What made the kingdom of the English so vulnerable to invasion in the eleventh century?

The Kingdom of the English may be concisely defined as the territory of the ruling House of
Wessex dynasty after the 10th century.1 The kingdom was vulnerable throughout the late 10th
to mid 11th century to a multitude of invasions and raids, ultimately culminating in Cnut’s
rule and conquest by William the Conquer. The causes of the long term 11th century crisis of
the Kingdom stem from the stability of its institutions, relisilience, wealth, its numerous
crises of succession, the impacts of Æthelred’s response, the weakness of Anglo Saxon
fortifications and the instability of Æthelred’s court.

Fundamentally, early 11th century scandinavian invasions of the Kingdom were motivated
chiefly by the prospect of loot and tribute in the form of geld. As argued by Stafford, the
impetus of early 11th century invaders was “the need for loot and tribute to maintain or
acquire power in the still volatile North.”2 Indeed this suggests that the invaders were
motivated less by a desire for imperial style provinces and more by the need to display wealth
and authority in Scandinavia. This is evidenced by the long record of gelds extracted by the
Scandinavians and by the behaviour of Sweyn and Cnut, both of whom succeeded in gaining
the throne and both of whom were motivated largely by the possibility of geld. Notably, as
stated by Stafford, Sweyn’s first action as king of the English was “neither a coronation, nor
land taking, but a great tribute”, suggesting that his key priority was to exploit the kingdom’s
sizeable wealth rather than learn how to rule. Similarly, Cnut’s chief priority in 1018 was to
extract 82,000 Roman pounds worth of silver from the citizens of the kingdom and from
London.3 Cnut still managed to extract such a sum despite over 3 decades of silver flowing
out of the Kingdom through various Scandinavian raids and geld extractions, indicating at the
wealth and strong apparatus of the late Anglo Saxon state, necessary to continually procure
silver from taxation and from a channel trade surplus.4 Therefore, the Kingdom’s instability
initially stemmed from its ability to continually provide such large gelds. This ability
incentivised further raids and also provided grievances against Æthelred, which may have
contributed to his flight in 1014 as well overall political instability.
In the early 11th century, political instability within Æthelred’s court created a vulnerability in
the Kingdom that could be exploited by foreign invaders. As suggested by Stafford, this
widespread discontent emerged by 1014, disguised as simple treachery by later chroniclers,
directed against his unpopular, supposedly harsh rule characterised by an aggressive pushing
of royal rights.5 This is evidenced by Cnut’s law codes, which “contain specific alleviation of
the abuses of power under Æthelred” and Æthelred’s negotiated promise via Edward upon his
return from exile in Normandy in 1014, which promised to rule more fairly than he had
before.6 This suggests that by Cnut’s accession and conquest in 1016, there was widespread
ingrained discontent in Æthelred’s court, which was leveraged by both Cnute and Swegn in
1
G. Molyneaux, ‘Introduction: The Unification of the English?’, in G. Molyneaux, The Formation of the
English Kingdom in the Tenth Century (New York, 2015), pp. 1-14
2
P. Stafford, Unification and conquest: A Political and Social history of England in the Tenth and Eleventh
Centuries (New York, 1989), p 64
Thereafter: Stafford, ‘Unification and Conquest’
3
Stafford, ‘Unification and Conquest’, pp 70-71
4
S. Baxter, History of the British Isles II Late Anglo-Saxon Government and Politics: The Conquests of 1016 and
1066, Lecture, University of Oxford, Examination Schools, 10th October 2022
5
Stafford, ‘Unification and Conquest’, pp 62-63
6
Stafford, ‘Unification and Conquest’, p 63
their conquests. This is evidenced by Swegn’s takeover as King of the English in 1014,
during which the English nobility submitted to him and Æthelred effectively abdicated,
fleeing to Normandy. Significantly, this meant that Æthelred was at least partially deposed by
his own nobility, and not forced out by Swegn, indicating that his own weakness contributed
significantly to Swegn’s eventual victory. It is also shown by Cnut’s invasion in 1015 during
which a rift developed in Æthelred’s court, provoked by Edmund Ironside and exacerbated by
the killings of Morcar and Sigeferth. Edmund’s rebellion was a clear indication of Æthelred’s
loss of control. As Stafford explains, “Eadric’s denunciation of Sigeferth and Morcar had its
own motivations of which loyalty to Æthelred was only one. Rivalries at court and in Mercia
itself could be settled now.”7 This suggests that Æthelred’s court was disfunctional: disputes
could now only be settled by force. This further indicates that Cnute was able to take
advantage of these divisions, attacking a dysfunctional and incoherent dynasty riven by
infighting.
This political instability also extended to divisions across the kingdom, providing potential
leverage to Scandinavian invaders in particular. As suggested by Stafford, Æthelred’s
desperate attempt to control the Danish invasions of the 980s and 990s resulted in the St
Brice’s Day massacre, which exposed deep divisions within the Danelaw region. This is
evidenced by the massacre being recorded as only taking place within one town, that of
Oxford, despite the fact that it was ordered as a widespread mass killing. This suggests that
the Danish presence in other towns across the country was too strong for Æthelred’s order to
be obeyed, which further suggests that Æthelred’s popularity cannot have been high within
those areas. This is supported by Swegn’s decision to base himself as Gainsborough, the
administrative centre of the Five Boroughs and one frequented by Scandinavian merchants.
As Stafford goes on to suggest, Swegn may have exploited these merchants for information
on further English divisions, using their dislike of Æthelred to his advantage.8
During the mid 11th Century, political instability exposed the Kingdom once again, although
in a slightly different way, via the succession crisis of Edward the Confessor. As expounded
upon by Baxter, Edward’s confused succession plans changed depending on political
circumstance and depending on his own position, particularly if he was able to restructure the
Kingdom’s earldoms to his advantage.9 An example of this can be seen in 1053, as Baxter
notes, due to the death of Earl Godwine, “Edward restructured his earldoms that year: Harold
was assigned his father’s earldom in Wessex but the earldom thus vacated in East Anglia was
assigned to Ælfgar, son of Leocricia, earl of Mercia.”10 While this brought stability to the
Kingdom temporarily, it did mean that Edward had the political freedom to alter the
succession once again after favouring Duke William, this time favouring Edward the Exile.
Should Edward have sworn William to be his rightful successor, the rapidity of his
succession changes provoked deep instability in the long term, since William’s claim was
never formally rescinded. Thus, when Edward died, Edgar was the only hope for the House
of Wessex. According to Baxter’s analysis, the rise of the House of Godwine destroyed
Edgar’s claim and caused him to be marginalised in the final years of Edward’s reign.11 This
strongly indicates that it was Edward’s loss of control later in the reign that made “one of
Godwine’s sons, by default in the early 1060s” heir to the throne and that this, through

7
Stafford, ‘Unification and Conquest’, p 68
8
Stafford, ‘Unification and Conquest’, p 66
9
S. Baxter, ‘Edward the Confessor and the Succession Question’, in R. Mortimer (ed), Edward the Confessor:
the Man and the Legend (Woodbridge, 2009)
Thereafter: Baxter, ‘Edward the Confessor and the Succession Question’
10
Baxter, ‘Edward the Confessor and the Succession Question’, p 96
11
Baxter, ‘Edward the Confessor and the Succession Question’, pp 102-103
ignoring all previous claims, was the source of instability that allowed Duke William to
somewhat credibly claim the throne.12
A lack of strong fortifications also contributed to the Kingdom’s vulnerability. Notably, as
Clarke argues, the English nobility lacked any significant defensive fortifications, in clear
contrast to kingdoms on the Continent such as areas of modern France. Clarke notes that even
in London, “King William had to construct a castle…although Edward had regularly been in
residence there.”13 This suggests that there was a systematic absence of strong fortifications
that could resist an attack to a densely populated town. Therefore, only pitched battles could
be fought between the invading and the defending armies, at a disadvantage to the defending
army. This defensive weakness would have been noticeable to foreign scouting ships and
may have been a significant factor as to why the Kingdom was attractive to foreign raiding
ships, such as those that devastated England from the 980s onward. This is further supported
by the evidence of the rapidity of Swegn’s advance: the Peterborough Chronicle records that
“and in the same year, before the month August, came King Sweyn with his fleet to
Sandwich” and that by Candlemas, Sweyn had died, having gained the submissions of all
major towns and having been crowned.14 In less than a year, he had succeeded, indicating the
absence of stiff military resistance in all areas except for London. While other issues may
have contributed to this, such as the weakness of Æthelred likely detracting from his
leadership, the absence of strong fortifications certainly did not help.

Out of the factors addressed above, the most decisive was the political weakness of the two
monarchs of the Kingdom concerned: Æthelred the Unready and Edward the Confessor.
Without their political weakness, Sweyn would not have been able to gain a military foothold
as easily as he did and William would not have been able to exploit an ongoing succession
crisis, depriving him of valuable legitimacy.

Bibliography:

Primary Sources:
- D. B. Killings, ‘The Anglo Saxon Chronicle’ (July 1996), http://mcllibrary.org/Anglo/

Secondary Sources:

- G. Molyneaux, The Formation of the English Kingdom in the Tenth Century (New York, 2015)
- P. Stafford, Unification and conquest: A Political and Social history of England in the Tenth and
Eleventh Centuries (New York, 1989)
- S. Baxter, History of the British Isles II Late Anglo-Saxon Government and Politics: The Conquests of
1016 and 1066, Lecture, University of Oxford, Examination Schools, 10 th October 2022
- R. Mortimer (ed), Edward the Confessor: the Man and the Legend (Woodbridge, 2009)
- P. A. Clarke, The English Nobility Under Edward the Confessor (New York, 1994)

12
Baxter, ‘Edward the Confessor and the Succession Question’, p 115
13
P. A. Clarke, The English Nobility Under Edward the Confessor (New York, 1994), p 151
14
D. B. Killings, ‘The Anglo Saxon Chronicle’ (July 1996), http://mcllibrary.org/Anglo/
COMMENTS:
TUTORIAL WITH DR TYREMAN ON THURSDAY 13TH OCTOBER 2022:

Discussion revolved around just how weak was the late Anglo Saxon state and how we presented that.
George has an argument that revolved in a very similar sense to how mine did, commenting on the
“political weakness” (“whatever that means”, remarked Dr Tyreman to that phrase), of the Anglo
Saxon state. He did not appear to have chosen a similar line of argument as castles, however. He read
different books, notably one on the nobility by Stephen Baxter.
It was a little awkward, because neither of us knew what to do or how this works. But we did
exchange ideas, taking turns to speak at a time. Dr Tyreman noted chiefly that the Anglo Saxon state
was not nearly as weak as it seems and that it was perfectly capable of resisting many more invasions
than it could not. He noted the political cohesiveness of the kingdom and noted that Æthelred II (or
Æthelred the Unready) was somehow still adept at gaining large volumes of taxation from his
nobility, procured with their consent, since “he had no standing army, no civil service” (Dr Tyreman)
and so must have needed the unanimous consent of the Kingdom’s nobility. He also noted it strange
that the King’s council was so necessary for approval on all sorts of things. For instance, during the
Northumbrian revolt, which interfered in the King’s magnates, the rebels marched straight down to
the council in London to make the King note that they had indeed done something significant. They
did not at this point align themselves as separatists or gain the support of the King of Scotland. Dr
Tyreman also noted that the argument of castles was significant. England was very unusual in that it
had 3 pitched battles in Hastings alone—very unusual in an era in which pitched battles were
extremely risky and, as such, were fought very rarely. William kept paying (a Viking) even after the
Conquest because he knew how fickle battles could be. Dr Tyreman also noted that Hastings was not
a foregone conclusion, the battle lasted well into the end of the day and that, despite how much has
been made of Harold’s supposed tactical errors, he won Stamford Bridge decisively. Then proceeded
to march down and fight a pitched battle for the better part of the day against the Normans. The key
decisive factor was arguably the Norman’s training and possession of horses. Arguably. Dr Tyreman
also noted that Hastings was not a battle of the English, it was a battle of the Godwine Army. Many
nobles sat the battle out. Though when I noted that perhaps a greater army could have swung the
battle in Harold’s favour, Dr Tyreman countered that medieval battles did not revolve around numbers
alone. He noted that men has to be trained to withstand horse attacks. Much was also discussed
around the resilience of the English state, as George noted, the Kingdom was extremely valuable, with
a great number of resources and institutions that allowed it to raise so many taxes, mint coins and pay
troops. Dr Tyreman also noted that Sweyn Forkbeard was perhaps chiefly motivated by the desire to
deprive his subordinates of loot and treasure (I.e, Thorkell the Tall). He also noted the significance of
Harold, despite being King for a pretty short time and with a pretty weak authority, was able to mint
coins in his name. So soon. Edgar the Ætheling (he noted that Edgar was indeed an Ætheling) was
briefly upheld by the nobles in London, until William “told them that that wasn’t going to work”. I
must confess I briefly droned out once or twice but I believe this to be the crux of the conversation.
Oh yeah, I added something on the Normans changing quite a bit of England after 1066, he
said we were going to focus on that next week (I.e, now), coz I got the essay right after
leaving the tutorial. He also considered the impact of European militaristic culture and the
impact of the Normans in Europe and their culture. I was weak on that, didn’t cover it in
much breadth.