Did the Owain Glyn Dŵr revolt stand any chance of succeeding?

Owain Glyn Dŵr’s revolt is celebrated as an immensely important event in Welsh history,
epitomising the shaping of modern-day nationhood. Drawing on the bloodline of previous
Welsh legends Llywelyn the Great and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, Owain crafted himself as
the true heir to lead the native Welsh. The official cause of the revolt is noted as a
dispute between Owain and neighbouring landowner Lord Grey of Ruthin. However, it is
generally accepted that an acutely unstable political climate fuelled by intolerable
English-Welsh legal differences and further worsened by the 1401 Ordinances were
responsible for the scale which the revolt reached.1 R. R. Davies’ study is seminal to the
work on this period, demonstrating that by 1403 the initial insurrection had been
‘transformed into a national movement’ and had control over all of Wales.2 This essay
will dispute such a notion. Instead, it will be argued that while Owain dominated as a
guerrilla leader, the Welsh hero never properly established an efficient internal
administration to truly rule over South Wales. The quasi-federalist marcher lordships
system in South Wales produced both complex personal attitudes within the localities
and also the English Crown’s longstanding perception of Wales as principally a source of
finance and men for military campaigns. In order to analyse if Owain’s revolt did stand a
chance of success, the following themes will be assessed: the rebels’ military strength,
economic burden on Henry IV, internal Welsh administration, cooperation with allies
within the British Isles, and cooperation with France. It will be concluded that while a
fully united Wales was an unrealistic expectation in this period, autonomy in North Wales
was very much a feasible outcome if Owain had not shown so much commitment to
campaigning in South Wales.

The rebels stood minimal chance of succeeding against the English in pitched battle, who
dwarfed Wales’ population by greater than twelve times.3 Consequently, Owain’s tactics
revolved around guerrilla warfare and raiding to spread fear and destabilise English
authority. The chronicle of Thomas Walsingham depicts the rebels at the Battle of Byrn
Glasin in 1402 to have “roused to arms almost the whole militia of the county of
Herefordshire…with more than a thousand of our own men being defeated”. Rebels were
described to have “cut off the genitalia of the dead…and hung his testicles from his
chin”.4 Evidently, the rebels endangered the safety of the English border counties and
stimulated social turmoil as a result. The inhabitants of Shropshire made a plea for help
to the King in April 1406 with at least a third of their land having been devastated by

1
D. Moore, The Welsh wars of Independence c.410 - c.1415, (Stroud, 2013), p.135
2
R. R. Davies, The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr, (Oxford,1995), p.155
3
J. Latimer, ‘The last Welsh Prince of Wales’, Military History, 19/5, (2002), p.48
4
Plots Against the King, 1402 in D. Preest and J. G. Clark (ed.) The Chronica maiora of Thomas Walsingham,
1376-1422, (Woodbridge, 2005), p.321-2
cross-border raiding, as highlighted by Helen Watt.5 Conversely, the royal campaigns in
Wales produced little results. Owain systematically withdrew into the forests and allowed
the English to become victims of the harsh climate and deprivation of resources, with
Owain’s “devilish skill…aroused storms of rain and snow and hail”. 6 Hence, the Welsh
rebels successfully created the perception of military strength and natural superiority in
their lands. R. R. Davies has taken these successes to mean they had military
supremacy over the English within Wales during 1403-05.7 However, despite there being
a lack of central English authority in the country, Owain’s forces were unable to capture
no more than eighteen out of the greater than fifty castles within Wales. David Moore
notes it as central to Owain’s eventual defeat.8 This is evidenced by comparison to the
Scottish First War of Independence, where the Scots were able to successfully create
their own independent government due to the capturing of castles between 1296-1301.
Prince Henry is credited with fortifying the English-held castles using 500 men-at-arms
and 2,500 archers, being made royal lieutenant in Wales in 1403.9 Rather than Moore’s
explanation that the rebels did not have enough time to capture them, it is more likely
the rebels did not possess adequate military strength having captured none of Ruthin,
Denbigh, Rhuddlan, Flint or Holt Castle during the campaign in north-east Wales.
Therefore, this contradicts Davies’ argument that the rebels enjoyed military supremacy
within Wales. Instead, it implies Owain needed to cripple Henry IV financially or ally with
the King’s enemies in order to succeed.

The economic burden of the conflict came close to forcing Henry IV to make concessions.
Between 1401 and 1413, the English parliament granted £72,000 for the war effort in
Wales.10 In addition to the drain on central finances, tax collection in Wales was severely
disrupted as many withheld rents and dues. Resentment of Henry IV in North Wales was
in part attributed his deposition of Richard II, as noted by Bryan Bevan.11 Furthermore,
damage to tax collection spread into English counties. Watt’s analysis concludes an 11%
average reduction in collection within Herefordshire and Shropshire during the course of
the rebellion 1401-15.12 Also, the political pressure exerted on Henry IV between 1401-
05 was immense. War with the Scots 1400-02, a major domestic rebellion by Henry
Percy in 1403, conflict with the Long Parliament over finances, disloyalty of the
Archbishop Thomas Arundell and attacks by French fleets on Plymouth and the Isle of
5
H. Watt, ‘On account of the frequent attacks and invasions of the Welsh’: The Effect of the Glyn Dŵr Rebellion
on Tax Collection in England’ in Dodd, G. and Biggs, D. (eds.), The Reign of Henry IV : Rebellion and Survival,
1403-1413, (York, 2008), p.71
6
Plots Against the King, 1402 in D. Preest and J. G. Clark (ed.) The Chronica maiora, p.321-2
7
R. R. Davies, The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr, p.115
8
D. Moore, The Welsh wars of Independence, p.147
9
C. Allmand, Henry V, (New Haven, 1997), p.40
10
J. Latimer, ‘The last Welsh Prince of Wales’, p.47
11
B. Bevan, Henry IV, (New York, 1994), p.79
12
H. Watt, ‘On account of the frequent attacks and invasions of the Welsh’, p.66
Man in 1404 plagued Henry IV’s early reign. It is profoundly impressive Henry IV did not
concede some autonomy to the Welsh, something many Kings would have. Aside from
Henry IV’s desperation to not yield any of his power having usurped the throne himself,
it is quite possible that his court were aware of Owain’s imminent plans to propose
negotiations in August 1405. Sir John Stanley had two spies, David Whitmore and Yevan
ap Meredith, attend Owain’s parliament in July, reporting Owain “doth propose to send to
you…for a treaty”.13 Other than not wanting to let Owain get his wish, Michael Brown has
argued Owain’s formal relationship with the English Crown was important. While Owain
was of a descendent of princely blood within Wales, to the English he was neither an earl
nor baron, simply an indifferent squire.14 However, a more practical explanation of Henry
IV not negotiating is because of the substantial lands he held in south-Wales as Duke of
Lancaster and marcher-lord. These sources private of income were incredibly valuable
given the King had personally funded 75% of the war effort.15 Thus, Owain’s ambition for
a wholly unified Wales was not realistic given the dynamic of lander ownership in the
southern marcher lordships which made a fully united Wales too ambitious an objective.

An important factor to assess in the revolt’s eventual suppression is Owain’s failure to

establish an internal Welsh administration. Some scholars have depicted Owain’s revolt
as a truly national uprising, with Brown describing an emergence of nationhood. 16 Gideon
Brough goes further, believing that in 1404, ‘a new state, governed by its native people,
had appeared’.17 However, these studies fatally assume that the absence of English
central authority across south Wales inherently corresponded to the existence of central
rebel authority. In reality, the nature of Owain’s power meant many localities were left
to self-govern. R. K. Turvey’s analysis of the county of Pembrokeshire during the conflict
reveals many localities resorted to self-administration, such as the region of Cemias
which was governed by their native-born steward Llywelyn ab Owain. The theme of
lawlessness is continuous throughout the revolt, with the Lordship of Roche only being
able to pay 100s of their annual £28 rent having been so ravaged by rebel activity. 18 This
is reflective of Owain’s strategy of successive raids and sieges focused on the expulsion
of the English from Welsh lands, rather than centralising the native rebels’ authority.
Critics may argue that evidence from Owain’s correspondence presents the
establishment of a new native Welsh state. Namely, the Pennal Letter, sent to Charles
VI’s court in 1406, which outlined plans for a sperate Welsh Church adhering to Avignon

13
G. Brough, The Rise and Fall of Owain Glyn Dŵr: England, France and the Welsh Rebellion in the Late Middle
Ages, (London, 2017), p.121-2
14
M. Brown, Disunited Kingdoms: Peoples and Politics in the British Isles 1280-1460, (London, 2013), p.233
15
C. Allmand, Henry V, p.41
16
M. Brown, Disunited Kingdoms, p.244
17
G. Brough, The Rise and Fall of Owain Glyn Dŵr, p.112
18
R. K. Turvey, ‘The Marcher Shire of Pembroke and the Glyndwr Rebellion’, Welsh History Review, 15/1,
(1990), p.167+p.162
papacy and also that Wales “shall have two universities (created)”.19 Crucially however,
these were simply desires and not the realities of localised systems of authority
propagated by existence of the marcher lordships as well as the geography of Wales
which meant east-west regions were better connected than north-south. 20 It would be
naïve to consider the letter as fully accurate to the state of the rebels’ power over Wales
given its purpose to present themselves as a valuable military ally. Furthermore, the
ambitious programme could also imply Owain was overestimating his strength, having
had his prospects transformed by unexpected success between 1402-03.21 The fact that
in 1405 the county of Pembrokeshire had to buy peace for £200, displays the rebels’
failure to establish authority in large parts of south Wales despite the lack of English
control.22 Personal circumstances had dictated allegiances, with the conflict being one of
attrition and brought disastrous social and economic effects attached. The swift return of
law and order within Wales under Henry V is indicates that while long-standing
grievances were felt by many, Owain did not possess unwavering support throughout all
of Wales. This links to Ralph A. Griffiths’ point that the uchelwyr, or Welsh squirearchy,
were essential to both Owain’s success and downfall by joining and then deserting the
revolt when success appeared unlikely.23 Hence, failure to establish an internal
administration and centralise the rebels’ authority in South Wales meant their only
chance of success was defeating Henry IV with the aid of allies.

Owain was consistently proactive in seeking out potential allies within the British Isles.
Overtures to the Scots and Irish representatives in 1401 touch on a sense of common
ancestry between the peoples, describing Robert III of Scotland his “royal cousin”. 24
While neither of these propositions proved fruitful, it confirms Owain’s awareness of his
limited power against the English Crown. Subsequently, Owain’s formed impressive ties
with Edmund Mortimer, Henry ‘Hotspur’ Percy, and the Earl of Northumberland in 1402,
1403 and 1405 respectively, leading to the 1405 Tripartite Indenture. At the Battle of
Shrewsbury in July 1403, Percy Hotspur mounted a major challenge to Henry IV’s Crown
and the encounter was a close contest. When the armies assembled opposite each other
Hotspur was repeatedly offered a full pardon, clearly indicating Henry IV felt his Crown
considerably threatened and described as having “humbled himself more than was fitting
for a royal person”.25 Despite Owain’s revolt having helped instigate Hotspur’s rebellion,
Brough has shown there is no evidence that the Welshmen serving in Hotspur’s army

19
Pennal letter, 1406 in M. Livingston and J. K. Bollard (eds. and trans.), Owain Glyndŵr: A Casebook,
(Liverpool, 2013), p.120-22
20
J. Latimer, ‘The last Welsh Prince of Wales’, p.47
21
R. R. Davies, The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr, p.155
22
R. K. Turvey, ‘The Marcher Shire of Pembroke and the Glyndwr Rebellion’, p.164
23
R. A. Griffiths, King and country: England and Wales in the Fifteenth Century, (London, 1991), p.61-62
24
Adam of Usk, 1402 in M. Livingston and J. K. Bollard (eds. and trans.), Owain Glyndŵr: A Casebook, p.61-7
25
The Lying answer of Lord Thomas Percy, 1403 in D. Preest and J. G. Clark (ed.) The Chronica maiora, p.327-9
were part of an Owain-Hotspur alliance.26 Instead, Brown has explained Owain used the
preoccupation of the English to launch further campaigns into South Wales.27 In this
instance, Owain’s priorities were misplaced. The rebels should have acted when Henry IV
was at his weakest, rather than when the rebels were comparatively at their strongest in
1405. The events of July 1403 could have easily resulted in autonomy over Wales if a
Owain had joined Hotspur in battle against Henry IV. Likewise, Owain could have feasibly
switched sides immediately before the battle, supporting Henry IV in exchange for
autonomy in North Wales. Owain had orchestrated the events of 1403, draining the King
economically which led to his neglect of Hotspur as well as capturing Edmund Mortimer
who subsequently defected, yet he had then failed to see them through at the crucial
moment. Despite contemporary Welsh describing Owain the “fair, brave…and ferocious
defender” of Wales, a pattern exists in his leadership. 28 Skilled political manoeuvring was
squandered by a failure to commit in practice; none of his court’s diplomacy was
translated into political achievements. Therefore, Owain did not use Hotspur’s rebellion
to his advantage. Instead, it represents a key miscalculation to ignore potential military
success against Henry IV by pursuing South Wales which was never truly brought under
the rebels’ control.

The final chance for the rebels to succeed was through the use of French assistance.
Owain took good advantage of his Welsh clerics’ diplomatic expertise to forge an alliance
with France in 1404.29 Numbers for the force which invaded in 1405 vary in the two
French sources, with a French monk quoting 30 ships, whereas Enguerrand de
Monstrelet substantially more at 140 and certainly exaggerated 12,000 troops.
Calculations by Brough deduce a combination of Monstrelet’s 140 ships and the monk’s
2,600 troops as the most credible figure, given an average of between 18 to 22 soldiers
per ship was in line with contemporary numbers on English vessels.30 Despite this
seemingly pre-eminent combination of the rebels with England’s greatest foreign foe, the
meeting of the rebel-Franco and royal forces at Woodbury Hill in August 1405 ended in
no more than a standoff. Brough has put forward the theory that a truce was negotiated
between the English King and the Welsh rebels, backed by French support. 31 However,
two important points discredit this idea. Firstly, Henry IV’s ill-health in 1405-6, likely
from epilepsy as well as a skin disease, serves as explanation for the absence of major
engagements with the rebels. Secondly, the rebels captured the King’s baggage train in

26
G. Brough, The Rise and Fall of Owain Glyn Dŵr, p.115
27
M. Brown, Disunited Kingdoms, p.234
28
When His Authority Was Greatest, c.1401-1403, in M. Livingston and J. K. Bollard (eds. and trans.), Owain
Glyndŵr: A Casebook, p.71-73
29
A. D. Carr, ‘14th Century Wales’ in Jones, M. (ed.), The New Cambridge Medieval History VI, (Cambridge,
2000), p.342
30
G. Brough, The Rise and Fall of Owain Glyn Dŵr, p.144+p.140-1
31
G. Brough, The Rise and Fall of Owain Glyn Dŵr, p.149-50
1406 while the English tried to relieve Coety Castle.32 Therefore, the existence of a royal
expedition at the time of the alleged truce repudiates Brough’s argument that there was
a negotiated peace in 1406. The fact that the joint rebel-Franco armies attempted to
siege numerous castles while marching through south Wales confirms Owain did not
have military supremacy over all of modern-day Wales in 1405. Likewise, their failure in
a majority of these sieges, such as Haverford Castle defended by Sir Roland Leynthale,
implies the combined 12,500 army was not an efficient fighting force and explains their
following retreat at Woodbury Hill. Alicia Marhcant’s analysis of the conflict’s chronicle
narratives concludes Wales was subject less to an organised rebellion, more a state of
‘chronic disorganization’.33 For the French, the Welsh rebels represented a potential
political and religious ally, providing a route into the British Isles as well as pledging
adherence to the Avignon pope. In reality however, the rebels did not have authority
over Wales they had claimed, and the French Court were never truly committed to the
alliance, choosing not to respond to Owain’s requests from 1406.34 Hence, while 1405 is
normally presented as the pinnacle of the rebels’ power, the contribution of the French is
often overestimated and did not produce any success for the rebels.

To conclude, Owain Glyn Dŵr’s revolt skilfully harnessed long-established socio-political

grievances, shared by many Welsh inhabitants, to successfully dismantle external
English central authority within Wales. Effective raiding and guerrilla warfare coupled
with English mismanagement of the conflict gave the rebels an opportunity to secure
recognised autonomy in North Wales. However, Owain is guilty of failing to centralise his
own authority within this power vacuum by overestimating the revolts’ potential with
consistent determination to extend control over all of Wales, something that was never
achieved. Social disorder persisted longer than localities could bear, resulting in the
collapse of support for Owain. Although this is a critical assessment of Owain, it should
not discredit the profound influence this revolt had on political instability within England,
triggering multiple rebellions within England as well as bringing a French army onto
English soil. The rebels scored more victories against the English than done ever before,
and their struggle is part of Welsh national identity today.

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