Public Management Review

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpxm20

Power and conflict in network governance:

exclusive and inclusive forms of network
administrative organizations

Asa Maron & Avishai Benish

To cite this article: Asa Maron & Avishai Benish (2022) Power and conflict in network
governance: exclusive and inclusive forms of network administrative organizations, Public
Management Review, 24:11, 1758-1778, DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2021.1930121

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2021.1930121

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Published online: 27 May 2021.

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PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW
2022, VOL. 24, NO. 11, 1758–1778
https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2021.1930121

Power and conflict in network governance: exclusive and

inclusive forms of network administrative organizations
a b
Asa Maron and Avishai Benish
a
Department of Sociology, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel; bPaul Baerwald School of Social Work and
Social Welfare, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

ABSTRACT
Scholars often view conflict management in governance networks as a consensus-seeking
practice in which managers attempt to resolve disputes and advance collective network
goals. In contrast, this article uses a power-based perspective to explore how different
power strategies – adversarial and cooperative – may be applied to manage conflict and
disagreements in networks. Using qualitative empirical evidence from two Israeli govern­
ance networks, it postulates these strategies lead to different types of network adminis­
trative organizations (NAOs) – exclusive and inclusive – which may enhance or obstruct
inter-organizational collaboration. The article uses the case studies to evaluate the ensuing
implications for networks‘ endurance, legitimacy, and performance.

KEYWORDS Governance Networks; Network Management; Conflict; Power; Network Administration Organization
(NAO)

Introduction
Governance networks are configurations of actors from government, business, and
civil society working together to produce and implement public policy (Klijn and
Koppenjan 2016). Disagreements and conflicts among network actors are inherent to
building and steering such networks (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Milward and Provan,
2006; Sørensen and Torfing 2007). This is not surprizing given that governance net­
works, by their very essence, bring together organizations with different logics and
interests and with competing, even conflicting, views on the network’s goals (Bryson,
Crosby, and Stone 2006; Provan and Lemaire 2012a). For this reason, scholars of
network governance and management maintain it is imperative to consciously address
networks’ tensions, disagreements, and conflicts. Yet the network governance and
management research has tended to highlight aspects of mutuality and collaboration,
largely refraining from applying the notion of power (Agranoff and McGuire 2001;
Klijn and Koppenjan 2016; Provan and Kenis 2008; Milward and Provan, 2006).
Saz-Carranza, Iborra, and Albareda (2016) recently challenged these dominant
views by offering an alternative power-based approach to the study of network govern­
ance and management. Following their path, this article uses a power-based approach
to examine the formation and evolution of centralized network governance, or more

CONTACT Asa Maron asamaron@soc.haifa.ac.il

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed at https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2021.1930121.
© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
 PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW 1759

precisely, of network administrative organizations (NAOs). It asks how power may be

applied in the context of disagreement and conflict. How do different strategies of
power affect the forms NAOs take and the ways they develop over time? Empirically it
relies on a comparative, exploratory study of the management of two cases of govern­
ance networks geared towards the modernization of social services in Israel. These
cases, characterized by substantial disagreements and power differences among
a similar set of network members, developed very differently, leading to different
types of NAOs (inclusive and exclusive) and to starkly different outcomes (one
succeeded, the other failed). The article explores the development of the governance
and management of each network, focusing on its members’ forms and strategies of
power.
The article makes a threefold contribution to the scholarship on network govern­
ance and management. First, while the existing literature emphasizes power strategies
aimed at collaborative ends, we show that power may also be used in an adversarial
fashion to obstruct certain forms of collaboration in order to promote NAO members’
specific goals and interests. Second, by exploring exclusive and inclusive NAOs, we
highlight the variety of power strategies NAO member can use to deal with opposing
members and the implications of such different power strategies for the development
of divergent NAO types. And third, by juxtaposing the development and maturation of
inclusive and exclusive NAOs in the short and long-run, we challenge the view of
inherent trade-off between efficiency and inclusiveness in network governance.
We begin by critically exploring the role of power in network governance and
management. Next, we present our methods. We then outline the development and
outcomes of each network studied. This is followed by a discussion and conclusions.

Power and conflict in network governance and management

Governance network is a term used to describe ‘public policymaking, implementation,
and service delivery through a web of relationships between autonomous yet inter­
dependent government, business, and civil society actors’ (Klijn and Koppenjan 2016,
11). These networks are deemed most suitable to deal with complex, wicked problems
cutting across disciplines and policy sectors (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). The notion of
interdependency conveys that single organizational actors cannot address these pro­
blems and meet their goals independently, as they lack either resources (resource
dependency) or the cooperation of key stakeholders who may undermine their efforts
(strategic dependency) or both (Hertting 2007). However, the coming together of
heterogeneous actors makes such networks complex and inherently unstable inter-
organizational structures. While network members are held together by their inter­
dependencies, they often have conflicting interests and different perceptions of pro­
blems, solutions, and even of network goals, leading to inherent conflicts and tensions
(Torfing and Eva 2014; Sørensen and Torfing 2009, 243).
By shifting the focus from networks as a means of governance to the governance
and management of such networks, the network management scholarship has started
to ask how these inherent tensions are addressed in efforts to prevent networks from
falling apart (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Provan and Kenis 2008). Sørensen and
Torfing (2007, 2009) refer to such efforts as ‘metagovernance’, claiming they aim at
enabling the network’s self-governing capacity and facilitating negotiation, conflict
mediation, and diplomacy to prevent conflicts from undermining the articulation of
1760 A. MARON AND A. BENISH

shared goals. In their view, the ‘metagovernor’ (which can be external or a network
member) may choose between ‘hands on’ and ‘hands off’ approaches and tools
(Sørensen and Torfing 2007:170–171, 2009). Viewing metagovernance as network
management, Klijn and Edelenbos (2007) discuss ‘institutional design’ and ‘process
management’ strategies managers can use to change the network’s rules and structure
(including its composition and procedures) and to manage network members’ percep­
tions, preferences, and strategies, influence their interaction, and facilitate their coop­
eration and coordination (see also Klijn, Steijn, and Edelenbos 2010). In a similar vein,
Klijn and Koppenjan (2016, 11) emphasize that ‘network management’ includes
deliberate actions and strategies taken from a non-partial (or meta) perspective
‘aimed at facilitating and guiding the interactions and/or changing the features of
the network with the intent to further the collaboration within the network processes’.
Provan and Kenis (2008) offer another important typology for understanding the
governance of networks and the role of management in handling conflicts and
tensions. Acknowledging network members’ will to participate in decision making,
they examine the analytic axes of participatory versus centralized network governance
and internal versus external network control. Based on these axes, they identify three
modes of network governance: Participant-Governed Networks (participatory and
internal), Lead Organization-Governed Networks (centralized and internal), and
Network Administrative Organizations (centralized and external). They stress, ‘It is
up to network management, as part of the governance process, to recognize the
tensions in each governance form, determine whether or not the tensions inherent
in the form adopted should be resolved, and how this should be accomplished’ (Provan
and Kenis 2008: 246, 248).
This article focuses on Network Administrative Organizations (NAOs). NAOs are
formal organizations with administrative staff established for the purpose of managing
governance networks. This centralized and external form of network governance
accommodates mechanisms of representation and participation (e.g., executive boards,
committees), allowing network members to participate in the network’s governance
and management (Provan and Kenis 2008). According to Provan and Kenis (2008) and
Saz-Carranza and Ospina (2010), NAOs are best suited to handle three types of
network-level tensions: (1) efficiency versus inclusiveness: NAOs’ formal and external
structure enables efficient network operation and goal attainment whilst maximizing
network members’ participation in decision making; (2) internal versus external
legitimacy: NAOs’ shared decision-making mechanisms and participatory routines
foster collaboration among members (establishing internal legitimacy), while NAO
leaders can represent the network to external actors (attaining external legitimacy); (3)
unity versus diversity: NAOs may balance nurturing cohesiveness and accord (needed
for effective coordination and operation) with encouraging diversity (vital for
innovation).
How and why do different modes or strategies of governing and managing networks
develop? For a long time, functional explanations dominated the literature. According
to the life-cycle processes perspective (see, e.g., Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006;
Milward and Provan, 2006; Provan and Kenis 2008), impartial managers recognize
tensions and consciously choose the appropriate governance mode to balance compet­
ing needs in accordance with the network’s goals and characteristics (i.e., trust, size,
goal consensus, level of internal coordination). Similarly, the network management
theory maintains an important task of network managers is to identify and address
 PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW 1761

disagreements and conflicts within the network to maximize overall network effective­
ness (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).
These approaches to network governance have been criticized for understating the
role of power and conflict, thus sterilizing and neutralizing network power relations
(see, e.g., O’Leary and Bingham 2007). According to the critics, as member organiza­
tions have diverging goals, priorities, and resources, as well as varying levels of
motivation, conflicts and power struggles will influence the formation of network
governance (Provan and Lemaire 2012; Huxham and Beech 2008; Agranoff
and McGuire2001). A more learning-oriented approach to the development of
informal governance arrangements was recently presented, with proponents arguing
interactive governance arrangements emerge via negotiations, social learning, and
trust building amongst engaged actors (Kinder et al., 2020). Whilst this approach
shifts the focus from managers to bottom-up dynamics, the role of power is still
largely overlooked.
Saz-Carranza, Iborra, and Albareda (2016) took an important step forward by
suggesting an alternative, power-based approach to the design and development of
network governance. Focusing on NAOs in two regulatory policy-mandated networks
in the EU, they argued network members vie for control of the NAO, both its design
and activities, and mobilize resources to serve this end. Their study, however, explored
consensual and homogenous networks where the main struggle takes place between
network members and the mandating agency. In their study, power results from
members’ independence, and bargaining is identified as a single form of power. Here
we seek to advance Saz-Carranza, Iborra, and Albareda (2016) power-centred
approach for studying NAOs and their evolution by adopting Purdy’s (2012) multi­
dimensional framework for assessing power in collaborative governance. For a sche­
matic presentation of Purdy's concepts see Figure 1.
Purdy (2012) distinguishes amongst three sources of power: authority, resources,
and discursive legitimacy. Authority is the socially recognizable right to decide or act.
In public networks, where members hold official roles and positions in government,
formal legal authority, including the ability to override the actions of subordinate state
units, forms an important source. Another source of power relates to members ability
to deploy resources including ‘tangibles such as financial resources, people, technology,
and supplies; and intangibles such as knowledge, culture, and capabilities’ (Purdy 2012,
410). Lastly, discursive legitimacy regards members’ ability to represent a discourse or
speak on behalf of an important social issue or ideal.
Network members may apply these power sources in three ‘power arenas’: partici­
pant, process design, and content. Power can be used to designate network member­
ship (the participant arena), define roles and configure procedures of interaction and
decision making (the process design arena), and outline the common agenda, issues
and goals (the content arena) (Purdy 2012). For example, network members may use
their authority and/or discursive legitimacy to control the content arena via framing.
Framing can be used overtly to set the agenda (what is up for discussion, and what is
not), but also covertly to change other members’ perceptions and align them with
a shared vision via the cultivation of ideas (Agranoff and McGuire2001:298–299; Purdy
2012; Saz-Carranza and Ospina 2010). Different combinations of power and trust can
shape the quality of inter-organizational relations (Bachmann 2001), and they can
change over the life-cycle of the network (Bachmann and Inkpen 2011). Although the
trust literature points to a fundamental tension between control and trust, whether
 1762

Sources of Power

Authority - a socially Resources - a capacity Discursive legitimacy

recognizable right to to deploy tangible and an ability to represent
A. MARON AND A. BENISH

decide and/or act intangible resource and speak on behalf of

a key issue

Participants Content
Process design - design
setting
designating roles and decision making
agenda, issues
network mechanisms
and goals
members
Power arenas

Figure 1. Different Power Sources and Power Arenas in Collaborative Governance Processes (source: Purdy 2012).
 PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW 1763

control and trust substitute for or complement each other is an unanswered question.
Moreover, although research has focused on virtuous cycles of trust building, evidence
suggests not all relationships take an upward trajectory (Brattström and Bachmann
2018).
Building on Saz-Carranza, Iborra, and Albareda (2016) and Purdy (2012), our
theoretical model assumes power has different sources and can be applied in different
arenas; in the context of managing tensions and conflicts in network management and
governance, power may serve different ends and posit diverse solutions to disagree­
ment and conflict. We also acknowledge network leaders may use their power to co-
opt, exclude, or silence some members or perspectives. This view of power’s potential
to obstruct collaboration challenges the current tendency in the literature on networks
to focus almost entirely on power’s role in enhancing collaboration (Agranoff and
McGuire2001:315–316; Huxham and Beech 2008) and to advance the notion that
power imbalances should be actively addressed by empowering weaker network
members and bringing disparate members together to facilitate joint action (Ansell
and Gash 2007). In that respect, we expect complex relationship between trust and
power that may change over time (Bachmann 2001; Bachmann and Inkpen 2011).
Based on this theoretical model, we ask how NAO members use power strategies
(drawing on different power sources manifested in different arenas) to address and
appease situations of conflict and disagreement inside the NAO. And what are the
consequences of these strategies for NAO design and for network development and
outcomes? We examine these questions in a comparative study of the development of
two governance networks in Israel’s social policy arena. The next section details the
study’s methods, including research design, data collection, and analysis.

Methods
We studied and compared the development of two NAOs of public goal-directed
governance networks geared at the modernization of social services in Israel. Both
networks emerged in Israel in the late 1990s. The first network focused on facilitating
the transition towards an Active Labour Market (ALM) policy (i.e., shifting from
welfare to work) and the governance of ALM service implementation. The second
network worked on advancing community-based policy solutions for children and
teens at risk (i.e., shifting from out-of-home services to community services).

Research design
We compared the development of the NAOs of these networks. They emerged and
operated over the same time frame and shared a number of significant characteristics,
such as their goals (policy innovation and change) and policy practices (deliberation,
experimentation, sub-contracting of service delivery). Figure 2 and Figure 3 present
the networks' development timelines. Both began as bureaucratic initiatives and were
then endorsed by politicians, and both aimed to encourage innovative policymaking by
facilitating collaboration between public and private for-profit and non-profit organi­
zations. Moreover, both networks included a similar composition of – mainly public –
members (see Table 1). They also preliminarily shared similar relations of conflict and
power asymmetry, particularly between so-called ‘spending’ ministries and units
(including the Ministry of Welfare [MoW] and Public Employment Service [PES])
 1764
A. MARON AND A. BENISH

2003
2002
MoW 2005 2005-2010
2000-2001 MoW 2010
1998 dominated MoF Critique of
struggles dominated Policy
preliminary NAO dominated policy and
over NAO NAO failure,NAO
network abolished by NAO NAO
control established dissolves
MoF established conduct

Figure 2. Active Labour Market Network: Development Timeline.

 1999‐2002 2003‐2004
2007
struggles inside Development of
1996‐1997 1998 the NAO Network
trust and
compromise florishes, NAO
Preliminary Ashalim is legitimacy inside
outcomes and becomes
network estalbished the NAO
legitimacy national policy
facilitate policy
leader
outcomes

Figure 3. Children and Teens at Risk Network: Development Timeline.

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW
1765
1766 A. MARON AND A. BENISH

Table 1. Network members compared.

Active Labour Market Policy Network Children and Teens at Risk Policy Network
Ministry of Finance (MoF) Ministry of Finance (MoF)
Ministry of Welfare (MoW) Ministry of Welfare (MoW)
National Insurance Institute (NII) National Insurance Institute (NII)
Public Employment Service (PES) Ministry of Education (MoE)
Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Employment (MITE) Ministry of Health (MoH)
Private consulting firm JDC-Israel (non-profit)

and the ‘guardian’ ministry (i.e. the Ministry of Finance [MoF], a powerful and central
advocate of pro-market reforms and social spending cutbacks).
Despite their similarities, the networks’ development and outcomes were at odds:
the first network failed and dissolved, whilst the second succeeded and is ongoing.
Research often focuses on successful networks, yet failed ones can provide lessons that
are at least as important. The interesting dichotomy between the two networks makes
them an ideal choice for an exploratory study of power in collaborative network
governance. Exploratory studies do not attempt to bring evidence to support or reject
existing hypothesis; rather, they seek to contribute to existing theories by offering an
in-depth exploration of concepts and suggesting new directions for research.
Recognizing governance networks’ complex, non-linear dynamics, in what follows,
we adopt insights from complexity theory to warn against a simple understanding of
network development and outcomes (Klijn 2008). The article’s Discussion and
Conclusion sections discuss findings in light of these insights.

Data collection and analysis

This article’s empirical base was compiled via comprehensive archival work and semi-
structured interviews with key informants. We had unusual access to internal doc­
umentation of NAO governing organs (boards and committees), such as protocols and
minutes, enabling a unique view of NAO development, decision-making processes and
the deployment of power. Documentation of the ALM case included records of the
Committee for the Reform of the Treatment of the Unemployed Recipients of Long-
term Subsistence Allowances (‘Tamir Committee’) and its subcommittees.
Documentation of the Children-At-Risk case was obtained from Ashalim archival
records, including records of the executive board committee’s discussions. We
obtained and analysed hundreds of pages of protocols, minutes, internal reports, and
letters. We obtained documents from other sources as well, including the Israel State
Archive and the Knesset Archive and website (committee reports, official publications,
full session protocols). In addition to the documentary evidence, we conducted 34
semi-structured interviews with key protagonists, 25 of whom were either
a representative of a network member organization or an NAO staff member.
Interviews were conducted between 2009 and 2015. Interviewees participated in the
inception, evolution, and ongoing operation of the networks and NAOs and thus were
well-placed to give inside information. A complete list of interviews appears in
Appendix 1.
We conducted a few preliminary interviews with key actors in an early stage of the
study to establish a basic timeline and compose preliminary hypotheses on key devel­
opments and outcomes in the NAO’s evolution. Following this, we sorted each
 PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW 1767

network’s documented evidence on the NAO’s inauguration and development. At that

point, we resumed interviewing, using the preliminary timeline and hypotheses to
inspire interview questions. In the next stage, all documents and transcribed interviews
were triangulated and coded, with attention to problem-solving strategies and the use
of power inside the NAO. The data were used to characterize key developments in the
NAO’s evolution and to shed light on members’ positions, interpretations, and actions
during such developments. Additional details on data analysis appear in Appendix 2,
including information on the research process, document and interview codes and
themes, and interview questions.
The following sections present the findings on the development of each NAO. We
begin by describing the preliminary stages of each NAO’s inception and go on to
discuss its dynamics, outcomes, and endurance over the long term.

Findings
Exclusive NAO: active labour market policy network
The preliminary network for advancing Active Labour Market (ALM) policy in Israel
emerged in 1998. After the failure of an inter-ministerial committee (1998) to for­
mulate an agreed-upon reform of the employment eligibility test for social assistance
benefits, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) with the aid of a private consultancy firm
began efforts to form an alternative network. At this point, the MoF required the
support of the Public Employment Service (PES) and the Ministry of Welfare (MoW)
to advance reform. Central members of this preliminary network included the MoF,
MoW, PES, National Insurance Institute (NII), and JDC-Israel (the Israeli branch of
the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, an historically committed non-
profit partner of the state). In March 2000, the network received formal political
recognition with the inauguration of a Committee for the Reform of Long-term
Subsistence Benefits, called the ‘Tamir Committee’ (after its Chair). The Committee
was mandated by the Minister of Welfare to experiment with different welfare-to-work
models and test the applicability of ALM policy instruments, form a NAO to coordi­
nate members’ activities, and oversee the policy experiment.
Soon after its inception, participating members revealed deep disagreements on
NAO control, and struggles began. In July 2000, the Minister of Welfare made a first
attempt to control the NAO-to-be and used its ministerial authority to appoint a senior
bureaucrat as its head.1 Four months after this unsuccessful attempt, the sub-
committee in charge of designing and governing the experiment, led by the MoF,
proposed hosting the new NAO at the non-government JDC-Israel (November 2000).
The MoW refused and demanded it be allowed to control the governance of the
network and the reform. In an interview, a senior MoW official stressed, ‘We felt the
MoF was taking a lead on something which belonged to the social ministries.’
Unable to come to an agreement on NAO control, the Tamir Committee withheld
its decision, recommending to the government that the sub-committee retain its role as
temporary NAO until a permanent one was established (August 2001). In this context,
the MoW made a second attempt to usurp NAO control by unilaterally establishing
a NAO within the MoW. All network members were present at the inaugural meeting
(April 2002), and network members – the MoW, the PES, and the NII – voiced their
strong commitment to the programme (Protocol 5129 of the Labour, Welfare, and
1768 A. MARON AND A. BENISH

Health Committee, 30 May 2002, 15th Knesset). The new NAO received government
recognition (Government Decision 1142, 2001) and began operating under MoW
control. Commenting on the MoW attempt to control the NAO, the MoF representa­
tive on the Tamir Committee said: ‘At some point, everything was settled, only the
NAO question was left open: who would lead it? Who will appoint its head: the MoW
or the MoF? The MoW tried to appoint one of its own and we thought it would trash
the whole thing. . . . We couldn’t agree with this’.
The MoF strongly opposed this development, fearing it would lose control of the
network and ultimately control of the reform. In March 2003, the MoF used its
superior authority inside government and took several unilateral actions aimed at
undermining and then replacing the MoW-controlled NAO. First, it collaborated
with the Prime Minister’s Office to move the responsibility for employment policy
and the executive power over the PES away from the MoW and transfer it to a newly
established Ministry: the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Employment (MITE)
(Doron, 2007). Then, with the collaboration of the MITE – leaving the MoW, PES,
and NII out of the policy process – the MoF used its advantaged position and
authority in government to amend the Social Security Act through the Israeli
Omnibus Law (Law of Arrangements) to legally enable the reform as a policy
experiment. As part of these legal amendments, and going against an existing
agreement with the PES, the amended law explicitly banned all public sector orga­
nizations, including the PES, from participating in the implementation of the policy.
By shifting implementation to private providers, the MoF compensated for its lack of
implementation capacity and reduced its dependency on the PES and MoW. In this
way, the MoF used its authority as a source of power in the participant arena; it
determined the network’s boundaries and membership by excluding the MoW and
PES from network-level decision-making. Repenting this development, the MoF
representative openly shared the following with us: ‘The MoF tends to decry com­
mittees and the agreements they produce, saying it’s easier to lead [reforms] alone.
It’s very hard to get everyone to agree on everything. But when there is a steering
committee, everyone feel committed’.
Following these actions, a new NAO emerged in 2004 and was formalized in
February 2005 as an independent administrative organization. The MoF was dominant
in designing the new NAO, its membership and decision-making procedures.
Although the MoW and the PES were members of the ALM steering committee,
they were banned from the NAO board which included the MoF, MITE, and NII.
The goal-oriented technocratic structure reflected the interests of the MoF and pre­
vented the representation of previously engaged organizations perceived by the MoF as
challenging its policy preferences. The NAO coordinated the actions of state organiza­
tions and was responsible for overseeing the establishment of private job centres,
regulating their ongoing operation, and representing the network to external
stakeholders.
The new NAO employed only a few staff members, including a deputy head (former
MoF economist), a legal counsellor, and a head, with the latter appointed by the MoF
and MITE. The NAO’s main governing organ was its board, with executive decision-
making in the hands of network members. The exclusion of the MoW and the PES
created a small, like-minded NAO. Led by the MoF, which controlled the NAO’s
agenda (content arena), the NAO soon achieved consensus on its goals and enjoyed
high internal legitimacy and efficiency. Interviews with NAO staff and network
 PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW 1769

members (representatives of the MoF MITE, and the NII) revealed that network goals
were consensual, and internal disagreements were minor. The NII representative on
the NAO explained potential tension between the MoF and NII was defused shortly
after inauguration, when the NII ended the preliminary ‘ideological disputes’ and
assumed a technical and supportive role (providing administrative data on social
assistance recipients), not a challenging role.
Lacking diversity, the exclusive and homogenous NAO supported a stringent and
uniform implementation of ALM policy (Maron and Helman 2017; Maron 2014). The
stringent nature of the policy was harshly criticized by various official reports. For
example, a special report of the State Comptroller accused the MoF, the MITE, and the
NAO of uniform implementation, noting the failure to pre-filter unemployable popu­
lations, thus damaging populations with limited employability (Some Aspects of the
Welfare-to-Work Programme, 2007, pp.20–21). As the report pointed out, the MoW
and PES had previously raised these concerns and argued for the need to filter out the
unemployable and create adjustments for reasons such as old age, ill health, or physical
impediment.
Excluding the MoW and PES from the NAO distanced and neutralized these
recommendations. In an interview, an MoF representative on the NAO reflected:
‘This policy was our baby and we nursed it closely . . . [W]e got too involved in micro-
management and became too dominant, it was not a right call. We did not provide the
[NAO] with the autonomy and administrative capacity it required. It was unbalanced.’
This regret was echoed by a senior MoW official: ‘The MoF made a mistake: it became
too dominant because it assumed we would object and obstruct the reform, but a more
collaborative approach could have made us strong supporters and engaged partners in
the reform’.
Following implementation, critiques of the NAO and policy implementation were
publicly voiced, creating grievances and antagonism. Gradually, the MoW and the PES
became public advocates against the policy and the NAO. Their exclusion from the
NAO drove them to join forces with non-state advocacy NGOs and establish a public
campaign to condemn the implementation of ALM and its outcomes (Maron and
Helman 2017). For example, on 1 March 2009, the PES head participated in a public
conference on implementation organized by advocacy organizations in Jerusalem. As
public antagonism increasingly received the support of popular media, the campaign
mobilized political support in the Knesset from both the government and opposition.
The MoF and MITE struggled to illuminate the policy’s economic success in terms of
caseload reduction and labour market integration. Yet at this stage, the NAO’s
reputation steeply declined, and the ALM policy suffered a deep legitimacy crisis.
Eventually, the NAO lost the battle for external legitimacy and was discredited by
civil society and politicians alike (Maron and Helman 2017). The programme under­
went various changes, attempting to meet critiques throughout its four year and eight-
month tenure, yet these changes did not restore public or political legitimacy. In
April 2010, Knesset members from the Labour, Welfare, and Health Committee of
the Knesset blocked permanent legislation, terminating the experiment.

Inclusive NAO: children and teens at risk policy network

During the 1990s, the social problem of children and youth at risk attracted wide
public and bureaucratic attention, particularly in the MoW and its sub-unit, the Child
1770 A. MARON AND A. BENISH

and Youth Service. Various policy initiatives were developed during the second half of
the decade in an attempt to produce an adequate policy response to a perceived need.
These bureaucratic initiatives were not endorsed by the MoF; it argued the MoW must
first improve its cost-effectiveness and redirect excess budgets to meet new social
needs. Yet interviews with senior officials at the MoW and the MoF suggested to us
that tight budgets and limited budgetary discretion constrained the MoW’s ability to
comply.
As in the ALM policy formation, the relations between the MoF and the MoW were
initially based on distrust, as the former considered the latter to be professionally
incompetent and politically biased, especially as it was controlled by a sectoral and
cliental party (1996–2000 and 2001–2003) (Doron, 2007). Interviews with the Director
Generals of the MoW and JDC-Israel revealed these organizations shared a common
vision and were interested in collaborating to raise new resources and develop new
policy solutions for children and teens at risk. Therefore, they formed an alliance and
worked to design an effective network by including powerful allies and excluding
organizations with few resources and/or potentially conflicting stands. In particular,
they recognized that including the MoF in the network was important to success and
excluding it would likely lead to failure. One interviewee even rephrased President
Lyndon Johnson’s famous quip, remarking: ‘[W]hen the NAO was established, the
MoF opposed and did not want to be a part of it . . . Based on evaluations of past
collaborations, we realized that if the MoF is not “in” – it was causing problems. We
knew it’s much better to have the MoF inside the tent pissing out than outside the tent
pissing in’.
Acknowledging their dependency on the MoF, network leaders mobilized organi­
zational resources, including personnel and data, to set the network’s agenda (content
arena) and later design its decision-making procedures (process design arena) (see
below) in order to include the MoF in the network (participant arena). In
December 1996, a founding team was formed to establish a preliminary network,
including representatives of the MoW, MoF, Ministry of Education (MoE), NII, and
JDC-Israel. Following yearlong preparations, in January 1998, Ashalim was established
as the network’s NAO. Members included the MoW, MoF, MoE, Ministry of Health,
and JDC-Israel. The NAO employed about 20 staff members, and a steering committee
comprised of the Director Generals of member organizations oversaw its operation.
Ashalim’s main goal was ‘deepening the common responsibility and motivation of all
engaged actors to develop and implement innovative, professional and successful
services’ (Ashalim three-year programme, 1998, 3). It focused on developing new
models of community care programmes, testing their efficiency in pilot experiments,
and evaluating their cost-effectiveness. Successful services were to be incorporated into
the public service system and replace outdated ones, though, as we shall see, the
execution of this change was highly contested.
Ashalim’s policy decisions were made by its member organizations. Two governing
organs or mechanisms of representation and decision making were established early
and convened regularly to govern the network’s policy: the executive board and
professional sub-committees. The executive board included 14 senior participants,
seven members representing government ministries and seven representing JDC-
Israel. JDC-Israel enjoyed such a vast representation because it was responsible for
about half of the network’s independent budget. In addition to the executive board,
four professional sub-committees were established (later reduced to three), each
 PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW 1771

headed by a senior bureaucrat from a member ministry. Proposals for new services
were first discussed and evaluated by the sub-committees; if approved, they moved up
to the executive board. The executive board would then discuss new proposals with the
NAO’s financial commission, headed by a senior economist from the MoF. Final
approval was conditioned on the financial commission’s consent.
Whilst agreeing on the main collective mission of the network – modernizing
children and youth at risk services – member organizations had different interests
and visions of the network’s role. The decision to set up the network and to accomplish
cooperation inside it via a NAO did not reconcile fundamental differences, mainly
those between the MoW and the MoF. Given the reality of depleting budgets and
mounting social problems, the MoW entered the network hoping to gain access to
additional resources and develop supplementary policy programmes to better meet
growing demands and diversifying needs. Meanwhile, the MoF hoped the network
would support the reprioritization of the MoW’s goals and budgets, without the need
for additional funding, by shutting down ‘old’ expensive dormitory care services and
funding new, flexible, and cost-efficient community services. Although the executive
board and professional sub-committees served as platforms for discussions between
member organizations, recorded protocols of the executive committee between 2000
and 2002 reveal this overarching dispute often took over the NAO’s deliberations.
The operation of the NAO was riddled with ongoing conflicts and power struggles,
however, Ashalim’s mechanisms of representation and deliberation were able to
contain the conflict and facilitate prolonged collaboration between member organiza­
tions. In interviews, NAO staff and MoW officials revealed they deliberately influenced
the NAO’s agenda (content arena), framing the collaboration in terms appealing to the
MoF by recognizing its central interests, i.e., maintaining budgetary control and
advancing cost-efficiency. The first NAO head said in an interview: ‘In every collabora­
tion, the MoF always demand to head the financial committee because they want to
assume control . . . . They used the NAO to design policy . . . . They say: “If we budget
this we want to make sure it’s done right”. . . . They want to stay vigilant all the time’.
In effect, network leaders and NAO staff tempted the MoF representatives, promis­
ing further collaboration would give the MoF control over network-wide resources,
support policy innovation, and facilitate a shift towards cost-effective services. One
NAO staff member remarked: ‘We knew that the promotion of flexible and cost-
efficient services was important for the MoF, so we used this leitmotif to solicit their
support whenever it was needed.’ A MoW representative in the NAO explained: ‘When
you understand how the MoF thinks, you align your interest and the children’s
interests with the MoF’s interests . . . . I told them, “Join me and we’ll develop cost-
effective community services”. . . . . This is how we connected with them . . . . They
participated in all [Ashalim] committees, they wanted to know and control everything,
and we allowed them’.
At the same time, the MoW also benefited by seizing the opportunity to develop
innovative policy solutions for mounting social risks (for which it was accountable)
and influencing the allocation of non-state, network-based resources towards these
ends. This was articulated by a senior MoW representative on the NAO: ‘The MoW’s
budget was insufficient and the MoF refused to budget new programmes . . . We used
Ashalim to gradually gain more resources for children at risk. We started with
5 million USD worth of services and programmes in 1998 and now (2010) we have
200 million USD. Back in 1998, no one believed it was possible’. Network leaders and
1772 A. MARON AND A. BENISH

NAO staff framed the NAO’s agenda and designed its decision-making procedures
(content and process design arenas) to include the MoF and establish network colla­
boration that serves their own goals. Lacking formal authority or coercion capacity,
these actors used their professional knowledge and ethics to represent the at-risk
children as a pressing social problem, using discursive legitimacy as a power source.
During its first years of operation and up until 2003, Ashalim was unable to propel
system-wide policy change. It was able to nurture innovative policy models (83 new models
were developed and tested during these years), but its low internal legitimacy coincided with
low network effectiveness and low external legitimacy, with relevant stakeholders in both
government and civil society seeing little actual change. Over time, however, the network’s
ability to effect macro-level nationwide policy change materialized in two policy pro­
grammes – the ‘Community 2000ʹ (2003) policy experiment, followed by the nationwide
‘Toward the Community’ (2004) programme, which introduced new community services.
Both were made possible by the trusting relations fostered between the MoF and MoW
inside the NAO. An MoF representative on the NAO said: ‘To enable policy change we had
to loosen the controls we applied before . . . . It required openness on our side and was based
on trust . . . [and] sitting together in the NAO created trust . . . . [This made the MoW] unlike
every other ministry “coming in” with a new project, and you don’t know if it was
professionally evaluated or not. . . . . The structured dynamics nurtured good trusting
relations between the sides’.
Interviews with MoF and MoW officials clearly indicated that ongoing, long-term
interactions within the NAO – between senior bureaucrats representing network
members – nurtured the development of personal trust and internal legitimacy. The
‘Toward the Community’ programme, a direct product of the network, enjoyed
significant support and legitimacy. The government first endorsed it and then
expanded it into a national programme (Government Decision 477, 2006). Following
in the footsteps of this programme, the National Programme for At Risk Children and
Teens was launched three years later (2007). In this case, the government approved an
annual budget of 35 million USD, established a new administrative authority to govern
the programme, and formed an inter-ministerial steering committee to oversee it.

Discussion
The study highlights two related issues: the variety of strategies of using power to
overcome disagreement in NAOs, and the dynamics such strategies evoke in the short
term and the long term. With respect to the first, the study highlights two power
strategies NAO leaders can use to deal with opposing members who challenge (or will
likely challenge) their interests and perception of network goals: exclusive and inclu­
sive strategies. Each presents a distinctive way to deal with disagreement and distrust
inside the NAO: the networks’ administrative decision-making centre. The exclusive
NAO model, as demonstrated by the ALM network, distances the conflict from the
NAO, making the conflict external and avoiding the need to deal with it internally. In
contrast, the inclusive NAO model, as demonstrated by the children at risk network,
contains conflict by keeping opposing members integrated in the NAO.
In the ALM case, representing an exclusive strategy to deal with conflict, the MoF
and MoW both used their authority as formal government organizations to try to set
up and dominate the NAO (see the MoW’s twofold attempt to set up an ‘in-house’
NAO). But the MoF’s central position in government and its control of the Omnibus
 PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW 1773

Law outweighed the MoW’s and the PES’s power, permitting it to mobilize political
support and legal authority to override the MoW and to advance the establishment of
a new, exclusive NAO and control it. The MoF used its power decisively and adversely
in the ‘participant arena’ to remove the MoW and the PES from the NAO in an early
stage and to establish a small and cohesive NAO with high internal consensus on the
network’s mission. The MoF was able to apply the exclusive strategy only when its
dependency on the PES and the MoW was reduced, and alternatives were formulated
(i.e., collaboration with the newly established MITE). Using this strategy, the MoF
assumed greater control of the network’s mission and operation, thereby reducing the
need for compromises down the road.
In the child at risk NAO, representing an inclusive strategy to deal with conflict, the
starting point was similar in terms of mutual distrust and disagreement on the network’s
mission, and, once again, the MoF had a clear formal power advantage due to its control over
the scope and forms of social expenditure. However, in this case, rather than engaging in
adversarial power struggle, the MoW favoured a ‘mission creep’ strategy to advance its
interests. MoW officials, JDC officials, and senior NAO staff members formed an alliance to
seize the NAO’s ‘content arena’. They used their power – based on discursive legitimacy and
resources (control of professional knowledge and normative ideas) – to frame a joint vision
of a cost-effective solution for a growing social problem. They stressed the network’s
potential for establishing flexible community services for children, and mobilized MoF
officials towards that end. Moreover, acknowledging and respecting the MoF’s superior
formal power, the MoW forfeited its veto power in the ‘process design arena’, granting the
MoF a de-facto veto power in the NAO’s decision-making mechanisms. The result was
a cooperative interdependence among NAO members with continuous efforts to strike
a middle ground and to generate policies that would avoid conflicts or at least strike
a balance between the different interests.
These findings demonstrate that power may be used to enhance but also to obstruct
collaboration, and that different ways of using power in collaborative arrangements –
adversarial and cooperative – may lead to different types of NAOs. While the existing
literature emphasizes the use of power for collaborative ends, power may also be used to
obstruct collaborative relations during the development of NAOs. NAO members may
pursue individual interests by restricting collaboration, for example by banning an undesired
point of view, restricting some aspects of communication, or even removing another
member.
With respect to the second issue, the networks’ short-term and long-term develop­
ment, the study suggests each NAO type – inclusive and exclusive – may have different
short-term and long-term dynamics and outcomes (see Table 2). Inclusive NAOs seem
to suffer from low internal legitimacy and ineffectiveness in the short term when

Table 2. Short-term and long-term dynamics of types of NAOs.

Short-term
Inclusive NAO Low internal legitimacy
High external legitimacy
Low network effectiveness
Exclusive NAO High internal legitimacy
Low external legitimacy
High network effectiveness
Long-term
High internal legitimacy
High external legitimacy
High network effectiveness
High internal legitimacy
Low external legitimacy
Low effectiveness
(due to network failure)
1774 A. MARON AND A. BENISH

attempting to reconcile competing demands of member organizations. In the case of

the children-at-risk network, the inclusion of different and even competing interests
initially led to an NAO which was slow to consolidate its policy goals. Yet following
a period of low internal legitimacy and ineffectiveness and despite the power advantage
of the MoF, dialogic processes were established over time through internal mechan­
isms of representation and participation – namely the executive board and professional
subcommittees. As the network matured, the actors intensified their interpersonal and
(as a result) inter-organizational trust relations. The accumulation of trust led network
members to demonstrate trustworthiness and express a willingness to be exposed to
vulnerability, prompting the MoF to reduce its control and enable reciprocal trust
relations (Bachmann and Inkpen 2011). This was evident in the MoF’s willingness to
allow the MoW control to enable the shift in public spending towards community
services for at-risk children (in the ‘Toward the Community’ programme), at the risk
of budget overrun. This positive trust-building cycle supported internal and external
legitimacy and fostered high network performance in the long run, with comprehen­
sive policy initiatives leading to a national inter-ministerial policy programme in the
domain of children at risk. As of 2020, this programme was ongoing: it was governed
by a specific administrative agency and had expanded its coverage from 72 to 171
locales nationwide.
Conversely, exclusive NAOs may establish internal legitimacy and network-wide
effectiveness in the short term, yet pay the price for decreased external legitimacy when
unresolved and uncontained conflicts re-emerge and cause a backlash. In the case of
the ALM network, the exclusive NAO design was effective in many ways, building the
capacity to coordinate the actions of a fewer members. At the same time, however, the
exclusion of the MoW and the PES meant their legitimacy as ‘social bureaucracies’ and
their valuable knowledge and expertise could not be applied to steer the transition
from a passive to an active labour market policy. Ultimately, both organizations joined
a counter coalition that criticized the policy (Maron and Helman 2017). In the longer
term, the decision to exclude key actors from the NAO undermined its external
legitimacy, leading to policy failure and network termination.
These significant variations in the short-term and long-term dynamics and out­
comes of inclusive and exclusive NAOs are summarized in Table 2. Different
approaches to address tension, risk and diversity underlie each model. In inclusive
NAOs, diversity within the NAO is favoured at the risk of network failure (worst case
scenario) or short-term instability and ineffectiveness. These NAOs aspire to reduce
tensions and conflicts using internal formal and informal mechanisms of representa­
tion, participation, and cooptation. Even if such mechanisms do not establish full trust
and consensus among members, they may enable an ambiguous yet practical agree­
ment that provides sufficient incentives to prefer collaboration over opposition. The
need to continuously engage in negotiation and consensus building consumes con­
siderable time and resources. If successful, the ongoing negotiations will allow the
network to thrive in the long run, or at least to remain reasonably stable and effective.
But if unsuccessful, the network may not survive its incubating stage.
An exclusive NAO favours unity and homogeneity. By excluding opposing mem­
bers, it reduces internal conflict and frictions to quickly achieve internal consensus,
legitimacy, and effectiveness. This is done at the cost of diversity (loss of professional
knowledge and expertise) and external legitimacy. The externalization of conflict does
not defuse conflict, and in some cases, it may cause a backlash, thereby exposing the
 PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW 1775

network to greater external opposition that may undermine its effectiveness and
endurance over time. The need to deal with such external resistance may consume
considerable resources and affect the NAO’s public legitimacy. If successful, such
networks may quickly mature to deliver effective policy. If unsuccessful, they run the
risk of network failure, long-term ineffectiveness, and policy failure.
In our study, the inclusive strategy succeeded, and the exclusive strategy failed. We
maintain the include/exclude decision was significant to the ways the networks devel­
oped and endured. However, governance networks generally display non-linear devel­
opment, and this is often the result of complex interactions (actions and reactions),
rather than network members’ intentional strategies (Klijn 2008). The failure of the
exclusive NAO was the result of complex circumstances, and our research design
makes it impossible to single out the influence of the MoF’s exclusive strategy.
Unlike the exclusive strategy presented here, exclusion may be sensible, legitimate,
and effective in some circumstances. Conversely, if a broader and more diverse NAO
were established away from bureaucratic ‘turf wars’, trust relations might develop,
supporting a balanced ALM policy and network endurance. Our interviews with
representatives of the MoW and MoF who participated in the network’s early stage
support the plausibility of this scenario. As for the success of the inclusive NAO, whilst
the literature suggests trust cycles are likely to be virtuous (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004),
and a high level of trust in networks is related to better network performance (Provan
and Milward 2001; Klijn, Edelenbos, and Steijn 2010), we acknowledge that contextual
factors – personal, organizational, or policy-related – could have led to the collapse of
trust. Another factor supporting the inclusive NAO’s success relates to the salience of
the networks’ respective social issues. As the issue of at-risk children generates more
moral anxiety and is less disputed, the inclusive NAO enjoyed more favourable
conditions. However, we should note that rather than making conclusive and deter­
ministic arguments, we simply aim to identify power strategies and NAO types and
point to plausible ramifications for network dynamics.

Conclusion
Few have studied the development of NAOs, especially in the context of power
relations and conflict. This article uses empirical evidence from two public goal-
directed governance networks to explore different strategic uses of power leading to
different NAO types – exclusive and inclusive – and to show how they influenced those
networks’ development and outcomes over time. It suggests exclusive and inclusive
NAOs may develop differently, affecting their legitimacy, trust, effectiveness, and
endurance. Setting up an exclusive NAO may produce unity, internal legitimacy and
network efficiency in the short term, but it may set in motion events that lead to public
de-legitimacy and reduced political support and, in the long run, the termination of the
network and its policy goals. Conversely, inclusive NAOs may contain and tame
conflict but pay a high price – low internal trust, lack of legitimacy, and ineffectiveness.
Yet with time, the initially low level of trust can grow through trust reciprocity,
increasing internal legitimacy and network effectiveness; this, in turn, may lead to
the development of external legitimacy, contributing to the endurance of the network.
Thus, excluding some actors may seem like the most promising strategy, but whilst this
may hold true in the short run, inclusion may be prove to be a much stronger power
strategy in the long run.
1776 A. MARON AND A. BENISH

Scholars often view conflict resolution in networks as a consensus-seeking practice

in which managers attempt to resolve disputes and advance collective network goals.
We have taken a different approach, using a power-based perspective to show how
different power strategies may be applied to govern conflict and disagreements in
networks. The distinction between inclusive and exclusive power strategies draws
attention to the role of boundaries in centralized network governance. It highlights
the importance of determining the insiders and the outsiders (manifesting power in the
‘participant arena’). The literature on collaborative governance is well aware of power­
ful actors’ ability to use their power in order to enhance collaboration and promote
inclusivity. Our study shows, first, how powerful actors can use power also to exclude,
by obstructing certain forms of collaboration and advancing alternative ones in which
they can better defend their interests and goals. Second, it shows how actors may
compensate for inferior formal authority by using alternative forms of power based on
resources of knowledge and discursive legitimacy to influence the NAO’s agenda (the
‘content arena’) and decision-making mechanisms (the ‘process design arena’). These
uses of power allow actors to mobilize challengers into cooperative partners by
including them in the NAO. This important facet of the development of centralized
network governance has received insufficient attention.
Our findings reinforce Saz-Carranza, Iborra, and Albareda’s (2016) power-based
explanation, stressing the centrality of power and conflicts in NAO design and devel­
opment. Whereas Saz-Carranza, Iborra, and Albareda studied consensual and symme­
trical networks, we broaden the perspective by examining two conflicted networks in
which members used different sources and forms of power to influence the boundaries
and control of the NAO. The temporal dynamics revealed here question traditional
assumptions in network theory on the efficiency vs. inclusiveness tension in network
governance. Whilst the existing literature generally assumes an inherent trade-off
between the two, our research suggests that in the long run, they might be mutually
reinforcing; under certain conditions, inclusivity and diversity may lead to efficiency,
while exclusivity and unity may lead to instability and ineffectiveness. Such outcomes
are not deterministic, but they are plausible and therefore should be considered in
network research and theory.
It is important to address the limitations of this study. As mentioned above, because of
the complexity of networks, we have not attempted to establish causal relations between
power strategies/NAO types and outcomes; rather, we wish to offer insights on their
plausible repercussions for networks’ legitimacy and efficacy. The transferability and
generalizability of our findings is limited by the exploratory nature of the study and its
design. In terms of data quality, the research is based on comprehensive empirical
evidence from both documents and interview data gathered from multitude sources.
We addressed the potential shortcomings associated with these sources, including
limited and biased perspectives, by triangulating methods and sources. Triangulation
allowed us to include and compare different perspectives on key events, thus increasing
our ability to gauge the reliability and validity of our findings. In spite of potential biases,
we believe using these sources and methods is worthwhile, as they provide a unique
perspective that enriches our understanding of manifestations of power in collaboration.
By conceptualizing the exclusive and inclusive modes of network governance, the
article opens up a space for studying varieties of power use in NAOs and probing
additional types of centralized network governance. We particularly need to know how
dominant members weigh the risk of including contenders against the risk of
 PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW 1777

excluding them. Future research will also need to establish what factors encourage or
discourage the development of specific NAO types and what factors determine their
respective success or failure. Our findings also call for more research on the diversity of
power sources, forms, and strategies, and their interaction in the development of
centralized modes of network governance in the context of disagreement and conflict.

Note
1. Letter of appointment issued by Minister Eli Ishai Chamber to Moshe Dimri. Carbon copies to:
Minister Haim Ramon, Chairman of the Ministerial Committee for State Control; Professor
Yossi Tamir, Chairman of the Reform Committee (Letter, 9 July 2000).

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributors
Asa Maron is Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology at the University of Haifa. He is
a political and economic sociologist specializing in the sociology of the welfare state and neoliberalism.
His research explores changing forms of public sector governance, the role of ideas in policymaking,
and most recently, social impact investment and the financialization of the welfare state.
Avishai Benish is Assistant Professor (tenured) at the Paul Baerwald School of Social Work and Social
Welfare at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His fields of expertise are social law and administra­
tion, and his main research is on regulation and governance reforms in welfare states.

ORCID
Asa Maron http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0673-8340
Avishai Benish http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1407-5607

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