one's purpose may be
to explain the operation of that system. Beyond this, the individual
case study may be useful in examining and modifying a more general
explanation.7 The uniqueness of the individual case, however, seri-
ously limits the applicability of generalizing with regard to other
cases.
Ultimately, if one desires explanations that encompass mor

one system, it is necessary to move beyond a series of case s
Generalizations that attempt this by including all Latin American
political systems raise difficulties of their own. In the first place, it is
not clear why generalizations should apply to all Latin America and
only Latin America. The creation of a Latin American class requires
that the cases assigned to that class share certain characteristics and
that such characteristics are relevant for the generalizations. Strictly
speaking, all Latin American political systems would have to possess
the attributes specified in the generalizations or the latter would not
apply to a Latin American class but rather to some narrower subclass. It
is not easy to find such attributes, particularly ones which would be
relevant in explaining political phenomena; and Latin Americanists
have tended to ignore this problem.
In summarizing some of the more frequently mentioned common
characteristics, Martin Needler lists six more or less political ones:
serving as control variables. The first point seems equivalent to my formulation, while the
second provides the basis for creating subtypes and lowering the level of generalization. See his
"Typologies of Democratic Systems," Comparative Political Studies, I (April 1968), 7.
5 Representative illustrations include Roger Vekemans and J. L. Segundo, "Sintesis de la
tipologia socioeconomic," Revista inter-americana de ciencias sociales, II (1963), 1-32; Gino
Germani, "Stages of Modernization in Latin America," Studies in Comparative International
Development, V (1969-70), 155-74; and Jacques Lambert, Latin America, Social Structure
and Political Institutions, trans. Helen Katel (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), pp. 23-48.
6 Lijphart has provided a useful classification of types of case studies and the merits and
limitations of each in "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," American Polit-
ical Science Review, LXV (September 1971), 691-93.
7 There is an important distinction between case studies which attempt to examine an
explanation or the applicability of a general framework and country-by-country studies that
follow a common framework or outline. The former, because of their conscious concern with
explanation, provide a basis for modification of the explanation, while the latter run a great risk
of descriptive distortion because of the limitations of the imposed framework. For a common
framework to be useful, its concepts must refer to common features which are important in all
of the systems described.
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ildon Lanning
(1) all are excolonies; (2) most had similar colonial institutions; (3)
the majority have communications problems stemming from geogra-
phy; (4) their economies, to a varied degree, are dependent on the
export of primary products; (5) they have a common political con-
sciousness since events in one country may influence events in
another; and (6) all are within a certain series of stages in their
political evolution.8 Of these characteristics, the first and, to some
degree, the fourth apply to all countries; the second and third apply to
most; the extent of applicability of the fifth is unclear; and the sixth
seems to imply differences within Latin America in terms of a
universal political development framework. It is difficult to see the
appropriateness of these characteristics as a basis for a Latin Ameri-
can class of political systems. After examining the applicability of
ten "non-Western" characteristics, John Martz observed that one
must "answer in the negative the question as to whether or not the
states of Latin America are homogeneous to an extent permitting
their blanket inclusion."9 He suggests that the non-Western/Western
classification might be useful for the study of Latin American states
but that this would involve assigning states to the appropriate classes
rather than the creation of a Latin American class. 10
This lack of clarity in defining the parameters of a Latin American
class of political systems, if indeed it is possible to define them,
helps to account for the vagueness of many of the generalizations
about the area. In some instances a generalization is seemingly meant
to apply to all Latin American political systems, but the author's
evidence or reservations suggest that it is actually limited to some
unspecified subclass. Charles Anderson, for example, has developed
a model of the Latin American political system which utilizes a
variety of power contenders and a variety of power capabilities, none
of which is more legitimate than another. The result is shifting
coalitions of power contenders and governmental instability.11 He
suggests that his propositions in regard to his model are not only
applicable to some Latin American political systems, but that they
are: ". . . of assistance in understanding the political dynamics of
8 Martin C. Needler, Latin American Politics in Perspective, rev. ed. (Princeton, 1968
4-5.
9 John D. Martz, "The Place of Latin America in the Study of Comparative Politics,"
Journal of Politics, XXVIII (February 1966), 77.
'(" Ibid., 76-80. I understand that Martz now rejects this framework as not particularl
useful. See his "Political Science and Latin American Studies: A Discipline in Search of a
Region," Latin American Research Review, VI (Spring 1971), 80.
11 Charles W. Anderson, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America (Princeton,
1967), chap. 4. This pattern is explained in greater detail later as a Type 1 Political System.
369

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any
any Latin
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This places his model's applicability in a most ambiguous state.
Since any political system has some power capability and each
capability theoretically may have any possible magnitude of effec-
tiveness, Anderson is actually suggesting universal concepts rather
than ones applicable solely to Latin America. The important task
then becomes the development of basic models for the important
mixes of capabilities within Latin America. While Anderson con-
structs a model for the situation where no power capability is more
legitimate than another, he seems to imply, as in his discussion of
individual differences and the possibility of a classification, that this
one model cannot describe all Latin American systems. The reader is
left, therefore, with a general framework and one model that applies
to some Latin American systems, but the extent of applicability remains
unclear.
A related problem occurs when the components of a general Latin
American system are described, but specific exceptions to each com-
ponent are noted. If these exceptions are found consistently in the
same countries, then the conforming systems would fit a general
pattern, although such a pattern would be a subclass of Latin Ameri-
can systems. Since, however, the exceptions actually change from
component to component, any generalization based on such descrip-
tions concerning a Latin American pattern is very misleading. It
might be noted here that whereas two statements are true individually
for fifteen of the twenty cases, they need be jointly true for only ten
of those twenty cases.
A somewhat similar problem is the use of evidence for one charac-
teristic, gleaned from a case which is an exception for another char-
acteristic. Thus, Merle Kling has argued that political instability in
Latin America is caused by the extreme concentration of wealth. In
the course of demonstrating this, Kling presented evidence of the
concentration of land and mineral wealth in Chile. 13 But since Chile
had an uninterrupted period of constitutional government between
12 Ibid.. p. 93.
13 Merle Kling. TToward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America.'
Western Political Quarter/l. IX (March 1956). 21-35.
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Eldon Lanning
1932 and 1973, he cannot use it as a case of political instability.

Therefore, although such evidence is cited to support a relationship,
it actually disproves that relationship. In Chile, at least, concentration
of economic wealth did not produce political instability. Even more
problematic for Kling's argument is the fact that the recent overthrow
of the Allende government occurred within a context of decreasing
concentration of wealth in Chile.
The frequent occurrence of these and similar problems of generali-
zation in Latin American political studies suggests that there has been
too much emphasis on area generalization and too little on determina-
tion of the actual extent of applicability of these generalizations.
Classifying the political systems by creating classes of cases which
possess one or more common characteristics is an alternative de-
signed to avoid these problems of generalization. Consequently, the
identification of additional common characteristics within any class
means that generalizations can be formulated with a clearly defined
parameter of applicability.
II
Any classification necessarily involves considerable simplification, in
part because only several out of a very large number of characteristics
appropriate for describing a political system can be used in the
classification. Some of the remaining characteristics may be subse-
quently related to the classification characteristics, but even here the
classification will present only a partial picture of a political system.
A second form of simplification occurs within the classification
itself. Individual cases must be assigned to a few classes, and any
differences in the defining characteristics in the same class are ig-
nored. The classes isolate cases that are similar, not identical, and
thereby produce some simplification. Both forms of simplification
should be kept in mind in evaluating a classification system since
they provide concrete meaning to the general principle that classifica-
tions reveal some similarities and differences by ignoring others.
Two characteristics are utilized in the typology presented here.
These have been selected because they isolate important aspects of
the political systems in Latin America and because the resulting
classes relate to other characteristics in such a way as to increase our
understanding of the political processes in these countries. The first
focuses on executive stability and instability, a topic that has attracted
several students of Latin American politics. A formulation exclusive-
ly in these terms, however, provides no basis for distinguishing
between potentially different kinds of stability and instability and
371

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Comparative
ComparativePolitics
PoliticsApril
April19 19
74 74
thereby
therebyhinders
hindersidentification
identificationof of
thethe
more
more
fundamental
fundamental
political
political
con- con-
ditions
ditions of
ofwhich
whichstability
stability
andand
instability
instability
maymay
be manifestations.
be manifestations.
This This
can be avoided by focusing on the somewhat more abstract concept
of the power relationship between the central governmental author-
ities and politically relevant groups in the society. In any Latin
American country it is possible to identify one or a very small
number of individuals who occupy positions that permit them to
make definitive decisions for the society. They will be referred to as
the 'central governmental authorities'; ordinarily they hold positions
as presidents, provisional presidents, dictators, military junta mem-
bers, and the like.14 Their ability to make definitive decisions does
not indicate that such individuals are free to make any decisions they
desire, or even that they are sure of maintaining their positions for
any period of time. It merely means that, while in these positions, the
decisions they make will be viewed as definitive unless they are
persuaded or forced to make different decisions or are removed from
such positions. 'Politically relevant groups' designates people who
are not central governmental authorities, but whose activities may be
important for the operation of the political system. This category is
clearly a residual one in that it includes persons who occupy noncen-
tral governmental positions (e.g., members of the mnilitary and the
bureaucracy) as well as nongovernmental groups; no distinctions are
made between these groups. Only the central governmental author-
ities and those groups that are so nonpoliticized that the political
system is not perceived to be of any consequence are excluded.
In each Latin American country there exists between the central
governmental authority and the politically relevant groups some iden-
tifiable power relationship, which designates the weight of each in
determining the general nature of decisions over time. Three basic
kinds of power relationships may be distinguished analytically:
1. The authority dominates or controls the politically relevant
groups. Lines of communication and influence flow primarily from
the authority down to the relevant population, creating the condition
Robert Dahl referred to as "low subsystem autonomy."'5 Demand
14 R. A. Gomez provides a useful list of such positions in GovLernment and Politics in Latin
America (New York, 1960), pp. 90-100.
15 Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewoodt Cliffs, 1963), pp. 35-37.
Actually the usage here is more restrictive since Dahl includes both the autonomy of groups
from the authorities and the autonomy of lower level authorities from higher level authorities in
the same concept, although they are not necessarily related. Almond and Powell, in borrowing
Dahl's concept, add to the confusion by including a third meaning of one group as autonomous
from another. In fact, Almond and Powell's typology of political systems must approach an
extreme of confusion since it is composed of one dimension (subsystem autonomy) with three
different referents and another dimension whose two components-structural differentiation and
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Eldon Lanning
activity
activity by
bygroups
groupsisishighly
highlyrestricted,
restricted,tends
tends
to be
to covert,
be covert,
and and
relies
relies
upon
upon irregular
irregularchannels.
channels.SoSolong
longas as
this
this
power
power
relationship
relationship
exists,
exists,
the the
authority
authority isisimmune
immunefromfrom serious
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andand
can can
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maintain
himself
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or
or his
his chosen
chosensuccessors
successorsinin
office
officeindefinitely.
indefinitely.
2. The authority and the politically relevant groups are relatively
equal in power, each capable of maintaining a sphere of independent
activity. The authority occupies a role in a set of governmental
institutions which are stable, effective, and legitimate; this allows
him to remain in office over a designated period of time and to resist
some demands from groups within the society. The relevant groups
have independent bases of existence and are able to resist attempts at
control by the authority.
3. The politically relevant groups dominate the authority. In this case
the authority not only cannot control the relevant groups; he is not
able to resist, refine, or moderate group demands. Consequently, his
position remains uncertain and he may be removed from office at any
time. No stable and effective governmental power exists. Instead,
groups easily penetrate governmental institutions and conflict with
one another directly, producing the "praetorian society" described
by Samuel Huntington.16
Since each power relationship has a distinctive pattern of central
governmental authority office tenure, these patterns can be used as
reasonably good operational criteria for identifying the power rela-
tionship in each country. The condition of power balance (2), there-
fore, is indicated by a pattern of regular rotation in office by central
governmental authorities. To establish the existence of a pattern,
there must be a minimum of three consecutive regular rotations.
Group dominance (3) is indicated by a pattern of irregular change in
office. Given the minimum requirements for regular rotation, a pat-
tern of irregular change requires at least one irregular change out of
every three changes in office. Finally, authority dominance (1) is
indicated through long-term control by a single individual, family, or
clique. To establish a clear pattern of long-term control and to
distinguish it particularly from the frequent short-term military gov-
ernments entailing group dominance, long-term control must last a
minimum of seven years, a period longer than any regular term of
office in Latin America.
cultural secularization-are not necessarily empirically related, as the authors concede. Never-
theless, fifteen types of political systems are plotted in the resulting matrix (p. 308). See
Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Ap-
proach (Boston, 1966), pp. 233-314, and particularly pp. 214, 259-60, and 306-10.
16 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968),
particularly chaps. 1 and 4.
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Table 1 Power Relationship between Central Governmental Authorities and Po-

litically Relevant Groups, 1972
Authority Power Group

Dominance Balance Dominance
Brazil (1969, Chile Argentina (1971, 1970, 1966,

1964, 1961)* Colombia (1957) 1962, 1955)
Cuba (1959) Costa Rica Bolivia (1971, 1970, 1969, 1964)
Haiti (1957) Mexico Dominican Republic (1965, 1963, 1962)
Nicaragua (1956) Uruguay Ecuador (1972, 1966, 1963, 1961)
Paraguay Venezuela (1958) El Salvador (1961, 1960)
Guatemala (1963, 1956)
Honduras (1972, 1963, 1956)
Panama(1968, 1955)
Peru (1968, 1962)
* Dates indicate irregular changes in office in the 1955-72 period.
Table 1 presents a classification of the twenty Latin American

countries based on the power relationships existing at the end of 1972.
With the clear exception of Brazil, the countries seem to be appropri-
ately classified by the operational criteria. All nine countries classi-
fied within the group dominance category had at least one irregular
change in office in the 1960-72 period. In most cases two or more
such changes occurred, and in no case had the 1972 central govern-
mental authority been in power at least seven years. Six countries are
included in the power balance class, with Colombia and Venezuela
nearest the minimum criteria for inclusion. In three of the five
authority dominance cases, a single individual or family has been in
control for more than a decade (Castro in Cuba from 1959, the
Duvaliers in Haiti from 1957, and Stroessner in Paraguay since
1954), while the Somoza family's dominance in Nicaragua has been
much longer and almost as complete.17 Brazil, classified here within
the authority dominance category, is an ambiguous case not ade-
quately handled by the empirical criteria. A military junta seized
power in 1964 and still ruled at the end of 1972, a period of time
17 General Anastasio Somoza seized power in 1937 and remained the leader until his
assassination in 1956. One of his sons, Luis, succeeded him through 1963. After a close family
friend served for almost a full term, Anastasio Somoza, Jr. was elected president, a position the
latter held through 1972. The brief period of non-Somoza rule, during which Anastasio
Somoza, Jr. controlled the military, does not constitute a true break in this lengthy period of
family dominance. The elder Somoza permitted the election of another president in the 1940s,
but was soon forced to depose him when he proved not to be completely compliant.
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Eldon Lanning
which would just qualify as long-term control by a single clique. In

1969 there was an irregular change in office which suggests the
existence of group dominance. That change, however, was in order
to maintain in power the same military group rather than permit an
interruption of control.'18 Based upon this analysis, supported by
other academic reviews of this period,19 Brazil is classified as a case
of authority dominance.
The second characteristic in the present typology focuses on the
dominant organizational basis of political activity in the system. A
basic distinction is made between political activity based upon hori-
zontally organized secondary groups and such activity based upon
vertically, or hierarchically, organized alliances of individuals and
primary groups. Since both are likely to exist in all political systems,
the distinction is concerned with the predominant pattern for national
or system-wide political activity.
1. Horizontal organization. Horizontally organized political activity
unites people who perceive that they share some functional interest or
basic characteristic, e.g., class position, economic activity, religion,
race, locality, or ideology. This form of organization may be viewed
as an alliance of "equals" who share a set of basic interests, in
contrast to people who occupy different positions or have different
characteristics and therefore have other interests. The dominant mo-
tive for political participation is the maintenance or enhancement of
the interests of the group and its members. The governmental allo-
cations sought, therefore, are usually general in nature in that they
are applicable to all persons in a designated class or category rather
than to particular individuals. The common understanding of the term
"interest group" refers to this pattern of horizontal organization,
which indicates that the organized groups are relatively formal, sta-
ble, enduring, and easily identified. When political parties are im-
portant parts of the political system they also possess these character-
istics.
2. Vertical or hierarchical organization. Vertically or hierarchically
organized political activity unites individuals of unequal status who
have primary loyal(ies to individual or family interests. This form of
organization may be regarded as an alliance of "unequals" com-
peting for scarce resources with other, similar alliances. The ties
18 Specifically General Costa e Silva had to resign because of poor health. Rather than
permit his civilian vice-president to assume office, the military forced the selection of General
Medici.
19 See in particular Ronald M. Schneider, The Political System of Brazil, Emergence of a
"Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime, 1964-1970 (New York, 1971).
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which
which unite
unite people
peoplehere
hereare
are"'clientelist'"
"'clientelist'"
in in
nature,20
nature,20based
based
on on
thethe
personal
personal exchange
exchangeofofresources.
resources.Of Ofparticular
particular importance
importanceis the
is the
factfact
that
that the
the rewards
rewardssought
soughtare
arepersonal
personalrather
rather than
than
categoric
categoric
in nature,
in nature,
focusing on, for example, jobs, money, special benefits, status,
influence, or power.21 Each person seeks an improvement in his own
position relative to that of others. The personal basis of clientelist
systems means that "interest groups" as ordinarily understood are
relatively unimportant organizations for political activity; important
political groups are generally informal, unstable, transitory, and rath-
er hard to identify. Political parties, where they do exist, share most
of the same characteristics.
Since many of the hierarchical groups that exist within a political
system cannot be identified, it is not possible to determine the
dominant pattern of organization in each Latin American country by
utilizing empirical criteria based on assessment of such factors as the
number and importance of each kind of group. Political parties
represent some of the groups which organize political activity; they
are easily identifiable as well. Thus, they can serve as indicators of
the general organizational pattern, if certain assumptions about the
relationship between the parties and the general pattern of organiza-
tion are correct. When the dominant organizational pattern is hierar-
chical, it is assumed that all significant political parties in that system
will be essentially personalist organizations, consisting of the particu-
lar followings of individual leaders. Therefore, they ordinarily do not
survive the leader's political demise. In a few cases where, for
20 For a good discussion of clientelist politics, see Carl H. Lande, Leaders, Factio
Parties, The Structure of Philippines Politics (New Haven, 1965), particularly pp. 141-48.
Also see Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A
Preliminary Analysis," Comparative Politics, IV (January 1972), 149-78; Lemarchand, "Po-
litical Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-
Building," American Political Science Review, LXVI (March 1972), 91-113; Arnold J.
Heidenheimer, ed. Political Corruption, Readings in Comparative Analysis (New York, 1970);
David A. Wilson, Politics in Thailand (Ithaca, 1962); and John Duncan Powell, "Peasant
Society and Clientelist Politics," American Political Science Review, LXIV (June 1970),
411-25. For some specific applications to Latin American countries, see Anthony Leeds,
"Brazilian Careers and Social Structure: A Case History and Model," in Dwight B. Heath and
Richard N. Adams, eds. Contemporary Cultures and Societies in Latin America (New York,
1965), pp. 379-404; Nathaniel H. Leff, Economic Policy-Making and Development in Brazil,
1947-1964 (New York, 1968); and James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New
Haven, 1968).
21 Personal rather than categoric rewards seem to be the crucial condition which distinguishes
clientelist systems from other forms. A failure to include this distinction leaves the analysis of
clientelist politics open to the charge that it is merely a general conception of politics as
exchange masquerading as a special form of politics. Thus John Powell, who does not include
the requirement of personal rewards, argues that peasant leagues in Venezuela-which sup-
ported the governing party in exchange for land reform programs-were engaging in clientelist
politics. It may be argued, however, that there is no difference between the peasants and union
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Eldon Lanning
historic reasons, the politically relevant population has deep and

long-term loyalties to some parties, hierarchical patterns of organiza-
tion will convert these parties into loose coalitions of personalist
factions so that these factions will have the characteristics of parties
in other hierarchical systems. When the dominant organizational
pattern is horizontal, it is assumed that there is at least one political
party which has-or could have-won control of the central govern-
mental authority and which is sufficiently institutionalized so that its
existence does not depend on the personal fortunes of a particular
leader. Some personalist parties may continue to exist, but it is
assumed that the importance of the institutionalized party results in
the predominance of horizontal patterns of organization.22 In some
cases the parties have been suppressed or abolished by the central
governmental authorities. Where this has occurred, classification will
be based on the characteristics of the parties prior to their abolish-
ment.
Table 2 presents the classification of Latin American countries
by dominant pattern of organization. Again, with the exception of
Brazil, the operational criteria categorize the systems in a rather
unambiguous way.23 Brazil creates difficulties since a basic change
in the party system followed the military takeover in 1964. Prior to
that time, the party system indicated the dominance of hierarchical
members supporting those candidates promising a higher minimum wage. or steel executives
contributing funds to candidates who support import quotas. The essential requirement for
clientelist politics in this situation is that particular peasants exchange their votes (or other
resources) for land (or credits) which is not made available to other peasants in the area. See
Powell, 418-20.
22 This distinction is very similar to Brigitte Berger's distinction between Gemeinschaft and
Gesellschaft groups in a society. She argues that where Gemeinschaft groups are dominant they
tend to be the only groups, but that when Gesellschaft groups are important there "is not a
complete disappearance of Gemeinschaft groups, though it is true that no Gemeinschaft exists
on the level of the total social context within which the individual lives, as it once did. What is
peculiarly modern is that life is divided between Gesellschaft and Gemeinschajt relations, and
that the overall society can therefore only be organized along Gesel/schaft lines.' Brigitte
Berger, Societies in Change (New York, 1971), p. 224.
23 Since the use of political parties as indicators of organizational patterns requires the
acceptance of certain assumptions, an alternate but more subjective procedure was used in
addition. Although the distinction between organization patterns is usually not made in analyses
of the political systems in Latin America, personalist patterns are often described in discussions
of the political cultures of some countries. Therefore, standard discussions of the political
process in each country were consulted and, where two or more authors emphasized such
personalist patterns, the system was classified as a hierarchical organization. Otherwise, the
system was classified as a horizontal organiz.ation. These procedures produced a classification
identical to that created by the use of political parties, including the Brazilian ambiguity. This
ambiguity was clearly related to the time period under consideration: interpretations of the
period before 1964 emphasized personalist patterns heavily, while interpretations of the post-
1964 period concentrated on horizontal organization.
377

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Table 2 Dominant Organizational Basis of Political Activity, 1972
Horizontal (Functional Interest) Hierarchical (Personalist)
Argentina (Radicals, Peronists)* Colombiat

Brazil** Dominican Repulbic
Bolivia (MNR) Ecuador
Chile (Christian Democrats, Radicals, El Salvador
Socialists)
Costa Rica (National Liberation) Guatemala
Cuba (Communists) Haiti
Mexico (PRI) Hondurast
Peru (Apristas) Nicaragua
Venezuela (Democratic Action, COPEI) Panama
Paraguayt
Uruguayt
*'The political parties mentioned are those that classify the system as horizon
They are not necessarily the only parties in each country that could be listed.
** This is an ambiguous case not classifiable by the operational criteria. It is cl
horizontal organization on other grounds, as explained in the text.
t These cases have well-established two-party systems which, however, consis
personalist factions.
organization, a classification supported by several analyses of that

period. The party system was abolished by the junta, which subse-
quently organized a government party and forced the opposition into
a single party. These two new parties are not obvious continuations
of the earlier pattern of hierarchical organization, but the nature of
their creation and perpetuation as well as the shortness of their
existence raises doubts concerning a new dominance of horizontal
organization in Brazil. Since a shift in the dominance of patterns of
organization is a plausible interpretation, and one which is supported
by analyses of the post-1964 period, Brazil is tentatively classified as
dominantly horizontal organization.
III
Cross-classification of the two basic characteristics produces the
political systems typology presented in Table 3. Each Latin Ameri-
can political system has been assigned according to the operational
criteria, and the six basic types derived have been given names
suggestive of their basic characteristics. All of the cases within a type
necessarily possess the two defining characteristics of that type. A
further examination of these cases can uncover additional shared type
characteristics, thus warranting the formulation of generalizations.
378

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Table 3 A Typology of Latin American Political Systems, 1972
Power Relationship between Aut
Organizational Group Power A

Basis Dominance Balance D
Functional
interest groups ......... .. . Interest Bargaining II. Interest Dema
Argentina Chile
Bolivia Costa Rica
Peru Mexico
Venezuela
Personal
relations............... IV. Personal Bargaining V. Personal Dem
Dominican Republic Colombia

Ecuador Uruguay
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Panama

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Concurrently,
Concurrently, anyany significant
significantdifferences
differencesbetween
between the
the
cases
cases
in in
a type
a type
must
must bebe unrelated
unrelated to
tothe
thedefining
definingand
andassociated
associatedcharacteristics.
characteristics.Their
Their
discovery,
discovery, however,
however,cancanbebeof
ofimportance
importanceininsuggesting
suggesting future
futurelines
lines
of inquiry
inquiry and
and possibly
possiblyuseful
usefulsubtypes.
subtypes.The
Thefollowing
following discussion
discussion of of
the six basic types is designed to show that this typology can be of
value in both ways.
Type I: Interest Bargaining (Argentina, Bolivia, Peru) The inter-

est bargaining type occurs when functionally organized interest
groups are so powerful that stable governmental processes, whether
legitimate or coercive, cannot be established.24 Instead, there is a
lack of consensus concerning the value of any particular regime and
power is so fragmented that no one group can force acceptance of its
own view. Any power resource available can be and is utilized in the
political process, with no one resource regarded as more legitimate
for political purposes. Thus, elections are only one means of acquir-
ing and demonstrating political power; they are no more legitimate or
definitive than military intervention, general strikes, economic pow-
er, or other possible power resources. Political parties and elections,
therefore, are means for mobilizing a particular kind of power re-
source-popular support, but they must compete with groups which
control other power resources. The political process itself involves
the demonstration and assessment of the power resources of the
various groups as well as negotiation and coalition formation among
these groups. As a result, ". . . government is based on a flexible
coalition among diverse power contenders which is subject to revi-
sion at any time if the terms under which the original government
was formed are deemed violated.25
The need to retain coalition support to remain in office limits the
government to a narrow and specific set of policy alternatives. Of
more fundamental importance is the fact that the governing coalition
is restricted to policy choices that do not significantly harm the
primary interests of any reasonably important power contender, much
less threaten its existence. All significant power contenders, whether
in the governing coalition or not, are tacitly guaranteed continued
existence and veto power in matters directly concerning them. Nor-
24 The following discussion relies heavily on Charles Anderson's treatment. For a slightly
different discussion of this type which explores the dynamics of bargaining among the groups,
see Eldon Kenworthy, "Coalitions in the Political Development of Latin America," in Sven
Groennings, E. W. Kelly, and Michael Leiserson, eds. The Study of Coalition Behavior,
Theoretical Perspectives and Cases from Four Continents (New York, 1970), pp. 103-40.
25 Anderson, p. 133.
380

154.59.124.141 on Mon, 29 Aug 2022 08:25:37 UTC
Eldon Lanning
mally,
mally,therefore,
therefore,the the
governing
governing
coalition
coalition
is limited
is to
limited
concernto
with
concern with
the
thedevelopment
developmentandand
allocation
allocation
of newofresources
new resources
and can, at
and
best,
can, at best,
effect
effectonlyonly minor
minorredistributions
redistributions
of current
of current
resources.resources.
Only occasion-
Only occasion-
ally
allyisisititpossible
possible
to seize
to seize
and redistribute
and redistribute
the resources
the resources
of a weak and
of a weak and
vulnerable
vulnerable power
power contender.26
contender.26Major Major
effortsefforts
to move beyond
to move these
beyond these
limits
limitsnot notonly
only
unite
unite
noncoalition
noncoalition
members members
in violentinopposition,
violent opposition,
but but
also
alsofragment
fragment thethe
existing
existing
coalition
coalition
as someasmembers
some members
appreciate appreciate
the the
inherent
inherentthreatthreatto their
to their
own veto
own positions.
veto positions.
Therefore,Therefore,
a policy stasis
a policy stasis
underlies
underliesthe the
governmental
governmental instability
instability
in this pattern.
in this Governments
pattern. Governments
may
maycome
come and
andgo go
withwith
relative
relative
frequency
frequency
in these inpolitical
thesesystems,
political systems,
but
butititisisunlikely
unlikelythatthat
a new a government
new government will produce
will major
produce
changes
major changes
in
in basic
basicpolicies
policies
without
without
also producing
also producing
a transformation
a transformation
in the basicin the basic
type
typeofofpolitical
politicalsystem.
system.
Type
TypeII:II:Interest
Interest
Demand
Demand
(Chile,
(Chile,
Costa Rica,
CostaMexico,
Rica, Venezue-
Mexico, Venezue-
la)
la) This
Thistype
typeidentifies
identifies
the modern
the modern
democratic
democratic
or polyarchic
or polyarchic
sys- sys-
tem.
tem.AsAsinin
thethe
interest
interest
bargaining
bargaining
pattern,
pattern,
the politically
the politically
relevant relevant
groups
groupsareare
primarily
primarilyfunctionally
functionally
organized
organized
interest groups.
interestThegroups.
dif- The dif-
ference
ferencelies
lies
in in
thethe
factfact
that that
governmental
governmental
authorityauthority
positions are
positions are
accorded
accordedwidespread
widespreadlegitimacy
legitimacy
by theby
groups.
the groups.
This permits
Thisthe
permits the
authorities
authorities to to
resist
resist
penetration
penetration
by particular
by particular
groups and
groups
to make
and to make
effective
effectivedecisions
decisionswithinwithinthe generally
the generally
acceptedaccepted
boundariesboundaries
of per- of per-
missible
missiblegovernmental
governmental activity.
activity.
The actual
The range
actualofrange
governmental
of governmental
activity
activityis is
notnot
itself
itself
a common
a commonfeaturefeature
of this pattern,
of this but
pattern,
the limited
but the limited
nature
natureofof thethe
range
rangeis. Inis.short,
In short,
while the
while
authorities
the authorities
are accessible
aretoaccessible to
the
thedemands
demands of ofautonomous
autonomous groupsgroups
and limited
and limited
to an agreed
to anrange
agreed
of range of
acceptable
acceptable policies,
policies,
theythey are able
arewithin
able within
these bounds
thesetobounds
formulateto formulate
and
andimplement
implement policies
policies
withoutwithout
ad hocadpenetration
hoc penetration
and interference
and interference
by
by the
thegroups.
groups. Electoral
Electoralcompetition
competition
is used is
routinely
used routinely
in selectinginthe
selecting the
central
centralgovernmental
governmental authorities;
authorities;
hence, hence,
political political
parties, inparties,
addition in addition
to
to being
beingarticulators
articulators of group
of group
demands,
demands,
are the primary
are the channels
primary channels
through
throughwhichwhich authority
authority positions
positions
are secured.
are secured.
The military
Theplays
military
a plays a
much
muchmoremore marginal
marginal role role
than than
in most
inofmost
the other
of thetypes
other
of systems,
types of systems,
26
26 The
Thereference
referenceherehere
is particularly
is particularly
to the occasional
to the occasional
possibility possibility
of nationalizing
of nationalizing
the the
resources of foreign corporations (principally United States), such as petroleum and utilities.
Under certain circumstances these external interests may be viewed as inappropriate or losing
coalition partners; therefore they will not be defended by other power contenders. National
power contenders who are weak and vulnerable usually enjoy the protection of more powerful
power contenders who anticipate present and future coalition support. Henry Landsberger, for
example, argues that many labor unions in Latin America received such sponsorship in their
early years. See his, "The Labor Elite: Is It Revolutionary?" in Seymour Martin Lipset and
Aldo Solari, eds. Elites in Latin America (New York, 1967), pp. 260-62.
381

154.59.124.141 on Mon, 29 Aug 2022 08:25:37 UTC
largely
largely confining
confiningitself
itself
toto
thethe
acquisition
acquisition
of institutional
of institutional
benefits.
benefits.
All All
four
four ofof the
theLatin
LatinAmerican
American nations
nationsgrouped
groupedin the
in the
interest
interest
demand
demand
type
type are
are consistently
consistentlyfound
found to to
rank
rank
quite
quite
high high
on various
on various
measures
measures
of of
democracy. Russell H. Fitzgibbon's 1965 "democracy" ratings for
Latin America ranked these countries second through fifth (with
Uruguay ranking first),27 while Arthur S. Banks and Phillip M.
Gregg clustered them with a "polyarchy" group in their factor
analysis.28
Type III: Interest Control (Brazil, Cuba) This type seeks to char-
acterize the modern authoritarian and totalitarian systems, with each
of the two Latin American systems herein representing a different
possible subtype.29 Although the distinction between authoritarian
and totalitarian systems might be very useful for some explanatory
purposes, these systems share enough common characteristics to
permit a general description that distinguishes them from other types
of political systems. In the interest control system the population is
organized into functionally based groups, but these groups are pri-
marily for control or support-building purposes or are regarded by the
authorities as politically unimportant. Popular political activity is
highly structured by the authorities and involves more mobilization
than participation.30 The range of human activity considered politi-
cally relevant, and consequently the actual range of governmental
activity, also is largely determined by the authorities, who may
choose to expand or contract it. The authorities' control requires the
creation of some specialized organization, such as an internal police
or military force, possibly supplemented by a political party. A
formal ideology or popular leader, in turn, is helpful in maintaining
the legitimacy of the control organization, although the pattern can be
maintained at least over the short term without either. Recruitment of
27 Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Measuring Democratic Change in Latin America," Journal of

Politics, XXIX (February 1967), 129-66.
28 Arthur S. Banks and Phillip M. Gregg, "Grouping Political Systems; Q-Factor Analysis
of A Cross-Polity Survey," American Behavioral Scientist, IX (November 1965), 3-6. They
classified four other Latin American systems (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay) as
polyarchies; these are classified differently here. The Dominican Republic also loaded highly
on the polyarchy dimension, but this was discounted by the authors (correctly, I think) as being
a result of overly optimistic expectations about the new Bosch government.
29 For a good discussion of authoritarian regimes which distinguishes them from totalitarian
ones, see Juan Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan,
eds. Mass Politics, Studies in Political Sociology (New York, 1970), pp. 251-83.
30 This distinction between participation and mobilization follows that drawn by Sartori,
1050-52.
382

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Eldon Lanning
new
new and
andadditional
additionalauthorities
authoritiesis under
is under
the the
supervision
supervision
of theofexisting
the existing
authorities,
authorities,while
whilethe
thereplacement
replacement of existing
of existing
authorities
authorities
occursoccurs
as a as a
result
result of
ofintraauthority
intraauthority conflict
conflict
or decision
or decision
rather
rather
than than
by popular
by popular
demands.
demands.Interest
Interestcontrol
control systems
systems have
have
beenbeen
rare rare
in Latin
in Latin
America,
America,
with Brazil and Cuba the only current examples. The early days of
the Bolivian revolution and Argentina's first period under Peron are
historic cases.
Type IV: Personal Bargaining (Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El

Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama) In the personal bargain-
ing pattern, as in interest bargaining, governmental authority is quite
weak and occupants remain in central governmental authority posi-
tions only so long as there is a stable coalition of groups defending
them. Since such coalitions are short-term, governments are short-
lived and subject to penetration by the relevant groups. This pattern
differs since the dominant form of organization is hierarchical rather
than horizontal. The minimum basic unit is the patron-client dyad
exchanging dissimilar resources on a personal basis. Although this
dyad represents the minimum basic unit of interaction, most relevant
activity actually occurs within the framework of a triad.31 A, the
leader, establishes a patron-client relationship with B. This exchange
provides the basis for B's ability to maintain a relationship with C in
which B becomes the patron. B's relationship with A establishes B's
control over resources which he may grant to C and makes B an
intermediary broker able to present C's request to A. At the same
time, B's patron relationship with C may provide B with the re-
sources necessary for the A-B relationship (as where B is able to
deliver C's vote for A).
The personal-bargaining pattern may be envisioned as a series of
chains, each of which is composed of several linked triadic relation-
ships. At every level in the chain the leader heads several competing
triads. Conflict at the lower levels occurs primarily between com-
peting triadic links within the chain in order to gain benefits from the
leader, while at the higher levels conflict develops between the
leaders themselves. To the extent that the ties between the partici-
pants are opportunistic rather than inherited-a condition clearly
dominant in an urban setting and increasingly so in rural areas-the
various links in each chain are unstable. Since the leader at each level
has several competing clients available, he can adjust the distribution
31 For a discussion of the utility of the triad concept, see Jeremy Boissevain, "Patronage in
Sicily," in Heidenheimer, p. 145.
383

154.59.124.141 on Mon, 29 Aug 2022 08:25:37 UTC
of rewards to each so as to accommodate his own shifting needs and

the changing importance of individual clients. A leader's increased
interest in electoral victory would cause him to channel more rewards
to clients able to deliver votes and, in the long run, to those able to
deliver the most votes. Concurrently, the number of direct and linked
clients in a leader's chain depends upon his ability to control and
distribute resources. Access to increased resources should stimulate
an increase in the number of potential clients, while a decline in
fortunes would produce further declines as clients ally with leaders
whose fortunes are improving. Anticipations of future conditions
should stimulate similar reactions.
This opportunistic basis for political alliances helps to explain the
lack of stable political and governmental organizations. Political
parties tend to be unstable client alliances. As the leader's chances
for victory improve, he attracts more and more potential clients;
conversely, as his chances decline, the party virtually evaporates as
the clients seek more promising patrons. The support for the central
governmental authority is subject to rapid fluctuations as well. By the
very nature of the process, his superior governmental position makes
the authority the most desired patron for the various competing
clients. He cannot, however, provide adequate rewards for all such
clients and is compelled to lose support by the mere existence of
scarcity. In the absence of some unique characteristic that could
structure the competition for such scarce resources, conflicting
groups composed of those left out necessarily arise and challenge the
leader's position. The lack of agreement concerning legitimate power
resources increases the vulnerability of the leader. Together these
features produce the instability of governmental authority character-
istic of this system type. Six Latin American systems have been
included in this category, making it the most common type of system
in the area today.
Type V: Personal Demand (Colombia, Uruguay) The previous

pattern described the process of unstructured competition between
hierarchically organized groups. The prevalence of scarcity, the dom-
inance of individual interests, and the instability of the personal ties
of hierarchical groups seem to make such unstructured competition
the normal pattern. The personal-demand type represents a rather
unique structuring of conflict which permits the establishment of
effective governmental authority while maintaining group autonomy.
The specific structures for shaping conflict can vary, but they all
operate so as to contain such conflict within certain permissible
384

154.59.124.141 on Mon, 29 Aug 2022 08:25:37 UTC
Eldon Lanning
bounds.32
bounds.32 In In
both
both
Colombia
Colombia
and Uruguay
and Uruguay
this structuring
this structuring
of conflict of conflict
occurs
occursatattwotwoseparate
separate
levels.
levels.
First, First,
the range
theofrange
permissible
of permissible
patron- patron-
client relationships and the amount of rewards a patron (and his
clients) is entitled to receive are limited by the existence of an
effective two-party system. The dominance of the Liberals and Con-
servatives in Colombia and the Colorados and Blancos in Uruguay
has served to limit patron-client alliances to party confines. Once
identified with a party, a client is limited to intraparty patrons. The
stability of party affiliation minimizes movement across party lines
and the dominance of the two parties minimizes opportunities for
creating effective third parties. The effect is to produce multifaction-
alism based on patron-client ties within the larger framework of a
stable two-party system. At the same time, the cohesion of party
affiliation and the importance of party as the primary group for access
to government-based rewards tends to legitimize electoral success as
the basis for determination of factional rewards.
Factional leaders who command large numbers of votes receive
more of the rewards available to the party. Political clients, in turn,
are responsive to the changing fortunes of patrons. The resulting
instability of factional alignments at the party level duplicates the flux
characteristic of the personal-bargaining type of polity. While the
party system thus tends to limit intraparty conflict to factional compe-
tition for electoral support, it also tends to polarize the system and
provides the basis for extreme interparty conflict. Each party pro-
vides a mechanism for allocating rewards among the component
factions, but there is no guarantee that there will be any such re-
wards. Control of government becomes crucial; it is the only avenue
to secure adequate rewards. Interparty conflict thus assumes a zero-
sum quality. The party in power is reluctant to share scarce resources
with the opposition, for such sharing would threaten its effectiveness
as a patron, and the party fears defeat as well, which would preempt
all rewards. The opposition party perceives the situation similarly,
fearing that the governing party will do anything to remain in office.
The opposition thus, in turn, becomes willing to do anything neces-
sary to capture power.
32 Lijphart makes much the same point about the variability of structures in his discussion of
consociational democracy. While I would not agree with his inclusion of Colombia and
Uruguay as examples because of his emphasis on subcultural cleavages, which seem not to
apply to these two countries, his discussion of structural measures for containing conflict is
applicable and I have relied on some of his ideas for the following discussion. See Lijphart,
'Typologies," and his 'Consociational Democracy," World Politics, XXI (January 1969),
207-25.
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A second set of structures becomes necessary to contain this

interparty conflict and permit the establishment of effective govern-
mental authority. The primary element at this level is elite agreement
on the distribution of governmental rewards between the parties. In
Colombia this agreement was formalized by constitutional amend-
ments providing for alternation in the presidency and for parity of
party representation in executive, legislative, and judicial offices at
the national, departmental, and municipal levels-an agreement ef-
fective until 1974. Electoral competition during this period is con-
fined to intraparty competition for access to rewards allocated to the
party.
Uruguay has relied similarly upon a variety of agreements formal-
izing divisions of rewards, the most famous being the nine-member
plural executive in existence between 1952 and 1966. The relative
importance of the legislature and the lack of party discipline has also
permitted factional bargaining which provides factional leaders with
access to resources necessary to satisfy their clients. Here relative
prosperity is an additional important feature which has contained
conflict until recently. Such prosperity has permitted the development
of an extensive welfare system which lessens the importance of
securing individual benefits. While political activity may be regarded
as dominantly patron client in nature, such activity for personal
benefit occurs on top of a base of minimum general governmental
rewards to the population.
Type VI: Personal Control (Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay) This is

an alternate method for structuring conflict between hierarchically
organized groups. The structure results from the emergence of a
dominant leader who secures monopoly control over the channels of
access to governmental rewards. With this monopoly, the leader is
able to establish control over the relevant groups in the society, thus
minimizing overt conflict between them, and establishing effective
governmental authority. The leader's control depends upon his mo-
nopoly position and upon the importance of governmental rewards for
the contending groups. While the range of governmental control over
societal rewards will vary within this type, there is a strong induce-
ment for the leader to extend the range so as to expand his own
control. As a result of the leader's monopoly position, rewards are
secured by receiving his approval; and the leader is in a position to
withdraw approval, and hence the rewards, at any time, for any
reason. His position, in fact, depends upon client uncertainty, which
is created by frequent losses of favor by clients.
386

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Eldon Lanning
There
There is,
is,in
inother
otherwords,
words,a continual
a continual
threat
threat
of loss
of loss
of rewards,
of rewards,
producing
producingclient
clientsubservience.
subservience. A client,
A client,
perceiving
perceiving
that that
othersothers
have have
lost
lost rewards
rewardsforforthe
theslightest
slightest
disloyalty,
disloyalty,
seeksseeks
to protect
to protect
or improve
or improve
his
his own
ownposition
positionby bymanifesting
manifesting complete
completeand and
openopen
loyalty.
loyalty.
Such Such
instability
instabilityof ofaccess
accessminimizes
minimizes thethe
development
development of alliances
of alliances
whichwhich
could become alternate power centers capable of challenging the
leader's dominance. This stability tends also to corrode the impor-
tance of patron-client ties at subsidiary levels in the hierarchy. This
occurs since the uncertainty of a potential patron's position reduces
the value of rewards he can offer to potential clients; because the
patron desires to minimize the number of his clients so as not to
appear as a potential challenger to the leader; and because the leader,
in order to maximize his own power, frequently bypasses potential
patrons and confers individual benefits at low levels in the hierarchy.
The number of individual rewards to be allocated precludes complete
control by a single leader and thus sustains the viability of hierarchi-
cal ties throughout the system.
While the leader's control of access to rewards may be used to
maintain control, it is important to realize that his control also
depends upon a monopoly of coercion. Although there will be some
variability in the amount and extent of coercion, the leader's ability
to control channels of access ultimately requires that he be in a
position to force acceptance of his decisions. At a minimum, this
requires a loyal military force which may be secured through granting
large rewards to the established institution, or by creating a new
force, or both. The three political systems classified within this type,
as well as the historic case of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican
Republic, represent somewhat different mixes of instruments of con-
trol. Trujillo and Frangois Duvalier emphasized the extension of
governmental control, heavy coercion, and personal glory, while the
Somozas and Alfredo Stroessner have been content with lesser
amounts of each. All, however, share the common features of per-
sonalist dictatorship described in this pattern.
IV
Up to this point the author has been concerned with defining the
various types of political systems, classifying each Latin American
nation accordingly, and identifying important associated character-
istics that form the general pattern for each type. The analysis has
been a static one in that it has aimed at characterizing each system at
a certain point of time. There has been no consideration of change in
type of political system. A full analysis of stability and change is
387

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beyond the scope of this article since it would require an examination

of each system over time. Some of the more probable lines of
transition may be suggested, however.
1. Socioeconomic development and political system types. It is gen-
erally assumed that the clientelist pattern of organization will be
dominant at low levels of socioeconomic development, while interest
organization will prevail at a higher level. A simple test, using a
high-low dichotomization of average rankings on three socioeconom-
ic variables,33 provides considerable support for this hypothesis (Q =
+.80). The existence of five deviations (Colombia, Panama, and
Uruguay with clientelist patterns at higher levels of development,
Bolivia and Peru with interest patterns at lower levels) clearly shows
that the relationship is not necessary, and can be modified by other
factors. Some of these factors emerge when the level of socioeco-
nomic development of the cases in each type of political system is
examined. In four of the six types of systems (Types II, III, V, and
VI) all cases within the type are of the same socioeconomic develop-
ment group, with two of the five deviant cases (Colombia and
Uruguay) clustered together as Type V systems.34 Five of the six
Type IV systems are at lower levels of development, with Panama
the deviant case. The two remaining deviants-Bolivia and Peru-
are clustered together as Type I systems, while Argentina, the other
case of this type, is situated at a higher level of development. The
small number of cases in this type precludes any clear interpretation,
but it does not seem plausible to regard Bolivia and Peru as deviants.
Conceptually, one can envision alternative patterns within this type
based upon different levels of participation, and a thorough investiga-
tion might show this to be the case.
Although there is a risk of circularity in the argument since polit-
ical parties are utilized as indicators of clientelist and interest politics,
the political parties seem to be important structural factors in four of
the deviant cases. It would appear that the two Type I cases, Bolivia
33 The test used average ranks on GNP per capita, urbanization, and literacy. An even
distribution of the cases into high and low categories produced a minimum number of devia-
tions. Sources for socioeconomic ranks: UNESCO, Compendium of Social Statistics: 1967
(Paris, 1968) and Latin American Center, UCLA, Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1968
(Los Angeles, 1969).
34 All cases in Types II, III, and V are at higher levels of development, while Type VI cases
are at lower levels. Although the test is very crude, it might be noted that all six cases of power
balance (Types II and V) rank at higher levels of socioeconomic development. This provides
some support for the often investigated hypothesis that socioeconomic development is a
precondition for "democracy."
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Eldon Lanning
and Peru, underwent early shifts to interest politics, in part because

of the relatively early development of a significant, dominantly inter-
est based political party (the MNR [Nationalist Revolutionary Move-
ment] in Bolivia and the Apristas in Peru). By providing organization
based on shared functional interests, these parties undermined the
perceived necessity of maintaining clientelist ties in order to secure
rewards. The reasons for their success are undoubtedly many and
complex, but it should be noted here that early support came from
pockets of relatively modern economic activity in what were other-
wise much less modern societies.
Similarly, the party systems in Colombia and Uruguay, the two
Type V systems, seem to have been important structures in maintain-
ing clientelist patterns at higher levels of development. While the
historic reasons for the development of strong loyalties to the two
parties in each system are far from clear, the resulting dominance of
these parties created the belief that new interest based groups would
not succeed. Given this belief, an individual would be reluctant to
forego clientelist ties and their resulting benefits in order to partici-
pate in interest group activity which would probably fail and would
also hinder or even prevent the reestablishment of beneficial clien-
telist ties in the future. The more probable response to a condition of
unsatisfactory rewards from current clientelist ties would, therefore,
not be to create new patterns of organization, but either to accept that
condition as the best obtainable, or to search for a more beneficial
clientelist relationship. In both situations the basic pattern of organi-
zation would be perpetuated.
Panama, the remaining case, also deviates from the pattern within
its own type of political system and cannot be accounted for by either
of these partial explanations based on the political party systems. It
must remain an unexplained exception, awaiting further investiga-
tion.
2. Change in clientelist systems. The personal-bargaining (IV) pat-
tern is currently the most common clientelist system; it should be
expected to remain as such as long as there are several clientelist
systems in Latin America. This expectation is based on the fact that a
personal-bargaining system requires no special maintenance condi-
tions (that is, no particular conditions need exist in order to perpet-
uate instability), while each of the other clientelist systems requires
some special conditions. The personal-control (VI) type emerges
when a powerful leader is able to gain a monopoly over the distri-
bution of governmental rewards. In order to maintain this position,
the leader must increase the personal nature of authority and prevent
the establishment of institutionalized bases of authority. Consequent-
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154.59.124.141 on Mon, 29 Aug 2022 08:25:37 UTC
ly, the leader's death or departure creates the likelihood of change

from a personal-control system to a personal-bargaining one, unless
some succession provision has been made. In many cases no such
provision exists since the leader, expecting to rule indefinitely, does
not anticipate a situation where he is no longer the dominant author-
ity. Moreover, serious consideration of succession might well be
rejected here since it would have a corrosive effect on the leader's
power by stimulating clientelist efforts to move away from depen-
dence on the leader in order to establish important ties with his
successor. The two modern cases of apparently successful succession
in a personal-control system (the Somoza sons in Nicaragua and
Duvalier's son in Haiti) suggest that there might be a dynastic
solution to the problem. The failure of this solution following Tru-
jillo's assassination in the Dominican Republic indicates, however,
that the process is more complicated, involving several other factors.
Both systems in the personal-demand (V) pattern emerged through
a process of historic interparty conflict which led to civil war and,
subsequently, to elite agreement. While this kind of process is prob-
ably not predictable for any specific political system, the stability of
the pattern, once established, can be specified to some degree. Three
conditions35 seem to be most essential: (a) an elite agreement on
sharing rewards, with trust that the agreement will be honored; (b)
the ability to satisfy important demands, which requires either ample
resources or relatively few demands; and (c) relatively little change or
demand for change in the system. This pattern, thus, is a low-load,
low-adaptive system.
In recent times, both countries seem to have approached the outer
limits of these conditions. The Uruguayan system, as noted earlier,
has operated on the basis of governmentally supplied welfare, with
political activity concerning itself with added benefits to individuals.
Recent economic declines, particularly in the export sector, and thus
in government revenues, have undermined the welfare base of the
system and intensified demands for major political change.36 Given
the high level of modernization, such threats could move the system
from clientelist activity toward interest activity, a change suggested
by the rise of the interest based Tupamaro guerrillas and the impor-
tance attributed to the electoral challenge of the 1971 "Wide Front"
:35 These conditions are those among Lijphart's prerequisites and favorable conditions for
consociational democracy which seem to be most applicable to the nonsocial cleavage Latin
American variant. See Lijphart, 'Typologies."
3f For a particularly informative analysis of these developments in Uruguay, see M. H. J.
Finch, "Three Perspectives on the Crisis in Uruguay," Journal of Latin American Studies, III
(November 1971), 173-90.
390

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Eldon Lanning
(Frente
(FrenteAmplio)
Amplio)coalition
coalition
of the
of Socialists,
the Socialists,
Communists,
Communists,
and Chris-
and Chris-
tian Democrats. The continued electoral success of the established
clientelist parties, even when challenged as such, shows the durable
quality of clientelist patterns in this type of system.
The Colombian political system, which is based on restricting
demands, has also come under significant stress. The most immediate
challenge has been that of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, who has
successfully mobilized the excluded lower groups in the urban cen-
ters. Rojas' appeal, highly personal in nature, is a challenge to the
elite agreement underlying the "demand" nature of the system rather
than to its clientelist base. Compounding Rojas' challenge is the fact
that the formal elite agreement will expire this year, to be followed
by a return to interparty competition. The agreement, in effect since
1958, was concluded after a decade of civil war. The relative recency
of such intense conflict casts doubt on the future possibilities for
stable party competition, particularly with the complications Rojas
has caused.
3. Change in interest systems. The interest-bargaining (I) system,
much as the personal-bargaining pattern for clientelist systems, might
seem to be the most probable form of interest politics, since the
interest-control (III) system requires a high degree of centralized
control and the interest-demand (II) system calls for the establishment
of legitimate institutions. This is not the case in this classification,
however, since only one-third of the interest-based systems are of this
type. Moreover, the shifts of the three cases to this type of system do
not indicate a common pattern of transition. It will be recalled that
two of the cases-Bolivia and Peru-shifted at low levels of socio-
economic development, while Argentina, the third case, followed the
more "normal" pattern in this regard. Furthermore, both Argentina
and Bolivia moved to the interest-bargaining pattern from the inter-
est-control pattern, whereas Peru moved from the personal-bargain-
ing pattern.
Despite these varied transition patterns, once type location occurs,
there seems to be a marked contraction in the number of viable future
alternatives. This is because the system contains some groups that
perceive their interests to be basically incompatible with the interests
of other groups; therefore, the system contains the potential for very
intense conflict. A low-conflict, veto-bargaining process can operate
under these conditions, but it should be recognized that this is only an
acceptable defensive alternative for the incompatible groups rather
than their clear preference. Ideally, each group would prefer a gov-
ernment under its control and completely responsive to its interests.
In the absence of such control, veto bargaining between groups is
391

154.59.124.141 on Mon, 29 Aug 2022 08:25:37 UTC
preferred
preferred as
as aa protection
protectionagainst
againstthe
thepossibility
possibilitythat
thateffective
effectivegovern-
govern-
mental
mental authority
authority might
mightbe bemobilized
mobilizedtotosupport
supporthostile
hostileinterests.
interests.
The constant
constant threat
threat remains,
remains,however,
however,that
thatsome
somegroup
group oror
coalition
coalition
might move to high intensity conflict in an effort to break the
veto-bargaining arrangement-a threat which increases as the incom-
patible groups become more powerful or as the distribution of power
shifts within the system. The military, with its high coercive capabil-
ity, ordinarily plays a major role in preventing such conflicts and
maintaining the existing policy stasis.37 This conflict process con-
verts the interest groups into struggle groups confronting hostile
interests and thus makes it virtually impossible to dissolve group ties
and shift to any clientelist system. Nor is a shift to the interest-
demand pattern likely here, since intense intergroup coInflict and
governmental instability minimize the possibility of establishing any
institutions that might be effective over a sufficient period to become
legitimate.
A shift to the interest-control type seems, therefore, to be the most
plausible alternative. Such a change could occur through the emer-
gence of a dominant group which either eliminates some of the other
groups and thereby wipes out the contradiction, or demobilizes large
segments of the population and maintains authoritarian control in a
depoliticized system. Several of the recent military governments in
Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru have indicated this potentiality through
statements referring to the need for an extended period of military
rule during which the system would be restructured to overcome
chronic instability.38
Generally, it can be stated that a move to the interest-demand type
becomes possible when the politically relevant groups perceive that
they are fundamentally compatible and that there is potential benefit
and little threat in policy changes by the authorities. The factors that
may have contributed to these conditions in each of the systems seem
to have been rather different. Included in any listing of such factors
would be the following:
37 Whether the military's intention is to defend particular interests in the society or to contain
the intergroup conflict, the immediate effect of its action is conservative in nature. For a
discussion of the conservative motives of the military in this type of system, see Jose Nun, *'A
Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle-Class Military Coup," in James Petras and Maurice
Zeitlin, eds. Latin Almerica, Reform or Revolution? (Greenwich, 1968), pp. 145-85, and
Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America,"
American Political Science Review, LX 'September 1966), 616-26.
38 The military government in Brazil has expressed a similar view. For a discussion of this
restructuring role of the military, see Jose Enrique Miguens, "The New Latin American
Military Coup," Studies in Comparative International Development. VI (1970-71), 3-15.
392

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Eldon Lanning
1. A
A very
very gradual
gradualincrease
increaseinin
the
the
politicization
politicization
of new
of new
groups
groups
and the
and the
expansion
expansion ofofpolitical
politicalparticipation
participation(e.g.,
(e.g.,
Chile).
Chile).
ThisThis
permits
permits
partial
partial
and and
delayed
delayed satisfaction
satisfactionofofthe
the
demands
demands of of
new new
groups,
groups,
increasing
increasing
the likeli-
the likeli-
hood
hood that
that adjustments
adjustmentscan can
bebe
made
madeto to
satisfy
satisfy
thethe
interests
interests
of established
of established
groups.
2. Socioeconomic conditions that produce largely compatible interests
among relevant groups (e.g., Costa Rica). A specific example is a
modern agrarian economy which minimizes the importance of urban
lower class and rural landless peasant interests. The level of conflict is
reduced and accommodation of existing interests becomes much easier.
3. The elimination of some groups whose interests are incompatible with
those of other groups (e.g., Mexico). This would involve some sort of
land redistribution and the possible nationalization of some major eco-
nomic activities. As in the previous case, the remaining interests can be
more easily accommodated.
4. The possession of ample and increasing resources, which minimizes
perceptions of scarcity (e.g., Venezuela). Here the demands of new
groups pose less of a threat to established groups since they can be met to
a great extent through allocations of new resources rather than redistribu-
tion of existing ones.
Each factor is not intended to apply solely to the system mentioned,

nor to be the only relevant factor for that system. An adequate
explanation in each case involves various combinations of these and
other factors. While such diversity might be encouraging from a
policy standpoint, it poses complex problems for any proposed gen-
eral explanation.
Identifying the conditions for movement to the interest-control type
also poses problems, since there is no single pattern of transition. If
the number of cases is expanded by including revolutionary Bolivia
and Peronist Argentina, some general conclusions may be drawn. In
these two cases and in Cuba, transformation occurred when new
groups with incompatible interests were rapidly mobilized by a new
elite which captured the authority position. This kind of shift is to
some extent revolutionary in nature and requires an initial major
redistribution of resources. The Brazilian military government repre-
sents the related condition of an authoritarian, depoliticizing response
to an attempt at mobilization and redistribution. The two variants in
this type, therefore, are alternate outcomes of the same essential
conditions, with the mobilization outcome resulting from the success
of the new groups and the depoliticization outcome from their failure.
The long-term stability of the type requires that the authorities even-
tually eliminate or render powerless some of the established groups as
well as maintain control over the remaining ones. Where this is not
done, the control of the authority will remain vulnerable to attack and
393

154.59.124.141 on Mon, 29 Aug 2022 08:25:37 UTC
the
the leader's
leader'sdownfall
downfall
willwill
result
result
in a type
in a type
shift for
shift
that
for
system.
that system.
The The
first
firstPeron
Peronperiod
period
exemplifies
exemplifies
a casea where
case where
established
established
groups were
groups were
not
not eliminated,
eliminated,so so
that
that
after
after
the fall
the of
fall
Peron
of Peron
the system
the system
shifted to
shifted
the to the
interest-bargaining
interest-bargaining type.
type.
In Bolivia
In Bolivia
the governing
the governing
MNR did MNReliminate
did eliminate
some
somegroups,
groups, butbut
its its
inability
inability
to maintain
to maintain
control
control
over theover
remaining
the remaining
groups
groupsledledtoto
itsits
ownown downfall
downfalland aand
similar
a similar
shift to
shift
the interest-bar-
to the interest-bar-
gaining
gainingtype.39
type.39
V
Although this typology is useful in identifying and examining some
important factors of the political processes in Latin America, it must
be remembered that it provides a selective and partial view. Only
those characteristics that are in some way related to the defining
characteristics can be brought into the analysis. It is clear that there
are important features of the political processes that do not meet this
requirement and hence must be investigated within other frameworks.
Among the many possibilities, three important characteristics investi-
gated by students of Latin American politics are worthy of mention:
the relationship between the center and the periphery; the impact of
external actors on the national political system; and the nature and
consequences of policy outputs. Unfortunately, most of these recent
analyses perpetuate the assumption that there is a single Latin Ameri-
can political process to which their generalizations apply. Although
the characteristics considered in this article may be of little relevance
for understanding such unrelated characteristics, hopefully the typo-
logical procedure will stimulate efforts to determine the actual extent
of applicability of generalizations which do not really relate to all of
Latin America.
39 For a discussion of the limitations of the Peron regime in this regard, see Kalman H.
Silvert, "The Costs of Anti-Nationalism: Argentina," in Silvert, ed. Expectant Peoples,
Nationalism and Development (New York, 1963), pp. 347-72. On the problems of the MNR
government in Bolivia, see Eldon Lanning, "Governmental Capabilities in a Revolutionary
Situation: The MNR in Bolivia," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XXIII (Autumn 1969),
3-22.
394

154.59.124.141 on Mon, 29 Aug 2022 08:25:37 UTC

Lanning - Tipología de Los Sistemas Políticos Latinoamericanos

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Lanning - Tipología de Los Sistemas Políticos Latinoamericanos

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A Typology of Latin American Political Systems

Author(s): Eldon Lanning

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/421520

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While, as Silvert notes, there have been several attempts to classify

Ultimately, if one desires explanations that encompass mor

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1932 and 1973, he cannot use it as a case of political instability.

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Table 1 Power Relationship between Central Governmental Authorities and Po-

Authority Power Group

Brazil (1969, Chile Argentina (1971, 1970, 1966,

* Dates indicate irregular changes in office in the 1955-72 period.

Table 1 presents a classification of the twenty Latin American

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which would just qualify as long-term control by a single clique. In

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historic reasons, the politically relevant population has deep and

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Table 2 Dominant Organizational Basis of Political Activity, 1972

Horizontal (Functional Interest) Hierarchical (Personalist)

Argentina (Radicals, Peronists)* Colombiat

organization, a classification supported by several analyses of that

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Power Relationship between Aut

Organizational Group Power A

Dominican Republic Colombia

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Type I: Interest Bargaining (Argentina, Bolivia, Peru) The inter-

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27 Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Measuring Democratic Change in Latin America," Journal of

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Type IV: Personal Bargaining (Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El

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of rewards to each so as to accommodate his own shifting needs and

Type V: Personal Demand (Colombia, Uruguay) The previous

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A second set of structures becomes necessary to contain this

Type VI: Personal Control (Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay) This is

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beyond the scope of this article since it would require an examination

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and Peru, underwent early shifts to interest politics, in part because

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ly, the leader's death or departure creates the likelihood of change

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Each factor is not intended to apply solely to the system mentioned,

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