Sers

CHAPTER III
SAFETY OF PASSENGERS
ARTICLES 1755 to 1763
ARTICLE 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the

passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances.
The hazards of modem transportation demand extraordinary diligence. A

common carrier is vested with public interest. Under the New Civil Code, instead
of being required to exercise mere ordinary diligence, a common carrier is exhorted
to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide “using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons.” (Art. 1755) Once a passenger in the
course of travel is injured, or does not reach his destination safely, the carrier and
driver are presumed to be at fault. (Bacarro v. Castano, 118 SCRA 187)
When the bus is not in motion, there is no necessity for a person who wants
to ride the same to signal his intention to board. A public utility bus, once it stops,
is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. Hence, it becomes the duty of
the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act that would have
the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was attempting to board
the same. The premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach of such
duty.
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers
by railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances within a
reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board
and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers
resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they
are doing so.
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It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one to attempt to

board a train or streetcar, which is moving slowly. An ordinarily prudent
person would have made the attempt to board the moving conveyance
under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that passengers board
and alight from a slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience
and both the driver and conductor in this case could not have been
unaware of such an ordinary practice.
The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the
bus, is already considered a passenger and is entitled to all the rights and
protection pertaining to such a contractual relation. Hence, it has been
held that the duty which the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons
extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to those alighting therefrom
(Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 574):
“It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier

and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights
from the carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the
point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a
reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s
premises. And, what is reasonable time or a reasonable delay within
this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a
person who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station
platform is considered still a passenger. So also, where a passenger
has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to
leave the company’s premises, but before actually doing so is halted
by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and
he in good faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty,
returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and
necessarily delayed and thus continued to be a passenger entitled as
such to the protection of the railroad company and its agents. (La
Mallorca v. Court of Appeals, et al., 17 SCRA 739; See also Light Rail
Transit Authority v. Natividad, 397 SCRA, February 6, 2003)
Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a

reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at
CHAPTER III
railroads crossings, which duties pertain both to the operation of trains and to
the maintenance of the crossings. Moreover, every corporation constructing or
operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where such railway
crosses any public road, good, sufficient and safe crossings, and erect at such
points, at sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of
vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to
give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the necessity
of looking out for trains. The failure of the PNR to put a cross bar, or signal
light, flagman or switchman, or semaphore is evidence of negligence and
disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance
requiring it because public safety of the public demands that said device or
equipment be installed. (PNR v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157658,
October 15, 2007)
Carrier-passenger relationship continues until the passenger has
been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel-owner’s
premises.
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. Hon. Court of Appeals,
Lucila Viana, Sps. Antonio and Gorgonia Viana,
and Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation
G.R. No. 84458, November 6,1989
FACTS: The evidence disclosed that on May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana
boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by defendant, at the port of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila, having purchased a ticket (No.
117392) in the sum of P23.10. On May 12,1975, said vessel arrived at Pier 4,
North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked, a gangplank
having been provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of
using said gangplank, Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck, which
was on the level with the pier. After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded
on said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated July 26,
1975 between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and
defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation.
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The crane owned by the third-party defendant and operated by its crane
operator Alejo Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one
(1) hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started operation
by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the crane was being operated,
Anacleto Viana, who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously
remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back to
the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the
place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the
side of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he
later expired three days thereafter, on May 15, 1975.
ISSUE: Whether or not the victim’s presence in the vessel after one hour
from his disembarkation was no longer reasonable and he consequently ceased to be
a passenger.
HELD: The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until
the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel
owner’s dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily
terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from
the carrier’s conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s
premises. All persons who remain on the premises for a reasonable time after
leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time
or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances,
and includes a reasonable time to look after his baggage and prepare for his
departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact
that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such
person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.
It was in accordance with this rationale that the doctrine in the aforesaid
case of La Mallorca was enunciated, to wit:
“In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his
baggage which was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus.
Racquel, the child that she was, must have followed the father. However,
although the father was still on the running
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board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong,
the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the
moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the
bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that
the carrier’s agent had exercised the ‘utmost diligence’ of a ‘very cautious
person’ required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a
common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its
passengers, x x x The presence of said passengers near the bus was not
unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of
the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.” The
presence of passengers at the carriers’ premises is reasonable.
It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule as it
did in said case is the fact of the passenger’s reasonable presence within the
carrier’s premises. That reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the
attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature
of its business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a
consideration of the time element per se without taking into account such other
factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the cited case of La Mallorca there was
no appreciable interregnum for the passenger therein to leave the carrier’s
premises whereas in the case at bar, an interval of one hour had elapsed before the
victim met the accident. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a
reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner’s
vessel. It is submitted that there exists such a justifiable cause.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner’s business
as a shipper, the passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to
disembark from the ship than other common carriers such as a passenger bus. With
respect to the bulk of cargoes and the number of passengers it can load, such vessels
are capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both as compared to the capacity
of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need at least an
hour, as is the usual practice, to disembark from the vessel and
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claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his
luggage in a very short period of time. Verily, petitioner cannot categorically claim,
through the bare expedient of comparing the period of time entailed in getting the
passenger’s cargoes, that the ruling in La Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at bar.
On the contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine enunciated therein to the instant
petition, [W]e cannot in reason doubt that the victim, Anacleto Viana, was still a
passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred, the victim was in
the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner’s
vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely
to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.
It is not definitely shown that one hour prior to the incident, the victim had
already disembarked from the vessel. Petitioner failed to prove this. What is clear to
us is that at the time the victim was taking his cargoes, the vessel had already docked
an hour earlier. In consonance with common shipping procedure as to the minimum
time of one hour allowed for the passengers to disembark, it may be presumed that
the victim had just gotten off the vessel when he went to retrieve his baggage. Yet,
even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner’s
premises was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage, which was
possibly only one hour after the vessel, arrived since it was admittedly a standard
procedure in the case of petitioner’s vessels that the unloading operations shall start
only after that time. Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim,
Anacleto Viana, is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic
death.
Common carriers required to exercise extraordinary diligence in

contract of carriage of passengers; Reasons.
Rosito Z. Bacarro, William Sevilla, and Felario Montefalcon
v. Geruridio B. Castano and The Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-34597, November 5,1982
FACTS: From appellee’s version just set out, it appears that after he boarded the
jeep in question at Oroquieta, it was driven by
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defendant Montefalcon at around forty (40) kilometers per hour bound for
Jimenez; that while approaching Sumasap Bridge at the said speed, a cargo
truck coming from behind blew its horn to signal its intention to overtake the
jeep; that the latter, without changing its speed, gave way by swerving to the
right, such that both vehicles ran side by side for a distance of around twenty
(20) meters, and that thereafter as the jeep was left behind, its driver was unable
to return it to its former lane and instead it obliquely or diagonally ran down an
inclined terrain towards the right until it fell into a ditch pinning down and
crushing appellee’s right leg in the process.
Throwing the blame for this accident on the driver of the cargo truck,
appellants, in turn, state the facts to be as follows:
‘In the afternoon of April 1, 1960, plaintiff Gerundio Castano
boarded the said jeepney at Oroquieta bound for Jimenez, Misamis
Occidental. While said jeepney was negotiating the upgrade approach of
the Sumasap Bridge at Jimenez, Misamis Occidental and at a distance of
about 44 meters therefrom, a cargo truck, owned and operated by a
certain Te Tiong alias Chinggim, then driven by Nicostrato Digal, a
person not duly licensed to drive motor vehicles, overtook the jeepney
so closely that in the process of overtaking sideswiped the jeepney,
hitting the reserve tire placed at the left side of the jeepney with the
hinge or bolt of the siding of the cargo truck, causing the jeepney to
swerve from its course and after running 14 meters from the road, it
finally fell into the canal. The right side of the jeep fell on the right leg of
the plaintiff-appellee, crushing said leg against the ditch resulting in the
injury to plaintiff-appellee consisting of a broken right thigh.’
And take the following stand: ‘The main defense of defendants-
appellants is anchored on the fact that the jeepney was sideswiped by the
overtaking cargo truck.’
“It must be admitted, out of candor, that there is evidence of the
sideswiping relied upon by appellants, x x x”
This appeal by certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals asserts that the latter decided questions of substance
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which are contrary to law and the approved decisions of this Court. Petitioners
alleged that respondent Court of Appeals erred: (1) in finding contributory
negligence on the part of jeepney driver appellant Montefalcon for having raced
with the overtaking cargo truck to the bridge instead of slackening its speed,
when the person solely responsible for the sideswiping is the unlicensed driver of
the overtaking cargo truck; (2) in finding the jeepney driver not to have exercised
extraordinary diligence, human care, foresight and utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, when the diligence required pursuant to Article 1763 of the
New Civil Code is only that of a good father of a family since the injuries were
caused by the negligence of a stranger; and (3) in not considering that appellants
were freed from any liability since the accident was due to fortuitous event — the
sideswiping of the jeepney by the overtaking cargo truck.
HELD: The Court is not persuaded. The fact is, petitioner-driver
Montefalcon did not slacken his speed but instead continued to run the jeep at
about 40 kilometers per hour even at the time the overtaking cargo truck was
running side by side for about 20 meters and at which time he even shouted to the
driver of the truck.
Thus, had Montefalcon slackened the speed of the jeep at the time the truck
was overtaking it, instead of running side by side with the cargo truck, there
would have been no contact and accident. He should have foreseen that at the
speed he was running, the vehicles were getting nearer the bridge and as the road
was getting narrower the truck would be too close to the jeep and would
eventually sideswiped it. Otherwise stated, he should have slackened his jeep
when he swerved it to the right to give way to the truck because the two vehicles
could not cross the bridge at the same time.
The second assigned error is centered on the alleged failure on the part of
the jeepney driver to exercise extraordinary diligence, human care, foresight and
utmost diligence of a very cautious person, when the diligence required pursuant
to Article 1763 of the Civil Code is only that of a good father of a family.
Petitioners contend that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of
the driver of the truck. However, the fact is, there was a contract of carriage
between the
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private respondent and the herein petitioners in which case the Court of Appeals
correctly applied Articles 1733, 1755, and 1766 of the Civil Code which required
the exercise of extraordinary diligence on the part of petitioner Montefalcon.
Article 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case.
Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Article 1766. In all matters not regulated by this Code, the rights and
obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by
special laws.
Indeed, the hazards of modem transportation demand extraordinary
diligence. A common carrier is vested with public interest. Under the new Civil
Code, instead of being required to exercise mere ordinary diligence, a common
carrier is exhorted to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide “using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons.” (Art. 1755)
Once a passenger in the course of travel is injured, or does not reach his destination
safely, the carrier and driver are presumed to be at fault.
The third assigned error of the petitioners would find fault upon respondent
court in not freeing petitioners from any liability, since the accident was due to a
fortuitous event. But, we repeat that the alleged fortuitous event in this case — the
sideswiping of the jeepney by the cargo truck, was something which could have
been avoided considering the narrowness of the Sumasap Bridge which was not
wide enough to admit two vehicles. As found by the Court of Appeals, Montefalcon
contributed to the occurrence of the mishap.
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The failure of the common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its

vessel involved in the contract of carriage is a clear breach of its duty
prescribed in Article 1755 of the Civil Code.
Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

and Atty. Renato T. Arroyo
G.R. No. 118126, March 4,1996
FACTS: Plaintiff, herein private respondent Atty. Renato Arroyo, public
attorney, bought a ticket from defendant, herein petitioner, a corporation engaged
in inter-island shipping, for the voyage of M/V Asia Thailand vessel to Cagayan de
Oro City from Cebu City on November 12, 1991.
At around 5:30 in the evening of November 12, 1991, plaintiff boarded the
M/V Asia Thailand vessel. At that instance, plaintiff noticed that some repair
works [sic] were being undertaken on the engine of the vessel. The vessel departed
at around 11:00 in the evening with only one (1) engine running.
After an hour of slow voyage, the vessel stopped near Kawit Island and
dropped its anchor thereat. After half an hour of stillness, some passengers
demanded that they should be allowed to return to Cebu City for they were no
longer willing to continue their voyage to Cagayan de Oro City. The captain
acceded [sic] to their request and thus the vessel headed back to Cebu City.
At Cebu City, plaintiff together with the other passengers who requested to
be brought back to Cebu City, were allowed to disembark. Thereafter, the vessel
proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City. Plaintiff, the next day, boarded the M/V Asia
Japan for its voyage to Cagayan de Oro City, likewise a vessel of defendant.
On account of this failure of defendant to transport him to the place of
destination on November 12, 1991, plaintiff filed before the trial court a complaint
for damages against defendant.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was negligence on the part of the petitioner.
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HELD: Undoubtedly, there was. between the petitioner and the private
respondent, a contract of common carriage. The laws of primary application then
are the provisions on common carriers under Section 4, Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book
IV of the Civil Code, while for all other matters not regulated thereby, the Code of
Commerce and special laws.
Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, the petitioner was bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of the private respondent. That
means that the petitioner was, pursuant to Article 1755 of the said Code, bound to
carry the private respondent safely as far as human care and foresight could
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all
the circumstances.
Before commencing the contracted voyage, the petitioner undertook some
repairs on the cylinder head of one of the vessel’s engines. But even before it could
finish these repairs, it allowed the vessel to leave the port of origin with only one
functioning engine, instead of two. Moreover, even the lone functioning engine
was not in perfect condition as sometime after it had run its course, it conked out.
This caused the vessel to stop and remain adrift at sea, thus in order to prevent the
ship from capsizing, it had to drop anchor. Plainly, the vessel was unseaworthy; it
must be adequately equipped for the voyage and manned with a sufficient number
of competent officers and crew. The failure of a common carrier to maintain in
seaworthy condition its vessel involved in a contract of carriage is a clear breach of
its duty prescribed in Article 1755 of the Civil Code.
Nature of the Contract of Air Carriage

A contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Imbued with public interest,
common carriers are required by law to carry passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person, with due regard for all the circumstances. A contract to transport
passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation.
And this, because its business is mainly with the traveling public. It invites people
to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of carriage, therefore,
generates a relation attended with a public duty. Failure of the
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carrier to observe this high degree of care and extraordinary diligence renders it
liable for any damage that may be sustained by its passengers. (Singson v. Court
of Appeals, 282 SCRA 149)
Categories of International Transportation

There are then two categories of international transportation, viz., (1) that
where the place of departure and the place of destination are situated within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties regardless of whether or not there be a
break in the transportation or a transshipment; and (2) that where the place of
departure and the place of destination are within the territory of a single High
Contracting Party if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to
the sovereignty, mandate, or authority of another power, even though the power is
not a party to the convention.
The High Contracting Parties referred to in the Convention are the
signatories thereto and those which subsequently adhered to it. In the case of the
Philippines, the Convention was concurred in by the Senate, through Resolution
No. 19, on May 16,1950. The Philippine instrument of accession was signed by
President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950 and was deposited with the Polish
Government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became applicable to the
Philippines on February 9, 1951. Then, on September 23, 1955, President Ramon
Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring the Philippines’ formal
adherence thereto, “to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof
may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and
the citizens thereof.” (Mapa v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 286, G.R. No.
122308, July 8, 1998)
QUESTION: Does the Philippine recognition of Warsaw Convention
preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws in the
determination of extent of liability of common carriers in cases of breach of
contract of carriage, particularly for willful conduct of their employees?
ANSWER: Although the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of
law in this country, being a treaty commitment assumed by the Philippine
government, said convention does not operate as an
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exclusive enumeration of the instances for declaring a carrier liable for breach of
contract of carriage or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. The
Warsaw Convention declares the carrier liable for damages in the enumerated
cases and under certain limitations. However, it must not be construed to
preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not
regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating
the rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful
misconduct on the part of the carrier’s employees is found or established.
(Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals and Tomas L. Alcantara,
G.R. No. 60501, March 5, 1993)
Round trip plane ticket was itself a complete written contract between
the carrier and the passenger.
Carlos Singson v. Court of Appeals and Cathay

Pacific Airways, Inc.
G.R. No. 119995, November 18,1997
FACTS: The instant case is an illustration of the exacting standard
demanded by the law of common carriers. On May 24, 1988, Carlos Singson and
his cousin Crescentino Tiongson bought from Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd.
(CATHAY), at its Metro Manila ticket outlet two open-dated, identically routed,
round trip plane tickets for the purpose of spending their vacation in the United
States. Each ticket consisted of six flight coupons corresponding to this itinerary:
flight coupon No. 1 — Manila to Hongkong; flight coupon No. 2 — Hongkong to
San Francisco; flight coupon No. 3 — San Francisco to Los Angeles; flight
coupon No. 4 — Los Angeles back to San Francisco; flight coupon No. 5 — San
Francisco to Hongkong; and finally, flight coupon No. 6 — Hongkong to Manila.
The procedure was that at the start of each leg of the trip a flight coupon
corresponding to the particular sector of the travel would be removed from the
ticket booklet so that at the end of the trip no more coupons would be left in the
ticket booklet.
On June 6,1988, CARLOS SINGSON and Crescentino Tiongson left
Manila on board CATHAY’s flight No. 902. They arrived safely in Los Angeles
and after staying there for about three weeks they decided
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to return to the Philippines. On June 30, 1988, they arranged for their return
flight at CATHAY’s Los Angeles Office and chose July 1, 1988, a Friday, for
their departure. While Tiongson easily got a booking for the flight, SINGSON
was not as lucky. It was discovered that his ticket booklet did not have flight
coupon No. 5 corresponding to the San Francisco-Hongkong leg of the trip.
Instead, what was in his ticket was flight coupon No. 3 — San Francisco to Los
Angeles — which was supposed to have been used and removed from the ticket
booklet. It was not until July 6, 1988 that CATHAY was finally able to arrange
for his return flight to Manila.
On August 26, 1988, SINGSON commenced an action for damages
against CATHAY before the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. He
claimed that he insisted on CATHAY’s confirmation of his return flight
reservation because of very important and urgent business engagements in the
Philippines. But CATHAY allegedly shrugged off his protestations and
arrogantly directed him to go to San Francisco himself and do some
investigations on the matter or purchase a new ticket subject to refund if it turned
out that the missing coupon was still unused or subsisting. He remonstrated that
it was the airline’s agent/representative who must have committed the mistake of
tearing off the wrong flight coupon; that he did not have enough money to buy
new tickets; and, CATHAY could conclude the investigation in a matter of
minutes because of its facilities. CATHAY, allegedly in scornful insolence,
simply dismissed him like an impertinent “brown pest.” Thus, he and his cousin
Tiongson, who deferred his own flight to accompany him, were forced to leave
for San Francisco on the night of July 1, 1988 to verify the missing ticket.
CATHAY denied these allegations and averred that since petitioner was
holding an “open-dated” ticket, which meant that he was not booked on a
specific flight on a particular date, there was no contract of carriage yet existing
such that CATHAY’S refusal to immediately book him could not be construed
as breach of contract of carriage. Moreover, the coupon had been missing for
almost a month; hence, CATHAY must first verify its status, i.e., whether the
ticket was still valid and outstanding, before it could issue a replacement ticket to
petitioner. For that purpose, it set a request by telex on the same day, July 1,
1988, to its Hongkong
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Headquarters where such information could be retrieved. However, due to the

time difference between Los Angeles and Hongkong, no response from the
Hongkong office was immediately received. Besides, since July 2 and 3, 1988
were a Saturday and a Sunday, respectively, and July 4, 1988 was an official
holiday being U.S. Independence Day, the telex response of CATHAY
Hongkong was not read until 5 July 1988. Lastly, CATHAY denied having
required SINGSON to make a trip back to San Francisco; on the other hand, it
was the latter who informed CATHAY that he was making a side trip to San
Francisco. Hence, CATHAY advised him that the response of Hongkong
would be copied in San Francisco so that he could conveniently verify thereat
should he wish to.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner herein holding

that CATHAY was guilty of gross negligence amounting to malice and bad
faith for which it was adjudged to pay petitioner P20,000 for actual damages
with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum from August 26, 1988 when
the complaint was filed until fully paid, P500,000 for moral damages, P400,000
for exemplary damages, PI00,000 for attorney’s fees, and, to pay the costs.
On appeal by CATHAY, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
finding that there was gross negligence amounting to bad faith or fraud and,
accordingly, modified its judgment by deleting the awards for moral and
exemplary damages, and the attorney’s fees as well.
ISSUE: Whether or not a breach of contract was committed by
CATHAY when it failed to confirm the booking of petitioner for its July 1,
1988 flight.
HELD: The Court finds merit in the petition. CATHAY undoubtedly
committed a breach of contract when it refused to confirm petitioner’s flight
reservation back to the Philippines on account of his missing flight coupon. Its
contention that there was no contract of carriage that was breached because
petitioner’s ticket was open-dated is untenable. To begin with, the round trip
ticket issued by the carrier to the passenger was in itself a complete written
contract by and between the carrier and the passenger. It had all the elements of
a complete written contract, to wit: (a) the consent of the contracting parties
manifested
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by the fact that the passenger agreed to be transported by the carrier to and from
Los Angeles via San Francisco and Hongkong back to Philippines, and the
carrier's acceptance to bring him to his destination and then back home; (b) cause
or consideration, which was the fare paid by the passenger as stated in his ticket:
and (c) object, which was the transportation of the passenger from the place of
departure to the place of destination and back, which are also stated in his ticket.
In fact, the contract of carriage in the instant case was already partially executed
as the carrier complied with its obligation to transport the passenger to his
destination, i.e., Los Angeles. Only the performance of the other half of the
contract — which was to transport the passenger back to the Philippines — was
left to be done.
Clearly, therefore, petitioner was not a mere “chance passenger with no
superior right to be boarded on a specific flight,” as erroneously claimed by
CATHAY and sustained by the appellate court.
Interestingly, it appears that CATHAY was responsible for the loss of the
ticket. One of the two things may be surmised from the circumstances of this
case: first, US Air (CATHAY’ agent) had mistakenly detached the San
Francisco-Hongkong flight coupon thinking that it was the San Francisco-Lost
Angeles portion; or second, petitioner’s booklet of tickets did not from issuance
include a San Francisco-Hongkong flight coupon. In either case, the loss of the
coupon was attributable to the negligence of CATHAY’s agents and was the
proximate cause of the non-confirmation of petitioner’s return flight on July 1,
1988. It virtually prevented petitioner from demanding the fulfillment of the
carrier’s obligations under the contract. Had CATHAY’s agents been diligent in
double checking the coupons they were supposed to detach from the passengers’
tickets, there would have been no reason for CATHAY not to confirm
petitioner’s booking as exemplified in the case of his cousin and flight
companion Tiongson whose ticket booklet was found to be in order. Hence, to
hold that no contractual breach was committed by CATHAY and totally absolve
it from any liability would in effect put a premium on the negligence of its agents,
contrary to the policy of the law requiring common carriers to exercise
extraordinary diligence.
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“Force majeure, ” common carriers are not the insurer of all risks.
Japan Airlines v. Court of Appeals, Enrique Agana, et al

G.R. No. 118664, August 7,1998
FACTS: On June 13, 1991, private respondent Jose Miranda boarded
JAL flight No. JL 001 in San Francisco, California bound for Manila. Likewise,
on the same day, private respondents Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana
and Adelia Francisco left Los Angeles, California for Manila via JAL flight No.
JL 061. As an incentive for traveling on the said airline, both flights were to
make an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan, at the airlines’ expense, thereafter
proceeding to Manila the following day.
Upon arrival at Narita, Japan on June 14,1991, private respondents were
billed at Hotel Nikko Narita for the night. The next day, private respondents, on
the final leg of their journey, went to the airport to take their flight to Manila.
However, due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, unrelenting ash fall blanketed Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA), rendering it inaccessible to airline traffic.
Hence, private respondents’ trip to Manila was cancelled indefinitely.
To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, JAL rebooked all
the Manila-bound passengers on flight No. 741 due to depart on June 16, 1991
and also paid for the hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay. On June
16,1991, much to the dismay of the private respondents, their long anticipated
flight to Manila was again cancelled due to NALA’s indefinite closure. At this
point, JAL informed the private respondents that it would no longer defray their
hotel and accommodation expense during their stay in Narita.
Since NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22,1991, private
respondents were forced to pay for their accommodations and meal expenses
from their personal funds from June 16 to 21, 1991. Their unexpected stay in
Narita ended on June 22, 1991 when they arrived in Manila on board JL flight
No. 741.
Obviously, still reeling from the experience, private respondents, on July
25,1991, commenced an action for damages against JAL before
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the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. To support their claim,
private respondents asserted that JAL failed to live up to its duty to provide care
and comfort to its stranded passengers when it refused to pay for their hotel and
accommodation expenses from June 16 to 21, 1991 at Narita, Japan. In other
words, they insisted that JAL was obligated to shoulder their expenses as long as
they were still stranded in Narita. On the other hand, JAL denied this allegation
and averred that airline passengers have no vested right to these amenities in case a
flight is cancelled due to “force majeure. ”
On June 18,1992, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of private
respondents holding JAL liable for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not JAL, as a common carrier has the obligation to
shoulder the hotel and meal expenses of its stranded passengers until they have
reached their final destination, even if the delay were caused by “force majeure. ”
HELD: To begin with, there is no dispute that the Mt. Pinatubo eruption
prevented JAL from proceeding to Manila on schedule. Likewise, private
respondents concede that such event can be considered as “force majeure " since
their delayed arrival in Manila was not imputable to JAL.
However, private respondents contend that while JAL cannot be held
responsible for the delayed arrival in Manila, it was nevertheless liable for their
living expenses during their unexpected stay in Narita since airlines have the
obligation to ensure the comfort and convenience of its passengers. While the
Court sympathizes with the private respondents’ plight, the Court is unable to
accept this contention.
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that in a plethora of cases, the Court
has consistently ruled that a contract to transport passengers is quite different in
kind and degree from any other contractual relation. It is safe to conclude that it is
a relationship imbued with public interest. Failure on the part of the common
carrier to live up to the exacting standards of care and diligence renders it liable for
any damages that may be sustained by its passengers. However, this is not to say
that common carriers are absolutely responsible for all injuries or damages even if
the same were caused by a fortuitous event. To rule otherwise
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would render the defense of "force majeure, " as an exception from any liability
and ineffective.
Accordingly, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his
obligation because of "force majeure, ” the general rule is that he cannot be held
liable for damages for non-performance. Corollarily, when JAL was prevented
from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption,
whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded
passengers incurred, cannot be charged to JAL. Yet, it is undeniable that JAL
assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected overnight stay on
June 15, 1991.
Admittedly, to be stranded for almost a week in a foreign land was an
exasperating experience for the private respondents. To be sure, they underwent
distress and anxiety during their unanticipated stay in Narita, but their predicament
was not due to the fault or negligence of JAL but the closure of NAIA to
international flights. Indeed, to hold JAL, in the absence of bad faith or negligence,
liable for the amenities of its stranded passengers by reason of a fortuitous event is
too much of a burden to assume.
Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks
incident to the mode of travel. In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme
climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the consequences of
which the passenger must assume or expect. After all, common carriers are not the
insurer of all risks.
The Court is not prepared, however, to completely absolve petitioner JAL
from any liability. It must be noted that private respondents bought tickets from the
United States with Manila as their final destination. While JAL was no longer
required to defray private respondents’ living expenses during their stay in Narita
on account of the fortuitous event, JAL had the duty to make the necessary
arrangements to transport private respondents on the first available connecting
flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort
and convenience of its passengers when it declassified private respondents from
“transit passengers” to “new passengers” as a result of which private respondents
were obliged to make the necessary arrangements themselves for the next flight to
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Manila. Private respondents were placed on the waiting list from June 20 to 24.
To assure themselves of a seat on an available flight, they were compelled to
stay in the airport the whole day of June 22, 1991 and it was only at 8:00 p.m.
of the aforesaid date that they were advised that they could be accommodated
in said flight, which flew at about 9:00
a. m. the next day.
The Court is not oblivious to the fact that the cancellation of JAL flights
to Manila from June 15 to 21,1991 caused considerable disruption in
passenger booking and reservation. In fact, it would be unreasonable to expect,
considering NAIA’s closure, that JAL flight operations would be normal on
the days affected. Nevertheless, this does not excuse JAL from its obligation to
make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on its first
available flight to Manila. After all, it had a contract to transport private
respondents from the United States to Manila as their final destination.
Consequently, the award of nominal damages is in order. Nominal
damages are adjudicated in order that a right of a plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized and not
for the purpose of any loss suffered by him. The court may award nominal
damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article
1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded.
COMPARED TO: Philippine Airlines v. Court of Appeals 226

SCRA423 (1993)
The reliance of the Court of Appeals \nPAL v. CA (226 SCRA423) is

misplaced. The factual background of the PAL case is different from the instant
petition. In that case, there was indeed a fortuitous event resulting in the
diversion of the PAL flight. However, the unforeseen diversion was worsened
when “private respondents (passenger) was left at the airport and could not even
hitch a ride in a Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel,” not to mention the
apparent apathy of the PAL station manager as to the predicament of the stranded
passengers. In light of these circumstances, the Court held if the fortuitous event
was accompanied by neglect and malfeasance by the carrier’s employees, an
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action for damages against the carrier is permissible. Unfortunately, for

private respondents, none of these conditions are present in the instant
petition.
The power to admit or not an alien into the country is a sovereign act,
which cannot be interfered with by an airline.
Japan Airlines v. Jesus
Simangan G.R. No. 170141,
April 22,2008
FACTS: In 1991, respondent Jesus Simangan decided to donate a
kidney to his ailing cousin, Loreto Simangan, in UCLA School of Medicine
in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. Having obtained an emergency U.S. visa,
respondent purchased a round trip plane ticket from petitioner Japan Airlines
(JAL) for US$1,485, and was issued the corresponding boarding pass. He
was scheduled to a particular flight bound for Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. via Narita, Japan.
On July 29, 1992, the date of his flight, respondent went to Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA). He was allowed to check-in at JAL’s
counter. His plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority, and personal
articles were subjected to rigid immigration and security routines. After
passing through said immigration and security procedures, respondent was
allowed by JAL to enter its airplane. While inside the airplane, JAL’s airline
crew suspected respondent of carrying a falsified travel document and
imputed that he would only use the trip to the United States as a pretext to
stay and work in Japan. The stewardess asked respondent to show his travel
documents. Shortly after, the stewardess, along with a Japanese and a
Filipino, haughtily ordered him to stand up and leave the plane. Respondent
protested, explaining that he was issued a U.S. visa. Just to allow him to
board the plane, he pleaded with JAL to closely monitor his movements
when the aircraft stops over in Narita. His pleas were ignored. He was then
constrained to go out of the plane. In a nutshell, respondent was bumped off
the flight. Respondent went to JAL’s ground office and waited there for three
hours. Meanwhile, the plane took off and he was left behind. Afterwards, he
was informed that his travel documents were, indeed, in order. Respondent
was refunded the cost of his plane ticket less the sum
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of US$500, which was deducted by JAL. Subsequently, respondent’s U.S.

visa was cancelled.
Displeased by the turn of events, respondent filed an action for
damages against JAL with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Valenzuela
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 4195-V-93 for damages and attorney’s
fee.
On September 21, 2000, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of

respondent (plaintiff), ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
amount of PI,000,000 as moral damages, the amount of P500,000 as
exemplary damages, and the amount of P250,000 as attorney’s fees, plus
the cost of suit.
In a decision dated May 31, 2005, the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification in that it lowered the
amount of moral and exemplary damages and deleted the award of
attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not Japan Airlines is guilty of breach of contract.
HELD: That respondent purchased a round trip plane ticket from
JAL and was issued the corresponding boarding pass is uncontroverted. His
plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority and personal articles were
subjected to rigid immigration and security procedure. After passing
through said immigration and security procedure, he was allowed by JAL
to enter its airplane to fly to Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. via Narita,
Japan. Concisely, there was a contract of carriage between JAL and
respondent.
Nevertheless, JAL made respondent get off the plane on his
scheduled departure on July 29, 1992. He was not allowed by JAL to fly.
JAL, thus, failed to comply with its obligation under the contract of
carriage.
JAL justifies its action by arguing that there was “a need to verify the
authenticity of respondent’s travel document.” It alleged that no one from
its airport staff had encountered a parole visa before. It further contended
that respondent agreed to fly the next day so that it could first verify his
travel documents; hence, there was novation. It maintained
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that it was not guilty of breach of contract of carriage as respondent was not able
to travel to the United States due to his own voluntary desistance.
The Court cannot agree. JAL did not allow respondent to fly. It informed
respondent that there was a need to first check the authenticity of his travel
documents with the U.S. Embassy. As admitted by JAL, “the flight could not wait
for Mr. Simangan because it was ready to depart.” Since JAL definitely declared
that the flight could not wait for respondent, it gave respondent no choice but to
be left behind. The latter was unceremoniously bumped off despite his
protestations and valid travel documents, and notwithstanding his contract of
carriage with JAL. Damaged had already been done when respondent was offered
to fly the next day on July 30, 1992. Said offer did not cure JAL’s default.
Considering that respondent was forced to get out of the plane and left
behind against his will, he could not have freely consented to be rebooked the
next day. In short, he did not agree to the alleged novation. Since novation
implies a waiver of the right the creditor had before the novation, such waiver
must be express. It cannot be supposed, without clear proof, that respondent had
willingly done away with his right to fly on July 29, 1992.
Moreover, the reason behind the bumping off incident, as found by the
RTC and CA, was that JAL personnel imputed that respondent would only use
the trip to the United States as a pretext to stay and work in Japan. Apart from the
fact that respondent’s plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority, and person
articles already passed the rigid immigration and security routines, JAL as a
common carrier, ought to know the kind of valid travel documents respondent
carried. As provided in Article 1755 of the New Civil Code, “A common carrier
is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard
for all the circumstances.” Thus, the Court finds untenable JAL’s defense of
“verification of respondent’s documents” in its breach of contract of carriage.
It bears repeating that the power to admit or not an alien into the country is
a sovereign act, which cannot be interfered with even by JAL.
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In addition for breach of contract of carriage, all that is required of

plaintiff is to prove the existence of such contract and its nonperformance by the
carrier through the latter’s failure to carry the passenger safely to his destination.
Respondent has complied with these twin requisites.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common

carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
Under the law, common carriers are, from the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy, bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case. More particularly, a common
carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard
for all the circumstances. Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured, the common
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This gives
rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage and its non-performance by the
carrier, that is, the failure of the carrier to carry the passenger safely to his
destination, which, in the instant case, necessarily includes its failure to safeguard
its passenger with extraordinary diligence while such relation subsists.
The presumption is, therefore, established by law that in case of a
passenger’s death or injury, the operator of the vessel was at fault or negligent,
having failed to exercise extraordinary diligence, and it is incumbent upon it to
rebut the same. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to afford
full protection to the passengers of common carriers, which can be carried out
only by imposing a stringent statutory obligation upon the latter. Concomitantly,
the Supreme Court has likewise adopted a rigid posture in the application of the
law by exacting the highest degree of care and diligence from common carriers,
bearing utmost in mind the welfare of the passengers who often become hapless
victims of indifferent and profit-oriented carriers. (Aboitiz Shipping
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 95)
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It has been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of

carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the
part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought by the
passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation
to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary
diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be
suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of
the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be
proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the common carrier to prove that it has
exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the
Civil Code. (Sy v. Malate Taxicab and Garage, Inc., 102 Phil. 482;
Singapore Airlines Limited v. Fernandez, 417 SCRA 474, December 10,
2003)
CIRCUMSTANCES INDICATIVE OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART

OF THE DRIVER/EMPLOYEE.
1. The fact that Pestano was able to use a bus with a faulty
speedometer shows that Metro Cebu was remiss in the supervision
of its employees and in the proper care of its vehicles. It had thus
failed to conduct its business with the diligence required by law.
(Pestano v. Sumayang, G.R. No. 139875, December 4, 2000,
346 SCRA 870)
2. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the
contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic
regulation. As found by the appellate court, petitioners failed to
present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption.
(Mallari, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 147)
3. It has been said that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of
another vehicle” are presumed to be “the cause of the accident,
unless contradicted by other evidence.” The rationale behind the
presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of
the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of
him.
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TRANSPORTATION LAWS
Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim himself

since he was the one who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu
truck. He had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident. (Raynera v.
Hiceta, 306 SCRA 102)
PRECAUTIONS REQUIRED OF A DRIVER TO AVOID ACCIDENTS.

The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the
purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty
to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in
safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is
special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does
not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to
turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into
view.
This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Section 41, pars,
(a) and (b), of R.A. No. 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land
Transportation and Traffic Code which provides:
Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. — (a) The
driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center
line of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle
proceeding in the same direction, unless such left side is
clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient
distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be
made in safety.
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass
another vehicle proceeding in the same direction when
approaching the crest of a grade, nor upon a curve in the
highway, where the driver’s view along the highway is
obstructed within a distance of five hundred feet ahead except
on a highway having two or more lanes for movement of
traffic in one direction where the driver of a vehicle may
overtake or pass another vehicle: Provided, That on a
highway, within a business or residential district, having two
or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction, the
driver of a vehicle
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may overtake or pass another vehicle on the right. (Mallari, Sr

v. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 147)
As a professional driver operating a public transport bus, he should have
anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous maneuver and should thus
have exercised extreme caution. (Pestano v. Sumayang, 346 SCRA 870)
A common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of

force majeure or fortuitous event alone — the common carrier
must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or
injury resulting from an accident.
Alberta and Cresencio Yobido v. Court of Appeals
and Leny Tumboy, et al
G.R. No. 113003, October 17,1997
FACTS: On April 26, 1988, spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their
minor children named Ardee and Jasmin, boarded at Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur,
a Yobido Liner bound for Davao City. Along Pico Road in Km. 17, Sta. Maria,
Agusan del Sur, the left front tire of the bus exploded. The bus fell into a ravine
around three feet from the road and struck a tree. The incident resulted in the death
of 28-year old Tito Tumboy and physical injuries to other passengers.
On November 21, 1988, a complaint for breach of contract of carriage,
damages and attorney’s fees was filed by Leny and her children against Alberta
Yobido, the owner of the bus, and Cresencio Yobido, its driver, before the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City. When the defendants therein filed their
answer to the complaint, they raised the affirmative defense of caso fortuito.
ISSUE: Whether or not the explosion of a newly installed tire of a
passenger vehicle is a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from liability for
the death of a passenger.
HELD: As a rule, when a passenger boards a common carrier, he takes the
risks incidental to the mode of travel he has taken. After all, a carrier is not an
insurer of the safety of its passengers and is not bound
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TRANSPORTATION LAWS
absolutely and at all events to carry them safely and without injury. However, when
a passenger is injured or dies while traveling, the law presumes that the common
carrier is negligent. Thus, the Civil Code provides:
“Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common

carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently ;
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755. ”
Article 1755 provides that “(a) common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.”
Accordingly, in culpa contractual, once a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This disputable
presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier had observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed by Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 of the Civil
Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event.
Consequently, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on
the part of the carrier to hold it responsible for damages sought by the passenger.
In view of the foregoing, petitioners’ contention that they should be exempt

from liability because the tire blowout was no more than a fortuitous event that
could not have been foreseen, must fail. A fortuitous event is possessed of the
following characteristics: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligations, must be
independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which
constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. As Article
1174 provides, no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must
be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss.
CHAPTER III
Under the circumstances of this case, the explosion of the new tire may not
be considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the situation.
The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from
manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle. Neither may
the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for
quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within five days’ use.
Be that as it may, it is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the
automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would
exempt the carrier from liability for damages.
Moreover, a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case
offorce majeure or fortuitous event alone. The common carrier must still prove
that it was not negligent in causing the death or injury resulting from an accident.
This Court has had occasion to state:
“While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because
the grooves of the tire were still visible, this fact alone does not make the
explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No evidence was presented to show
that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions
were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to
cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused
by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the
jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident.”
Having failed to discharge its duty to overthrow the presumption of
negligence with clear and convincing evidence, petitioners are hereby held liable
for damages. Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206 of the Civil Code prescribes
the amount of at least three thousand pesos as damages for the death of a
passenger. Under prevailing jurisprudence, the award of damages under Article
2206 has been increased to P50,000.
Moral damages are generally not recoverable in culpa contractual except
when bad faith had been proven. However, the same damages may be recovered
when breach of contract of carriage results in the death of a passenger, as in this
case. Exemplary damages, awarded by way of example or correction for the public
good when moral damages
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TRANSPORTATION LAWS
are awarded, may likewise be recovered in contractual obligations if the defendant

acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. Because
petitioners failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of a common
carrier, which resulted in the death of Tito Tumboy, it is deemed to have acted
recklessly. As such, private respondents shall be entitled to exemplary damages.
In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at

fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured.
Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

Spouses Antonio Garcia and Leticia Garcia
and Julio Recontique
G.R. No. 116110, May 15,1996
FACTS: The record show that on July 31, 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her
five-year old son, Allan Garcia, boarded Baliwag Transit Bus No. 2036 bound for
Cabanatuan City driven by Jaime Santiago. They took the seat behind the driver.
At about 7:30 in the evening, in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the bus
passengers saw a cargo truck parked at the shoulder of the national highway. Its
left rear portion jutted to the outer lane, as the shoulder of the road was too narrow
to accommodate the whole truck. A kerosene lamp appeared at the edge of the
road obviously to serve as a warning device. The truck driver, Julio Recontique,
and his helper, Arturo Escala, were then replacing a flat tire. The truck is owned
by respondent A & J Trading.
Bus driver Santiago was driving at an inordinately fast speed and failed to
notice the truck and the kerosene lamp at the edge of the road. Santiago’s
passengers urged him to slow down but he paid them no heed. Santiago even
carried animated conversations with his co-employees while driving. When the
danger of collision became imminent, the bus passengers shouted, “Babangga
tayo!” Santiago stepped on the brake, but it was too late. His bus rammed into the
stalled cargo truck. It caused the instant death of Santiago and Escala, and injury
to several others. Leticia and Allan Garcia were among the injured passengers.
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Leticia suffered a fracture in her pelvis and right leg. They rushed her to
the provincial hospital in Cabanatuan City where she was given emergency
treatment. After three days, she was transferred to the National Orthopedic
Hospital where she was confined for more than a month. She underwent an
operation for partial hip prosthesis.
Allan, on the other hand, broke a leg. He was also given emergency
treatment at the provincial hospital.
Spouses Antonio and Leticia Garcia sued Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J
Trading and Julio Recontique for damages in the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan. Leticia sued as an injured passenger of Baliwag and as mother of
Allan. At the time of the complaint, Allan was a minor, hence, the suit initiated
by his parents in his favor.
Baliwag, A & J Trading and Recontique disclaimed responsibility for the
mishap. Baliwag alleged that the accident was caused solely by the fault and
negligence of A & J Trading and its driver, Recontique. Baliwag charged that
Recontique failed to place an early warning device at the comer of the disabled
cargo truck to warn oncoming vehicles. On the other hand, A & J Trading and
Recontique alleged that the accident was the result of the negligence and
reckless driving of Santiago, bus driver of Baliwag.
After hearing, the trial court found all the defendants liable.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by
absolving A & J Trading from liability and by reducing the award of attorney’s
fees to PI0,000 and loss of earnings to P300,000, respectively.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in absolving A & J
Trading from liability and holding Baliwag solely liable for the injuries suffered
by Leticia and Allan Garcia in the accident.
HELD: As a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of carriage
when it failed to deliver its passengers, Leticia and Allan Garcia to their
destination safe and sound. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. In a
contract of carriage, it is presumed
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that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is
injured. Unless the presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the
carrier exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755
of the Civil Code.
The records are bereft of any proof to show that Baliwag exercised
extraordinary diligence. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrates its driver’s
recklessness. Leticia Garcia testified that the bus was running at a very high
speed despite the drizzle and the darkness of the highway. The passengers
pleaded for its driver to slow down, but their plea was ignored. Leticia also
revealed that the driver smelled of liquor. She could smell him as she was seated
right behind the driver. Another passenger, Felix Cruz testified that immediately
before the collision, the bus driver was conversing with a co-employee. All these
prove the bus driver’s wanton disregard for the physical safety of his passengers,
which makes Baliwag as a common carrier liable for damages under Article
1759 of the Civil Code:
“Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or
injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the
former’s employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the
common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers do not cease upon proof
that they exercised all the diligence of a goodfather of a family in the
selection or supervision of their employees. ”
Baliwag cannot evade its liability by insisting that the accident was
caused solely by the negligence of A & J Trading and Julio Recontique. It
harps on their alleged none use of an early warning device as testified to by
Col. Demetrio dela Cruz, the station commander of Gapan, Nueva Ecija who
investigated the incident, and Francisco Romano, the bus conductor.
The records do not bear out Baliwag’s contention. Col. Dela Cruz and
Romano testified that they did not see any early warning device at the scene of
the accident. They were referring to the triangular reflectorized plates in red
and yellow issued by the Land Transportation
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Office. However, the evidence shows that Recontique and Escala placed a
kerosene lamp or torch at the edge of the road, near the rear portion of the truck to
serve as an early warning device. This substantially complies with Section 34(9g)
of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
To be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough

that the accident was caused by force majeure; common carrier must
still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from
such accident.
Bachelor Express, Inc. and Cresencio Rivera v.

The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al
G.R. No. 85691, July 31,1990
FACTS: On August 1, 1980, Bus No. 800 owned by Bachelor Express,

Inc., and driven by Cresencio Rivera was the situs of a stampede, which resulted
in the death of passengers Omominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut.
The evidence shows that the bus came from Davao City on its way to
Cagayan de Oro City passing Butuan City; that while at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan
City, the bus picked up a passenger; that about 15 minutes later, a passenger at the
rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused commotion and panic
among the passengers; that when the bus stopped, passengers Omominio Beter
and Narcisa Rautraut were found lying down the road, the former already dead as
a result of head injuries and the latter also suffering from severe injuries which
caused her death later. The passenger-assailant alighted from the bus and ran
toward the bushes but was killed by the police. Thereafter, the heirs of Omomino
Beter and Narcisa Rautraut, private respondents herein (Ricardo Beter and Sergia
Beter are the parents of Omominio while Teofilo Rautraut and Zoetera Rautraut
are the parents of Narcisa) filed a complaint for “sum of money” against Bachelor
Express, Inc., its alleged owner Samson Yasay, and the driver Rivera.
In their answer, the petitioners denied liability for the death of Omominio
Beter and Narcisa Rautraut. They alleged that “x x x the
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driver was able to transport his passengers safely to their respective places of
destination except Omominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut who jumped off the
bus without the knowledge and consent, much less, the fault of the driver and
conductor and the defendants in this case; the defendant corporation had
exercised due diligence in the choice of its employees to avoid as much as
possible accidents; the incident on August 1, 1980 was not a traffic accident or
vehicular accident; it was an incident or event very much beyond the control of
the defendants; defendants were not parties to the incident complained of as it
was an act of a third-party who is not in any way connected with the defendants
and of which the latter have no control and supervision.”
After due trial, the trial court issued an order dated August 8,1985
dismissing the complaint.
Upon appeal however, the trial court’s decision was reversed and set
aside. The Court of Appeals finds the petitioners solidarity liable for damages in
the total amount of PI 20,000.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the accident was caused by force majeure.
2) Whether or not the petitioner common carrier observed extraordinary
diligence to safeguard the lives of its passengers.
HELD: The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of
the incident as it triggered off a commotion and panic among the passengers such
that the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in
the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal
injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the
bus is within the context offorce majeure.
However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability
in case offorce majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force
majeure. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in
causing the injuries resulting from such accident.
Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals — the bus driver
did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion; the bus was
speeding from a full stop; the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened
or gave way while the bus was still
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running; the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had
already fallen off the bus and the bus was not properly equipped with doors in
accordance with law — it is clear that the petitioners have failed to overcome
the presumption of fault and negligence found in the law governing common
carriers.
The petitioners’ argument that the petitioners “are not insurers of their
passengers” deserves no merit in view of the failure of the petitioners to
prove that the deaths of the two passengers were exclusively due to force
majeure and not to the failure of the petitioners to observe extraordinary
diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their destinations as
warranted by law.
Duty of a common carrier to overcome the presumption of

negligence.
Franklin Gacal and Corazon M. Gacal

v. Philippine Airlines
G.R. No. 55300, March 15,1990
FACTS: Plaintiffs Franklin G. Gacal and his wife, Corazon M. Gacal,
Bonifacio S. Anislag and his wife, Mansueta L. Anislag, and the late Elma de
Guzman, were then passengers boarding defendant’s BAC 111 at Davao
Airport for a flight to Manila, not knowing that on the same flight,
Macalinog, Taurac Pendatum known as Commander Zapata, Nasser Omar,
Liling Pusuan Radia, Dimantong Dimarosing and Mike Randa, all of Marawi
City and members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), were their
co-passengers, three armed with grenades, two with .45 caliber pistols, and
one with a .22 caliber pistol. Ten (10) minutes after takeoff at about 2:30 in
the afternoon, the hijackers brandishing their respective firearms announced
the hijacking of the aircraft and directed its pilot to fly to Libya. With the
pilot explaining to them especially to its leader, Commander Zapata, of the
inherent fuel limitations of the plane and that they are not rated for
international flights, the hijackers directed the pilot to fly to Sabah. With the
same explanation, they relented and directed the aircraft to land at
Zamboanga Airport, Zamboanga City for refueling. The aircraft landed at
3:00 in the afternoon of May 21, 1976 at Zamboanga Airport. When
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the plane began to taxi at the runway, it was met by two armored cars of
the military with machine guns pointed at the plane, and it stopped
there. The rebels through its commander demanded that a DC-aircraft
take them to Libya with the President of the defendant company as
hostage and that they be given $375,000 and six armalites, otherwise they
will blow up the plane if their demands will not be met by the
government and Philippine Air Lines. Meanwhile, the passengers were
not served any food nor water and it was only on May 23, a Sunday, at
about 1:00 in the afternoon that they were served slice of a sandwich and
1/10 cup of PAL water. After that, relatives of the hijackers were allowed
to board the plane but immediately after they alighted therefrom, an
armored car bumped the stairs. That commenced the battle between the
military and the hijackers which led ultimately to the liberation of the
surviving crew and the passengers, with the final score of 10 passengers
and three hijackers dead on the spot and three hijackers captured.
“City Fiscal Franklin G. Gacal was unhurt. Mrs. Corazon M.
Gacal suffered injuries in the course of her jumping out of the plane when
it was peppered with bullets by the army and after two hand grenades
exploded inside the plane. She was hospitalized at General Santos Doctors
Hospital, General Santos City, for two days, spending P245.60 for hospital
and medical expenses. Assistant City Fiscal Bonifacio S. Anislag also
escaped unhurt but Mrs. Anislag suffered a fracture at the radial bone of
her left elbow for which she was hospitalized and operated on at the San
Pedro Hospital, Davao City, and thereafter, at Davao Regional Hospital,
Davao City, spending P4,500.00. Elma de Guzman died because of that
battle. Hence, the action of damages instituted by the plaintiffs.
The trial court, on August 26, 1980, dismissed the complaints finding
that all the damages sustained in the premises were attributed to force
majeure.
ISSUE: Whether or not hijacking or air piracy during martial law
and under the circumstances obtaining herein, is a caso fortuito or force
majeure which would exempt an aircraft from payment of damages to its
passengers whose lives were put in jeopardy and whose personal
belongings were lost during the incident.
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HELD: The source of a common carrier’s legal liability is the contract of

carriage, and by entering into said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. There is breach of this
obligation if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all the
circumstances of the case in exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person. (Isaac v. Ammen Transportation Co., 101 Phil. 1046 [1957]\ Juntilla v.
Fontanar, 136 SCR A 624 [1985])
It is the duty of a common carrier to overcome the presumption of negligence
(Philippine National Railways v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87 [1985]) and it
must be shown that the carrier had observed the required extraordinary diligence of a
veiy cautious person as far as human care and foresight can provide or that the
accident was caused by a fortuitous event. (Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 523
[1976]) Thus, as ruled by this Court, no person shall be responsible for those “events
which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen were inevitable.” (Art. 1174,
Civil Code) The term is synonymous with caso fortuito (Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil.
657 [1924]), which is of the same sense as ' force majeure. ” (Words and Phrases,
Permanent Edition, Vol. 17, p. 362)
In order to constitute a caso fortuito or force majeure that would exempt a
person from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, it is necessary that the
following elements must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the human will (the will of the debtor or the obligor); (b) the event
must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render
it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the
debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the
creditor. (Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657 [1924]; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39
SCRA 527 [1971]; Estrada v. Consolacion, supra; Vasquez v. Court of Appeals,
138 SCRA 553 [1985]; Juan E Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA
596 [1986]) Caso fortuito or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events
not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, are inevitable. It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have
been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be
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one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the

happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. (Republic v. Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation, 21 SCRA 279 [1967])
Applying the above guidelines to the case at bar, the failure to transport
petitioner safely from Davao to Manila was due to the skyjacking incident
staged by six passengers of the same plane, all members of the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) without any connection with private respondent,
hence, independent of the will of either the PAL or of its passengers.
Otherwise stated, these events rendered it impossible for PAL to
perform its obligations in a normal manner and obviously it cannot be faulted
with negligence in the performance of duty taken over by the Armed Forces of
the Philippines to the exclusion of the former.
It is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a
transportation company makes it an insurer of the passenger’s
safety, but that its liability for personal injuries sustained by its
passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree
of diligence that the law requires.
Herminio Mariano, Jr. v. Idelfonso C. Callejas

and Edgar De Borja
G.R. No. 166640, July 31,2009
FACTS: At around 6:30 p.m. on November 12 1991, along Aguinaldo
Highway, San Agustin, Dasmarinas, Cavite, the Celyrose Express bus
carrying Dr. Mariano, as its passenger, collided with an Isuzu truck with trailer
bearing plate numbers PJH 906 and TRH 531. The passenger bus was bound
to Tagaytay while the trailer truck came from the opposite direction bound for
Manila. The trailer truck bumped the passenger bus on its left middle portion.
Due to the impact, the passenger bus fell on its right side on the right shoulder
of the highway and caused the death of Dr. Mariano and physical injuries to
four other passengers.
Petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage and
damages against the respondents for their failure to transport his
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wife and mother of his three minor children safely to her destination.
Respondents denied liability’ for the death of Dr. Mariano. They claimed
that the proximate cause of the accident was the recklessness of the driver
of the trailer truck, which bumped their bus while allegedly at a halt on the
shoulder of the road in its rightful lane. Thus, respondent Callejas filed a
third-party complaint against Liong Chio Chang, doing business under the
name and style of La Perla Sugar Supply, the owner of the trailer truck, for
indemnity in the event that he would be held liable for damages to
petitioner.
In the case at bar, the trial court, in its Decision dated September 13,
1999, found respondents Idelfonso Callejas and Edgar De Boija, together
with Liong Chio Chang, jointly and severally liable to pay petitioner
damages.
Respondents Callejas and De Boija appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA), contending that the trial court erred in holding them guilty
of breach of contract of carriage.
On May 21, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the common carrier has observed
extraordinary diligence in the discharge of its duty.
HELD: In accord with the provisions of Articles 1733, 1755, and
1756, Celyrose Express, a common carrier, through its driver respondent
De Boija, and its registered owner, respondent Callejas, has the express
obligation “to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances,” and to observe extraordinary
diligence in the discharge of its duty. The death of the wife of the
petitioner in the course of transporting her to her destination gave rise to
the presumption of negligence of the carrier. To overcome the
presumption, respondents have to show that they observed extraordinary
diligence in the discharge of their duty, or that the accident was caused by
a fortuitous event.
This Court interpreted the above quoted provisions in Pilapil v.
Court of Appeals. The Court elucidated: “While the law requires the
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highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their
passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not,
however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.”
Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care,
vigilance and precaution in the carriage of passengers by common carriers to
only such as human care and foresight can provide. What constitutes compliance
with said duty is adjudged with due regard to all the circumstances.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or
negligence on the part of the common carrier when its passenger is injured,
merely relieves the latter, from the time being, from introducing evidence to
fasten the negligence on the former, because the presumption stands in the place
of evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by proof
that the common carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as required by law
in the performance of its contractual obligation, or that the injury suffered by the
passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event.
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a
transportation company makes it an insurer of the passenger’s safety, but that its
liability for personal injuries sustained by its passenger rests its negligence, its
failure to exercise the degree of diligence that the law requires.
First, the Court adverts to the sketch prepared by P03 Magno S. De Villa,
who investigated the accident. The sketch shows the passenger bus facing the
direction of Tagaytay City and lying on its right side on the shoulder of the road
about five meters away from the point of impact. On the other hand, the trailer
truck was on the opposite direction, about 500 meters away from the point of
impact. P03 De Villa stated that he interviewed De Boija, respondent driver of
the passenger bus, who said that he was about to unload some passengers when
his bus was bumped by the driver of the trailer truck that lost its brakes. P03 De
Villa checked out the trailer truck and found that its brakes really failed.
In fine, the evidence shows that before the collision, the passenger bus
was cruising on its rightful lane along Aguinaldo Highway when the
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trailer truck, coming from the opposite direction, on full speed, suddenly
swerved and encroached on its lane, and bumped the passenger bus on its left
middle portion. Respondent driver De Borja had every right to expect that the
trailer truck coming from the opposite direction would stay on its proper lane.
He was not expected to know that the trailer truck had lost its brakes. The
swerving of the trailer truck was abrupt and it was running on a fast speed as it
was found 500 meters away from the point of collision. Secondly, any doubt as
to the culpability of the driver of the trailer truck ought to vanish when he
pleaded guilty to the charge of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple slight
physical injuries and damage to property in Criminal Case No. 2223-92,
involving the same incident.
ART. 1757. The responsibility of a common carrier for the

safety of passengers as required in Articles 1733 and 1755 cannot be
dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by
statements on tickets, or otherwise.
While it is true that a passenger’s ticket is a complete contract between
the common carrier and the passenger, the fact that it contains provision at the
back thereof in fine letters that common carrier will only exercise ordinary
diligence is contrary to law.
ART. 1758. When a passenger is carried gratuitously, a

stipulation limiting the common carrier’s liability for negligence is
valid, but not for willful acts or gross negligence.
The reduction of fare does not justify any limitation of the
common carrier’s liability.
Thus, in one case where a non-paying passenger was injured during the
trip, the carrier was still held liable since the non-paying passenger is
accompanied by his father who is a paying passenger. In fact non-payment of
fare will not exempt the common carrier from liability due to injuries to
passengers as a result of the common carrier’s negligence.
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Liability of common carriers for death or injuries to a non-passenger.
Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. The Honorable Court of

Appeals (Twelfth Division) and
Jacinta L. Pamalaran
G.R. No. 106279, July 14,1995
FACTS: A contract of carriage was entered into between petitioner and
ALC for the transport of the latter’s timber from Pugad, Lianga, Surigao del Sur.
On March 17, 1976, petitioner sent its tugboat “MT Edmund” and barge “Solid
VI” to Lianga to pick-up ALC’s timber. However, no loading could be made
because of the heavy downpour. The next morning, several stevedores of CBL,
who were hired by ALC, boarded the “Solid VI” and opened its storeroom. The
stevedores were warned of the gas and heat generated by the copra stored in the
holds of the ship. Not heeding the warning, a stevedore entered the storeroom and
fell conscious. Two other stevedores followed, one of whom was Leoncio L.
Pamalaran. He also lost consciousness and eventually died of gas poisoning.
Thus, Civil Case No. 2864 for damages was filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 2, Tagbilaran by Pamalaran’s heirs against
petitioner CBL, ALC and its manager, Ernie Santiago. The trial court ruled in
favor of plaintiffs, ordering the defendants CBL Timber Corporation, AGO
Lumber Company, Sulpicio Lines, Inc. and Ernie Santiago to pay plaintiffs
jointly and severally, actual and compensatory damages, moral damages,
attorney’s fees and cost of suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated April 8, 1992,
affirmed the lower court’s decision.
Not satisfied with the appellate court’s decision, petitioner filed a petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the victim is not a passenger thereby relieving the
common carrier from liability for his death.
HELD: The Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that
although Pamalaran was never a passenger of petitioner, still the
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latter is liable as a common carrier for his death. The Court of Appeals relied on
Canas v. Dabatos, 8 Court of Appeals Report 918 (1965). In said case, 13
persons were on board the vessel of defendant not as passengers but as
“cargadores” of the shipper’s goods. They were with the consent and
knowledge of the owner of the vessel. Despite the absence of a passenger-carrier
relationship between them, the appellate court, just the same, held the patron
thereof liable as a common carrier. The appellate court ruled.
There is no debate as to the fact that not one of the 13 passengers has paid
an amount of money as fare for their conveyance from Hingotanan to Cebu. The
undisputed fact, however, is that all of them were in the boat with the knowledge
and consent of the patron. The eleven passengers, other than Encarnacion
and Diosdado, were in the boat because they helped in loading cargoes in
the boat, and “serve as cargadores of the cargoes ” presumably, in
unloading them at the place of destination. For those services, they were
permitted to be in the boat and to proceed to their destination in Cebu. The
services rendered were the valuable consideration in exchange for the
transportation fare. “In onerous contracts, the cause is understood to be, for
each contracting party, the prestation or promise of a thing or service by the
other...” (p. 925; Emphasis supplied)
ALC had a contract of carriage with petitioner. The presence of the
stevedores sent by ALC on board the barge of petitioner was called for by the
contract of carriage. For how else would its lumber be transported unless it is
placed on board? And by whom? Of course, the stevedores. Definitely,
petitioner could not expect the shipper itself to load the lumber without the aid of
the stevedores. Furthermore, petitioner knew of the presence and role of the
stevedores in its barge and, thus, consented to their presence. Hence, petitioner
was responsible for their safety while on board the barge.
Petitioner next claims that its employees even warned the stevedores and
tried to prevent their entry into the storeroom. Such argument, again, is
demolished by the findings of the Court of Appeals, thus, “... However, appellant
failed to prove that its employees were actually trained or given specific
instructions to see to it that the barge is fit and safe not only in transporting goods
but also for people who
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would be loading the cargo into the bodega of the barge. It is not enough that
appellant s employees have warned the laborers not to enter the barge after
the hatch was opened. Appellant’s employees should have been sufficiently
instructed to see to it that the hatch of the barge is not opened by any
unauthorized person and that the hatch is not easily opened by anyone. At
the very least, precautionary measures should have been observed by appellant’s
employees to see to it that no one could enter the bodega of the barge until after
they have made sure that it is safe for anyone to enter the same. Failing to
exercise due diligence in the supervision of its employees, the lower court
was correct in holding appellant liable for damages. ”
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or

injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the
former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond
the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers.
The liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
ART. 1760. The common carrier’s responsibility prescribed in

the preceding article cannot be eliminated or limited by stipulation, by
the posting of notices, by statements on the tickets or otherwise.
This is a harsh provision against the common carrier. But the law is the
law no matter how harsh it may be. Dura Lex Sed Lex. Thus, a security guard of
the common carrier who happens to come across an old enemy and shot him
while boarding the truck of the common carrier, the latter is still liable although
the act of the security guard is in violation of the orders of the common carrier.
1975 Bar Question

A taxicab passenger was deliberately killed by the driver. Is the operator
of the taxicab liable?
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Answer: Yes, the taxicab operator is civilly liable on the basis of

breach of the contract of carriage. Article 1759 of the Civil Code states that
common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although
such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers. This liability does not cease
upon proof that the common carrier exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
In other words, the liability of the employer is not based on delict or
quasi-delict. The liability of the common carrier is primary and cannot be
eliminated or limited by stipulation. (Art. 1760; Maranan v. Perez, 20 SCRA
412)
Sulpicio Lines Inc. v. Napoleon Sesante, now

Substituted by Maribel Atilano, Kristine Marie, Christian lone
Kenneth Kerrn and Karisna Kate, all surnamed Sesante
G.R. No. 172782, July 27, 2016
FACTS: On September 19, 1998, around 12:55 p.m., the M/V Princess
of the Orient, a passenger vessel owned and operated by the petitioner, sank
near Fortune Island in Batangas. Of the 388-recorded passengers, 150 were
lost. Napoleon Sesante, then a member of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) and a lawyer, was one of the passengers who survived the sinking. He
sued the petitioner for breach of contract and damages. Sesante alleged in
his complaint that the MTV Princess of the Orient left the Port of Manila
while Metro Manila was experiencing stormy weather; that at around 11:00
p.m., he had noticed the vessel listing starboard, so he had gone to the
uppermost deck where he witnessed the strong winds and big waves
pounding the vessel; that at the same time, he had seen how the passengers
had been panicking, crying for help and frantically scrambling for
lifejackets in the absence of the vessel’s officers and crew; that sensing
danger, he had called a certain Ceballos through his cellphone to request
him to inform the proper authorities of the situation; that thereafter, big
waves had rocked the vessel, tossing him to the floor where he was pinned
by a long steel
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bar; that he had freed himself only after another wave had hit the vessel; that he had
managed to stay afloat after the vessel had sunk, and had been carried by the waves
to the coastline of Cavite and Batangas until he had been rescued; that he had
suffered tremendous hunger, thirst, pain, fear, shock, serious anxiety, and mental
anguish; that he had sustained injuries, and had lost money, jewelry, important
documents, police uniforms, and the .45 caliber pistol issued to him by the PNP; and
that because it had committed bad faith in allowing the vessel to sail despite the
storm signal, the petitioner should pay him actual and moral damages of P500,000
and PI,000,000, respectively.
In its defense, the petitioner insisted on the seaworthiness of the M/V
Princess of the Orient due to its having been cleared to sail from the Port of Manila
by the proper authorities; that the sinking had been due to force majeure; that it had
not been negligent; that its officers and crew had also not been negligent.
In October 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered its judgment in
favor of the respondent, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff temperate damages in
the amount of P400,000, and moral damages in the amount of One Million Pesos.
The RTC observed that the plaintiff, being negligent, was liable to Sesante pursuant
to Articles 1739 and 1759 of the Civil Code; that the petitioner had not established
its due diligence in the selection and supervision of the vessel crew; that the ship
officers had failed to inspect the stowage of cargoes despite being aware of the
storm signal; that the officers and crew of the vessel had not immediately sent a
distress signal to the Philippine Coast Guard; that the ship captain had not called for
then “abandon ship” protocol; and that based on the report of the Board of Marine
Inquiry (BMI), the erroneous maneuvering of the vessel by the captain during the
extreme weather condition had been the immediate and proximate cause of the
sinking.
The Court of Appeals (CA) lowered the temperate damages to PI20,000,
which approximate the cost of the Sesante’s lost personal belongings, and held that
despite the seaworthiness of the vessel, the petitioner remained civilly liable
because its officers and crew had been negligent in performing their duties.
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ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the petitioner is liable for breach of contract of
carriage. (2) Whether or not the cause of the loss or injury is due to a fortuitous
event thus exempting the petitioner from liability.
HELD: Article 1759 of the Civil Code does not establish a presumption of
negligence because it explicitly makes the common carrier liable in the event of
death or injury to passengers due to the negligence or fault of the common carrier’s
employees. It reads: “Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death or
injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of
their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. ” This
liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees. The liability of common carriers under Article 1759 is demanded by
the duty of extraordinary diligence required of common carriers in safely carrying
their passengers.
The petitioner has attributed the sinking of the vessel to the storm
notwithstanding its position on the seaworthiness of MW Princess of the Orient.
Yet, the findings of the BMI directly contradicted the petitioner’s attribution. The
BMI found that the “erroneous maneuvers” during the ill-fated voyage by the
captain of the petitioner’s vessel had caused the sinking. After the vessel cleared
Limbones Point, while navigating towards the direction of the Fortune Island, the
captain already noticed the listing of the vessel by three degrees to the portside of
the vessel, but, according to the BMI, he did not exercise prudence as required by
the situation in which his vessel was suffering the battering on the starboard side
by big waves of seven to eight meters high and strong southwesterly winds of 25
knots. The BMI pointed out that he should have considerably reduced the speed of
the vessel based on his experience about the vessel, a close-type ship of seven
decks, and of a wide and high superstructure, being vulnerable if exposed to strong
winds and high waves. He ought to have also known that maintaining a high speed
under such circumstances would have shifted the solid and liquid cargo of the
vessel to port, worsening the tilted position of the vessel. It was only after a few
minutes thereafter that he finally ordered the speed to go down to 14 knots, and to
put ballast water to the
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starboard-heeling tank to arrest the continuous listing at the port side. By then, his
moves became an exercise in futility because, according to the BMI, the vessel
was already listing to her port side between 15 to 20 degrees, which was almost
the maximum angle of the vessel’s loll. It then became inevitable for the vessel to
lose her stability. The BMI concluded that the captain had executed several
starboard maneuvers despite the critical situation of the vessel, and that the
maneuvers had greatly added to the tilting of the vessel.
The Chief Mate, when interviewed under oath, had attested that he was
not able to make stability calculation of the ship vis-a-vis her cargo. He did not
even know the metacentric height (GM) of the ship whether it be positive or
negative. As cargo officer of the ship, he failed to prepare a detailed report of the
ship’s cargo stowage plan. He likewise failed to conduct the soundings
(measurement) of the ballast tank before the ship departed from port. He readily
presumed that the ship was full of ballast since the ship was fully ballasted when
she left Cebu for Manila on September 16, 1998, and had never discharged its
contents since that time. Being the officer-in-charge for emergency situation like
this, he failed to execute and supervise the actual abandon ship procedure. There
was no announcement at the public address system of abandon ship, no orderly
distribution of life jackets, and no orderly launching of life raffs. The witnesses
have confirmed this finding on their sworn statements. There was miscalculation
in judgment on the part of the Captain when he erroneously navigated the ship at
her last crucial moment. To aggravate his case, the Captain, having full command
and responsibility of the M/V Princess of the Orient, had failed to ensure the
proper execution of the actual abandoning of the ship. The deck and engine
officers (Second Mate, Third Mate, Chief Engineers, Second Engineer, Third
Engineer, and Fourth Engineer), being in charge of their respective abandon ship
post, failed to supervise the crew and passengers in the proper execution of
abandon ship procedure. The Radio Officer (spark) failed to send the SOS
message in the internationally accepted communication network (VHF Channel
16). Instead, he used the Single Side Bank (SSB) radio in informing the company
about the emergency situation. The aforestated negligent acts of the officers and
crews of M/V Princess of the Orient could not be ignored in view of the
extraordinary duty of the common carrier to ensure the safety of the passengers.
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ART. 1761. The passenger must observe the diligence of a good

father of a family to avoid injury to himself.
This is not a redundant provision but a constant reminder to every passenger
to take all necessary precautions to avoid injury to himself and to others. For after
all, common carrier is not an insurer against all risk of travel.
ART. 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not

bar recovery of damages for his death or injuries, if the proximate cause
thereof is the negligence of the common carrier, but the amount of
damages shall be equitably reduced.
This is a counterpart provision of Article 1741 in vigilance over the goods or
the mitigated liability of the common carrier. If there is contributory negligence on
the part of the passenger, he is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
The underlying precept of the above provision on contributory negligence is
that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to
recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The
defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his
negligence. (Estacion v. Bernardo 483 SCRA 222; See Lambert v. Heirs of Ray
Castillon, February 2005, 452 SCRA 285 and Syki v. Begasa, October 23,
2003, 414 SCRA 237)
Is the doctrine of proximate cause applicable in actions involving breach of
contract?
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device
for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another
party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves
who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the
relation thus created. (Calalas v. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 356)
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In FGU Insurance Corporation v. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking

Corporation, 386 SCRA 312, August 6, 2002, it was held that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in cases of breach of contract of
carriage:
Res ipsa Loquitur, a doctrine being invoked by petitioner,
holds a defendant liable where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the latter’s management and
the accident is such that in the ordinary course of things, cannot be
expected to happen if those who have its management or control
use proper care. It affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant that the accident arose from want of
care. It is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, it does not
create an independent ground of liability. Instead, it is regarded as
a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience since it
furnishes a substitute for, and relieves the plaintiff of the burden
of producing specific proof of negligence. The maxim simply
places on the defendant the burden of going forward with the
proof. Resort to the doctrine, however, may be allowed only when:
(a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the
absence of negligence; (b) other responsible causes, including the
conduct of the plaintiff and third persons are sufficiently
eliminated by the evidence; and (c) the indicated negligence is
within the scope of the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff. Thus, it is
not applicable when an unexplained accident may be attributable
to one of several causes, for some of which the defendant could not
be responsible.
Res ipsa Loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a
contractual relationship exists between the plaintiff and the
defendant, for the inference of negligence arises from the
circumstances and nature of the occurrence and not from the
nature of the relation of the parties. Nevertheless, the requirement
that responsible causes other than those due to defendant’s
conduct must first be eliminated, for the doctrine to apply, should
be understood as being confined only to cases of pure (non-
contractual) tort since obviously the presumption of negligence in
culpa contractual, as previously so pointed out, immediately
attaches by a failure of the covenant or its tenor. In the case of
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the truck driver, whose liability in a civil action is predicated on

culpa acquiliana, while he admittedly can be said to have been in
control and management of the vehicle which figured in the
accident, it is not equally shown, however, that the accident could
have been exclusively due to his negligence, a matter that can allow,
forthwith, res ipsa loquitur to work against him.
Similarly, the principle of last clear chance is inapplicable in cases
of breach of contract of carriage, as it only applies in a suit between the
owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a
passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and
its owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of
negligence. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts
to grant recovery to a plaintiff who has also been negligent provided that
the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to
do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law
of last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the
common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article
2179 of the Civil Code. (Anuran v. Buho, 17 SCRA 224\ Phil. Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. v. I AC, 189 SCRA 158; Tiu v. Arriesgado, 437 SCRA 426,
September 1, 2004)
However, the defense of contributory negligence does not apply in
criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot
allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own
negligence. (Genobiagon v. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 422; Manzanares v.
People, 504 SCRA 354, October 16, 2006)
Mitigation of Defendant’s Liability in Case of Contributory

Negligence of the Plaintiff.
Travel & Tours Adviser, Incorporated v. Alberto
Cruz, Sr., Edgar Hernandez and Virginia Mufioz G.R. No.
199282, March 14, 2016
FACTS: Respondent Edgar Hernandez was driving an Isuzu Jitney
(jeepney) that he owns with Plate No. DSG-944 along Angeles-
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TRANSPORTATION LAWS
Magalang Road, Barangay San Francisco, Magalang, Pampanga, on January 9,

1998, around 7:50 p.m. Meanwhile, a Daewoo passenger bus (RCJ Bus Lines)
with Plate No. NXM 116, owned by petitioner Travel and Tours Advisers, Inc.,
and driven by Edgar Calaycay traveled in the same direction as that of
respondent Edgar Hernandez vehicle. Thereafter, the bus bumped the left rear
portion of the jeepney causing it to ram into an acacia tree, which resulted in the
death of Alberto Cruz, Jr. and the serious physical injuries of Virginia Munoz.
Thus, respondents Edgar Hernandez, Virginia Munoz, and Alberto Cruz, Sr.
father of the deceased Alberto Cruz, Jr., filed a complaint for damages before
the Regional Trial Court claiming that the collision was due to the reckless,
negligent, and imprudent manner by which Edgar Calaycay was driving the
bus, in complete disregard to existing traffic laws, rules and regulations. They
also alleged that the bus veered away from its usual route.
For its defense, the petitioner claimed that at the time of the incident,
Edgar Hernandez violated his franchise by traveling along an unauthorized
line/route.
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court, on January 20, 2008,
rendered judgment in favor of the respondents, ordering the petitioner to jointly
and solidarity pay the following: (1) To plaintiff Alberto Cruz, Sr. and his
family - a) the sum of P50,000 as actual and compensatory damages, b) the sum
of P250,000 for loss of earning capacity of the decedent Alberto Cruz, Jr., and
c) P50,000 as moral damages. (2) To plaintiff Virginia Munoz - a) the sum of
P16,744 as actual and compensatory damages, and b) the sum of P50,000 as
moral damages. (3) To plaintiff Edgar Hernandez - a) the sum of P50,000 as
moral and compensatory damages, b) the sum of P50,000 as attorney’s fees, c)
the sum of P4,470 as cost of litigation.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the award of damages in favor
of the plaintiff as follows: (1) To plaintiff Alberto Cruz, Sr., it reduces the
amount of actual damages to P25,000, but added the sum of P50,000 for the
death of Alberto Cruz, Jr.; (2) To plaintiff Virginia Mufioz, it reduces the
amount of moral damages to P30,000; and (3) To plaintiff Edgar Hernandez, it
reduces the amount of actual and
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compensatory damages to P40.200. The rest of the award of damages remains.

ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the bus is liable because it veered away from its
usual route at the time of the mishap, and 2) Whether or not this is a case of pari
delicto considering that the passenger jeepney was traveling beyond its route.
HELD: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) are
one in finding that both vehicles were not in their authorized routes at the time of the
incident. The conductor of petitioner’s bus admitted on cross-examination that the
driver of the bus veered off from its usual route to avoid heavy traffic. The Court of
Appeals, thus, observed: First, as pointed out in the assailed Decision, both vehicles
were not in their authorized routes at the time of the mishaps. Francisco Tejada, the
conductor of defendant-appellant’s bus, admitted on cross- examination that the
driver of the bus passed through Magalang Road instead of Sta. Ines, which was the
usual route, to avoid heavy traffic. Regardless of the reason, however, the irrefutable
fact remains that defendant-appellant’s bus likewise veered from its usual route.
Petitioner now claims that the bus was not out of line when the vehicular
accident happened, because the PUB (Public Utility Bus) franchise that the petitioner
holds, is for provincial operation from Manila-Ilocos Norte/Cagayan-Manila, thus,
the bus is allowed to traverse any point between Manila-Ilocos
Norte/Cagayan-Manila. Such assertion is correct. “Veering away from the usual
route” is different from being “out of line.” A public utility vehicle can and may veer
away from its usual route as long as it does not go beyond its allowed route in its
franchise, in this case, Manila-Ilocos Norte/Cagayan-Manila. Therefore, the bus
cannot be considered to have violated the contents of its franchise. On the other hand,
it is indisputable that the jeepney was traversing a road out of its allowed route.
Necessarily, this case is not that of “In pari delicto” because only one party has
violated a traffic regulation. As such, it would seem that Article 2185 of the New
Civil Code is applicable where it provides that: “Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to
the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent
if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation.” The provision,
however, is merely a presumption.
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From the factual findings of both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals based on the evidence presented, the proximate cause of the collision
is the negligence of the driver of petitioner’s bus. The jeepney was bumped at
the left rear portion. Thus, the Court’s past ruling that drivers of vehicles, who
bumped the rear of another vehicle, are presumed to be the cause of the
accident, unless contradicted by other evidence, can be applied. The rationale
behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of
the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
Rate of speed, in connection with other circumstances, is one of the
principal considerations in determining whether a motorist has been reckless in
driving a vehicle, and evidence of the extent of the damage caused may show
the force of the impact from which the rate of speed of the vehicle may be
modestly inferred. From the evidence presented in this case, it cannot be
denied that the bus was running very fast. As held by the Supreme Court, the
very fact of speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, as a motorist must
exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate
with the conditions encountered, which will enable him to keep the vehicle
under control and avoid injury to others using the highway.
From the above findings, it is apparent that the proximate cause of
accident is the petitioner’s bus and that the petitioner was not able to present
evidence that would show otherwise. Be that as it may, this doesn’t erase the
fact that at the time of the vehicular accident, the jeepney was in violation of its
allowed route as found by the RTC and the CA, hence, the owner and the driver
of the jeepney likewise are guilty of negligence as defined under Article 2179
of the Civil Code, which reads as follows: “When the plaintiff’s negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury, being the defendant s lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages
to be awarded. ” The petitioner and its driver, therefore, are not solely liable
for the damages caused to the victims. The petitioner must, thus, be held liable
only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. It is, therefore, proper
to mitigate the liability of the petitioner and its driver.
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The determination of the mitigation of the defendant’s liability varies

depending on the circumstances of each case. The Court had sustained a
mitigation of 50% in Rakes v. AG & P; in Phoenix Construction, Inc.
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals; and 40% in Bank of the Philippines Islands v. Court of
Appeals, and Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals.
In the present case, it has been established that the proximate cause
of the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr., is the negligence of petitioner’s bus
driver, with the contributory negligence of respondent Edgar Hernandez,
the driver and owner of the jeepney, hence, the heirs of Alberto Cruz, Jr.,
shall recover damages of only 50% of the award from petitioner and its
driver. Necessarily, 50% shall be borne by respondent Edgar Hernandez.
This is pursuant to Rakes v. AG &P, and after considering the
circumstances of this case.
The petition for review is denied and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is modified, insofar as the award of damages, as follows:
The petitioner and Edgar Calaycay are ordered to jointly and
severally pay the following: (1) To respondent Alberto Cruz, Sr. and
family - a) PI2,500 as actual damages, b) P25,000 as civil indemnity for
the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr., c) P25,000 as moral damages. (2) To
respondent Virginia Munoz - a) P8,372 as actual damages, b) PI5,000 as
moral damages. (3) To respondent Edgar Hernandez - a) P20,100 as
actual damages, and (4) The sum of P2,235 as cost of litigation.
Respondent Edgar Hernandez is also ordered to pay the following:
(1) To respondent Alberto Cruz, Sr. and family - a) PI2,500 as actual
damages, b) P25,000 as civil indemnity for the death of Alberto Cruz,
Jr., and c) P25,000.00 as moral damages. (2) To respondent Virginia
Munoz - a) P8,372 as actual damages, and b) PI5,000 as moral damages.
(3) The sum of P2,235 as cost of litigation.
ART. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries
suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence
of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
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TRANSPORTATION LAWS
QUESTION: What are the instances when a common carrier becomes

liable for the death of or injury to a passenger or passengers?
ANSWER: The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for
death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or willful acts of its
employees (Art. 1759) or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the
exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission (Art. 1763). (Light Rail Transit Authority v. Natividad, 391 SCRA
75, February 6, 2003)
It appears that due to the extraordinary diligence required by the common
carrier for the safety of passengers, their agents will also act as security guards
for the passengers.
A tort committed by a stranger, which causes injury to a passenger,
does not accord the passenger a cause of action against the carrier.
Jose Pilapil v. Court of Appeals and Alatco
Transportation Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 52159, December 22, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner-plaintiff Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, boarded
respondent-defendant’s bus bearing No. 409 at San Nicolas, Iriga City and Naga
City, upon reaching the vicinity of the cemetery of the Municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur, on the way to Naga City, an unidentified man, a bystander along
said national highway, hurled a stone at the left side of the bus, which hit petitioner
above his left eye. Private respondent’s personnel lost no time in bringing the
petitioner to the provincial hospital in Naga City where he was confined and
treated.
Considering that the sight of his left eye was impaired, petitioner was taken
to Dr. Malabanan of Iriga City where he was treated for another week. Since there
was no improvement in his left eye’s vision, petitioner went to V. Luna Hospital,
Quezon City where he was treated by Dr. Capulong. Despite the treatment
accorded to him by Dr. Capulong, petitioner lost partially his left eye’s vision and
sustained a permanent scar above the left eye.
Thereupon, petitioner instituted before the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, Branch I an action for recovery of damages sustained
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as a result of the stone-throwing incident. After trial, the court a quo rendered
judgment ordering respondent transportation company to pay to petitioner
damages in the total sum of PI 6,300.
From the judgment, private respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals. On October 19, 1979, the Court of Appeals, in a Special Division of
Five, rendered judgment reversing and setting aside the judgment of the court
a quo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the stoning of the bus by a stranger resulting in
injury to petitioner-passenger is one such risk from which the common carrier
may not exempt itself from liability.
HELD: While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from
common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a
presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier
an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the
business of transporting passengers and goods, a common carrier does not give
its consent to become an insurer of any and all risks to passengers and goods. It
merely undertakes to perform certain duties to the public as the law imposes,
and hold itself liable for any breach thereof.
Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care,
vigilance and precaution in the carriage of passengers by common carriers to
only such as human care and foresight can provide. What constitutes
compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard to all the
circumstances.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or
negligence on the part of the common carrier when its passenger is injured,
merely relieves the latter, for the time being, from introducing evidence to
fasten the negligence on the former, because the presumption stands in the
place of evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same is rebuttable
by proof that the common carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as
required by law in the performance of its contractual obligation, or that the
injury suffered by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event.
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TRANSPORTATION LAWS
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a
transportation company makes it an insurer of the passenger’s safety, but that
its liability for personal injuries sustained by its passenger rests upon its
negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of diligence that the law requires.
As stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence against the
carrier is only a disputable presumption. It gives in where contrary facts are
established proving either that the carrier had exercised the degree of diligence
required by law or the injury suffered by the passenger was due to a fortuitous
event. Where, as in the instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in
no way due to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of
transporting or to the negligent or willful acts of private respondent’s
employees, with the injury arising wholly from causes created by strangers over
which the carrier had no control or even knowledge or could not have
prevented, the presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not and ought not to be
held liable. To rule otherwise would make the common carrier the insurer of the
absolute safety of its passengers, which is not the intention of the lawmakers.
While, as a general rule, common carriers are bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence in the safe transport of their passengers, it would seem
that this is not the standard by which its liability is to be determined when
intervening acts of strangers directly cause the injury, while the contract of
carriage exists. Article 1763 governs:
“Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries
suffered by a passenger on account of the willftil acts or negligence of
other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could
have prevented or stopped the act or omission.”
Clearly under the above provisions, a tort committed by a stranger which
causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against
the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is
the negligent omission by the carrier’s employees to prevent the tort from being
committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them.
Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that when the violation of the
contract is due to the willful
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acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be

exercised by the common carrier for the protection of its passenger is
only that of a good father of a family.
A common carrier can be held liable for failing to prevent a

hijacking by frisking passengers and inspecting their baggage.
Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Paulie

v. Caorong and minor children
G.R. No. 119756, March 18,1999
FACTS: On November 18, 1989, a bus of petitioner figured in an
accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, resulting in the
death of several passengers of the jeepney, including two Maranaos.
Crisanto Generalao, a volunteer field agent of the Constabulary Regional
Security Unit No. X, conducted an investigation of the accident. He
found that the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao residing in
Delabayan, Lanao del Norte and that certain Maranaos were planning to
take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses. Generalao
rendered a report on his findings to Sgt. Reynaldo Bastasa of the
Philippine Constabulary Regional Headquarters at Cagayan de Oro.
Upon the instruction of Sgt. Bastasa, he went to see Diosdado Bravo,
operations manager of petitioner, at its main office in Cagayan de Oro
City. Bravo assured him that the necessary precautions to insure the
safety of lives and property would be taken.
At about 6:45 P.M. on November 22,1989, three armed Maranaos,
who pretended to be passengers, seized a bus of petitioner at Linamon,
Lanao del Norte while on its way to Iligan City. Among the passengers
of the bus was Atty. Caorong. The leader of the Maranaos, identified as
one Bashier Mananggolo, ordered the driver, Godofredo Cabatuan, to
stop the bus on the side of the highway. Mananggolo then shot Cabatuan
on the arm, which caused him to slump on the steering wheel. Then one
of the companions of Mananggolo started pouring gasoline inside the
bus, as the other held the passengers at bay with a handgun. Mananggolo
then ordered the passengers to get off the bus. The passengers, including
Atty. Caorong, stepped out of the bus and went behind the bushes in a
field some distance from the highway.
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However, Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the
overhead rack. At that time, one of the armed men was pouring gasoline on the
head of the driver. Cabatuan, who had meantime regained consciousness, heard
Atty. Caorong pleading with the armed men to spare the driver as he was innocent
of any wrongdoing and was only trying to make a living. The armed men were,
however, adamant as they repeated their warning that they were going to bum the
bus along with its driver. During this exchange between Atty. Caorong and the
assailants, Cabatuan climbed out of the left window of the bus and crawled to the
canal on the opposite side of the highway. He heard shots from inside the bus.
Larry dela Cruz, one of the passengers, saw that Atty. Caorong was hit. Then the
bus was set on fire. Some of the passengers were able to pull Atty. Caorong out of
the burning bus and rushed him to the Mercy Community Hospital in Iligan City,
but he died while undergoing operation.
The private respondents brought this suit for breach of contract of carriage
in the Regional Trial Court, Branch VI, Iligan City. In its decision, dated
December 28, 1990, the trial court dismissed the complaint, holding the defendant
common carrier not negligent.
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court and awarded damages to the plaintiff amounting to P3,449,649.20 plus
attorney’s fees.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not petitioner breached the contract of carriage by
failure to exercise the required degree of diligence. 2) Whether or not the act of the
Maranao outlaws was so grave, irresistible, violent and forceful, as to be regarded
as caso fortuito.
HELD: Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is
responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts of
other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the
act through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. In the present
case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner’s employees, the
seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible.
Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the
Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner
172
CHAPTER III
by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioner’s operation manager,
Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did
nothing to protect the safety of its passengers.
Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to
see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the
circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers,
such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggage, preferably with
non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing them on board
could have been employed without violating the passenger’s constitutional rights.
As this Court intimated in Gacal v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., a common carrier
can be held liable for failing to prevent a hijacking by frisking passengers and
inspecting their baggage.
From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner’s employees failed to prevent
the attack on one of petitioner’s buses because they did not exercise the diligence
of a good father of a family. Hence, petitioner should be held liable for the death of
Atty. Caorong.
The petitioner contends that the seizure of its bus by the armed assailants
was a fortuitous event for which it could not be held liable.
Article 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as an occurrence
which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen, is inevitable. In Yobido
v. Court of Appeals, [the Court] held that to be considered as force majeure, it
is necessary that: (1) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the human will;
(2) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (3) the occurrence
must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a
normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or
aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. The absence of any of the requisites
mentioned above would prevent the obligor from being excused from liability.
Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the common
carrier was liable for its failure to take the necessary precautions against an
approaching typhoon, of which it was warned, resulting in the loss of the lives of
several passengers. The event was foreseeable, and, thus, the second requisite
mentioned above was not fulfilled. This ruling
173
TRANSPORTATION LAWS
applies by analogy to the present case. Despite the report of PC agent

Generalo that the Maranaos were going to attack its buses, petitioner took no
steps to safeguard the lives and properties of its passengers. The seizure of
the bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous
event, which would exempt petitioner from liability.
174

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CHAPTER III

ARTICLE 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the

The hazards of modem transportation demand extraordinary diligence. A

It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one to attempt to

“It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier

Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a

Common carriers required to exercise extraordinary diligence in

The failure of the common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its

Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

Nature of the Contract of Air Carriage

Categories of International Transportation

Carlos Singson v. Court of Appeals and Cathay

Headquarters where such information could be retrieved. However, due to the

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner herein holding

Japan Airlines v. Court of Appeals, Enrique Agana, et al

COMPARED TO: Philippine Airlines v. Court of Appeals 226

The reliance of the Court of Appeals \nPAL v. CA (226 SCRA423) is

action for damages against the carrier is permissible. Unfortunately, for

of US$500, which was deducted by JAL. Subsequently, respondent’s U.S.

On September 21, 2000, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of

In addition for breach of contract of carriage, all that is required of

ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common

It has been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of

CIRCUMSTANCES INDICATIVE OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART

Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim himself

PRECAUTIONS REQUIRED OF A DRIVER TO AVOID ACCIDENTS.

may overtake or pass another vehicle on the right. (Mallari, Sr

A common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of

“Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common

In view of the foregoing, petitioners’ contention that they should be exempt

are awarded, may likewise be recovered in contractual obligations if the defendant

In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at

Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

To be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough

Bachelor Express, Inc. and Cresencio Rivera v.

FACTS: On August 1, 1980, Bus No. 800 owned by Bachelor Express,

Duty of a common carrier to overcome the presumption of

Franklin Gacal and Corazon M. Gacal

HELD: The source of a common carrier’s legal liability is the contract of

one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the

Herminio Mariano, Jr. v. Idelfonso C. Callejas

ART. 1757. The responsibility of a common carrier for the

ART. 1758. When a passenger is carried gratuitously, a

Liability of common carriers for death or injuries to a non-passenger.

Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. The Honorable Court of

ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or

ART. 1760. The common carrier’s responsibility prescribed in

1975 Bar Question

Answer: Yes, the taxicab operator is civilly liable on the basis of

Sulpicio Lines Inc. v. Napoleon Sesante, now

ART. 1761. The passenger must observe the diligence of a good

ART. 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not

In FGU Insurance Corporation v. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking

the truck driver, whose liability in a civil action is predicated on

Mitigation of Defendant’s Liability in Case of Contributory

Magalang Road, Barangay San Francisco, Magalang, Pampanga, on January 9,

compensatory damages to P40.200. The rest of the award of damages remains.

The determination of the mitigation of the defendant’s liability varies

QUESTION: What are the instances when a common carrier becomes

acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be

A common carrier can be held liable for failing to prevent a

Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Paulie

applies by analogy to the present case. Despite the report of PC agent